04 Statehood and Its Rough Road--final

A statehood bill that was overwhelming approved by the House of Representatives in May 1902 died in the Senate upon adjournment of the 57th Congress on 4 March 1903.. No finer, succinct

Statehood Era and the Federal Presence in New Mexico

A Long, Rough Road

The facts are not in dispute A statehood bill that was overwhelming approved by the House of Representatives in May 1902 died in the Senate upon adjournment of the

57th Congress on 4 March 1903 Professor Lewis L Gould, the distinguished historian of American political life, explained in one-sentence the failed attempt to secure statehood

in 1902-3 No finer, succinct account exists: “Led by a coalition of Republicans and Democrats, an attempt to obtain the admission of the territories of Arizona and New Mexico ran into the determined opposition of Senator [Nelson] Aldrich and the

Republican leadership.” But why did such a political impasse arise and doom the

statehood bill in the Senate? Professor Gould’s summary is correct: a bipartisan move to pass the bill encountered overwhelming opposition from key Republicans, led by Senator Aldrich (R-RI) But what was so objectionable about statehood? The answer lies in delineating several broad trends in American political life, particularly within the

Republican Party, at the beginning of the twentieth century

The search for what held up statehood begins in Washington, D.C There federal officials, vested with the authority to grant it by Article Four of the Constitution, rode rough shod over the aspirations of New Mexicans Events at each end of the two-mile stretch of Pennsylvania Avenue connecting the White House and Congress on Capitol Hill loomed especially large in both shaping and responding to petitions for statehood The key to understanding the delay lies in understanding how statehood came to be seen

as a threat to the existing political order What made statehood so subversive to power in the eyes of Senator Aldrich?

While today Senator Nelson Aldrich is likely best remembered in the namesake of his grandson, the forty-first vice president of the United States, Nelson Aldrich

Rockefeller (1974-77), during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909), Senator Aldrich controlled the Senate Elected to his fourth Senate term in 1898, he settled in as the new chair of the Senate Finance Committee He also controlled all committee assignments, which permitted him to act as gatekeeper of legislation wending its way through hearings and onto the Senate’s floor for final deliberation The reasons that motivated Aldrich’s opposition to statehood are entangled in his bitter memory of his loss of power during Democratic President Grover Cleveland’s second administration (1893-97), when the Democrats held a majority in Congress

The new states admitted in 1889-90 had gone overwhelming for Cleveland, and as Aldrich’s biographer noted, “He had burnt his fingers once admitting States that proved a danger to his party, and he did not propose to do it again.” So pervasive was Aldrich’s opposition to statehood for the Territories that he maneuvered to kill the Omnibus Bill of

1902 when it actually had sufficient votes to pass Aldrich did so by manipulating the Senate’s handling of the Omnibus Statehood bill pressed by the House of

Representatives His chief agent of obstruction was his obsequious protégé Senator Albert

J Beveridge, who had Aldrich’s backing to employ all means necessary to block a vote

on separate statehood for New Mexico and Arizona so that the Omnibus Statehood bill would expire when the 57th Congress adjourned on 4 March 1903

A historically favorable disposition toward statehood prevailed in the House of Representatives Representative William S Knox (R-MA) chaired the House Committee

on Territories and introduced a statehood bill to his committee on 14 March 1902 It

received overwhelming committee support and moved to the full House on 1 April 1902

as H.R 12543 Knox’s accompanying report demanded quick action: “There is neither justice nor reason in longer denying statehood to the Territories which are here through their representatives petitioning as they have again and again in the past.” Anticipating arguments over the so-called fitness issue, Knox pointedly reminded his colleagues of Territorial accomplishments:

Of what manner of men this population is made up let their works speak

Cities and towns, with all that modern civilization demands, homes of

culture and refinement, schools and higher institutions of learning, public

and private charitable institutions, everywhere the free church and free

press These are not the monuments of the Indian nor the Mexican, the idle nor the vicious

Knox concluded his appeal by endorsing New Mexicans as “a patriotic people,” vowed that they were worthy of “enjoying the benefits of American citizenship,” and brushed aside all remaining objections by averring, “If education, integrity, and devotion to American institutions make the bulwark that insures recognition, then Congress, in our judgment, should by legal enactment admit her to the sisterhood of States.”

Knox’s unqualified endorsement of New Mexico’s loyalty to “American

institutions” was purposeful rhetoric It explicitly addressed and affirmed completion of the goals and values to be inculcated while a Territory His report satisfied most of his colleagues, and the Omnibus Statehood Bill passed the House with overwhelming support on 9 May 1902 Next it went to the Senate’s Committee on Territories, where its reception by Chairman Albert J Beveridge (R-IN) proved hostile

No one did more to obstruct New Mexico’s statehood than Senator Beveridge, so his opposition needs to be fully explored It is critical to examine the intellectual and political ambience which focused Beveridge’s objections to statehood

An editorial in a southern newspaper cogently explained the reason statehood failed in 1902-3: “Nothing but jealously of the growing power of the west is responsible for the opposition to statehood in the United States senate Plenty of pretexts are urged— for example, the Mormon and ‘greaser’ pretexts—but no reasons.” Statehood unleashed genuine anxiety among many Republican senators that new, western senators would usher in a debilitating shift in power—away from the East and Midwest, away from their party, and away from Republican’s almost four-decade dominance of the White House and Congress Fear led to delay, which preserved the political status quo, and accordingly obstructionist tactics orchestrated by Senators Aldrich and Beveride abounded in the statehood debates between 1900 and 1910 An actual conspiracy existed to keep New Mexico out of the Union for as long as possible, and it originated in a friendship

Beveridge had with an influential New York editor and public intellectual, Albert Shaw

Within weeks of being selected Indiana’s U.S Senator, Albert J Beveridge wrote Albert Shaw He sent him copies of recent speeches, including “March of the Flag,” and a friendship quickly blossomed Each man cultivated the other for his own ends Beveridge

craved publicity, and Shaw had a national forum in his political magazine Review of

Reviews For his part, Shaw sought access to power and, when Beveridge took over as

chair of the Senate’s Committee on Territories in December 1901, Shaw immediately pushed his opposition to New Mexico’s statehood Shaw set the agenda for their

discussions in a letter to Beveridge in early January 1902:

I have been wondering what position you would take on the admission of

territories, in view of your new committee assignment The union of

Oklahoma and the Indian Territory might give us a promising State which

could be admitted in the course of the next year or two I do not at all believe

that New Mexico or Arizona ought to be admitted The territorial system gives them all the home rule they need for local purposes I am not asking you to take

a radical position against the territories at once, but only that you will consider the question in its large national bearings Too often the admission of new States has turned upon immediate party exigencies

Shaw’s primary objection revolved around politics He believed it time to stop

“packing the Senate from unpopulated regions which were admitted to the Union fifteen

or twenty years too soon.” In his view, the Senate had expanded too quickly, going from

76 members in 1888 to 90 in 1896 (an 18.4 percent increase) Shaw viewed with alarm the dilution of Republican power stemming from the addition of seven new western states (ND, SD, MT, WY, ID, WA, UT) in less than ten years

The sectional loyalty of the seven recently admitted states galled Shaw In the presidential elections of 1896, six of the seven voted for the Democratic candidate

William Jennings Bryan in his loss to William McKinley Although only two of the new states went for Bryan when he again ran (and lost) to McKinley in 1900, a disturbing trend became apparent in the Senate Among the Senators from these seven states in the

56th U.S Senate (1899-1901) were two populists (ID and SD), two Democrats (UT and MT), and a Silver-Republican (WA) In the 57th U.S Senate (1901-1903) the opposition made a net gain of one seat: a second Silver-Republican (WA) The Silver-Republicans

proved especially repugnant because they illustrated what Shaw, and Beveridge, most resented These senators gave primary allegiance to narrow regional interests (read: farmers) to the detriment of the entire nation

Shaw only saw more sectional partisanship in new states from the Southwest, and such a prospect hardened his opposition Beveridge replied promptly to Shaw and

concurred that statehood posed a threat to Republican majorities:

I tell you in the strictest confidence: my present tendency is in favor of Oklahoma and Indian Territory as a single state and the rejection of the application of New Mexico and Arizona My reasons for this are along the lines indicated by you The whole subject will require a careful and not a hurried study by me I hope to do my work well

Beveridge’s pledge “to do my work well” aligned perfectly with his temperament

As a newspaper had remarked in 1899, “he is not content with an investigation of a subject unless it is exhaustive.” Throughout 1902 Beveridge applied this characteristic thoroughness in learning about New Mexico He drew on four sources in mapping the territory’s political and social landscape: confirmation hearings to reappoint Miguel Otero

as the Territory’s governor held before his committee in January 1901; testimony before his Committee on Territories in late June 1902; data from the 1900 census (published in 1901); and unprecedented “on-site” hearings conducted by himself and three members of his Committee on Territories in mid-November 1902 From the information gathered, Beveridge carefully built his case against New Mexico and Arizona’s statehood

During the same week in January 1902 that Beveridge and Shaw discussed tactics

on delaying statehood, Beveridge also opened and chaired hearings on President

Theodore Roosevelt’s reappointment of Miguel A Otero as Territorial governor The reappointment process began the previous summer when the Interior Department and the White House reviewed, discussed, and secured Otero’s written replies to allegations of malfeasance But the resulting dossier was put aside when President McKinley died from

an assassin’s bullet on 14 September 1901 President Theodore Roosevelt turned aside concerted attempts to have Otero removed in the fall of 1901 Instead, he recommended reappointment for another four-year term—pending consent by the Senate’s Committee

on Territories

Senator Beveridge listened attentively while the two titans of the territory’s Republican Party—Governor Otero and Thomas B Catron—laid out vituperative charges and countercharges in formal testimony between 7 and 16 January 1902 The hearings provided abundant evidence of New Mexico politics being akin to ‘scorpions in a bottle.’ Catron submitted a list of thirty-one grievances to Senator Beveridge (and also to

President Roosevelt), to support his allegation that Otero’s administration “has been extravagant, impure, oppressive, tyrannical, partial, and has been run by rings and

cliques.” Otero rebutted with the assertion that Catron’s complaints were “1 per cent truth and 99 per cent political chicanery.” And so it went, back and forth, for more than a week Finally Otero prevailed and secured the Committee and the Senate’s

overwhelming approval

Between June and December 1902, Beveridge skillfully exploited his position as chair of the Committee on Territories to undermine support for statehood In doing so, he initially cut against the grain in both the Republican and Democratic parties, each of which had included calls for statehood in their party platforms of 1896 and 1900 He also

turned back a nearly unanimous House of Representatives, which had overwhelming approved an Omnibus Statehood Bill (House Bill 12543) in May 1902 calling for “the people of Oklahoma, Arizona, and New Mexico to form constitutions and state

governments and be admitted into the Union.”

Beveridge began applying the brakes to the political momentum for statehood during his June hearings on House Bill 12543 The New Mexicans testifying unwittingly contributed evidence that allowed Beveridge to bolster his case against statehood New Mexicans boasted of the recent arrival to the territory of William H “Bull” Andrews, a former national Republican party official and Pennsylvania state representative The New Mexicans naively assumed that such name-dropping might impress fellow Republicans Nothing could have been more ill-conceived since Andrews and Beveridge represented opposite and competing political traditions Andrews was a crony of Pennsylvania’s Republican U.S Senator Matthew S Quay, a political boss from Philadelphia who had a long history of questionable dealings, particularly among railroad interests Only three years earlier he had “beaten” a corruption indictment and regained his Senate seat

Nothing riled Beveridge more than money-making schemes of railroads, and yet the New Mexicans testifying repeatedly praised Andrews’ role in an important new railroad expansion in their Territory According to Beveridge’s biographer, such

revelations alarmed the senator more than he let on publicly He saw “Bull” Andrews as aligned with Otero’s political machine (already denounced in the January hearings) More ominously, Beveridge saw his arch political foe, Senator Quay, moving in the shadows to carry out his financial and political schemes in New Mexico

Beveridge and Aldrich’s opposition to Senator Quay’s quest for statehood, though, came at a price to the Republican Party It precipitated a bitter intra-party feud Shortly before Beveridge headed to New Mexico, he cautioned Aldrich about likely Republican defections on a statehood vote He was especially worried about Senators “Quay,

Penrose, Wellington, and the Nevada Senators.” He went on to lament, “It does seem too bad to have all the work we have done in the last decade to build up our domestic and foreign policies jeopardized by Senators from states admitted of selfish considerations.” The reference to “selfish considerations” can be read two ways As applied to the two Republican senators from Nevada, it acknowledged that regional loyalty trumped party unity Or it could apply to Pennsylvania Senators Boies Penrose and Matthew S Quay, each of whom fostered large-scale business interests in Arizona and New Mexico,

respectively The Pennsylvania senators presented a vexing problem Nearly as powerful

as Aldrich, their staunch pro-statehood position would impede any action backed by Aldrich or Beveridge

To hamper Quay and Penrose’s business prospects, Beveridge pledged to Aldrich that on his upcoming trip to New Mexico he expected to uncover facts that “will make an unfavorable impression on the people and investors, which will set the territories back for many years.” In the view of many contemporary observers, Senators Quay and Penrose promoted statehood solely for economic gain A major Chicago newspaper claimed that

“a squad of Pennsylvania capitalists,” made up of “close friends of the two senators, to say the least, have been behind the statehood movement for Arizona and New Mexico.” Even the New Mexico and Arizona delegates to congress acknowledged investors and

their corporate backers “wanted statehood for the express purpose of securing a decided advantage in the stock market.”

Statehood held the promise of attracting more capital because greater financial security attached itself to statehood Senator Beveridge claimed just before leaving for New Mexico in November 1902 that “if the territories are admitted the bond of the [rail]road can be sold for several points higher.” When he returned from his tour, he made even more pointed criticisms about politics and personal gain intertwined in the statehood question He alleged that statehood was a ploy to get William H “Bull” Andrews “a seat in the United States Senate and also to help him to sell his

bonds for his new railroad down there.”

Proponents and opponents of statehood held completely incompatible views of New Mexico Men such as Quay and Penrose looked upon the territories as an economic

tabula rasa onto which they expected to write a bright future Money could be made

there and they expected statehood to maximize their gain But Aldrich and Beveridge represented a different vision of New Mexico, one in which transformation through Americanization held the only promise for statehood

New Mexicans also undercut their own cause by complaining bitterly in their June testimony—and without corroborating evidence—about mistakes in the official census of 1900 Territorial Delegate to Congress Bernard S Rodey went so far as to denounce the census as “absolutely wrong and worthless.” He sought to rebut the

“general impression [held] all over the country that New Mexico is somewhat of a crude place.” He ticked off the errors: illiteracy was much lower than the 40 percent reported;

“about three-fifths of our population are people from the States, who have come in since