FIGHTING TERRORISM IN THE LIBERAL STATE doc

Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State An Integrated Model of Research, Intelligence and International Law Edited by Samuel Peleg Department of Political Science and Strategic Dialo

FIGHTING TERRORISM IN THE LIBERAL STATE

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Fighting Terrorism in the

Liberal State

An Integrated Model of Research, Intelligence and

International Law

Edited by Samuel Peleg

Department of Political Science and Strategic Dialogue Center,

Netanya College, Israel

and Wilhelm Kempf

Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Germany

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State: An Integrated Model of Research, Intelligence and International Law

Konstanz, Germany

15–16 April 2005

© 2006 IOS Press

All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,

or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher ISBN 1-58603-600-9

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LEGAL NOTICE

The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State v

S Peleg and W Kempf (Eds.)

Israel

In June 1974, I was staying with my Aunt and Uncle during my summer vacation They lived in northern Israel, in the sleepy little town of Naharya At the age of 16, it was the farthest away from home that I could go On the fifth night of my visit, at around 2:00 a.m., we were violently awakened by a barrage of bullets and the deafening blasts

of hand grenades We were all terribly frightened and felt totally helpless The onslaught lasted for about 30 minutes, and then suddenly everything fell ominously silent At dawn, we learned how fortunate we had been: The attack on the apartment house was the work of a terrorist band that had crossed over the border from Lebanon earlier that night My relatives’ building had been randomly selected, simply because it was located near the shore The terrorists continued wounding and killing the residents

of the ground floor until Israeli Special Forces moved in, surrounded them and ended their rampage That was my first encounter with the phenomenon of terrorism – but not

of terrorism: indiscriminate, ruthless and unexpected Lurking in the shadows like a ferocious beast, terrorism is aggressive and vicious To its prey, it does not matter whether the beast is hungry or has a right to kill From the victim’s point of view, any lethal assault is depraved, senseless and criminal

Nevertheless, however clearly and unambiguously terrorism is captured in these personal recollections, it is still a highly perplexing and confusing phenomenon Scholars and practitioners are constantly debating the nature of terrorist activities in various parts of the world The anti-terrorist effort is notoriously faltering and indecisive, and global cooperation against terrorism is reprehensibly inadequate These shortcomings are especially conspicuous in liberal states, where insidious, ruthless and indiscriminate terrorism exploits the liberty and vulnerability of the open society Terrorism appears to flourish and attract attention by striking at the soft underbelly of

vi

democracy The accessibility of targets and the “silent collaboration” of the media,

which exploit the sensationalism of terrorist attacks for commercial advantages, play

into the hands of terrorists This is the dilemma of terrorism in the liberal state: Should

democratic liberties be curtailed for the sake of greater security? Isn’t the restriction of

civil liberties a triumph for terrorism? If a “golden path” must be found, combating

terrorism without sacrificing human rights and freedoms, where does such a path lead?

Such questions inspired the April 2005 NATO Advanced Research Workshop,

which was held at the University of Konstanz in southern Germany This volume

presents the outstanding contributions of participants at that gathering It consists of

papers by 18 leading scholars and practitioners of the war against terrorism from four

continents and nine countries They include philosophers, political scientists,

psychologists, criminologists, jurists, sociologists, historians, computer analysts,

intelligence analysts and law enforcement officers This remarkably varied range of

participants yielded a fascinating meeting and a noteworthy, often provocative

collection of papers The great diversity enriched our undertaking with a variety of

philosophies, perspectives, and understandings It brought together a plurality of

cultures, norms and experiences to afford an exhilarating mixture of definitions and

approaches The workshop benefited greatly from the open-mindedness and

forbearance reserved for those unique occasions where a diverse group of persons is

present The complex and varied nature of the contributions is reflected in this

collection

Terrorism and counter-terrorism are in many ways mirror images of each other,

and their names reflect that notion quite well They are both violent activities that

attempt to influence political developments and situations: the former in the direction

of change, instability and disorder, the latter in the opposite direction of the status quo,

stability and order They both vie for an attentive audience and for the legitimacy of the

“critical mass.” The challengers aspire to convince the population of the callousness

and brutality of their government, while the authorities in turn strive to portray their

opponents as ruthless criminals and malefactors Both parties try to win the hearts and

minds of the people This struggle is waged on all political fronts, whether aimed at the

members of a tribe, the citizens of a nation or world public opinion It is relevant and

meaningful on every level While counter-terrorism marches under the banner of law

and morality, terrorism defies the law and attempts to recast morality in its own terms

While the former boasts of order and stability, the latter proclaims justice and equality

The papers in this book illustrate this balanced dichotomy between terrorism and

counter-terrorism against the background of the liberal state This is a unique

battlefield, where the tactical advantage is seemingly conceded to terrorists, who are

free to exploit the liberties of the open society, while the authorities are constrained by

those very rights and freedoms They work under the constant scrutiny of the free

press, public opinion, the political opposition, human rights organizations and the

guardians of legal codes But, as already pointed out, they have only an apparent

advantage, which is forfeited the more depraved and indiscriminate terrorism becomes

Then terrorists begin to lose their popular support, and the authorities begin to win

citizens’ trust in their efforts to restore tranquility Thus, it really boils down to a

question of balance: of how to establish the delicate equilibrium of combating terrorism

while preserving the liberties of the open society This book begins with this question

and becomes increasingly complex as it tackles the different aspects and dimensions of

this dilemma

vii

The layout of the chapters follows the logic of the terrorism – counter-terrorism

dichotomy The first entries grapple with the notion of terrorism, its elusive and

problematic definition, its structural preconditions, motivations and incentives The

next three chapters juxtapose terrorism with counter-terrorism and emphasize the

movement – countermovement dynamics between them This is presented via three

case studies from three different corners of the globe Then, counter-terrorism is

introduced through communications and media, international law and foreign policy

analyses As in the terrorism section, both sympathetic and critical views are expressed,

conveying a sense of the wide gamut of approaches to this sensitive topic Finally, the

practical and programmatic portion of the book is laid out The three chapters of this

section illustrate analytical and adaptive models for countering terrorism while

minimizing the loss of the liberties of the democratic state Thus, the book returns full

circle and offers an equilibrant to the predicament of terrorism in the liberal state

My opening chapter challenges the widespread perception of terrorism as

irrational, indiscriminate and improvised Instead, I show that terrorism is a deliberate

and premeditated activity that is sometimes intentionally made to seem pathological

and irrational The suggestiveness of, “Don’t offer any resistance, we are ruthless

fanatics who won’t stop at anything,” might serve terrorists by intimidating the

authorities and deterring citizens from cooperating with the police, but it can also

benefit a State that resorts to harsh retaliatory measures against terrorists, “who don’t

listen to reason.” Nonetheless, to portray terrorism as irrational is misleading and

should be avoided Unless terrorism is comprehended and countered rationally, it

cannot be defeated

Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi delves into the anatomy of terrorism and

turns it on its head He demonstrates logically and eruditely the vagueness and

ambiguity of the term ‘terrorism’ in contrast to the clarity and consistency it is

ordinarily perceived and understood to possess His view is that, “terrorism as a term is

already a pre-judgment It has a moral connotation The problem is resolved

beforehand, even without the necessary effort to understand It is a partial perception

which works against the objective analysis of socio-political phenomena.” Lack of

communication and reciprocal demonization between the West and the Arab world are

responsible for the current gulf between terrorists and the targets of terrorism, or in

Hanafi’s words, the victimizers and the victims To bridge the chasm separating the

two cultures, a dialogue between equal partners must be promoted, because so far, “…

the stumbling block in the Euro-Arab dialogue is the discrepancy between the

European economic agenda and the Arab political agenda.”

In a similar fashion, Mokhtar Benabdallaoui does not consider terrorism in the

conventional sense He relates it to the larger concept of violence and maintains that in

different contexts violence changes its meaning and its legal and moral status But

despite its complex, protean nature, terrorism, the extreme form of violence, should be

condemned in all its forms, including, and above all, state terrorism, which is often

thought to complement and support the law Nevertheless, concludes the author, the

eradication of global terrorism should not be pursued by pointing a finger at a specific

religion or culture, or by invoking cultural Darwinism The best way to counter the

phenomenon is by constructing a more just and interdependent world society,

composed of autonomous and free governments and societies with the appropriate

means to promote new values

viii

Dealing more with the perpetrators of terrorism than with the act itself, Anne

Speckhard calls attention to the unique and devastating phenomenon of suicide

terrorism In a detailed and insightful study of suicide terrorism, one of the first of its

kind, the author describes the motivations and rewards that induce young persons to

become suicide bombers The individual, psychological and social conditions that

underlie and support these tragic choices are objectively depicted in order not only to

better understand this most devastating form of terrorism, but more importantly, to find

ways of opposing it Speckhard offers some valuable proposals following her in-depth

analysis and a series of rare interviews with prospective suicide-bombers She argues,

among other things, that “religious leaders must begin to stand up to the manipulation

of Islam by Jihadist militants, and those who do speak out ought to be supported (if

quietly) by the West.” The prevention and gradual reduction of the threat posed by

suicide terrorism must address its root causes She asserts further that, “Repressive

governments must be encouraged and pressured to reform, so as to open the way for

economic growth and increased opportunities for the frustrated, disillusioned and often

well-educated youth who constitute the most explosive sector of the societies from

which suicide terrorism comes.”

General Mansour Abu Rashid, a former Director of the Jordanian Military

Intelligence Department, discusses issues from the pure practitioner’s perspective

After discussing several practical difficulties in the conceptualization of terrorism and

counter-terrorism, he turns to the pragmatic and programmatic questions of what can be

done about terrorism In a succinct and realistic manner, Abu Rashid enumerates what

should be done on various levels – political, economic, ideological and informational

He concludes that: “fighting the contemporary wave of terrorism requires a

multi-branched, multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional response Although the traditional

instruments – police and intelligence services – are the most critical, they are

inadequate to meet the extent and emerging challenge of terrorism.” Finally, the

General adds a counter-intuitive argument, which resonates well with his extensive

experience: “an effort to institutionalize the war on terror should avoid trying to

achieve greater intelligence-sharing This oft-cited goal is best handled through

bilateral intelligence channels.”

Abu Rashid’s contribution structurally links terrorism and counter-terrorism and

also relates to three further papers which do this using illustrations from three

distinctive case studies: the Palestinian-Israeli, the Spanish-Basque and the

Russian-Chechnyan In the first of the three, Eitan Alimi analyzes the revealing case of the

Tanzim (Arabic for organization) In the second Intifadah (2000–2004), or uprising of

the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation, this militant faction of the Palestinian

armed forces was at the forefront of violent assaults against the Israelis Although

regarded by Israeli Intelligence as a terrorist group, some of its leaders were previously

committed supporters of the Oslo peace initiative Alimi expands the theoretical

approach to comprehending terrorism by embedded his case study in the larger

framework of collective action and social movement theory Such an approach, Alimi

believes, will shed more light on the radicalization of the formerly non-extremist

Tanzim and in addition supply counter-terrorism with fresh new insights to improve on

the ways it has been conducted so far Radicalization in general, and the resort to

violence and terrorism in particular, can be better understood in the context of internal

organizational dynamics, or in the author’s terms, the milieu of the SMO (social

movement organization) “The study of counter-terrorism would benefit from viewing

ix

a terrorist organization as one actor in the overall ‘field of actors’ – a social movement,

and from furthering the analysis of the internal dynamics within the movement.”

Thereby, perceptiveness, discernment and pragmatism in understanding terrorism and

counter-terrorism would be best served

Juan Aviles introduces the Spanish case, specifically the fight against the Basque

separatist terror group ETA The author poses the question of how to characterize the

indiscriminate killing of civilians during armed conflict This is a hybrid situation

between the killing of civilians in peacetime, which is clearly terrorism, and the killing

of army and police personnel during violent conflict, which is more like guerrilla

warfare However, ETA terrorism falls in the middle, for it also attacks (though not

exclusively) civilian targets in the midst of an ongoing conflict with the Spanish

government Additionally, in an age of protracted, low-intensity conflicts, does the

struggle constitute a war or an anomaly in a time of peace? How to characterize ETA

then: terrorist group? guerrilla movement? paramilitary unit, or perhaps a band of

committed freedom fighters? This is not simply an exercise in semantics, but rather a

serious question of how to defeat Basque extremists and with what means: legal,

political, military or diplomatic Ultimately, Aviles concludes that recognizing ETA as

a political actor and permitting its political arm to participate in Basque elections was a

mistake Another mistake was that the Spanish authorities resorted to undemocratic

measures in their campaign against ETA This was counter-productive and hurt the

interests of the State One of the biggest challenges, perhaps the most crucial, in

fighting terrorism in an open society is waging efficient counter-terrorism without

abandoning the principles of the democratic State

A Russian and an Armenian scholar introduce the problem of terrorism in

Chechnya Vorkunova and Hovhannesian argue that terrorism challenges order and

stability by “ultimately … creating the conditions for chaos and uncoordinated

activities It is conceived to include systems of disorder at all levels of human

activity’.” They call attention to the expansion of the official Russian approach to

terrorism as the Chechnyan terrorist campaign began to take its toll on the Russian

people From the rather limited and narrow Article 205 of the Russian Criminal Code

to the Russian Federation Federal Law On the Fight Against Terrorism, adopted on

June 25, 1998, the scope of counter-terrorism has widened in direct proportion to the

growing menace of Chechnyan terrorism The authors point to the amalgam of

traditional and modern motives in Chechnyan terrorism which render it extremely

brutal and ruthless Bolstered by intense Islamic fervor, this terrorism represents a

formidable challenge to the newly founded democracy in Russia However, as the

authors poignantly stress, counter-terrorism in that region is still very cumbersome and

handicapped by mutual suspicions and fears for economic, environmental and genetic

security, the breakdown of the traditional system of values and the traditional way of

life in the South Caucasus

The last part of the book concentrates on counter-terrorism and its challenges

before the background of the open society This section focuses on analytical models

for combating terrorism in democracies without sacrificing civil liberties Dealing

again with the delicate issue of finding a balance between the necessity to oppose

terrorism and the need to preserve the spirit of liberty, this section brings to the fore the

legal perspective Two experts on international law, one Israeli and the other German,

present two contrasting viewpoints on that controversial subject, whose differences are

quite apparent when juxtaposed Barry Feinstein, in a carefully reasoned study of the

x

State’s right to defend itself against terrorism, positively evaluates and justifies

counter-terrorism as a form of preemptive strike He draws heavily on international law

when he asserts that, “[b]eyond the responsibility of a State for all acts conducted

within its territory which violate the rights of another State, as well as for any resulting

violations of the other State’s sovereignty, it moreover must actively prevent such acts

and violations.” Of course, if there are other alternatives to the use of force against the

threat of terrorism, they must be chosen But if there are none, “the State thereby

attacked is indeed permitted to exercise force to protect itself pursuant to its inherent

right of self-defense” according to Article 51 of the UN Charter But then, an obviously

pragmatic, but also moral, question arises: when to launch a pre-emptive strike? What

are the justifiable grounds to initiate counter-terrorism, or should anti-terrorism efforts

be exclusively reactive? Must States threatened by terrorism wait for a clear and

present danger to arise, or for a threat of considerable consequence? Feinstein rejects

this latter alternative He believes that counter-terrorism is applicable not only in

situations where a threat is imminent, “but also in those cases where the danger is more

remote, but nevertheless real,” if the intent of the terrorist to attack has been

demonstrated in the past

Berthold Meyer is less willing to condone pre-emptive measures He earnestly

questions whether increasing security is a suitable means to protect liberty In an

illuminating survey of German Law and German security measures taken after 9/11,

Meyer concludes that German leaders neglected their most critical obligation: to defend

freedom and civil liberties By shifting the balance between security and democracy in

favor of security, and by relying too heavily on “stockpiles of paragraphs on suspicion”

and presumed intentions to act, rather than on actual and demonstrated infringements of

security, the German Law on Terrorism, known as Security Packet II, fails to embody

the spirit of democracy The criteria for when to apply the strict Law are the tests of

sufficient probability and life experience Using such criteria is, in the author’s words,

“treading on shaky ground.” Meyer’s own recommendations are clear: there must be

stricter and more demanding standards for action, even, and especially, when emotions

and sentiments are strongly aroused The usefulness of any countermeasure against

terrorism must be evaluated before its implementation, and new security legislation

should expire after two years unless extended This is the only way, warns Meyer, “to

prevent civil rights from being permanently limited.”

Wilhelm Kempf and Lubna Nadvi also offer reservations and admonitions against

excessive counter-terrorist measures Their perspectives differ from the previous

writers and reflect their respective research disciplines, psychology and political

science Kempf examines and criticizes the overly ambitious and overly aggressive

trends of post-9/11 counter-terrorism He points out that, “outrage at war is

transformed into outrage at the enemy,” which does not serve democracies well The

reprehensible attacks of September 11, 2001 could, he proposes, have been adequately

dealt with using strong legal, economic and diplomatic means, but instead the United

Stated chose a policy of extreme force The author attributes this response to America’s

threatened pride in its world leadership The vulnerability of the US triggered a “…

natural impulse that American self-confidence needed to be restored and strength

needed to be demonstrated by fighting back.” This was the wrong approach to

counter-terrorism not only because it is irrational, but also because it is counter-productive and

self-defeating The US launched an all-out war against an elusive enemy and

committed its armed forces to a protracted campaign that has provoked animosity and

xi

resentment in many parts of the world Enormous amounts of energy and resources

were invested by the American government in convincing its people of the legitimacy

of the war Such efforts can easily deceive the public, cautions Kempf, who concludes

that, “Fighting terrorism exclusively by military means bears the danger that the values

of democracy will gradually be reduced to a mere facade.”

Nadvi also addresses the reaction to 9/11 She asks whether “… the war against

terrorism that had been unleashed by a range of governments on ‘militant insurgents’ is

actually curtailing terrorist activities, or whether their actions are simply serving to

inflame further violent militancy.” Nadvi insightfully points to the futility of the

vicious cycle of terrorism from below and terrorism from above, or insurgent terrorism

and State terrorism The two forms of terror nourish and draw energy from each other

The only way to escape the predicament of this “chaotic global security situation” is for

global civil society to step in and “create a space for constructive engagement where

the public can demand accountability from both governments and non-state militants

who are essentially responsible for the chaos that is being unleashed on civilian

populations.” This is a fresh and ambitious approach to the task of countering

terrorism Since governments are incapable of fulfilling this mission, civic networks,

grass-root movements and NGOs must come together at global summits and coordinate

a plan of action to prevent, or at least to reduce the prospects of global terrorism

The final three contributions offer practical approaches for combating terrorism in

the liberal State Eitan Hadar, a computer scientist, Irit Hadar, a management

information systems analyst, and Alexander Bligh, a well-known political scientist with

a strong military intelligence background, propose instructive and thought-provoking

models to supply encompassing solutions for the shifting balance of security and

freedom The Hadars’ contribution consists of two complementary papers: one presents

an archetypical model of an adaptive global intelligence system for detecting and

warning against developing terrorist activities, while the other supplements and

strengthens the model by adding “the human aspects that may impact the process of

building and using the system, the challenges and risks derived from them, and possible

solutions.” Both writers share a similar point of departure – the need to explore better

collaboration against international terrorism not only across cultures, political systems

and borders, but also across intelligence agencies Eitan Hadar pinpoints the

weaknesses of past endeavors in this demanding area: “conventional collaboration

technologies do not provide enough flexibility to achieve these ambitious goals These

systems must adapt to rapid changes within a dynamic environment … [and] current

centralized systems are inadequate.” He then goes on to suggest a remedy in the form

of a peer-to-peer network using a decentralized grid of computers that collaborate with

one another on a geographically distributed computational platform Each terminal, or

each ‘node’ of the grid supplies specific and unique information that is rapidly

combined into a concrete whole of relevant material on terrorism This is a vision

which focuses on the “… network language and on the interface definition of the

systems boundaries and architecture.” If adopted and implemented, this model could

contribute enormously to the war against terrorism

Irit Hadar offers a perspective to further improve the model She calls attention to

the human aspects involved in designing and developing artificial intelligence systems

and complex computer grids This is an opposite orientation to the previous entry:

instead of mechanizing human collaboration, Irit Hadar’s vantage point is to try to

humanize or personalize machines This is crucial to the enhancement of the model,

xii

because a consideration of the cognitive processes of decision-makers, the associations

and fears of leaders and the stigmata, prejudices and social motivations of analysts

incorporated into the design of the hardware may enrich the system with human

subtleties and sensitivities The intricate situations that counter-terrorism must face can

be dealt with in a significantly better way if human aspects are prudently integrated

into the mechanism

Alexander Bligh combines analytical skills with an understanding of intelligence

services and their needs to devise a standardized model for anti-terror agencies to share

information and jointly act on their information Bligh starts where the Hadars leave

off: he develops the Hadars’ rudimentary prototype and adds preemptive and punitive

dimensions His elaborate model purports to “break down each terrorist incident into its

smallest elements, endeavoring through appropriate software to find associations and

commonalities among certain actions and their stages.” Thus, details are combined to

create an inclusive scenario of terrorism This clearinghouse of information, in the

author’s words, will “enable law enforcement agencies, on a regular basis, to classify

the degree of risk and operate within the imperatives of all pertinent laws.” With such

precise means of identifying and combating terrorism, the excessive and

disproportionate face of counter-terrorism, which has deleterious effects on democracy

and liberty, could be avoided or at least minimized

In the concluding paper, I attempt to shed some light on the new arena and the new

actors of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the post-9/11 world The most crucial step

on the road to successful counter-terrorism is the precise identification of the

phenomenon of terrorism and its perpetrators Terrorism has changed in the last two

decades since the war in Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution It has grown in range,

intensity and cruelty It has become more global, destructive and relentless New actors

have assumed the roles of perpetrators Instead of socialist, communist or Anarchist

revolutionaries, on the one hand, or fanatical nationalists and vehement de-colonizers,

on the other, the new terrorists are cut from a different cloth: they are messianic

fundamentalists, and their cause is redemption on their own terms Counter-terrorism

must espouse new tools and new understandings in order to come to grips with such a

formidable enemy My paper introduces revitalization movements, such as Al-Qaeda,

which “must discredit the prevailing system in the most fundamental manner Its

leaders should discount and denounce every aspect of the current regime, focusing

chiefly on the issues pertaining to the group’s predicament.” This partly answers the

de-contextualized “why-do-they-hate-us” quandary in the wake of the terror attacks on

New York and Washington This pathetically nạve question illustrates the unsettling

effects of terrorism It challenges conventional wisdom and forces a reconsideration of

taken-for-granted ‘truths’ Ignorance frustrates pre-emptive capability, and awareness is

overwhelmed by surprise If terrorism breeds and spreads through ignorance and

surprise, then awareness and preparedness must become key features of

counter-terrorism

ContentsIntroduction: Terrorism and the Open Society – A Question of Balance vSamuel Peleg

Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures 1 Samuel Peleg

Hassan Hanafi

September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda 14Wilhelm Kempf

Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Collective Action Perspective for

Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws: A Tightrope Walk Between

Berthold Meyer

Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents: Modular

Infrastructure for Adaptive Distributed Intelligent Systems 98Eitan Hadar

The Impact of the Human Aspects in Designing Collaborative Information

Irit Hadar

Mansour Abu Rashid

The Role of Business in the UK Policing Counter-Terrorist Effort 122 Jeff Fouhy

An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation 124 Alexander Bligh

Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 134 Olga A.Vorkunova and David Hovhannesian

The War Against State Terrorism: Reframing the Debate on Global

Terrorism 154 Lubna Nadvi

Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and

Contemporary Modern Terrorism:

Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures

Samuel PELEG

Department of Political Science and Strategic Dialogue Center at Netanya College,

Israel

Abstract This article sets the tone for the entire book It introduces terrorism as a

political term: It is an act intended to influence politics As such, it is a calculated

and premeditated initiative, which is carried out with purposive motivations

Consequently, terrorism is not a spontaneous caprice or a whimsical impulse but a

rational deed, which has a goal, chosen means and a fit between them

Counterterrorism, therefore, must severe this crucial link between goals and means

and render terrorism less attractive to its prospective perpetrators

Keywords Political terrorism; rationality; stress-seekers; messianism;

participation; deprivation; ideology

Introduction

“We must put an end to this madness,” vowed British Prime Minister Tony Blair after the July 7, 2005 terror attack on London, which claimed the lives of 59 people and injured many more But this was no madness This was a premeditated, cold-blooded and vicious assault on one of the most vibrant symbols of the open society London was not attacked by mentally deranged outcasts that awful morning, but rather by a team of rational and calculating human bombs with a mission: to disrupt the everyday routines of a democracy The British capital, like every other thriving, bustling city that cherishes its freedoms, was a very propitious stage for the perpetrators’ atrocities Taking advantage of their freedom to move about at will carrying deadly explosives without the risk of being stopped and searched, the terrorists found it easy to deliver destruction into the very heart of the metropolis

Blair’s statement was typical of the immediate responses to despicable and indiscriminate terrorism It is consoling to assume that rational persons do not commit morally depraved crimes, since they weigh the costs and benefits of their actions and are guided by some form of moral code This perspective contrasts the reasonable and sensible against the inexplicable and insane The most comforting way to cope with incomprehensible savagery is to quarantine the perpetrators in the category of the criminally insane and stamp them with the all-encompassing label of “mad fanatics.” Such a demarcation serves two purposes: it isolates and excludes the “bad guys” from normal society, and it protects the “good guys,” people such as we Such an understanding actually undermines the struggle against terrorism, however, because it abandons a thorough analysis of the background and motivation of terrorism for the sake of a fleeting reassurance that “we are all right.” It trades the insecurity of

Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State

S Peleg and W Kempf (Eds.)

IOS Press, 2006

© 2006 IOS Press All rights reserved.

1

regarding terrorism as logically patterned behavior for the reassuring preference for viewing terrorism as pathological and deviant Labeling terrorism as abnormal exonerates society for maltreating its pariahs and excuses policymakers for their failings This is a colossal misunderstanding

Characteristics of Political Terrorism

There are reasons why people commit terrorism The reasons usually involve political, ideological or social meanings and orientations In their condemnation of terrorism, many analysts and policymakers often overlook that the perpetrators always have an ultimate objective and a designated target The ultimate objective is to bring about political change; the chosen target can be anyone seen as blocking this desired change,

or anyone perceived as responsible for an unacceptable status quo The indiscriminate character of modern terrorism, as opposed to, for example, the selective nature of 19th century terrorism1, is explained using the distinction that has been developed between two types of victims: the innocent, or immediate victim, and the ultimate victim The former can be a crowd of shoppers in a shopping mall, or the passengers on a bus, whereas the latter are usually policymakers and power elites [2] The growing psychological effect of terrorism, improved technologies of violence and the distance

of political leaders from society have led to differences among victims: the more spectacular the act of terrorism, the more rapid the governmental response A government is regarded as incompetent when it does nothing to ward off the threat of terrorism or when, through its countermeasures, it aggravates the plight of those who initiated a challenge to order and stability Increasing mistrust of and delegitimization

of the system result, coupled with a harsh doctrine that provokes true believers to draconian action Such action is often translated into political terrorism [3]

The decision to opt for terrorism may be based on three grounds:

1 Terrorism may be indicative of extremist groups that can ideologically justify violence and are disillusioned with all other channels of expression

2 Terrorism is one of the most effective ways to disrupt the status quo or to block the emergence of an alternative, unacceptable state of affairs Terrorism puts governments on the spot, since it challenges their capacity to govern Thus, it compensates perpetrators for their lack of military capability to change their situation Hence, terrorism makes a group’s power to act appear much greater than it really is, as Gideon showed with his few warriors against the Midianites

3 By its nature, terrorism is more easily diffused across borders than any other type of politically oriented violence It requires secrecy, commitment, loyalty, confidence, and willingness to sacrifice oneself for the cause But these are precisely the traits that often appeal to disheartened, humiliated self-proclaimed world redeemers Traditionally, becoming a terrorist has meant joining a marginal group or organization of radical activists, identifying with their goals and methods of operation, and accepting their norms, principles, moral codes and rules of behavior When this was the case, this transformation

meant a total break with a terrorist’s previous way of life and the absorption of his individual self into the collective identity of the group Political extremists who decide to act and become terrorists see themselves not as lone assassins, but rather as representatives of a vigorous constituency The attempt to stigmatize them as loners, madmen, psychopaths or socio-paths distorts the fact that many potential political terrorists flourish under the auspices of a protecting identity group, be it ethnic, religious or national, and are buoyed up

by the camaraderie and esprit des corps of a group

What is it that prompts young, idealistic individuals who are dissatisfied with the socio-political situation surrounding them to try to change the status quo by joining a radical and violent group? We can distinguish between the “push” of individual psychological attributes and the “pull” of the organizational incentives and benefits that terrorist groups promise their potential recruits A combination of “pushes” and “pulls”

is responsible for the final matching of the terrorist organization and its recruits The internal psychological need to become a terrorist stems from discontent and disenchantment with the existing state of affairs A sense of revolt and defiance of materialistic and accepted reality is accompanied by profound contempt for monetary values, luxuries or the culture of consumption The worldview of a potential terrorist is dichotomous: it is comprised of a sense of the opposition between good and evil: the unfair status of the ‘top-dogs’ who oppress the ‘underdogs’ without there being any intermediate gray tones or circumstances to mitigate the sharp contrast [5] Potential terrorists are so convinced of their self-righteousness that they are totally insensitive to the suffering and injustice they themselves wreak in their quest to create a perfect society

Many terrorists do not personally suffer from inequality and poverty On the contrary, they often come from middle-class families and tranquil social environments They first encounter social injustice when they grow up and leave home, begin their university education and become aware of social and political instability in the world Others are not attracted as much by a concern for social justice as by the thrill of action, the excitement and constant danger of being pursued day and night; psychologists call these individuals stress-seekers [6] A similar reason for joining a terrorist group is to escape from boredom or the dull routines of everyday life Others are intoxicated by the mystique and the aura of heroism and romanticism surrounding terrorism They enjoy the sense of power and the advantage of being unexpected, unpredictable, and always initiating The young terrorist or “freedom fighter” expects to enjoy eternal glory in exchange for joining the good fight; he hopes to achieve martyrdom or sainthood if he dies carrying out a dangerous mission

The organization provides an alternative framework or family for disenchanted youth Being part of a group offers a sense of belonging and an opportunity for camaraderie, friendship and participation in a common fate Such reassuring experiences diminish the recruit’s insecurities vis-à-vis a hostile environment and bolster his belief in the righteousness of his chosen path Social status is also guaranteed by joining a terrorist group, especially if the organization is popularly perceived as expressing the anguish of a large, persecuted group, as in the cases of the Irish Republican Army or the various factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization In these cases, the terrorist has no need to break with his own social background, since that very milieu may have led to his recruitment by a terrorist group

in the first place The young terrorist or “freedom fighter” has the prospect of achieving

S Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures 3

eternal glory by joining the struggle; he can hope for martyrdom or sainthood if he perishes in the course of performing his destructive duty

Another distinction relevant to what makes terrorists tick is between rational and irrational motives for joining terrorist groups The rational terrorist is the goal-oriented, calculating activist who makes a careful cost-benefit calculation of the risks and incentives before choosing a course of action The rational terrorist needs material or other tangible incentives in order to become an active member of the militant group: large salaries, respected status and a luxurious life-style Terrorists in this category act more like mercenaries or professional assassins than deeply committed idealists Money and security can raise the appeal of terrorism: if the risk of being caught is offset by financial compensation or reduced by diplomatic immunity or safe passage through certain territories, then the advantages of the terrorist act overshadow the potential risks Though tangible incentives are the easiest to comprehend, intangible rewards such as eternal bliss in paradise and enhanced social status for one’s family are, in the social and religious environments where they are ardently believed in, no less “rational.” The terrorist, in this case, sacrifices a transitory this-worldly life for an immensely better eternal one

On the one hand, rational participation in terrorism is inspired by purposive incentives such as consecrating the deed and glorifying the end, which justify the terrorist act as a necessary means, regardless of its seemingly depraved nature The greater the dedication, and the greater the sense of potential fulfillment, the more likely

it is that a recruit will rationally choose to participate in terrorist groups On the other hand, irrational terrorism is often the act of emotional, spontaneously radical individuals Such activists neither possess a burning commitment to a cause or an ideology, nor are they usually motivated by material incentives They act instead in response to sudden, unexpected mood swings and outbursts of hatred and the desire for vengeance Sometimes the yearning for esteem and acceptance by peers drives them to commit the most depraved atrocities These two motivations of terrorism co-exist in many identity groups, thus both escalating their struggle and making it more effective The leadership can be perceived as rational because it devises goals, weighs options and makes choices The rank-and-file may be seen as emotional, driven by religious, ethnic or patriotic zeal, and bound together by the fellowship of the group The leaders and adherents complement each other: the former derive their authority to make rational decisions from the devotion of their followers, while the latter gain deference and meaning through the ideology and tasks delegated to them by their leaders

Terrorists are well aware that they are crossing a point of no return in the strategy

of the struggle and that incremental tactics of escalation are virtually impossible to adopt once the ultimate weapon has been employed But they seem to relish the shocking impact of their deeds and utilize the immediate, short-term success of their audacity to strengthen their faltering spirits Thus, many terrorist factions are characterized by unbounded ruthlessness and the small size of the group Belonging to

a factional, close-knit group supports the secrecy and efficiency that foster terrorism

To choose terrorism as a course of action, a recruit has to hold passionate convictions

of the right sort, and must develop a profound disdain for any potential hindrance He also has to believe that a better future is possible, even imminent, and that human effort

S Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures

4

may expedite motion toward this future A passionate certitude of a cataclysmic redemption that justifies any means is archetypal of messianic thought patterns2.

Composite Profile of Political Terrorism

From the aforementioned, a quintessential description of political terrorism may be drawn Its major characteristics include:

logical-moralistic sense, but rather in a functional-strategic sense, meaning that it chooses goals and selects means which are conceived as appropriate to those goals Political terrorism is not an incomprehensible undertaking, but rather the coherent and organized work of resolute perpetrators

and illegal, it is also an attempt to exert political influence on behalf of people who, in the terrorists’ view, have been neglected and abused Terrorists as political actors who challenge the status quo [7], and who use their weapons as negotiation tactics [8], are often underemphasized in analyses

response to dissatisfaction with or fear of an existing or impending social and political reality Thus, the professed objective of extremists is to undermine routine daily life and to disrupt expected agendas Political terrorists are frequently visionaries who aspire to swift and decisive changes in the human condition (preferably in their group’s own condition) They abhor moderate change and incremental reform and inexorably sanctify their means with the justness of their cause There have been, throughout history, political terrorists who acted in the name of preserving the status quo, but these were rare and far less significant, because the State and its agents of social control were more effective in achieving their ends [9, 10]3

exertion of power and influence and attempting to change the political agenda are evidence of a set of independent political preferences and a desire to

2 Messianism is not innately and necessarily a religious phenomenon By definition, the major attribute of the concept is comprehensive apocalyptic and traumatic change for large populations In order to be a true believer and survive the apocalypse, one must follow the directives and edicts of “those in the know.” While

it is true that by its nature religion is more akin to notions such as boundless faith, miraculous circumstances, vast changes, and infallible, divine leadership, secular ideologies like Marxism, Maoism, or Nazism are also messianic in nature They boast a monopoly of the truth, they demand unquestioning loyalty, and they promise a swift and limitless change for the better for those who support them It is, thus, no wonder that such very different persons as Vladimir Lenin – the fierce Russian revolutionary – and Sayyid Qutb – the precursor of revived Islamic fundamentalism – saw themselves as “vanguards of the revolution.”

3

Terrorist groups that organize to stave off change and protect the status quo are sometimes affiliated with governments, but not necessarily The Vendée uprising of peasants in Western France against the revolutionary government in Paris was a local initiative aimed at restoring the Monarchy and overthrowing the radical regime, but the members organized because of their own economic and religious interests [7] Similarly, Gush Emunim, the extremist religious group of Jewish settlers on the West Bank, organized in order to thwart the prospects of the Middle East peace process Although they reaffirmed the policy tendencies of the right-wing Shamir government at the time, they did not act in the name of that government [3] Hence, terrorism in the name of the status quo ought to be distinguished from state terrorism, or

“terrorism from above,” in which the government officially and directly employs the means of terrorism to pursue its policies [11]

S Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures 5

realize them and to benefit others with their advantages In other words, it means the terrorist wants to participate in decision-making processes and wants to influence their outcomes Terrorism is therefore a channel to direct participation in politics It is a criminal and destructive channel, and yet nevertheless an effective means

ironic truth that the success of the political terrorist ultimately depends on the good will of his victims The terrorist’s accomplishments are not measured by the number of buses blown up or by the number of airplanes hijacked They are judged by the political change they are intended to expedite This change hinges upon governmental compliance with the terrorist’s wishes When change can be brought about “from below,” regardless of, or despite a government’s response, terrorists become revolutionaries

Government To be against the status quo means to be against the existing

order At the two extremes of the political philosophy spectrum stand order and justice [12] Order calls for maintaining and preserving an acceptable today; justice dictates a progression toward a better tomorrow This dichotomy pits not only order and justice against each other in opposing and uncompromising positions, but also pits challengers (i.e., terrorists) against the guardians of the status quo (i.e., governments) There is an inherent incompatibility between political terrorists and governments

from a group ethos It is a spirit of “all for one and one for all” which favors qualities such as self-sacrifice, total commitment and unconditional loyalty among extremists The members of the terrorist movement, group, or cell4encourage and inspire one another They become a surrogate family for individuals who have joined them and perhaps thereby severed all ties to their former way of life This is particularly true of Islamist terror groups, which clearly designate themselves as an alternative “community,” “nation” or

“family” and demand that their followers repudiate any ties to believers.” Although lone perpetrators often carry out many terrorist attacks, these actors usually act for, and are embraced by, a group

spirit and resolve, activists draw strength from their sense of belonging to a community Whether it is a religious, national, ethnic or class spirit, the solidarity and cohesion that typify many terrorist groups emerge from the feeling that their identity and destiny are inextricably linked with their core community

4 Terrorist movements, groups or cells do not merely differ in size There are also ideological considerations here: revolutionaries have always attempted to recruit the masses for their cause in order to tilt the balance of power in the state Thus, they have always written and spoken about ‘movements’, even when their followers were few; for incitement purposes, they had to claim to be leading a movement In the 1960s and 1970s, the tactics used to bring about socio-political change were modified due to the repeated failures of attempted revolutions The ideal of the urban guerrilla became popular, and with it, the tactic of “the strike in the middle,” which was advocated by Guevara and Debrais Urban guerrilla efforts necessitated smaller operating units, hence terrorist groups Finally, the term terrorist “cell” is an expression that originated in the anarchist terrorist tradition The anarchist disdain for structure and hierarchy led anarchist theorists and adherents to activism in small and minimally structured units, hence, in terrorist cells [13, 9, 14]

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9 Political Terrorism Is Guided by Ideology Terrorists experience a profound

sense of conviction and belief They adhere to strict precepts that are anchored

in a consistent worldview and a fervent ideology Ideology, with its clear explanation for the ills of the present and its utopian solutions for the future, supplies the energy that galvanizes terrorists to adopt frightening methods

10 Political Terrorism Espouses a Messianic Aura Following Rapoport’s ideas,

it seems that political terrorists are on a mission to make the world a better place Some may even perceive them as modern day crusaders who are willing

to sacrifice their own welfare for the benefit of others Their image as moved

by values and steadfast commitments wins them sympathy and support, and sometimes provisions and material sustenance Terrorists set out to proselytize the public and convince it of the justice of their cause [15] Due to the spectacular nature of their deeds, they enjoy a permanent captive audience [16]

Ultimately, political terrorism is more complex than it was formerly given credit for being The above discussed characteristics point to a composite profile that should

be studied carefully if this phenomenon is to be countered effectively These characteristics of political terrorism can be realized in different ways, and their consequences can be diversely appreciated They must be heeded if terrorism is to be defeated in the 21st century The specific type of terrorism which currently occupies the global agenda is the radical Islamist brand It is a vicious and relentless kind of terrorism, for it combines all the above-discussed characteristics with an unyielding and uncompromising ideology This ideology must be carefully analyzed and understood if the battle against modern terrorism is to be won

References

[1] Laqueur, W (1987) The age of terrorism Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987

[2] Wilkinson, P (1986) Terrorism and the liberal state (2nd edition) New York: New York University Press

[3] Peleg, S (1997) They shoot Prime Ministers too, don’t they? Religious violence in Israel: Premises, dynamics and prospects Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 20, 227-247

[4] Peleg, S (2002) Zealotry and vengeance: Quest of a religious identity group Lanham, MD: Lexington Books

[5] Galtung, J (1971) A structural theory of imperialism Journal of Peace Research, 8(2), 81-117 [6] Crenshaw, M (1986) The psychology of political terrorism In: Hermann, M (ed.) Political psychology San Francisco: Jossey-Bass

[7] Tilly, C (1978) From mobilization to revolution Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley

[8] Thornton, T (1964) Terror as a weapon of political agitation In: Eckstein, H (ed.) Internal war New York: Free Press

[9] Oberschall, A (1973) Social conflict and social movement Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall [10] Rule, J (1988) Theories of civil violence Berkeley: University of California Press

[11] Arendt, H (1968) On violence New York: Harcourt, Brace & World

[12] Bull, H (1995) The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics (2nd edition) New York: Columbia University Press

[13] Brinton, C (1965) The anatomy of revolution New York: Vintage Books

[14] Tarrow, S (1998) Power in movement (2nd edition) New York: Cambridge University Press

[15] Hoffer, E (1951) The true believer: Thoughts on the nature of mass movements New York: Harper and Row

[16] Heymann, P (1998) Terrorism and America: A commonsense strategy for a democratic society Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press

S Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures 7

The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of

Whom?

Hassan HANAFI

Department of Philosophy at Cairo University, Egypt

Abstract To condemn or to understand? / Victimizers and victims / Terrorism or

resistance? / Terrorism of the mutual image / Dialogue between equal partners

Keywords Authoritarian state, state terrorism, fundamentalism, globalization,

dialogue of cultures, regional co-operation

To Condemn or To Understand?

1 It is easy to condemn, but difficult to understand Condemning without understanding results from blindness, presuppositions and the power of arrogance It may backfire into an infinite spiral of violence which works against dialogue and conflict resolution

2 To understand is not to justify Understanding is the first step toward changing the roots of terrorism To understand comes first, to change, second Changing the roots of violence is a part of conflict resolution which works by eliminating the sources of conflict

3 Using the term terrorism is already a pre-judgment It has a moral connotation The problem is resolved beforehand, even without the necessary effort to understand It is a partial perception which works against the objective analysis of socio-political phenomena A more impartial word is violence, including counter-violence, primary and secondary violence, oppressive and liberating violence, visible and invisible violence, state and individual violence…, etc., common distinctions in Latin American socio-political literature

4 Global war against terrorism is a kind of counter-terrorism Punishment is never a solution to crime That is why capital punishment, namely the death penalty, doubles the crime of homicide, because not only the victim, but also the victimizer, is killed Instead of a single crime sacrificing one human soul, there are two crimes, sacrificing two human souls

5 Global war against terrorism and global war against hegemony may be of the same order of magnitude The question is: what is the cause and what is the effect? A linear notion of causality belongs to religious thinking, pre-supposing a primary cause, while a circular notion of causality is more scientific

Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State

S Peleg and W Kempf (Eds.)

IOS Press, 2006

© 2006 IOS Press All rights reserved.

8

6 Terrorism, or more precisely violence, cannot be theoretically understood without being existentially lived It is not a matter of a theoretical analysis, but rather of an existential drama It is a matter of life and death for the terrorized

7 Science is not the gathering of intelligence This is the function of intelligence agencies, usually linked to state power Science is motivated by the search for

“Truth,” namely the laws of reality Espionage and superstitious techniques are not part of the methodology of science The assault on privacy is a crime and a violation of human rights It is usually linked to break-ins, surveillance and residence confinement

8 Terrorism is not only a problem of security, but also a problem of justice When forms of injustice prevail, terrorism emerges in an effort to create a more just world, even by using evil means

9 Scholars do not work for institutions such as ministries of defense, or even for alliances such as NATO Scholars are motivated by an interest in knowledge They can make the military and security force more aware of the limitations of their approaches Surely knowledge minimizes risks by revealing more horizons of conflicts and reasons for tension Science may also create weapons

of mass destruction and lead to the use of atomic weapons in wars against people in the name of the war against terrorism

10 The Liberal State is not the only form of state Terrorism is practiced by both liberal states and authoritarian states Authoritarianism causes more terrorism than liberalism In authoritarian regimes dialogue yields to violence Divergences of views lead to power struggles and civil wars If the Liberal State is identified with the model of the European State, then fighting terrorism means defending Europe against its enemies National experiences are not just those of Spain and America Both of these countries, as victims of terror, are Western states, while the victimizers in both cases were Muslim Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya and Kashmir are also victims, and the West, the USA and Russia are their victimizers Israel and India, although located in Asia, like Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan …, etc., act in the manner of Western cultures The West is not a geographical site, but rather a worldview, namely that of hegemony

Victimizers and Victims

1 It has become very common to look at terrorism from the perspective of the victim, not from that of the victimizer, as if terrorism were a one-way street, not a two-way street, blaming the victims, not the victimizers, hearing the cry

of pain, but not seeing the needle, pointing the finger at the weak, not at the strong This creates, in small nations or in individuals, a great sense of frustration against the ‘cocalization’, namely the Americanization or the Westernization of the World

2 The New World order may be the victimizer of small nations, leading dissident groups or individuals to use violence against the symbols of power in modern times, such as the WTO, the GATT, the Pope, and even making threats against the UN system, which is often misused by the Great Powers Globalization as a new form of hegemony is the crux of this new world that

H Hanafi / The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom? 9

arose in the fifties and the sixties: decolonization, liberation movements, national struggles, the Third World emerging in the bi-polar World

3 Big Powers, especially the Western ones, are also part of the New World Order: The Group of Eight, most industrial countries, the European Union, allied to the USA, and sometimes France, are returning to their colonial history, as in the case of Darfour in Sudan, championing the UN resolution to try war criminals, with the exception of those of the USA, before the International Court of Justice Russia invades Chechnya to fight the Chechnyan national movement for independence, which is called separatism Israel occupies all of Palestine, half in 1948, the other half in 1967 India, playing the Big Power in Asia, occupies Kashmir and rejects the implementation of a UN resolution concerning the right to self-determination

of the Kashmiri people

4 The sole Big Power in the uni-polar system is a source of state terrorism, the invasion of Afghanistan under the pretext of fighting terrorism, of Iraq under the pretext of seeking weapons of mass destruction Now it is threatening Iran under the same pretext, Syria under the pretext of its sheltering terrorist groups, and Sudan to save the people of Darfour from genocide The Big Power sometimes manipulates the UN System and sometimes violates it

5 State Terrorism is also practiced internally by the "New Nation State." It was

at the beginning the outcome of the national liberation movement It became at the end a source of oppression It became an Army and Police State, controlling education, information, political institutions and civil society

Terrorism or Resistance?

1 It is glorious on the epistemological level to define terrorism Given the specificities of different national experiences, it is hard to standardize a definition which does not take into consideration all the different kinds of terrorism

2 There is no one stereotyped definition of terrorism It depends on the perspective, the commitment of the scholar and his attitude to life There is no one simple, unilateral and sole definition of terrorism, because it is a complex phenomenon Terrorism cannot be defined as a fixed essence, but is rather a changing relationship It refers to two sides, that of the terrorist and that of the terrorized The operational definition is based on major distinctions

3 Terrorism is an expression of a strong sense of frustration and feelings of injustice If the two sides of the equation, that of the terrorist and that of the terrorized, are not equal in power, to create a fair struggle the weak side will use any means it possesses to compensate for its weakness Power is not only physical, but also moral It is not only destruction, but also persuasion, or more precisely, dissuasion Nuclear weapons are created as a force of dissuasion to deter the other side from using them

4 In the case of equal power, the struggle between two opposed sides is called battle, conflict, hostilities, or even war Where there is a power imbalance, the weak side empowers itself by any means it has, including martyrdom, so-called suicide-bombing, or terrorism, to resist the stronger side

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10

5 A sense of frustration arises in the face of double-standard judgments The Palestinian is a terrorist, not the militarized settler The PLO is a terrorist organization, not the Likud party or the state of Israel Hamas and Jihad are terrorist movements, while the state of Israel is a terrorist state Iraqi resistance against American occupation is terrorism, while the American invasion of Iraq

is not

6 Therefore, individual terrorism is a myth used to justify state terrorism as a reality Both pretend to be self-defensive mechanisms against the transgression of the other side and a legitimate self-defense against the aggression of the other

Terrorism of the Mutual Image

1 Visible terrorism is a concrete expression of the invisible form, which is more serious and does not need security forces This is the terrorism of the mutual image which each side, the terrorist and the terrorized, the victimizer and the victim, creates of the other Each partner is known as such, but constructed as

an image which includes one real thread and many invented ones An image is

a construct made up of perceptions, motivations, interests, power struggles, historical accumulations, misunderstandings, misconceptions and misapprehensions Over time, images became realities and are completely substituted for them Bloodshed on both sides is the outcome The power of information contributes to this transformation

2 The Muslim World has been identified as the terrorist per excellence The mass media even identify terrorism, a socio-political phenomenon, with Islam itself, as an essence and a culture All of its history in centers such as Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Qayrawan, Fès and in the magnificent Andalusia, Grenada, Cordoba and Seville has been reduced to 11 September in Washington and New York and the Madrid train bombings

3 Terrorism is a sign of underdevelopment, because it solves conflicts by means

of violence, not by negotiation Terrorism against the other is also directed against the Self in “suicide bombings.” Muslim societies become number one

in the number of political prisoners, torture, violations of human rights, political dictatorship, discrepancies between poverty and wealth The statuses

of women, minorities and NGOs are very deplorable The question is how an argument de facto becomes an argument de jure If it does, then racism, arrogance, Nazism, fascism, war and persecution will be arguments de facto against the “love thy neighbor” of Jesus, an argument de jure

4 Given the centrality of Europe in modern times over the past five centuries, Eurocentrism has given the European consciousness a certain arrogance, intertwined with skin color and race The ideals of the Enlightenment have made Europe a model per excellence of modernism The West creates, and the Rest transfers This center and periphery dichotomy created in the West a superiority complex, and in the Rest an inferiority complex Superiority is intertwined with supremacy and hegemony, while inferiority is linked to the Semitic mind, to a primitive “mentality” and a “pensée sauvage.” The

H Hanafi / The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom? 11

American question: Why they do hate us? is a real question, since 5% of the world’s population owns and consumes 75% of the world’s wealth and goods

5 This situation has placed the victim, who is labeled a terrorist, permanently on the defensive, in defense of his own history, culture and personality He needs some present respect and historical recognition, according to the Hegelian dialectic of master and slave The acts of violence which erupt from time to time are the sigh of the oppressed, a self-affirmation in an unjust world Violence aims sometimes at alleviating the suffering of the marginalized, so that the center will have an equal partner

6 The victim is constantly being scrutinized, looked at under the microscope, objectified and reified as an object of study How many international conferences there are, held even by NATO, on terrorism, fundamentalism, violence, reform, the other, democratization, civil society, minority rights, human rights, gender in the Muslim World, etc Violence is a kind of a revolt

of the object desiring to be a subject, a rejection of reification in an effort to rediscover one’s own subjectivity, from the object to the subject, from the observed to the observer, from Orientalism, where the West is the subject and the Rest is the object, to Occidentalism, where the Rest is the subject and the West is the object

Dialogue between Equal Partners

1 To fight terrorism in the liberal state and to create an integrated model of research on counter-terrorism is to lay the groundwork for a dialogue between equal partners The stumbling block in the Euro-Arab dialogue is the discrepancy between the European economic agenda and the Arab political agenda

2 This equal dialogue is a manifestation of the dialogue of cultures, not of a clash of civilizations A dialogue between the victim and the victimizer on equal terms substitutes arguments for bombs, the power of persuasion for military power The honorable thing to do is to discuss, to convince or to be convinced Using physical violence, minimum violence by the victimized and maximum violence by the victimizer, is a sign of weakness Moses did not succeed, but Jesus did

3 A double standard in judgment and action is one of the major factors which arouses in the victimized, who is labeled a terrorist, a sense of outrage The bombing and killing of innocent people in Northern Ireland, in the Pays-Basque, by the ETA in Spain and neo-Nazis in Germany, the extreme right in Italy and right-wing extremists in the USA, are not counted as terrorism Organized crime in the USA, the Mafia in Italy or Russia, are likewise not considered forms of terrorism

4 Europe is an equal partner of the Arab World around the Mediterranean Basin The two shores, North and South, have had relations throughout history When the North is strong, it overflows its borders, as it did during the Greco-Roman period, and the present European hegemony When the Southern shore is strong, it overflows into the North, as happened in the period of strong Islamic culture, especially in Spain The North played the master twice in classical and

H Hanafi / The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom?

12

modern times, and the South played the role of disciple twice in the same two periods The South played the role of master once, in the era of Islamic civilization peaking in Andalusia, and with the recognized Islamic resurgence now a second time Europe did acknowledge its role as disciple one time, in late Scholasticism and on the eve of modern times Can it acknowledge the role of disciple now, in the time of the eclipse of the West, after “God is dead” and “Man is alive,” and man is also dead and nobody is alive?

5 Terrorism may be a symptom of the West wind’s eclipse and the East wind’s rise, a crossroads in world history When the Earth moves, earthquakes follow Signs of the European malaise can be seen in: Feyerabend’s Farewell to Reason and Against Method, Spengler’s Untergang des Abendlands, Husserl’s Krise der europäischen Wissenschaft, Scheler’s Umsturz der Werte, Toynbee’s Western Civilization on Trial, Paul Hazard’s crise de la conscience Européenne, Bergson’s la machine à faire des dieux Postmodernism, deconstructionism, skepticism, agnosticism and nihilism are also symptoms

6 Advanced research workshops must renew the agenda from fundamentalism

to post-fundamentalism, from the war on terrorism to avenues of peace, from Globalization to Inter-dependence and regional co-operation The current agenda in international scholarship is really obsolete The world is changing due to the nature of things, while the agenda is fixed by ideologies, because of the fixed stereotyped images that each partner has constructed of the other The destruction of these mutual images is one of the ways of ending the myth

of terrorism

H Hanafi / The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom? 13

September 11 and the Need for a Social

Science Research Agenda

Wilhelm KEMPF

Department of Psychology at the University of Konstanz, Germany

Abstract Comparing US propaganda strategies after September 11 with those of

the Gulf War and the Bosnia Conflict the paper argues that targeted propaganda

measures were not needed in order to plant military logic in the public mind All

that was needed was a lack of understanding of the terror attack and its

pseudo-explanation in terms of groundless hate It was this mind-set, which rejected any

analysis of the conflict sources, which ruled out any resolution other than the

elimination of the enemy, and which even denied his most essential human rights

And it is this mind set, which threatens to reduce democracy to a pure façade, to

destroy its credibility and to produce even more hatred against the Western world

Keywords Propaganda, military logic, peace logic, human rights, human dignity,

democracy

‘So great are the psychological resistances to war in modern times, that every war must appear to be a war of defense against a menacing, murderous aggressor’ [1] In this process, propaganda plays an important role The aim of pro-war propaganda is to get people to strongly and personally identify with the goals of the war and to manipulate their entanglement in the conflict in order to reorganize their hierarchy of values so that winning the war is at the top, and all other values – like truth, ethical considerations and individual rights – are only subservient to this goal

In order to win public support for war, it is necessary to produce a mindset where there is a delicate balance between the experience of threat and confidence in winning the conflict Typical features of this mindset are its Zero-Sum orientation and the designation of force as an appropriate means of conflict resolution It is characterized

by cognitive factors like

x idealization of own rights and goals,

x denial of the opponent’s rights and demonizing his intentions,

x rejection of a peaceful settlement of the conflict,

x demonizing the opponent’s actions and emphasis on his dangerousness,

x denial of possibilities for cooperation,

x denial of superordinate rights and goals and

x justification of own side’s actions and emphasis on own strength

And it has emotional consequences, like

x mistrust of the enemy,

x feelings of being threatened,

x denial of a threat to the opponent: If he behaves well, he has nothing to fear!

x Confidence in winning: Good will prevail over Evil!

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Due to the overall cognitive and emotional mindset, outrage at the war is transformed into outrage at the enemy [2]

The idea underlying traditional propaganda strategies was to transmit propaganda messages from the top on down and to unify society in its struggle against an enemy

As Lasswell [1] put it: “Civilian unity is not achieved by the regimentation of muscles

It is achieved by a repetition of ideas rather than movements The civilian mind is standardized by news not by drills Propaganda is the method by which this process is aided and abetted.” Accordingly, the traditional means of propaganda are:

x Restrictive methods like censorship to suppress information that might reduce patriotic spirit

x Supportive methods like the fabrication, selection and exaggeration of information that might strengthen it

And the professional credo is: Truth is only raw material Lies are merely a technical, not a moral problem If no lies are needed, so much the better

And lies are not needed if the propagandist manages to get the public personally engaged in a conflict This was the beginning of psychological propaganda techniques that build upon:

x Polarization of identification suggestions [3]

x Production of a specific motivational logic [3]

x Immunization of the propaganda message against criticism with measures like: harmonization of referential levels [3], double-bind communication (cf Reimann, 2002), and two-sided messages [4]

The idea behind these techniques is: to get the public emotionally involved and then wait for those escalation-oriented changes in the cognitive representation of conflict that we can observe whenever a person, a group or a society is involved in competitive conflicts and that are due to the logic of the win-lose model underlying competitive conflicts [2]

Psychological preparation for war is a time consuming process, however: in the case of the Gulf War, it took 6 months, in the case of the Bosnia Conflict 6 years – but

in case of the War on Terrorism it took only 6 weeks In order to get the US public to support the Gulf War, it was necessary to construct a complex motivational logic that included a specific interpretation of the past, assessment of the present and promise for the future [5]

Interpretation of the past: The appeasement policy towards Adolf Hitler caused the

Second World War and a world catastrophe If Hitler had been stopped early enough, the war could have been avoided The same goes for Saddam Hussein If he is not stopped now, right after the invasion of Kuwait, he will go on to attack the whole Persian Gulf area

Assessment of the present: The collapse of socialism and the triumph of Western

democracy are just the right moment to restore the position of the UN and to show terrorist states that no gains can be had through violence Economic sanctions would work too slowly While the world was waiting, Iraq might build nuclear weapons or might attack with chemical weapons

Promise for the future: After the war, a New World Order will be established

where the rights of small nations will not be allowed to be trampled on and where the rules of international justice will be respected The alternative scenario would be the world's oil reserves ending under the control of a nuclear-armed Iraq, and dictators everywhere would be encouraged

W Kempf / September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda 15

Based on this motivational logic, the right balance between threat and confidence could be established rather easily, and even more so, since most average citizens didn’t know much about Iraq or Saddam Hussein, and human rights organizations, as well as pacifist groups, had already been opposed to Saddam Hussein during the war between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988), at a time when Saddam Hussein was still an esteemed ally

of the United States

In former Yugoslavia, the situation was much more complicated [6]: Serbia, which had been part of the anti-German alliance during two world wars, was holding on to socialism This was not in accordance with the interests of the European Union German and Austrian diplomacy supported the struggle for independence in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia As these countries were ready to open their economy to the European market, this coincided with EU interests as well

Croatia and Bosnia had collaborated with the Nazis during World War II, however,

and their current leadership was rather suspect: In his book Wastelands of Historical

Reality, Croat President Tudjman had made statements that could easily be interpreted

as anti-Semitic, and in his book The Islamic Declaration, Bosnian President

Izetbegovic openly advocated creating a fundamentalist Islamic state

Although the Bosnia Conflict involved a similar motivational logic as the New World Order concept, this was not sufficient to unite the European nations against Serbia and to get the United States involved In order to produce the necessary balance between threat and confidence, propaganda could not simply take sides against the Serbs, but differences in the media images of the three ethnic groups developed gradually and were mainly due to the different roles in which the groups were portrayed by the media The most positive role was constructed for the Muslims, who were depicted as least confrontational and most often in a defensive position Both Serbs and Croats, on the other hand, were portrayed more as aggressors

Although the military logic on the Serbian side was the least reported, the negative image of the Serbs resulted from other factors, however First, Serbian actors were covered by the media twice as often as each of the other groups, and Serbian behavior was depicted as most confrontational Second, Serbian rights and intentions were given little attention, and as possibilities for cooperation between the Serbs and their opponents were accentuated, confrontational Serbian behavior appeared to be even less justified Third, the press stimulated the least outrage about the opponents of the Serbs and rather downplayed the suffering on the Serbian side Fourth, incentives for social identification with Serbian victims were extremely low, and there was even a considerable amount of dehumanization of Serbian victims

While it is not surprising that the international media portrayed the Muslims in a defensive role and assigned the Serbs the role of evil-doers, the really striking move was to get the Croats out of the line of fire, and even more so, since the Croats placed the greatest emphasis on military logic and rejected the logic of peace more decisively than the other parties Both the Croat emphasis on military logic and the rejection of peace logic by the Croats could seemingly be justified, however, by giving the highest priority to their rights and intentions, as well as by the rejection of cooperative alternatives

Nonetheless: although the international press reported quite unequally about the three ethnic groups, the coverage was quite ambiguous about all three of them The press identified itself with none of the Bosnian war parties, but rather with the international community, which had a problem with the ethnic groups in Bosnia

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In doing so, the media supported a policy of peace enforcement (by military intervention) rather than a policy of peacemaking (by third-party mediation efforts) The more deeply the international actors got involved in the conflict, the greater was the media sympathy for them The more they managed to stay in a neutral position, the more they were criticized, and the more negative was their press coverage

In the case of the Afghan War, things were completely different, and far less propaganda was needed to persuade the public to support the war In order to understand this, we must be aware that the emotional and motivational correlates of warfare are not only a consequence of the respective cognitive mind set, but also that the cognitive correlates result from emotional entanglement in the conflict There is a circular relationship between emotions and cognitions, and each influences the other [7]

In the case of the Afghan War, the public’s emotional entanglement in the conflict was the greatest possible from the start All that was necessary in order to motivate the public to support the war was to identify the enemy, to justify military action as an appropriate response and to make victory appear probable

The attacks of September 11 were certainly criminal acts of horrendous proportions, the threat was real, and it could be experienced first hand by anybody Thousands of innocent people were killed in the heart of the USA, and as life is the most essential human right, there was no need to idealize US rights and goals There was also no need to demonize the attack: that it was a brutal act of terrorism was self-evident And there was no need to emphasize the opponent’s dangerousness: The threat was real, and what happened on September 11 could have happened anywhere

As a criminal act, the terrorist attack of September 11 could have been dealt with

on the basis of international law The Taliban could have been persuaded to turn over Osama Bin Laden to a neutral country, and an independent court could have tried him Terrorist organizations all over the world could have been fought by police operations subject to control by courts, and the struggle against terrorism could have been fought

in compliance with the democratic principle of the division of power Perhaps this is what critics like the German author Günter Grass or German President Johannes Rau were thinking of when they called for a civilized response to the terrorist acts Obviously, however, such a civilized response was not on the political agenda The events of September 11 were not only a terrorist attack against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, they were also a symbolic act that humiliated the US by demonstrating what had been unimaginable before: the vulnerability of the American homeland

In a situation like this, it was only a natural impulse that American self-confidence needed to be restored and strength needed to be demonstrated by fighting back Fighting back needed to be justified, however It could not look like pure vengeance, and to accomplish this, the attack had to be seen as more than criminal and humiliating

By interpreting the attack as an attack against civilization in general, the planned war could be made to seem like a sort of civilized police operation employing all available means, including armed force, which would add to the expectation of victory And as every nation in the world was given a choice between unconditional solidarity with the

US or being regarded as part of the terrorist network, the war presumably would not threaten any civilized country either

W Kempf / September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda 17

One month after the terrorist attack, on October 11, 2001, US President George W Bush [8] came to the climax of this interpretation and even aggravated it by expressing

an inability to understand what had happened and why:

“How do I respond when I see that in some Islamic countries there is vitriolic hatred for America? I’ll tell you how I respond: I’m amazed I’m amazed that there’s such misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us I am – like most Americans, I just can’t believe it, because I know how good we are.”

The rest of the mind set that was needed to gain public support for the War against Terrorism was due to pure automatism: outrage at violence was replaced by outrage at the enemy, literally anyone could be suspected of anti-Americanism, any negotiations with the Taliban could be rejected, and higher-order rights could be denied: Any state which did not cooperate with the USA would be a legitimate target Any sort of peaceful settlement of the conflict had to be rejected, and the entire mind-set turned into a zero-sum game where warfare was the only acceptable option

Naturally, these are all traditional propaganda contents, and the media were saturated with them Targeted propaganda measures were not needed to plant them in the public mind All that was needed was a lack of understanding of the terror attack of

11 September and its pseudo-explanation in terms of completely groundless hate, through which the initially still unknown enemy was demonized, the US idealized, and the search for possible conflict causes became taboo

Nonetheless, it can be assumed that George W Bush’s statement was not a deliberate propaganda message It sounds like the honest words of a somewhat simple-minded man facing an unbelievable excess of violence against his own people, expressing what millions of people felt at this moment People who never gave much thought to other people in some distant corner of the world, to whom our wealth and abundance is their poverty and starvation, our liberties destroy their culture, and our way of life is an insult to their concept of honor

Nonetheless, these words were destined to set the world on fire They declared total war, rejected an analysis of the sources of conflict, ruled out any resolution other than the elimination of the enemy and even denied his most essential human rights That the US government later decided that thousands of imprisoned suspected or actual Al-Qaeda terrorists were neither combatants (otherwise they would have been entitled

to the protection of the Geneva Conventions) nor criminals (otherwise they would have been entitled to the protection of American criminal law), but rather belonged to a third category without rights or claims to respect for their human dignity, was merely the logical consequence For words like these are also words suitable to destroy the so-called “civilized world” from within – And all this, without calls for revenge, without enthusiasm for war in the true sense of the word and out of the pure necessity of dealing with the emotional burden imposed by the terror of September 11

Even if President Bush is right, and there is this vitriolic hatred against the US and Western civilization in some corners of the world, fighting terrorism exclusively by military means bears the danger that the values of democracy will gradually be reduced

to a pure facade The US concentration camp at Guantanamo and the torture of Iraqi prisoners of war offer alarming signals that point in this direction And the more Western democracy loses its credibility, the more hatred will increase

Wiping out the roots of hatred can only be accomplished on the basis of cultural change, and it is not only those societies where this hatred is present, it is our own societies as well that need to progress in the direction of more respect for others How

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this cultural change can be stimulated by an open intra- and intercultural discourse, what sort of input the media can provide in order to stimulate such a discourse and how the media can offer a platform for this discourse are among the questions that urgently need to be put on the research agenda

There is no need to say that the aim of such an agenda cannot be to justify terrorism The aim must be to understand the roots of terrorism And these roots cannot

be found in the Islamic culture per se They need to be searched for in the Western world as well, and particularly in the interaction between the two

References

[1] Lasswell, H.D (1927) Propaganda technique in the World War London: Kegan Paul

[2] Kempf, W (2002) Conflict coverage and conflict escalation In: Kempf, W., Luostarinen, H.(eds.) Journalism and the New World Order Volume II: Studying war and the media Göteborg: Nordicom, 59-72

[3] Luostarinen, H (2002) Propaganda analysis In: Kempf, W., Luostarinen, H.(eds.) Journalism and the New World Order Volume II: Studying war and the media Göteborg: Nordicom, 17-38

[4] Reimann, M (2002) Communication disorders in conflict coverage In: Kempf, W., Luostarinen, H.(eds.) Journalism and the New World Order Volume II: Studying war and the media Göteborg: Nordicom

[5] Kempf, W., Reimann, M., Luostarinen, H (2001) New World Order rhetoric in American and European media In: Nohrstedt, S.A., Ottosen, R (eds.) Journalism and the New World Order Vol I Gulf War, National News Discourses and Globalization Göteborg: Nordicom, 125-148

[6] Kempf, W (2002) Escalating and deescalating aspects in the coverage of the Bosnia conflict – A comparative study In: Kempf, W., Luostarinen, H., (eds.) Journalism and the New World Order Vol

II Studying war and the media Göteborg: Nordicom, 227-258

[7] Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ed.) (2003) Constructive conflict coverage

A social psychological approach Berlin: regener

[8] Weiner, B (2001) What Bush should have said (www.antiwar.com) (23.05.02)

W Kempf / September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda 19

Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Collective Action Perspective for

Analyzing the Tanzim

Eitan Y ALIMI Department of Political Science at the Hebrew University, Israel

Abstract An attempt is made to re-contextualize the study of political terrorism

by embedding it within the larger phenomenon of Collective Action It is

suggested that a process-sensitive analysis of the interplay among the components

of Collective Action (action context, action target, action means and action agent)

can be beneficial for gaining insights into the study of group risks for political

terrorism The case of the conflict between the Tanzim and the Israeli forces is

used to illustrate how processes within, between and outside the conflict parties

affected the Tanzim members’ decision to employ political terrorism Based on the

analysis, several implications for counterterrorism are offered

Keywords Tanzim, contentious politics, Intifada, political opportunities,

repression

Decision-makers, terrorism specialists and the general public have been forced by recent events to acknowledge the unsettling reality that terrorism is, “always has been, and always will be instrumental: planned, purposeful, and premeditated … a perennial, ceaseless struggle” [1] (pp 313-4) In the face of the devilishly-planned, horrendous airborne attacks on US targets on September 11, 2001, it is no longer possible, nor is it responsible, to dismiss political terrorism as solely the result of innate human aggressive propensities or of psychopathic, twisted ideas, as some terrorism researchers still argue [2, 3]

Our responsibility, as well as the responsibility of decision-makers, is to ask not,

“Why do they hate us?” but rather, “What have we done to provoke such deeds?” Terrorism is here to stay precisely because it is no less the product of human relations and interactions than the product of twisted minds and fanatical obsessions As argued

by Peleg, “… the capacity for violence might be inherent in men However, the likelihood of an actual outburst of collective violence hinges upon how badly systems violate the socially-derived expectations of certain groups in the populace” [4] (p 28) The cost of continuing to shut our eyes and cling to the easier question of, “Why do they hate us?” has long been too great to accept In suggesting such a shift, I am by no means implying that we should seek an answer in self-incrimination or expiation Rather, I am seeking a deeper understanding of terrorism and ourselves – what Honderich [5] calls a practical moral inquiry, an acknowledgment of our responsibility, whether or not we feel guilty for what has gone wrong

In his illuminating radical treatment of collective violence [6], Charles Tilly picks

up on an earlier, brief treatment of the subject [7] and writes the following, “I still think that terror is a recurrent political strategy adopted by a wide variety of actors rather

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than a creed, a separate variety of politics, or the work of a distinctive class of people

… The word ‘terror’ appears nowhere in [my] typology … Terror always refers to someone else’s behavior … The roll call makes clear that terror … consists of a single party’s conflict strategy rather than a causally coherent category of collective violence

… terror is a strategy not a creed” [6] (pp xii, 19, 233, 237)

I concur with Tilly and suggest an expansion of our epistemology, namely, to incorporate a Collective Action perspective (hereinafter: CA) into the analysis of political terrorism, seen here as an extreme form of CA Political terrorism develops during episodes of collective action, a radicalization process by a segment within a given movement, claims the Zionist ‘right-wing’ organization Israel Freedom Fighters (Le’HI) The growing attraction to and fascination of the abnormality of the deed and the attempt to treat political terrorism as sui generis has had the unintended consequence of decontextualizing the phenomenon under study Recontextualizing political terrorism may be beneficial to our endeavor to learn more about this doubtlessly unusual phenomenon Just as our knowledge and understanding of CA significantly broadened when it was no longer treated as the actions of a “madding crowd,” so is it possible to learn more about the shift to political terrorism when we no longer perceive it as solely the behavior of the psychopath or the fanatical “true believer” [8] Concomitantly, I would further suggest that an analysis of the shift to political terrorism using the theoretical tools of CA has the potential for generating additional insights into the study of counter-terrorism

In fact, I will argue that we should understand terrorist groups in terms of their location in larger fields of actors: social movements – the agent of CA For clarity, I perceive collective action as a political phenomenon that involves (1) the agent of CA (a social movement), (2) that engages in contentious politics as the means of CA, (3) targeted always, but not exclusively, against authorities (the target of CA) and, (4) embedded within a structure of conflict, that is, the context of CA As we will see, the shift towards political terrorism by one actor – a group-at-risk – within a larger movement is usually the result of how the various components interact and mutually affect each other

In proposing the incorporation of the CA perspective into the analysis of the shift

to terrorism, this paper draws on Tilly’s recent treatment of political collective violence, which offers a less value-laden approach for understanding variation in the form, salience, and coordination of outright damage to persons and objects As I shall attempt to show, the shift to terrorism has to do more with developments and processes within, between, and outside the parties involved in the politics of contention than with innate aggression and/or ideological creed – a relational approach to the study of contentious politics This paper draws also on a recent treatment of Islamic Activism, a collection of essays edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz [9] which adopts a social movement theory approach to the analysis of Islamic-oriented contention, demonstrating how theoretical tools borrowed from the SM perspective repertoire help

to de-Orientalize movements such as Hamas or contentious episodes such as the Shi’a uprising in Bahrain in 1994-1998

Finally, in suggesting that a CA framework is an effective tool for providing additional insights into the shift to political terrorism and the study of counter-terrorism, I shall be drawing on my own work on the Palestinian Intifada, specifically the case of the Fatah Tanzim (the organization) The Tanzim is defined by the IDF Spokesperson Department as a terrorist organization Yet, many other institutions do

E.Y Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim 21

not see the Tanzim as a terrorist organization, a fact that only pinpoints the relativity in defining terrorism and underscores the problematic aspect of viewing terrorism as a creed or as a separate variety of politics As I will try to show, the classification of the Tanzim as a terrorist group without an attempt to understand the reasons for the shift from a non-violent mode of action to a violent mode of action is both misleading and detrimental to any genuine effort at countering terrorism

In attempting that, this paper will follow along two interrelated lines First, I will discuss three aspects in the study of CA, demonstrating the relevancy of these aspects

to a better understanding of the Tanzim in general and its shift to terrorism in particular I will then proceed to specify several implications for countering terrorism that are suggested by the analysis of the Tanzim

In this part of the paper, I will discuss several aspects in the study of Collective Action, showing their usefulness to the study of the Tanzim’s shift to political terrorism In accordance with Tilly’s relational approach, I will focus on three such aspects: within the agent of collective action, outside the agent of collective action, and between the agent and the target of CA

Two points of clarification are in order First, while perceiving these three processes as deeply interwoven and mutually affecting each other in pushing a group towards political terrorism, I shall nonetheless treat them as analytically distinct in order to simplify my argument Second, due to considerations of length, I have decided

to incorporate the analysis of the context of CA (“action-context”) into the analysis of each of the three aspects A systematic analysis of the shift to political terrorism must

be attentive to dynamics and changes in the structure of the conflict in which the parties involved are embedded

Social Movement: The Agent of Collective Action

An ongoing underdeveloped theme in the literature is the tendency to focus on the Social Movement Organization (SMO), instead of viewing a social movement as a field

of actors [10, 11, 12] In line with my suggestion to distinguish between the agent and the phenomenon of Collective Action, I suggest further to avoid treating a social movement, and a terrorist group, for that matter, as a monolithic entity or as a unified whole In fact, I suggest viewing a terrorist group as part of a social movement: a collective actor, comprising people, beliefs, social locations and actions in pursuit of political goals This collective actor consists of various actors (individuals and/or organizations) that interact formally and informally with one another and mutually affect each other’s strategy The extent to which these actors collaborate, and the types

of interaction they engage in, depend on social organization, a sense of commitment, shared beliefs and solidarity A terrorist group is an actor within a social movement The study of Collective Action has already acknowledged the conceptual and empirical shortcomings in treating a movement as a unified whole – what McCarthy and Zald labeled SMO, rather than as a field of actors In the second edition of his path-breaking The Strategy of Social Protest, Gamson made reference to this shortcoming, for which he was responsible in part, when discussing the difficulties a social movement faces in achieving standing in mainstream news media Reflecting on the first edition of ‘Strategy’, Gamson writes, “By using the social movement organization

as the unit of analysis, Strategy fails to illuminate the dynamics among a set of

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challengers in the same broad movement Challengers sometimes complement and sometimes undercut each other’s strategies, but one can understand this process only at

a more aggregate level of analysis” [13] (p 160)

To view a social movement as a field of actors that do not necessarily hold the same ideology, strategy, preferable modes of action and goals has considerable implications for the analysis of collective action Heeding the internal dynamics, balance of power and division of labor within a movement can be beneficial in understanding a movement’s strategy and tactics of contention For example, how does the mode of action employed by one actor affect other actors within the movement?

My analysis of the Intifada [14, 15] describes a complicated sociopolitical setting within which various groups and organizations compete for power within the authoritative setting of the Palestinian Authority and under the overarching Israeli military occupation The Tanzim became a central player in this complex setting Focusing exclusively, however, on the Tanzim without examining the dynamics among various arms within the Tanzim, its relationships with other groups and actors in the Palestinian movement, and in isolation from the power structure within which it has evolved and operated, would provide a somewhat artificial analysis and, consequently,

an overly simplistic understanding of the group

Essentially, the Tanzim is an integral part of the Palestinian movement as consolidated during the run-up to the 1987 Intifada and as developed thereafter While not named as such during the 1987 Intifada, the Tanzim actually consists of grassroots activists who played a central role in the initiation and conduct of the 1987 uprising Its formation was the result of internal relationships within the movement, especially as developed during the aftermath of the 1987 Intifada and the institutionalization of a portion of the movement, i.e., the establishment of a Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in June 1994

Intifada researchers share the argument that the formation of the Tanzim should be seen in the context of Arafat’s attempt to channel and focus the passions of many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip away from Islamist groups during the aftermath of the 1987-1992 Intifada [16] True, the first half of the 1990s witnessed the growing popularity and political influence of the Islamic camp, primarily of Hamas The reasons for this are numerous, some of which are rooted in the painstaking achievements made by non-Islamic factions within the Palestinian movement already during, but mainly in the wake of the 1987 cycle of contention

During the first years of the 1987 Intifada, the two rival camps managed to maintain a general consensus vis-à-vis the primary goal of the Palestinians However,

as the first signs of political achievements unfolded (especially the commencement of a dialogue between Arafat and the US), Hamas was quick to reject any recognition and acceptance of what had become the Madrid talks of October 1991 Indeed, the actual process of peace talks and preparation for self-rule generated a renewal of clashes between the respective Hamas and Fatah-led PLO factions Between July and August

1992, numerous confrontations broke out between the parties, leading the editor of the daily al-Shaab to state, “What is happening … is frightening It threatens not only the Intifada, but our whole social framework” [17]

The challenge posed by Hamas, for example to the Fatah-led PA, was translated into systematic attempts at undermining the Oslo Accords through the use of numerous suicide bombings, which resulted in dozens of Israeli deaths and hundreds of injuries between early 1994 and 1996 As Arafat’s difficulties in delivering the promise of Oslo

E.Y Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim 23

increased (difficulties for which Hamas was partly responsible), Hamas’s power increased significantly The gradually faltering Oslo, as a result, had made the alternative presented by Hamas attractive in the eyes of growing numbers of Palestinians [15] In that context, Arafat’s decision to form the Tanzim was truly a way

to reassert his control over the hearts and minds of the Palestinian populace in the occupied territories

The formation of the Tanzim, then, may have been Arafat’s counterweight to the growing influence of Islamic forces As it turned out, however, Arafat’s grand scheme did not bear the expected fruits While originally the Tanzim was designed to counter the Islamic forces, and some even argue that the Tanzim provided Arafat with a tool for combating Israel without risking international condemnation for violating signed agreements, it seems that the Tanzim “turned on its own creator,” developing its own agenda and goals [18] Thus, instead of countering Hamas, the Tanzim under the leadership of Marwan Barghouti grew closer to Hamas

This was already apparent during late 2000, the first months of the 2000 al-Aqsa Intifada, which was aimed against both Israel and the Palestinian Authority In the case

of Hamas, the challenge to the PA is already understandable An expression of this is found in an interview given by Hamas spokesperson in Hebron Abdel Khaleq al-Natshe to the Palestine Times in April 2000 When asked about Hamas’s relations with the PA, al-Natshe responded, “The Palestinian Authority is our oppressor, but again we don’t like to accentuate this too much, since our conflict is with Israel.”

In the case of the Tanzim, the PA was not perceived as an outright oppressor, and Arafat was unequivocally proclaimed to be sacred: the indisputable leader of the Palestinian people Yet, it seems that the convergence between Hamas and the Tanzim, coupled with the latter’s growing autonomy and influence, raised serious concerns amongst Arafat and PA officials In an interview with the Israeli daily Ha’aretz,following the conclusion of the Sharm al-Sheikh summit (October 2000), Barghouti contended that “the current Intifada would not stop with an order, as it did not start with an order … insinuating that the ‘street’ might not obey Arafat, should he announce

a cease-fire with Israel and a halt to the Intifada” [19] (p 468) Alarmed by these developments, Arafat made attempts to undermine Barghouti’s power by encouraging rivalries, such as indirectly supporting Barghouti’s rival for the leadership of the Tanzim, Hussein al-Sheikh, or limiting the flow of funds to Barghouti’s grassroots forces [19] (p 52) Yet, it became clear that the Tanzim and the Islamic forces had gained the upper hand in setting the pace and tone of the situation, enjoying widespread popularity among the Palestinian populace

An expression of the convergence between the Tanzim and Hamas can be found in

a statement drafted by the National and Islamic Forces (NIF) to President Arafat on January 13, 2001, during the preparations for what became the Taba Talks The NIF was a coalition formed by the Tanzim and Hamas and included a vast array of organizations such as the PFLP, DFLP, PIJ, etc The content of the statement is revealing, demonstrating the firm and bold characteristics of the grassroots forces:

In the Name of God, the Forgiving and Compassionate

Our Brother, the President and Struggler Abu Ammar, God save him, The President of the State of Palestine … We express our confidence in your constant position that adheres to the national constants [i.e., freedom, independence and return]; however, we warn of falling into the trap of dealing with these tricky

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scenarios … The consensus of our people to continue with the Intifada until it achieves its goals requires all of us to be prepared for a long battle … which requires reconsidering our internal condition and addressing it in a radical manner

to secure the components of steadfastness Together until victory, until liberating Jerusalem and achieving independence and return

The State of Palestine

January 13, 2001

Arafat, while being elevated to a father-like status, is nevertheless warned not to deviate from the constants He is reminded of his militant past and of his days of armed struggle as a symbol, being addressed as Abu Ammar the Struggler, to indicate the sacredness of the goal, the achievement of which justifies the means taken and, equally important, the organic linkage between himself (not the Tunisian-led PA) and the Palestinian people Thus, in spite of his symbolic status, Arafat is still constrained by the blessed Intifada and, just as with the NIF members, the legitimacy of Arafat as the leader of the Palestinian people is contingent upon a radical “reconsidering of our internal condition,” seen as essential for the continuation of the Intifada

Thus, instead of undercutting Hamas’s strategy, both the Tanzim and Hamas complemented each other’s agendas and jointly posed a major challenge to the PA Indications of convergence between the two organizations were expressed, at first, in a division of labor regarding their respective spheres of operation Beginning in early

2001, it became clear that the Tanzim was concentrating on terrorist attacks against Israeli soldiers and settlers within the territories, whereas Hamas was concentrating on terrorist attacks (including suicide terrorism following the Israeli liquidation of one of the organization’s activists in November 2000) inside Israel

This is not to say, though, that groups and factions within the Tanzim were not calling for an escalation of the struggle, or that competition over Tanzim leadership was absent In fact, the harsher the Israeli crackdown became, the louder became the voices within the Tanzim calling for it to engage in more lethal tactics In that context, Hamas’s growing popularity, given its success in inflicting damage on Israel, only amplified these voices Such was the case, for example, with Abd-al-Karim Awiss, a grassroots leader of the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades” in Jennin, the armed wing of the Tanzim Escaping an Israeli liquidation attempt, Awiss called for the removal of the taboo of limiting the Tanzim’s operations to within the territories Despite a lack of approval for his plan by Barghouti, Awiss nonetheless went ahead to initiate a terrorist attack, although an abortive one, in the Golani intersection inside Israel, in late May

2001

Tensions within the Tanzim revolving around the leadership of the organization in the West Bank were also detrimental to Barghouti’s ability to implement the Tanzim’s strategy His rival for the organization’s leadership was Hussein a-Sheikh, who enjoyed the support of several veteran Fatah members Israel also acted to undermine Barghouti’s growing political power when during elections to the Fatah general secretariat in summer 2000 it tried to influence the outcomes in favor of a-Sheikh The tension between Barghouti and a-Sheikh intensified, the more influential Barghouti became At times, a-Sheikh deliberately acted in opposition to Barghouti’s directives, with the consequence of heavier Israeli crackdowns, as was the case when the former’s supporters continued to fire on the settlement of Psagot, despite Barghouti’s decision to stop the shooting [19]

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The fact of the matter was that Arafat indeed had little control over the spreading clashes In fact, the Palestinian leadership, according to Mansour [20], acted more as an

“overseer” than as the Intifada’s general command, namely, “the PA would sometimes let things happen, sometimes be a spectator, and at other times arbitrate between rival groups, in most cases to avoid taking initiatives” (p 11) To make things even more complicated, attempts to dissociate himself from the increasing violence vis-à-vis the

US and EU seriously damaged Arafat’s status vis-à-vis the Tanzim and Hamas

Structural Changes and Politics of Contention

Can changes in the structure of political conditions affect the strategy and tactics of contention employed by the parties involved by projecting a sense of opportunity or a sense of threat? Collective action does not develop in a vacuum; social movements act for the fulfillment of political goals and, in turn, the political environment affects their strategy While students of CA shared this truism from the outset, political factors were nonetheless viewed as limits rather than as engines for contention [21] (p 201)

The view of political factors, developments, and processes as engines for contention has been the cornerstone of the Political Process Model for the study of Collective Action, with its promotion of the concepts of political opportunities and/or threats In contrast to earlier schools, the Political Process Model deals with changes in political conditions that are above and beyond within-movement issues of shared deprivation, organization and leadership While acknowledging the importance of internal factors to social movements, proponents of the Political Process Model argue that events and occurrences external to movements are either ignored or seen, at best,

as indirectly affecting movement activists For McAdam, “The point is that any event

or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities … the political process is based on the idea that social processes … promote insurgency only indirectly through a restructuring of existing power relations” [22] (p 41)

These changes, according to political scientist Sidney Tarrow, are consistent, although not necessarily formal, permanent, or national dimensions of the political struggle in a given political setting [23] (p 83) Changes in political conditions can be institutional (e.g., shifts in political alliances or the strength of social cleavages) or cultural (e.g., legitimacy or public discourse) [12] Depending on the specific political location and status of a given political actor, changes in political conditions can be perceived as either opportunities or as threats; hence an increase or a decrease in mobilization for action is likely to ensue

Finally, whether perceived opportunities and/or threats will increase or decrease mobilization is contingent on the way both are combined to shape contention [24] Specifically, instead of treating threats as merely the flip side of opportunities, we should be mindful of (1) the various levels and types of political opportunities/threats (i.e movement, regional, national, and international levels or current and anticipated threats), (2) asking: “opportunity for what?” – that is, opportunity for or threat to the accumulation of power within a movement or for shaking off an unjust authority, and (3) that we should also think about political actors who make opportunities for

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