ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES TO REPLACE ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES potx

ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES TO REPLACEANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems Office

ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES TO REPLACE

ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES

Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace

Antipersonnel Landmines

Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems

Office of International AffairsNational Research Council

NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESSWashington, D.C

NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of theNational Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy

of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine The members ofthe committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regardfor appropriate balance

This study was supported by Contract/Grant No V101(93)P-1637, TO#16 between the NationalAcademy of Sciences and the Department of Defense Any opinions, findings, conclusions, orrecommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarilyreflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2001088182

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distin-guished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance ofscience and technology and to their use for the general welfare Upon the authority of the chartergranted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise thefederal government on scientific and technical matters Dr Bruce M Alberts is president of theNational Academy of Sciences

The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National

Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers It is autonomous in itsadministration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciencesthe responsibility for advising the federal government The National Academy of Engineering alsosponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and re-search, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers Dr William A Wulf is president ofthe National Academy of Engineering

The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure

the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matterspertaining to the health of the public The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the NationalAcademy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and,upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education Dr Kenneth I.Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine

The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to

associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of ing knowledge and advising the federal government Functioning in accordance with general poli-cies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both theNational Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services tothe government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities The Council is admin-istered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine Dr Bruce M Alberts and

further-Dr William A Wulf are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council

National Academy of Sciences

National Academy of Engineering

Institute of Medicine

National Research Council

GEORGE BUGLIARELLO (NAE), chair, Polytechnic University, Brooklyn, New York

H NORMAN ABRAMSON (NAE), Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio, Texas

THOMAS F HAFER, Science and Technology Associates, Inc., Arlington, Virginia

J JEROME HOLTON, Defense Group, Inc., Alexandria, Virginia

LEE M HUNT, Consultant, Alexandria, Virginia

RICHARD H JOHNSON, U.S Army (retired), Alexandria, Virginia

K SHARVAN KUMAR, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island

RONALD F LEHMAN II, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California

LARRY G LEHOWICZ, U.S Army (retired), Quantum Research, International, Arlington, VirginiaALAN M LOVELACE (NAE), General Dynamics Corporation (retired), La Jolla, CaliforniaHARVEY M SAPOLSKY, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge

DANIEL R SCHROEDER, U.S Army (retired), Vass, North Carolina

MARION W SCOTT, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

K ANNE STREET, Riverside Consulting Group, Inc., Alexandria, Virginia

PATRICK H WINSTON, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge

National Research Council Staff

BRUCE A BRAUN, Director, Division of Military Science and Technology

JO L HUSBANDS, Senior Staff Officer, Office of International Affairs

MARGARET N NOVACK, Study Director

LOIS E PETERSON, Program Officer

WILLIAM E CAMPBELL, Administrative Coordinator

CHRISTINA B MAIERS, Program Specialist (until August 2000)

GWEN ROBY, Senior Project Assistant

Liaisons

Board on Army Science and Technology

GEORGE T SINGLEY III, Hicks and Associates, Inc., McLean, Virginia

Air Force Science and Technology Board

ANTHONY J BURSHNICK, U.S Air Force (retired), Consultant, Springfield, Virginia

iv

COMMISSION ON ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SYSTEMS

W DALE COMPTON (NAE) chair, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana

ELEANOR BAUM, Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and Art, New York, New YorkRUTH M DAVIS (NAE), Pymatuning Group, Inc., Alexandria, Virginia

HENRY J HATCH (NAE), U.S Army (retired), Reston, Virginia

STUART L KNOOP, Oudens and Knoop, Architects, PC, Chevy Chase, Maryland

NANCY G LEVESON (NAE), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge

CORA B MARRETT, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

ROBERT M NEREM (NAE), Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta

LAWRENCE T PAPAY (NAE), Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, VirginiaBRADFORD W PARKINSON (NAE), Stanford University, Stanford, California

BARRY M TROST (NAS), Stanford University, Stanford, California

JAMES C WILLIAMS (NAE), GE Aircraft Engines, Cincinnati, Ohio

RONALD W YATES, U.S Air Force (retired), Monument, Colorado

Staff

DOUGLAS BAUER, Executive Director

DENNIS CHAMOT, Deputy Executive Director

SYLVIA GILBERT, Administrative Associate

CARLA PAGE, Administrative Assistant

SHARON SEGAL, Financial Officer

CAROL R ARENBERG, Editor

NOTE: This study was initiated under the auspices of the Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, which was subsumed in January 2001 by the newly established Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences.

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

F SHERWOOD ROWLAND (NAS, IOM), chair OIA, co-chair IAB, University of California, Irvine; Foreign Secretary,

National Academy of Sciences

HAROLD K FORSEN (NAE), co-chair IAB, Bechtel Corporation (retired); Foreign Secretary, National Academy of

Engineering

FRANCISCO J AYALA (NAS), University of California, Irvine

JOHN D BALDESCHWIELER (NAS), California Institute of Technology, Pasadena

NICOLE BALL, University of Maryland, College Park

DAVID R CHALLONER (IOM), University of Florida, Gainesville; Foreign Secretary, Institute of Medicine

ELLEN FROST, Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C

JOHN H GIBBONS (NAE), Consultant, The Plains, Virginia

DAVID A HAMBURG (NAS, IOM), Carnegie Corporation of New York (emeritus), New York

RICHARD R HARWOOD, Michigan State University, East Lansing

DONALD A HENDERSON (NAS, IOM), Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland

JULIA MARTON-LEFEVRE, Leadership for Environment and Development International, Inc., London, United KingdomLEAL ANNE MERTES, University of California, Santa Barbara

HENRY METZGER (NAS), National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases, Bethesda, MarylandDIANA S NATALICIO, University of Texas at El Paso

JAMES W POIROT (NAE), CH2M Hill, Inc (retired), Denver, Colorado

ERNEST J WILSON III, University of Maryland, College Park

Staff

JOHN BORIGHT, Executive Director

CAROL PICARD, Associate Executive Director

JOANNA K ROSENBERGER, Administrative and Financial Officer

EFFIE BENTSI-ADOTEYE, Administrative Assistant

vii

This National Research Council (NRC) study,

commis-sioned by the U.S Department of Defense (DOD) in

re-sponse to a mandate from Congress, addresses the question

of whether there are alternatives to antipersonnel landmines

(APL)—including technologies, tactics, and operational

con-cepts The study was conducted at an interesting historical

juncture, when the United States is at peace and, at the same

time, the number of new technologies rich in military

possi-bilities is unprecedented The convergence of these two

fac-tors presents the U.S Armed Forces with a unique window

of opportunity to develop new systems and concepts to

address future challenges

This is also a moment of heightened international

con-cern about the thousands of civilian casualties that occur

every year when APL that have been left in the field after a

conflict explode automatically on contact When military

operations are conducted in the midst of a civilian

popula-tion, the problem is compounded because today’s mines

can-not discriminate between friend and foe, belligerent and

ci-vilian It is important to note, however, that APL fielded by

U.S forces, except for APL in storage in Korea, are designed

to self-destruct or self-deactivate at a preset time Therefore,

they do not remain a danger indefinitely

No simple device today can provide capabilities

compa-rable to those of APL, both as self-standing devices and as a

part of other systems Devices currently under development

include mine-like devices that do not explode automatically

on contact and nonlethal devices that could complement

lethal devices and systems Thus, the functions of today’s

APL could be performed by a combination of devices,

care-fully planned tactics, and appropriate operational procedures

In some circumstances, however, replacing APL could lead

to higher casualties to our ground forces and/or could reduceour military capabilities

The committee believes strongly that the development ofnew systems with decoupled sensing, communication, andexplosive functions and the creation of networks of techno-logically sophisticated tactical sensors would greatly in-crease the situational awareness and power of war fightersand help meet the goal of ensuring the information superior-ity of U.S forces These systems would also respond to thehumanitarian principle manifested in the Ottawa Conven-tion of eliminating antipersonnel devices that explode oncontact Although these new systems are bound to have vul-nerabilities different from those of APL, these vulnerabili-ties could be greatly reduced by the application of appropri-ate technologies Therefore, DOD should move rapidly tosupport pertinent research and development to createfieldable systems

The NRC committee that produced this report workeddiligently in the limited time available to respond to DOD’srequest The report draws on presentations to the committee

in both public and closed sessions by representatives of ernment, industry, and nongovernmental organizations, in-terviews, research by committee members, and their exper-tise and judgment

gov-The committee is grateful to everyone who contributed tothe study, particularly Margaret Novack, study director, andLois Peterson, program officer, who worked tirelessly to seethe study through to completion

George Bugliarello, ChairCommittee on Alternative Technologies

to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines

ix

The study was conducted under the codirectorship of two

National Research Council commission-level offices: the

Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems (CETS)

and the Office of International Affairs (OIA) An oversight

group was formed to ensure unity of effort and to provide an

internal review of this report We wish to thank the

follow-ing individuals for their participation in the oversight group:

Henry J Hatch (NAE), chair, U.S Army (retired)

John Baldeschwieler (NAE), California Institute of

Technology

Nicole Ball, University of Maryland

Ruth M Davis (NAE), Pymatuning Group, Inc

This report has been reviewed in draft form by

individu-als chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical

exper-tise, in accordance with procedures approved by the NRC’s

Report Review Committee The purpose of this independent

review is to provide candid and critical comments that will

assist the institution in making its published report as sound

as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional

standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to

the study charge The review comments and draft

manu-script remain confidential to protect the integrity of the

de-liberative process We wish to thank the following

individu-als for their review of this report:

Arden L Bement (NAE), Purdue UniversityJohn Christie, Logistics Management InstituteStephen D Goose, Human Rights WatchJerome H Granrud, U.S Army (retired)Thomas McNaugher, RAND CorporationHyla Napadensky (NAE), Napadensky EnergeticsRichard I Neal, U.S Marine Corps (retired)Francis B Paca, VSE Corporation

William C Schneck, U.S Army Night Vision andElectronic Sensors Directorate

Sarah Sewall, Carr Center for Human RightsJohn F Troxell, U.S Army War CollegeGerold Yonas, Sandia National Laboratories

Although the reviewers listed above have provided manyconstructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked

to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did theysee the final draft of the report before its release The review

of this report was overseen by Lewis M Branscomb, NAE,Harvard University Appointed by the National ResearchCouncil, he was responsible for making certain that anindependent examination of this report was carried out inaccordance with institutional procedures and that all reviewcomments were carefully considered Responsibility for thefinal content of this report rests entirely with the authoringcommittee and the institution

Report Road Map, 18

FOR LANDMINES

National Security Strategies, 19

Benefits and Vulnerabilities of New Technologies, 22

Doctrinal Guidance for Using Landmines, 25

Role of Landmines in Warfare, 26

Capabilities of Antipersonnel Landmines, 26

Technologies in Antipersonnel Landmines, 27

7 ALTERNATIVES POTENTIALLY AVAILABLE AFTER 2006 60

Overview, 60Materiel Alternatives, 63Committee Assessments, 73

Introduction, 77Alternatives Available by 2006, 77Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006, 78Self-Destructing, Self-Deactivating Fuzes, 79

APPENDIXES

MIXED MINEFIELDS

CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

ALTERNATIVES TO LANDMINES

Tables, Figures, and Boxes

TABLES

ES-1 Current and Potential Systems Considered in This Report, 4

1-1 Current and Projected Funding for Tracks I, II, and III, 17

5-1 Alternatives Available Today, 37

5-2 Score Sheet for Alternatives Available Today, 42

6-1 Alternatives Available by 2006, 46

6-2 Score Sheet for Alternatives Available by 2006, 58

7-1 Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006, 64

7-2 Score Sheet for Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006, 75

C-1 Current U.S Mines, 93

1-1 Definitions of Antipersonnel Landmines, 11

3-1 Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines, 25

3-2 Capabilities of Antipersonnel Landmines, 27

3-3 Unexploded Ordnance Hazards, 28

6-1 Track 1 Nonself-destructing Alternative (NSD-A), 55

6-2 Remote Area-Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM), 57

D-1 Fundamentals of U.S Breaching Operations, 100

xv

computers, intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Munition

Vehicle

System

MOSAIC multifunctional, on-the-move, secure,

adaptive, integrated communication

NSD-A nonself-destructing (antipersonnel

landmine) alternative

System-Nonlethal

RD-Sensor RAAMS enhanced with telemetry and

sensor packageRD-Telemetry RAAMS enhanced with telemetry

SINCGARS Single-Channel Ground-to-Air Radio

System

Executive Summary

BACKGROUND

Military forces use landmines or landmine-like devices

because they are capable of autonomously delaying or

kill-ing the enemy at a safe distance from friendly forces

Landmines fall into two broad categories Antipersonnel

landmines (APL) are intended to kill or disable soldiers on

foot (a dismounted force).1 Antitank landmines (AT mines)

are used against vehicles, such as tanks and armored

person-nel carriers (a mounted force) Mixed systems, which

com-bine both AT mines and APL in the same munition, are

typi-cally used against an enemy force that is mostly mounted but

is accompanied by significant numbers of dismounted

sol-diers APL in mixed systems are intended to prevent or

dis-courage foot soldiers from penetrating or breaching an AT

minefield

Landmines are essentially tactical and operational

weap-ons, although on occasion they also have strategic

implica-tions When used tactically, landmines are usually employed

during battlefield engagements of relatively limited duration

to disrupt an enemy’s progress There are also long-term

strategic landmine missions, such as border protection, as is

the case in Korea

Minefields are used to place an enemy in a vulnerable

position that can be exploited by friendly forces, cause the

enemy forces to divide, interfere with enemy command and

control, inflict damage on enemy personnel and equipment,

exploit the capabilities of other weapon systems by delaying

enemy forces in an engagement area, and protect friendly

forces from enemy infiltration U.S doctrine requires that

minefields be mapped, marked, and eventually cleared

De-spite these precautions and for a variety of reasons, U.S

landmines also occasionally kill friendly personnel, typically

in hastily marked minefields In addition, if the tide of battlechanges rapidly, U.S mines previously emplaced duringdefensive missions could become an obstacle to the execu-tion of rapid offensive maneuvers

Over time, landmines used by the United States and othercountries with advanced military forces have become morecomplex, more effective, and easier to use Advances in the1970s also led to the development of landmines capable ofdestroying or deactivating themselves after a given time Alllandmines currently in U.S stocks, with the exception ofthose intended for the defense of Korea, are self-destructingand/or self-deactivating

Other nations and nonstate actors, unfortunately, have sorted to less technologically advanced landmines, whichare inexpensive, easily obtainable, and highly effective.Most of these simple, nonself-destructing mines are de-ployed with no thought to keeping track of their locations

re-As a result, millions of these devices are still strewn acrossold battlefields APL have killed or maimed thousands ofinnocent civilians in the last 25 years and impeded the resto-ration of normal activities after conflicts have ended Hu-manitarian groups, international organizations, and manygovernments around the world have increasingly identifiedthese residual hazards as a threat to innocents and demandedthat all APL be eliminated

Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (otherwise known as the Con-

vention on Conventional Weapons, or CCW) was the firstinternational treaty to attempt to regulate the use of land-mines A review of the CCW in 1996 led to Amended Proto-col II, which, among other things, distinguished between theuse of APL and AT mines and restricted the uses of all APL.The United States has signed and ratified the CCW, includ-ing Amended Protocol II

Subsequent national and international campaigns

de-manding a total ban on APL led to the Convention on the

1 The Convention on Conventional Weapons, Amended Protocol II,

de-fines an APL as “a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the presence,

proximity, or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure, or kill

one or more persons” (see Appendix E).

Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and

Trans-fer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the

Ottawa Convention), which was signed by 122 countries in

Ottawa, Canada, on December 3, 1997, and entered into

force in March 1999 As of September 2000, 139 nations

had signed the Ottawa Convention, including all NATO

member states, except the United States and Turkey, and all

European Union member states, except Finland The Ottawa

Convention bans the use of all APL,2 whether used alone or

in mixed systems, including those that are self-destructing

and self-deactivating.3 Signatories are prohibited from

de-veloping, producing, acquiring, or stockpiling APL, as well

as assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone else to

under-take these actions All APL currently held by signatories

must be destroyed within four years of the signing

Despite showing early support for a ban on APL and

taking the lead in efforts to ameliorate residual effects, the

United States did not sign the Ottawa Convention President

Clinton stated that the United States would consider acceding

to the convention when alternative technologies that provide

capabilities similar to those of APL have been identified and

fielded He also announced that the United States would

undertake an active research and development program to

find such alternatives At the same time he established the

presidential policy that after 2003, the United States would

no longer use pure APL4 outside Korea, where landmines

are considered particularly important If alternatives for

Korea and for mixed systems can be found by 2006, the

president said, the United States will sign the Ottawa

Con-vention In the meantime, the United States has destroyed

three million nonself-destructing mines

U.S SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES

In 1997, the U.S Department of Defense (DOD) began

the task of developing alternatives to APL DOD initially

adopted a two-track approach Track I, led by the U.S Army,

was a search for alternatives to the nonself-destructing

landmines used in Korea Track II, a Defense Advanced

Research Projects Agency (DARPA) program, was focused

on an assessment of long-term, more technologically

ad-vanced alternatives that would effectively prevent access to

an area In 1999, Congress provided funds to add a third

track The goal of Track III, which overlaps both Track I

and Track II, is to find existing and new technologies and

operational concepts that can provide an equivalent to thecapabilities of (1) nonself-destructing APL; (2) APL used inmixed AT mine systems; and (3) current mixed landminesystems, including AT mines with antihandling devices

The National Academies

As part of the Track III initiative, DOD contracted withthe National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study ofexisting and new technologies that might provide an alterna-tive to APL In response, the Committee on AlternativeTechnologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines wasestablished The committee was asked to (1) identify andexamine possible tactics, technologies, and operational con-cepts that could provide tactical advantages similar to thoseprovided by APL by 2006; (2) suggest a near-term alterna-tive technology, weapon system, or combination of systemsthat could be derived from known, available systems or thatcould provide a short-term solution if the recommended al-ternative will not be available by 2006; and (3) describe howthe identified technologies and systems could be usedconsistently with current tactical doctrine and operationalconcepts or recommend changes in tactics or operationalconcepts This report is the result of that study

Political Context for the Study

The committee was asked to consider alternatives thatwould provide tactical advantages to U.S forces similar tothose provided by APL The committee also recognized that

it had an opportunity to recommend alternatives, especiallyimproved sensors and communications that would be moremilitarily effective than current APL However, consideringthe presidential policy and official statements regardingAPL, the committee recognized that one reason for the searchfor alternatives was to enable the United States to accede tothe Ottawa Convention The committee made no judgment

as to whether the United States should accede to the OttawaConvention

Conclusion 1 The major reasons for seeking alternatives to

current antipersonnel landmines (APL) are humanitarianconcerns, compliance with the Ottawa Convention, and en-hanced military effectiveness Indeed, this study would nothave been empanelled were it not for the Ottawa Conven-tion The current inventory of self-destructing and self-deactivating U.S APL is militarily advantageous and safe.They achieve desired military objectives without endanger-ing U.S warfighters or noncombatants more than otherweapons of war, but they are not compliant with the OttawaConvention However, humanitarian concerns and Ottawacompliance are not always synonymous In fact, some of theapparently Ottawa-compliant alternatives examined by thecommittee may be less humane than present U.S self-destructing and self-deactivating landmines

2 The convention does not prohibit command-detonated munitions, such

as the Claymore, although they are customarily described as APL.

3 The negotiators did not allow for the inclusion of self-destructing and

self-deactivating APL for several reasons These mines still fit the

defini-tion of APL, and no excepdefini-tions were to be made If an excepdefini-tion had been

made for these mines, primarily in the inventory of only the United States

and a few western European countries, exceptions might have had to be

made for weapon systems of other countries.

4 “Pure” APL are APL used alone and not as part of a mixed system.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3

Recommendation 1a If the decision is made to accede to

the Ottawa Convention, a transition period may be necessary

before implementation to maintain current U.S military

ca-pabilities until suitable alternatives can be made available

During that transition, existing destructing and

self-deactivating antipersonnel landmines should be retained,

both in their stand-alone form and as part of mixed systems

Recommendation 1b Of the solutions not compliant with

the Ottawa Convention, simply retaining the current

self-destructing and self-deactivating mines would be the best

course of action

COMMITTEE ASSESSMENTS

After reviewing the functions performed by landmines,

as well as the context within which these functions might be

needed now and in the future, the committee sought

alterna-tive ways of performing the same tasks The committee

re-viewed a broad variety of nonmateriel alternatives,

includ-ing innovative operational concepts and military tactics, and

materiel alternatives, such as weapon systems, nonlethal

de-vices, and improved sensors and communications The

al-ternatives considered included existing systems, concepts

under consideration or development, and new concepts

Although a number of these ideas are not fully developed,

they might be a basis for new approaches for the future

A prominent feature of many alternatives is the

“man-the-loop,” which ensures a positive identification of an

in-truder before a response element is activated The

man-in-the-loop concept envisions a soldier/operator positioned in

such a way that he can observe the minefield and determine

whether or not the intruder is a friend, an enemy, or a

non-combatant New technologies, especially improved sensors

and communications, would enable the soldier/operator to

make a faster, more accurate identification, which would be

beneficial for humanitarian purposes and would reduce

frat-ricide However, a man-in-the-loop also introduces a variety

of new vulnerabilities

Conclusion 2 The rapid emergence of new technologies

after 2006 will create opportunities for the development of

systems that can outperform today’s antipersonnel landmines

and that would be compliant with Ottawa

Recommendation 2a The development of sensor-net

tech-nology should be pursued aggressively and eventually

in-corporated into a fully militarized, deployed system

char-acterized by networking, strong detection and tracking

capabilities, robustness, low power consumption, low cost,

covertness, low probability of intercept, easy deployment,

and disposability

Recommendation 2b Investments already being made in

new technologies for other purposes should be leveraged and

applied to the search for alternatives to antipersonnel

landmines

Evaluation Methodology

Unfortunately, the committee did not have enough time

or resources to use independent modeling or simulations inevaluating the alternatives Therefore, the committee devel-oped a score sheet to assess systematically the effectiveness

of alternatives The resulting analysis is admittedly tive, and the results are qualitative rather than quantitative.Guided by the Statement of Task, the committee firstscreened alternatives in terms of their availability by or be-fore 2006 Because 2006 is near, especially in terms of thesteps required for fielding an alternative system, and becauseremarkable improvements in technology are forecast for thenear future, alternatives that might become available after

subjec-2006 were also considered

Each of the alternatives was considered against a baseline,depending on whether it was intended to be used againstdismounted or mounted targets The M14 and M16, currentAPL that are nonself-destructing and require hand emplace-ment, were used as the baseline for alternatives against dis-mounted targets The Volcano (M87), a mixed system thatincludes self-destructing APL to protect AT mines, was used

as the baseline for alternatives against mounted targets.The committee used several criteria to judge the alterna-tives against these baseline systems: military effectiveness;humanitarian concerns; technical risk; tactics and operationalconcepts; and cost To determine whether an alternativewould meet DOD’s military requirements, the committeeused the two mission need statements developed by DODfor APL alternatives as a basis for assessing military effec-tiveness The humanitarian intent of international agree-ments such as the Ottawa Convention and the CCWAmended Protocol II, although not specified in the State-ment of Task, was an implicit basis for this study and wasalso considered a criterion The committee also consideredthe overall technical risk of an alternative, that is, whetherthe technology could feasibly be developed and manufac-tured The committee also indicated whether an alternativewould require a change in tactics and operational concepts.The last criterion was cost Although the sponsor indicatedthat cost should not be a driving factor in the selection of analternative, the committee decided a rudimentary consider-ation of cost was necessary

Table ES-1 lists all of the current systems and tives considered by the committee Descriptions can befound in the body of the report The alternatives that arementioned in the committee’s conclusions and recommen-dations are described briefly below

alterna-NONMATERIEL ALTERNATIVES

The committee first considered whether nonmateriel ternatives, such as changes in tactics and operational con-cepts, could fully compensate for the elimination of APL

al-TABLE ES-1 Current and Potential Systems Considered in This Report

Alternatives Available by 2006

Nonself-Destructing Alternative (NSD-A) Track I APL Y L *** H D

Wide Area Munition Product Improvement Program (WAM PIP) AT Y L Y H D

Remote Area-Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM) Track I Mix Y L N R R D

Canister-Launched Area-Denial System (CLADS)**** n/m n/a N/L Y R R D

Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) with

Random Fuzing (Popcorn)

Alternatives Available After 2006

Tags/Minimally Guided Munitions Track II n/m n/a n/a Y R D

RAAMS Enhanced with Telemetry and Sensor Package (RD Sensor) AT Y L Y R C

Self-Healing Minefield Track II AT Y L Y R D

Early Warning Subsystem for Remotely Delivered AT Minefields

(EWSS)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

Conclusion 3 By 2006, alternative tactics or operational

concepts could not, on their own, provide tactical

advan-tages similar to those provided by antipersonnel landmines,

without a significant increase in force structure In certain

situations, however, some nonmateriel alternatives might be

useful: increased reconnaissance forward; more soldiers or

weapon systems in a given battlefield area; more

command-detonated Claymores to protect against a dismounted enemy;

antitank mines remotely delivered “just in time” to support a

maneuver and inhibit the enemy’s ability to breach; and

speed, mobility, and offensive tactical operations

MATERIEL ALTERNATIVES

Alternatives Available Today

Of the five APL currently in the U.S arsenal, only the

Claymore, which is activated by a man-in-the-loop, can be

used under the terms of the Ottawa Convention All three

existing AT mines are usable under the Ottawa Convention,but APL munitions could not be used to protect them

In addition to landmines, several other systems have beenproven effective against tanks and large ground vehicles All

of these are air-delivered, precision weapons, however, andprobably could not be rapidly delivered on target Each ofthese alternatives fell well short of meeting the military ef-fectiveness criteria compared to the Volcano baseline Al-though not included in the scoring criteria, the committeewas also concerned about the unintended consequences ofunexploded ordnance that might result from these weapons.These residual effects could be worse than those of self-destructing and self-deactivating APL

Alternatives Available by 2006

Between now and 2006, many innovations will be made

in weapons technology and sensors and communications.Alternatives that use these technologies will feature newcharacteristics, such as separation of sensors and kill

TABLE ES-1 Continued

Ground-Emplaced Mine Scattering System (GEMSS) Mix Y L N R R E

Key: SD/SDA = self-destructing/self-deactivating, APL = antipersonnel landmine, AT = antitank landmine, mix = combination

of APL and AT, n/m = nonmine, n/a = nonapplicable, N = no, Y = yes, L = lethal, N/L = nonlethal, R = remotely delivered, H = hand emplaced, E = existing system, C = committee concept, D = in development, O = other.

*Systems in bold italics would be unavailable if the United States ratifies the Ottawa Convention.

**Compliance is based on the definition in the Ottawa Convention.

***Ottawa compliance would depend on whether the battlefield override switch was part of the design.

****This system is assumed to be used alongside AT mines.

*****Existing mine systems are discussed in Appendix C.

mechanisms and improved communications between sensors

and soldiers However, unless DOD gives these new

tech-nologies a very high priority, six years will not be long

enough for the weaponization of any innovative technology

Alternatives for Use Against Dismounted Targets

The committee evaluated six alternative deterrents to

dis-mounted threats, four of which are described below: the

Nonself-Destructing Alternative (NSD-A) Program; the

Hand-Emplaced Sensor Field (HESF); the Bounding

Non-lethal Munition (BNLM); and the Taser nonNon-lethal munition

The DOD Track I concept, NSD-A, whose

man-in-the-loop design makes the system Ottawa compliant, has a high

potential of providing tactical advantages for U.S forces

similar to those provided by current M14 and M16 APL To

be available for implementation by 2006, this system would

require concerted, aggressive development and a streamlined

acquisition process Enhancements to the NSD-A system,

such as additional sensors and nonlethal elements, could be

added over time

The DOD must also decide whether or not to include a

capability in the software design of the NSD-A5 to permit

the soldier/operator to put the system in an autonomous

mode This capability has been referred to as the “battlefield

override switch.” With this feature engaged, the

man-in-the-loop would no longer be necessary to activate the munition,

which would become a conventional, target-activated,

self-destructing APL The committee recognized that the

NSD-A with the switch would provide greater military flexibility

in responding to an intruder However, the committee

con-cluded that the NSD-A without a battlefield override switch

would have significant tactical advantages over the existing

M14/M16 APL and would reduce the potential for fratricide

and noncombatant casualties

Conclusion 4 For use against dismounted forces, the Track

I alternative to nonself-destructing landmines (NSD-A)

could provide, by 2006, similar or enhanced tactical

advan-tages for U.S forces as compared to those provided by

current nonself-destructing antipersonnel landmines The

battlefield override switch, a software capability that allows

the system to operate autonomously, is highly contentious

because, as presently designed, it would render the NSD-A

non-Ottawa compliant Even though the timing of a decision

on the switch or other programmatic delays could jeopardize

the timeline, the NSD-A system appears to be technically

mature enough to be available by 2006 This weapon system

could be greatly enhanced in the future by planning for the

inclusion of additional sensors, nonlethal elements, and an

Ottawa-compliant battlefield override capability

Recommendation 4a The development and production of

the Track I alternative to nonself-destructing landmines(NSD-A) system should be aggressively pursued to ensureits availability by 2006

Recommendation 4b Two suites of weapon software

should be developed simultaneously in preparation for apresidential decision concerning the Ottawa Convention Ifcompliance with the Ottawa Convention were desired, thebattlefield override switch, as currently designed, would not

be used in the production of the NSD-A If the presidentdecides that other considerations outweigh Ottawa compli-ance, the option of retaining the switch would be available

In any case, Ottawa-compliant variations to the battlefieldoverride switch should be explored to provide the UnitedStates with greater flexibility

The HESF could exploit the effectiveness of currentweapons by providing early warning and enabling man-in-the-loop control The sensor field would be a combination

of sensor technologies, including existing military systems,off-the-shelf technologies, and sensors being actively devel-oped by the military science and technology community.The operator and his chain of command would respond

to confirmed enemy targets with an appropriate killmechanism

Recommendation 4c Sensor technology should be

lever-aged immediately to develop sensor systems to improve asoldier’s ability to discriminate among friends, foes, andnoncombatants in all terrain and all weather conditions atmuch greater battlefield ranges

Two promising nonlethal alternatives, the BNLM and theTaser nonlethal munition, were also considered as deterrents

to dismounted threats Both weapons could be developedeventually as remotely delivered devices to provide protec-tion against dismounted breaches of AT minefields Non-lethal alternatives are described and assessed later in thissummary

Alternatives for Use Against Mounted TargetsThe committee compared nine alternatives to the Vol-cano M87 baseline, four of which are discussed below: theRemote Antiarmor Mine System (RAAMS) enhanced withtelemetry (RD-Telemetry); the Hornet/Wide Area Munition(WAM) Product Improvement Program (PIP), the WAMPIP; the Remote Area-Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM);and the Canister-Launched Area-Denial System (CLADS).The committee was also provided with descriptions of sys-tems under consideration by DOD as part of the Track IIIsearch for alternatives None of these systems had beendeveloped enough to be assessed, although several didappear to be promising Because of the need to protect pro-prietary information, none of them is described here

5 A separate study is under way by an office within DOD to assist with

this decision.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7

One concept developed by the committee was the

RD-Telemetry (RAAMS enhanced with telemetry) This

concept would involve upgrading the existing RAAMS

projectile, which contains AT mines, with a subminiature

telemetry and communications package that could calculate

the precise locations of dispensed mines and send the

infor-mation back to friendly forces Although significant research

and development would be necessary, the technology might

be useful not only for RD-Telemetry, but also for other

submunitions

The system the committee considered the best alternative

against a mounted enemy that might be available by 2006

was the Hornet/WAM PIP This two-phased, evolutionary

improvement program for the existing Hornet/WAM would

add a man-in-the-loop to control the minefield, better

sen-sors to improve target detection, and an improved

dual-purpose warhead The WAM PIP’s much greater kill-radius

would provide military advantages over the baseline

Vol-cano M87 The disadvantages of this mine are its large size

and that it cannot be remotely delivered

Conclusion 5 Under current policy, no fully equivalent

al-ternative to mixed systems is likely to be available by 2006

Other than the Track III search for an alternative, little is

being done that could lead to the fielding of a satisfactory

alternative The Hornet/Wide Area Munition (WAM), with

its large lethal radius and antihandling device, could replace

most of the tactical functions currently provided by mixed

systems but has no remote delivery capability If a

satisfac-tory remote delivery capability could be developed by 2006,

the Hornet/WAM appears capable of performing the

mixed-minefield mission satisfactorily

Recommendation 5a Promising Track III concepts should

be developed into weapon system programs The

develop-ment of any of these concepts by the 2006 deadline,

how-ever, would require that considerable additional resources

be allocated for development and procurement

Recommendation 5b The feasibility, cost, and schedule of

providing a remote delivery option for the Hornet/Wide Area

Munition should be investigated Shock hardening of the

mine to withstand the impact of remote delivery appears to

be an Ottawa-compliant, low-risk solution to current mixed

minefields

One mixed system considered by the committee was

RADAM (Remote Area-Denial Artillery Munition), a

con-cept under development by the DOD Track I The RADAM

would combine existing Remote Antiarmor Mine System

(RAAMS) AT mines and the Area-Denial Artillery

Muni-tion (ADAM) APL, which are now fired separately, into one

projectile This would necessarily reduce the number of AT

mines per projectile, so more projectiles might be required

to cover a given area Although APL in mixed systems are

acceptable under current presidential policy, they would notcomply with the Ottawa Convention Until another alterna-tive is developed, using ADAM and RAAMS together, ratherthan developing RADAM, would be a better way to main-tain the mixed capability of artillery-delivered scatter-able mines

Conclusion 6 The Remote Area-Denial Artillery Munition

(RADAM), a mixed system, provides little or no militaryadvantage over the combined use of the Remote AntiarmorMine System (RAAMS) and the Area-Denial Artillery Mu-nition (ADAM) Because RADAM would be no more com-pliant with the Ottawa Convention than the ADAM/RAAMScombination, funding for its development could be betterspent on accelerating the development of an Ottawa-compliantalternative If DOD determines that an artillery-deliveredmixed system must be maintained, there are two options:(1) request a change in presidential policy to allow the con-tinued use of ADAM to be fired in tandem with RAAMS; or(2) develop RADAM The latter option would require takingthe Ottawa-compliant RAAMS out of the inventory to create

a new non-compliant munition

Recommendation 6 Until a long-term solution can be

de-veloped, the Area-Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM)should be retained in the inventory for use with the RemoteAntiarmor Mine System (RAAMS) Production of the Re-mote Area-Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM) should behalted and funding redirected toward the development oflong-term alternatives for mixed systems

The nonlethal CLADS, a joint Army-Marine Corps lethal program currently on hold, was evaluated both as aweapon launched separately from AT mines and as part of amixed system in the same canister as Volcano AT mines.CLADS emits an audible warning signal and projects rubberballs when activated by a trip wire In general, CLADS is apromising, nonlethal APL alternative that may provide someprotection for AT minefields from dismounted breaches

non-Conclusion 7 Although nonlethal variants by themselves

cannot replace antipersonnel landmines, they would be ful in certain military operations U.S forces will face abroad range of potential scenarios in the future, from peaceoperations to intense full combat With nonlethal variants,U.S forces could mount a graduated response in situationswhere the threat is unclear, such as peace operations, or iflarge noncombatant populations were in the immediate tac-tical area Nonlethal weapons have several advantages: theycan be used in a broad variety of circumstances; they can betriggered automatically; and they do not require man-in-the-loop operation to be Ottawa compliant, which could improvethe timeliness of a response and lessen the burden on thesoldier/operator

use-Recommendation 7 The development of nonlethal variants

to support antipersonnel landmine alternatives should be

emphasized Funding should be restored and development

accelerated for the nonlethal Canister-Launched Area-Denial

System (CLADS) The CLADS munition should then be

integrated into Volcano (M87A1) canisters to provide a mix

of antitank and nonlethal antipersonnel munitions

Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006

Only well after 2006 will accelerated advancements in

technology lead to truly innovative alternatives to APL As

sensor technologies mature into reliable systems of systems,

multidimensional sensor networks will become available,

which will dramatically improve situational awareness on

the battlefield

Conclusion 8 After 2006, improvements in the tactical

ef-fectiveness of existing or proposed remotely delivered

anti-tank (AT) landmines ought to be technologically feasible,

which could eliminate the need for mixed systems Future

systems that separate the sensor from the shooter could be

improved by multiple means of remote deployment and

re-sistance to countermeasures through signature reduction and

other techniques Track III programs, like the Track I

initia-tive, will require concentrated effort and stable funding In

the long term, the emergence of new technologies, such as

the ability to distinguish accurately between combatants and

noncombatants, will provide opportunities for the

develop-ment of systems that can outperform today’s antipersonnel

landmines

Alternatives for Use Against Dismounted Targets

The committee considered five systems that should be

available after 2006 for use against dismounted targets

When measured against the M14/M16 baseline, they all

ap-peared to meet both the military and humanitarian

re-quirements All of these systems involved a combination of

sensors, communication to a man-in-the-loop, and kill

mechanisms Given their preliminary state of development,

the committee did not make any specific recommendations

regarding these systems

Alternatives for Use Against Mounted Targets

The committee considered eight systems that might be

available after 2006 for use against mounted enemies The

concepts included enhancing current AT mines by adding

nonlethal devices, such as Tasers, to protect them from

be-ing breached, or a telemetry and sensor package that could

provide near real-time knowledge of the location of

scat-tered minefields or of a breach attempt The committee also

considered the Raptor, a smart, autonomous, AT system

already in development that will improve situational ness and provide targeting information to other weapons,such as the Hornet/WAM

aware-Recommendation 8a The Army should proceed rapidly

with plans for modernizing existing remotely delivered pureantitank landmine systems, such as the Remote AntiarmorMine System (RAAMS) and Volcano (M87A1), by incorpo-rating other technologies, including sensors, precision loca-tors, and nonlethal devices

The Self-Healing Minefield concept, a DARPA Track IIprogram, is an intelligent distributed network of mines withdecentralized control The individual mines detect breach-ing attempts through mine-to-mine communications and au-tomatically react by moving to fill gaps in the minefield.This innovative system is unlikely to be available in lessthan 10 years

Recommendation 8b The development of the Self-Healing

Minefield concept, which automatically reacts to any ing attempt by refilling gaps, should be experimentallyevaluated to determine its operational effectiveness

breach-The Distributed Web Sensor Complex (DWSC), the cus of a U.S Army science and technology program, is asensor network that would exploit future ground-based andair-based combat systems The concept envisions deliver-ing, by artillery or air, hundreds, or even thousands, of small,expendable sensors over a wide area Because the DWSCexploits the capabilities of future combat systems and doesnot require a dedicated kill mechanism, it appears to be one

fo-of the most effective future systems, and it scores very high

in the military effectiveness category

Other Considerations

The committee was briefed by representatives of zations, inside and outside DOD, on concepts and technolo-gies being developed for other purposes, such as non-minesystems, sensors for other defense purposes, and commer-cial devices Any of these technologies could be leveraged

organi-to provide elements of future alternatives organi-to APL

Recommendation 8c Several other technologies or systems

already under development for other purposes should be sidered as potential components of long-term alternatives toantipersonnel landmines, including unmanned air and groundvehicles, directed-energy weapons, battlefield sensory-illusion devices, passive transponders (e.g., tags), and otherlethal and nonlethal systems

con-Because U.S APL, other than some of those used inKorea, are self-destructing and self-deactivating, they do notpresent as great a danger to noncombatants as do other APL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9

Nor do they leave battlefield residue that may inhibit

post-war reconstruction For the safety of both U.S forces and

noncombatants, DOD should consider making other

non-recoverable explosive munitions destructing and

self-deactivating

Conclusion 9 The self-destructing and self-deactivating

capability of today’s U.S scatterable landmines, used in

ac-cordance with international law, is a desirable operational

capability because it (1) increases maneuver options and

(2) addresses humanitarian concerns by reducing residualexplosive hazards

Recommendation 9 Any nonrecoverable, explosive

alter-native to antipersonnel landmines should have destructing and self-deactivating fuzes to meet operationalrequirements, address humanitarian concerns, and reducefratricide among friendly troops The U.S governmentshould consider equipping all nonrecoverable explosivemunitions with similar technologies

1

Introduction

Antipersonnel landmines (APL), an often

low-technology, inexpensive staple of armies around the world,

became the center of international controversy as the

twenti-eth century drew to a close On one side of the debate were

the military utility of APL and doubts about the feasibility of

controlling their use; on the other side were the tragic

residual humanitarian effects of APL In December 1997,

122 countries signed the Convention on the Prohibition of

the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of

Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, known as the

Ottawa Convention, banning APL (see Appendix E for text)

The Clinton administration announced, “The United States

will sign the Ottawa Convention by 2006 if we succeed in

identifying and fielding suitable alternatives to our

anti-personnel landmines and mixed antitank systems by then”

(Berger, 1998) Since then, the United States has destroyed

millions of APL that did not have destructing or

self-deactivating devices In addition, in accordance with

Presi-dential Decision Directive 64, pure APL (i.e., those that are

not part of a mixed APL-antitank [AT] mine system) cannot

be used outside Korea after 2003 In the meantime, the

United States is searching for alternatives This National

Research Council1 study was part of the U.S government’s

efforts to determine if and when alternatives will be available

The Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace

Antipersonnel Landmines was created for the purpose of

(1) identifying and examining possible tactics, technologies,

and operational concepts that could provide tactical

advan-tages similar to those provided by APL by 2006; (2)

suggest-ing a near-term alternative technology, weapon system, or

combination of systems that could be derived from known,

available systems or that could provide a short-term solution

if the recommended alternative will not be available by 2006;and (3) describing how the identified technologies andsystems could be used consistently with current tacticaldoctrine and operational concepts or recommending changes

in tactics or operational concepts

This chapter provides background information on the velopment and use of landmines, including their use by theU.S military It then describes the residual hazardslandmines may pose to noncombatants during and after com-bat and to postwar relief and recovery activities Variousinternational agreements relating to the use of APL and theevolution of U.S policy are reviewed as a context for briefdescriptions of efforts to identify alternatives The State-ment of Task for this study, a description of the committeeprocess, and a road map for the report are provided at the end

de-of the chapter

DEFINITIONS

Several accepted definitions for APL are currently in use,leading to confusion over whether a specific APL is compli-ant with the Ottawa Convention or not The subtleties andimplications of the definitions continue to be the subject ofdiplomatic and scholarly debate The U.S Army doctrinal

manual on landmines, Field Manual 20-32, mine Operations, uses the following definition:

Mine/Counter-A landmine is an explosive device that is designed to destroy or damage equipment or personnel Equipment targets include ground vehicles, boats, and aircraft A mine is detonated by the action of its target, the passage of time, or controlled means There are two types

of land-based mines—AT [antitank] and AP [antipersonnel] (U.S Army 1998b)

Definitions in various treaty documents that specificallyaddress APL are shown in Box 1-1

For the purposes of this study, the committee used the

definition found in the Convention on Conventional ons (CCW), Amended Protocol II, an international conven-

Weap-tion that has been signed and ratified by the United States

1 The National Research Council is the operating arm of the National

Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the

Insti-tute of Medicine Together these institutions are known as the National

Academies.

The Union Army of the Potomac was pressuring Confederate forces retreating from Yorktown Suddenly a series of shells exploded beneath the hooves of Federal horses Pandemonium erupted as many whole Union companies bolted in panic (Robbins, 1997)

INTRODUCTION 11

(see Appendix E for text) APL that are part of mixed

sys-tems fall under this definition; antihandling devices2 do not

HISTORY OF MINES

The use of mine-like devices has a long history in

mili-tary operations,3 but widespread concerns have arisen only

recently, primarily because of the increasing proliferation of

mines A tenet of military operations is to force the enemy

into a disadvantageous position by controlling terrain and

the situation on the battlefield while conserving combat

power Ideally, all weapons used in war are designed to

provide friendly forces with maximum flexibility and to

in-flict maximum damage on the enemy In recent years, a

concerted effort has been made to reduce the effects of all

weapons on noncombatants—so-called collateral damage

The first landmines in the West (in the sixteenth century)required high maintenance and were susceptible to damp-ness By the nineteenth century, the availability of explosiveshells and the invention of the percussion cap enabled thedevelopment of more water-resistant mines (Schneck, 1998).APL were first used in the American Civil War by theConfederate Army during the Peninsula Campaign of 1862.Developed by Brigadier General Gabriel Rains and known

as land “torpedoes” or as the subterra explosive shell, theseAPL would explode when a soldier (or a horse or wagon)stepped on the fuze Although they were decried by GeneralMcClellan of the Union Army, similar devices were used byGeneral Sherman during his March to the Sea The idea ofmarking mines with small flags planted 10 feet in front ofthem on the defender’s side was introduced at this time.Explosive mining tunnels under fortified positions were used

at Vicksburg in 1863 and again at Petersburg in 1864 U.S.armies did not use mines again for 76 years (Croll, 1998).Landmines were used between 1865 and 1914 by Prussia(1870), the British (in numerous colony wars), and Russia(1904) In response to the introduction of tanks by the Brit-ish in World War I, the Germans fabricated explosive ATmines, improvised in the field from artillery projectiles.Later, mines were mass-produced to improve their effi-ciency By the end of the war, both sides had a small inven-tory of AT mines (Croll, 1998) As early as 1918, the Ger-mans had developed a methodology for laying minefields in

a pattern, marking and recording them, and protecting themwith observation and small-arms fire Soon thereafter, theAllies also initiated a doctrinal requirement that minefields

be marked and recorded

In World War II, landmines were widely used as acounterforce to the inherent mobility of large armored for-mations Concurrently, smaller APL were developed to dis-courage foot soldiers from disabling the AT mines4 and foruse in terrain where infantry forces predominated

The Germans, who developed extensive mine warfarepractices based on their antitank operations in World War I,had refined their methods for laying mines during the inter-war period Mines were typically laid in a uniform pattern;the friendly side of a minefield was usually marked, as werelanes and cleared areas; and locations of minefields wererecorded The minefields were observed and protected withcovering fire from antiarmor weapons, small arms, andartillery

Although no new aspects of mine warfare were introduced

in the Korean War, the lessons learned in World War II weretested and affirmed Mines were used during the KoreanConflict to cover withdrawals and to reinforce defenses.However, United Nations forces did not always mark andrecord minefields, which sometimes resulted in casualties tofriendly forces crossing unmarked minefields In some

BOX 1-1 Definitions of Antipersonnel Landmines

Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW),

Amended Protocol II

Antipersonnel mine means a mine primarily designed to be

ex-ploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and that

will incapacitate, injure, or kill one or more persons

Ottawa Convention

Antipersonnel mine means a mine designed to be exploded by the

presence, proximity, or contact of a person and that will

incapaci-tate, injure, or kill one or more persons Mines designed to be

detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle, as

opposed to a person, that are equipped with antihandling devices

are not considered antipersonnel mines as a result of being so

equipped.

2 Antihandling devices perform the function of a mine fuze if someone

attempts to tamper with the mine They are intended to prevent someone

from moving or removing the individual mine, not to prevent reduction of

the minefield by enemy dismounts An antihandling device usually

con-sists of an explosive charge that is connected to, placed next to, or

manufac-tured in the mine The device can be attached to the mine body and

acti-vated by a wire that is attached to a firing mechanism U.S forces can use

antihandling devices only on conventional AT mines (U.S Army, 1998b).

3 As early as the ninth century B.C., the Assyrian army dug tunnels under

walls and fortifications, creating breaches when the wooden beams

support-ing the tunnels were set on fire and the ground above them collapsed The

development of gunpowder by the Chinese in the ninth century and its later

production and use in Europe led to more effective mining (Schneck, 1998).

The term “mines” in reference to an explosive charge in or on the ground is

derived from these tunneling (or mining) activities 4 This action has come to be called a dismounted breach.

cases, unguarded minefields were removed and reused by

the enemy against United Nations forces (Roy and Friesen,

1999) Allied forces found that they could not always stop

waves of attackers willing to take the significant casualties

caused by forcing their way through an active minefield

After the war, the U.S military called for a light APL that

would guarantee casualties, which led to the development of

the M14 pressure mine and the M18 (Claymore) (Croll,

1998) United Nations forces were confident of the efficacy

of using APL to supplement other, more lethal means of

defense (Roy and Friesen, 1999) and South Korean and

American forces laid extensive minefields on the border

between North and South Korea to deter or delay an

inva-sion The growing importance of landmines was also

evi-denced by the emphasis on them in military field manuals

written after the Korean War Many also believed that mines

could help stop invading Warsaw Pact armies if a war broke

out in Europe

The developments in mine warfare after World War II

and Korea, especially the use of protective minefields to

guard well defined areas, such as borders, were of little use

to the United States in Vietnam Vietnamese, U.S., and

al-lied forces operated from base camps or fortified enclaves

throughout the country, but the insurgents, and later the

North Vietnamese, moved throughout the countryside

De-pending on the enemy’s objectives, the terrain, and other

factors, he was capable of conducting both standoff attacks

and ambushes

When U.S combat units arrived and established base

camps, minefields were emplaced in many locations to

pro-vide security perimeters These minefields were a

combina-tion of convencombina-tional nonself-destructing APL (i.e., M14s and

M16s), trip flares, and Claymores (M18s) In some cases,

improvised mines were also used Within a short time,

be-cause of the buildup of forces, many base camp perimeters

were expanded, which necessitated the clearance or

isola-tion of previously emplaced APL U.S forces also

aggres-sively patrolled outside their base camps, which posed the

problem of crossing defensive minefields Therefore, early

in the war, the use of APL in large defensive minefields

around U.S base camps was drastically reduced Later,

dur-ing the Vietnamization of the war, when the United States

had become less active offensively, mines were again used

to protect bases and camps

The APL most used by U.S and allied forces in Vietnam

was the M18 series Claymore, used extensively around base

camps and to protect positions established in the field, as

well as on ambushes by all combat units The Claymore was

a basic component of every infantryman’s gear

Although the United States developed several

experimen-tal mines specifically for use in Vietnam, none was

perma-nently adopted For example, the XM-61, a linear explosive

charge (similar to detonating cord) wrapped at intervals with

a fragmentation sleeve, was developed for use as a

com-mand-detonated mine along trails during ambushes Several

air-delivered mines were also introduced, including the

“Gravel Mine” (XM42 mine dispensing system), theBLU-42/B APL, BLU-43/B APL, and the BLU-45 (the firstscatterable AT mine) The BLU-43/B, also called the

“Dragontooth,” was filled with liquid explosive and nated by the application of about 7 kilograms of weight.Although the BLU 43/B was never adopted as a standardservice item by the United States, it was copied by the Sovi-ets (PFM-1 and PFM-1S, called the Butterfly) and used inlarge quantities in Afghanistan

deto-A major challenge for U.S forces in Vietnam wascountermine activities to minimize the use of mines by en-emy forces Mines became a constant threat during U.S.convoy operations to resupply base camps Command-detonated mines, either locally fabricated or made fromunexploded ordnance, such as artillery projectiles and aerialbombs, were buried beneath and alongside roads Findingthem and removing them was a daily challenge

The Viet Cong made extensive, effective use of minesand booby traps to protect their base areas and target pathsand roads Like the Irish Republican Army later in NorthernIreland, the Viet Cong used command-detonated and timer-detonated mines in populated areas as terrorist weaponsagainst military and civilian targets North VietnameseArmy units used mines in generally the same way as theirViet Cong counterparts By most accounts, this use of minesand booby traps inflicted a much higher percentage of casu-alties in Vietnam than it did in World War II or Korea andhad even more significant psychological effects.5

In the limited wars of the 1970s and 1980s, landminescontinued to be used, sometimes effectively and sometimesnot Guerilla forces in Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesiashowed that mines could be used effectively for “unconven-tional” warfare, to instill terror in the population or to forcemigrations by making an area uninhabitable The speed ofoperations during the Yom Kippur War (1973) demonstratedthat traditional minefields or mine tactics could sometimes

be a hindrance to one’s own movements Subsequently,many countries began working to improve their mines foruse in rapidly paced operations

In the early 1980s, the first self-neutralizing systems with

a selection of self-destruct times were deployed The ians developed helicopter-delivered, scatterable mine sys-tems Although these were an improvement over manuallyplaced mines, the helicopters were susceptible to ground fire.From these early systems, the United States developed the

Ital-“family of scatterable mines” (FASCAM), which can be livered by ground launcher, helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft,

de-5 According to sources cited by Roy and Friesen (1999), wounds and deaths in Vietnam from mines and booby traps were 11 percent and

15 percent, respectively, of all casualties in Vietnam, compared with 3 to

4 percent in World War II and Korea The authors also quote one account

of small unit actions in Vietnam: “The enemy they found hardest to combat was not the VC; it was mines.”

INTRODUCTION 13

or artillery FASCAM devices that can be deployed rapidly

and have self-destructing/self-deactivating mechanisms have

been integrated into current U.S doctrine for fast-paced,

maneuver warfare

The FASCAM were first deployed during the Gulf War

ahead of and behind Iraqi positions to prevent the movement

of forces They were also used against airfields and storage

facilities for chemical weapons The Iraqis, drawing in part

on their experience in the war with Iran in the 1980s, began

laying extensive, traditional minefields of both AT mines

and APL immediately after their occupation of Kuwait The

coalition forces, in turn, made extensive preparations to deal

with the minefields by eliminating Iraqi overwatching fires

and by thoroughly preparing to conduct countermine

opera-tions The offensive campaign plan was built around

coun-tering the Iraqi minefields and effectively neutralized their

impact on coalition forces As a result, the Iraqis were

un-able to stop, or even appreciably slow, the ground attack

against them Success was attributed to many factors,

in-cluding the coalition’s ability to survey minefields and

ex-ploit their weaknesses and the Iraqis’ inability to observe

and defend their barriers

RESIDUAL HAZARDS OF MINES

Nonself-destructing landmines, even when used

accord-ing to the generally accepted Western doctrine of markaccord-ing

and recording minefields, can continue to pose hazards after

conflicts have ended The danger of nonself-destructing

mines is part of the more general problem of unexploded

ordnance, although hazards from landmines are particularly

serious because they are target activated In 1960, five Civil

War era landmines found in Alabama were determined to be

capable of exploding on contact Since the 1940s, several

active mines from World War II have been found each year

scattered throughout Western Europe After the Gulf War,

landmines posed a hazard for both soldiers and civilians

Unfortunately, until the 1980s, most mines were not

self-deactivating or self-destructing

The adoption of self-destructing and self-deactivating

de-vices by the United States, which, when used in accordance

with accepted international practice, can largely eliminate

residual hazards, was copied only by its NATO allies and a

few other countries.6 Therefore, the bulk of the mines in use

around the world are still deactivating or

nonself-destructing APL Because they are cheap and easy to obtain,

they are especially attractive to regional and nonstate

belligerents

It is impossible to estimate accurately the number of

landmines around the world today The Office of

Humani-tarian Demining Program of the U.S Department of State

has used the figure of 60 to 70 million landmines in more

than 60 countries, mostly in Africa, the Middle East, east Asia, South America, and Latin America The Interna-tional Committee of the Red Cross estimates that during thelate 1980s and early 1990s landmines killed or maimed morethan 25,000 people each year (Patierno, 2000a) However,this figure may include a large number of casualties caused

South-by unexploded ordnance

In addition to causing casualties, the presence of mines can also seriously inhibit relief efforts during con-flicts and resettlement and reconstruction after conflicts areover Mine-infested land creates refugees and prevents theresettlement of people who fled during the conflict Even asuspicion that fields are mined may render them unusable If

land-a country’s infrland-astructure (roland-ads, bridges, land-and rland-ailroland-ads) hland-asbeen mined, economies are much more difficult to rebuild.The burden of uncleared landmines on war-devastated coun-tries was a major motivation for trying to prevent the em-placement of new mines For many international organiza-tions, governments, and nongovernmental organizations, thehumanitarian costs of mines outweigh their militaryadvantages

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

For centuries the international community has attempted

to minimize unnecessary wartime suffering by combatantsand noncombatants alike Beginning in the mid-1800s, theincreasing destructiveness of weapons made possible by in-dustrialization made the problem more urgent The 1864

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field introduced principles

upheld in later Geneva Conventions that the wounded betreated humanely regardless of nationality and that medicalpersonnel and units be regarded as neutral In 1899, andagain in 1907, the Hague Peace Conferences reaffirmed thelaws and customs governing land warfare As warfare wasextended to the air, concerns about the treatment of civilians

in enemy territory increased, and in 1949 the internationalcommunity addressed the issue of the safety of noncomba-

tants in the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War (ICRC, 1949) Throughout this report, the committee uses the term hu- manitarian, which can be construed to have more than one

Protec-meaning The principal meaning is the effort to protect combatants from the effects of wartime weapons As, a cor-ollary, humanitarian also refers to compliance with the inter-national agreements limiting or banning mines Thehumanitarian intent of these instruments was the basis forthe committee’s development of the humanitarian criteriafor alternatives to APL described in Chapter 4

non-Convention on non-Conventional Weapons

From time to time, the international community has tempted to regulate the possession or use of a weapon or

at-6 This has been attributed to their greater complexity and higher

produc-tion and acquisiproduc-tion costs.

even to ban it completely The 1996 Chemical Weapons

Convention and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons

Convention are recent examples of the prohibition of a

weapon The 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or

Restric-tions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which

May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have

Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) was the first international

treaty to attempt to regulate the use of landmines

specifi-cally The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the

Use of Mines, Booby-traps and Other Devices (Protocol II)

proscribed the use of APL against civilians or in areas of

civilian settlement, as well as their indiscriminate use (i.e.,

not directed at a military objective) The CCW required

accurate recording of all mines to facilitate their removal,

and prohibited the use of remotely delivered mines unless

they had neutralizing mechanisms or their locations could be

accurately recorded The protocol also called for agreements

after the cessation of hostilities, among the parties to the

conflict and with other states and international organizations,

as necessary, to remove all mines or render them ineffective

Shortcomings of the protocol included: (1) it was not

appli-cable to internal conflicts; (2) it did not provide a probation

period for modifying non-detectable APL, and (3) it did not

cover long-lived APL (Matheson, 1999)

After an extensive review of the CCW, an amended

landmine protocol was issued in May 1996 addressing these

shortcomings (see Appendix E for the text) Amended

Pro-tocol II, which entered into force on December 3, 1998,

dis-tinguishes between APL and AT mines and further restricts

the use of mines and minefields All APL must be

detect-able (i.e., manufactured or modified with a minimum amount

of metal content specified in the Technical Annex to the

Pro-tocol) All remotely emplaced APL must be equipped with

self-destructing devices and backup self-deactivating

de-vices All nonremotely emplaced APL must either be placed

in an area with a marked and monitored perimeter or must be

equipped with self-destructing and self-deactivating devices

Amended Protocol II also established rules governing the

transfer of landmines and extended the protocol to cover the

use of landmines in internal conflicts As of June 15, 2000,

50 countries were party to the Amended Protocol II (79 were

party to the CCW)

The CCW, including Amended Protocol II, will be

re-viewed again in 2001 The United States envisions further

improvements to the protocol with respect to applying the

APL detectability standards to AT mines, the adoption of

increased self-destruction and self-deactivation

require-ments, and adding a verification and compliance mechanism

(Matheson, 1999)

The Ottawa Convention

At the same time the CCW was undergoing review,

non-governmental organizations began to address the issue of the

use and humanitarian consequences of landmines In 1992,

six nongovernmental organizations (Handicap International,Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advi-sory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and VietnamVeterans of America Foundation) joined forces to create theInternational Campaign to Ban Landmines, which called for

a total ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer

of APL (ICBL, 2000) National campaigns in several tries followed, many nongovernmental organizations world-wide7 joined in the fight, and the International Campaign toBan Landmines gradually gained the support of several like-minded governments, most notably Canada

coun-In October 1996, the Canadian government hosted the

Towards a Global Ban on Landmines: International egy Conference, which was attended by representatives of

Strat-74 countries At the conclusion of the meeting, 50 ment participants agreed to a statement expressing the needfor a ban on APL and Canada announced it would hold atreaty-signing conference for a total ban in December 1997.Preparatory conferences to discuss and develop the text of adraft treaty, prepared initially by Austria, were held inVienna in February 1997, Bonn in April 1997, and Brussels

govern-in June 1997 The treaty was negotiated over a three-weekperiod in September 1997 in Oslo, Norway On Decem-

ber 3, 1997, 122 nations signed the Convention on the bition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (called the

Prohi-Ottawa Convention or Mine Ban Treaty) in Prohi-Ottawa (seeAppendix E)

The Ottawa Convention bans the use of APL under anycircumstances The ban includes APL used alone, APL used

in mixed systems, and APL that are destructing and deactivating.8 Furthermore, it prohibits the development,production, or any other means of acquisition, stockpiling,retention, or transfer of APL to anyone, directly or indirectly.Governments that sign agree not to assist, encourage, or in-duce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohib-ited to a state party under this Convention Finally, eachsignatory must undertake to destroy or ensure the destruc-tion of all APL in accordance with the provisions of the Con-vention

self-By September 1998, 40 countries had ratified the tion, thus bringing it into force as international law on March

conven-1, 1999 As of September 7, 2000, a total of 139 nations hadsigned or acceded to the Ottawa Convention, including allNATO member states, except the United States and Turkey,and all European Union member states, except Finland Ofthe 139, 107 have ratified the convention (see Appendix F)

7 Currently, there are over 1,100 organizations in over 60 countries that are part of the campaign network (ICBL, 2000).

8 The negotiators did not allow for the inclusion of self-destructing and self-deactivating APL for several reasons These mines still fit the defini- tion of an APL and no exceptions were to be made If an exception had been made for these mines, primarily in the inventory of only the United States and a few western European countries, exceptions might have had to

be made for weapon systems of other countries.

INTRODUCTION 15

A number of major mine producers or nations in regions of

conflict, including Russia, China, Egypt, Israel, India,

Pakistan, and North and South Korea, have not agreed to

the treaty

THE U.S POSITION

Although the use of landmines by U.S forces did not

cre-ate the current humanitarian crisis, the U.S government has

taken strong actions toward mitigating the effects of

indis-criminate use of APL around the world These actions

in-clude a ban on exports, assistance with clearance of mines

(also called demining), assistance to victims, and a search

for alternatives to APL

Ban on Exports

As a result of legislation introduced by Senator Patrick

Leahy (D-Vermont), the United States has had a moratorium

on exports of APL since 1992 (Rieser, 1999) The first

one-year moratorium on exports became law on October 23,

1992, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1993 The United States thus became the first

country to enact legislation controlling APL The

morato-rium was extended to four years in the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 and to five years in

the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related

Pro-grams Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1996 On January

17, 1997, President Clinton announced that the United States

would permanently ban the export and transfer of APL

(White House, 1997a)

Mine Clearance and Assistance to Victims

Since 1988, the United States has been assisting countries

affected by landmines in several ways: promoting awareness

(educating people about the dangers of landmines and what

to do when they are found); actively searching for mines and

clearing minefields; and providing assistance to victims

Since 1993, the United States has provided assistance to

more than 35 countries (Patierno, 2000b)

The Humanitarian Demining Program was created in

1993 to establish self-sustaining, indigenous demining

programs, reduce civilian casualties, facilitate the return of

refugees, enhance the stability of affected nations, and

en-courage international cooperation and participation The

Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining,

chaired by the U.S Department of State with the U.S

De-partment of Defense (DOD) as vice-chair, is responsible for

approving, developing, and coordinating U.S humanitarian

demining policies and programs (DOS, 2000) Since 1994,

the U.S military has trained indigenous forces in demining

techniques and assisted in the establishment of in-country

training programs

Movement Toward a Ban

President Clinton first called for the elimination of APL

in a speech to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly

on September 26, 1994 (White House, 1994) On May 16,

1996, he announced a new policy, including a commitment

to pursue an international ban on APL and to destroy aboutthree million nonself-destructing APL by the end of 1999,retaining only those necessary for training and for defense ofthe Demilitarized Zone in Korea (White House, 1996) OnDecember 10, 1996, the UN General Assembly voted(156-0) in favor of a U.S.-initiated resolution urging states

to pursue an agreement to ban APL

In the meantime, the United States continued to work ward limiting the use of landmines On January 7, 1997, thepresident transmitted the CCW Amended Protocol II to Con-gress for ratification; Congress ratified it on May 24, 1999.The United States had also planned to work toward a world-wide treaty banning APL through the United Nations Con-ference on Disarmament, which largely deals with nuclearmatters and operates on a consensus rule (White House,1997a) This initiative did not elicit support from other mem-bers of the conference

to-The Ottawa Convention

Despite America’s strict limitations on APL and its initialsupport for a ban, the United States has not signed the Ot-tawa Convention The U.S government had expressed bothgeneral and specific concerns throughout the negotiations,but in the end, two primary concerns dominated As Presi-dent Clinton explained on September 17, 1997, for theUnited States to sign the treaty, two provisions would have

to be included First, the United States wanted a transitionperiod during which APL could be phased out to ensure thatenough time would be available to devise alternatives Sec-ond, the United States wanted to preserve its mixed AT minesystems, which include APL, as additional protection againstdismounted breaching (Clinton, 1997; Witkowsky, 1999).The decision not to sign the Ottawa Convention wasstrongly influenced by security concerns on the Korean Pen-insula (Witkowsky, 1999) The U.S government and theU.S military were convinced that APL, including APL with-out self-deactivation/self-destruction mechanisms and APL

in mixed systems, are essential to the defense of the tarized Zone in Korea “The security situation in Korea isunique, requiring the United States to maintain the option ofusing [APL] there until alternatives are available or the risk

Demili-of aggression has been removed” (White House, 1997b) AsGeneral John H Tilelli, then Commander in Chief (CINC),

UN Command/Combined Forces Command (UNC/CFC),and Commander, U.S Forces Korea, testified before theHouse Armed Services Committee:

… these weapons, both the non-destructing and deactivating types, are absolutely vital to the success of UNC/CFC’s

self-mission to deter North Korea aggression and defend the [Republic

of Korea] (Tilelli, 1999)

Although the United States would not sign the Ottawa

Convention in 1997, the president announced further

refine-ments to U.S policy as a demonstration of the U.S

commit-ment to ending the use of all APL:

… I’m directing the Department of Defense to develop alternatives

to antipersonnel land mines so that by the year 2003 we can end

even the use of self-destruct land mines everywhere but Korea.

As for Korea, my directive calls for alternatives to be ready by 2006,

the time period for which we were negotiating in Oslo By setting

these deadlines, we will speed the development of new

technolo-gies… In short, this program will eliminate all antipersonnel land

mines from America’s arsenal (Clinton, 1997)

President Clinton had repeatedly stated that the U.S goal

is to sign the Ottawa Convention as soon as its concerns

have been met Assistant to the President for National

Secu-rity Affairs Samuel Berger reiterated this commitment in a

letter to Senator Leahy stating that the United States would

search for alternatives for Korea and for mixed AT mine

systems, including replacements for APL in mixed systems

or replacements for the mixed systems entirely If both

al-ternatives (for Korea and for mixed systems) could be found

by 2006, the United States would sign the Ottawa

Conven-tion (Berger, 1998) If the United States decides to sign the

Ottawa Convention, all of the APL in the current inventory,

except the command-detonated Claymore, would be banned

and would have to be destroyed within four years of the

signing

Search for Alternatives

In a memo dated October 21, 1997, the deputy secretary

of defense assigned the Office of the Under Secretary of

Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) to develop

and oversee a two-track program to find alternatives to APL

Track I, headed by the secretary of the Army, has two major

components: (1) the search for an alternative to the

nonself-destructing APL designated for use in Korea and (2) the

de-velopment of Remote Area-Denial Artillery Munition

(RADAM) for use in Korea until 2006 (or when suitable

alternatives are available).9

The purpose of Track II, headed by the Defense Advanced

Research Projects Agency (DARPA), is to develop

“alterna-tives to meet the requirements currently met by APL” and to

“investigate maneuver denial approaches that may be more

innovative and/or take advantage of advanced technologies”

(Altshuler, 1999) DARPA’s current efforts are focused on

the development of a self-healing minefield and mally guided munitions (for a description and assessment ofeach of these, see Chapter 7)

tags/mini-In June 1998, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 64added the requirement that DOD “actively investigate alter-natives to the anti-personnel submunitions used in our mixedanti-tank systems, as well as actively explore possible re-placements for all mixed munitions” (DOD, 2000) The can-didate alternatives must be militarily advantageous, cost ef-fective, and safe PDD 64 did not include a schedule

A memorandum on March 23, 1999, from the deputy retary of defense created the Track III program under theleadership of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) The initial pur-pose of Track III was to address “doctrine, tactics, forcestructure options, use of combat systems currently fielded orunder development, Track 1 and 2 alternatives, materiel andnon-materiel alternatives, and alternatives recommended bythe combatant commanders.” The first phase of conceptevaluation was to assess alternatives that could be developedand fielded for the near term (by 2006), the midterm (2006

sec-to 2012), and the long term (beyond 2012) (DOD, 2000).Track III guidance was eventually focused on the devel-opment of materiel or nonmateriel alternatives to replace alllandmines Nicknamed RATTLER (rapid tactical terrainlimiter), a number of working groups were formed to carryout the first phase of the Track III program An array of 74refined ideas were gradually reduced to 22 idea categories,then 17 initial concepts, nine combined concepts, and even-tually seven final concepts, three of which are undergoingconcept exploration by industry (and are considered propri-etary) RATTLER projects are exploring three principalconcepts: (1) the use of sensors that are not co-located withthe effects (lethal or nonlethal responses) that require “just-in-time” delivery or prior placement of the responding weap-ons; (2) sensors and effects (lethal and nonlethal) that areco-located; and (3) sensors that are used for situationalawareness and are protected by AT mines (Morelli, 2000).The identification of alternatives for landmines will re-quire considerable effort To date, progress on Track I hasbeen slow and technologies being explored under Track IIwill not be available until well after 2006 The conceptsdeveloped under the first phase of Track III are too new forthe committee to judge their potential

Recommendation If the decision is made to accede to the

Ottawa Convention, a transition period may be necessarybefore implementation to maintain current U.S military ca-pabilities until suitable alternatives can be made available.During that transition, existing self-destructing and self-deactivating antipersonnel landmines should be retained,both in their stand-alone form and as part of mixed systems

Recommendation Of the solutions not compliant with

the Ottawa Convention, simply retaining the current

9 The Remote Area-Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM) would

com-bine AT mines (the Remote Antiarmor Mine System [RAAMS]) and APL

(the Area-Denial Artillery Munition [ADAM]) into a single projectile to

create a new mixed system Although RADAM fulfills the requirement set

by President Clinton to eliminate pure APL everywhere but Korea by 2003,

it would not be compliant with the Ottawa Convention because it contains

APL (see Chapters 5 and 6).

INTRODUCTION 17

self-destructing and self-deactivating mines would be the

best course of action

Funding for Alternatives

The progress report by DOD to Congress on the search

for alternatives included a table (Table 1-1) showing current

and projected funding levels (DOD, 2000)

Congressional Mandate

In addition to providing direction and funding for the

search for alternatives, the Strom Thurmond National

De-fense Authorization Act for FY99 (Public Law 105-261,

Section 248) and the conference report accompanying the

1999 Department of Defense Appropriations Act (H.R

105-746) mandated that the secretary of defense enter into

con-tracts with two scientific organizations to study alternatives

to APL DOD concluded contracts with (1) a U.S

Depart-ment of Energy team of Lawrence Livermore and Los

Alamos National Laboratories and (2) the National

Acad-emy of Sciences These studies are part of the Track III

effort The following statement of task was agreed to

be-tween DOD and the National Academy of Sciences for work

to be carried out by its operating arm, the National Research

Council

The National Research Council, building on its experience in

ex-amining and assessing potential technologies for military

applica-tion, will appoint a committee that will:

1) Identify and examine possible alternative tactics, technologies,

and operational concepts for APL capable of providing similar

tac-tical advantages for U.S forces A solution should be selected for

its ability to meet the future warfighting needs of U.S forces and

provide the strategic and tactical benefits of the system it is

replac-ing If selected alternatives require research and development to the

extent that they will not be available to implement before 2006, the

committee will suggest a near-term alternative technology, weapon

system, or combination of systems that can be derived from known,

already available systems or systems of systems that can act as a near term solution until the long-term solution is available.

2) Describe how the identified technologies/systems will best be applied for U.S force use consistent with current tactical doctrine and operational concepts, or what changes in tactics or operational concepts would be required to achieve comparable results.

COMMITTEE PROCESS

The use of APL is a sensitive and contentious politicaland military issue Therefore, in creating the Committee onAlternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Land-mines, the National Research Council (the operating arm ofthe National Academy of Sciences) selected committeemembers representing a broad spectrum of backgrounds,expertise, and interests Areas of expertise include technol-ogy development, experimental design, military operations,and defense policy (see Appendix A for biographies)

In addition, the committee relied on the expertise and vice of representatives of the National Security Council, theU.S Department of State, DOD, industry, and several non-governmental organizations Classified information wasprovided on several occasions to ensure familiarity with asmany aspects of the search for alternatives as possible In-formation available in the open literature and material sub-mitted by experts, as well as the practices of nations thathave already signed the Ottawa Convention (see AppendixF), were reviewed Meetings of the full committee werecomplemented by site visits by smaller subcommittees (Ap-pendix B)

ad-Even though the Statement of Task did not require thecommittee to consider the Ottawa Convention, the commit-tee concluded that this study would not have been empan-elled were it not for the Ottawa Convention and attendanthumanitarian concerns The committee believed the majorreasons for seeking alternatives to APL are humanitarianconcerns, compliance with the Ottawa Convention, and en-hanced military effectiveness The current inventory of

TABLE 1-1 Current and Projected Funding for Tracks I, II, and III (in $ millions)

self-destructing and self-deactivating U.S APL is militarily

advantageous and safe (i.e they achieve desired military

ob-jectives without endangering U.S warfighters or

noncomba-tants more than other weapons of war), but they are not

com-pliant with the Ottawa Convention However, humanitarian

concerns and Ottawa compliance are not always

synony-mous In fact, some of the apparently Ottawa-compliant

al-ternatives examined by the committee may be less humane

than present U.S self-destructing and self-deactivating

landmines Therefore, the committee spent a considerable

amount of time clarifying and defining the framework of the

treaty and included complying with the Ottawa Convention

as a criterion for evaluating alternatives

REPORT ROAD MAP

Chapter 2 characterizes the current and future national

security environments and describes how the functions

served by landmines might change with technological

ad-vances in weaponry Chapter 3 describes the current uses of

landmines Chapter 4 explains the committee’s selectioncriteria and methodology for analyzing alternatives Chap-ter 5 analyzes currently available technologies that mightprovide the same capabilities as APL Chapter 6 evaluatestechnologies and alternatives that should be available by

2006 Chapter 7 analyzes technologies and proposes natives that might be available after 2006 Chapter 8 is acomplete list of conclusions and recommendations Appen-dix A contains the biographies of committee members Ap-pendix B lists meetings of the full committee, site visits, andmeetings of subcommittees Appendix C gives a description

alter-of current types alter-of landmines Appendix D provides mation about how minefields can be breached and discussesthe value of APL in protecting minefields from breaching

infor-The texts of the CCW Amended Protocol II and the OttawaConvention are reprinted in Appendix E Appendix F liststhe countries that have signed and/or ratified the Ottawa Con-vention and any work on alternatives to APL by other coun-tries of which the committee was aware Appendix G pro-vides copies of DOD’s mission need statements for APLalternatives

2

National Security Environments and

the Context for Landmines

Current national security and potential warfighting

envi-ronments are complex and are expected to become even more

so Although the United States is nominally at peace, large

numbers of U.S forces are currently deployed around the

world, either as deterrents to aggression or as peacekeepers

This chapter describes the international environment through

the lens of planning documents used to prepare for an event

or series of events in which U.S military power will have to

be used Even though landmines, which are essentially

tac-tical weapons, are seldom mentioned, a description of these

documents will provide the reader with an idea of situations

in which mines would be used The chapter begins with

descriptions of current strategies, such as the national

secu-rity strategy, the defense strategy, and efforts by various

military services to implement these strategies This is

fol-lowed by the views of some of the U.S commanders

respon-sible for protecting U.S interests abroad Also described are

the technological opportunities provided by the ongoing

revolution in military affairs The chapter concludes with a

brief description of the benefits and vulnerabilities of

sev-eral advanced technology concepts

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES

The strategies described below provide a context for how

APL may be used in the future The committee reviewed

many strategy documents and was briefed by several

mili-tary leaders on how future operations might be conducted

In addition, the committee met with representatives of the

National Security Council and the U.S Department of State

A National Security Strategy for a New Century

Every year, as required by law, the president issues a

national security strategy defining the United States’ vital

national interests and how they should be protected In

De-cember 1999, President Clinton issued his annual update, A

National Security Strategy for a New Century, which

de-scribes anticipated threats to the United States The

strategy’s core objectives are to enhance America’s security,

bolster America’s economic prosperity, and promote racy and human rights abroad The president stated that

democ-“arms control and nonproliferation initiatives are an tial element of our national security strategy,” and the strat-egy referred specifically to APL:

essen-[The United States is] committed to ending the threat to innocent civilians from antipersonnel landmines (APL) The United States has already taken major steps toward this goal while ensuring our ability to meet international obligations and provide for the safety and security of our men and women in uniform President Clinton has directed the Defense Department to end the use of all APL, including self-deactivating APL, outside Korea by 2003 and to pur- sue aggressively the objective of having APL alternatives ready for Korea by 2006 We will also aggressively pursue alternatives to our mixed anti-tank systems that contain antipersonnel submunitions.

We have made clear that the United States will sign the Ottawa Convention by 2006 if by then we have succeeded in identifying and fielding suitable alternatives to our self-deactivating APL and mixed anti-tank systems (White House, 1999)

The national security strategy envisions that the U.S tary will be faced with an array of threats to our interests,including direct threats to the continental United States,small-scale contingencies, major theater wars, terrorism,cyber attack, information operations, and the threat or use ofweapons of mass destruction

mili-U.S Department of Defense Strategy

In his 1999 Annual Report to the President and the gress, the secretary of defense affirmed the value of a strong

Con-military, stating that the essence of the U.S defense strategybetween now and 2015 will be shaping the internationalsecurity environment, responding to the full spectrum ofcrises, as required, and preparing now for an uncertain future(DOD, 1999)

Echoing presidential concerns about current instabilityand anticipating the advantages that will accrue from U.S.scientific and technological superiority, the secretary ofdefense stated:

The fundamental challenge confronting the Department of Defense

is simple but daunting U.S armed forces must meet the immediate

…among the most deplorable developments…are (1) extensive use of antipersonnel mines in the conflicts in Chechnya and Kosovo, especially by Russian and Yugoslav forces, and (2) continued use of antipersonnel mines by treaty signatory Angola, and likely use of antipersonnel mines by treaty signatories Burundi and Sudan (Human Rights Watch, 2000)

demands of a dangerous world by shaping and responding

through-out the next 15 years, while at the same time transforming U.S.

combat capabilities and support structures to be able to shape and

respond effectively in the face of challenges in the future.

(DOD, 1999)

To carry out its strategy, the DOD will take the following

actions:

• Pursue a focused modernization program to replace

aging systems and incorporate cutting-edge

technolo-gies to ensure continued U.S military superiority

• Continue to exploit the revolution in military affairs to

improve the U.S military’s ability to perform

near-term missions and meet future challenges

• Exploit the revolution in business affairs to reengineer

DOD’s infrastructure and support activities

• Ensure against unlikely, but significant, future threats

so that risk in a resource-constrained environment can

be managed effectively, and position the military to

respond quickly and effectively to new threats as

they emerge

Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020

Joint Vision 2010, issued by the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in 1996, is consistent with both the

president’s national security strategy and DOD’s strategy

Joint Vision 2010 provides:

…the conceptual template for how America’s armed forces will

channel the vitality and innovations of our people and leverage our

technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in

joint warfighting (CJCS, 1996)

Based on assumptions about emerging information-age

tech-nologies, the strategy in Joint Vision 2010 depends on

un-precedented cooperation between the Army, Marine Corps,

Navy, and Air Force (Close, 1999)

Joint Vision 2020, issued in June 2000, builds on and

ex-tends the conceptual template established by Joint Vision

2010 to guide the continuing transformation of U.S forces.

The goal of the transformation is the creation of a force that

is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations,

based on the strategic concepts of decisive power, power

projection, overseas presence, and strategic agility

Al-though considerable emphasis is placed on information

op-erations, “…information superiority neither equates to

per-fect information, nor does it mean the elimination of the fog

of war” (CJCS, 2000) Joint Vision 2020 is based on the

following assumptions:

• The United States will continue to have global

inter-ests and to be engaged with a variety of regional

actors

• Potential adversaries will have access to the global

commercial industrial base and much of the same

tech-nology as the U.S military

• Potential adversaries will be able to adapt as U.S pabilities evolve

ca-Comments of Regional Commanders-in-Chief

Strong statements in support of the continued use oflandmines were made in the testimonies of two regionalCINCs before the U.S Congress General John H Tilelli,Jr., then CINC of the United Nations Command, CombinedForces Command, and U.S Forces Korea, testified that that

“these weapons…are absolutely vital to the success” of theU.S mission in Korea (Tilelli, 1999) During an informalmeeting with the committee, General Tilelli restated thisopinion (Tilelli, 2000) Mines have been used for many years

in Korea to defend the Demilitarized Zone and are pated to be used extensively if North Korea again attempts

antici-to cross the 38th parallel

Several factors are involved in the decision to use APL inKorea First, the allies anticipate having to fight with verylittle warning and being overwhelmingly outnumbered by anenemy seeking to enter Seoul, only 50 miles from the bor-der Therefore, the faster North Korea can be stopped thebetter Second, rugged mountains characterize much of thetopography In this type of terrain, mines are ideal forcreating obstacles that can slow a military advance(Troxell, 1999)

General Wesley K Clark, then CINC of the United StatesEuropean Command, stated that:

Self-destructing and self-deactivating APL, and anti-tank (AT)/APL mixed systems constitute a critical force protection and counter- mobility asset Our field commanders count on these systems to protect the force, influence maneuver, shape the battlespace, and mass combat power for decisive engagement The requirement for such a capability is increasing in light of evolving and future opera- tional concepts that envision our forces conducting dispersed opera- tions over expanded battlespace (Clark, 1998)

Concept for Future Joint Operations

The purpose of the Concept for Future Joint Operations,

issued in May 1997 by the CJCS, was to move the military

toward the implementation of Joint Vision 2010 The cept for Future Joint Operations is expected to be updated, based on Joint Vision 2020; for the present, however, this edition remains authoritative The Concept, which offers a

Con-marketplace of ideas and tools for thinking about future erations, identifies the following military-specific trends(CJCS, 1997):

op-• The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles willincrease the vulnerability of U.S and allied forces intheater and jeopardize access to ports and airfields

• Advanced technology weapons, platforms, and sensorswill significantly increase the capabilities of somemilitary forces

NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS AND THE CONTEXT FOR LANDMINES 21

• Microtechnology and biotechnology will create new

areas for activity and competition; breakthroughs are

likely in the military application of directed energy;

and information technology will be vital to military

operations

• Weapons will become more portable and more lethal,

and military forces will become more mobile, which

will complicate U.S and allied targeting

• Some states will rely on asymmetric capabilities (e.g.,

man-portable air defenses, advanced space

capabili-ties, information operations, landmines, chemical and

biological weapons, and terrorism) as substitutes for,

or complements to, large conventional forces

Joint Vision 2010 and the Armed Services

In keeping with their missions and drawing upon their

unique capabilities, the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air

Force have adapted their force structures, strategies, tactics,

people, weapons, and platforms, indeed the way they

con-duct warfare, to fulfill the broad objectives outlined in Joint

Vision 2010.1 The Army and the Marine Corps, the forces

that must fight ground wars, rely on landmine capabilities in

battlefield environments The Navy and the Air Force are

responsible for the air delivery of certain landmine systems

In addition, each service has a variety of weapon systems

capable of destroying enemy tanks and vehicles If these or

future weapons can destroy enemy tanks and vehicles more

efficiently than landmines, they might obviate the need for

certain landmine systems

In this section, the strategies developed by each military

service for moving toward 2010 are described The

strate-gies are simple, high-level blueprints, however, and

land-mines are not specifically mentioned

U.S Army

Army Vision 2010 (U.S Army, 1997a) anticipates the

Army’s contributions to the operational concepts identified

in Joint Vision 2010 Army Vision 2010 is based on the

assumption that land forces will exercise direct, continuing,

comprehensive control over an area of land, including

re-sources and people, thus solidifying the preliminary

advan-tages achieved by air power Doctrinally, the Army

antici-pates being outnumbered and, therefore will depend very

heavily on technological superiority

The geostrategic environment suggests that the Army

must be prepared for a range of future missions, which can

be categorized into seven general areas: (1) the defense

or liberation of territory; (2) a punitive intrusion; (3)

con-tainment of a conflict; (4) leverage; (5) reassurance; (6) core

security; and (7) humanitarian missions (humanitarian

missions that include a range of peace operations are ing increasingly common) (Rigby, 1999)

becom-The Army is moving toward a combat structure of forcesthat can be transported and deployed rapidly in times of cri-sis The centerpiece of this structure, a system of systemscalled the Future Combat System, consists of several net-worked functions, vehicles, and subsystems that could col-lectively provide overwhelming combat power Current con-cepts include an infantry carrier vehicle and robotic vehiclesthat can provide direct and indirect fire and sensing capabili-ties Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisitionand command and control will be part of the network(DARPA, 2000a) Scientific and technological research forthe Future Combat System may lead to the development ofother alternatives to landmines

U.S Marine Corps and U.S NavyMuch of the tactical environment described for the Army

will also apply to the Marine Corps Operational Maneuver from the Sea describes an environment in which some opera-

tions may require that bases be established ashore ever, most will involve units operating without interruptionfrom ships at sea to their inland objectives Improvements inthe precision of long-range weapons, greater reliance on sea-based fire support, possible reductions in the fuel consump-tion of military vehicles, and more direct, timely delivery oflogistics from sea to users ashore will enhance the MarineCorps’ operational maneuvers from the sea This approachwill not be limited to the high end of the spectrum of armedconflict but will be used in a variety of situations, rangingfrom a struggle against a rising peer superpower to humani-tarian relief operations (U.S Marine Corps, 1997)

How-With the termination of the Cold War, the Navy doned its maritime strategy, based on a war at sea with theSoviet fleet and land-based naval air, and adopted a forward-from-the-sea strategy The new strategy calls for focusingthe power of the fleet and embarked Marines through thelittorals and against land targets in regional conflicts (U.S.Navy, 1995)

aban-U.S Air Force

In response to Joint Vision 2010, the Air Force is in the

process of changing from the global-reach, global-power

strategy of the Cold War to a new strategy called Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force (U.S.

Air Force, 1998) The change is based on the conviction thatgood intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance com-bined with modern aircraft and weaponry will enable the AirForce to find, fix, track, and target anything that moves onthe surface of the earth Information superiority, along with

a command and control capability that can coordinateactivities and integrate them smoothly with those of the otherservices, will be an important factor in the Air Force’s ability

1 Changes based on Joint Vision 2020 are expected but have not been

published.

to achieve global-engagement capability The Air Force’s

capabilities can be divided into the following core

compe-tencies: air and space superiority; global attack; rapid global

mobility; precision engagement; information superiority; and

agile combat support As the lead service for space

explora-tion, the Air Force recognizes that space assets will also be

vitally important to its own operations, as well as to the other

services

Contrasting Opinions

The contentious nature of APL is reflected in diverse

opinions about their use, even within the military In an

open letter to President Clinton published in the New York

Times, 15 senior, well-respected retired military officers

an-nounced their support for a potential ban on APL: “We

sup-port such a ban as not only humane, but also militarily

re-sponsible” (New York Times, 1996).

BENEFITS AND VULNERABILITIES OF NEW

TECHNOLOGIES

With no threatening peer competitor to plan for and with

the continued rapid emergence of new technologies,

particu-larly information technologies, this would appear to be an

opportune time for the United States to make a concerted

effort to replace (or at least improve) the systems that

cur-rently provide APL functionalities In addition to retaining

the desirable characteristics of APL, new systems should

satisfy new requirements, including the capability of

distin-guishing among friends, foes, and noncombatants rapidly

and reliably, easy recovery after hostilities, and

environmen-tally benign effects (see Chapter 3)

Like most innovations, new technologies are bound to

have limitations As weapon systems become more

com-plex, they will also become increasingly vulnerable to

break-downs and to enemy countermeasures Better C4ISR

(com-mand, control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities will entail

in-creased bandwidth, which will also increase the potential for

unintended interference among friendly electronic emitters

Improvements in technology should improve U.S

war-fighting capabilities; at the same time legacy systems must

be able to absorb these advances

Revolution in Military Affairs

The U.S military is experiencing what many experts call

a “revolution in military affairs” (Krepinevich, 1994) In

their classic book War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn

of the 21st Century, futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler

ob-serve that “the way we make wealth is the way we make

war—that today’s revolutionary changes in business are

being mirrored in the world’s armies and the future of war

itself” (Toffler and Toffler, 1993) Just as the Agrarian Age

gave us the hoe and sword, and the Industrial Age gave usmass production and mass destruction, the Information Agewill give us the means to fight smarter and more effectively.The revolution in military affairs is defined as a majorchange in warfare brought about by the innovative applica-tion of technologies that, combined with dramatic changes

in military doctrine and operational concepts, will mentally alter the character and conduct of operations Sys-tems, such as the bow and arrow, the rifled gun tube, oraircraft, that use dramatically new technologies can create amajor break with the past (Krepinevich, 1994) The newtools invariably affect tactics, operational concepts, andstrategies

funda-Technology, particularly information technology, nowdefines the possible and is pushing old ideas, values, meth-ods, and organizations into obsolescence (Metz, 2000) Al-though information technology was used for military pur-poses prior to 1990 in isolated instances, the beginning ofthe present revolution in military affairs is usually traced tothe Gulf War, when the U.S public became aware of “smartweapons” and other advances (O’Hanlon, 2000) Since then,the U.S military has focused more and more on using tech-nology to gain battle space advantages and reduce U.S.casualties

Many advances in technology will be essential to tives to APL, especially in the areas of munitions, informa-tion, and communications The following examples areprovided as indicators of where these technologies mighttake us:

alterna-• Killing Devices High-energy explosives that release

energy very quickly have improved fragmenting nitions and shaped-charge weapons Munitions thatmust penetrate hulls, armor, and other obstructionsbefore they detonate require insensitive, high-energyexplosives The major outstanding issue is achieving

mu-a bmu-almu-ance between insensitivity mu-and performmu-ance(NRC, 1997)

• Sensors Infrared imaging systems have clearly

dem-onstrated their value on the battlefield Affordable,cooled and uncooled staring focal-plane arrays andassociated components that can operate in the mid-wave infrared and long-wave infrared bands willgreatly enhance their value This technology will sig-nificantly reduce the costs of operations and providewarfighters with better performing, smaller, lighterinfrared imaging systems (Samuels and Supola, 2000)

• Miniaturization Microelectromechanical systems

(MEMS) are a revolutionary enabling technology.Embedded into weapon systems, MEMS will providenew levels of situational awareness, information, pre-cision strike capabilities, and new weapons by provid-ing the advantages of small size, low power, low mass,low cost, and high functionality to integrated electro-magnetic systems The primary goal of the DARPA

NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS AND THE CONTEXT FOR LANDMINES 23

MEMS program is to develop technology that merges

sensing, actuating, and computing into new systems

that will increase the perception and performance of

weapon systems and the control of battlefield

environ-ments (DARPA, 2000b)

• Platforms Advances in the development of unmanned

aerial vehicles might enable a platoon pinned down by

enemy fire to launch a bird-sized aircraft and use its

video camera to look over the horizon, behind

build-ings, and beyond the range of average eyesight These

micro air vehicles might be able to fly miles from their

takeoff point for hours, all the while feeding video

images back to ground stations that can use the

infor-mation to coordinate ground attacks and air strikes

(Braham, 1999)

• Connectivity The Army’s multifunctional,

on-the-move, secure, adaptive, integrated communication

project (MOSAIC) will be an energy-efficient,

wire-less, mobile communications system that provides

reach-back and secure networked sensor integration

The open systems architecture will feature increased

survivability (Kern, 1999)

Limitations and Vulnerabilities

The seductive promise of advanced technologies should

not obscure their vulnerabilities Future conflicts based on

the success of precision engagement, with precision-guided

munitions and information dominance, may be advantageous

if all combatants are technologically advanced However, it

is somewhat far-fetched if one side relies on less

sophisti-cated small arms and guerrilla tactics Advanced weapons

and smart weapons may not be effective against an adaptive

enemy (Scales, 2000)

Even advanced technologies must adhere to the laws of

physics Propulsion systems are generally changing at

mod-est rates Sensors, however advanced, still have limited

abili-ties to see through many substances Communications are

vulnerable to a variety of attacks, especially to

electro-magnetic pulse (O’Hanlon, 2000)

The recent air war in the Balkans is an example of mixed

success by new technologies According to press reports,

after 78 days and 38,000 combat sorties in Serbia/Kosovo,

NATO investigators could only confirm that a dozen

Yugoslav tanks had been destroyed, along with 18 other

ar-mored vehicles and 20 artillery pieces Compare this to the

original claim that 120 tanks, 220 other armored vehicles,

and 450 mortars and artillery pieces were destroyed

(Wash-ington Post, 2000).

Although we currently have a technological advantage

even over our friends and allies, this superiority may not last

because the United States is not the only country interested

in advanced technologies For example, a recent book by

Chinese military theorists has been described as a Chinese

attempt to “explore how technology innovation is setting off

a revolution in military tactics, strategy and organization”(U.S Embassy Beijing, 1999) The widespread availability

on the world market of new technologies will certainlyneutralize some of the advantages the U.S military cur-rently enjoys

Potential Uses of Mine-like Systems

Despite radical changes in advanced weaponry, the damentals of land warfare have changed very little sinceWorld War II Therefore, the need for traditional AT minesand APL capabilities is likely to continue A mine-like sys-tem acting as a force multiplier might be very useful to smallunits facing a numerically superior foe The sensing andalerting functions currently provided by mines could pro-vide valuable real-time inputs to a tactical information sys-tem In addition to the traditional uses of landmines, thefollowing examples illustrate the potential benefits of mine-like capabilities in future operations

fun-Seizure of an Airfield

A logistically efficient mine-like system that could bedropped from aircraft and turned on and off using codedtransmissions could be deployed in large numbers over andaround an airfield during or just prior to an air assault If thedevices could be turned off locally, perhaps within a50-meter radius of each U.S soldier, the remainder of theactivated munitions would provide a large tactical advan-tage to the U.S force The munitions would warn ofapproaching enemy troops or tanks, inhibit enemy mobilityand reinforcement, and cause some enemy casualties If themunition sensors were based on radio signals, they couldidentify friends and foes with passive or semiactive elec-tronic devices

Building ClearanceOnce a building or facility has been cleared of personnel,

it would be useful to have a system capable of maintainingthe building’s cleared status without requiring large num-bers of troops Current mines could be used, but the risk ofinjury to friendly forces and noncombatants would be high.Future mine-like devices consisting of communicating sen-sors and nonlethal munitions would be safe for civilians andcould automatically warn the tactical information system ofintrusions This mission would require a sensing systemcapable of detecting and tracking personnel remotely andreporting their movements automatically Commercial mo-tion sensors could be used for this today, but laser-based orradio-frequency sensors would have longer range and bettertracking and discrimination properties Radio-frequencysensors would have the added advantage of working well insmoke or fog