External Evaluation of OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit

 Mainstreaming internal displacement issues: The team found that the Unit had not achievedsubstantial progress in mainstreaming internal displacement issues into the work of IASCpartner

Internal Displacement Unit

Final Report

Elizabeth Stites Victor Tanner

21 January 2004

The Unit in Context: Challenges of Internal Displacement

Findings on Institutional Relationships

Evaluation Terms of Reference

List of People Interviewed

List of Acronyms

OCHA IDP Unit Evaluation Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

In September and October 2003, a team of two independent external consultants (‘the team’)

evaluated OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit (‘the Unit’) They conductedinterviews with a wide array of informants in Geneva, Rome, Belgrade, Prishtina,Nairobi, Kinshasa, Goma, London, Kabul, New York and Washington, DC The twocase studies selected by OCHA and the Unit were Serbia and D.R Congo, withadditional fieldwork in Nairobi and Kabul In keeping with its independent nature,the evaluation’s conclusions are to be self-standing and public All interviews wereconducted on a not-for-attribution basis

Findings

Challenges the Unit Faces

It is necessary to place the findings of this evaluation in context Many of the difficulties faced

by the Unit reflect broader and more systemic problems: the inherent difficulties dealing withinternal displacement, systemic failings of the UN system, problems OCHA itself has experiencedover the past years, and finally the Unit’s difficulties are those of every new entity trying to showadded-value yet stay focused

Institutional Relationships

The Unit has suffered from a number of fraught institutional relationships

 Partners on the Senior Network complain of meetings that revolve around a one-way flow ofafter-the-fact information, of lack of dialogue and lack of consultation

 Strong currents of opinion exist within OCHA headquarters that the internally displaced areOCHA’s business and that Unit activities should be mainstreamed

 The Unit’s most valuable asset is its direct link to the ERC, the Secretary General’s focalpoint on internal displacement, but this link has not been fully realized

 The operational agencies reproach the alleged lack of consultation on the part of the Unit, andcomplain that the Unit shows too much operational involvement in the field

 Despite recent efforts, the respective roles and responsibilities of the Unit vis-à-vis the Office

of the RSG and the Norwegian Refugee Council remain unclear to many

Performance Findings

Field Support:

 Unit and Inter-Agency Missions: The Unit has undertaken nearly 40 missions to more than 20

countries These missions have varied in their effectiveness, often because of exogenousreasons: the political sensitivities of national authorities, lack of follow-up by UN countryteams, or overly ambitious TORs

 IDP advisors: The Unit has helped articulate the need for, identify, recruit, and in some cases

fund IDP advisors in the field in Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Iraq, Liberia, Serbia, Sudan,Zimbabwe, and soon in Uganda

Protection:

 Response Matrix, Protection Survey: The Unit developed and conducted the Response

Matrix and Protection Survey, the former country-specific, the latter thematic, both ready indraft form (The Protection Survey was conducted together with the Brookings SAIS Project.)They should become powerful advocacy tools for the Unit to advise the ERC on howRC/HCs, UN agencies, and their partners can more effectively meet the needs of theinternally displaced

 Protection coalition: The protection coalition was designed to consist of a core group of

partners with protection expertise who would act to support the Unit’s protection efforts, to beactivated in specific countries when needed A protection coalition had limited success inLiberia prior to the resumption of conflict Unsuccessful efforts were made in Iraq

Capacity Building and Training:

 Training and seminars The Unit’s training and seminar activities are well received in the

field by local and international partners There is limited progress in getting nationalauthorities to understand the UN Guiding Principles, notably in Serbia and D.R Congo.However, the lack of follow-through (not necessarily the responsibility of the Unit) has meantlost momentum

Strengthening the Institutional Framework for IDPs:

 National strategies and mechanisms: Working groups were established in Serbia, D.R.

Congo, and Sudan (since disbanded), and draft strategies on internal displacement have beenestablished or are being worked on in Uganda and Serbia

Advocacy and Public Information:

 The Unit recently released the book No Refuge: The Challenge of Internal Displacement

(with the Migration Policy Institute), a thematic overview of the issues and challenges and thefirst UN publication on internal displacement Regardless of the quality of the book, manyquestion whether such a publication was the best use of the Unit’s time and energy

 Upcoming projects: The Unit plans to commission a documentary to shed light on internal

displacement in “forgotten crises” such as Sudan, D.R Congo, or Georgia The Unit also hasplans for a photographic exhibit of pictures taking by displaced individuals and depicting thelives of the internally displaced

Additional Performance Findings:

 Mainstreaming internal displacement issues: The team found that the Unit had not achieved

substantial progress in mainstreaming internal displacement issues into the work of IASCpartners and OCHA branches This may be because the Unit is still relatively new, or becausethe Unit’s focus on internal displacement “excuses” other agencies from addressing the issue

 Monitoring internal displacement: The Unit is knowledgeable on situations of internal

displacement around the world It should seek to improve the collection of information fromoutside sources and the dissemination of information to other agencies and actors

Management Issues

Terms of reference: The Unit’s TOR do not contain specific objectives, leading to confusion on

what the Unit is “supposed to do.”

Staffing: The secondment arrangement confers the Unit its inter-agency nature, but also brings

unique difficulties as staff members are thought to favor their ‘mother’ agency while often beingsuspected of disloyalty by this very agency The Unit is trying to do too much with not enoughstaff (The solution is not an increase in staff, but better focused activities.) Unit staff display onthe whole considerable skills, experience and commitment

Awkward internal management arrangements: The structure of the Unit is flat—a structure

which could encourage flexibility and initiative But there are too many managers and notenough management This has resulted in lack of strategic vision, thrust and follow through TheUnit’s planning process lacks method and transparency, notably in selecting countries forintervention

Gender

The Unit has not been effective to date in integrating a gender perspective in its work Not oneinterviewee was able to recall a specific focus on gender in the trainings, missions, or in any otherinteraction with the Unit Mission reports vary in the extent to which they address gender issues;there is no systematic method of examining gender when conducting missions Interviewees whospecialize in gender spoke of a lack of receptivity on the part of the Unit to broach gender issues.The Unit is clearly aware of these shortcomings, and has already drafted a training moduledealing specifically with gender issues

Conclusions

Specific Conclusions

Busy, committed, but scattered: In its 22 months of existence, the Unit has initiated a wide array

of activities Unit staff has demonstrated energy, hard work, commitment, even enthusiasm

in their efforts to promote the cause of the internally displaced Some of their initiativeshave been more successful, better received or better understood than others Some areobjective successes The problem is that these activities have not amounted to positivechange in how the UN responds to internal displacement

Lack of impact on the UN system To date, the Unit has not had the impact on the UN system that

it was intended to achieve The Unit has not been able to capitalize on its direct link to the ERC,

it has failed to get RC/HCs to follow its recommendations, and has not been effective in reportingegregious failures of the system The Unit should be aggressively identifying needs and gaps and

making clear, practical suggestions to the ERC on how to remedy these gaps The ERC’s explicit,tangible support is a sine qua non condition for any Unit success.

Lack of strategic vision: The Unit lacks strategic vision, clear objectives and a sense of thrust.

Examples included the Unit’s choice of geographic areas of intervention (the criteria are unclear),

of activities (too many), and of advocacy efforts within the UN system (too few, too shy) TheUnit has been overly output-oriented, and has scattered its energy in too many different activities

Lack of follow-through: The Unit has lacked follow-through on many of its initiatives, from

reporting to training, to inter-agency missions Sometimes this has been because the Unit itselfhas not followed up, sometimes because other actors have been unable or unwilling to follow up

Bitter lessons from Iraq: The ERC sidelined the Unit in the planning of how internal

displacement would be handled by the UN in Iraq This was an important lost opportunity toassert the Unit’s input, notably on protection It also weakened the Unit’s credibility, asoperational agencies and others drew the conclusion that the Unit was irrelevant to decision-making on critical issues

The Unit can do more to promote protection: The Unit has made valuable contributions to

promoting the notion of protection, but much remains to be done The Unit has yet to take on theleadership role it is expected to play in promoting protection (though the Protection Survey is animportant step in that direction)

The Unit lacks the security of a continued existence: In the fraught inter-agency context of the

UN, the natural concern of a new unit to demonstrate relevance has morphed into pervasivefeelings of insecurity that have hobbled the Unit’s internal advocacy role Support from the ERCwill help address this Also necessary is longer-term support from donors

Where to?

Looking forward, what should the Unit be? A technical support Unit that provides training andadvisory services, identifies IDP advisors, collects lessons learned, etc.? Or the premier advocatefor internal displacement issues within the UN system, capitalizing on its direct SG-mandatedlink to the ERC, who himself is the SG’s focal person on internal displacement issues?

In the past, the Unit has tended towards the former It is the strong conclusion of this evaluation

that the Unit should gravitate towards the latter Advocacy within the UN to improve the system’s

response, both overall and case by case, making the collaborative approach work, is the singlegreatest contribution the Unit can make to the well-being of internally displaced populations.This is the Unit’s most powerful comparative advantage

Recommendation Two: The Unit must focus all its energy on increasing its impact on the UN system.

 The Unit must revitalize its link to the ERC It must, within the privacy of its relationshipwith the ERC, name and shame agencies that are failing the internally displaced in specificsituations, and advise on practical remedies The Unit should ensure that its voice in NewYork is more senior, forceful and articulate, and pursue its effort to re-energize the SeniorNetwork as a working group for consultation

Recommendation Three: The Unit must develop strategic vision and thrust.

 The Unit must try to do less and achieve more This will include abandoning activities thatmay have been successful but are not central to the Unit’s role as premier advocate for theinternally displaced within the system The Unit should consider reorganizing itsmanagement structure to include a non-traveling deputy director and two main pillars:internal (UN) advocacy and protection

Recommendation Four: The Unit must improve follow-through on existing initiatives.

 The Unit should consult with OCHA, the office of the RSG and the NRC to improve

follow-up of activities that is has decided to maintain The Unit must aggressively and proactivelyfollow through on the Protection Survey and the Response Matrix

Recommendation Five: The Unit must play a strong advisory role in unfolding crises.

 Iraq shows that large, unfolding crises are where bad decisions can be made The Unit mustmake its voice relevant to the ERC in these decision-making processes

Recommendation Six: The Unit must strengthen its visibility and impact on protection.

 The Unit should make protection one of its two main pillars (with internal advocacy) Itshould use the Protection Survey and Response Matrix to identify gaps in the internationalresponse to protection The Unit should explore why the protection coalition failed and makeappropriate adjustments in other protection mechanisms

Recommendation Seven: OCHA must empower the Unit as a distinct entity in its midst

 OCHA headquarters (New York and Geneva) should recognize the Unit’s distinct agency nature and seek to enhance the Unit’s work as critical to the ERC’s ability to fulfil hismandate as the SG’s focal point for internal displacement OCHA should help follow up onUnit activities and recommendations in the field

inter-Recommendation Eight: Operational UN agencies must show real commitment to the Unit as the inter-agency embodiment of the collaborative approach.

 The operational agencies must fund their secondees fully and maintain a tight relationshipwith them They should invest in the Senior Network process They should seriouslyconsider, if not follow, the recommendations made by the Unit and endorsed by the ERC

Recommendation Nine: The donors must provide the Unit with breathing space.

 Donors should make a pluri-annual commitment to the Unit, to afford the Unit breathingspace, but only if both the Unit and the ERC follow through on the recommendations above

If these changes are not enacted, the Unit cannot be successful and should not be supported

Donors should consider forming a ‘Friends of the Unit’ group to galvanize support for theUnit’s efforts to improve the UN response to the internally displaced.

In short, this evaluation recommends that the Unit be granted a two-to-three-year time frame tomake a positive impact on the UN’s collaborative approach to internal displacement, but only ifthree things happen: (i) the Unit must demonstrate a strategic ability, so far lacking, to identifyand clearly articulate gaps in the UN’s response to specific internally displaced crises and bringthem to the attention of the ERC; (ii) the ERC in turn must unequivocally pledge hisdetermination to follow through on the Unit’s findings, including by calling on the authority ofthe Secretary General when appropriate; and (iii) the operational agencies must demonstrate realcommitment to making the collaborative approach work

If, over the course of the next three years, there is no tangible progress in the UN’s accountabilityfor meeting the needs of the internally displaced, then the existence of the Unit becomes adistraction from the real problem, and not longer part of a possible solution The path thenbecomes clear Shut the Unit down Write up the collaborative approach’s post-mortem Takestock of failure Seek new solutions Move forward

At that point the Unit will have to disappear so that the cause of the internally displaced mayadvance

OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit:

1 The last decade has witnessed mounting awareness of the plight of people who are displacedwithin the borders of their own state – mounting awareness of both the inherent vulnerability ofthese populations and of the constraints in the international system’s ability to provide them withassistance and especially protection A number of initiatives – some donor-led, some private,some focusing on the responsibilities of national authorities, others on the ability of aid agencies

to help – have in recent years sought to improve conditions for the internally displaced But areal difference required dramatic change in the UN system

2 By the turn of the millenium, it had become clear that, as far as the UN system wasconcerned, there were in essence three options to improve the response to the needs of internallydisplaced populations: (i) create a new agency with a mandate for the internally displaced, (ii)extend the mandate of an existing agency to cover the internally displaced, or (iii) create amechanism that would ensure a greater focus on the needs of the internally displaced In April

2001, the Special Coordinator of the Senior Network on Internal Displacement recommended thethird option in his final report The Internal Displacement Unit, a non-operational, inter-agencyunit within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), was thus born,launched by the Secretary General in January 2002 Some saw the Unit as the best solution theinternational system would allow at that point in time Critics saw the decision to create the Unit

as a common denominator so low as to be meaningless – in essence, a non-decision

3 The Unit provides advice and support on issues of internal displacement to the EmergencyRelief Coordinator (ERC), and the director of the Unit reports directly to the ERC The Unit iscomposed of professional staff seconded by agencies and partners, including UNDP, UNHCR,IOM, UNICEF, an NGO consortium, and the office of the RSG The Unit sits in OCHA/Genevaand has a liaison in the office of the ERC in New York As well as assisting the ERC in hiscoordinating role, the Unit provides technical expertise and advisory support to UN country teams

in the field The Unit has undertaken missions to more than 20 countries since its establishment,including inter-agency missions

4 Nearly two years after its creation, has the Internal Displacement Unit succeeded in

“promoting more effective inter-agency, operational responses to internal displacement?”1 That isthe question this evaluation seeks to answer

This Evaluation

5 In early 2003, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, through its PolicyDevelopment and Studies Branch, commissioned a team of two independent external consultants(‘we,’ ‘the team’) to evaluate OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit (‘the Unit’).2 The evaluationwas mandated in the Unit’s terms of reference.3 The evaluation was to assess the “relevance,efficiency and effectiveness” of the Unit.4

1 “Terms of Reference for an IDP Unit Within OCHA,” OCHA, no date: p 1

2 Elizabeth Stites and Victor Tanner (team leader) make up the evaluation team

3 Ibid.: p 2

4 “Internal Displacement Unit Evaluation, Terms of Reference (final version),” OCHA, 15 July 2003: p 2

6 The evaluation, initially slated for Spring 2003, was postponed until autumn because of theIraq crisis and reasons pertaining to the Unit’s schedule Throughout the evaluation, the teamoperated under the clear understanding that its conclusions and recommendations were to beindependent and public The evaluation’s terms of reference (TOR) state that the “results of theevaluation will be made public on OCHA’s website.”5 In the course of its research, the teamfound high levels of interest in the evaluation’s outcome

7 The evaluation followed a review exercise conducted by an external analyst in September

20026, and an internal review prepared later in 2002 There is substantial agreement between theconclusions of this evaluation and those of the September 2002 review

8 We would like to thank all who agreed to share their time and insights with us Specialthanks go to OCHA staff in Geneva, Belgrade, Prishtina, Nairobi, Kinshasa, Goma and New Yorkwho worked so hard to keep our days full and our travel pleasant

Methodology

9 The team conducted roughly 200 interviews with individuals from UN agencies, governmental and international organizations, diplomats and donor representatives, and localauthorities in Geneva, Rome, Belgrade, Prishtina, Nairobi, Kinshasa, Goma, London, Kabul, NewYork and Washington, DC The team also reviewed numerous public and internal documents

non-10 OCHA and the Unit selected Serbia and D.R Congo as the two main case studies that bestreflected the breadth of the Unit’s work The team’s initial discussions with OCHA had settled onSudan and West Africa as case-studies, with a third, non-African country to be determined Afterthe evaluation was postponed, OCHA decided that Serbia and D.R Congo were better case-studies, due to logistical and institutional concerns The team agreed to these substitutions, withsome reservations.7

11 By design, the team met with few of those most directly affected by whether the Unit – andthe UN system above it – is successful in its job: internally displaced persons themselves Thereason for this is that the Unit deals with the system, not with the displaced themselves Ourresearch focused on the dynamics of institutional relationships, which are remote to mostinternally displaced populations Also, we felt that they should be spared having to dedicate time

to another set of ignorant visitors

12 The team conducted most interviews in person and followed a semi-structured interviewformat We spoke to key informants who had worked directly with the Unit, been involved in theinitial debate on the creation of the Unit, focused on internal displacement or related issues intheir own work, funded the Unit, participated in the Unit’s workshops, been debriefed by theUnit, or simply followed the evolution of the Unit since its inception OCHA and the Unitdeveloped the original lists of key contacts for the evaluation team in each country, and this list

was then expanded with contacts suggested by interviewees or through the team’s own contactsand experience The list of interviewees expanded and evolved over the course of the evaluation

13 The team held phone interviews with informants in countries not visited (e.g., Uganda,Ethiopia, Eritrea), as well as with people who were unavailable at the time of our visits Follow-

up questions and clarifications were made via phone and email When necessary, the team split

up to conduct interviews in places with a large number of respondents, such as Geneva The teamalso split up for certain visits: only one team member visited Prishtina, Goma, Kabul, London andNew York A small number of interviews were held simultaneously with two or moreinterviewees from the same organization or agency All interviews were conducted on a not forattribution basis (Annex Two lists names and affiliation of interviewees)

14 The team conducted an extensive document review of public documents relating to the Unit(e.g., mission reports and progress reports) and internal Unit documents, such as yearly workplans, self-evaluation reports, budgets and funding reports, previous internal evaluations, trainingstrategies, training modules, TORs of Unit staff, and reports on the collaborative approach,Protection Survey, and protection coalition We also received internal documents from a number

of individual sources, including Unit staff (eg., correspondence, notes on projects in progress),donors (e.g., internal reports to capitals), other UN agencies (e.g., memos on relations with theUnit, thoughts on initial establishment and evolution of the Unit), partners and UN staff in thefield (e.g., memos on interaction with the Unit, memos from IDP Advisors on progress andproblems) The team also reviewed current publications and grey literature on the major topicsand trends in internal displacement, with specific focus on protection, sovereignty, and the on-going debate on the international response to internal displacement

15 The team’s review of documents and current trends highlighted key issues and questions Weraised these questions in our interviews and considered these issues throughout our fieldwork andanalysis Broadly speaking, we examined the nature and effectiveness of the systematic response

to the problem of internal displacement and also considered the broader and more ideologicalquestions of responsibility, resolution, and the role of the international community For instance:

Is the Unit (or has the Unit become) synonymous with the collaborative approach? Is it possiblefor a Unit that is non-operational and situated within a non-operational agency (OCHA) to havethe clout and voice to engender change within the UN system and with recalcitrant countrygovernments? Is the Unit currently “the best” means for the UN to address internaldisplacement? If not, should the Unit be eradicated or should it be reformed? Does the greatestresponsibility for the faults and shortcomings in responding to internal displacement lie with thenational governments, the operational agencies, the IDP Unit, or the UN system? If theinternational community adopts responsibility for the problem of internal displacement, does thisexcuse country governments from assisting and protecting their own citizens? Does thisperpetuate (or even encourage) the continuation of the problem at the country level? Should theinternational community (and the Unit) seek to engage with governments or to provide assistance

to displaced populations in countries where the authorities have intentionally created internaldisplacement for personal or political gain, such as Sudan or Zimbabwe? This evaluation cannotand does not attempt to address all of these questions, but these issues came up repeatedly in ourinterviews and our analysis, and form the underpinnings of this evaluation

16 The team made a set of preliminary conclusions available to OCHA and the Unit prior tofinalization The Unit and OCHA were given the opportunity to respond via teleconference and

in written comments The team also discussed its findings with a number of key informants Wefactored in these exchanges when finalizing the summary note submitted to OCHA on 6November 2003 The team submitted a draft of the full report to OCHA on 11 November 2003.This draft was widely circulated and comments requested The team reviewed the comments andmade adjustments or corrections where appropriate in preparing the final full report

17 Finally, this report has sought to avoid using the acronym ‘IDPs’ to describe the internallydisplaced

Main Argument of the Evaluation:

18 The United Nations continues to fall short in its response to the internally displaced In the

22 months since its inception, OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit has not changed the way the

UN addresses internal displacement, and is not likely to do so unless radical changes in outlookoccur The reasons for this are twofold First, the Unit has lacked focus and strategic purpose.Its activities have been numerous but scattered It has not managed to leverage its direct link tothe Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) It has not played its central role of premier advocatewithin the UN system on behalf of the internally displaced aggressively enough Second, andmore pointedly, the UN system is not ready for change The out-going ERC did not effectivelyuse the Unit to fully perform his mandate as the Secretary General’s focal point for the internallydisplaced UN operational agencies remain more concerned with their organizational intereststhan with the interests of the internally displaced They do not display the collegiality necessaryfor a truly collaborative response to crises of internal displacement

19 The evaluation’s main recommendation is that the Unit concentrates on internal UNadvocacy This is in keeping with the Unit’s original terms of reference The Unit should becomethe premier advocate for the internally displaced within the UN system, advising the ERC onspecific breakdowns or weaknesses within the UN’s response to internal displacement crises, andmaking practical recommendations on how to address these problems The Unit must, within theconfines of its relationship with the ERC, name and shame those who do not step to the plate torespond to the needs of the internally displaced This will require an increase in conceptual andmanagement focus on the part of the Unit The ERC in turn must commit to soliciting, endorsingand following through on the Unit’s recommendations Finally, if both the Unit and the ERCappear committed to a real effort on enforcing more accountability in the UN system’s response

to the internally displaced, donors should offer a pluri-annual commitment to the Unit

20 If, on the other hand, after a period of two to three years there is still no progress in thecollaborative approach, then the Unit should be shut down – at that point it will have become aveil masking inherent failures of the system

Evaluation Findings

The Unit in Context: Challenges of Internal Displacement

21 This evaluation set out to assess the effectiveness, relevance, and efficiency of the Unit TheUnit, however, does not operate in a vacuum, but as part of the UN system and as a player in thebroader international response to internal displacement It is therefore impossible to evaluate thework of the Unit without also looking at this broader context Indeed, many of the ‘shortcomings’

of the Unit are inextricably linked to the actions (or inactions) of other international actors,especially within the UN system, to their collegiality (or lack thereof), to weak (or malfeasant)national authorities, to inexistent or ineffective legal frameworks, and to the dearth of effectiveinternational protection mechanisms

22 Interviewees repeatedly highlighted the difficult context in which the Unit is expected toperform Respondents both within and outside of the UN stressed that perceived weaknesses inthe Unit were often indicative of broader and more systemic difficulties in responding to internaldisplacement These difficulties and challenges lie behind the very creation of the Unit: the UNrecognized that its response to internal displacement was inadequate to deal with a growinginternational problem and sought to create a tool to address this problem But the establishment ofthe Unit did not remove the underlying difficulties in addressing internal displacement or thechallenges in creating a coherent international response among diverse actors and agencies Thechallenges that the Unit faces fall into the following four categories:8

 The Unit’s difficulties are indicative of broader problems in addressing the issue of theinternally displaced: lack of access to populations and countries, high political sensitivitywith governments, lack of international commitment, lack of clear benchmarks, and lack

of adequate protection instruments

 The Unit’s difficulties in achieving greater UN responsibility for the internally displacedmirror systemic failures of the UN in dealing with internal displacement These problemsare widely recognized both within and outside of the UN system and include: lack ofaccountability, lack of responsibility, lack of collegiality amongst agencies, and lack ofcommitment to the collaborative approach.9

 The Unit’s difficulties in establishing itself within OCHA reflect the problems OCHAitself has experienced over past years: the ERC’s lack of authority within the UN, tensionbetween New York and Geneva, and difficulties weighing in with operational agencies

 Finally, the Unit’s difficulties are those of every new entity: how to show added-valuewithout being over-extended; how to relate to more powerful, better established partners;

8 The challenges of working within the UN came up repeatedly in interviews with NGO staff and donors

In Serbia and D.R Congo, the team was repeatedly reminded of the difficulties of the internal displacementsituation, and how difficult this problem was to address due to sensitivity with authorities, lack of access to populations, and lack of adequate protection or legal mechanisms Many interviewees pointed to the tensions that accompany the work of a new entity, with some respondents pointing out that it was “too early

to conduct an evaluation” because the Unit had not had sufficient time to prove its merit and capabilities

9 The team found that the unclear role and varied experience levels of RC/HC’s on matters of humanitarian assistance was a recurring problem in the response to internal displacement There is much discussion within the UN agencies and partners about the appropriate qualifications and terms of reference for the Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs), and until this issue is resolved the problems of responsibility and accountability for the internally displaced at the country level are likely to continue

how to curry favor with diverse partners and yet stay focused; how to establish a strategywith no clear timeframe for existence

23 There is a further issue that one must address when speaking of the internally displaced.Despite widespread agreement that internally displaced populations are especially vulnerable,there remains a concern that concentrating specifically on the internally displaced will lead toother vulnerable populations being ignored This is a real concern in places like D.R Congo andLiberia where non-displaced populations are vulnerable to the abuses of armed groups and unable

to meet their basic needs The Unit has responded well to this by broadening the scope of itsprotection focus to include non-displaced populations as well

Findings on Institutional Relationships

24 The Unit’s relations with other agencies and actors are critical to its success in improvinginternational response to internal displacement

25 Lack of commitment within the Senior Network: The IASC established the Senior

Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement to make proposals for the improvement of agency response to the needs of internally displaced populations In turn, the Senior Networkconducted a series of country reviews and recommended the creation of the Unit The IASCopted to retain the Senior Network as an inter-agency support and advisory mechanism for theUnit The Network is mandated to carry out two main functions: (i) to act as an advisory andconsultative body on issues of internal displacement, and (ii) to function as a forum forinformation sharing between the Unit and agencies.10

inter-26 At present, the Senior Network is not able to fulfill these functions as initially envisioned.Partners on the Network complain of meetings that revolve around a one-way flow of after-the-fact information from the Unit to them, of lack of dialogue and lack of consultation In turn,agency representatives on the Network have often been inconsistent in presence and junior inrank, and are thus unable to act effectively as conduits to convey information to their agencies.The lack of constructive dialogue and information sharing at the Network creates a bottleneckthat blocks the Unit’s interaction with the IASC members.11

27 The Senior Network needs to be revitalized The Unit recognizes the need for improving theNetwork as the critical link to the IASC, and has initiated discussions to that effect Concreteimprovements will require a sustained effort as some partners have grown skeptical of the SeniorNetwork’s potential for reform, and weary of attending long meetings which entail little morethan a review of the Unit’s most recent missions The IASC endorsed a revised terms ofreference for the Senior Network following the inception of the Unit, and these TOR should bemade to function effectively and with greater buy-in from the partner agencies

28 Poor access to the IASC: The Senior Network is the Unit’s natural gateway to the IASC,

which is in turn the critical link to the operational agencies The Senior Network is notfunctioning as an effective forum for dialogue, and therefore the Unit has limited andunproductive access to the IASC This creates further distance between the Unit and the inter-agency partners, makes it more difficult for the Unit to identify specific gaps and call for agencies

10 Terms of Reference, Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement, Endorsed by the IASC WG

in September 2002

11 Views on the Senior Network taken from interviews with, inter alia, UN official, non-UN Senior Networkparticipant, NGO representative

to take responsibility for these gaps, and increases the ambiguity and misperceptions amongagencies in regard to the work of the Unit.12

29 Relationship with the IASC: The Unit also has access to the IASC through the internal

displacement “standing item” mechanism on the IASC agenda A recent external review of theIASC found that the IASC took decisive steps to solve its gap in mandate and capacity regardinginternal displacement through the establishment of the Senior Network on Internal Displacementand the Unit While these actions have diminished inter-agency tensions over internaldisplacement, they have not brought accompanying improvements in response mechanisms.13

But the IASC (or the Unit, or OCHA) cannot repair the flaws in the systematic response tointernal displacement without the active and continued cooperation and support of the operationalagencies and other partners In our analysis, if the Unit is functioning as designed and operating

as a tool of the ERC, then the Unit should be able to garner the support of these agencies andpartners for country-specific responses and system-wide improvements The “shared” inter-agency findings should then be presented to the IASC, ideally through the existing standing item

on the IASC agenda Some within OCHA and on the IASC, however, have pointed out that theUnit has not made effective use of the standing item of internal displacement on the IASCagenda, and that issues were presented through mission reports instead of substantive analysis

30 Malaise within OCHA: The Unit’s relationship with OCHA remains awkward, characterized

on both ‘sides’ by a general lack of consultation.14 Competition over resources increases tensionand hinders transparent information sharing Strong currents of opinion exist within OCHA

headquarters that the internally displaced are OCHA’s business (“so why the Unit?”) and that

Unit activities should be mainstreamed These feelings are particularly strong in Geneva (RCB),with some individuals questioning the size of the Unit (“too big”), lack of accountability (“nobenchmarks, no indicators of success,”), and lack of transparency Relations with the desk inGeneva are workable, even cordial, at the desk level, but remain tinged with lack of clarity andlack of mutual understanding at management level.15 Some within RCB management say thatpositive interaction with the Unit has decreased over time: Unit staff members initially consultedwith OCHA desk officers about specific countries or missions, but these meetings have sincedwindled in frequency Communication is clearly a two-way process, and while the Unit mustmake efforts to include RCB staff both before and after missions, RCB staff should also seek toengage with the Unit on technical matters, for specific expertise, and as links to other agenciesinvolved in internal displacement

31 Relations with the desks in New York (HEB) are distant HEB desk officers have littleinteraction with the Unit, little understanding of the Unit’s strategy, and a poor appreciation ofwhat the Unit does In part, this distance mirrors the hamstrung nature of OCHA’s transatlanticstretch, and the political–humanitarian dichotomy that exists between New York and Geneva But

it also reflects two of the Unit’s main weaknesses: the lack of strategic vision, and its weakrepresentation in New York

12 IASC points from, inter alia, interviews with former participant in the Senior Network and a UN Official

13 Dr Bruce Jones and Abby Stoddard, “External Review of the IASC: Issues Paper for the IASC Working Group Workshop,” New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University, September 8,

2003

14 Information on relations between the Unit and OCHA come from interviews with RCB staff in Geneva, HEB staff in New York, and Unit staff Outside observers from the NGO community and donors also expressed concern about the nature of this relationship and the effectiveness of communication

15 Relations between specific Unit staff members and some desk staff are very good and reportedly involved regular communication Interviews with Unit staff member, OCHA staff, Geneva

32 Relations between the Unit and OCHA field offices are for the most part very positive.OCHA field staff see real value in the Unit’s activities, even if following up on Unit initiativesremains a problem due to lack of resources, capacity, or presence in certain areas When the work

of the Unit is viewed as helpful and positive (as are most of the trainings that the team discussed),this helps advance the reputation and stature of the OCHA office This is because most non-OCHA partners in the field see the Unit as ‘OCHA’ – as opposed to an inter-agency body.16

33 The Unit as a discrete entity: In general, interviewees outside OCHA felt it was preferable

that the Unit retain its status as a discrete, inter-agency entity, rather than incorporate its activitiesinto OCHA Mainstreaming the Unit within OCHA, it was felt, would undermine the effort tobuild an inter-agency approach to the problem of the internally displaced, deprive the ERC of atool necessary to his role as the UN’s focal point for the internally displaced, and minimize theUnit’s potential to play a forceful advocacy role within the UN system Most of these problemsrelate to the way in which OCHA is perceived by other agencies and non-UN actors: OCHA tries

to cover too many disparate aspects (CAP, internal displacement, natural disaster reduction,humanitarian training, Chernobyl recovery, etc), OCHA has difficulty in coordinating the biggerand better funded operational agencies, OCHA lacks authority within the UN Respondents whostressed the need to keep the Unit as a discrete entity (or “quasi-independent,” as one NGOinterviewee described it) feared that the Unit would become mired in the same issues andproblems that OCHA already faces

34 The link to ERC has not been realized: The Unit was established with the explicit purpose to

advise and support the ERC in his role as the UN focal point on internal displacement TheUnit’s most valuable asset is this direct link to the ERC—a point made time and again byinterviewees The Unit should be acting on the behalf and at the request of the ERC, and the ERCshould refer to the Unit for support, information, and concrete assessments and recommendationsfrom the field

35 This link between the ERC and the Unit has not been fully realized In the team’s analysis,several factors are at play: a lack of engagement on the part of the former ERC, reluctance on thepart of the Unit to push for a stronger link to the ERC’s office, a weak liaison position in NewYork, and the ERC’s inability to make strategic use of his link to the Secretary General forassistance in weighing in on operational agencies Although the ERC is faced with a great manyresponsibilities and has a large number of people reporting to him, it is essential that the directreporting line between the Unit and the ERC be not only maintained but also strengthened Theonus is on both the Unit and the ERC to vitalize this link

36 Mixed feelings among operational agencies: The operational agencies, especially those with

the largest roles in internal displacement crises (UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP), continue to harbormisgivings about the Unit These misgivings range from alleged lack of consultation on the part

of the Unit to the complaint that the Unit shows too much operational involvement in the field

On this latter point, there is a fair amount of resistance, especially in agency headquarters, to theidea that a Unit within OCHA should be involved in making recommendations on the conduct ofoperations On balance, the agency most skeptical of the Unit’s ‘operational’ role is UNHCR

37 Although respondents within operational agencies express skepticism about the work of theUnit, the team was told by interviewees at both UNHCR and UNICEF that there are country-specific instances in which “the Unit should be going in and telling [respective agency] to takeresponsibility for the internally displaced.” This implies that although the agencies are generally

16 This was particularly the case in Serbia, where non-OCHA interviewees spoke of the work of the Unit asthe work of OCHA and vice versa Some governmental bodies also seem to combine the activities of OCHA and the Unit, and assume that any OCHA initiative on internal displacement is automatically the work of the Internal Displacement Unit

hesitant about the role of a strong coordinating body, they recognize the necessity and added of such an entity in certain cases

value-38 The team found that personnel of agencies in the field made no distinction between the Unitand OCHA As mentioned above, this might bolster the reputation of OCHA in instances wherethe Unit’s initiatives are seen as particularly useful, but this equation can be problematic if itdetracts from the inter-agency image and clout of the Unit In other words, if staff of operationalagencies such as WFP and UNHCR were to acknowledge that their organizations (and thereforepresumably their interests) are represented by Unit, then these field offices might be moreresponsive to the Unit’s initiatives and recommendations As it is, the inter-agency nature of theUnit seems to become lost or muted during fieldwork, and other agencies see the initiatives aslittle more than another coordination effort on the part of OCHA

39 Collaboration between the Unit and OHCHR needs to be strengthened there still is noOHCHR secondee to the Unit, which hampers the Unit’s ability to focus on broader protectionand human rights issues

40 Relations with NRC and Office of the RSG: Despite recent efforts, two key partnerships

remain at times tinged by a lack of consultation and collaboration The Unit has documents ofunderstanding with both the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Office of the Representative ofthe Secretary-General for the Internally Displaced, but outside observers claim that the roles andresponsibilities of the Unit vis-à-vis these two institutions are unclear For instance, someinterviewees wondered why the Unit was conducting trainings when the NRC had provencapacity in this regard and was able to run trainings for less money Others commented that thedata collection of the Unit (e.g., the Response Matrix) seemed to duplicate the NRC’s Global IDPDatabase, and said that the information resources of the NRC were much superior to those of theUnit Many respondents, especially in the field, expressed confusion over the difference betweenthe advocacy efforts of the RSG and the advocacy strategy of the Unit The MOUs notwithstanding, interviewees both within and outside the three concerned organizations pointed to alack of coordination on missions and other activities, follow-up to these activities, and publicstatements

Performance Findings

Field Support:

41 Unit and Inter-Agency Missions: The Unit has undertaken nearly 40 missions to more than 20

countries, usually at the request of the UN country teams, national authorities, or the ERC Thesemissions have varied in their effectiveness, often because of exogenous reasons: the politicalsensitivities of national authorities, lack of follow-up by UN country teams, or overly ambitiousTORs Some mission reports were seen as unhelpful because of a plethora of recommendationslacking prioritization (Colombia) Interviewees in the field often credited the missions withraising awareness of important aspects of internal displacement in a given country, introducingthe Guiding Principles, and initiating dialogue between country teams and national authorities.Comments on missions and fieldwork in select locations follow

42 Serbia: The Unit’s work in Serbia appeared generally positive, especially in regard to thetrainings on the Guiding Principles (discussed in more detail below) The OCHA Belgrade officeand a local NGO enjoyed a good deal of support and positive relations with the Unit, and inter-agency officials were also mostly positive about the Unit’s work One criticism of the Unit’swork focused on the need for greater technical resources and support For instance, a member ofthe UN country team said that the Unit could have assisted local work by providing lessonslearned from the handling internal displacement in other situations, such as Bosnia It was felt

that these and other examples might serve as a useful resource for agencies, organizations, andgovernment officials in Serbia

43 Many interviewees in Serbia felt that the Unit should keep better pace with the politicaldevelopments on the ground In particular, they worried that the Unit was pushing prematurelyfor high-level discussions between authorities in Prishtina and Belgrade on internal displacement,and feared that efforts to hold talks on this highly sensitive topic could derail measured progress

on other political issues In a few cases, UN officials questioned the overall value of the work ofthe Unit in Serbia, stating that the Unit had provided “useful support in the background, buthaven’t made much of a difference or done anything that the [UN country team] would not havedone on their own.”17 For the most part, however, the work of the Unit in Serbia was consideredpositive and points to the value of follow-up, multiple visits to a region, and the benefits ofhaving a positive relationship with an OCHA field office

44 D.R Congo: The Unit led an inter-agency mission to D.R Congo in January 2003.18 Theinter-agency mission is credited with ‘articulating’ the issue of internal displacement, and forproviding a framework that assisted the UN country team in raising the issue with nationalauthorities.19 The mission report identifies a key gap in the response strategy to internaldisplacement: “No formal commonly adopted UN strategy exists regarding the provision ofassistance to IDPs and their host communities,” and then details the conceptual framework underwhich all assistance activities should occur.20 This framework calls for all actors to agree uponprinciples and objectives, and highlights the underlying reasons for displacement that should beaddressed in a comprehensive assistance strategy The report goes on to recommend theestablishment of thematic groups on population movements at the provincial level, and theidentification of an internal displacement focal point in local administrations Overall, the report

is insightful and offers concrete recommendations, but the ultimate test in relevance andeffectiveness lies in the follow-up and response on the ground

45 To date there have been various initiatives in the wake of the mission and report, including apilot project implemented by UNFPA and a working group on internal displacement created bythe UN country team Both of these initiatives, however, were established only recently (theworking group was launched the very day the evaluation team arrived in Kinshasa in lateSeptember) — nearly nine months after the mission This delay in response is not the directresponsibility of the Unit, as a number of interviewees stressed that the Unit had repeatedly andalmost tirelessly sought to follow up on its recommendations But it is indicative of thechallenges facing an over-stretched country team under changing leadership, and of the lack ofweight afforded to the Unit’s recommendations, even when they emerge from an inter-agencymission The Unit should ensure that clear lines of responsibility are established following therelease of recommendations, and should remain in communication with the relevant actors toassess progress and to provide further advice or technical support when appropriate

46 Some critics of the Unit’s work in the D.R Congo said that Unit personnel lacked sufficientunderstanding of the issues in the country, and that the teams “blew in and blew out” too quickly

17 UN official, Belgrade

18 The Unit also conducted a mission in May 2003 aimed at national authorities, which was reportedly attended and generated useful dialogue However, the interim government was formed shortly thereafter, and the Unit and OCHA have decided to wait until the ministries are more established and operational before continuing with government-focused workshops and trainings

well-19 Interview with a UN official, Kinshasa

20 IDP Unit, “Inter-agency mission on internal displacement in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 16 January – 8 February, 2003, p 6

to have an impact or make a real difference in a complex political and humanitarian landscape.Others spoke of lack of sufficient attention to protection, which remains the most pressingconcern in D.R Congo.21 Of note, while the mission report from February 2003 states that theinter-agency team learned that roughly 40 rapes per day were reported in the Uvira area betweenOctober 2002 and early 2003, the report does not mention any specific protection needs ofwomen or recommend a strategy for the reduction of gender violence

47 Internal displacement advisors: The Unit has helped articulate the need for, identify, recruit,

and in some cases fund internal displacement advisors in the field (for an initial period of 3-6months) in Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Iraq, Liberia, Serbia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, and soon inUganda Once deployed, these advisors do not report to the Unit, but to the Resident /Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) or other appropriate field personnel (e.g., the UNAMA chief

of staff in Afghanistan) This reporting line is appropriate, but the Unit should be able to draw onthe work of the advisors to improve its own analysis and pursue the advisor’s recommendationswith the ERC and other agencies Also, the Unit should be prepared to offer political support toadvisors who become caught in inter-agency tangles within a given UN Country Team

48 Afghanistan: The Unit recommended sending an internal displacement advisor to Afghanistanfollowing a mission to the country in March 2002 This idea was initially welcomed by the UNcountry team, including UNAMA and UNHCR, but three sources of tension later arose First,there was confusion over where the advisor would best be located (i.e., with UNAMA, withUNHCR, or with the government) Debate over the location (and hence the reporting line) of theadvisor continued throughout his posting, and limited the extent of the impact he was able tomake in his position Second, debate also arose over the appropriateness of the TOR for theadvisor position There were significant changes – in both the political structure and thehumanitarian situation—in Afghanistan between the time of the Unit’s mission in early 2002 andthe deployment of the advisor in late October 2002 Officials in Kabul reported that the Unitseemed unable or unwilling to take these shifts into account, and felt that the final TOR for theadvisor did not adequately reflect the needs on the ground Third, there was tension following theadvisor’s arrival over how he would carry out his work, where he would be based, and whatissues he would focus on Some respondents felt that there was no need for a coordinatingadvisor on internal displacement in Afghanistan, as the consultative group system (sector-specificgroups of government ministries and UN agencies) already handles coordination

49 The internal displacement advisor in Afghanistan experienced a great deal of trouble gettinghis recommendations considered by the appropriate authorities In an instance such as this, theUnit should seek to work with the UN country team or with agency headquarters to identify theproblem and seek a more effective solution In Afghanistan, the solution may have been to raisepoints with senior officials in other agencies, to relocated the advisor to another host agency or to

a field office where he would have had a greater impact, or to revisit the initial terms of reference

in order to ensure that the job description matched the job that was most needed on the ground

Protection:

50 Protection is the largest gap in the international response to internal displacement The Unittook steps to address this gap through the Protection Coalition, Response Matrix, and ProtectionSurvey The Unit also sent internal displacement advisors to key countries in times of crisis, such

as Iraq and Liberia These are all positive steps, but critics continue to question the overallimpact of such measures on the UN system and on the protection needs of internally displacedpopulations

21 Opinions expressed by UN and NGO staff members

51 Response Matrix, Protection Survey: The Unit developed and conducted the Response

Matrix and Protection Survey (the former country-specific, the latter thematic, both ready in draftform) in order to highlight gaps in the international provision of protection and assistance tointernally displaced populations (The Protection Survey was developed in collaboration with theBrookings-SAIS Project.) Many interviewees expressed skepticism as to the usefulness of theseexercises, citing cost, duplication with other efforts, and lack of focus on local responses Thesecriticisms miss the point If successful, the reports will point to gaps and opportunities within the

UN system, particularly in regard to protection As such they should become powerful advocacytools for the Unit to advise the ERC on how RC/HCs, UN agencies, and their partners can moreeffectively meet the needs of the internally displaced

52 Protection Coalition: The Protection Coalition was designed to consist of a core group of

partners with protection expertise who would act to support the Unit’s protection efforts Thiscoalition was to be activated in specific countries when needed According to Unit staff as well

as coalition partners, the initiative proved simply too difficult to get off the ground TheProtection Coalition had limited success in Liberia prior to the resumption of conflict, but somepartners boycotted coalition meetings in Monrovia citing misgivings on how the Unit addressedprotection issues Unsuccessful efforts were made to launch the coalition in Iraq Problems withthe Protection Coalition include an overly ambitious initial concept, difficulties in practicalimplementation in the field, and lack of commitment of partners The Unit should take stock ofthese lessons and apply them to other protection efforts

Capacity Building and Training:

53 Training and seminars The Unit’s training and seminar activities are well received in the

field by OCHA staff, local and international humanitarian partners, and local and nationalauthorities The quality of the training, the materials, and the subject matter all receive highmarks The training and seminars appear to have led to progress in getting national authorities tounderstand and recognize the Guiding Principles, notably in Serbia and D.R Congo However, afrequent criticism is that the lack of follow-through (not necessarily the responsibility of the Unit)has meant that the momentum generated by the workshops has often not been seized upon Thislack of follow-through has hampered effective capacity building Participants in some training oftrainers programs also raised criticism about the lack of accessible training materials Placing alltraining materials on a CD would allow for better sharing and greater access, but this has not beendone by the Unit Multiple versions of training materials exist, and material is difficult to accessoff the internet Interviewees said that they had raised this point with the Unit, but had not seenany progress to date

54 Serbia: The Unit conducted trainings on the Guiding Principles in Belgrade, Kosovo, and

Montenegro, and interviewees felt that these sessions were critical in initiating dialogue oninternal displacement at the official level as well as amongst the UN country team and civilsociety organizations People commented that the sessions were particularly effective inintroducing the Guiding Principles as a non-political tool to discuss the sensitive political topic ofinternal displacement Much credit was given to the trainers at the workshops, who were said to

be relatively well versed in the issues in Serbia and also adept at running sessions Dialoguearound internal displacement and the Guiding Principles has continued in Serbia, with thecreation of an internal displacement Working Group (and more technical sub-working groups)and the initiative of policy discussions on internal displacement

55 One of the greatest successes of the Unit in Serbia (assisted by the OCHA Belgrade office)has been the follow-up with Group 484, a local NGO This organization adapted the materials forthe Unit’s training sessions and has initiated a training of trainers program to reach internallydisplaced people and local authorities Group 484 had the initiative to develop these trainings,

but stated that they could not have implemented the program without extensive support from theUnit and the OCHA office

56 D.R Congo: Working closely with the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Unit has conducted

an extensive training program in D.R Congo with the aim of “responsibilizing” the variouspolitical and armed actors to respect civilians according to basic human rights and internationallaw.22 These trainings have been considered successful in raising awareness about a rights-basedapproach and the Guiding Principles, but repeated comments were made regarding problems withfollow-up after the trainings Civil society groups and local authorities responded well totrainings and, in some cases, began to establish collaborative mechanisms based on informationreceived in the trainings However, these groups required some follow-up support and advice onorganization and protection mechanisms In many instances this support was not available Thisshortcoming is largely due to the limited capacity of OCHA in the vast D.R Congo, and it isneither the role nor the responsibility of the Unit to remain on the ground after the trainings to

provide such support It is, however, the responsibility of the Unit to ensure prior to organizing

such trainings that there are people or offices willing and able to take the responsibility for this

sort of follow-up, and the Unit has a clear plan as to how to shift responsibility from the Unit for

“trainings” and to OCHA offices for “coordination and protection.” Only through such clear lines

of responsibility will longer-term positive results be realized

57 The presence of OCHA is now expanding in D.R Congo, and the Unit has recently hired anassistant to conduct follow up and work on internal displacement issues in the east These stepswill hopefully result in greater follow-up and a more forward-looking strategy in the Unit’s work

in the country

Strengthening the Institutional Framework for the internally displaced:

58 National strategies and mechanisms: The Unit aims to work with UN country teams and

governments to realize the introduction of strategies, policies, working groups, or othermechanisms to address internal displacement Some successes have been achieved in this regard.For instance, working groups were established in Serbia, D.R Congo, and Sudan (sincedisbanded), and draft strategies on internal displacement have been established or are beingworked on in Uganda and Serbia

59 The Unit and its supporters place a great deal of emphasis on formulating national strategiesand legislation However, some interviewees pointed out that getting legislation or policies tabled

in countries without a working democracy, rule of law, or effective means of implementinglegislation was a hollow victory This is especially true in countries where the governmentcontinues to forcibly displace populations or exacerbate conditions for those already displaced,such as in Uganda According to critics, the Unit should not emphasis legislation in thesecountries, but should rather focus on its role as an internal advocate within the UN system to callfor greater responsibility of agencies.23 It is important not to over-emphasize legislative victories

in countries that lack respect for rule of law or effective legislative processes In Uganda,however, the Unit has worked both with the government on national policies and with the UNCT

to increase assistance and protection capacity in the north The Unit’s mission report from August

2003 indicates a careful strategy that seeks to increase the resources and UN presence in the norththrough the appointment of an IDP Advisor, and also to work with UNICEF to strengthenprotection initiatives.24 Some have suggested that the Unit has not done enough to push UNICEF

22 OCHA, Internal Displacement Unit, IDP Training Programme, Democratic Republic of Congo, no date

23 Discussion with NGO representative

24 IDP Unit, “UN system response to the IDP issue in Uganda and recommendations for enhanced support

to national and local authorities,” A Report of the Internal Displacement Unit, August 2003