defense acquisitions assessments of selected major weapon programs pptx

‘With the exception ofthe Navy's V22, which has experienced significant Jesign changes since development star 1980 these programs have experienced a 6 pereent inerease jn developmen cost

United States Government Wt Accountability Office

eA 9

Why GAO Did This Study

‘he Department of Defense (DOD) embarking on a mer of

Sorts to enhance warihting and

the way the department comucts

tring made to develo improved

‘weapon systems to combat various eat to Us secur White the

‘weapons that DOD attinately

Aovelops havo no ni là

‘siperionsy, weapon systems

‘Sequlston ema fong standing

Highsk area, GAO's eviews over

tconsitent problems with weapon equlstons such cost crests,

Selle delay, and performance

Shortfall nation, DOD Taces

Several budgetary challenges that

tindorcore the need to deliver

few maior eapon programs

vin ested cots and

Than Os maa rm Ue

Investinonts DOD ean help resolve

‘hee poblens by saga ore

moeledacbasedapproach for

Ateveloping new weapons

‘hia report provides congressional

st DOD deision makers wth

Independent, knowledge based

ssemnent of select denne

Drograms that Metis potential

tis and needed actions when 2

progean'sprojeced altainent of

nowiedge diverges from to best

Dactle tea al highlight those

Droge that employ practices ‘worthy of emulation by oxher

Programs GAO plans to update and

Se this port annually

‘Farmureeanetion conuct Pas Pans

‘weapor-technolog, design, and production-al key consecutive junctures in

‘development Ifa program isnot attaining these levels of knowledge, i

‘ncurs increased ris of technical problems, with sliieant potent cos and schedule growth implications (ee Hue) I program ffi shoe ‘one element, ike technology maturity, its harder to attain Ue requisite mount of knowledge to prudently proceed in succeeding elements

"The majority of programs GAO assessed are costing more an taking longer

to develop than planned Mose ofthe programs proceeded with less knowledge at eleal junctures than suggested hy best practices although some prograns came close to meeting best practice standart For example, technology and design forthe F:-22 matured lat inthe program

‘contributing to large ost growth and schedule delays The JASSM program,

in contrast, has achieved a high evel of knosledge at ciiealjnetires while

‘experiencing minimal cost inereases or scedle delays, Managing these levels of knowledge takes on ational signifeance as DOD's state ofthe aseretonary budget faces increasing pressure from the srowth in mandatory spending and the demas of ongoing rltary

‘operations For these reasons if DOD approves programs with lv levels of knowledge and aceeptsthe attendant kely adverse cost and schedule

‘consequences it will probably gel fever quantes forte sume investment

‘or face dificut choices on which investments i cannot ford to pursue

Unie Sta Goverment Accounabty Ome

Current Programs Are Costing More and Taking Longer to Develop AKuowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition 5

Most Programs Have Proceeded with Lower Levels of

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) it Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHE) 19 Active Electronically Seanned Array Radar (AESA)

Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS)

‘Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) Advanced Threat Infrared Countermessure/Common Misile

'B2 Radar Modernization Program (8-2 RMP) at

€-130 Avionies Modemization Program (C-150 AMP) 33

€5 Avionies Modernization Program (C6 AMP) 35

5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program

(CHL-ATE Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-TF) 4t

+10A Nuli.Sensor Comrmandamd Conlrol Airera (E-I0A) 40

‘Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) Joint Airto Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) Joint Common Missile (JCM)

Joint Strike Fighter SE) Joint Standoff Weapon (ISOW) Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1 Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Closter 5 Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KED, Land Wamior

1ãdondl Combat Sip (LCS)

‘Meauun Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) AMullanlsloa Narhtine Airerf (MA)

Mobile User Objective System [AUOS)

MQ Predator B National Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Small Diameter Bomb (SDB)

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (SSS)

‘Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

‘Tactical Tomnahavel Missile

‘Transforinational Satellite Communications System (TSA) V.22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Li Aireratt

"` .vẻ

‘Wideband Gapiier Sates (WS) Warfighter Information Network:Tatesl(WIN-T) Ti tại

Appendixes

Comments from the Department of Defense 120

Tables Table Coat and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems Table Examples of Programs with Reduced Buying Power 1 5

“Thị Cost and Cycle Time for the Same Programs 2001 “Assessment and 2005 Assessment 5

Figures Figure RDT&E and Procurement Funding—Malor Defense Acquistion Programs

Figure Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at Key Junetures 8 Figure Percent of Programs Achieving Design Stability at Key Sunetures 0 Figure & Depiction ofa Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared with Best Practices 13

Pog {690.0501 Asseosments of Slee Malor Weapon Programe

Abbreviations Acts

BAN

BTERM DARPA DeMa, pop

AEH Comsec/Transee System Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Ballsie Trajectory Extended Range Musition Defense Advanced Restarch Projets Agency Defense Contract Nanagement Ageney Department of Detense

‘exoatmospherie killvehicle Fiscal year Government Accountability Office eosynetironous earth orbit Global Positioning System highly etiptiea orbit, heavy lút vehicle Integrated Maintenance information System Intelligence, surveillance and veeonnalssance Joint Direct Attack Manion

“oint Single Integrated Aie Pleture Systems Bngineering Organization isle Defense Agency

ot applicable National Aeronsties and Space Administration North Atlante Treaty Organiation

National Oceanic and Atzaosphere Administration

‘Operational Test and Hvaluabon Preliminary Design Review Research, Development, Tes, and Bvaluation Solid Divert an Attitade Control System Standard Missle

tobe determined

‘Terain Following and Tertain Avoidance

‘Technology Readiness Level Unmanned Acta! Vehicle tea high frequency United States Cade

Unkced States Maine Coms

"`

nied States Itmey be repreduced and dstibued ns entiay mihout tune

tien {640.0 01 Assumes of Slr Malo Weapon Prone

of the United State

Tilted States Government Accountability Office

Washington, Doc 20548

March 3, 205 Congressional Comittee seal realities demand that the Department of Defense (DOD) get better

‘outcomes from is wezpon system investments Federal diseedionary spending, along with other federal policies and programs, wil face serous Duulget pressures inthe coming years While providing for th cotton Afense i inthe Constitatian, defense spending is considered

“iseretionary” from a budget sense Furthermore investzaents in new capabilities such as Weapon ssstem are more discretionary than other aspects af defense sending, sich as personnel cass ad the costs of

‘supporting and maintaining current force operations, As result itis

"mnperaive that DOD's lnted resources be allocated tothe most propriate weapon system investinen’s based on current and reasonably expected threats and that the investments yield the results promised (34h fspesformiance, cost, and liming} within the constesats impased Dy those

We have assessed weapon acquisitions asa high-risk area since 1990 Attnough US weapons are the Bes inthe world, the programs to acquire them often take signifeantly longer and cost siieandly more money chan promised anv often deliver fewer quantities a ather capabilities than planned Kis not nusial for estimates of time nd money to be of by 20 to

50 percent When costs and schedules increase, quantities are ent, ad the

‘ahve forthe sarfighter—as well asthe value ofthe investment dllar—is feced, In these ines of asymmetsie threats and neteentscty india

‘weapon system investments are geting larger and more complex Just 4Lyears azo, the top five weapon systems cost about $28 billion: today, in the same base yea dollars, the top five weapon systems cost about 521 billion IFthese megasystems are jvanaged with tindiional margins of| ferro, the ftancial consequences can be dire, especially i ight ofa

‘constrained discretionary budget

‘Our work on the development of success commercial and defense prodyets has shown that its possible co get better outcomes fom Investments if decisions are based on high levels of knowledge: Defense acquisition policies sipportsueh an approach to manaying weapon system programs, However, actual practi isnot yet consistently following tentien policy As this annual assessment of major weapon acquisitions shows, most programs are proceeding with inadequate levels of

‘knowledge, with attendant inerease iss for tational rates of cost

Me ——

David M, Walker Comptroller General

‘ofthe United States

Tilted States Government Accountability Office

AChallenging Time for

Weapon System

Investments

Congtessional Comsalttees The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on x numberof efforts to enhance warfighting capabilites Primary among these efforts are the Investments being made to develop improved weapon systems with technologie supevionty and enhanced lethality to combat threals co

US security Investment in programs such asthe Amny's Future Combat Stents and Warfighter information Network-Tactiea, the Missile Tefense Ageney’s suite of land, sea, alan space systems, the Navy'sadvanced Ships such asthe DDC) Destroys, an the Alt Botee’s space systems seh

48 te Transformational Satelite Commanications System age kely to đđoninale he budget and daetinal debate well in the next decade Many

‘oftese embody the dual challenge of employing complex technology with

‘atapie pace af development Fiscal realities, coupled withthe larger scope fof key acanisitions, reduce the ability of budgets lo accommodate type! ‘margins for estor in terms of east increases sind selene delays

‘dentfying risks early and adlressing them before they become problems

«an lessen cost increases and seltedule delays az thus enable budgets to bay what was planned

Ân Bi report, we assess 34 programs that represent an investment of approximately 880 billion.’ Our objective i to provide decision makers

‘with independent, knowledge-based assessments of individual systems Atlante knowledge and potential risks

DOD has entered apeviod of high investment A significant portion of this Investment is for the acquisition of weapon systems th offer

technologially advanced capabilites The investment inthe research, development, and procurement of major weapon systems is expected to

‘ise from §114 billion in fiscal year 2005 to $185 hill in fseat yee 2000, Major Defense Aquisition Progranis make up aout 15 peteeat, oF

[DOD's total planned investment In these progranis is approximately 365 billion, as shown in figure 1, ofthe seal year 2005 investment request

81 tlio, with sbout $512 blion of dat investment ye fo be made,

‘Towing pressures from increnses in mandatory Tederal spending”

According tthe Congressional Budget Office, federal deficits toaverage $250 billion Dhroush feal year 2000 and new budgetary ave expected demands stemming from demographie wend ie beyond that tine frame In calendar year 200, discretionary spending 2ecounied for about ofthe federal budget, and cureent projections show that beeause of 38 percent Inceeases in aandatory spending, diseretionsey spending sikely to sdeecease 1.35 percent ofthe federal budget by fiscal year 2000 Te wil be dlitculs for DOD to inerease its budget share (o cover cost increases in

‘veapon programs in that environment

Second, DOD faces competing densands within ts own budget, such a8 from operationsin Afganistan and rag, Since September 2001, DOD hss needed $158 bilion in supplemental appropriations to support the global

‘sar on terrorism "Te budget implications of these operations further Increase the demand mate of the defense dollar and therefore the Investment in new weapon programs For example, current military

‘operations are causing faster wear on existing weapons, which ill weed

‘refurbishment or replacement sooner than planned These needs will

‘compete with the investment in new Weapon programs

‘Third, DOD programs typically take longer to develop and cast more to huy

‘han planned pling additional demands an available nding, These programs inereasigly compete for resources and are sometimes forced to make tade-offsin quvities esting ina reduction of ying power Asa Tesult funds are not avalable for other competing needs and programs veld fewer quantities for the same, ifnot higher, cost Table Listrates

‘seven programs with the gieatestreduetion of hyn power Some ofthese programs experienced higher costs forthe same initia! quantity

Table 1 Examples of Programe wih Reduced Buying Power

Paget (640.0501 Asenmments of Slot aor Weapon Programe

Current Programs Are

Costing More and

‘Taking Longer to Develop

‘The majority of programs in our assessment are costing more and taking longer to develop than estimated As shown in able 2, otal ROTRE costs {or 26 common set weapon programs ivereased by nearly $127 billion, or

42 pereent, over the orginal business ease (he first ful estimate) The same programs have also experienced an increase in the tine needed to ‘develop capabilities wih a weighted-avetage schedule increase of nearly

‘knowledge baer aequlstion practices proven 1 be more effective and eflclentìn developing new products By filly implententing these practices, DOD can bette leverage its investments by shortening the time it

‘aes o develop capabilities with more preditable eosin and schedules,

thereby maintaining ts ving power Successful product developers ensure a high level of awed was achieved at key juneturesin development We characterize these junctures 1s knowledge poin's These knowledge points and associated indiators fate defined a8 follows

+ Knoyledge point 1 Resources oyledgc occurs sre a sound business case ise fr the and needs match This evel of roduct—that is, atnateh is mace betaeeen the customers requicements

‘nd the produit developer's available resources in terms lie, and money Aeeving a high level of eehology maturity atthe of knovedze,

‘tart of system development isan important indicator of whether this tnatch bas been made, This means hat the technologies needed o meet essential product requirements have been demonstrated to work their Intended environinent

+ Knowledge point 2: Product design is sable This level of knowledge ecurs khen a program determines that n product's design is stable— hạt le twill meet customer requirements and cost and schedule ages A best practice isto achieve design stability atthe system-level trical design review, usally held midway dhrough development, Completion oft least 99 percent of engineering drawings tthe system design review provides tangible evidence that the design is stable

‘+ Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature This level of knowledge is alieved when it has heen demonstraed that the prodhet can be manufaetited within cost, schedole, and quality targets best [practice iso ensue that all key manufacturing processes ae in

‘Salisical control—that ls, they ae repeatable, sustainable 2nd eapable br eonsistenty producing parts within the produets quality tlerances Ani stanidarls—a the star of production

‘The attalnment of egch successive knowledge point bulls on the preceding one While the knowledge ise lds continously without ‘lear lies of denvaccation, die atainntent of knowledge ints is sequential In otter words, production maturity cannot be attained ifthe

‘fesign isnot stable, andl design stability cannot be attained if he cites technologies are not mature

‘Seeking to improve acquisition outcomes, DOD revised its acquisition Dolley in May 2003 t9 Incorporate a knowledge-based, evolitionary framework The policy adopts lessons teamed from suecessfil commer companies, For example, the polieyattempis co separate technology evelopment irom produet development ard requires the demonstration of technologies to high readiness levels The policy also allows managers to develop a product i increments rather than tying to corporate al of Ihe

‘sired eapabiliies in he fist version that comes off the production line

Most Programs Have

Proceeded with Lower

Levels of Knowledge at

Critical Junctures

‘Most ofthe programs we reviewed proceeded with lower levels of knowledge at ertical junctures and attained key elements of product, -knovsledge later in development than specified in DOD pales, which sted in cost increases and schedule delays

Development Start ‘Our work shows cha the demonstration of technology maturity by the start of system development isthe key measure for achievement of knowledge

point 1 A program that proceeds into product development without emonstrating mature technologies does so with inerezsed risk of cost fsrowth and seherhile delays throughout the life ofthe program,

‘nly 15 percent of the programs we assessed began development having demonstrated al of tele cechnologies mature, as Mustzated in igure 2

————— Figure 2: Percent ot Propramne That Achieved Technology Malu at Key dunctures

development with mature technologies experienced lower development and unit cost increases than those programs that started development with immature technologies For example, RDT&E costs for the programs that started development with mature technology increased by an average of

5 percent over the first ful estimate, whereas the development costs forthe progeams that started development with immature technologies increased Aan average of 11 percent over the frst fl estimate Likewise, program

‘acquisition unit costs forthe programs with mature technology inereased

by less than 1 percent, whereas the programs that started development

‘with immature technologies experienced an average program acquisition

the 0A0 B 01 AeeeemeteofSdedel Glereugo Programe

‘unit coat increase of nearly 21 percent over the first full estate." Finally the programs with mature tecinology experienced an average schedule delay of T months-—a9 percent increase—whereas the schedule forthe programs tat started development with immature technology increased an average of 13 monthis-a 13 percent increase

nee {680.0501 Assnsments Slated Mor Weapon Programe

‘With the exception ofthe Navy's V22, which has experienced significant Jesign changes since development star 1980 these programs have experienced a 6 pereent inerease jn developmen costs and an average Schedule increase of 11 months since the rst ful estimate.” Those programs that did not achieve design stability have experienced combined development cost inerease of 6 percent and an average schedule increase of 29 manths since she frst fl estimate

Design stabibty cannot be attained if key technologies are not mature Ten programs held design review without demonstra mature ritieal rechnolozies Out ofthe 10 pragrans, 7 had experlenced a cos increase, schertle delay, ofboth The unit east of of these programs increased by atleast 10 pereent.” In eontrast, 3 programs entered product development

‘with mature technologies These three programs kept progrars unit east, Increases toa rồnhmunn, with casts either failing or increasing by single igus

Cass at st The Pas hl ee ng ee 18d wb me |

‘Nine programs are scheduled to hold thelr aystem design review inthe next sean.” Only two of those programs, the 8-2 Radar Modernization aud the Excalibur program, expect their cechnologies co be mature at dhe tine of their design reviews, The remaining seven programs project chat teit technologies will mot attain maturity untl aller User eitent design reviews,

Production Start

How to Read the Knowledge

Graphic for Each Program

Assessed

To determine ifa product’ design is reliable and producibe, successful programs nse stalisieal process control to bring manufacturing processes lunder eonteol so they are repeatable, sustainable, and consisterely

producing parts within quality standards, The colleton of process control

‘aa priorto a production decision can enable a smooth transition from product development to the production phase OF the 19 progeams in production or approaching a production decision inthe next year, only

2 collected or panto collect statistical process control data to measure the rmhurty of production processes While the absence ofthe data does not

‘mean that production processes assessment agalnst an objective standard were immanure, it does prevent a

‘We assess each program in 2 pages and depict the exten! of knowledge ina stacked bar graph and provide a narrative summary a the bottom of the fst page- As illustrated in figure 4, the knowledge graph is tase om the three knowledge poins ad the ke indieaors forthe atainment af oovledge: tehology maturity (depicted in orange), design stability (epicted in green), and production maturity (depicted in Live) “best practice" ine is ran based on the ideal atainment ofthe three types of|

‘knowledge atthe three knowledge points in sone eases, ve obtained projections from the program office offuure knowledge ataimvent These projections ate depicted as dasted bars, The closer a programs aiained [knowledge is to the best practice line, the more hkelythe weapon will be delivered within estimated cost and schednle A knowledge deficit atthe Start of development—indieated by a zap between the technology

‘knowledge attained and the best practice ine—moeans the progrant proceeded with immature technologies and feces a greater likelihood of

Dewcomet san DOD in ‘decision

An interpretation of this notional example would be that the system development began with key technologies immature, thereby missing

‘knowledge point 1 Knowledge point 2 was not attained atthe design review as some technologies were still not mature and only a

‘small percentage of engineering drawings had been released, Projections for the production deesion show tha the program is expected to achieve treater levels of maturity but will til fall shor Its ely that this programm would have had signifieant eost and schedule increases

age H {680.0501 Assnsments Slated Mor Weapon Programe

Common Name: ABL Airborne Laser (ABL)

MDA ABL element is being developed in

incremental, capability based blocks to destroy

‘enemy missiles during the boost phase of their Might Carried aboard highly modified Boeing 7

aieraft, ABI employs beam contrite contro!

subsystem to focus the beam on target, high-energy chemical laser co rupture the fuel

tanks of enemy missiles, and a battle management

subsystem to plan and execute engagements ‘We assessed the Block 2004 design that is under

{evelopment and expected to lea to an inital

Program Essentials Program Performance (fiseal year 2008 dollars in millions)

Progam fe: Kitand AFB, N Max, Tả Research and doolpmont cost GHẾ vases hange ssa $503 ah

“oa uring $2.3869 ition TS SƠ tôn HỆ “ott quanttes| Program unt cost Ne NRO TRD TNA MA MÃ

Although program officials expected ABL to Attainment of Product Knowledge

provide an initial capability during Block 2006, prosaton

this event has been delayed and only one ofits seven critical technologies is fully mature During ratray | eign

Block 2004, the program contimies work ona

prototype thats expected to provide the basi

Aesign fora future operational capability Program — Bean,

officials expect to demonstrate the other six sy

technologies during a prototype Might test that wil assess ABLS lethally Dial in integrating

otolype components could delay ths effort from

2105 02008 MDA has released about 94 DEFEeM sean

fofthe engineering drawings forthe prototype’s design, which will be the basis for an intial tan

‘operational capability during a future block ithe

testis siceessul However, additional dravvings

say be needed ifthe design is enhanced or if

‘Common Name: AB

ABL Program

Technology Maturity

Only one of ABLS seven critica! technologies —

maisaging the high-power beamn—is full native

‘The program office assessed three technologies —

the sic module laser, missile tracking, and

atmospheric compensation—as near manuee The

reralning thee technologlestransinissive opties,

‘plies! coatings, snd jitter cantvol-ate che least

mature Aecordng to program offal al of test

technologies are needed to provide the system with

an intial pperational capability

While the program office has zssessed the

six-module laser as being elose to reaching fll

‘maturity, the power generated by grouping sx laser

‘modules together must be demonstrated before fll

aatrityean be reasonably assessed The tecent

‘demonstration of te staltaneous firing ofall

sax laser modules relaces risk in this area, Adaltional testing planned over the next 6 months,

‘nus sillbe completed to demonstrate the fll

power and dratian of the laser segment prior to

Fstallation on the aera

‘The transmissive opties,opitea coatings, and iter

‘control ate the least mae ential technologies and

‘consist of prototypes that have only been tested in

{he aboratory or demonserated through alysis aad

‘simulation The program plans to demonstrate all

{technologies in an operational environment duriga Miah tes of the system prototype, referred 1038,

lethal demonstration in whiel ABI, wil ater to

shoot downa short-range ballistic missle

Callenges with integrating the laser ard beans

controVfize control subeomponents could delay this

{es ta 2008, but the final schedule ito be

{devernined, Upon suecessful completion of this tes

MDA expectsto develop asecond itera that will

provide an initial operational capability

Design Stability We could not assess the design stability because

ABLs intial capability will not be fall developed

‘until the second sirerafl—what is expected to

Drovide sn nial eapabty—is well underway

‘Wile the progeans has released 10,280 ofthe 1081 engineering drawings for the prototype, its

unclear whether te design ofthe prototype aireft

can be relied upon asa good indicator of design

Stability fr the second aireraft lore dravvings m

be needed if the design is enhanced or if problems neountered daring Miah testing foree design anges

Other Program Issues Technological challenges caused he prime contract

to appnoaeh is cost celling during fiscal year 2004 Ineaely Apel 2001, MOA directed the ABL- progran

to resiricture the contact, nezease ts cost cen, tind refocus the contract’ efforts on making technical progress, Asa resi, the cost ceiling ‘was inereased by 81.5 billion al the period of performance was extended to 2008 fom 2005 The eonteaet s eureently valved at approximately

$36 lion, The foeus of eurrent work is onto nears evenis The first event was the six mode laser test

tn aground test facility that the program completed

in November 2004, The second event was the inital Beam Controlire Control flight test, which

‘ceurred in December 2004 Agency Comments

In commenting ‘uintaned tha the current design is stable despite ona drat ofthis assessment, MDA the assessed technology matin OMelals tol us that because the ABL operational environment is impractical ro duplicate onthe ground the technology matuniy assessment will understate sethal maturity unl after LOD percent of the drawings are released While the officials expect ranges to fate blocks as part of eapability based

‘Spiral sequistion, they believe the basse design will dircetly migrate to subsequent blocks

Aegis Ballist

MDA’ Aegis BMD element isa sea-based missile

{defense system being developed in incremental,

‘apability-based blocks to protect deployed

1S forees and eriial assets from short-and

medium-range ballistic missle attacks Key

‘omponens include the shipboard SPY-1 radar,

hitto-kllintereeptors, and command and control

systems I will also be used asa forward-deployed

sensor for surveillance and tracking of

Intercontinental balistie missiles We assessed only

Block 2004 of the elements intereeptor—the

Standard Missile 8 (SMS),

(Common Name: Ais BMD Missile Defense (Aegis BMD)

Forsng FYOSEYOR RAD 840082 ion Procurement cost Feseachand devotpmentesst Sarita 878789 0 mg Tt so

“oa uring $4008 Penney carta 3 itlon Toni guannes| Program unt cost NA” Na TBD 8 NA M

According to program officials, the first increment

‘of SM-3 missiles being fielded during 2004-2005,

has mature technologies and a stable design

However, the program has been struggling with

the technology that maneuvers the missiles kinetic warhead (il vehicle) to its target Partial

funetionality of this"diver” technology was

successful in Night ests, but full fonetionaity

has only been demonstrated in ground tests—t fale during June 2003 Might test Design

moulfeations were identified but will nt be

{implemented in the fist Smissiles being fielded

rogram officials noted that even with a reduced

capability, these missiles provide a credible

defense Ail drawings forthe Hirst inerement of

inissiles have heen released to maniiueturing

‘The program isnot collecting statistical data on its

production process but is using other means to

ange production readiness

‘Common Namo: Aegis BMD

Aegis BMD Program

Technology Maturity

Program officials estinsate that ll shee

{echnologies eitieal to the SMB are mature These

echnologies tie third stage rocket motor the

inrred seeker ofthe kinetie warhead, an the Sole

Divert ad Attitude Control System (SDACS) ofthe kinetic warhead—were ll ested i ght While the

frst two technologies were fully demonstrated in

flight tess, the SDACS, which generates divert,

pallses o steer the kinetic warhead, was only

Partially demonstrated As noted previous ull but paral failed during June 2009 fight vest iver” technology seceded in ground testing

According to program officals, the ts allure was

likely caused by a defective subeoroponent within

the SDACS, «problem that shouldbe corsected

through specie desig modifications Prograre

officals note that only partial fanctionaliy of dhe

SDACS is required for Slack 24, whieh was

sticcessflly demonstrated in Might tests Although

the kinetic warhead ofthese interceptors will have

reduced divert capability they provide a credible

defense against a large population ofthe threat and

fan be retroatied upon the completion of design

Updates and testing

Design Stability

rogram officials reported thatthe desian forthe

Sst eight interceptors being fielded during

‘Block 2004 is stable with 100 percent ofits denwings

released to manufacturing The progtam plans 0

implement design eranges in subseaient

contigurations of Ue SM (delivered during

20062007 to resalve the SDACS fale witnessed in

the June 2009 Mish test,

Production Maturity We did not assess the production maturity of the

missiles being procured for Block 2008 Program

officials sated that given the low quantity of

‘missles being proshiced, statistical process control

ata on the produetion pracess would have no

Significance The Aegis BMD program is using other

means fo assess progress in production and

‘manufacturing—sich as integrated product teams,

tisk reviews, and SM-2 metries—as art of ts overall

evelopment of the SMS,

Other Program Issues

‘The Aegis HMD element builds upon the existing capabilites of Aegiseauipped Navy erusersand ttesrovers Planned hardvare and softvare

"paradesto these ships willenable them to cary out

te ballistic missile defense mission In particular, the program is working to upgrade Aegis destroyers for surveillance and tacking of incexcontinental ballistic missiles, Beesuse this hnetion is new to the lement—allowed only ater the US withdeawal from the Ant Hallistic Missile Treaty—the program office face ight schedule o fully develop and est Thịs addel unelonaliv, whieh it completed i September 2004 with the deployment ofthe frst Hdestzoyer for this mission

‘Agency Comments

In commenting on a drat ofthis assessient, the program office stated chat exis BMD progress femains on track, For example, (he program

‘deployed the frst operational destroyers (Cr the long-range surveillance and cracking mission) 19 the Sea of Japan, delivered 5 missiles in November, and successfully around tested the redesigned SDACS,

Ie noted, however, that our review focused on the

SM, a junior parton ofthe overall cost and development ofthe Aegis BMD system Inaudition, the program office reiterated that SDACS technology was successful In Four of {ive Aegis BMD flight tests The current SDACS configuration fuly eapable of defeating the lock 24 theeat se, alm lesan update sn progress to complete the ai increment of txpabiliy Asan appliation of capabilities based acquisition, the warfghter Is provided a sigalficant ‘abi years earlier (albeit using partial SDACS Fonetonality) intead of waiting fora perfect design

_— CammonName: AEHE Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF)

The Air Force's AEHF satelite system wil replenish

the existing Milstar system with higher eapacity

survivable, jam resistant, worldwide, secure

‘communication capabilities for strategie and tactical

‘warfighters The program inhides stelites and a mission control segment Terminals used to transmit

and receive communications are acquired separately

by each service ABHF san international

partnership program that includes Canada, United Sngdom, ad the Netherlands We assessed the

satellite and mission control segment

Program Essentials ‘rogram Performance (iscal year 2008 dolar in millions)

be eto ‘onan 820 mon ‘oa pogam ot Program nt eoet "` fare omy ae

Progra technologie Issiable However the high risk strategy of are mature and (ie 41g progeny ee

concurrenly developing two crideal path tema Saxe

fasted to further schedule delays and cost, ‘nereases The program i lying onthe

concurrent development ofthe AEHE oro

‘Comsec/Transec System (ACTS) suite of cexyptological equipment, which limits access to authorized users, and terminals used for satelite motwry

‘command and control Both of these tems are

being developed outside the program offic, s

Delivery delays ofthe ACTS and command and Sean

‘control terminals resulted in an addtional 12monHh Ìauch delay and an estimated

20 pereent cost inerease, incurring NunieMeCurdy breach (10 U.S.C 2493) at the

1Bpercent threshold

Common Name: AEHE

AEHF Program,

Technology Maturity

All ofthe Lt enteal technologies are manute, -ecordingto the program otis Te adion, ll 1 of

{he appicationspecitie integrated crculsertieal to

Thnetioning of the commisications payload have

been Might qualified through demonstration nd

testing

Design Stability ABHP's design i now stable since more than

97 percent of te design drawings have been

released While the program completed its system

Jevel ertieal design review In April 2004 with only

bout two thirds ofthe drawings cleased the AEH

‘contractor has since resolved al oustanding issues from that review

Production maturity could nat be assessed a the

prouram office doesnot collect satistieal process

‘control lata, In June 2004, the formal decision as

rade to acquite the third and final satelite

Other Program Issues The concurrent developanent of two eitical path

'Remns- the ACTS and the commnandl am contưot tenninals_ hasled to further schedule delays and

cost owt The ACTS sa suite of eryptologieal

‘equipment insalied in both the satellite ad the

{erminals to linst access to authorized users and is

being developed and produced by the National

Security Agency The ACTS has aleeady experienced

significant eos growth aid schedule delays due production problems and changing sexily

‘requirements, In September 2003, ACTS delivery

{lays and development problems led the program

office to delay the launch ofthe est two satellites

by A months The second erieal path eem—the

‘command post cerminals—is developed and funded

boy another Air Force program office These

terminals must be in place and tested prior to the Hrs auneh or cheve will bea day-frday sip inthe

satelite laineh schedule

The concurrent development of the AEHE satellites, terminals, and the ACTS hus led to further delays

and cost ineteases Delayed delivery of the ACTS

‘ha resulted in sv additional 12-mnonth dea

Launches for the tree ABNF saelites are now

scheduled for Apel 200, April 2009, sad Apri

‘The launch delays along with added pasos

‘component testing and replacement of etical elecronie parts are expeeted to increase the fverall program cost by about 20 percent

In December 2004, the Air Force notified Congress

of NunnAfeCurdy breach atthe 15 percent threshold

Jn December 2002, satellites four al five were leleted from the AEH program because the new Transformational Satelite Communications System (ISAT), assessed elsewhere in this report, is to replace these satellites if they are suficienty Heveloped, The Air Force scheduled an interim review point in November 2001 to determine

‘whether to buy addtional AEHF satelites or eely on TSAT However, in light of the I23v0ath program sip, the decision was delayed until November 005

‘Agency Comments nvcommenting Air Free presided technical omments, whiet Were ona deat ofthis assessment, the inconorated where appropriate

Common Name: AESA Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA)

‘The Naiy’s ABSA radar is one ofthe top upgrades,

forthe PIA-ISEIF aircraft IListo be the airerafts

primary searehftrack and weapon control radar and

1s designed to correct deficiencies in the current

radar According tothe Navy, the AESA radar Is key

{omalntaining the Navy's aleto ale ghỪng

advantage and will improve the effectiveness of the

airto-ground weapons When completed, the radar

‘willbe inserted in new production airerat and

retrofit into lot 26 and above alrerat

Program Essentials rogram Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in millions)

Corp Praja lfc: Far Aer Me Research and doolpmont cost cm .—- 1 change Funding reese complet "Hao Stes ion “oa program cost Procurement cost "ma ^^: Procurement 81.8147 millon “ound §t 8800 man Program unt cost “ott quanttes| ssoi 9653188 a as Đo

‘The AESA radar’ critical technologies were not

‘mature atthe start of system development or at

the desin review, bu they now appear to be

‘mature The design also appears stable However,

radar development is continuing during

production The program is tracking a number of

risks withthe technieal performance of the radar

Ifproblems are discovered, they could require

design changes while the radar isin production

For example, the software schedule leaves litle

oom for error ot rework, and development of the

zadar simulation model puts training at risk In Addition, there are some prodition risks that

‘could afect the quality ofthe initial radarsand the

aireraft delivery schedule, Antitamper protection

forthe radar is curently in design The ABSA,

program also has interdependencies with other

programs that eould make the radar vulnerable to

elays in thelr progress

ae

Attainment of Product Knowledge

‘cect

= sur eamesm|

‘Common Name: AESA

ABSA Program

Technology Maturity

‘The Tates technology readiness assessment forthe

radar determined that the four eeitical eehnologies were mature To further ensure cetmology maturity,

aminitechnoloay assessments planned prior 0

the fulkrate production decision Hy then, the

‘technologies should have heen demonstrated in he final form and under expected conditions

Design Stability As of July 2004, ll engineering drawings forthe

‘radar and its subsystems had been vleased At the

design review in 2001, 59 percent had been release

Development ofthe radar hes eantinued daring

production The program office has wend some

‘evelopment risks that could result in design

changes According toa prograre alice risk

assessinent the Lop curentehallenge involves the

Software, The lack of tively software delivery puts

the program a significant risk, and could aso

eqnire radar hardware rework dae to delays in the

Might rest program Another risk is thatthe radar Simalation mode integrated nto the F/A-18 training

Simulator may not accurately represent the

‘operation and performance of tie ear, which

could result in some taining tat is unrealistic

Fhrther, the numberof conducted may not be adequate ro mature radar fight tests that ean be

software Other enzrent risks inele whether the

rrudar will be able to track siffcient targets

Simultaneously, radiation emissions wil interfere

‘with FACIBE/® weapon systems; and will have

the capability to detect tal aspect targets at low

altitude Aitigation plans are in place to addeess a

Aesign risks,

Production Maturity

During 4 low-rate produetion runs 84 radars are

planned—20 perceat of the 415 radars to be

procured, The program is currently inthe second

Drodietion run Most radars are planed to be

Installed is F/A-ABE/PS on the areratt ptolueflon

line, However, 135 radars will have to be retrfitted

into alealy produced F/8-ISE/F%—a more costly

process upfront, that, according to the Navy, is

expected to save money an support casts ater We

could noc assess production maturity because

atistcal process control data are not being

collected, Officias said they are comfortable with

_manufacturing processes based on audits and

Inspections conducted at some key manufacturers Nonetheless, radar production eursently faces umber of esks, The radar contractor may have Aifeulty transitioning from development t0 production due to production risks, which could tease sone Late aera deliveries Other risks include realty poblenis with one ofthe ada's eiteal telmologies may not allow intial radars to rect a specification and qualification tests may not bbe complete in tie, resting in delivering radar

‘hardware that isnot filly qualified Moreover full-rate production costs could increase Sgnifieandy ithe projected payot from cost reduction initiatives is nt fully realized, Hexeever, program officials expect sizaifeant savings from the

ost redietion inilatives Other Program Issues The program office is closely tacking Interdependencies that could place the radar at risk Success! development of ether Navy programs s required forthe radar to meet key performance parameters Also, the midae program i being fleveloped, in part, with funding from contractors, (Changes in the flow of his funding woud afect the ABSA program, but progtam officials stated that

‘Almost al of the contractor funding is been provided,

1m, 1990, DOD diveeted the seevices to implement bitamper protection to guard against explotation ofenteal US technologies This protection was not fone of the radar's orginal requienvents While oficial said there sa requirement for his Droteetion co have no effect on radar performance,

‘nerational tess ofanitamper models are not planned until after perational tests of radars

‘without this protection, wich may identify problems that require design changes tothe protection package,

‘The program’ strategy fora depot has ehanged Plans have been canceled to sind up a Navy depot maintenance faiity forthe radar in 2010 at North Island, California Instead, Raytheon will conduct depot maintenance avis Felty in Bl Segundo, California st substantial eos sings, secording to program officials

Common Name: AN/ASO 205 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)

‘The Naiy’s AMNS is designed to relocate, ident,

and neuialize bottom of moored sea mines: AMNS

consists of an operating console and a launch and

‘handing system containing up to four neutalizers

‘When deployed, the ME-608 helicopter hovers near

the target mine and lowers AMNS via stow eable

Ino the water A neutralizer, controlled through

fiberoptic cable, exits the lunch and handling

lethal charge, destroying the mine and the

Program Essentials Program Performance (fiseal year 2008 dollars in millions)

Progam fe: Wasgtan, 20 eee Research and doolpmont cost — ¬-.=- ‘oi S67 2S

RE TS Procter $108.8 mon “oa program cost Pecrenentee guar $1031 sms 3083 Hà 272

22 reimliietdoel ete ee “ott quanttes| Program unt cost suet $3100 # 28 20,

‘The AMNS program began system development Attainment of Product Knowledge

with none oft four eriical technologies mature proucton

‘While progress as been made since then, See

women ica te he cm HH SS]

Ko ong mets cn clonal in

ondute nid Ut, The ANS prow’

designs sable `-

thedamings complete Hoeven since ANNS Sa

tteinologies ae a expected to demonstrate

matin evelopment engi conducted

theprogam ns the isk ac problems ented

hr ht testing wl rere deings tobe

‘vied To atin anal operon

“apabiy of June 207 the pros oce

feaueteda $10 illo inrease near and

{cyelopment ands rer te suppor aerate

tung on the MESSE eteoper nto supbori

ete erung on the MEE 2NS leper

Common Name: AWASO.235

AMNS Program

Technology Maturity

‘The AMNS launch and handling system, the

eplaymentsubsssembs, the warhead assembly,

and the neutralizer are not fully ature, The

poutralizes, which was demonstrated ina relevant

environment, i approsching ull maturity The

program office desenibes the newraizet asa rondevelapimental em because i already

‘operations However, needs to ndergosfes ad

performance improvements before it wil be realy

{or ANS The other three technologies have not

been sntegtated or demonstrated outside of Jaboratory environment, bat program officals have

‘sated that no technology hurdles remain, merely

‘engineering challenges, Program officials expec all Tour technologies developmental testing tha ls chedtlef ta take fo demonstrate maturity during

place between May and October 2008

Among risks identified by program officiats are

‘eoncenis rat dhe neutralzer will no launch

properly nn environment of strong water eurents

‘The program office isatempying by establishing plans and fondling fr testing the to mitigate this sk

neutralizer in strong water eurrents, including fame

Lani testing Additionally, progran officials noted

ceoucerns bout the survivability of he lawach and

Pauling systenn in an underwater explosives

environment The program office plans for this isk

{abe mitigated through an alysis oF lamuch and

handling sssten ternal yar ad an analysis £0

Drove tat the launch and handing ysten can

{olerate environments of up Lo B06 levels,

Design Stability

Approximately 0 percent of the AMNS drawings

ate currently releasable Moreover, the program

bflce projects al drawings to be releasable 10

‘mamfacturing atthe completion of the design

feadiness review in March 2005 Accordingto program officials, (op level assembly drawings

will be considered atthe design readiness review

Detaled designs of AMNS components were

‘aliated throagh 17 interim design reviews held by

{he progeam oice,

Because the AMNS technologiesare not expected to demonstrate maturity unt developmental vesting is conducted in mid-2005, the program rus the risk thất any problems idenifed durin testing would require drawings tobe modified

Other Program Issues The program office hss requested an approximately

813 milion inceesse mn research and development funds for the fiscal year 2008 budget According to program officials, this increase is required to Support altemate testing on the ME-SAE helieapter ani fo supporta iG-month delay in completion of {eating on the MELAS hefeopter The MH-608 helicopter will not be wala to suppor the courvent AMINS development snd tes sehedule Without alrerate testing on the MH-52E helicopter, Lye program will not be able to make a low-rate intial production decision in Peb rary 2008 of, more ‘importantly, naintsin an intial operational capability of June 2007 For the MH-60S helicopter, development testing is wot seheduled to start until

B monthsaftera low-rate inal production decision thas been made,

to deploy the system from Lion rather than aircraft carters Regarding technology ruaturity it noted that currently the programs ecitical technologies, for example the warhead sembly, are slightly more mature than indicated inthe assessment In addition o performing a fnalysis to prove tat the Iauneh and handing system can tolerate high pressure underwater environments, the Navy intendsto conduct Underwater Bxplosive Testing as futher risk mitigation

Regarding other program issues, the Navy stated that whale alternate platform testing on Une SEH-S3E helicopter would enable the program to meet its lov-rate inital prodhetion decision sn inital operational eapabiity targets, alternate platform testing fs pending approval by the Assistant Seeretary ofthe Navy (Research, Development, snd Aquisition) I also indicated tat constzalnts in the walsbllty 8ƒ ME 0S test assets have the potential 1o elay the progranrs schedule and inevease is cost beyond the projections presented inthe assessment

Common Name: APKWS Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS)

‘The Army's APKWS isa precision guided,

airto-surace missile designed to engage soft and

lightly armored targets The system will ad a new

laser based seeker to the existing Hydra 70 Rocket

‘System and is expected to provide lower cost,

accurate alternative to the Helfie missile, Future

block upgrades are planned to improve system

effectiveness, We assessed the laser guidance

technology used inthe new seeker

Tehi lương 817100 lim .eeurenenisuarky: 8458 ‘Tout quanttes| Program unt cost som an ea ee 2A 4

‘The APKWS entered system development and held

ts design review before demonstrating that is

critical guidance technology was fully mature

‘While the system's design was otherwise stable at

the time ofthe March 2004 design review; initial

system-level testing identified problems with the

design Program plans eal fora production

‘ecision in September 2005 and low-rate

production contract award in December 2005 We

‘were unable to assess the program's production

maturity beeause program officials do not expect

tobegin collecting statistical data on their key

‘manufacturing processes until the start of

production Remaining efforts include competing

Aevelopmental and operational testing It

subsequent testing identifies further problem

‘with the design, additional coss of redesign and

‘modification of drawings late in development

Common Name: APKWS

APKWS Program

Technology Maturity

‘The APEWS program has not demonstrated full

raatuity of is onl ete tehnologs—laser

auidance, Although a procotype guidance system

‘was secessfilly demonstrated ruler the ow Cost

Precision Kill Advanced Technology Demonstration,

the current design forthe guidance system includes numerous hardware changes 19 Improve stem)

ost, performance, and peoduetilty The new

guidance system will not be fully intenrated and

{ested from an aireralt unl winter 2005 Program

officals noted that although he protorspe ssn

{design exists reverting oie would inerease cost and

{degrade the system's performance and producibibiy

Design Stability

rogran officials relessed 100 percent of the

ravings after aysten level design review in

March 2001, Recently completed testing, however,

uncovered the need fr design changes The APKWS,

ta date, has completed two test lights, The frst test

‘igh went as planned The second fghn test missile,

however, experienced! a mechanical fallure ofthe

‘wing lack mechanism, causing the test msi to

veer off target The program office identified &

esizn solation, and fight resting resumed in

September 20

Production Maturity

Program officials expect shat tere ill be nine key

processes associated with manufacturing the

[APKWS The program plans to collect statistical

fata an these prcesses wen prodietion begins in

fiscal year 2008

Other Program Issues

According to program offal the Army ent

ADKWS research, development es, and evaluation

(RDT&E) funding by 221 percent de to other

funding priorities, These officials noted that this

rechiction affects planned improvements to the warhead, fe, seeker, andl propulsion subsystems

Furthermore, the prostam has experienced a 153 pereent growti in acquisition eye time as the

result of slower initial production ofthe system tan

Common Name: ASDS Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS)

‘The Special Operations Forces’ ASDS isa

battery powered, dry interior minisubmarine

eveloped for clandestine insertion and extraction

fof Navy SEALS and their equipment It is carvied to

‘ts deployment area by a specially configured SSNS class submarine eis intended to provide

Increased range, payload, on-station loiter time,

and endurance over current submersibles, The

(5-fot long, §foot diameter ASDS is operated by a

{two-person erew and equipped with alock outiock

in chamber tallow divers to exit and reenter the vehicle

Program Essentials rogram Performance (fiseal year 2005 dollars in millions)

Progam fe: Washington, 26 Punäng mndedteorile' esearch and devlpment oe HUẾ - Change Ea 2280 hunker aie, Procurement $1 2180 mien Procurement cost Total pega cost sists Siamese rat sts

“oa uring 81.2594 miton Procurement quant =| Program unt cost ‘Tout quanttes| Su eo es

One of ASDS's thee erticalteehnoogies—the Attainment of Product Knowledge

oon aeee (mat

‘The production decision hasbeen delayed from sma”

test other vehicle design changes The Navy Sens | :

foleciede deter ark ou tery ond) „*

'atery replacemenL other vehieleimprovemehts — mưny”—$#

are being developed and tested and design om

problems are being addressed Acoustic signature sate

sues are being addressed; however, this

requirement doesnot have tobe met until delivery ‘ofthe second ASDS boat =

trấn LEA0 301 keeteerivofRledel uje in Programe

Common Name: ASOS

ASDS Program

Technology Maturity

Ofte three critteal technologies identified by

{he ASDS program office, one—the lithium fon

battery—has not reached maturity However, tis

expected tobe mature before the December 2005

‘production decision or addtional boats

Acoustic, or noise level, problems are belng

addressed; however, the frst boat isnot que,

‘enough to meet acoustie stealth requirements In

carie tests, the ASDS propeller {he most significant noise, sida new composite was te source of

propeller was installed before operational test and

‘valuation in 2003 hough program officials

believe it meets requirements, precise acoustic

rmersurements have not been made and are not

scheduled tobe done before the production

‘Sesion, ther acoustic issues wil be adressed

‘ona timesphased basis because the acoustic requirement has heen deferred unit delivery ofthe

second boat,

Design Stability Although el engineering drawings for ASDS have

been relensedl to manfacturing, ASDS design

changes have been required based on aditional

§improsemenis, tes resuls, ad other tes since ASDS reached initial operational capability in

Noveriber 209, An assessment of ASDS

survivability design feanres is also underway

however, the Vulnerabilty Assessment Report will

othe completed until Apel 2005

An uprated ASDS operations requirements

document was approved in June 2001 The nuhnber

ff key performance parameters Ghose elementsthat

are so significant tat fiir to tt thêm could

eal ino question a system's ability to perfor

rissions) were redueed from 16 08, and they

lnchide one new requirement (operational

avails) Other fequitements are categorized a8

‘system erica requirements,

Until requirements are addressed, technical

Droblensare solved, and testing is eompleted, we

believe ASDSSs final design sail remain acerca

and may ave eost and schedule implications

Other Program Issues

‘The Navy completed an independent cost estimate, Including ite-eyee cass, Maech 2004, Hoseever, Hala were not released, andthe estimates ice now

‘out-of date because they do not refieet the inet of the 2-year delay in production ofthe second bost Acco tothe June 2004 Selected Acqisiion Report the U.S Special Operations Command was preparing a new proposed program plan to account for the delay inthe production decision and updated ost information was expected tobe reported i (he December 2014 report However, according to the Navy's January 2005 update, he revised program plan atl updated cost estimate willbe developed, reviewed, and approved as pan of the production Aecision, which has been delaed unl December

2005, Sine the program’ frst cost estimate was

‘originally approved in 1994, research and tievelopment costs have more then triple

The Navy plans to conduct follow-on testing (0

‘erly that đeDciencies øndl vilnerablities Mentiied dug the Blay 2003 operational evaluation are

‘corrected: However, not all results will be known before the scheduled production deision

‘Agency Comments The Nevy provided technical comments, which were incomporated ss appropriate

Common Name ATIRCMICHWS Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System

‘The Army's and the Special Operations Command's

ATIRCM/CMWS isa component of the integrated

infrared countermeasures suite planned to defend

US areraf from advanced infrared guided missiles

‘The system willbe employed on Army and Special

Operations alrerat The system includes an ative infrared jammer, a missile warning system, and a

countermeasure dispenser eapable of loading and

‘employing expendables, such 38 ares, chal,

Concent system development Prodution

Program Essentials Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in millions) ora convactor:BAE Sytem Noh Asol —Latst Percent freien Seaton, Ne fesnacrandanecometcnt Seo Saas efi suis Shge BS

nao tan nen Procurement $2097 ion Tot prea cet Program nit cos 1n soos S107 135 at

‘ral trang 82151? lon ‘rosa quan 2568 ‘hagas ‘egusten eye tie mont) Ciazaed_—Clsiied Chases ‘aoe “nese a

‘The ATIRCM/CMWS program entered production

Attainment of Produet Knowied

InNovemter 209 with technologies matte poet

nddesgnosable Cumenty, heprogan’s Spa

`

ontoL The CMWS prlonofthe program

entered limited production in February 2002 to

meet ungent deployment requierents Howeve

{ullrate production for both components was motu

delayed beenuse of reliably problems Over

the past several years, the program has had 10

‘overcome cost and schedule problems brought on

by shortfalls in knowledge: key technologies were

demonstrated late in development and only 8

‘mall number of design dravvings were completed

by design review At the low-rate production

decision point, the Army developed a new cost

estimate reducing program procurement cost

substantially

THỜ

Common Name: ATIRCKLCNS

ATIRCM/CMWS Program

Technology Maturity

‘The ATIRCM/CMWSS five critieal technologies are

arr However, they did not mature wit after the

design review in February 1997, Most of the early

technology development effor was focused on the

application to rotary wingaireratt When system

‘evelopment began ln 1585, the requlrements were

‘expanded to include Naxy an Air Force fixed wing

aireraf This change caused problems that large

‘contibited to cost ineresses of more han 150,

percent to the development contract The Navy and

{he Air Force subsequently dropped out ofthe

program, rendering Nasy ail the Any are erent pursing Faure de extra effort needless, but the

joint production planning

Design Stability

‘The basie design of the system is complete with 100

percent ofthe drawings released to manufacturing The design was not stable atthe tive ofthe design

"oview, with only 22 percent ofthe drawings

‘complete This was primarily die othe expanded

eqvement, Ie was not uni 2 vears ater the

esign review that 9 pereent ofthe drawings were

released and Une design was considered stable This

ested in inefficient manufacturing, ewark,

addtional esting, and a year schedale delay The

‘stem design was suecessfilly demonstrated

rough engineering and manufacturing

development and transitioned to production,

Production Maturity

‘The production maturity could not be assessed

‘base! on the iormation provided by the program

office Aecordng to program officials, the TIRCM/CMWS program has 16 key manufacturing

processes i vations phases of contol They stated

that ATIRCM statistical process controls are in

‘evelopment, contro plans are being enhanced and

asthe programm continues in production and data are

fathered, lessons lezned willbe included inthe

Drocesses The Army entered tinted CNWS

production in February 2002 to meet an urgent need

ff the US Special Operations Command,

Subsequently, fllrate produetion was delayed for

ott earaponents die to relay resting fallres

‘The program implemented reliability fixes 1 Six

podhction representative subsystems Lat wil be

‘used forintial operational test and evaluation,

Tuese systems were delivered in Blarch 2004 he {ollrate production deelsion forthe complete system is now seheded for 2008,

Other Program Issues The Army procured an initial 32 systems in fiscal sear 2002 fuse on the US Speelal Operations Commands CH47 helicopters The Army plans 10 procure a total of 98 systems to ont special fnerations stcraft betsreen fiscal year 2003 and

2009 Currently, program officals are working to (hfegrate CMIWS on 16 đdflomal platform types and modkls, eich will esi in an inerease quantity sid funding The CMS low-rate intial production

‘quantity increased by 111 systems to a total of 200 The Army procured sll 200 of these systems, a deliveries are on sehedle

A the low-rate production decision poi, the Army developed a new cost estimate forthe program that atuted a variety of diferent program assumptions For exaniple, program officials deleted 17 years of Contractor Logisties Suppor, reducing potential duplication, and eleced 29 training systems As result, program officals report that procurement,

‘os was reduced by 17 percent

‘Agency Comments ‘The Army concurred with this esseserent and provided echnical comments, which were Incorporated wheve appropriate Additionally, the Army commented tat in January 2004, directed the acceleration of CMWS for deployment om (Operation Iragi Freedom aircraft Initial operational tests and evaluation will be completed during fiscal sear 2005 for CMWS aod in fiscal year 2006 for ATIRCN,

Common Name: 8-2 IMP B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP)

‘The Air Force's B2 RMP is designed to modify the

current radar system to resolve potential conicts in

frequency band usage To comply with federal

requirements, the frequency must be changed to 8

band where the B2 will be designated asa primary user The modifed radar system is being designed to

support the B2 stealth bomber and its combination

‘of stealth, range, payload, and near precision

‘weapons delivery capabilities

concept System development

= agus} te (mon) mo OMA

‘The B2 RMP entered system development in August 2004 with wo ential technologies mature

and two approaching maturity ll eitical

technologies are planned to be mature by the June

2005 design review The program has released

71 percent ofits design drawings and plans to

have 85 1095 percent released bythe June 2005

design review Program officials indicated that

production maturity metris willbe formulated

during development and that these metres may'or

‘nay’ not inelude manufacturing process control

data The program plans to bulld six radar units

during development for pilot training with the

'B2 operational wing prior co the planned

‘completion of fight testing Bven though these

units are necessary, bulling ther early in

development adds tothe risk of later design

changes becalise most ofthe radar gh test

Activity will not oceur until after these units