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introduction to cryptography - principles & applications, 2nd ed.

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Tiêu đề Introduction to Cryptography Principles & Applications
Tác giả Hans Delfs, Helmut Knebl
Trường học Georg-Simon-Ohm University of Applied Sciences Nürnberg
Chuyên ngành Information Security and Cryptography
Thể loại Textbook
Năm xuất bản 2007
Thành phố Nürnberg
Định dạng
Số trang 372
Dung lượng 2,63 MB

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[...]... practice to use public-key encryption for this purpose 1.2 The Objectives of Cryptography Providing confidentiality is not the only objective of cryptography Cryptography is also used to provide solutions for other problems: 1 Data integrity The receiver of a message should be able to check whether the message was modified during transmission, either accidentally or deliberately No one should be able to substitute... hash value In schemes 3 For the long history of cryptography, see [Kahn67] 4 1 Introduction like the famous RSA (named after its inventors: Rivest, Shamir and Adleman), the decryption algorithm is used to generate signatures and the encryption algorithm is used to verify them This approach to digital signatures is therefore often referred to as the “hash-then-decrypt” paradigm (see Section 3.4.5 for... Authentication The receiver of a message should be able to verify its origin No one should be able to send a message to Bob and pretend to 1.2 The Objectives of Cryptography 3 be Alice (data origin authentication) When initiating a communication, Alice and Bob should be able to identify each other (entity authentication) 3 Non-repudiation The sender should not be able to later deny that she sent a message If messages... somehow make repeated use of it 5 Chosen- and adaptively-chosen-ciphertext attack These two attacks are similar to the above plaintext attacks Eve can choose ciphertexts and gets the corresponding plaintexts She has access to the decryption device 1.4 Cryptographic Protocols Encryption and decryption algorithms, cryptographic hash functions or pseudorandom generators (see Section 2.1, Chapter 8) are... adversary, as usual referred to here as Eve, might be able to modify the message during transmission in such a way that the legitimate recipient Bob does not detect the manipulation One objective of cryptography is to provide methods for preventing such attacks Other objectives are discussed in Section 1.2 1.1 Encryption and Secrecy The fundamental and classical task of cryptography is to provide confidentiality... follows: 1.4 Cryptographic Protocols 5 1 Ciphertext-only attack Eve has the ability to obtain ciphertexts This is likely to be the case in any encryption situation Even if Eve cannot perform the more sophisticated attacks described below, one must assume that she can get access to encrypted messages An encryption method that cannot resist a ciphertext-only attack is completely insecure 2 Known-plaintext... Chapter 2 In 1976, W Diffie and M.E Hellman published their famous paper, New Directions in Cryptography ([DifHel76]) There they introduced the revolutionary concept of public-key cryptography They provided a solution to the long standing problem of key exchange and pointed the way to digital signatures The public-key encryption methods (comprehensively studied in Chapter 3) are asymmetric Each recipient... algorithm to the hash value h(m) Both steps are done by one person Thus, we do not call it a protocol Typical examples of protocols are protocols for user identification There are many situations where the identity of a user Alice has to be verified Alice wants to log in to a remote computer, for example, or to get access to an account for electronic banking Passwords or PIN numbers are used for this purpose... might be able to impersonate her We sketch a simple challenge-and-response protocol which prevents this attack (however, it is not perfect; see Section 4.2.1) The protocol is based on a public-key signature scheme, and we assume that Alice has a key k = (pk, sk) for this scheme Now, Alice can prove her identity to Bob in the following way 1 Bob randomly chooses a “challenge” c and sends it to Alice 2... 8) If f is a one-way function, it is not only impossible to compute x from f (x), but certain bits (called hard-core bits) of x are equally difficult to deduce This feature is called the bit security of a one-way function For example, the least-significant bit is a hard-core bit for the RSA function x → xe mod n Starting with a truly random seed, repeatedly applying f and taking the hard-core bit in each

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