Introduction As airplanes grow in size, so do the forces needed to move the flight controls … thus the need to transmit larger amount of power Ram Air Turbine Pump Hydraulic Storage/
Trang 1Aircraft Hydraulic System Design
Peter A Stricker, PE
Product Sales Manager
Eaton Aerospace Hydraulic Systems Division
August 20, 2010
Trang 2Purpose
design principles for civil aircraft
architectures on common aircraft
Trang 3electric” and “all electric” architectures
Conclusions
Trang 4Introduction
As airplanes grow in size, so
do the forces needed to move the
flight controls … thus the need to
transmit larger amount of power
Ram Air Turbine Pump
Hydraulic Storage/Conditioning
Engine Pump
Electric Generator
Electric Motorpump
Flight Control Actuators
Air Turbine Pump
Hydraulic system
transmits and controls
power from engine to
flight control actuators
2
Pilot inputs are transmitted to remote actuators and amplified
pneumatically
5
Pilot Inputs
Trang 5Introduction
aerodynamic forces that drive control surface size and loading
• A380 – 1.25 million lb MTOW – extensive use of hydraulics
• Cessna 172 – 2500 lb MTOW – no hydraulics – all manual
Trang 6Controlling Aircraft Motion
Primary Flight Controls
Definition of Airplane Axes
1 Ailerons control roll
2 Elevators control pitch
1
Trang 7Controlling Aircraft Motion
Secondary Flight Controls
• Flaps (Trailing Edge), slats (LE Flaps)
increase area and camber of wing
• permit low speed flight
Flight Spoilers / Speed Brakes: permit steeper
descent and augment ailerons at low speed
when deployed on only one wing
Ground Spoilers: Enhance deceleration on
ground (not deployed in flight)
Trim Controls:
• Stabilizer (pitch), roll and rudder (yaw) trim to
balance controls for desired flight condition
Trang 8Example of Flight Controls (A320)
REF: A320 FLIGHT CREW OPERATING MANUAL CHAPTER 1.27 - FLIGHT CONTROLS
PRIMARY SECONDARY
Trang 9Why use Hydraulics?
• Effective and efficient method of power amplification
• Small control effort results in a large power output
• Precise control of load rate, position and magnitude
• Infinitely variable rotary or linear motion control
• Adjustable limits / reversible direction / fast response
• Ability to handle multiple loads simultaneously
• Smooth, vibration free power output
• Little impact from load variation
• Hydraulic fluid transmission medium
Trang 10• Extension, retraction, locking, steering, braking
• Primary flight controls
• Rudder, elevator, aileron, active (multi-function)
spoiler
• Secondary flight controls
• high lift (flap / slat), horizontal stabilizer, spoiler, thrust
Landing Gear
Nosewheel Steering
Trang 11Sources of Hydraulic Power
Ram Air Turbine
AC Electric Motorpump
Maintenance-free Accumulator Engine Driven Pump
• Pump attached to electric motors, either AC or DC
• Generally used as backup or as auxiliary power
• Electric driven powerpack used for powering actuation zones
• Used for ground check-out or actuating doors when engines are not running
Pneumatic
• Bleed Air turbine driven pump used for backup power
• Ram Air Turbine driven pump deployed when all engines are inoperative and uses ram air to drive the pump
• Accumulator provides high transient power by releasing stored energy, also used for emergency and parking brake
Trang 12Key Hydraulic System Design Drivers
• High Level certification requirement per aviation
regulations:
Maintain control of the aircraft under all normal and
anticipated failure conditions
• Many system architectures * and design approaches exist to meet this high level requirement – aircraft
designer has to certify to airworthiness regulators by analysis and test that his solution meets requirements
Arrangement and interconnection of hydraulic power sources and consumers in a manner that meets requirements for
controllability of aircraft
Trang 13Considerations for Hydraulic System Design
to meet System Safety Requirements
• Redundancy in case of failures must be
designed into system
• Any and every component will fail during life of
aircraft
• Manual control system requires less
redundancy
Fly-by-wire (FBW) requires more redundancy
• Level of redundancy necessary evaluated per
methodology described in ARP4761
• Safety Assessment Tools
• Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis –
computes failure rates and failure criticalities of
individual components and systems by
considering all failure modes
• Fault Tree Analysis – computes failure rates
and probabilities of various combinations of
failure modes
• Markov Analysis – computes failure rates and
criticality of various chains of events
• Common Cause Analysis – evaluates failures
that can impact multiple components and
systems
• Principal failure modes considered
• Single system or component failure
• Multiple system or component failures occurring simultaneously
• Dormant failures of components or subsystems that only operate in emergencies
• Common mode failures – single failures that can impact multiple systems
• Examples of failure cases to be considered
• One engine shuts down during take-off – need
to retract landing gear rapidly
• Engine rotor bursts – damage to and loss of multiple hydraulic systems
• Rejected take-off – deploy thrust reversers, spoilers and brakes rapidly
• All engines fail in flight – need to land safely without main hydraulic and electric power sources
Trang 14Civil Aircraft System Safety Standards
(Applies to all aircraft systems)
Failure
Criticality Failure Characteristics
Probability of Occurrence
Design Standard
Minor Normal, nuisance and/or possibly requiring
emergency procedures
Reasonably
Major Reduction in safety margin, increased crew
workload, may result in some injuries
Hazardous Extreme reduction in safety margin, extended
crew workload, major damage to aircraft and possible injury and deaths
Extremely remote P ≤ 10-7
Catastrophic Loss of aircraft with multiple deaths Extremely
improbable P ≤ 10-9
Examples
Minor: Single hydraulic system fails
Major: Two (out of 3) hydraulic systems fail
Hazardous: All hydraulic sources fail, except RAT or APU (US1549 Hudson River A320 – 2009)
Catastrophic: All hydraulic systems fail (UA232 DC-10 Sioux City – 1989)
Trang 15System Design Philosophy
Conventional Central System Architecture
• Multiple independent centralized power
systems
• Each engine drives dedicated pump(s),
augmented by independently powered
pumps – electric, pneumatic
• No fluid transfer between systems to
maintain integrity
• System segregation
• Route lines and locate components far
apart to prevent single rotor or tire burst
from impacting multiple systems
• Multiple control channels for critical
functions
• Each flight control needs multiple
independent actuators or control
surfaces
• Fail-safe failure modes – e.g., landing
gear can extend by gravity and be
locked down mechanically
EMP
EMP RAT
ROLL 2 PITCH 2 YAW 2 OTHERS
EMP
ROLL 3 PITCH 3 YAW 3 LNDG GR
EMRG BRK NORM BRK
NSWL STRG ADP
OTHERS
Trang 16System Design Philosophy
More Electric Architecture
• Two independent centralized power
systems + Zonal & Dedicated
Actuators
• Each engine drives dedicated pump(s),
augmented by independently powered
pumps – electric, pneumatic
• No fluid transfer between systems to
maintain integrity
• System segregation
• Route lines and locate components far
apart to prevent single rotor or tire burst
to impact multiple systems
• Third System replaced by one or more
local and dedicated electric systems
• Tail zonal system for pitch, yaw
• Aileron actuators for roll
• Electric driven hydraulic powerpack for
emergency landing gear and brake
• Examples: Airbus A380, Boeing 787
LEFT ENG.
SYSTEM 1
RIGHT ENG SYSTEM 2
ROLL 1 PITCH 1 YAW 1 OTHERS
EMP
GEN1 RAT
ROLL 2 PITCH 2 YAW 2 OTHERS
EMP
ROLL 3
ZONAL PITCH 3 YAW 3
NORM BRK
EMRG BRK LNDG GR
NW STRG
GEN2
EDP Engine Driven Pump EMP Electric Motor Pump
GEN Electric Generator
RAT Ram Air Turbine Generator
Electric Channel
OTHERS
ELECTRICAL ACTUATORS
LG / BRK EMERG POWER
Trang 17System Design Philosophy
All Electric Architecture
“Holy Grail” of aircraft power distribution ….
capable of high power / high power density generation,
running at engine speed – typically 40,000 rpm
• Electric power will replace all hydraulic and pneumatic power for all flight controls, environmental controls, de-icing, etc.
• Flight control actuators will like remain hydraulic, using
Electro-Hydrostatic Actuators (EHA) or local hydraulic
Trang 18Fly-by-Wire (FBW) Systems
Fly-by-Wire
• Pilot input read by computers
• Computer provides input to electrohydraulic flight control actuator
• Control laws include
• Enhanced logic to automate many functions
• Artificial damping and stability
• Flight Envelope Protection to prevent airframe from exceeding structural limits
• Multiple computers and actuators provide sufficient redundancy – no manual reversion
Conventional Mechanical
• Pilot input mechanically connected to flight control
hydraulic servo-actuator by cables, linkages, bellcranks, etc
• Servo-actuator follows pilot command with high
force output
• Autopilot input mechanically summed
• Manual reversion in case of loss of hydraulics or
Trang 19Principal System Interfaces
Electrical power variations
under normal and all
demanding flow
Avionics
Signals from pressure, temperature, fluid quantity sensors
Trang 20ir 200
Learj
et 45
BAe Jetstre
Gulfstream
G650
s A321
Boein
g 757-300Airbu
s A330-300
Boein
g 777-300ER
Boein
g 747-400E
RAirbu
s A380
Aircraft Hydraulic Architectures
Comparative Aircraft Weights
Increasing Hydraulic System Complexity
Trang 21Aircraft Hydraulic Architectures
Example Block Diagrams – Learjet 40/45
Flight Controls: Manual
Key Features
• One main system fed by 2 EDP’s
• Emergency system fed by DC electric pump
• Common partitioned reservoir (air/oil)
• Selector valve allows flaps, landing gear,
nosewheel steering to operate from main or
• All Power-out: Manual flight controls; LG extends by
gravity with electric pump assist; emergency flap
extends by electric pump; Emergency brake energy
stored in accumulator for safe stopping
Mid-Size Jet
Trang 22Aircraft Hydraulic Architectures
Example Block Diagrams – Hawker 4000
Flight Controls: Hydraulic with manual reversion
exc Rudder, which is Fly-by-Wire (FBW)
Key Features
• Two independent systems
• Bi-directional PTU to transfer power between
systems without transferring fluid
• Electrically powered hydraulic power-pack for
Emergency Rudder System (ERS)
Safety / Redundancy
• All primary flight controls 2-channel; rudder has additional backup powerpack; others manual reversion
• Engine-out take-off: PTU transfers power from system #1 to #2 to retract LG
• Rotorburst: Emergency Rudder System is located outside burst area
• All Power-out: ERS runs off battery; others manual;
LG extends by gravity
Super Mid Size
REF.: EATON C5-38A 04/2003
Trang 23Aircraft Hydraulic Architectures
Example Block Diagrams – Airbus A320/321
MTOW (A321): 206,000 lb
Flight Controls: HydraulicFBW
Key Features
• 3 independent systems
• 2 main systems with EDP
1 main system also includes backup EMP &
hand pump for cargo door
3rd system has EMP and RAT pump
• Bi-directional PTU to transfer power between
primary systems without transferring fluid
Trang 24Aircraft Hydraulic Architectures
Example Block Diagrams – Boeing 777
LEFT SYSTEM
Wide Body
RIGHT SYSTEM CENTER SYSTEM
MTOW (B777-300ER): 660,000 lb
Flight Controls: Hydraulic FBW
Key Features
• 3 independent systems
• 2 main systems with EDP + EMP each
• 3rd system with 2 EMPs, 2 engine bleed
air-driven (engine bleed air) pumps, + RAT pump
Safety / Redundancy
• All primary flight controls have 3 independent
channels
• Engine-out take-off: One air driven pump and
EMP available in system 3 to retract LG
• Rotorburst: Three systems sufficiently
segregated
• All Power-out: RAT pump powers center
system; LG extends by gravity
REF.: AIR5005 (SAE)
Trang 25Aircraft Hydraulic Architectures
Example Block Diagrams – Airbus A380
Wide Body
Flight Controls: FBW (2H + 1E channel)
Key Features / Redundancies
• Two independent hydraulic systems+ one electric system (backup)
• Primary hydraulic power supplied by 4 EDP’s per system
Trang 26Conclusions
• Aircraft hydraulic systems are designed for
high levels of safety using multiple levels of
redundancy
• Fly-by-wire systems require higher levels of
redundancy than manual systems to maintain same levels of safety
• System complexity increases with aircraft
weight
Trang 27Suggested References
Federal Aviation Regulations
FAR Part 25: Airworthiness Standards for
Transport Category Airplanes
FAR Part 23: Airworthiness Standards for
Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and Commuter
Category Airplanes
FAR Part 21: Certification Procedures For
Products And Parts
AC 25.1309-1A System Design and
Analysis Advisory Circular, 1998
Aerospace Recommended Practices (SAE)
ARP4761: Guidelines and Methods for
Conducting the Safety Assessment
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and
Equipment
ARP 4754: Certification Considerations for
Highly-Integrated or Complex Aircraft
Systems
Aerospace Information Reports (SAE)
AIR5005: Aerospace - Commercial Aircraft Hydraulic Systems
Radio Technical Committee Association (RTCA)
DO-178: Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification (incl Errata Issued 3-26-99) DO-254: Design Assurance Guidance For Airborne Electronic Hardware
Text
Moir & Seabridge: Aircraft Systems – Mechanical, Electrical and Avionics Subsystems Integration 3rd Edition, Wiley 2008