Having applied various measures to evaluate the bank system restructure program 2011-2015, no one would deny that SBV has achieved valuable successes, especially under the context of macroeconomic uncertainty resulted from both internal and external problems.
Trang 1Chương trình Tái cơ cấu hệ thống ngân hàng Việt Nam giai đoạn 2011- 2015 và thách thức cho giai đoạn tái cơ cấu 2016- 2020
Tô Kim Ngọc
Nguyễn Khương Duy
Ngày nhận: 19/04/2017 Ngày nhận bản sửa: 10/05/2017 Ngày duyệt đăng: 22/05/2017
Khi đánh giá kết quả của quá trình tái cơ cấu hệ thống Ngân hàng Việt
Nam giai đoạn 2011-2015, không ai có thể phủ nhận những thành công
của nó, đặc biệt nếu đặt quá trình này trong bối cảnh bất ổn vĩ mô xuất
phát từ các vấn đề nội bộ nền kinh tế cũng như ảnh hưởng từ khủng
hoảng tài chính toàn cầu Tuy vậy, những kết quả này còn khá xa so với
mục tiêu được thiết kế trong Quyết định 254/QĐ-TTG Điều này sẽ tạo
thêm áp lực cho giai đoạn 2016-2020, Giai đoạn 2 của chương trình Tái
cơ cấu hệ thống ngân hàng Những áp lực này liên quan đến ý tưởng điều
hành, tầm nhìn chính sách và năng lực thực thi Bài viết tập trung phân
tích các thách thức và các giải pháp cần thiết cho quá trình tái cơ cấu 5
năm tiếp theo Mô hình DEA truyền thống được sử dụng để đo lường hiệu
quả hoạt động của hệ thống ngân hàng giai đoạn 1990-2015 và kết quả
được sử dụng cho mô hình Tobit để khảo sát tác động của các biến số vĩ
mô tới mức độ hiệu quả của hệ thống Ảnh hưởng của quá trình tái cơ cấu
giai đoạn 2011-2015 cũng sẽ được xem xét trong mô hình Kết quả định
lượng sẽ được sử dụng làm căn cứ đưa ra các khuyến nghị chính sách
cho giai đoạn II quá trình tái cơ cấu ( 2016-2020).
Từ khóa: Tái cơ cấu hệ thống ngân hàng, Hiệu quả hoạt động của hệ
thống ngân hàng, Mô hình DEA
1 Achievements of the Bank
System Restructure Program
2011-2015
The macroeconomic stability is
maintained and enhanced
he macroeconomic risk as well as risks related to the monetary and financial condi-tions all are mitigated in
com-parison with the status in 2008 (Figure 1) To specify, the 2008 episode was dominated by very expanding monetary and finan-cial conditions and resulted in high domestic macroeconomic,
Trang 2credit and banking risk The
2011 status followed domestic
stimulus that led to a rapid credit
expansion against a backdrop of
already depleted policy buffers
and a weak external
environ-ment In subsequent years, the
government’s efforts to achieve
macroeconomic stability,
includ-ing through tighter monetary and
financial conditions, constituted
a normalization of a number of risk
The improvements in the macroeconomic prospective are also evident in the move-ment of credit rating of Vietnam government’s bonds rated by international organizations
After having been downgraded
in 2011 with the negative prospective, Vietnam’s credit rating has gradually improved and maintained its stable outlook in the following years (Table 1)
Credit institution system
is protected from system-atic risk and ‘domino’ effect
It is true that the Restruc-ture Scheme 2011-2015 has fundamentally solved weak credit institutions, which contributed significantly
to mitigate the spill-over ef-fects and consolidate the liquid-ity condition and eventually prevented the system from the domino collapse As shown in the Figure 1, the inward spill-over risks based on the IMF estimation have declined from 6.5/10 at end-2008 to about 5/10 at end-2014
NPL information is disclosed
in more transparent manner
The disclosure of informa-tion on bad debt of each credit institution as well as the whole bank system was more trans-parent To specify, there are always a large gap between the non-performing loan to total loan ratio published by the commercial banks and by the Supervisory Agency of the State Bank of Vietnam It
is also true for the difference between the estimation of the international credit rating agency such as Fitch, Moody’s and the SBV’s statistic The more transparent information about the bank’s asset qual-ity gives stakeholders a more
Table 1 Vietnam government bond’s creditability and outlook
evaluation by international credit rating agencies
Standard & Poor Moody’s Fitch Ratings
Year Rating Outlook Rating Outlook Rating Outlook
2011 BB- Negative B1 Negative B Stable
Ascending order
of credit ratings BB-, BB, BB+ B3, B2, B1 B, BB, BBB
Source: Summarized by authors
Figure 1
Financial Stability Map 1 in Vietnam for 2008, 2011 and 2014
1 The Financial Stability Assessment provides a framework under which four
broad risks (macroeconomic, inward spillovers, credit, and market and funding
liquidity) and two conditions (monetary and financial conditions, and risk appetite)
are analyzed Indicator values ranked relative to their own past values from 0
to 10 for every quarter, with 0 representing the lowest risk and 10 representing
the 99th percentile of risk A ranking of 5 broadly corresponds to the long-term
average (IMF, 2016).
Sources: IMF, 2016
Trang 3realistic view about the banks’
profitability and as the results,
the investors will place less
pressure on the bank’ targeted
profit and less expectation on the
unbacked increase in the share
price This provided credit
insti-tutions a more favorable
condi-tion to focus on dealing with bad
debts and consolidate the bank’s
operation rather than making up
the financial statements for the
shortsighted benefits
Cross-ownership in banking
system has been identified
One of considerable
achieve-ment of the Restructure Scheme
2011-2015 is to identify the
magnitude of the
cross-owner-ship in banking system and a
variety of type of
cross-owner-ship (primarily between banks,
banks and financial companies
and banks and enterprises)
Three main trends employed
to mitigate the complexity of
cross-ownership picture are:
i/ The banks owned by the
same dominant shareholder
are merged with each other1;
ii/ The weak banks have been
placed under the self-restructure
process or merged into stronger
banks such as PG Bank with
Vietinbank, Mekong
Hous-ing Bank with BIDV2; and iii/
1 Ficombank, Tin Nghia Bank and
Saigon Commercial Bank were
merged into the Saigon Commercial
Bank in 2011; Mekong Development
Bank was merged into Martime
Bank; Dai A Bank was merged into
HD Bank.
2 PG Bank (40% vote belonging to
Petrolimex) has been merged into
Vietinbank (a State-owned bank
with the ownership of 64.5%) in the
context that other shareholders are
unable to contribute more capital
into bank while Petrolimex has been
in the progress to divestment
non-The application of the Circular 36/2014/TT-NHNN required that a credit institution is no longer permitted to hold shares
of more than 2 credit institutions with more than 5% of charter capital However, there are large commercial banks3 which still hold the shares of more than two other banks despite the fact that the due date for divestment required by Cir 36 was over
2 Obstacles of the Bank System Restructure Scheme 2011-2015
The shortage of real money (powerful resources) led to the delay in solving the huge amount of bad debts
The establishment of Vietnam Asset Management Company
- VAMC is considered as a merely technical method to reduce the officially-announced NPL rather than truly solving the NPL in the effective manner
By the way of selling bad debts
in exchange for the special bond issued by VAMC, the bank can amortize the impaired loan over the period from 5-10 years into profit and loss, instead of mak-ing full provision at the present
The late recognition of expenses
core companies Mekong Housing Bank (with the accumulated loss at the merge date of more than VND
642 billion) is merged at the existing condition into BIDV since May 2015 with the share swap rate 1:1 based
on the fact that both banks are the State-owned Bank with the state ownership of more than 90%.
3 As at end-2016, VCB has been currently holding shares issued by 4 other commercial banks (7.16% of MBB; 8.19% of Eximbank; 5.07% of OCB and 4.3% of SCB) and 1 finan-cial company (10.91% of Cement Finance JSC).
on credit losses in the financial statement of banks temporar-ily helps the bank system buy time and at the same time, give the government the chance to collect the corporate income tax (because making fully provision leads to negative profit before tax and no corporate income tax would have been obligated) The statistics showed that the mainstream resources that banks use to deal with bad debts come internally from retained earn-ings and provision funds It is so rare that there is only one case
in which there is real money (equity capital) pumped into the troubled bank - TP Bank is
a telling and rare example of a successful self-restructure with more capital contributed by the DOJI Corporation, while the rest
of restructure cases relied
main-ly on the combining method or netting-off liabilities with equity
of the existing shareholders In addition, theoretically speaking, credit institutions can discount the VAMC bond (up to 40% of face value of the special bond)
to the SBV at a lower interest rate (about 2%) than the normal borrowing from the SBV How-ever, in the early stage, there are very little banks which want to employ this refinancing method because of the fear that this dis-count transaction can imply that the bank has been confronting with the liquidity difficulties and subjected to the potential inspec-tion of the supervisory authority For the rationale mentioned above, despite the fact that the NPL rate officially announced
by the commercial bank system has declined from 3.3% at
end-2011 to 2.5% at end-2015, it is
Trang 4more pessimistic view when the
calculation takes the impaired
loans such as those sold to
VAMC and those restructured
under Decision 780 and
Circu-lar 09 (being kept at the same
credit risk as pre-restructure
and without adequate credit
risk provision) into account To
illustrate, estimation of the IMF
2016 showed that the impaired
loan to total loan balance
of the whole bank system
in Vietnam can reach
even 12.7% at end-2015
(IMF, 2016) As shown in
the Figure 2, the
propor-tion of impaired loans at
the State-owned Banks
(SOBs) was about 13.7%,
higher than the level of
11.7% at private sector
banks Most importantly,
the amount of impaired
loans at the SOBs has
exceeded the regulatory
capital This suggests
that in the longer term,
when the buying-time
technique expires (VAMC
bonds go maturity within 5-10 years and the borrowers have to commit the restructured repay-ment schedule), the pressure on making credit loss provision will
be significantly burdensome, leading to erosion of the profit and even retained earnings Ac-cordingly, how to maintain the whole bank system’s sustain-ability is really a big question
After dramatically increas-ing in 2013, the bad debt ratio has followed a declining trend during the period 2014-2015 The technical support from the SBV’s policy such as Decision
780 and Circular 09 as well as the endless efforts of the bank system is the two key contribu-tors to this movement of bad debts However, this trend is not
Figure 2 Impaired loan in comparison with regulatory capital
(*) Joint stock banks, joint venture banks, fully foreign-owned banks and branches
Source: IMF, 2016
Figure 3 NPL ration of some commercial banks, 2012-2016Q1
Source: Authors’ summary
Trang 5sustainable To illustrate, the
NPL ration started to increase
in the first half of the year 2016
with the most significant jump
up to 5.3% of EIB (Figure 3) It
is consistent with the fact that
it is about one year since the
last minute when banks would
be able to restructure loans
to customers without making
further provision (April 2015)
and a considerable component
of restructured loans have been
past due and reclassified into
non-performing loans in 2016
It is necessary to note that many
commercial banks have
restruc-tured the impaired loans in the
manner that allocated more
financial obligation at maturity
or even capitalized interest into
principals Clearly, credit risks
may impose more challenges in
the following years
The analysis above is in line
with the evaluation of IMF in
Figure 1 While macroeconomic,
inward spillover, and market/
liquidity risks had fallen close to
historical averages and
mon-etary/financial conditions were
close to the neutral levels; the
credit risk stood at a high level
reflecting sovereign factors-
rapidly rising public debt and
publicly guaranteed debt and
high fiscal deficits- and banking sector issues- legacy NPLs and capital shortfalls in the banking sector stemming from instability
in 2008 and 2011, and a rela-tively weak domestic corporate sectors, in particular SOEs
Replacement of the existing complex cross-ownership with the new complicated one and the lack of resolution mecha-nism that allows the orderly exits of weak banks without domino effect
It is not uncommon to find that shareholders come and go dur-ing the process of the restructure program in some commercial banks In other words, the complexity in the new cross-ownership is built up on the background of the exit of the preceding dominant sharehold-ers such as Navibank (renamed
as NCB) and Trustbank (re-named as Construction Bank before being acquired at zero dong by the SBV)
The case of Construction Bank also proved that the lack of reso-lution mechanism that permits weak banks to go bankrupt in the orderly condition has led to serious consequence To specify,
if the SBV took over Trust Bank in 2012 or allowed it to
go bankrupt, the damage would
be approximately the accumu-lated loss of this Bank with the amount of deposits from cus-tomers of over VND 11 trillion While, at end-2015, VNCB has made further loss of VND 18 trillion with a bigger volume of deposits than the figure in 2012 Furthermore, the idea that did not allow any bank collapse will eventually result in the exces-sive risk-taking behaviors and the ‘too big to fail’ situation
of credit institutions In addi-tion, depositors who have been receive the state’s guarantee over their deposits would cer-tainly become less responsible
in selecting the healthy banks
to invest their savings- as they usually choose the weak banks that have offered higher inter-est rate This created ineffec-tive allocation of resource It is also evident in the practice that deposit insurance agency has not applied the mark-to-risk pricing policy in transactions with each bank and this has impeded the resource that can be available for the restructure program
(Read in next issue)
Tài liệu tham khảo
1 ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard Country Reports and Assessments 2014;
2 Financial statement reports and prospectus of commercial banks published in their official websites;
3 International Monetary Fund, 2016, “Vietnam 2016 Article IV Consultation”, IMF Country Report No 16/240;
4 Ngo Dang Thanh and Mai Thi Thanh Xuan, 2012, “Effects of macroeconomic policy on the efficiency of the Vietnamese bank-ing system 1990-2010”.
5 Nguyen Xuan Thanh, 2016, “The commercial bank system in Vietnam: from changes of regulation and policy in the 2006-2010 period to the events of Restructure Program 2011-2015”;
6 The Draft on the Economy Restructure Plan 2016-2020 proposed by the Ministry of Planning and Investment;
7 Tô Kim Ngọc, 2016 Evaluation of Banking System Restructuring in the period of 2011-2015- BIDV Project incorporation with Banking Academy.
Thông tin tác giả
Trang 6Tô Kim Ngọc, Phó Giáo sư, Tiến sĩ
Học viện Ngân hàng
Email: ngoctk@hvnh.edu.vn
Nguyễn Khương Duy
Công ty Kiểm toán Deloitte Việt Nam
Summary
Banking System Restructure Program 2011-2015 and ongoing challenges for the Stage 2 of the
Restructure Scheme 2016-2020
Having applied various measures to evaluate the bank system restructure program 2011-2015, no one would deny that SBV has achieved valuable successes, especially under the context of macroeconomic uncertainty resulted from both internal and external problems However, this is quite far from the targets designed in the Bank System Restructure Program 2011- 2015 (issued with Decision 254/QD-TTg) that certainly poses ongoing challenges to the Stage 2 of the Restructure Scheme 2016-2020 in terms of regulatory ideas, policy visions and fulfilling capacity The paper focuses on the obstacles on the way to achieve the objectives of the next five year banking reform and overcoming these calls for more decisive remedies Traditional DEA model is also used to measure the efficiency level of banking system’s operations during the period 1990-2015 The efficiency score
is then incorporated into the Tobit model to further investigate the impact of macroeconomic conditions (fiscal strain, monetary condition, foreign exchange policy and financial stability) on the level of efficiency Our paper also verifies whether the Restructure Scheme has generated positive effects on the efficiency level of banks’ operation Highlighted findings are the solid basis on which policy recommendations are given to contribute to the success of the Restructure Program 2016-2020.
Key words: Banking System Restructuring, Banking Operation Efficency, DEA model
Ngoc Kim To, Assoc.Prof PhD.
Banking Academy
Duy Khuong Nguyen,
Deloitte Vietnam Company Limited