traffic incident management systems fa 330 march 2012 doc

car ISAO rer tg gr dena ean roadway scene fatalities, The USEA published the eeulw in FÀ-272 Emegsy Vehicle Slay Inte in August 2004 Figure 1.2, The report identified several recommenda

U.S Fire Administration Mission Statement

As an entity of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA), the mission

of the U.S Fire Administration (USFA) is to

reduce life and economic losses due to fire

and related emergencies, through leadership,

advocacy, coordination, and support We serve

the Nation independently, in coordination with

other Federal agencies, and in partnership

with fire protection and emergency service

communities With a commitment to

excellence, we provide public education,

training, technology, and data initiatives

U.S Fire Administration

Traffic Incident

Management Systems

April 2008

EMA 6 US Department of Transportation

oe Federal Highway Administration

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Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Roadway Incidents 5

‘Other Considerations Relative to Roadway Incident Scenes 6

‘Tis Technologies to Improve Roadway Safty

Talc Survelance Technology

Mayday and Automatic Collision Notation Syscems

Freeway Service Pat eee eee

‘Establishing the Work Area

Appiratus PheeHEnf co ees

‘Operations on Surfice Streets i

Operations on Highways

‘Apparatus Warning Lights

[Eikng the Apparatus

Determining the Magnitude of the Incident cosvsvsesstessessesecevestesss 49

"Eeminaing the Temporary Taf Cou Gperaton

Recommendations for Setting Up a Safe Work Zone

ZPỂểL AAAAAl Chapter 5—Incidene Command for Highway Incidents

Preincden Planing for Roadway Incidents

‘Tansportation Department Roks in the Highway Incident

Incident Command System Organization “ Organizing the Incident

‘Emergency Responder Safety Institute

‘National Teaffe neident Management Coalition

‘Maou sve Tic Conta Dies (MUTCD)

ion Roadway Operations Safery Website

‘Minnesota Traffic Incident Management Recommended Operational Guidelines

Mode Sunland Operating Procedure for Safe Operations a1 oat dents Emergency sponder Safety Institute, tấp assists Tổ Scene Safety Survival Basics =— suisse Hampton Roads Highway Incident Management Plan sass suixccc S4

Appendix C—Illustration of Seeing Distances and Stopping Distances sẽ

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PREFACE

‘The US Fie Adminstration (USPA) would lke co acknowledge the US Deparment of Tansportation (DOT) Federal Highvsay Administration (FHWA) for providing the substantial support necessary to per- form this research and develop this report

“This report was developed through a Cooperative Agreement between the USFA and the Intemational Fire Service Training Asocaton (IESTA) st ORahonna State University IESTA an its partner OSU Fire Protection Publications has been a major publisher of fire service taining materials since 1934 and trough is associa- ton with the OSU College of Engineering, Arcitecure, and Technology i also conduct variety of funded, technical sear on fie service, fre prevention, and ie safey issues,

“The extensive information provided within this report would not have been possible without the dedica- tion and efforts of the following people assigned to this projet

Nancy Trench—Program Administrator

Michael A Wieder—Progrann Investigator/Project Manager

Judy Janing—Program Weiter

Kevin Roche—Program Researcher

Ben Brock Senior Graphic Designer

ee Shortridge—Senior Graphic Designer

‘Clint Parker—Senior Graphic Designer

“The USFA would alto ike to acknowledge the efforts of the National Fite Service Incident Management CConsortinm in developing the excellent procedures for applying the Incident Command System (ICS)

to highvsay incidents that are outlined in this document This information was excerpted from the

‘Consarium's IMS Motel Prats Gale or Highway lcd hat was developed with funding fiom the DOT,

‘We are grateful for the use of that information in this report

‘TRAFFIC INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTENS, "

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The US Fire Administration (USFA) is commited to reducing onduty Brefighter faites by 25 percent

within § years and 50 percent within 10 years It also is commited to doing research that would support

that goal The consistently high annual percentage of faites related to fire department response and

roadway scene operations prompted the USEA to look at several aspects related to these colisions in an

effort improve responder safety,

ÍNTRODUCTION

Frefghtets who are kiled In privately owned vehicles (POVS) during the course of heir duties account

for the largest percentage of vehicle-eated deaths These are typically volunteer freighters who are

responding to or returning from emergency calls, However, carer firefighters also are killed occasionally

in POVs during the performance oftheir die,

Fire department tankers (tenders) account for the most irefighter response-relted fatalities in ire appara

tus (Figare 1.1) More firefighters are killed in tankers than in pumpers and ladder apparatus combined

[mn respone tothe alarming numbers of fatalities occurring in tankers, che USFA published Sole Options

of FueTeakes (FA-248) in 2003 In parmership with the US

Deparonent of Transporation (DOT)/Navonal Highway

Transportation Safety Adminisuation (NHTSA) and thể

DOT/Inteligent Transporation Systems (ITS) Joint Program |

(fice, USEA initiated the Emergency Vehicle Seety Initiative

(2VSI) in 2002 The initiative:

> identified the major issues related to firefighter faites

‘hat occur while responding to or returning rom alarms

and while operating on roadway emergency scenes: and

» developed and obtained consensus among majornational

level fie and emergency service trade associations on

draft “best practices” guidelines, mitigation techniques

".` car ISAO rer tg gr dena ean

roadway scene fatalities,

The USEA published the eeulw in FÀ-272 Emegsy Vehicle Slay Inte in August 2004 (Figure 1.2,

The report identified several recommendations to improve safey seated 10 response and highway

operations

As a follow-up to the EVSI, the USFA initiated parmerships with the Intemational Association of Fre

Chief (IAFC), the International Assocation of Fe Fighters (IAFF), and the Nasional Volunteer Fire

Council (NVEC) to reduce the number of firefighters killed while responding 1 oF rtuening from the

emergency scene or while working at roadway emergency scenes The USEA and the NVFC developed the

Eee eile Sle Operations out ml Smel Canhisim Emktgmdy Sa Oygnimtem program, This Web

base educational program includes an emergency vehicle safety best practices self-assessment, standard

‘operating guideline examples, and behavioral motivation techniques ca enbance emergency vehicle safety

This program ako discusses criial safety issues of volunteer firefighting

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“The USEA and IAFF developed similar Web-and computer bated training and educational programn—Iepriy Apnus Regs and aay Opens sy eh Cre Fi Sane Ths program alscusses

‘xitcal emergency vehicle safety issues such 28 seatbelt use, inter section safe, roadway operations safety on crowed intersttes ann local roads and driver traning Instructor and participant {hides and PowerPoint sides ae inched

‘The USFA and the IARC developed IARC Plies & Peers or are ei fey This Web-based document provides guid ance for developing the basic policies and procedures requiced : Đinh lỂ Si dành: dể ah dì te mộ Emergency Vehicle Selon ck ndoling Bs ppc face PKG

itiati tule, comnatd and Seppo ine FOTG dy cer

Safety Initiative vehicles operated by fire department members tm the perfor-

Totes of he die Ln io Ca fue ue peas tre ced Append B:Resoure Web tes

Most agencies that collect and report data On firefighter injuries and deaths, sich a the USFA and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) combine response-elted casualties with aay scene casualties into a single “vehicle related” cast Figure 12-theEmageoy While Safe iatte mas ey reporing area OF the two, clearly response-elated inj

TA 0 ANH, ries and deaths account for the majority of these casualties

This s why response-related issues were the primary focus of the previous USRA projects discussed earlier in this section Roadway incidents were the focus of portions ofthe EVSI epor, the URFA/IAFF project, and the work ofthe Emergency Responder Safety Insitute The USEA has been working with dhe Combesland Valley Volunteer Fireman's Association's (CVVFA) Emergency Responder Safety Institut to enhance the operational safety of emergency responders on the highway-The ongoing effort has resulted in the development ofa white paper —PrteingEreny Redes

sn the Hghny—and supporting their ResponderSafencom Web site

Sma

‘The USEA has received support fortis initiative from the DOT, Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and most recently from the US Department of Justice (DO)) National Insitute of justice (NI) Office of Justice Programs (O}P)

When the two areas are analyzed separately, it becomes evident hat injuries and deaths that occur at roadway emergency scenes have increased steadily in recent years The purpose ofthis report isto focus fom the causes of firefighter injuries and deaths when working on roadway incidents This report will focus fon the causes ofthese incidents and provide strategies for mingating them inthe furure The occurrence and severity ofthese incidents ca be reduced through proper roadway incident scene tactics and incident

‘management, information which will be covered in the remaining chapters of his document

The remainder of this chapter focuses on statics and causal information on these types of incidents Although the remaining chapters of this report focus on roadway incident scene issues, some data on response-related injuries and deaths also are provided below 10 put the overall vehicle related injury and death problem in perspective In some cases, such asthe topic of secondary collisions at roadway scene

‘operations, the two are directly related

°ŠẹBØBØỹIAA LULU lellllnallllllllll Firefighter Fatalities

Over the lst decade (1996 102006) for which complete figures wore availble, vehicle collisions claimed

227 firefighter lives, and another 52 firefighters were lost as a result of being stuck by a vehicle Besween

1996 and 2006, vehicle collisions/struck-by incidents accounted for 20 percent of all faites In 2003, thức figure jumped dramatically to 35 percent of al faites, with 54 freighters killed im vehicle colt sions and § struck by vehicles,

‘This wend continued in 2005, with 22 percent (25) of the 115 false resulting from vehicle collisions Five firefighters wece killed in tener crashes, five Rireighters were killed in crashes that involved passenger ehicles and four firefighters were killed in pump crashes Firefighters also were killed in crashes roi ing temain veces, icra, and a boat The numbers remained consistent in 2008, Table 1.1 provides 3 summary analyse of firefighter ftalties occurring in vehicle collisions and those struck bya vehicle wile

‘working on an emergency scene forthe pas decade,

Tobe 1.1-Fietighter Fatalities in Vehicle Clslons and Stucky Vehicles: 1996-2008,

SG HB — "= tw Ee 5 '"="=™ Pechaps most imereting to note in relation tothe topic ofthis document was the fc thatthe CDC report showed that 21 percent of the total fitalities experienced by volunteers in all disciplines were driving relied This figure is very consistent with the fie service's own experience inthis area, What this number ray be teling us Is that, although any number of injures and deaths is unaccepuable, the number of |

‘eicle-related deaths thatthe fr service experiences is not out af ine with those in the general popula tion ofthe US.This does not mean, however, that we cannot improve upon those statistics

Firefighter Injuries

Table 1.2 shows the summary of frefighter injuries occurring during response and eur, from 1995

‘Brough 2004, the most recent years avilable a the ime this report was written What ie statistically Interesting n these numbers dhe fact tha, while vehicle-related deaths account fr afily significant percentage (Second leading cause overall) of ficefighter deaths, they actually account for nly a small, percentage of overall irefightr injuries

Tobe 1.2-Firefighter injuries RespondingTo/ Returning From incidents 1995-2008

‘while they tend tobe lower in fequency in the grand scheme of overall firefighter casualties, when they

do occu they ate serous evens

ẳ.AAAAAAAlllll and civilian injuries/deaths as the result of second

ary crashes However, there is no specific database that

allows for retrieval of the total numbers oF any cơn:

dition (e.g, weather, lighting, apparatus placement)

related to the collisions A DOT report indicated that

approximately 18 percent of all uaffic fatalities nation-

wide occur as a result of secondary collisions

The Minnesota DOT references two studies in their

Incident Management Program that estimate approxi

mately 15 percent of al colisions result fom an earlier

fncident What must be remembered is that a secondary

collision is often more serious than the original coli-

sion, especially sf it occurs between fiee-flawing and

Stopped traffic Secondary collision is an area where

more studies and data are needed

Law enforcement personnel ae very cognizant of the likelihood and seventy of secondary collisions This often translates into one of the causes of fition that sometimes occurs berween police officers and other emergency responders at the scene of roadway incidents The police ae under pressure to clear the scene as soon as posible, as this helps to minimize traffic delays and reduce the possiblity ofa secondary collision n their view, the more apparatus and people brought roan incident, the moe time it will ake

to eventually clear the scene, puting mare sources of contact for secondary collisions onthe roadway In reality, the needs of both agencies must be balanced This needs to be done in preincident planning and Interagency cooperation Trying 10 irom these sues out while standing in the roadway at an incident

rarely suceesstl

For the purpose ofthis report it must be realized thatthe majorly offiefighter struck-by incidents fll Ito the category of secondaty collisions Most of the ie, the only reason that firefighters age in the roadway in a postion to be struck is because they are operating at an incident that already occurred The principal purpose of much ofthe information contained in the remainder of this report aimed atthe prevention of secondary collisions

Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Roadway Incidents

Modern fie departments deliver ull ange offre, rescue, and emergency medical services to handle vit ally every typeof emergency that may occirin a jurisdiction These emergencies can happen a any time and {in any location, Many of the emergencies that fire deparments routinely respond 10 happen onthe roadvay

‘These include vehicle collisions, pedestrian collisions vehicle fies, medical emergencies, and hazardous

‘materials incidents Other incidents may not actually accu on the oadvay but require responders to deliver their services from the roadway, such asa medical emergency in s house next othe road

In order to reduce the frequency of frefighters being struck by vehicles during the performance oftheir duties, tis important ro understand some of the more common causes that lead to these incidents The following is a summary of causal factors tht have been noted in incident reports and through experience

to be responsible for Rrefightes and ather emergency responders coming in contact with other vehicles

aa roadway incident soene

`

# >» Lack of tmining—Responders are not trained on the

hazards asociated with roadway incidents and the [proper ways to minimize their occure

Ề > Lak of iumieml seœene—Responders Bi to rccognize

the dangers associated with a particular roadway situation they ae facing due to insficient waining or lack of experience

>» Falter xa pope Feng Tc Cool (TTC) e— Many fire departments do not have suficient traning equipment, or Sandard Operating Procedures (SOPS) for che correct way to setup a properly marked work Figue Lé-Fourewo oper enn atencean vfte Nai smepertetgreainaaaevmsreston atta when operating a roadway incident scene Cases,

also have been noted where the responders did have Seeger Moms pen renee IS {good training, equipment, and SOPs, but for whatever

reason filled to use or fllow them (Figure 1.4)

> improper stoning of pate— Nunnetons case bar been cited where apparatus was not positioned to the flest advantage ofthe Incident In Some cases the apparatus was not positioned in a manner shat protected the work area In other cases apparatus was unnecessarily positioned in the roadway

> tmproprine we of se gng—Inappropriae use of vehicle headlights, warning lights, and floodlights can confse of blind approaching motorists (Figure 1.5) Thú causes thetn to strike an emergency schicle, responder, or ether vehicle in the incident area

> Fale touse PPE od highs appr and slay guipnsr—Resbonders working in the roudway must wear appropriate protective garments and wse all available trafic control devices in onder o prevent being steuck by oncoming taf

» Cazds, aston o impel ees—Even when we ry 10 do everyting correctly, we must be cogalzant ofthe fact that these are drivers out there who will not react corecl tơ the altered trafic pattern that fceus ata roadway incident This may reslt in them driving into our work space

» Rac vison dig canlians—Although firefighters may’be stuck by vehicles in vewaly any condition, the chances of an incident occurring ae grester during obscured vision conditions, including darknes, fog, rain, snow, and blinding sunshine,

» Altcol i pteos—Devers may’ be confused by the traffic contol measures used at an incident scene or those being employed in a construction zone

Other Considerations Relative to Roadway Incident Scenes

Fire service personne! need to look beyond the obvious, Immediate concerns when considering the implications aind impacts of roadway incident scenes Taking a broader

‘view ofthe subject wil reveal some issues that fire service

Fre 15-Fee utd fois ann binding

°ŠẹBØBØỹIAA LULU lellllnallllllllll personnel and agencies should be more oncerned about It also gives keen insight into some ofthe major oncems held by other agencies with responsibilty for roadway incident response The fire service's falure 1 recognize these other concerns s one ofthe frequent sources of conflict thar occurs berween responding agencies a a roadway inident scene Ofcourse, the reverse s crue 35 wel,

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Some ofthe economic impacts of roadway incident scenes are quite obvious, while others may not beso apparent ehicle collisions have immediate and long-term economic effects on both the individual and Society Coss ate both die (those that are the result of the collision and resultant injury/fality) and Indinect (overall cost 10 society)-These costs apply 10 both the viens of the primary incident and any responders who may be involved ina secondary incident and include, bur are not necessarily limited to:

» Property dapag—Many of these costs ae obvious and include the value of vehicles, cargo, roadways, adjacent property and other items damaged inthe incident

» Mall eai—These costs include emergency zoom and inpatent costs, fllowp vis, physical dherapy,

‘rehabilitation, prescriptions, prosthetic devices, and home modifications for both the original cums ofthe incident and any responders who may be injured in a secondary calision

» Enesgy series ast —This includes the cost of providing police, emergency medical services (EMS), and fire department response tothe original incident andthe additional costs ofa secondary incident

In many cases the cost associated with providing service tothe second incident will exceed those of |

‘he original incident,

>» Imesiginn cat —The cost includes time spent investigating the incident and writing reports for primary and secondary incidents Inthe case of fatal incidents these costs increase exponentially over injury oF oninjury incidents

> Laplcot—This includes fees, court costs, and overtime costs asociated with civil tigation resulting fiom primary and secondary incidents

» Veal bain —This isthe cost of job or career retraining required asa result of disability caused

by roadway incident scene injuries

>» Rplcann emplyes—Emyployers wil often have to ite temporary help or pay other people overtime to cover the postion of an injured employee

» Diaiiy/Raenetinsme—These costs occur when employees, including firefighters, cannot return co

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>» Fonts cpaciy—This includes the long-term changes i a person's ability to Function in daily ving Nev opeionlcss—This isthe cos of developing new procedures and taining t0 improve safey 2 facut incidents,

IMPACT OF TRAVEL DELAY RESULTING FROM VEHICLE COLLISIONS

DOT and lave enforcement officals try to minimize lane blockages not only because of fear ofa second ary collision, but also because they realize the economic impact it his on those who become delayed inthe resultant congestion A general rule-ofchumb is that every minute a lane of trafic is blocked by

an incident resuls in for minutes of cangestion The FHWA estimates that the Nation loses 1.3 billion

‘ehicle-hours of delay due to incident congestion each yea, at 2 cost of almost $10 bili This does not lake into consideration the cost of wasted fuel and environmental damage by idling vehicles in incident, related lanes of stopped tlic

Every driver reacts differently to an unexpected incident, Reactions include slamming on the brakes, swerving into another lane or jst slowing down in order co gawk at the event- Regardless af the sponse, reat a wave tat progressively slows following trafic Table 1.3 shows the reduction of vehicular taf- fic in relation tothe location of the incident on thee-lane freeway (three lanes in each direction)

NHTSA found that travel delay cost $25.6 billion, or 11 percent of total collision costs, in 2000 Costs were calculated based only on police-reported crashes using the premise that any substantial impact on tealfic would attrac the atenion of police The coss per hour of delay were calculated using 60 percent ofthe wage ate for noncommercial drivers and 100 percent for commercial dwers Table 1.4 shows 3 breakdown of the hours of delay by roadway type

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Tole 4—Wours of Delay per Wear Vehicle Crash by Roadvay Type and Loeaton2000

eater ype Property Damage ony our, _

‘TheUstAandheDOT/ HWA formed pares wi ihe national Fre Seeing socaton {GUA} es eet a sy ent se guste ea wong oopans fv Se od toe

ee Insts on complanc wah tt DOTS al Une Gnl es (MUTED) ane Navona Pe lai loi Serene Mangement jc Conortums (SIS) Mea Pele

‘Manual on Unitorm

help enhance freighter operational effectiveness reduce potest! ah and

enhance responder safety at roadway emergency scenes ì a

ems Caner ry MANUAL OF UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES

‘The effective use of approved traffic contol devices promotes highway safety

and efficiency by providing for orderly movement of all road users The

MUTCD, which is published by che FHWA, contains che basc principles thar

govern the design and use of waficcontral devices oral streets snd highway,

regardless ofthe public agency having jurisdiction (Figure 1.6) The MUTCD is

divided into 10 parts, each with chapters Part 6 is “Temporary Trafic Control”

and within Past 6 is Chapter 61, "Control of Traffic Through Traffic Incident

Management Areas” This section is particularly relevant to emergency highway

spcatoe,nlichan co el ndephin Chgier 2afdiedeetme, “Không ,ñ#m 1h min,

Up Safe Highway Work Zones” Si thto/muted one

SG HHH 55 7558 TEER; WE

f=) MODEL PROCEDURES GUIDE FOR HIGHWAY INCIDENTS Experience shows that itis critical to integrate all response agencies on highway incidents, Motel Proelurs Guie fr Highway Incidents, developed by the [NESIMSC in cooperation with the DOT, applies the organizational principles

of the Incident Management System (IMS) to generic highway incidents (Figure 1.7) Ie concentrates on the integration of al responders into a uni- fied effor The guide support all response disciplines (fie, EMS, tansporta, tion, law enforcement, public works) ro address thelr specific tactical needs, Highway; while retaining the overall IMS structure This guide is reviewed sn depth in PPPS MEY, Maa Chapter S ofthis document, "Management of Highway Incidents.”

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CHAPTER 2

[eis important to be aware ofthe numerical data and statistics on fatalities related to fire department response and roadway scene operations These daa give a sense of the magnitude ofthe problem we are facing However, also is important 10 review several specific incidents ìn order tọ kiehtfY thế Artore Involved and show the personal side of these tragedies This chapter presents selected cases on firefighter pedestrian fatalities that were identified through the data obtained from the USFA Brefgiter fatalities, studies over the pas several years prior othe development of this report, As you read these cases studies, think about how many times you have been in similar position or situation, yet didnot fll victim to 3 collision

ee

(On October 27, 2003, at 2137 hous, olunteer members of 2 combination fire department responded ro

a report ofa smoking generator at a road construction ste, Seven volunteer fizeightes in three spparats responded They determined thatthe problem was electrical, 2nd notified the contactor who owned the equipment One piece of apparatus, the brush tuck, and thee firefighters stayed on the scene to was for the contractor 1 come and tend tothe equipment

Incivent Case Stupies

‘When the contractor arrived, the assistant chief briefed the contractor onthe situation and made prepara- tons to leave the scene the brush truck crew departed, they stopped atthe entrance tothe construction sive 10 replace barricades they had moved upon entering, All ree fie personnel got out of the brush truck, which was parked with its engine running and headlights and emergeney lights on As dhe asis- tant chief reached for a barricade, one of the firefighters noticed a white pickup truck headed towards them, fshtling and apparently moving much faster than the posted 20 mule per hour speed limit The firefighter yelled a warning to the other personnel, and he and the other freighter dave for cover The pickup flled to make the sharp turn necessary to detour around the construction ste The pickup hit the lef front coener of the beush tuck The vehicle then struck the assistant chief, who was standing towards the rear of the brush track, and dragged him 60 feet before coming toa slop The pickup Tost is front left wheel inthe crash, and the assistant chief was parlly pinned underneath the font of i, which was resting onthe ground,

‘The other two firefighters ran back tothe brush truck to call for assistance and get equipment In the mesntme, the driver of the pickup let the seene on foot Medical care was provided bythe Breighters on the stene and by responding paramedics Despite their effons, treatment was dscoatinued atthe scene, and the assistant chief was pronounced dead 3 2348 hours

Police searched chrough the nigh forthe driver ofthe pickup involved in dhe rash but id not find him The driver turned himself i the nextday, admitting that his blood alcohol level was more than 0.10, the State's legal limit atthe time ofthe crash He had been drinking at several bars befor losing control ofthe pickup

‘After leaving the scene, he passed ut in the yard ofa house nearby and woke the next morning unaware of| har had happened The driver pled gut 0 criminal vehicular homicide

SG HB — "= tw Ee 5 '"="=™ CAUSAL FACTORS FOR THE INCIDENT

» The driver of the stking vehicle was reported 1 be under the influence of alcohol and was driving

100 fist for conditions

e Vithilty was decreased due to darkness atthe time ofthe collision

The firefighters filed to exercise situational awareness and take appropriate precautions to prevent being struck by oncoming taf

TH

On January 9, 2001, at 1642 hours, a fre department was dispatched to 2 reported motor vehicle crash with downed power lines At the ume of the crash, the weather was reported as light snow with high winds causing lited wisi

‘The department’ assistant chief responded 10 the scene in his personal vehicle Upon anal, he reported

‘haa vehicle had truck a power poe, and power lines were down, but there were no injuries He secured the scene and requested thatthe road be closed ar the inersetion ofthe Sate highway anda local oad, 1.8 miles north of the crash st, The road was eported a having loose wet naw with ice under the snow Trac

‘was reported a unusually high due to a sporting event being held ata nearby school, There was a trafic signal at the intersection that was tobe closed The State highway had yellow caution igh, andthe cross suet had stop signs and red lights,

‘Two firefighters proceeded to this intersection to clase the road There were no fares, cones, or signs posted on the roadway or atthe intersection The wo firefighters were in street clothes, with no reflective

‘ests, belts, oF outs

‘At 1720 hours, a civilian driver stopped in the imerseetion, signaling to make 2 left curn onto the closed road, One firefighter walked over to inform the drier that the road was closed due to the crash and lawned power lines At 1722 hours, he stepped backward sway from the drivers side window and 3 pickup tuck eaveling the other direction at approximately 20 0 25 miles per hour struck him The driver

‘ofthe pickup reported applying the brakes as soon ashe save the firefighter step ino his lane: however, the pickup sid on the slippery roadway and struck him

‘The firefighter was thrown approximately 32 feet and pinned underneath a pickup inthe opposing lane that was stopped in traffic Ambulances responding toa simultaneous cll were diverted to provide care for him Firefighters and civilians a dhe scene life che pickwp off of him by hand He was transported first to a local hospital and then transfered by sir ambulance to a regional trauma center He was pro- nounced dead a 0323 hours on January 10 from a massive closed head injury pulmonary contusion, and chest injuries,

Additional information on this incident is available in National Insitute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program report number 2001-07.The repo is availble for review a mde gr/nnh/Bte/ pnts ae200107 Am

CAUSAL FACTORS FOR THE INCIDENT

> Visibility was decreased due to darkness at che time ofthe collision

128 "TRAFFIC INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS,

°ŠẹBØBØỹIAA LULU lellllnallllllllll

Dy The firefighters filed to exercise situational awareness and take appropriate precautions to prevent being sruck by oncoming taf

Dy The firefighters were not wearing appropriate retrorflecive protective clothing,

» Road conslitions a the time of the incient were poor (snow and! ice) and may have prevented the striking vehicle fram slowing or stopping in time to avoid the collision,

The victim had no training on trafic contol, nor did the department have any SOPs on trafic contro

ee

On March 13,2004, at 1654 hours, aie department was dispatched toa vehicle and brush freon four lane highway The engine arrived at 1708 hours to find fully imvolsed minivan on the side ofthe road, Although a Stat highway patrol trooper was on the scene, the trooper had not slowed or diverted traffic and both northbound lanes were open The engine was parked upwind ofthe burning vehicle

As a firefighter stetched hose to begin fie suppression, the wind shifed and eaused smoke to obscure

‘sibility for oncoming motorists The freighter was struck bya Chevy Corsica that was driven through the smoke He was throwin on top of the apparatus and then fl tothe ground, where he did instanly

‘The driver of the Corsics left che scene but was apprehended about an hour later She proved to be & 12-year-old undocumented immigrant who was driving without 3 license The dri

thar she thought tha she had hit a cane, despite the fac that pieces of the Siceigh

were lodged in her windshield

[mn May of 2005, the County Training Officers Association adopted a standard set of procedures for high-

‘way incidents The procedures include warning signs and high visibility vss

CAUSAL FACTORS FOR THE INCIDENT

> Visibility was decreased due to smoke blowing across the roadway a the ime of the collision,

» The firefighters filed 10 exercise situational awareness and take appropriate precautions to prevent

‘being strc by oncoming trafic

> The roadway was left open to tafic eventhough visibility was near zero because of smole

‘The driver of the car that struck him was arrested a the scene and later charged with driving while limpaired by alcohol and prescription drugs

CAUSAL FACTORS FOR THE INCIDENT

» The driver of the sting vehicle was reported to be under the influence of drugs atthe dime ofthe collision

> Visbity was decreased due to darkness ac the ume of che collision

e Study S

On December 23, 2003, 3¢ 0238 hours, a eruck company was dispatched to asist an ambulance respond- ing to a vehicle rash on an expressway er the department’ Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGS), the truck was positioned (o protect the ambulance and the crash scene from the flow of traffic, blocking the inside and center lanes State police also set lares to mark the scene

(Once twas determined that there were no injuries inthe inl collision, dhe truck company was advised to return to service The fr Heutenant was in the process of checking the ruck to make sure all equipment ad been replaced and that the compartment doors were closed.As the eutenant was checking the exposed ide ofthe apparats, a 1997 Oldsmobile Curls illegally crossed over the center lane to ext infront ofa tacior teller in the ouside lane, in an attempt to circumvent the crash scene, The Oldsmobile struck the tactor teller on the front passenger side, causing ito spin counterclockwise ad sekethe lieutenant, pinning hie between the cand the rear bumper ofthe fie truck His legs were crushed by the impact, and he died less than 12 honrs her afer sulfering massive blood los and kidney a hear fare

‘The 26-year-old driver ofthe Oldsmobile had a blood alcohol level of 132 percent atthe sme of the crash, well above the Sute limit of 08 He ako had a history of taffc violations inthe Sac, where he never held a valid diver’ license He was charged with drunk deving and reckless homicide

CAUSAL FACTORS FOR THE INCIDENT

> The driver of the striking vehicle was reported 1 be under the influence of alcohol and was driving too fist for condiions

> Visibility was decreased due to darkness atthe time ofthe collision

The lieutenant filed to exercise situational awareness and take appropriate precautions to prevent boeing struck by oncoming traffic He should not have placed himself berween oncoming traffic and the exposed side ofthe apparatus

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M Case Study 6

On July 1, 2002, a 0708 hours a volunteer fire department and police personnel were dispatched 102 veh freon the right shoulder ofthe local interstate municipal police officer was ist on the scene,

‘parking his vehicle, with emergency lights activated, 30 feet behind the incident vehicle, An engine com-

‘pany with four firefighters on it arrived at 0712 hours and was positioned on the shoulder approximately

50 fet in front ofthe incident vehicle The brush tuck, with the captain on it arived at 0715 hours and

‘yas parked approximately 100 fet behind the incident vehicle, with all emergency lights activated At the point where the incident occurred, the highvsay was saight and level and the road was dry

“The Siefighters on the engine were working under the hood of the incident vehicle while the captain and the police officer stood near the passenger door talking withthe driver.A northbound passenger cat

In he left ane was rear-ended by a pickup tuck pulling 2fifth-wheel camper The passenger car skidded toward the shoulder, hi the police ca, and then struck the captain, wo other firefighters, the diver of the incident vehicle, and the police office I then impacted the incident vehicle, whick was propelled approximately 50 feet and lodged under the rear ofthe engine company The passenger vehicle carne to rest about SO fect behind the engine The pickup crossed the median ina the southbound traffic lane and then kết the scene

A Siate highway patrol officer witnessed the incident and radioed for assistance The captain was found

‘unresponsive, ying on the right shoulder of the highway just north of where the pasenger vehicle came to

2 stop After advanced lfe support effos, he was wansported by air ambulance to a nearby hospital where

he was ater pronounced dead.The police officer was found unconscious, ying near che right rear tire of the passenger vehice-Two fieighters and the owner ofthe incident vehicle were thrown onto the grassy re)

«ast ofthe right northbound! shoulder All three wer injured but conscious Two freighters jumped clear of | the vehicles and escaped inary

“The captain wa killed asthe result of multiple traumatic injuries inching a ruptured aorta Addivional information on thisincidentis available in NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Programs report number 2002-38 The reports available for review at monick gn noha fa 200238 A

CAUSAL FACTORS FOR THE INCIDENT

» The firefighters fied 10 exercise situational awareness and take appropriate precautions 0 prevent being struck by oncoming traffic The engine company was not parked in a manner that shielded the work ata

Neither police nor fire personnel made any attempt to mark the incident seene properly or 4 rowe traffic away fom the work area,

The victim had no formal traning on tlic contr nor dd the department have any SOPS on trafic control

On the evening of February 3, 2004, a volunter fire department was dispatched fo a roll-over motor vehicle crash with injuries on a four-lane highway The crash ad blocked the right lane, A firefighter,

‘wearing 2 reflective ves, was standing in tht lane about 200 feet upstream ofthe crash scene to slaw

SG HB — "= tw Ee 5 '"="=™ tealficand direct vehicles to move ito the lef lane The firefighter was standing in the right-hand lane of |

‘seo westbound anes of the highway He was wearing a retroreficcive vet

Am atomobile in the lef lane passing the firefighter slowed suddenly andthe vehicle behind it swerved to the right to avoid rear ending tin swerving, ths vehicle entered the right-hand lane where the firefighter was standing He was sruck bythe vehicle and thrown 16 feet into the ditch beside the road, He died of traumatic injuries on his way 0 the hospital

His widow later sued the driver of the vehicle that struck him, 2 19-yearold man who was not injured in the canh, s vell se his parents, under a State la that allows parents of teenagers to be held responsible for the driving actions oftheir children, The driver ofthe car later pled guilty to careles driving involving death,

CAUSAL FACTORS FOR THE INCIDENT

D> The driver of the striking vehicle was driving too fist for conditions

> Visibility was decreased due to darkness at the time ofthe collision

» The firefighters filed 10 exercise situational awareness and ake appropriate precautions to prevent being struck by oncoming taf

» There were no signs or other traffic markers being used to direct traffic away from the Magger oF incident scene,

Cea

(On Mach 19, 2003, 3 0237 hours volunteer fire department was dispatched to trafic incident with reported minor injuries inthe eastbound lane of an intestate highway The dispatcher realized thatthe incident was actualy in a neighboring department's service area and she notified that department That department dispatched an engine tothe scene and requested mutual aid in the form of an ambulance because they were short on manpower

‘Alieutenant from the fst department tht was dispatched stared towards the ie station in his personal vehicle, but diverted straight to the scene There was heavy fog atthe station, and the responding eaprain announced on the radio forall personnel to use caution The lieutenant acknowledged the fog warning

“The fist-ariving freighter responded westbound and parked his vehicle in the median dicectly across from the incident, turning off his headlights but leaving his emergency fashers on He notified the dis- ptcher tat only one person had sustained hand injuries atthe incident-The murual-ad department uses the Incident Command System (ICS), but this firefighter did not take command because the incient was

in the neighboring department's service are,

| paramedic had arrived before the fist firefighter and parked her personal veblcle on the eastbound putside shoulder near the incident A county sheriffs deputy was also on the scene No trafic contol had been established, and all the vehicles involved inthe original incident were parked onthe shoulder or off the roadway

At approximately 0259 hours the lleutenant arrived and parked his personal vehicle behind the arriving firefighter’, im the meelan on the westbound sie ofthe interstate He exited is vehicle: he was

‘swearing sret clothes and did noe put on his vest with reflective trim,

16m "TRAFFIC INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS,

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‘The driver of an eastbound tractor trailer heard CB radi traffic reganding the incident, moved to the inside lane and slowed to 48 0 50 miles per hour He saw the emergency lights on the vehicles parked

fm the eastbound outside shoulder and saw other nonemergency vehicles parked on the inside west- bound shoulder

Ashe passed the incident, the truck driver checked his eight mirror to see if he had cleared the scene

‘When he looked back to che front, he saw the leutenant step inta the eastbound lane of trafic He was tunable to stop and struck hims with the right Fen ofthe suck jus 0 the left of th center divider line

He came wo controled stop on the shoulder approximately 598 feet beyond the point of impact

“The lieutenant was thrown by the impacto the grassy median approximately 170 fet east of the point of Impact Others on the scene checked hima, but he was obvionsly deceased No charges were filed agains, the ck driver

Additional information on this ineldent is avaiable In NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatay Investigation and Prevention Program report number 2003-13 The report is svallale for review (wwnlego/ si ie! repos /fe200313.hinl), The Slate Fire Marshal aso prepared a thorough report on this incident Thai report is avaible st wmulliattetrts/frơÍnlsdHmad Aml

CAUSAL FACTORS FOR THE INCIDENT

> Visbiluy was decreased due to darkness atthe ume ofthe collision,

> The leutenant filed to exercise situational awareness and take appropriate precautions to prevent beng stuck by oncoming taf

The llewrenant filed to don high-vsibilty apparel that had been provided to im

> The victim had no taining on traffic control nor did the department have any SOPs or preplans for teaffc contro

ee

(On December 21, 2004, at 1645 hours, a fire department was dispatched to a vehicle crash The fs

arriving unit, a brush truck, found cat che incident was actualy on the border ofthe neighboring county

‘The incident was not technically a crash, a a vehicle had driven ino a ditch a that location Prior tothe fie department’ arrival, the people involved had been able to ge heir vehicle out of the ditch without assistance The fie chief and one firefighter arived on an engine shorty thereate, only to lesen from the frst-ariving firefighter that chey were not needed

‘The two units proceeded south 10 find a driveway where they could turn around and return 10 the station Although the chief asked him ott, the firefighter exited the engine 0 asist in allowing the tock to turn around, He took a traffic fashlight set him

Acconling to the tai crash report the driver of a white pickup trick headed northbound noticed the shadow of someone walking across the roadway and surmised the person was headed to his mailbox AS

he approached the driveway, he saw the firefighter standing in his lane of traffic He hit his brakes and swerved tothe lft in an auempr ro avoid hitting the firefighter, but the maneuver was nat suecessful-The ambulance that had been dispatched tothe original incident proceeded in and took the firefighter tothe hospital, where he was pronounced dead The cause of death was listed as mokiple rams

SG HB — "= tw Ee 5 '"="=™ CAUSAL FACTORS FOR THE INCIDENT

» Visiity was decreased due to darkness atthe time ofthe collision

The firefighter filed to esercise situational awareness and take appropriate precautions to prevent being stuck by oncoming taf

The firefighter filled to don retrorefecive personal protective pquipment (PPE) while working in the roadway

>» Case Study 10

On January 7, 2006, at 0715 hours, the fie department’ shift had just come on duty when fre com- panies were dispatched to a series of weather-related motor vehicle crashes in a curve on an eastbound Ingerstate According to a responding police office, the road went from wet to black ice in a matter of | minutes; there was no indication that ie had Formed wnt vehicles began to sip nd crash, total of 13

‘icles seas involved in six crashes along that stretch of roadway supporting the finding thatthe road iced over very quickly and drivers had no knowledge ofthe need to slow dosen,

As the firefighter and her pariner approached a pickup tuck that had been involved im a rash to check

fn the occupants, another pickup came around the curve and lst contol, striking a median wall and the first pickup Someone yelled a warning tothe firefighters, who began to move out ofthe way Her partner was able ro avoid the pickup, but she was stuck by the front quater pane! ofthe vehicle on the drivers side She was wearing her tumout gear, and her helmet was knocked off by the impact She was thrown ann unknown distance o the east ofthe crash

‘Firefighters coming to her aid found her ying on her side and unresponsive She was quickly ranspored

to the hospital and pur on life suppor However, she suffered closed head wauma and was taken ofF fe support late in the afternoon of January 12, 2006 She died the next morning,

‘The district atorney’s fice declined to press charges against the driver of the pickup that hic er, cing the fcr thar no witnesses reported him driving inan erratic or unsafe manner Blood tess done the day of|

‘he crash indicated that he was not under the influence of alcoho or drugs a the time

CAUSAL FACTORS FOR THE INCIDENT

» Visibility was decreased duc to darkness ac the ume ofthe collision

> Road conditions were poor due to ice om the oad

» The firefighters filed to exercise situational awareness and take appropriate precautions to prevent being sruck by oncoming taf

» Neither police nor fre personnel made any attempt to close the rosdovay or shield the work area from approaching talc

°ŠẹBØBØỹIAA LULU lellllnallllllllll near the fre station to assist with traffic control a the fre apparatus lef the station, Because he lived lose

by one fire police officer unally peeformed this roe, ashe di this evening

“The fre pace officer was wearing reflective safety gear consisting of reflective safety helmet, high-visib Thy arobe light, high-vstbility safety vest, and strobe traffic wand The intersection was well lit by properly operating mercury vapor ster lights Also per SOP the responding fire engine came to 2 complet stop 2t fhe intersection Asi id, the lieutenant on the engine saw a pickup truck coming down the road faster than the posted 35 mille per-hour speed limit

‘The fire police officer had his back to che pickup, but he turned and saw it coming toward him as the fire engine topped He took one step Forward into the other lane 10 avoid the pickup, but ie was over the Alouble yellow lane macker and struck him His body impacted the hood and cab ofthe pickup and was thrown approximately 75 feet forward, landing ina driveway

‘The hewtenant radioed the dispatch center that a frefighter had heen struck, and the crew on the engine Immediately went 1 his ald A frefighter/EMT who was responding (othe original incident witnessed the event and provided care The fire police officer was transported to the hospital, where he was pro- nounced dead

‘The State police investigated his death and placed the driver ofthe pickup under atest for driving while Intoxicated and vehicular manslaughte

CAUSAL FACTOR FOR THE INCIDENT

The driver of che suring vehicle was reported o be under the influence of alcohol and vias driving too fist for conditions,

>» Case Study 12

(On March 20, 2002, a approximately 1430 hours, voluateer fre department was dispatched toa motor

‘ehicle cash on the interstate in the southbound lane There was a dhunderstorin with heavy ean i progress inthe area, One firefighter was the frst volunteer to reach the scene, coming in from the north

in his personal vehicle and crossing the median to park on the outbound shoulder in front ofthe original crash, He was wearing street clothes, jeans, and a light-colored shir

While he was on the scene, another crash occurred approximately 150 yards south of the ist incident

He walked along the outside shoulder and approached the vehicle volved in the second crash on the

‘passenger side to assess any injuries, He radioed the driver of the responding engine that there were no tajor injuries and that he could slr his response

Approximately 2 minutes later, a motorist attempted to move from the right to the eft lane but lost contral ofthe vehicle The automobile skidded off the road, traveled along the outer shoulder ofthe southbound lane, ad struck the fieighte The impact crew the firefighter into passing traffic, where he was hit by

2 pickup cruck and thrown imo the median By chat ume, 2 sherif"s deputy had arsived on scene and radioed for assistance rescue unit with two paramedics from a mutual aid department sel- dispatched

to the scene and atended to the firefighter, who was unresponsive with no pulse or respirations He was transported 1 the hospital, where he was pronounced dead,

SG HB — "= tw Ee 5 '"="=™ Aitional information on this incident is available in NIOSH Eire Fighter Fataty Investigation and Prevention Program report number 2002-13, The report is avalable fr review at wna go/ lt e/ repo /fe20213 Aa

CAUSAL FACTORS FOR THE INCIDENT

» Visibility was decreased due to heavy rain at the time ofthe collision

» The firefighter filed to exercise situational awareness and take appropriate precautions to prevent being struck by oncoming taf

The firefighter was not wearing high-visbiity apparel

» Road conditions were poor a the ume ofthe incident due ro heavy rainfall

There was a filure ro establish a prorected work aea before starting incident operations

The depariment di not have or enforce SOPs or preplans for thes situations

Summary

A review of these casestudies finds tha some ofthe fctors that led 10 these deaths ae within the control

of firefighters and some ae not- OF those that are within our contol ee see multiple examples of basic safety procedures not being fllowel In these case studies we see firefighters who consistently do not recognize the danger signs present at she roadway scene, freighters who fall to wear appropriate protec- tive clothing, and fire and police agencies chat do not take effective actions in guarding the incident scene and work area from oncoming tafic The remainder ofthis manual s Focused on information to improve the performance offieeighters and other emergency responders in these stations

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Equipment To Improve Hichway SAFETY

For several years now, the DOT has been engaged in a program called the Imelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) The goal of IS isto improve transportation safery and mobility and enhance productivity through the use of advanced communications technologies There ate nlne major initaives within the

FT program:

D> Vebicle infrastructure Integration (Vi)

Next Generation 9-1-1:

» Cooperative Intersection Collision Avoidance Systems;

» Inegrated Vehicle Base Safety Systems;

> invegrted Corridor Management Systems

>» Clarus, the Natonsvide Surface Transportation Weather Observing and Forecasting System;

>» Emergency Transportation Operations:

» Mobily Services for ll Americans; and

»» Blecronic Freight Management

Much work has been done within the Emergency Transportation Operations section of this effort rel tuve (othe safety of frfighters and ather fist responders who ate working on the roadway One ofthe concepts being studied within this area ofthe projects the concept of using Talc Incident Management Systems (TIMS) to reduce the effects of incdent-related traffic congestion by decreasing the time neces- sary to detect incidents, the time for responding vehicles to arive, and the time required for traffic ro return to normal conditions TIMS contributes to increasing emergency responder’ safety stan incident scone both directly and indiecty

‘Though many of the findings and features of dhe cverall IS project are not related directly to isuesfire- fighters will work with or even be concerned about, they indizecly have a positive impact on the safety

of firefighters who wrk on the roadhay The frst portion ofthis chapter discusses some of these projects

“his information is based on che Federal Highvray Adinnistation’s Inlet Tenpovao Sens Beets end (Cass: 20053 Update (hp “etd a o/c ps_e/13772 hl 4)

Much of what firefighters need to know abou trafic control and safe operations on the highway i

‘contained in 1 DOT document ved Manu! oe UnranTele Contal Dees (MUTCD) The MUTCD isthe rational standard of roadway operations forall highway operations, both routine and emergency The MUTCD refers to the incidents awe work on as “trafic incident management areas” and sates tht effective

‘Temporary Traffic Control (TTC) measures must be in place t these senes The MUTCD sats that the primary functions of TTC at a saffie incident management area ar to:

1 Move road users past or around the trafic incident in a reasonably safe and expeditions manner

2, Reduce the likelihood of secondary tlic colisions

3 Preclude unnecessary use ofthe surrounding local rad system

CHAPTER 3 EQUIPMENT To IMPROVE HIGHWAY SAFETY m2

`

‘The later portions ofthis chapter discuss the appropriate types of MUTCD-compliant equipment that can

be used to establish TTC at roadway emergency incidents It also discusses some new technologies and

‘equipment used outside the United States The goal of ths chapters to provide firefighters with inform

‘don on the correct types of equipment that should be used when working on the roadway

ITS Technologies to Improve Roadway Safety

‘This section details a selection of new technologies that the ITS program has advanced forthe improve- ment of roadway safety and incident scene safety: Many of these are related tothe role of fefighers only Indirectly, but firefighters should be aware oftheir existence and impact on the jobs they peeform

‘TRAFFIC SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY

‘The ITS program has been responsible for the development and installation of a wide variety of trafic surveillance and detection technologies, such as acoustic roadway detecor, sill photos, and video cam- era sjstems (Figure 3.1) These technologies monitor waffc flow, detect deviations in eae patterns, and

feed information to a vaflic contol center In some cases the tafe contol cener is able ro send emergency help before civilians on the scene ae able ta dil 9-1-1 Video based systems also may be used 10 provide emergency responders with important information on the incident

‘hile they are sil enroute

TS also is responsible for advances im wireless enbanced 9-1-1 systems and Automated Collision Nowfcation (ACN) systems Although not diecly involved with emer

‘gency respons, these technologies can help idenafy the problem eath, contact the appropriate hep, and divert traffic though announcements tothe pubic This helps to Figute 31-Te Pennivania Ture Carmien wae reduce congestion, speed response 10 the sene, and pre

“nel ena vent secondary collisions

MAYDAY AND AUTOMATIC COLLISION NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS

The ACN systems cam affect both firefighter and motorist safety These systems transmit voice and data to

an emergency call center on manval activation when the driver preses a button (Mayday), or automat cally when they are triggered by onboard safety equipment such as air-bag deployment The On-Sta system that is used in GM vehicles is pechaps the most recognizable of these systems, These units use in-vehicle crash sensors, Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, and wireless communications to supply cll centers with crash location and, in some cases, the number of injured passengers and narure

Of injuces Advanced ACN products can assist in determining the type of equipment needed (basic or advanced life support), mode of tansport (air or ground), and location of the nearest tauina center Although anecdotal, reports suggest that ACNs have a positive effect om vitim outcomes by reducing time toemergency medical care

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’ (NHTSA) 1998 Strategic Plan noted that 24 per cent of al fatal crashes in the United Sates occur on rural roads, However, this relatively small percent age of crashes accounts for nearly §9 percent ofall crash deaths, One factor that contributed to the

Ỗ°ˆðAAAAAAAlAll diepropordonatly hígh Rualty re fr rol rath ietims was a delay in delivering emergency medical services tothe scene, Included in these deaths are many volunteer firefighter deaths responding to rural Incidents or fire stations in private vehicles The highest percentage of deaths in actual fire apparatus crashes are those involving fie department tankers (Lenders), which ako tend t0 occur in ruta areas ACNS could help decrease those fatalities by lessening the response time of emergency medical care for

‘hose involved in the collision,

Two studies on ACN aze worth reviewing, Under a grant from DOT, Harris County, TX, installed ACN systems in $00 police and fire department vehicles in 2002 fora 2-year pilot study The ACN fed informa- tion directly to a roadside asitance provider in Boston, who called the vehicle to confirm the crash and verify the identities of occupants They then forwarded the information o a Colorado-based telecom-

‘munications and public safety technology provider, who used the vehicle's location to route the dara to {he appropriate Public Safery Answering Point (PSAP) using existing 9-1-1 systems Simultaneously the

‘occupants’ demographic data were forwarded to a Viginia-based technology provider who generated an

‘injury prediction algorithm and related that to the wauma center AS ofthis writing, there were no pub: lished resus of this sty

‘The Minnesota DOT, in partnership with the Mayo Clinic (Rochester, MN) launched a lower-tech system

Jn 2003 In the Minnesota system, telematics system providers (TSPs) relay emergency calls and caller location obtained from the GPS unit inthe vehicles equipped with an ACN system to the PSAP on 9-1-1 priority vice communications lines The SP transmits additional data on to the Condition Acquisition fund Reporting System secure data network Responding agencies are abe to access the incident dat fom, the Internet, according to thelr data access privilege classifications,

AGNS are becoming more common as standard installation om new cas, and there also are afer-market product The cost of market devices range from approximately $400 to $1,900, These units appear to hold a great deal of promise in improving incident reporting and thus emexgency response However there ia fee forthe service of the TPs, ranging from $10 10 $27 per month, so if the fe has not been paid the ACN wil be inactive

FREEWAY SERVICE PATROLS

TS has encouraged the development and operation of freeway service patrols Freeway service patrols

‘operate in many major metropolitan areas, as well some suburban and rural areas These are often State DOT programs and consist ofa fleet of light-duty trucks that have two-way radio communication with

a teaffic control center They usually ar equipped with

‘motorist asist supplies, trafic cones, a lighted vehicle

arrow board, and, in some cass, extendable floodlights

(igure 3.2)

While the primary focus of these units is to monitor

roadway conditions and provide assistance to disabled

‘motorists, these patrol vehicles also may be dispatched

to roadvay incident 0 assist other emergency respond:

es with talfic contol Depending on local protocols

Aispatch of Uhese units may be automatic, by request of

{he Incident Commander (IC), or from law enforcement

personnel State DOT representatives should be included

4 part ofthe traffic incident management team to iden- We S2-A rae pal ut ithe Hampton Roads, tly criteria and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) MS

GHAPTER 3 EQUIPMENT To IMPROVE HIGHWAY SAFETY "23

SHH HHH — BB Dg;

for incorporating DOT resources into rosdway scene responses 10 aid in traffic contol and reduce incident relied delay

VARIABLE MESSAGE SIGNS Variable message signs (VMS) are becoming more com- mon on the Nation’ feeeways (Figure 3.3) They pro- B} vide a versale means of communicating information 0 drivers and can be invaluable i alerting oncoming tac

to an emergency incident Alhough, im some locations, incident management personnel can disecly post inc Fee 33a maoogs vs prove evanced naming dent-relaed information to VMS, usually messages are

“Sormoschne nae tet OO ogee posed by transportation management center personne

For VMS to be useful, the message must be concise and lear Drivers must be able ta imeerpet the message while traveling a high speed with distractions The MUCTD requires minimum legibility of portable variable message signs a 650 feet and 1,000 feet for higher speeds I'a series of message panels is displayed, 2 10 4 seconds per message panel is recom mended Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show how many seconds it takes to travel 1,000 feet at various speeds, and the number of message panels that can be displayed for each speed limit fora least 1,000 feet of sight distance

Tobe 3:1-Time to Travel 1,000 Fetin Seconds Table 3.2-Number of Message Panels Speeding Time in seconds ¬ umber Paes

Drivers should be able 0 ead the message wice while traveling atthe posted speed, In addition, messages,

‘har ake more chan wo panels ean be confusing, since drives may not be abe to determine the apprope ate order Thetefore, messages should be limited vo «wo panels

“Messages should be concise clear and provide relevant information All messages are printed in capital leuers The average driver traveling ta high rate of speed can handle 8-word messages of # 0 8 characters, per word at 2 (04 seconds per message-The message should consist ofa leas the problem and action and

‘may contain an effect For example lec’ say the problem isan accident 2 miles ahead in the right lane Drivers should expect delays and merge left A two-pane VMS might read

Panel 1: CRASH AHEAD TWO MILES

Panel 2: MERGE LEFT EXPECT DELAYS

‘Acne panel might rads CRASH TWO MILES MERGE LEFT

Ỗ°FAAAAAAAAAllll Portable changeable message signs should be visible fom

4 half mile under both day and night conditions, Leer

height should be 1 minimum of 18 inches and legible

frown at leat 650 fee if he sige is mouated on a wailee

or lage tuck If mounted on service patrol truck, letter

height should be a minimum of 10 inches and wstle

from atleast 330 feet (Figures 34a and b)

Temporary Traffic Control Zones

Before geting into a detailed discussion ofthe types of

equipment most emergency esponders will use 10 assis

with trafic contol ata roadveay emergency scene, its

fist necessary to review the basic components of a TTC

zone The procedures fr establishing these zones will be

‘covered in more detail n Chapter 4.The MUTCD defines

A TTC zone as; “an area of 2 highway where road user

conditions are changed because of a work zone oF an

‘cident through the use of FTC devices, uniformed law

enforcement offices, or other authorized personnel An

incident area is an area ofa highway where temporary

trafic controls are imposed by authorized officials in

response toa traffic incident, natural disaster, or special

fvent It extends fom the first warning device (sich a8

sign, light, or cone) tothe last TTC device orto a point

where road users return to the original lane alignment

and are clear of the incident” (MUTCD Section 6C.02)

Imennge bows Courtany of on ore Matin HF

The primary function of the TTC is 10 provide for

reasonably safe and effective movement of road users

rough or around the work area, while providing a

reasonable evel of protection tothe responders operat-

ing on the scene

TTC zones may be established fora varity of reasons including road maintenance, weather conditions, disabled vehicles, and emergency incidents,The MUTCD refers to emergency scenes on the roadway as tealfic incident management areas (TIMA) To be specific emergency responders need o be familiar with the MUTCD procedures for establishing TTC arTIMAs

Most TTC/incident zones are divided into four areas (Figure 3.8) The advanced warning area isthe sec- tion of highway where drivers are informed of the upcoming incident area, Because drivers on freeways

ae assuming uninterrupted traffic low, the advance warning sgn should be placed further back fom the Incident scene than on two-lane roads or urban srets Table 3.3 shows the stopping sight distance as a finction of speed

CHAPTER 3 EQUIPMENT To IMPROVE HIGHWAY SAFETY 25

topping Sight Distance as

t ‘Function of Speed Temlnslen ea $ Distance)

mg

200

20

‘The eranstion area is the section

of the TTC zone where drivers

ae redireced from thelr normal path This usually volves the cre- ation of tapers using channeling Seices, Tapers may be used in

‘both the transition and sermin sion areas The MUTCD designates the distance of cone placement to {orm the apes based on the speed innit multiplied by the width of the lanes being closed off, This fan be shown mathematically 38 fallow:

ewe 35-the por of TH wen

TL = (LW x # of lanes) = PSL Where: TL =Taper length in fet

LW = Lane width in fet PSL = Posted Speed Limit in miles per hour Forexample, suppose you ae closing twa hanes ofa interstate highway whose speed limits 75 miles pee hhour-The lanes are 12 feet wide In this example, the per length would be calculated 2 follows:

"TRAFFIC INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS,

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TTL = (LW x # oflanes) PSL

1 12 fix 2 lanes) x 75 mph 24)(75)

TL= 1,800 feet

“The activity ara isthe section of highway where the work activity or incident rakes place es made up ofthe incident space, the trafic space, and the buffer space, The incident space is where the actual work acuity occurs The trafic space isthe portion of the roadway wsed to rote traffic through the incident aca, The ber space i the lateral and/or longitudinal are that separates trafic ow from the work are,

‘The buffer space may provide some recovery space for an errant vehicle, The MUTCD (Section 6.06) specifically states that "an incident response and emergency-vehicle storage area should not extend into any portion of the buffer space.”

“The termination area is used to return drivers to cheir normal path, Ie ends a¢ the last TTC device Conditions and safery considerations may dicate the need for a longitudinal buffer space between the work area and the start ofthe downstream apex

Sce Chapter 4 ofthis publication for more information on establishing TTCs,

Channelizing Devices

‘Channelizing devices ae used 10 warn dives of conditions created by incident acovites In or neat the roadway and to guide drivers around the incident, Channelizing devices used during an emesgency inc lene can include signs, cones, cubular marker, faze, directional arows, and fagger,

SIGNS

‘The MUTCD establishes specific color requirements for signs that will be used in different situations

“The MUTCD (Section 61.01) slates thatthe required colors for warning signs used For TTC in TIMAS is fluorescent pink with black letters and border In emergency situations where uorescent pink signs ae not available, older style signs with yellow backgrounds may be used (Section 6F.15) However itis rec

‘ommended that as fire departments and other emergency response agencies replace old signs or purchase new signs that the new signs be pink with blac levers

Minimum sign size on roadways with moderately low speeds and volumes is 36 by 36 inches, Minimam size on roadways with higher speeds and on freeways and expressways is 48 by 48 inches Departments Wich limited resonrees are advised to acquire the larger signs, as they can be used in elthersimaton,

‘When a series of two oF more advance warning sign is sed, the closes sign to the TTC zone shouldbe approximately 100 fet for low-speed veban streets to 1,000 fet or more for freeways and expressways (Gection 6E 16) cat distances ae dealed in Chapter 4

NNavional Fite Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 1500, Sendad ot Fle Danes Ocapatinel Slay and Hehi Pog, also requires that a reuoreflective fluorescent pink highway safety sign be deployed as advance warning anytime a fre department vehicle is wsed in a blocking mode ata highway incident, [NFPA requires the wording "EMERGENCY SCENE AHEAD" forthe sign (Figure 5.6) In essence, this mir- son the MUTCD requirement

CHAPTER 3 EQUIPMENT To IMPROVE HIGHWAY SAFETY mới

For daytime and low speed roadways, cones shall be not less than 18 inches (450 mm) in height When

her high speed highways or at night on all highssays, cones shall be a minimum

‘of 28 inches (700 mm) in height, When used at ight, cones must also be reuoreflectorized by 2 6-inch-wide white band located 3 0

44 inches from the top of the cone and an additional 4-inch-wide

‘White band located approximately 2 inches below the 6-inch band (gure 3.7) The retrorelecuve material used on cones or any other channelling devices must be smooth with sealed outer sueace that Aispays a similar color, day or night,

‘The MUTCD does nor specify whether the cones need to be of the solid or collapsible styles Many fre departments choose 10 equip fire apparatus with collapsible cones, as they reduce the amount of required storage space Others find unigue, easily accessible loca sions to carry canes on the apparatus (Figure 3.8)-There area var

fy of options that can be used ea increase the effectiveness of the

‘cones, particulrly in low light situations Cones are avalable that iluminate from within or ae equipped with light strips that encece them Cones may also be equipped with flashers atached to the tops Figure 3.9),

TUBULAR MARKERS Tubular markers also must be predominantly orange and not less than 18 inches high and 2 snches wide facing driver They shall be

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made of a material that can be struck without causing damage to the impacting vehicle The MUTCD {Section 6F.60) requires tubular markers used during the day and on low-speed roadways (< 40:mph) to bea minimum of 18 inches high Tubular markers used on feways and other high-speed highway, and

om all highways during nightime, must be a minimum of 28 inches high, For nighttime use, the mark- fers must be retorefletorized by two 3-inch-wide white bands placed 2 maximum of 2 inches from the top with a maximum of 6 inches between the bands (Figure 3.10) Again, jurisdictions that use ubular markers are advised to carry the larger size so they ae appropriate for use a any incident,

FLARES

‘There are thc basic types of fare devices that may be used in TTC 2ones.These devices Include

> incendiary Hares

> chemical light sticks and

> light-emiting diode (LED) fares

ich ofthese devices s detaled inthe following section

Incendiary Flares

Some Form of incendiary road fare has been used co alert drivers to dangerous conditions for almost

100 yeats (Figure 3.11) Incendiary fares are sel sustaining There are no concerns about batery lie or corroding electrical parts Incendiary Rates burn at approximately 70 candela By comparison, chem rminescent light sticks are approximately 10 candel, and atypical aslight 5 candela,

CHAPTER 3 EQUIPMENT To IMPROVE HIGHWAY SAFETY m 29

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‘There are several concerns with the se of incendiary flares Incendiary flares ate classified asa fammable solid and must be stored according to specie guidelines The

‘hemials tn standard incendiary road flares (strontium nitrate, potassium perchlorate, and sulfur with a saw- dlust/oil binder) are hazardous substances Exposure to the chemicals causes corrosive injury to the eyes and lertatio to the skin and respiratory tract Lit fares can cause skin bums and destroy clothing and vehicle tres Incendiary fares cannot be wsed at scenes with fuel spl, hazardous materials or during high wind conditions

mm Ove cleanups require after use Chemical Light Sticks

Chemical light sticks generate chemiluminescence in an enclosed container, making them suitable for tse in hazardous environments.Two different types of chemicals (usualy lumiaal and oxalate) are stored

‘within two tubes, an outer one and an inner glass vial These ro tubes are stored in a transparent plastic Container The gliss vil lots inthe onter tubes chemical, When the outer tube is bent oF broken and shaken, the chemicals eambine and stato glow: Glow time is between 6 and 12 hours,

Chemical ight sticks are inexpensive an easy to store and use However once they ae activated, they can rot he reused, LED light sticks are a reusable alternative to chemical light stick, They are battery operated and will ast about 20 hours ifleft on continuously: longer ifturned on and off incerminent Light sticks

ae not as bright as incendiary fuses or LD fares,

Light-Emitting Diode Flare

‘These devices use LEDs to project an extremely bright light, visible 360” from great distances Depending

fn the manufacture, the ights may be adjusted between a steady, ashing, or rotating mode One mani fcturer has a mode tha emulates the flicker of an incendiary fae The rotating and ashing signals put fou by these unis are non-hypnotic and non-disosienting These units come in a varity of configura ton—some lie fat on the ground, some can ston stands, and some come with a brace hat ataches,

‘hem tothe top ofa trafic cone (Figures 3.124 and 3.12b), Most use disposable or rechargeable AA or AAA batteries,

‘These units average approximately 90 to 100 hours running time They are sturdy, standing up 10 the weight of vehicle traffic, and weather proof As ofthis iting the cost of the units varied from $10 t0 S50 per unit

Directional Arrow Panels

An arrow panel is a sign with a matrix of elements capable of either Aashing or sequemtial displays Directional arow panels can provide additional warning and directional information for merging and controlling drivers through/around a TTC zone Directional arrow panels must be uted in conjunction with other TTC devices such as channelizing equipment There are four types of arow panels Type 8 i tsed on low-speed urban stees Type Bis used on intermediate-speed roadways and for maintenance or

‘mobile operations on high-speed roadways Type C is used in areas of high-speed, high-volume motor schicle walle Type D 4s used on authorized vehicles Type A, B, and C arrow panel shall be a solid

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rectangle-Type D shall conform to the shape of the arrow All

arrow panels shall be finished in non-reflective black The mint

‘um mounting height of an arrow is 7 feet fom the roadway

torte bottom of the panel, except on vehicle-mounted panels Fgu 942>~Th LD mater canbe mounted

Tris becoming mcreasingly common for fre departments 10

‘mount directional arrows on apparatus (Figure 3.134 and 3.13b) When contemplating this, i is impor: tant to review the MUTCD requisements in Section 6F 56 to assure the signs are compliant Arrow pines should be able to operate inal of three modes: 1) ashing arrow, sequential 2row, oF Sequential chevron, 2) fishing double arrow, and 3) ashing caution mode, Figure 3.14 shows these modes The panel must

be capable of atleast 2 50 percent dimining from fall brllance for use during nightime operation in

‘order not co have an adverse effect on oncoming driver vision The size of the arrow must equal 48 inches long, and the width ofthe arrowhead must be 24 inches and must be wsible ata minima of 0.5 mies [Note that many’ of the serow panels and directional light bass cuneenly located om apparats do not meet this standard, If the arrowhead is not obvious to approaching trafic, it simply becomes another blinking

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‘The MUTCD (Section 6-F) identifies four types of barricades (Figure 3.15) Rll stripe width on all barricades 36 inches or over must be & inches For aries that are less than 36 inches wide, che ral stripe may be + inches The side of the buricade facing trac must have reroreflective rail faces

‘Warming lights on barricades are optional

‘incident This section deals the requirements for personnel who are assigned this function

|Aflaggee manually provides temporary traffic con twol According tothe MUTCD, a fagger is respon sible for the safery of both emergency workers and the motoring public Any person, includ Ông an emergency responder, who is assigned t0 diyect wafic is considered a flagger and therefore

eR T6 hon te SE a co bi CN 8 | reduiremenis rust be tained and meet the MUTCD flagger