The development of wise action in adulthood

Any psychological analysis of wisdom must make reference to the concept of wisdom as it is already defined within the intersubjective and pre-empirical matrix of human social relations..

The Development of Wise Decision-Making Across Adulthood:

An Intersubjective Framework

Michael F Mascolo Merrimack College

To appear in Long, J S., Lynam, A., & Kallio, E (in press) The International Handbook of Adult Development and Wisdom Oxford

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WISE DECISION-MAKING ACROSS ADULTHOOD:

human diversity has created cultural clashes that threaten the more-or-less shared values and norms that hold societies together Many have suggested that technology and innovation have evolved faster than our individual and collective capacities to manage them

Given the enormous success of science and technology, it is not surprising that many would seek scientific and technological solutions to our social problems However, while science and technology will no doubt be essential in facing human predicaments, by themselves, they are

morally neutral Science seeks to study what is rather than what ought to be; technologies are mere tools for meeting human wants and needs Against this backdrop, if wisdom is what we

need “to cope with the central problems and avoid the dangers” (Nozick, 1989) of human

problems, then what the world needs is more wisdom rather than merely more knowledge or

technology From this perspective, discussions of wisdom take on deep societal importance

If studying wisdom is important, how are we to study it? In recent times, there has been a turn

in many circles toward the use of scientific methods to seek answers to moral questions

(Hunter & Nedelisky, 2018) This practice occurs, for example, when scholars seek to identify the biological foundations of morality, the evolutionary foundations for a good society, or to establish a moral science Such pursuits immediately run up against a series of deep conceptual

problems These include the fact/value distinction (Gorski, 2017; Putnam, 2002) and the

naturalistic fallacy (Clipsham, 2014; Qu, 2019) Science is typically based upon the desire to

identify objective descriptions of the world – that is, facts that can be identified independent of the values and biases of the observer Given this distinction, the naturalistic fallacy occurs

individuals seek to infer what ought to be (i.e., values) from descriptions of what is (i.e.,

empirical facts)

If this is so, then how is it possible to develop a science of morality? Social science can provide

us with descriptions of how people think about moral issues, how psychological and brain activity mediate the process of making moral judgments, and even how the capacity for moral judgment evolves in species, collectives and individuals It can even provide empirical

knowledge that can help people make moral judgments and decisions However, science itself cannot tell us what is good, worthy, right or moral To the extent that science is constrained to

describing what is, it cannot prescribe what ought to be

The same issues arise in attempts to study wisdom from the standpoint of empirical science Wisdom is an evaluative concept A wise decision is one that anticipates the possibility of

maximizing the good As such, wisdom is not an extant something that can be measured

through careful observation Instead, what we call “wise” – like all evaluative categories – is a reflective product of human relational experience (Mascolo & Di Bianca-Fasoli, 2020) It arises discursively as people work together to identify what it means to live good lives Any

psychological analysis of wisdom must make reference to the concept of wisdom as it is already defined within the intersubjective and pre-empirical matrix of human social relations Thus, if

we are to study wisdom scientifically, we cannot do so within the framework of traditional objectivist science (Ichinose, 2017; Kristjánsson, 2012; Mascolo, 2017)

An intersubjective framework provides a way to reconcile the fissure between the scientific and humanistic study of wisdom An intersubjective analysis is informed by the idea that the ways in which we construct knowledge about people is fundamentally different from how we come to know physical objects and bodies (Brinkman, 2011; Martin & Sugarman, 1989) At base, our

knowledge of psychological states comes not from empirical observation but from our already existing human capacity for intersubjective engagement – the capacity to share, coordinate, represent and mutually-incorporate meaning and experience between people (Di Paoli & de

Jaegar, 2007; Mascolo, 2017; Matusov, 1996; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001) The capacity to

understand human experience is a mediated one (Wertsch, 2007): it occurs as people draw upon existing systems of meanings represented in an already shared psychological lexicon (Cipolletti, Procter & Mascolo, 2020)

This paper is divided into two parts Part I contains a critical analysis of psychological research

on wisdom and its development Although research on wisdom has exploded in recent

decades, I argue that the scientific quest to “measure wisdom” does more to obscure than illuminate the nature of wisdom While most researchers agree that wisdom is not something that can be directly observed, many nonetheless seek ways to “measure wisdom” empirically (Ardelt, 2003; Glück, 2018; Glück et al., 2013; Thomas, Bangen, Ardelt, & Jeste, 2017; Webster, 2019) Such measures are often created by (a) asking respondents to identify qualities of “wise persons”, and then (b) developing questionnaires to assess the extent to which people exhibit commonly nominated qualities (Bluck & Glück, 2005; Denny, Dew & Kroupa, 1995) The result

of such research is a kind of epistemic circularity: wisdom is defined in terms of lay beliefs about types of qualities exhibited by people who can be considered wise; people are then evaluated as wise to the extent that they are judged to exhibit those characteristics

Although they purport to measure wisdom, such scales do not seek to assess the extent to which people are actually capable of making decisions that might be evaluated as “wise” Given the prevalence of the value of objectivity in scientific research (Levitt et al., 2020), this is not surprising Assessing the wisdom of decision-making would require the invocation of value

judgments, thus violating the scientific norm of objectivity One might argue conventional

research on wisdom is informed by value judgments; however, value presuppositions are

largely implicit, hidden or unacknowledged (Cirillo & Wapner, 1986; Richardson & Woolfolk, 1994) This is not an intentional practice on the part of researchers; wisdom research is

designed to fulfill the objectivist requirements of the discipline The problem lies in the

fact/value distinction that informs psychological science in the first place (Brinkman, 2011; Kristjánsson, 2012; Mascolo, 2017)

Part II of the paper attempts to address these problems It contains a description of an

intersubjective framework for understanding psychological science and the psychological

analysis of wisdom in particular An intersubjective approach begins with an analysis of the

shared and contested meanings of “wisdom” as an a priori intersubjective category – complete

with its evaluative connotations Based on such an analysis, it is suggested that a wise decision

is one that, informed by conceptions of the good, anticipates, coordinates and maximizes the good over the bad across the full range of concerns that define a given problem Based on this

definition, the discussion turns to a psychological study assessing development changes in wise decision-making in adults between the ages of 18-80 In so doing, drawing on models of skill

development (Fischer, 1980; Mascolo & Bidell, 2020; Mascolo & Fischer, 2015) we identify

developmental changes in the structure of wise decision-making over adulthood The status of

decisions as “wise” is evaluated from both first-person and socio-normative points of view

PART I: A CRITICAL BUT SYMPATHETIC REVIEW OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WISDOM

The crisis of our times, in short—the crisis behind all the others—is the crisis of science without wisdom (Maxwell, 2005, p 32)

The study of wisdom has traditionally been understood as the province of humanities – and particularly of philosophy The scientific status of psychology has its origins in the severing of psychology from philosophy (Robinson, 1995) The empirical methods of the psychologist were seen to be more reliable than the “armchair” speculations of the philosopher While scientific psychology has the advantage of subjecting theoretical claims to empirical evidence, it

encounters difficulties when it seeks to address humanistic questions that do not lend

themselves to direct empirical analysis In this section, we explore the implications of this problem for the study of wisdom

Wisdom in Philosophy

Ryan (1998, 2008) has provided a cogent taxonomy for understanding the various ways that philosophers have approached the concept of wisdom In the Western tradition, Plato provides

among the earliest accounts of wisdom as epistemic humility In the Apology, (West/Plato,

1979), Socrates interviews many people who might be considered wise In each encounter, Socrates finds that those who are typically considered wise to lack knowledge that they claimed

to have Socrates’ experiment affirms the Oracle of Delphi’s statement that there is no man

wiser than Socrates: Socrates is wise precisely because he is aware that he knows nothing In the case of Socrates, wisdom is to be found in epistemic humility

Wisdom is broadly understood to be informed by knowledge This raises the question of the type of knowledge that is necessary for a person or decision to be counted as wise Ryan (2008) distinguishes among different forms of knowledge that scholars have invoked in discussions of

wisdom These include theoretical, factual, and practical knowledge, as well as knowledge about how to live a good life Theoretical knowledge consists of abstract and a priori

knowledge of the nature of reality It has generally taken to involve knowledge of what is

necessary and true about the physical or spiritual world Factual knowledge is a posteriori knowledge that is derived from or consistent with theoretical knowledge Practical knowledge

is useful human knowledge about how to conduct oneself in everyday life While theoretical, factual and practical knowledge are often seen to be important components or prerequisites for wisdom, they are not necessarily defined by concepts of the good Thus, while other forms

of knowledge may be prerequisites for wisdom, wisdom is most closely associated with

knowledge of how to live well An additional conception of wisdom builds on the idea that

deliberation alone is an insufficient condition of wisdom From this view, wisdom involves the ability to put deliberation in to successful action A wise person is thus one who is able to live a good life based on principles of virtue

Aristotle’s conception of wisdom incorporates each these various forms of knowledge

Aristotle identifies two forms of wisdom: sofia and phronesis Sophia consists of theoretical or

philosophical wisdom It is a form of higher-order abstract knowledge about the most valued

qualities and objects in the world Sophia makes use of both nous (intellect, intelligence or intuition) and episteme (scientific knowledge) Nous is the source of the a priori and apodictic first principles Episteme consists of universal and unchanging knowledge about objects in the world Phronesis consists of practical wisdom, which consists of useful knowledge about how

to live well in the world Both sofia and phronesis are directed at valued forms of knowledge

As a form of higher-order knowledge, sofia is directed toward universal knowledge of the

cosmos beyond everyday life In contrast, phronesis consists of practical knowledge Phronesis not only incudes useful knowledge about how to live but also knowledge of how to live well As such, it requires knowledge of the moral virtues – what is morally good in human affairs

Phronesis is tightly coupled with the concept of prudence Prudence is an intellectual virtue Prudence is often understood to function as the means of practical wisdom A person who is

prudent not only knows the virtuous ends toward which her actions are directed, she also is able to select the moral means that will move action toward that end In this way, prudence is both moral and worldly It describes the process of linking conceptions of the good with

concrete, particular and contextualized circumstances Thus, for Aristotle,

The phronimos is good at deliberation: [s]he can sum up a situation, weigh up various factors, and work out what to do to promote or achieve his objectives Often enough, because of his [or her] experience and wisdom, [s]he can see straight off the best thing

to do, without having to go through a process of deliberation

While wisdom implies comprehensive knowledge, it is possible for a person to have practical

wisdom (phronesis) without theoretical wisdom (sofia) In fact, in matters of everyday life, even

though theoretical wisdom reflects knowledge of the highest value, such knowledge may not be useful in everyday affairs The person with theoretical wisdom may understand explanatory first principles, but may not be able to put them into practice; in contrast, the person with practical wisdom may know useful practices, but may lack the explanatory framework to

understand why such practices are useful To illustrate this concept, Aristotle provides the example of person who knows that light meats are beneficial to health but does not know which meats are light: “Such a [person] is not likely to make you well as one who knows that chicken is good for you.” Thus, for Aristotle, while theoretical knowledge is concerned with identify truths, practical knowledge or reasoning is concerned with identifying and acting upon that which is moral and human goods (Kenny, 1992)

Although wisdom involves deliberation, the capacity to merely engage in virtuous thought is insufficient to qualify one as a virtuous person A virtuous person is one who is able to put

virtues into action; it is a matter of cultivating particular, long-lasting dispositions to act

virtuously A wise person is one who is prudent not simply in a particular science (episteme) or field (techne), but who is able to act prudently across situations and domains of activity The

wise person has comprehensive and flexible knowledge – knowledge that allows a person to adjust his or her actions to the particular demands of a given situation

Can Wisdom Be Studied Scientifically?

Many psychological analyses of wisdom begin with a review of philosophical conceptions, the intent of such reviews is more to provide historical background rather to than inform the

content of psychological theory Because philosophical analyses are seen as speculative and pre-empirical, they are often seen as largely irrelevant to the scientific process From this

perspective, psychological science offers something that goes beyond the “arm chair”

speculations of the philosopher namely the prospect of identifying wisdom through empirical analysis (Bergsma & Ardelt; 2012; Glück, 2018; Staudinger & Glück, 2011; Webster, 2014;

2019) As an empirical science, psychological science is founded upon the value of objectivity The goal of an objective description is to describe only what is publicly observable, without either adding or taking away information, using a theoretically neutral observation language –

one that is free of values, bias or prejudgment

Attempts to study wisdom scientifically raises a series of problems First, unlike objects and bodies that exist in the physical world, wisdom is not an observable entity; as an evaluative

concept, it has no empirical content Second, scientific analyses of wisdom immediately run up

against the fact/value distinction (Putnam, 2002) While science seeks unbiased accounts of

what is, wisdom consists of knowledge about how to lead a life that is good If this is so, how is

it possible to identify what wisdom is apart from the values that define what constitutes the good? Third, as an evaluative concept, wisdom is a product of human experience As such, its

study raises the perennial problems related to the “objective” analysis of modes of “subjective” experience

Psychologists have developed three broad ways address the problems of defining and assessing wisdom The first involves assessing lay concepts of wisdom (Sternberg, 1985; Glück & Bluck, 2011) The second seeks to “measure wisdom” through the use of psychometrically-validated self-report scales (Webster, 2014, 2019) The third method seeks to advance theoretical

models of wisdom (Baltes & Kunzmann, 2003; Cheraghi, Kadivar, Asgari, & Farzad, 2015; Li & Wang, 2017; Li, Wang, Wang, Shi & Xiong, 2020) and test them by assessing how people

perform in various activities that are assumed to require wise decision making (Baltes &

Straudinger, 2000; Staudinger & Leipold, 2019) While each approach has generated a wealth of useful empirical data, the issue of how these studies speak to the nature of wisdom remains unclear

Lay Conceptions of Wisdom

The first approach is to assess everyday folk conceptions of wisdom If we cannot identify wisdom “objectively” from the “outside-in”, perhaps it is possible to identify the nature of wisdom from the “inside-out” (Bluck & Glück, 2005) Toward this end, researchers ask

respondents to articulate their own conceptions of wisdom and to describe experiences of wisdom in their own lives One common task involves asking respondents to identify qualities of people whom they would regard as wise (Paulhus, Wehr, Harms & Strasser, 2002) In their review of research on implicit theories of wisdom, Bluck and Glück (2005) identify four common themes that respondents nominate when describing the attributes of wise persons These

include insight, a reflective attitude, concern for others, and real-world skills People who are

nominated as wise are typically understood to be people who are able to provide advice or

guidance to others (Jason et al., 2011)

Understandings of wisdom begin to develop in the preschool years and become increasingly differentiated, integrated and articulated over the course of development Young children tend

to think of wisdom in terms of concrete forms of intellectual ability (e.g., “smart”), social

goodness (e.g., being “nice”, “honest”), concern for others (e.g., “helping others”), self-control and rule following (Glück, Bischof, & Siebenhüner, 2012) First-graders were more likely than older children to regard wisdom as something associated with the elderly In comparison to Austrian children, Iranian children tended to emphasize adherence to social norms more often than Austrian children, who tended to emphasize cognitive aspects of wisdom (Asadi, Khorshidi

& Glück, 2019) By adolescence, teens identify wise actions in themselves and in others in terms of moral categories (e g., “It was the right thing to do”), the provision of support to others (e.g., “When my girlfriend broke her bone, I called the ambulance”), intellectual

accomplishment (e.g., “I got an A on a test”) and other increasingly sophisticated categories (e.g., “I did not fight back when they were beating me”)

Autobiographical accounts have revealed age-related and developmental differences in the ways in which people understand wisdom and its role in their everyday lives Research has

shown age-related changes in how people represent wisdom in their lives Interestingly,

researchers have shown shifts in how people represent wisdom as they confront the life Wright, Breier, Depner, Grant, & Lodi-Smith (2018) reported that illness and impending death was an occasion for many hospice patients to reconsider priorities Patients regarded the end of life as an opportunity for growth, reflection of the meaning of their lives, and mindful appreciation of the present moment Montross-Thomas, Joseph, Edmonds, Palinkas & Jeste (2018) asked hospice patients to explain how their illness impacted their conception of wisdom The investigators described many patient responses as reflecting a balance between active acceptance and simultaneous growth This work illustrates how the shifting circumstances related to end-of-life prompt forms of novel reflection that can be regarded by both

end-of-experiencers and investigators alike as forms of wisdom

Beyond developmental variation in lay conceptions of wisdom, researchers have identified both similarities and differences in conceptions of wisdom in different cultures (Brezina, 2010;

Ferrari & Alhosseini, 2019; Takahashi & Overton, 2005; Yeng & Intezari, 2019) For example, Ferrari, Abdelaal, Lakhani, Sachdeva, Tasmim, & Sharma (2016) reported similarities and

differences in how Canadians and Indians explained why Gandhi could be considered wise While Canadians tended to emphasize practicality and intelligence, Indians tended to speak of

an integration of benevolence, practicality and intellectual values Hu, Ferrari, Liu, Gao & Weare (2018) showed that people from mainland China tended to define wisdom in terms of cultural values involving “spirituality and the elaboration of generalized mindsets toward the world (e.g., an “attitude of benevolence”; a “mindset toward disengagement”) (see also Weidong & Haitao, 2003)

The Limits of Lay Knowledge To what evidence can we refer to support claims about

the nature of wisdom? If we cannot observe wisdom directly, perhaps we can approximate such observation by asking respondents about their conceptions of wisdom Such a method would appear to have at least two advantages First, it allows researchers to anchor definitions

of wisdom in some form of evidence Second, it allows investigators to assess how people

experience wisdom from the first-person perspective However, assessing lay conceptions of wisdom is not the same as studying “wisdom” This approach is analogous to seeking to define

“weather”, “life” or “memory” by asking everyday people about their conceptions of these

terms (Bluck and Glück, 2011) As a result, one could never be sure that what people say about wisdom maps onto whatever it is that we call wisdom Judgments about wisdom cannot be treated as indicators of what wisdom is, or even if wisdom is anything at all If philosophical

conceptions of wisdom are unreliable sources for defining wisdom, self-reports leave a gap between lay concepts and the referents to which those concepts are said to refer

Self-Report Wisdom Scales

A second method relies upon the concept of operationalization Such a view acknowledges that

wisdom does not refer to a thing or process that be directly observed Instead of

understanding wisdom as a psychological entity to be observed, this approach recognizes

wisdom as a hypothetical construct – an abstract concept or “latent variable” used to explain a

range of observable events Viewed as such, the study of wisdom can proceed through the process of identifying observable indicators of wisdom A series of researchers have developed rating scales intended to measure wisdom in individual persons (Ardelt, 2003; Glück et al., 2013; Taylor, Bates & Webster, 2011; Thomas, Bangen, Ardelt & Jeste, 2017; Thomas et al, 2019; Webster, 2003) Having operationalized wisdom in terms of these instruments,

researchers establish validity by assessing correlations among these instruments measures of variables that might commonly be expected to be related to wisdom

Table 1 identifies seven different self-report scales that are intended to assess wisdom within

individual persons Each of the indices indicated assess what theorists have called personal wisdom; that is, the capacity for first-person judgments about personal and interpersonal

concerns that are informed by life experience, rather than judgments about global human concerns as viewed from the perspective of a third-person observer (Staudinger & Glück, 2011) Sample questions for each scale are indicated in Table 1 The questions generally require

participants to rate the extent to which they or other people exhibit qualities that are seen to

be definitive of wise persons The questions that make up these various indices are derived from self-report studies using methods similar to those employed to assess lay conceptions of wisdom (e.g., descriptions of people nominated as wise; personal definitions of wisdom; etc.) Using conventional methods, with exceptions, researchers using these scales have reported acceptable levels of reliability (Webster, 2017, 2019)

Table 1

Self-Report Wisdom Scales

Psychological Assessments Adult

(Beaumont, 2009); Self-Efficacy, (.34), Openness (.44), Personal Growth (.22), Emotional Competence, (.50) Empathy, (.28) (Glück et al., 2013)

Practical (e.g., “I have built

well-formulated views and attitudes as far

as important moral matters of modern life are concerned”)

Dialectical Thinking (e.g.,” I am usually

open to and interested in different viewpoints, because this way I can

Wisdom: Modest relations to ASTI, 3D-WS, WRS, Moderate relation to SAWS; self-efficacy (Digangi et al., 2013)

form a more complete and clear opinion about an issue”)

Awareness of Uncertainty (e.g.,

“When I plan tomorrow’s schedule, I

usually think about the possibility that something happens and as a result my plans would be reversed”)

Situated Wise

Reasoning

Scale 3 (SWRS)

Perspective Taking (e.g., “Put myself in

the other person’s shoes”)

Consideration of Change (e.g., “Looked

for different solutions as the situation evolved”)

Intellectual Humility (e.g.,

“Double-checked whether my opinion on the situation might be incorrect”)

Search for Compromise (e.g., “Tried to

anticipate how the conflict might be resolved”)

Outsider Perspective (e.g., “Tried to

see the conflict from the point of view

of an uninvolved person”)

Wisdom: SAWS (.39), 3D-WS (.21), ASTI (.19); Adaptive Emotion Regulation, Mindfulness, Balancing Self-Interest and

Cooperation; Attributional Complexity about Conflict;

Openness, Extraversion, Perspective Taking; Emotional Intelligence, (Brienza, Kung, Santos, Bobocel & Grossmann, 2018); Diversity of Emotional Experience (Grossmann, Oakes & Santos, 2019)

Fundamental

Values Scale 4

(FVS)

Harmony (e.g., “Good Judgment”);

Warmth (e.g., “Humor”); Nature (e.g.,

“Reverence for Nature”); Intelligence

(e.g., “Problem-Solving Ability);

Spirituality (e.g., “Living a Spiritual

Life”)

Spirituality, Stress (Jason et al., 2001); Depression, Stress, Optimism (Jason et al., 2004)

Life Knowledge (e.g., “I look for deeper

meaning of events in life”)

Life Skills: I handle multiple obligations

effectively

Willingness to Learn (e.g., “I seek

assistance when necessary”)

Epistemological development (Ghina, Hasan & Fayyaz, 2017); leadership styles (Parco-

Tropicales & de Guzman, 2014)

San Diego

Wisdom Scale 6

(SD-WISE)

Social Advice (e.g., “I am good at

perceiving how others are feeling”)

Emotional Regulation (e.g., “I remain

calm under pressure”)

Prosocial Behavior (e.g., “I treat others

the way I would like to be treated”)

Insight (e.g., “I take time to reflect on

my thoughts

Value Relativism (e.g., “I enjoy learning

things about other cultures”)

Decisiveness (e.g., “I have trouble

making decisions”)

Wisdom: 3D-WS (.45), SAWS (.47); Age (ns); Education (ns);

Personal Mastery, Resilience;

Happiness; Life Satisfaction;

Emotional Distress; (Thomas et al., 2019); Loneliness (Jeste et al., 2020)

Self-Assessment

Wisdom Scale 7

(SAWS)

Emotional Regulation (e.g., “I am very

good at reading my emotional states”)

Reflectiveness (e.g., Reviewing my past

helps gain perspective on current concerns”)

Openness (e.g., ““I like to read books

which challenge me to think differently about issues”)

Experience (e.g., “I have experienced

many moral dilemmas

Humor (e.g., “There is nothing amusing

about difficult situations”)

Wisdom: 3D-WS (.33); Age (0);

Forgiveness (.35); Well-Being (.46) (Taylor, Bates & Webster, 2011); Generativity (.48), Attachment Avoidance (.24) (Webster, 2007); Meaning in Life (Webster et al., 2018); Ego Integrity, Pleasure in Life;

Personal Growth, Understanding; Friendships (Webster, 2010); Self-Efficacy (.28), Openness (.40), Personal Growth (.28), Emotional Competence (.32) Empathy, (.39) (Glück et al., 2013)

Self-Ardelt Three

Dimension

Wisdom Scale 8

(3D-WS)

Cognitive (e.g., “A person either knows

the answer to a question or he/she doesn’t”)

Affective (e.g., “It’s not really my

problem if others are in trouble and need help”)

Reflective (e.g., “I always try to look at

all sides of a problem”)

Wisdom: SAWS (.33); Age (0);

Forgiveness (.57); Well-Being (.64) (Taylor, Bates & Webster, 2011), Agreeableness,

Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Low Neuroticism, Well-Being (Ardelt et al., 2019); Self-Efficacy (.33), Openness (.59), Personal Growth (.41); Self-Acceptance (.37), Emotional Competence (.63), Empathy (.26) (Glück et al., 2013)

1

Levenson, Jennings, Aldwin & Shiraishi (2005); 2

Moraitou & Efklides (2012); 3

Grossmann, Na, Varnum, et al., (2010); 4

Jason, Reichler, King, Madsen, Camacho, & Marchese (2001); 5

Brown & Greene (2006); 6

Thomas, et al., (2019); 7

Webster (2003); 8

Ardelt (2003)

Studies have assessed correlations between scores on wisdom scales and assessments of a variety of different psychological variables As shown in Table 1, various indices of wisdom tend

to show moderate correlations with each other Studies also show modest to moderate

correlations between various measures of wisdom and indices designed to assess a suite of

variables that one might expect to be related to wisdom These include personal well-being, personal happiness, epistemological development, self-understanding, openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, ego-integrity, empathy, and other psychological variables

Such correlations are offered as an indication of the external validity of the various measures of wisdom employed

What do wisdom scales measure? The indices described in Table 1 are taken to be

measures of wisdom as it is assumed to exist within individual persons This assumption leads

to several difficult problems The first concerns the meaning of what is being measured When completing such scales, respondents rate themselves or others on a series of dimensions culled from lay conceptions about the general characteristics of people who may commonly be

considered “wise” As a result, such “measures of wisdom” cannot properly be said to assess

something called wisdom; instead, they reflect personal judgments about the extent to people

being rated display qualities typically assumed to be characteristics of “wise” persons Nothing

in the scales allows the researcher to judge whether the persons being rated are capable of judgments or actions that can be considered wise

The use of self-report scales raises an issue that might be called epistemic circularity Using

self-report scales, wisdom is operationally defined in terms of criteria defined by lay

conceptions of wisdom Participants then make judgments about their own qualities using these self-same criteria To the extent that the concepts built into the wisdom scales have their origins in lay judgments, participant ratings using those scales cannot be taken as independent

measures of wisdom That is, if wisdom is defined in terms of lay conceptions, then ratings

based on these same lay conceptions cannot function as objective indicators of wisdom

Because no independent measure of wisdom exists, it is not possible to test the extent to which wisdom scales measure “wisdom” This is not a fault of researchers Researchers cannot

identify wisdom independent of shared social meanings because it is simply not possible to do

so Wisdom is an inherently intersubjective and evaluative category The problem at hand is not with the idea that wisdom is intersubjectively defined; problems arise when we attempt to use empirical methodology to define a concept that is not itself open to empirical analysis

When completing such scales, respondents are asked to make summary assessments of

complex behaviors that are abstracted across time and place Such judgments are mediated by the respondent’s understanding of the questions and terms at hand As a result, participant ratings cannot be seen to be veridical assessments of the behaviors in question Instead, they reflect the ways in which participants use words and word meanings to describe the nature of their personal experiences

As shown in Table 1, researchers have reported reliable correlations between individual

differences on self-report measures of wisdom and scores on assessments of a suite of

psychological variables These results are often interpreted as support for the idea that

“wisdom” functions as a kind of trait – a stable pattern of thinking, feeling and acting that

functions as a property of individual persons Conceptualized in this way, the use of wisdom scales is open to the full range of problems associated with trait theories of personality and the use of self-report to measure so-called personality traits Like self-report assessments of

personality, wisdom scales call on respondents to make summative judgments about qualities that are abstracted across social contexts Higher scores on wisdom inventories are taken as indicators of the extent to which a person is wise As such, wisdom is taken to be a stable

property of individual persons However, like personality assessments, because

intra-psychological variation in behavior across social context is never considered, the stability of a person’s disposition toward wisdom is presumed rather than demonstrated

Theoretical Models of Wisdom

A third way that psychological scientists have sought to define wisdom is by postulating explicit theories of wisdom (Eriskson, 1958, 1966; Baltes & Kunsmann, 2008; Baltes & Smith, 2004; Baltes & Staundinger, 2000; Levenson, Jennings, Aldwin & Shiraishi, 2005; Sternberg, 1985, 1998; Grossman, 2017a, 2017b; Grossman, Dorfman & Oakes, 2020; Santos, Huynh &

Grossmann, 2017; Labouvie-Vief, 2000; 2015) The main difference between explicit and

implicit theories is that explicit theories do not rely primarily upon lay conceptions of wisdom for definitional purposes One might suggest that in such models, wisdom is a concept that is initially established by postulation and not one that accrues its status from empirical discovery

Wisdom researchers differentiated between explicit theories of general wisdom and personal

wisdom Personal wisdom refers to the extent to which persons have insight about themselves and their own lives; general wisdom refers to insights about life in general, often from a third-person perspective (Staudinger & Glück, 2011) Personal wisdom draws on insight from the first-person perspective and is typically assessed using self-report methods, including those that have been discussed above Nonetheless, not all models of personal wisdom rely on lay

conceptions of emotion for their theoretical content (Erikson, 1958; Grossman, 2017; Vief, 2000; Levenson, 2005)

Labouvie-The Berlin model (Baltes & Kunsmann, 2008; Baltes & Smith, 2004; Baltes & Straudinger, 2000) ranks among the most prominent explicit approaches to wisdom Baltes maintains that wisdom

is composed of five components: rich (a) factual and (b) procedural knowledge within (c)

different domains of application, (d) a relativistic appreciation of the diverse value systems that

undergird any given problem, and (e) the capacity to apply such knowledge in situations

involving of uncertainty Baltes’ approach is theoretically-driven Drawing on psychological

science, Baltes notes that the knowledge that mediates wise action must span not only knowing

that (factual knowledge) but also knowing how (procedural knowledge) Expert knowledge,

whether factual or procedural, takes time, effort and experience to cultivate; such expertise is only possible within particular domains of human activity We can expect deep wisdom only

within particular spheres of human activity Even here, however, mere knowledge is not

enough We would not call an action wise if the outcome of the act were easy to discern; wise

acts occur in contexts involving uncertain outcomes Further, beyond each of these qualities,

that which makes transforms mere knowledge into wisdom is a sense of the good Different individuals and peoples, of course, embrace different conceptions of the good Baltes addresses this problem by invoking the concept of sensitivity (relativism) in the process of coordinating diverse value systems in addressing any given problem

Although the Berlin model draws on evidence from studies of lay conceptions of wisdom, it does not rely upon them for its empirical verification The Berlin approach embraces the

importance of process-related assessment This requires assessing the ongoing process of engaging in wise deliberation, decision-making or action In the Berlin paradigm, participants are presented with difficult life problems and are asked to deliberate aloud as they consider how to address the issues implied by the problem Participant responses are then evaluated in terms of the five definitional components of wisdom proposed by the Berlin model

In his balance model, Sternberg’s (1985, 1998, 2001) defines wisdom as the application of intellectual resources and ethical principles to the task of achieving the common good The model stresses the need for balance in the application of ethical principles to meet the

common good – defined as the intersection of personal, interpersonal and extra-personal interests over both the short and long terms In any given context, advancement of the

common good can occur in a variety of ways, including adapting to the existing environments, modifying existing environments, and selecting novel environments Sternberg advocates an approach to assessing wisdom by evaluating the extent to which individuals exhibit the features

of wisdom he has proposed in order to solve real world problems Building on his work in

intelligence, Sternberg (2004, 2009) advocates a series of methods to promote the cultivation

of wisdom through education

Grossmann’s approach to wisdom is distinguished in its conceptualization of wisdom as a

contextualized process rather than as a static trait Grossmann’s approach stands in contrast to

models that represent wisdom as a decontextualized trait that exists within individual persons Rather than depicting wisdom as a static property of individual persons, Grossmann embraces the idea that what wise deliberations are processes that occur within particular socio-cultural contexts and that unfold over time Grossmann (2017a; Santos, Huynh & Grossmann 2017) defines wise reasoning as a process that consists of the coordination of (a) intellectual humility, the capacity to (b) seek out and (c) integrate diverse perspectives, while simultaneously

recognizing (d) uncertainty and change

In applying his mode of wisdom-as-process, Grossmann and his colleagues assess the presence

of these qualities in the ways in which persons reason about practical problems involving

everyday conflicts (Grossman, Gerlach & Denissen, 2016) In a series of studies, Grossmann has shown both consistency and variability within individuals in their capacity to engage in wise reasoning (Santos, Huynh & Grossmann 2017); differences in wise reasoning as a product of culture (Grossmann & Kung, 2020), region and social class (Brienza & Grossmann, 2017), and as

a function of whether it operates within or between individuals (Grossmann, Gerlach &

Denissen, 2017) In light of this research, Grossmann conceptualizes wisdom not as a fixed property of individual actors, but instead as a social-ecological process (Grossmann, Dorfman & Oakes, 2020) – a form of activity that operates both within and between persons and social context (Grossman, 2017b; Santos, Huynh & Grossmann, 2017)

Other explicit models have defined wisdom in terms of a variety of diverse but related

dimensions Webster (2007) defines wisdom as the coordination of experience, reflection, emotional regulation, openness, and humor Bangen, Meeks and Jeste (2013) reviewed scores

of studies and identified those components that were most frequently identified as aspects of

wisdom These include expert knowledge (Ardelt, 2004; Kunzmann & Baltes, 2003; Sternberg, 2000); prosocial attitudes (Webster, 2010), and self-reflection (Grossman & Varnum, 2010; Kitchener & Brenner, 1990; Staudinger, 1996); acknowledgement of uncertainty (Moraitou & Efklides, 2012), emotional stability (Jeste, Depp, Vahia, 2010), tolerance, openness (Ardelt, M., Gerlach & Vaillant, 2018; Wink & Staudinger, 2016), spirituality (Jeste & Vahia, 2008; Noghabi & Nabizadeh, 2017) and humor (Lee, 2018) Other components include humility (Krause, 2016), ego integrity (Erikson, 1959); self-transcendence (Levenson, Jennings, Aldwin & Shiraishi, 2005); personal growth (Mickler & Staudinger, 2008); affective complexity and optimization (Labouvie- Vief, 2003); ego development (Loevinger & Wessler, 1978) and self-understanding (Dorner &

Staudinger, 2010)

Where does “wisdom” gain its meaning? Where can we look for a definition of

wisdom? Advocates of explicit and implicit models of wisdom differ in their responses to this question As discussed above, much research draws upon how laypersons understand the concept of wisdom Such research has informed the development of scales intended to

“measure wisdom” In this way, what are taken to be objective measures of wisdom have their empirical foundation in the mediated conceptions of everyday individuals On the other hand, explicit models of wisdom do not rely upon everyday conceptions Their definitions of wisdom – and the measures that rely upon them – have their origins elsewhere There is nothing in any given act that marks it as an instance of wisdom: the identification of an act as wise is imputed,

not observed What justifies any given conception of wisdom?

Bluck and Glück (2013) represent the tension between explicit and implicit theories as follows:

There is a tendency to view explicit theories of wisdom as “the real thing” and implicit theories simply as perceptions that could easily be layperson’s mistaken ideas about what wisdom really is The notion that an entire culture would carry around an

organized construct of wisdom that is wrong, or incorrect, is a slightly bizarre one It suggests that human language and thought do not reflect reality… implicit and explicit, lay and expert definitions of wisdom converge in a basic sense on the same set of

features as central in defining wisdom Thus, at least in terms of lay and expert

definitions of wisdom, no strong dichotomy exists.” (p 91)

In this passage, Bluck and Glück (2013) suggest that we should not necessarily privilege

“expert” conceptions of wisdom over those of laypersons Why should experts and laypersons have similar conceptions of the nature of “wisdom”? Bluck and Glück suggest that the idea that laypersons could be “mistaken” about “what wisdom really is” would be tantamount to saying that “human language and thought do not reflect reality” Bluck and Glück are no doubt correct that there is no strong dichotomy between expert and lay beliefs about wisdom However, this

is not because experts and laypersons are equally in touch with the reality of “what wisdom really is” The reason why it is difficult for scientists to define “wisdom” empirically is because the term “wisdom” does not refer to a “reality” that resides in a world independent of human thought and language Wisdom is not a reality to be found in the world; it is a term that refers

to certain valued ways of making decisions about how to live As such, its meaning is not to be found in a world outside of human language and thought, but in how we use language to shape decisions about how we ought to live

Wisdom as an Evaluative Concept

The term wise is an adjective; wisdom is a noun As an adjective, wise has both descriptive and evaluative functions It describes idealized ways of acting in the world To say that an act is wise

is to evaluate a person’s decision-making in terms of shared and contested ideas In contrast, when we use the noun, we run the risk of thinking of wisdom as a kind of extant entity When

this occurs, we turn an evaluative description of a person’s actions and decisions into a kind of entity that exists within the person When this happens, the naturalistic fallacy comes full circle:

implicit and explicit evaluations of what “ought to be” are treated as measurable entities that exist within people The problem here is not one of eliminating the role of values in the study

of human experience; instead, it is to find ways to acknowledge the axiological dimensions of psychological inquiry without loss of precision

Wisdom is not like an object in the world that can be observed and manipulated Wisdom is an evaluative concept; it has no empirical content We cannot find out what wisdom is by looking very careful at “wise persons” or “wise actions” This is because in order to evaluate a person or act as “wise”, we must have an already existing sense of the meaning of “wise” – however tacit

or implicit Thus, wisdom does not exist in the world as much as it exists as an evaluative

product of human intersubjective experience If this is so, the study of wisdom requires the

development of theoretical models that are informed by reflexive analyses of a priori concepts

and values that have intersubjective origins If we are to study wisdom scientifically, we need a conception of science that acknowledges the inescapable role of values in producing facts about human experience

PART II: THE DEVELOPMENT OF WISDOM: AN INTERSUBJECTIVE FRAMEWORK

The entirety of science is a refinement of everyday thinking – Albert Einstein

The traditional conception of social science makes a sharp distinction between objectivity and subjectivity While behavior is seen as something that is objective and observable, experience is

seen as something subjective and private From this point of view, psychological science

operates as an attempt to identify objective indicators of subjective experience The

intersubjective framework proceeds from the view that what we call “objective” and

“subjective” are both products of the prior human capacity intersubjectivity The primary way

in which humans gain psychological knowledge is through intersubjective engagement From an intersubjective perspective, the severing of “inner experience” from “observable behavior” creates intractable methodological problems In the absence of existing and already shared knowledge about what it means to speak of various forms of human experience, any attempt to link the “subjective” to the “objective” would be futile If psychological and humanistic

knowledge has its origins in the everyday process of intersubjective engagement, it makes more sense to seek to build psychological science by refining that everyday process than by using methods more suitable to the analysis of physical objects

The View from Intersubjectivity

Husserl (1970) has suggested that we typically approach our relation to the world from what

might be called a naturalistic stance From this perspective, we live in a physical world of

physical objects and processes The naturalistic stance preserves a sharp distinction between knower and known To be sure, events, objects and processes in the world exist independent of the knower However, while it is true that we live in a physical world, as experiencing beings,

we also live in a lifeworld (Husserl, 1970) – a world of shared meanings, beliefs, understandings and values that provides the intersubjective backdrop of human knowing and action Any act of

knowing thus occurs by drawing upon shared meanings that are represented and

communicated in the discursive interactions that occur between people In this way, our

capacity to genuinely psychological states and processes is prefigured by existing forms of

shared psychological knowledge that have their origins in the intersubjective history of

individuals, communities and the species as a wholei

A model of the intersubjective process is provided in Figure 1 The intersubjective construction

of knowledge is founded upon four interlocking categories of processes The first consists of the

construction of (1) embodied experience within individual persons (Racine & Carpendale, 2008;

Thompson, 2007) To say that experience is embodied stands in contrast to the common idea that psychological experiences are something that are inherently private or hidden A wealth of theory and research in linguistic philosophy (ter Harke, 1990; Wittgenstein, 1953),

developmental psychology (Trevarthen, 1993) and neuroscience (Iacoboni, 2009) challenges the idea – shared by laypersons and psychological scientists alike – that only first-person

experiencers have access to their own psychological experience

Research suggests that basic forms of human experience (e.g., emotions, intentions, desires, etc.) are directly expressed in bodily and instrumental action (Ekman, 1993; Kret, Prochazkova, Sterck & Clay, 2020; Mascolo, 2020) We do not have to make complex inferences about an infant’s internal world to know that she is experiencing pain, hunger or frustration; we are able

to read it directly from the infant’s bodily expressions (Mascolo, 2009) Unless they are actively

de-coupled, overt expressions are not merely contingently related to personal experience; they

are its outer manifestations (Hacker, 2012; Wittgenstein, 1980) A child’s cry of distress is not

merely a probable expression of her experience, it is the public aspect of the personal

experience As experience shines through spontaneous action, it immediately becomes

available to third-person interlocutors (ter Harke, 1990; Wittgenstein, 1980)

Figure 1 The Intersubjective Origins of Psychological Knowledge

The second category of processes consists of the capacity for (2) intersubjective engagement

between persons Intersubjectivity consists of the capacity to share, coordinate, represent and

mutually-incorporate meaning and experience between people (Cipolletti, Procter & Mascolo,

2020; De Jaeger & Di Paoli, 2008; Fogel, 1993; Matusev, 2006) The capacity for intersubjectivity can be observed in the facial interplay that occurs between caregivers and their young infants Meltzoff, 2013) The mutual evocation of smiling between caregiver and infant suggests not only the matching of facial activity, but also of the affective state that typically accompanies those expressions (Rochat & Passos-Ferreira, 2009) In this way, infant and caregiver are

capable of coordinating both action and experience from the virtual start of lifeii

The third and fourth category of intersubjective processes consists of (3) culturally-shared symbolic meanings (Lau, Lee & Chiu, 2004; Nelson & Shaw, 2002) and (4) the use of signs

(words) to mediate higher-order social activity between persons (Verhagan, 2008; Wertsch,

2007) Signs (e.g., words) are symbolic vehicles for representing and communicating shared and quasi-arbitrary meanings It is through the capacity for language to represent shared meanings that members of a linguistic group are able to make their experiences intelligible to one

another Signs thus function as quintessential vehicles of intersubjectivity and culture

Implications for Intersubjective Psychological Science

We enter into psychological inquiry already saturated with human knowledge that is the

product the history of our relations with others As both laypersons and professional

psychologists, we are never fully strangers to each other (Jordan, et al., 1991) In this way, an intersubjective epistemology provides a vehicle for transcending the dichotomy between the social sciences and the humanities (Mascolo, 2017) To the extent that human categories have their origins in intersubjective reflection rather than in objective observation, there is an

inescapable mutuality between psychological science and humanistic inquiry We need not study wisdom as if it were something alien that must be demystified through empirical analysis The study of wisdom is part of an ongoing socio-moral conversation To study, we must start by being reflexive about a priori systems of knowledge and value, and then import them into the ongoing conversation that is psychological inquiry

The Development of Wise Decisions Across Adulthood

How can we study the development of wise decision making over the course of adulthood? We begin with three premises:

1 The evaluative component of wise decision-making is a discursive product of

intersubjective exchanges that occur between people It can only be identified against the reflexive backdrop of shared and contested evaluative frameworks As a result, the wisdom of any given action is not something that can be determined through empirical analysis Wisdom is a concept established by postulation (Kaplan, 1984) and validated through intersubjective corroboration (Mascolo & Kallio, 2020)

2 Within the context of a framework of evaluation, it is possible to identify the structure

of particular modes of thinking, feeling and acting that we call wise (Mascolo & Bidell, 2020; Mascolo & Fischer, 2015; Fischer, 1980) Forms of wise thinking, feeling and acting function as ongoing processes that occur within particular contexts and

interpersonal domains

3 Drawing on structural models of the dynamic development of action (Mascolo & Fischer, 2015), it is possible to identify changes in structure of thinking, feeling and action as they occur over the course of their development We embrace a strong form of the concept of development: To the extent that forms of thinking, feeling and acting

development, they become increasingly differentiated, integrated and hierarchically integrated over time (Basseches & Mascolo, 2010; Werner, 1948; Werner & Kaplan, 1984)

In what follows, drawing on structural analyses of developmental change (Mascolo, 2013; Mascolo & Fischer, 2010; 2015; Mascolo & DiBianca-Fasoli, 2020), we examine how the

structure of deliberative action becomes increasingly differentiated, integrated and

hierarchically integrated as it moves slowly over time toward the idealized state that we call wisdom

What is a Wise Decision?

Drawing on the large philosophical and psychological literature discussed above, we begin by

proposing definition of wise decision:

Informed by knowledge of the good, a wise decision is one that anticipates, coordinates and maximizes the good over the bad across the full range of concerns that define a given problem

This definition integrates a variety of elements expressed by philosophical, psychological and lay conceptions of wisdom We begin with the idea that a wise decision consists of a solution to

a problem of some sort A problem is defined as the attempt to produce some sort of valued end or to meet some series of unmet concerns One can only speak of a problem if the solution

or outcome to the problem is in some way uncertain The concept of uncertainty is common to

many philosophical and psychological conceptions of wisdom (Baltes & Straudinger, 2000; Grossman, 2017; Kekes, 1988; Moraitou & Efklides, 2012; Nussbaum, 2001)

The idea that wise decision is informed by knowledge brings together philosophical conceptions

of sophia and phronesis (Aristotle, 1970) with psychological approaches that identify factual,

procedural and practical forms of knowledge as sources of wise deliberation and action (Baltes

& Staudinger, 2000; Sternberg, 1985) The idea that wise decisions are informed by knowledge

of the good draws on the philosophical contention that wisdom is concerned with the process

of leading a good life (Aristotle, 1970; Kekes, 1988; Nussbaum, 2001) In so doing, by speaking

of both knowledge and goodness, it locates wisdom in both the humanistic and scientific

spheres of activity (Maxwell, 2005) The idea that wise action anticipates the good

acknowledges that wise deliberation is prescient; it proceeds with an appreciation of what is good in both the short and long term (Sternberg, 1985, 1998) as appropriate to the situation

To say that wise decisions coordinate and maximize the good acknowledges that decision

making in the world is always imperfect There are typically good and bad outcomes of any decision; the wise decision is thus one that acknowledges the good and bad consequences of any given decision, while seeking to maximize the good To ask whether a decision is wise immediately raises the question, “Wise for whom?”iii

Any single problem typically involves a multiplicity of concerns which may often conflict with one another Such concerns are typically distributed among a variety of issues and stakeholders spanning from the present and future Still further, any proposed solution to a problem is likely to bring forth good, bad and

unanticipated outcomes A wise decision is thus one that addresses the full range of concerns

that define a given problem and that emerge from attempts to solve the problem

The Structure of Wise Decision-Making

Toward this end, the left panel of Figure 2 provides a task analysis of the structure of wise deliberation A task analysis identifies the elements of thinking, feeling and acting over which

an individual must exert control in order to perform a given task The task analysis divides wise

decision making into five interlocking processes For any given problem, the (a) conception of good consists of the organization of ideas – either explicit or implicit – that defines what is good, optimal or desired in the problem in question The (b) solution space identifies the

structure of options represented in the individual’s deliberation A solution space optimally

includes (1) an articulation of at least two options for solving a problem; (2) representations of

both positive (“pros”) and negative (“cons”) possible outcomes for each option, both in (3) the

short- and long-term (as appropriate to the problem) The (c) solution identifies the particular choice adopted, while the (d) outcome consists of the actor’s evaluation and representation of the results of the chosen Finally, the (e) self-transformation consists of a representation – if

any – of the extent to which the actor has been changed or transformed over time as a result of the result of having made the decision in question (Straudinger & Gllück, 2011)

Figure 2: The Structure of Wise Decisions

Using the categories of this task analysis, the right panel of Figure 2 illustrates the structure a of

a mother’s decision to divorce her abusive husband and leave her son behind in another

country to be raised by her ex-husband and his new wife:

The most important decision was getting a divorce from my husband’s abusive

relationship It took me a while to do that I was trying to get my life back and be able to take care of myself in order to take care of my son That happened in another country – not the United States I got a divorce after my husband’s family kicked me out of the house and took my son away from me I had to get a divorce You might think that I was late to get a divorce I was not as they thought that I’ll keep going back to my husband

because he had my son I want to the police station and to the court to be able to get

my rights The big decision I made after getting my divorce was to leave my son behind

I didn’t leave him, I just left the idea of chasing him, as I was threatened to be killed and

I wanted my son to live his life in peace, and I wanted to be safe and alive in case he needed me one day It was a good decision My son is living with his family I’m aware that a step mom is not a mom, and that what happened back then will always hurt me and him, but I’m still alive and I’m mentally stable My son is healthy too which is

important That abusive marriage would leave me either dead or at least physically ill with mental disorders

As shown Figure 2, the core conception of good that weaves its way through this reflection is

the need for the narrator, in the context of abusive and life-threatening circumstances, to take care of herself in order to promote the well-being of her son The narrator has a series of

options – to remain in or leave her abusive marriage; to seek to keep her son by her side, or to

allow him to remain, against her will, with his more powerful father Both of these decisions

have implications for both the short-and the long-term (e.g., “wanting to be safe and alive”;

“wanting my son to live in peace”) The woman’s solution – to divorce her husband and leave

her son behind – was born of an integrated anticipation of possible positive and negative

implications of each choice Despite the pain that leaving her son behind would cause to both her son and to her, the narrator decides to leave the child so that he can live a safe and healthy life In so doing, the narrator is able to accept both herself and the bivalent nature of her decision through here awareness that “I didn’t leave [my son], I just left the idea of chasing him.” Beyond her decision itself, in the years since leaving her son, through her hardship, the woman experienced a transformation in self that she attributes to her decision – namely, her capacity to accept the pain of the past by knowing that her safety and mental stability would allow her to be available to her son if needed

In her decision, the mother’s decision anticipates, coordinates and maximizes the good over the bad across the broad range of concerns that defines her situation as a problem In so doing, the wisdom of the mother’s decision is not to be determined merely by her capacity to integrate and decide upon a complex suite of options, but also by a conception of the good However, in

evaluating the mother’s decision as wise, we cannot simply appeal to the mother’s personal

sense of the good Instead, we must see the narrator’s sense of the good in the context of broader cultural conversations about what can be considered optimal in such contexts – open-ended conversations that involve the narrator, the investigator, the reader, and other agents of culture spanning the past, present, and future

Developmental Changes in Wise Decision-Making

How does wise decision making develop over the course of adulthood? There are a variety of approaches that seek to understand how wisdom develops over the course of adulthood Some approaches adopt a classical “stage” model of developmental change From this view, wisdom, however defined, develops either as a series of qualitative “stages” over time (Armon

& Dawson, 2003; Pascual-Leone, 2000) or is considered to a higher-order stage of development

itself (Clayton, 1975; Miller & Cook-Greuter, 2000; Pesut & Thompson, 2018) From this view, stages consist of broad, homogeneous forms of thought organized around different conceptual themes Years of research, however, has shown that while psychological structures undergo dramatic change over time, they do not develop in broad stages (Fischer et al, 1993); instead, they develop in particular conceptual domains, social contexts and are even tied to particular tasks and activities (Mascolo & Fischer, 2010; 2015) In this way, even within a single

psychological domain – such as wise action – there is no single path of development

Developmental pathways are emergent and variegated, depending upon the individual, the content domain, past experience, culture and a suite of other variables

Other traditions, particularly those that conceptualized “wisdom” as a trait-like personality type assess the development of wisdom using self-report scales (Ardelt, Pridgen & Nutter-Pridgen, 2019) When such forms of assessment are used, it is sometimes found that the capacity for

“wisdom” does not show developmental change over the course of life In an important study, Ardelt,Pridgen & Nutter-Pridgen (2018) assessed relations between age, education and scores

on the Three-Dimensional Wisdom scale in a cross- sectional sample of over 1400 individuals between the ages of 18 and 98 As shown in Figure 3, the researchers found that three-

dimensional wisdom scores showed a curvilinear trajectory as assessed among people of

different ages The overall curve starts at the middle range and rises modestly through to age

42, and then declines over the course of later ages Contrary to everyday thinking, far from showing an increase in “wisdom” over the lifetime, the curve is relatively flat Among the elderly, where one would expect increasing levels of wisdom, the curve actually declines

Figure 3: Age-Related Changes in Scores on Ardelt’s 3D Wisdom Scale

(Adapted from Ardelt, Pridgon, and Nutter-Pridgen, 2018)

Compassionate

THREE DIMENSIONAL

2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0