Hurricane Katrina - Lessons for Army Planning and Operations pdf

xii Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operationsdeployments, we found that the experience of Hurricane Katrina gests that the characteristics of the National Guard respons

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law

as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents.

Limited Electronic Distribution Rights

View document detailsFor More Information

This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation

6

Jump down to document

THE ARTS CHILD POLICY

CIVIL JUSTICE

EDUCATION

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE

WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world.

Purchase this documentBrowse Books & PublicationsMake a charitable contributionSupport RAND

This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors All RAND mono-graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

Lynn E Davis, Jill Rough, Gary Cecchine, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Laurinda L Zeman

Prepared for the United States Army

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

ARROYO CENTER

Hurricane Katrina

Lessons for Army Planning

and Operations

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world R AND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

R® is a registered trademark.

© Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation

All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND.

Published 2007 by the RAND Corporation

1776 Main Street, P.O Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050

4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665

RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/

To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact

Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002;

Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org

The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No W74V8H-06-C-0001.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hurricane Katrina : lessons for army planning and operations / Lynn Davis [et al.].

p cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-0-8330-4167-8 (pbk : alk paper)

1 Military planning—United States 2 Armed forces—Civic action—United States 3 Hurricane Katrina, 2005 4 Disaster relief—Gulf States I Davis, Lynn U153.H87 2007

363.34'8—dc22

2007017599

Preface

Hurricane Katrina was a truly catastrophic domestic emergency, both

in the number of deaths and the untold damage and destruction caused by the storm The Army asked the RAND Arroyo Center to assess the Army response to Hurricane Katrina and to raise the critical issues for future Army planning and operations This book focuses on those problems that most affected the timeliness and robustness of the Army’s response to Hurricane Katrina It explores steps that the Army,

in both its active-duty and National Guard components, can take to improve its responsiveness, within the constraints inevitable in situa-tions involving such catastrophic destruction This publication will be

of interest to anyone concerned with how the nation should prepare to respond to future catastrophic events, not only to severe hurricanes and other natural disasters but also to potential terrorist attacks

This research was sponsored by the Commander of U.S Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) It was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army

The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is DAPRR06017

For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the tor of Operations (telephone 310-393-0411, extension 6419; FAX 310-451-6952; email Marcy_Agmon@rand.org), or visit Arroyo’s web site

Direc-at http://www.rand.org/ard/

v

Preface iii

Figures vii

Tables ix

Summary xi

Acknowledgments xv

Abbreviations xvii

CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1

Background 1

Analytical Approach 7

Report Organization 9

CHAPTER TWO Background 11

How the Nation Is Organized to Respond to Domestic Emergencies 11

Active-Duty Military 14

The National Guard 15

How the Nation Prepared and Responded to Hurricane Katrina 15

CHAPTER THREE The Military Response to Hurricane Katrina 19

The National Guard Response 19

The Response of Active-Duty Forces 28

The Command and Control System 38

Lessons from Hurricane Katrina 45

vi Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations

CHAPTER FOUR

Implications for Army Planning and Operations 47

Roles and Responsibilities of National Guard and Active Forces 47

Army Transformation 48

National Guard 49

Department of Defense Post–Hurricance Katrina Initiatives 51

Should States Do More? 52

Should There Be a Regional Approach? 54

Should National Guard or Active-Duty Forces in ARFORGEN Be Designated for HLS? 58

Command and Control Structure 60

Alternative 1: Separate Federal and State Task Forces 63

Alternative 2: Dual-Status Command 64

Alternative 3: State Joint Force Headquarters in Lead 66

Alternative 4: NORTHCOM in Lead 66

Matching the C 2 Structure to Disaster Response Characteristics 67

Choosing a C 2 Structure 70

CHAPTER FIVE Conclusions 73

APPENDIX Situational Awareness in Hurricane Katrina 77

References 83

1.1 Characteristics of Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Katrina 2

1.2 Accomplishments in Response to Hurricane Katrina 3

3.1 Army National Guard Buildup in Mississippi 21

3.2 Army National Guard Buildup in Louisiana 22

3.3 Types of Army National Guard Personnel (September 9, 2005) 25

3.4 Flow of Military Forces to Mississippi and Louisiana 30

3.5 Buildup of Army Active-Duty Units 31

3.6 Types of Army Units Deployed 35

3.7 Hurricane Katrina Command and Control Structure 43

4.1 Army ARFORGEN Process 49

4.2 Separate Federal and State Task Forces 64

4.3 Dual-Status Command 65

4.4 State Joint Force Headquarters in Lead 67

4.5 NORTHCOM in Lead 68

vii

1.1 Effects and Requirements of Catastrophic

Domestic Emergencies 5 3.1 Availability and Utilization of Louisiana and

Mississippi Army and Air National Guard 20 4.1 Illustrative CSB Force Structure 56 A.1 Strategic Situational Awareness 80

ix

Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic domestic emergency that, in its deaths and destruction, had many of the possible characteristics of future terrorist attacks, especially those that could occur simultane-ously in different parts of the United States or involve the use of weap-ons of mass destruction It thus provides a case study that will help further our understanding of the problems that can arise during the nation’s response to such an event Such a case study will also help to determine how the United States might better prepare to respond to future catastrophic domestic emergencies

The efforts undertaken by civilian and military organizations in response to Hurricane Katrina were historically unprecedented But, as the many “lessons-learned” reports generated to date have documented, the response was tragically inadequate Having researched what hap-pened, we focused our analysis on the problems that affected the out-come of the response to Hurricane Katrina in a major way The single most important problem was the speed with which the nation’s local, state, and federal civilian organizations were overwhelmed However, problems also arose in the military response in the critical first few days

of the response, problems that contributed to the delays in evacuating the Superdome and convention center in New Orleans and in accom-plishing search and rescue operations throughout the storm-ravaged areas of Louisiana and Mississippi

The lessons-learned reports focus on the time it took for both the National Guard and active land forces to arrive in the region Exam-ining the considerations that influenced the size and timing of these

xii Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations

deployments, we found that the experience of Hurricane Katrina gests that the characteristics of the National Guard response to that event may be close to the kind of response the nation can expect from the Guard in such future emergencies, given the reliance on volunteers among those guardsmen responding from outside the stricken states and on air (commercial and military) and ground transportation.Many considerations lay behind the timing of President Bush’s decision to deploy active-duty Army and Marine land forces The pri-mary reasons this decision was not reached sooner were the adminis-tration’s belief that the flow of National Guard forces would be suf-ficient and its reluctance to have active-duty forces involved in the deteriorating law-enforcement environment Even had the decision to deploy active-duty forces been made at the time of hurricane landfall, the time lines for readying and transporting these forces would still not have had them on the scene and engaged in response operations until after the evacuations of the New Orleans Superdome and New Orleans Convention Center had been completed

sug-Another problem in the military’s response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted in the lessons-learned reports is the lack of a unified com-mand and control (C2) structure, specifically the separation of the command structures for operations involving both National Guard and active-duty forces We examined the characteristics of the multiple

response efforts and could not find a direct link with the speed and efficiency of the military response

Once we developed an understanding of the events that occurred during the response to Hurricane Katrina, we turned to ways the Army’s response to future catastrophic domestic emergencies could be made quicker and more robust We identified a number of steps that could be taken to enhance a future National Guard response on the part of states and urge their adoption: Give the National Guard the federal mission to conduct homeland security (HLS) activities,1 as is

1 By “HLS,” we mean military activities in support of civilian organizations, i.e., those involved in preventing and responding to terrorist attacks as well as in responding to other kinds of domestic emergencies, including natural disasters and civil disturbances These

Summary xiii

the case today in counterdrug operations; make each National Guard

unit capable of rapid deployment; plan on having units ready to fill in for those deployed overseas; prepare governors to call up their units involuntarily to state active duty for out-of-state emergencies; and plan

to use the Air National Guard, or prepare plans to use commercial lines, to transport predesignated National Guard units to out-of-state emergencies

air-At a regional level, we see the need for steps that would dedicate National Guard units to HLS and have them work closely with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other civilian organiza-tions The creation of ten standing homeland security task forces, as recommended in our earlier report Army Forces for Homeland Security,

deserves support and is in line with the Army Campaign Plan’s regional

The Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process, whereby units move through a structured and predictable process of unit readi-ness over time, offers additional possibilities to improve the military’s readiness to respond to a catastrophic event, and these possibilities deserve serious consideration Some National Guard units could be given HLS as their mission, with their training and readiness tailored accordingly To achieve a quick and robust response to catastrophic emergencies, National Guard and active-duty Army units in the Avail-able pool could be designated for an HLS mission While in the ARFORGEN process these units would be designated as “theater com-mitted” and planned for use within the United States, they could still

be deployed overseas if needed

The issue of how to structure the military C2 arrangements will always emerge in responses to domestic emergencies Given the obsta-cles to deciding on a structure in advance of events and the drawbacks

activities encompass what the Department of Defense calls Defense Support to Civil ities (DSCA)

Author-2 See U.S Army, Army Campaign Plan, Annex F (ARFORGEN Implementation Plan) to Army Campaign Plan Change 4, July 27, 2006, p F-4-C-7 For a more detailed description

of characteristics of these homeland security task forces, including the training, personnel, legal issues, and command and control, see Lynn E Davis et al., Army Forces for Homeland Security, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-221-A, 2004, pp 31–37.

xiv Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations

of having the structure emerge slowly over time (as happened in the response to Hurricane Katrina), we urge the adoption of an approach that would prepare decisionmakers to quickly select from a set of pre-defined alternative C2 structures designed to give the lead to federal or state task forces, depending on the characteristics of the emergency.Some of these recommendations will cost money, but what is most needed is a change from past practices and in perspectives on the role and responsibility of the military in catastrophic domestic emergen-cies Having military forces trained and ready for homeland security is

no less important than for contingencies overseas

Acknowledgments

This report benefited from the support and assistance of many people

in the Army and at RAND We appreciate the support of our sponsor, GEN Dan K Mc Neill, Commander of FORSCOM, and especially thank LTC Dan Haveman and others in the Homeland Defense Divi-sion for their good counsel and for the information they provided on the Army’s response to Hurricane Katrina and on current planning for future domestic emergencies We would like to thank those in the Defense Department, U.S Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the National Guard Bureau, and the U.S Army Center for Army Lessons Learned who provided us with background information on Hurricane Katrina We also want to thank our RAND colleague Rick Brennan, who contributed to our research and analysis along the way, and to Jack Riley and Jim Carafano who provided thoughtful and careful reviews

of an early draft of this work Special thanks as well to our editor, Steve Kistler, whose careful review and revision greatly improved our mon-graph, and to Steve Bloodsworth, our terrific graphic artist The con-tent and conclusions of this work, however, remain solely the responsi-bility of the authors

Abbreviations

explosive

xviii Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations

Element

Team

1 Jerry D Jarrell, Max Mayfield, Edward N Rappaport, and Christopher W Landsea,

“The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United States Hurricanes from 1900 to 2000,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Technical Memorandum NWS TPC-1, October 2001.

2 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, February

2006, p 5.

3 “New Orleans Braces for Monster Hurricane,” CNN.com, August 29, 2005.

4 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, p 5.

5 National Hurricane Center, 11 AM Advisory, August 28, 2005.

2 Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations

of the city As a result, Hurricane Katrina brought with it not only the problems that accompany a “typical” hurricane, but also an enormous flood in New Orleans

In the end, Hurricane Katrina created over $96 billion in property damage, destroyed an estimated 300,000 homes, produced 118 mil-lion cubic yards of debris, displaced over 770,000 people, and killed an estimated 1,330 people In comparison, Hurricane Andrew (one of the costliest U.S natural disasters before Hurricane Katrina) created $33 billion in property damage, destroyed approximately 80,000 homes, produced 20 million cubic yards of debris, displaced approximately 250,000 people, and killed approximately 60 people About 80 per-cent of the fatalities attributable to Hurricane Katrina occurred in the New Orleans metropolitan area; 231 fatalities occurred in Mississippi.6

Figure 1.1 provides a comparison of the characteristics of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Andrew

Figure 1.1

Characteristics of Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Katrina

SOURCE: The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane

Katrina: Lessons Learned, February 2006, pp 5–9.

RAND MG603-1.1

Number of

displaced people (cubic yards)Debris

Number of dwellings destroyed

Property damage (2005 $)

250,000 20M 80,000

$33B

60 1,330

6 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, pp 7-8.

Introduction 3

The nation’s response to Hurricane Katrina was impressive Figure 1.2 shows three representative statistics The first is the cumulative number of people rescued by civilian and military responders at the end

of four selected days, with a total of nearly 50,000 over the two weeks

of the response Second is the total number of people provided with emergency shelter at the end of each selected day, with nearly 250,000

at the peak of the response The third is the cumulative number of people evacuated by the end of each selected day, with a total of nearly 80,000 over the course of the response This number does not include those people who evacuated on their own and in advance of hurricane landfall

Figure 1.2

Accomplishments in Response to Hurricane Katrina

SOURCE: U.S Department of Homeland Security, Situation Reports, August 29, 2005 through September 10, 2005.

(9-3) Evacuation

of Superdome/

Convention Center ends

(9-9) Evacuations completed

0

Cumulative number of people rescued at the end of each day

Total number of people provided with emergency shelter at

the end of each day

Cumulative number of people evacuated by the end of each day

4 Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations

The magnitude of the response requirements encountered after Hurricane Katrina is similar to what the country might be faced with

in a broad range of emergencies, both natural and man-made Table 1.1 compares the effects and response requirements of Hurricane Katrina with what the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Planning Sce-narios see as the potential effects and response requirements of nuclear, radiological, and biological terrorist attacks and of a major earthquake.7

Although Hurricane Katrina’s death toll—over 1,300—makes it one

of the deadlier hurricanes in U.S history, the possible death tolls from nuclear and biological terrorist attacks could well be higher In terms of possible destruction of infrastructure and utilities, Hurricane Katrina seems to be neither the highest nor the lowest; its effects are well within the range of what we might expect in these other types of domestic emergencies While the requirement for the evacuation of about two million people during and after Hurricane Katrina seems higher than what would be expected following a terrorist attack, it is worth remem-bering that of those 2 million people, 1.2 million evacuated in the days before Hurricane Katrina made landfall.8 Requirements for casu-alty care during the response to Hurricane Katrina were lower than the expected requirements of most of the terrorist attack scenarios and the earthquake shown in Table 1.1 It is reasonable to believe that the ample warning time prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall and the extensive evacuations before the storm helped to keep the requirements for evacuation support lower than they might have been; this warning time also allowed state and local medical responders to prepare for the event Not having such warning in the future could increase casualty-care requirements

In summary, Hurricane Katrina provides a useful case study from which to draw lessons for the nation’s and the Army’s planning and

7 U.S Department of Homeland Security, “National Planning Scenarios,” Draft Version 20.2, April 2005.

8 See Johnny B Bradberry, “Written Testimony of Johnny B Bradberry, Secretary, La Department of Transportation and Development Secretary,” Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, U.S Senate Committee on Home-

land Security and Governmental Affairs, January 31, 2006.

Radiological Attack

Nuclear Detonation

Biological Attack: Anthrax

Biological Attack: Plague

Natural Disaster: Major Earthquake

Description A dirty bomb

containing cesium-137 is detonated in a moderate-to- large city

10-kiloton improvised nuclear device is detonated in the business district

of a large city

Aerosolized anthrax is released in a major urban area

Pneumonic plague bacteria is released in three main areas of a major city

An earthquake measuring 7.2

on the Richter scale hits a major metropolitan area and is followed by

an 8.0 aftershock Destruction

Fatalities 1,349 180 Widely variable;

possibly tens of thousands

13,000 2,500 1,400

Infrastructure 93,000 sq miles Transportation

severely hampered by checkpoints;

extensive contamination

of about 36 city blocks

Total within radius of 5 to 1 mile; significant damage in larger area

Minimal damage

None 150,000 buildings

destroyed, 1 million damaged; significant transportation disruptions

Utilities 2.5 million

without power

Some damage near the explosion

Electrical power and tele- communications out for a couple of weeks; damaged

in 3-mile radius

Minimal damage

No damage Widespread

water, gas, electricity, and communication outages

Radiological Attack

Nuclear Detonation

Biological Attack: Anthrax

Biological Attack: Plague

Natural Disaster: Major Earthquake

decontaminating thousands of evacuees

Decontamination and short- and long-term care for tens of thousands

Care for over 325,000 exposures

Care for over 10,000 ill victims

Over 100,000 injuries, 18,000 hospitalizations;

many medical facilities damaged

SOURCES: For Hurricane Katrina, see The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane; U.S Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation

Still Unprepared, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, D.C.: U.S Senate, May

6, 2002; U.S House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the

Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, February 2006; U.S Department

of Homeland Security, “Highlights of United States Government Response to the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,” press release,

September 10, 2005; Senator John W Warner, “Statement Made on the Senate Floor: DOD Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts,”

September 15, 2005 For the scenarios, see U.S Homeland Security Council, “Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries,” July 2004.

Table 1.1—Continued

in all levels of government—federal, state, and local—to mistakes in the coordination of operations across different levels of government, between military and civilian organizations, and among military units Deficiencies in communications and the lack of information about what was happening were among the underlying reasons for poor coor-dination and planning The congressional reports focus prominently

on the lack of leadership, again at all levels of government

Literally thousands of recommendations have been made by those investigating the response to Hurricane Katrina, and many steps have been taken or are under way that will improve the nation’s plans and capabilities for responding to future catastrophic domestic emergen-cies Many of these are tailored specifically to future hurricanes, but others are applicable to all types of potential domestic emergencies.Underlying all of these lessons and recommendations is the assumption that had things been done differently in any given area, the response to Hurricane Katrina would have been more effective Having researched what happened in detail, our own analysis of the nation’s response to the storm began by looking for those problems that affected the outcome of the response in a major way (even though

it is difficult to demonstrate a precise link between a single aspect of such a complex and enormous response and the characteristics of the outcome) We appreciate that the very nature of a catastrophic disaster will cause a gap between needs and resources, a gap that can never be totally eliminated

The single largest problem encountered in the response to ricane Katrina was the speed with which civilian local, state, and fed-

Hur-8 Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations

eral government organizations were overwhelmed The various learned reports cover in detail the lack of plans, deficiencies in certain types of response capabilities, and organizational inadequacies How-ever, the response was also affected in a major way by what the military was and was not able to accomplish in the critical first few days The National Guard response was unprecedented in its size and quickness Active-duty units from all the services responded, with the combined number of active and reserve forces growing to over 65,000 by the peak of response efforts Nevertheless, the evacuations from the New Orleans Superdome and convention center were not completed until five days after hurricane landfall, and search and rescue operations across Louisiana and Mississippi were not finished until the end of the second week of the response Therefore, our analysis focused on the considerations that influenced the timing and size of the deployments

lessons-of the National Guard and active-duty forces and the lack lessons-of a unified command and control (C2) structure for the military’s response efforts Drawing on the lessons learned in the military’s response to Hurricane Katrina, we defined and analyzed the critical issues for future Army disaster response planning and operations

One problem that was often raised in the lessons-learned reports

is the lack of “situational awareness” during the Hurricane Katrina response,9 so we asked: what kinds of information about the relief needs were available to officials from DHS, Joint Task Force (JTF)-Katrina, the Louisiana emergency offices, and other military staffs during the critical first few days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall? We dis-covered that there was considerable information about the dire straits

of people and the significant destruction to infrastructure, enough information for officials to understand the capabilities required for an effective response See the appendix for a description of our analysis and findings on situational awareness

9 For example, the White House report states that the “lack of communications and ational awareness had a debilitating effect on the Federal response” and that the Secretary

situ-of Homeland Security “lacked real-time, accurate situational awareness.” The White House,

The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, pp 50, 52.

Introduction 9

Report Organization

Chapter Two presents background information on how the nation is organized to respond to domestic emergencies and what happened during the nation’s preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina Chapter Three focuses on the critical problems that arose in the mili-tary during the response stage.10 While there are lessons to be learned from all stages of such an event, we saw the utility in using the Hur-ricane Katrina response-stage case to help prepare for future situa-tions that might arise with little or no warning We also narrowed our focus to events in Mississippi and Louisiana, and then more specifi-cally to the response in New Orleans This sets the stage for Chapter Four, which offers our assessment of the implications of the Hurricane Katrina response effort for Army planning This chapter outlines the changes that will need to be made to enable the military to respond more quickly and effectively to such events in the future Chapter Five presents our conclusions and recommendations, and the Appendix pro-vides our findings as to the types of information that were available to decisionmakers across the government as they developed the response

to Hurricane Katrina

The study benefited from the many lessons-learned reports that have been produced by organizations throughout the government, as well as from the hours of congressional testimony of participants in the Hurricane Katrina response We also received copies of the daily briefings that senior officials were given over the course of the response These briefings were given to officials from DHS and the Federal Emer-gency Management Agency (FEMA); the offices of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Department of the Army; in the U.S Department of Defense (DoD) U.S Northern Command (NORTH-COM), U.S Forces Command (FORSCOM), and JTF-Katrina; the

10 In the case of a hurricane, there is time for preparations After landfall, there is a period— often referred to as the response stage—that includes initial search and rescue operations, the provision of relief supplies, and the restoration of various types of infrastructure This period

is followed by the recovery stage, when civilian agencies and private sector groups commence long-term reconstruction Some would argue that in the case of a hurricane (when warning

is available), the response stage actually begins prior to hurricane landfall

10 Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations

National Guard Bureau (NGB); and the governor’s and emergency offices in Louisiana

In this book, we use the acronym HLS (homeland security) to denote military activities in support of civilian organizations, i.e., those involved in preventing and responding to terrorist attacks as well as in responding to other kinds of domestic emergencies, including natural disasters and civil disturbances This is a broader definition of HLS than is found in National Strategy for Homeland Security, which focuses

only on counterterrorism within the United States.11 Our definition of HLS encompasses what DoD, in its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, calls Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and

what Joint Publication 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines as civil support (“Department of

Defense support to U.S civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities”).12

11 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, p 2.

12 U.S Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support,

Washing-ton, D.C.: U.S Department of Defense, June 2005; Joint Publication 1-02, The Department

of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, April

12, 2001, as ammended through March 22, 2007.

DHS was established by Congress in 2002, and in 2003 it assumed primary control of federal activities related to disaster management FEMA, which became a part of DHS in 2003, is the primary agency tasked with the coordination of federal disaster assistance FEMA is not, for the most part, an operational provider of assistance Rather, FEMA’s main role is to manage the response efforts of the rest of the federal government.1

The nation’s planning and response to natural and man-made disasters is outlined in the National Response Plan (NRP), which DHS

1 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, p 16.

12 Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations

released in 2004 and revised in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.2

The NRP, consistent with the U.S Constitution, recognizes that ning and preparing for and responding to natural and other disasters are primarily responsibilities of the states Local authorities request assistance from the state if local resources are overwhelmed, and state officials request assistance from the federal government if the state gov-ernment is in turn overwhelmed

plan-The NRP is based on the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which outlines a consistent framework for incident manage-ment across the country, regardless of the level of government The central component of the NIMS is the Incident Command System, which provides the means to coordinate a response through five major functional areas: Command, Planning, Operations, Logistics, and

and scalable enough to coordinate the response to any size disaster, and it helps to maintain common terminology and chains of command

to avoid confusion or overlap in response efforts among agencies and individuals In addition, the NRP uses the Emergency Support Func-tion framework, which divides topical responsibilities into at least 15

command structure for dealing with all hazards—both man-made and natural—across local, state, and federal jurisdictions

The NRP also provides a Principal Federal Officer (PFO), appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, to coordinate overall

2 See U.S Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, December 2004,

and U.S Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Change to the National Response Plan,

Communica-Background 13

federal incident management and assistance activities across the trum of prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.5 However, the PFO does not direct or replace the incident command structure established at the incident, nor does the PFO have directive author-ity over other federal officials The primary piece of federal legislation covering the provision of federal disaster aid is the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act The Stafford Act reiter-ates the philosophy that in a disaster, local resources should be used first, then state resources, and finally federal resources The Stafford Act also outlines the process by which state governors can request assis-tance from the federal government The NRP stipulates that a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) is responsible for managing and coordi-nating federal resource activities related to Stafford Act disasters.6

spec-The Joint Field Office (JFO) is a temporary federal facility lished locally at the time of a disaster to coordinate operational federal assistance activities to the affected areas The JFO is responsible for providing a common operating picture to all federal agencies.7 If DoD appoints a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) in an emergency, this person serves as DoD’s single point of contact at the JFO.8

estab-The NRP distinguishes between incident responses that require management by the Secretary of Homeland Security—termed Inci-dents of National Significance—and the majority of incident responses, which are handled by states and local authorities.9 There is also a Cata-strophic Incident Annex to the NRP; this annex addresses no-notice or

5 DHS National Response Plan, p 33.

6 DHS, National Response Plan, p 33 In 2006, the National Response Plan was changed

in order to provide the Secretary with the ability, during incidents other than terrorism, to combine the roles of the PFO and FCO DHS, Notice of Change to the National Response Plan, p 6.

7 DHS, National Response Plan, p 16 In the May 25, 2006, Notice of Change to the National Response Plan there is a call for the collocation of DoD Joint Task Force headquarters with

the PFO at the JFO whenever possible DHS, Notice of Change to the National Response Plan,

p 6.

8 DHS, National Response Plan, p 37.

9 DHS, Notice of Change to the National Response Plan, p 14.

14 Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations

short-notice incidents of catastrophic size for which anticipatory ning and prepositioning is precluded.10

plan-Military forces are often called upon to respond to disasters and emergency situations, as they offer a large number of readily accessible personnel and have preexisting control structures and communications and transportation assets In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, both active-duty and National Guard forces assisted response efforts in vari-ous capacities The following provides a simplified overview of how military forces can be accessed and used in such situations.11

Active-Duty Military

Active-duty military forces fall under the command of the President

of the United States and are available to support state and local civil authorities There are, however, some restrictions on the role of federal troops in certain situations In particular, federal troops are subject to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which restricts their involvement in law-enforcement activities.12 Even when federal troops are used to sup-

10 DHS, Notice of Change to the National Response Plan, p 6.

11 Current federal law generally forbids the use of the U.S Army Reserve (USAR) for sions within the United States, and given the existing requirements for overseas operations, these forces were for the most part not called upon to respond to Hurricane Katrina Until

mis-2002, Section 12304 of Title 10 contained an express restriction on the authority of the retary of Defense to call members or units of the federal reserve components to active duty

Sec-to execute provisions of the Insurrection Statutes or Sec-to otherwise “provide assistance Sec-to either the Federal Government or a State in time of a serious natural or man-made disaster, acci- dent, or catastrophe.” The rationale for that prohibition was that the National Guard is the appropriate entity for such purposes, including activities following its call to federal service Section 514 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 expanded the authority for a reserve call-up under section 12304 to include “a terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack in the United States that results, or could result, in catastrophic loss of life

or property.” The House-Senate conference on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 substituted the word “significant” for “catastrophic,” with the result being

an even-further expansion of the federal government’s authority to respond to most ist incidents Gary Cecchine et al., Triage for Civil Support: Using Military Medical Assets

terror-to Respond terror-to Terrorist Attacks, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-217-OSD,

2004.

12 The restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act and related legislation are complicated and often subject to interpretation For background on these issues, see Lynn E Davis et al., Army Forces for Homeland Security, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-221-A, 2004,

Background 15

port state or local governments, they still receive federal pay and efits As with other federal assets, active-duty military forces are gener-ally called upon to respond to domestic disasters only when local and state assets, including the National Guard, are overwhelmed

ben-The National Guard

National Guard forces fall under the command of the governor of the state or territory in which they are based Governors can call National Guard forces to state active duty to provide assistance during disasters The National Guard forces remain under the control of the governor and are generally paid by their state or territory, although there is pro-vision under Title 32 of the U.S Code for the federal government to pay the costs of National Guard forces operating under the control of their governor When Guard forces receive pay and benefits from the federal government but remain under the control of the governor, they are not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act and so can perform law-enforcement duties

National Guard forces can be federalized under Title 10 of the U.S Code In this case, the president, not the governor, controls Guard forces, and they receive federal pay and benefits like their active-duty counterparts However, they are also subject to the restrictions imposed

by the Posse Comitatus Act and, therefore, cannot normally perform law-enforcement duties within the United States

How the Nation Prepared and Responded to Hurricane Katrina

Before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, response preparations were made in the states and across the federal government For the most part, these preparations followed plans that were already in place; their

pp 59–67; and U.S Government Accountability Office, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S Forces for Domestic Military Missions, GAO-03-670, Washington,

D.C.: U.S Government Accountability Office, July 2003.

16 Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations

characteristics are reported in detail in the various lessons-learned reports.13

The story of Hurricane Katrina began on Tuesday, August 23,

2005, when the National Hurricane Center announced that tropical depression 12 had formed over the southeastern Bahamas, with maxi-mum sustained winds near 35 mph The DoD conducted an inven-tory of its response capabilities and established a “crisis action cell” to allow for rapid processing of FEMA requests FEMA activated its hur-ricane liaison team, and NORTHCOM issued its first warning orders

to Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, State gency Preparedness Officers, and the Senior Army Advisors (National Guard) in the states expected to be affected As the hurricane turned toward New Orleans on Friday, August 26, Louisiana Governor Kath-leen Blanco activated Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and declared a state of emergency.14 Governor Haley Barbour did the same in Mississippi.15 Both states also began activating their National Guards NORTHCOM issued an execute order, setting initial DoD relief actions into motion The next day, evacuations began in New Orleans, FEMA teams were deployed, and Governor Blanco wrote a letter to President Bush requesting that he declare a state of emergency for Louisiana, thus releasing the federal aid provided for under the Stafford Act

Emer-This same day, President Bush officially declared a state of gency in Louisiana and ordered federal aid to begin flowing to the state The next day, Sunday, August 28, he did the same for Missis-sippi FEMA Director Michael Brown deployed to Louisiana, DCOs deployed to Mississippi and Louisiana, and lead elements of what would become JTF-Katrina moved into Mississippi

emer-13 Our chronology of events draws upon The White House, The Federal Response to ricane Katrina; U.S Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared; U.S House, A Failure of Initiative.

Hur-14 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Proclamation No 48 KBB 2005, Baton Rouge, La.,

August 26, 2005; U.S House, A Failure of Initiative, p 64.

15 Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi, Executive Order No 939, August 26, 2005; U.S

House, A Failure of Initiative, p 60.

Background 17

At 7:00 AM EDT on August 29, Hurricane Katrina made landfall near Buras, Louisiana, as a very strong Category Three storm Accounts vary as to when the levees surrounding New Orleans were breached or overtopped, but as early as 9:12 AM EDT, the National Weather Ser-vice received a report of a levee breach and shortly thereafter issued a flash flood warning Mid-morning, President Bush declared Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama federal disaster areas

With dawn the day after the storm came the realization of how extensive the devastation was Later that day, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff declared Hurricane Katrina to be an Incident

of National Significance and appointed Michael Brown as the PFO LTG Russel Honoré was designated as commander of JTF-Katrina

On that same day, thousands of National Guard forces began flowing into Mississippi and Louisiana, with about 45,000 in the region by the end of the second week of the response

On the third day after hurricane landfall, September 1, 2005, the evacuation of the New Orleans Superdome began; two days later, the evacuations of the Superdome and the convention center were com-plete That day, September 3, President Bush ordered the deployment

of 7,200 active-duty Army and Marine land forces to Louisiana to port the ongoing search and rescue operations and the provision of relief supplies In the next week, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England signed a memorandum approving the use of Title 32 funds to support Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts, making their applica-bility retroactive to the date of Hurricane landfall By September 10, all the evacuations had been completed and major aid and reconstruc-tion efforts were under way The recovery stage had begun

The Military Response to Hurricane Katrina

Military forces played a critical role in the nation’s response to cane Katrina, so we initially focused our research on the timeliness and robustness of the deployments of the National Guard and active-duty forces, as well as on the characteristics of the military C2 structure used during the response We looked for the lessons to be learned, highlight-ing both accomplishments and problems

Hurri-The National Guard Response

State governors have a long history of calling on their National Guard

to respond to domestic emergencies The response of the National Guard in Hurricane Katrina is praised for its size and comprehensive-ness in the various lessons-learned reports issued to date.1 It is criti-cized for its perceived slowness in the House lessons-learned report,

“fragmented deployment system” in the White House report, and for its lack of coordination with other military responses in the Senate report.2 What were the considerations that influenced the size and timing of the National Guard response?

The governors of Louisiana and Mississippi began mobilizing their Army and Air National Guard in advance of Hurricane Katrina’s land-

1 U.S Senate, Hurricane Katrina, Chapter 26

2 U.S House, A Failure of Initiative, p 205; The White House, The Federal Response to ricane Katrina, p 43; U.S Senate, Hurricane Katrina, pp 26–50.

Hur-20 Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations

fall.3 As Table 3.1 indicates, by hurricane landfall, almost all available Louisiana National Guard forces were called up to state active duty The size of the mobilization effected by the Louisiana governor was smaller than it might have been, as Louisiana had a brigade combat team mobilized and in the process of redeploying from Iraq.4 Of those available in Mississippi, a much smaller number were called up;5 Mis-sissippi also had a brigade combat team redeploying from Iraq at the time the storm hit

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the buildup in Mississippi and ana of Army National Guard forces over the first week of the response, showing both those from Louisiana and Mississippi and those from other states that were operating through the Emergency Management

Number redeploying from Iraq 3,800 2,700

Number available to governor

3 According to the White House report, three days before landfall some 2,000 personnel were activated in Louisiana and 750 in Mississippi The White House, The Federal Response