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Failed States and Casualty Phobia Implications for Force Structure and Technology... FAILED STATES AND CASUALTY PHOBIA Implications for Force Structure and Technology Choices ety Recor

Failed States and

Casualty Phobia

Implications for Force

Structure and Technology

FAILED STATES AND CASUALTY PHOBIA Implications for Force Structure and Technology Choices

ety Record

Ait University axl Ar Forse Base, Albums

Failed States and Casualty Phobia

Implications for Force Structure and Technology Choices

Jelftey Resort september 2000,

techlogy ae chnpewion for US atonal eer, Cpe of NO, 1 inthe ais

ef the Cento Stoegy and Tecology, Air War College, 325

‘Gienaut Clk, Maxwell AF, Montgomery, Also 3612, The fx mur

Disclaimer

‘The views expressed in this publication are those ofthe author and do

ot reflect theofficial policy or position of the Department of Defense, the United Sates Government or of tie Air War College Cemer for Strate and Technology

‘The Author

Jeffrey Record is Professor of International Security Studies atthe Ait

‘War College and former professional stall member of the Senate Armed Services Committee ‘The author of over 250 books, monographs, and anicles, ineluding Hollow Vietors, A Conivary View of the Gulf War (1993) and The Wrong War, Why’ We Lost in Vietnam (1998), Dr, Record served 3s civilian advisor in the Mekong Delta during the Vietnam War and subsequently as research associate at the Brookings Institution, legislative assistant to Senator Sam Nunn, and senior fellow’ atthe Institute

‘or Foreign Policy Analysis, Hudson Institut, and the BDM Intentional Corporation, He received his BA from Occidental College, and MA and Ph.D trom the Johns Hopkins Schoo! of Advanced International Sri,

INTRODUCTION?

‘The emergence of failed states a the principal souree of intemational political insablity and the appearance of mounting casoalty phobia among U.S political and military elites have significant force structure and technology implications, Overseas, intrastate and often irregular warfare is displacing large-scale interstate conventional combat, At home, there has arisen a new generation of politcal and military leadership that displays an unprecedented timidity in using force

Yet the Pentagon continues to prepare to refight the Korean and Gult Wars—simultaneously, no less!—and to invest heavily in force sutures whose commitment lo combat would invite politially unacceptable casualties The air war over Serbia should be a warning o U.S, lose planners: In contingencies not involving direct threats to manifestly vital U.S inleests—the post-Cold War norm, elevation of force protection 10 fequal or greater importance than mission accomplishment mandates primary even exclusive reliance on air power It further mandates expanded investment in stand-off precision-strike munitions and other technologies providing greater range and sccuracy The Army’s combat ams were more of less irrelevant to the war against Serbia because of that

‘service's comparative strategic immobility, and hecause a easualty- phobic White House and Pentagon leadership had already decided to withhold UGS ground combat forces From exposure 10 combat Yet the war—

‘aginst a tiny, isolated, chnd-rate military power —consumed almost one hnalf the Air Foree’s deployable eomthar asses ‘The defense budget dchate fof recent years has predictably focused on the scope and wisi of the post-Cold War cuts in overall defense spending But the debate has

‘unfortunately’ sidestepped what i perhaps an even more important issue— namely, the continued sharing out of defense dollars in rouglly equal amounts f0 the various services against the backdrop of dramatically akered intemational and domestic politcal landscapes “Enough of

‘What is just as important a defense budget question as “How Much is Enough?”

II, FAILED STATES

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their mushrooming masses more than the barest minimum of economic and social security 10 say nothing of politiealIreedom

Iraq i a major casein point The coanlry 8a failed state by virwe of the strategie incompetence of is leadership in starting two disastrous wars and because of a decade of effective international evonomic sanctioning, lus infrastracture is all but gone, its wealth destroyed oF looted its air space patrolled by hostile aircraft, and its Kurdish North transformed into foreign military prtectoras Indeed, the Gulf War never relly ended it

is simply being continued at a mach lower evel of violence Consider also the inevitable emergence at a Palestinian state, which seems destined

to be a failure absent—perhaps even in spite of—massive injections of international capital, Political divisions within the Palestinian community are severe, as Grey are within Israel, the chief enemy ofa Palestinian state Successful statehood presupposes not only success in dealing with tenonous economic and social challenges but also Palestinian and Israel

leadership willing and able to cu die-hard extents on both sides,

‘These ae all orders

To repeat, strong states are no longer the problem; weak ones ae, Failed states have become the primary souree of instability in the international potitieal system, ot just because war within the advanced industrial world has drastically receded, but also because failed states invite intervention by stronger states Stale failure inherently atracts

‘humanitarian intervention even when no siategic interest is present But because the United States and its allies also have ä sương slake in the present global political and eeon

stake in containing state failures’ potentially adverse regional and strategic consequences Thus the United States invaded Hal

emcracy but also to stanch the flow of umvanied Haitian refugees into America Thus NATO moved against Serbia in 1999 not just to stop the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo but also to preserve the Alliance's own ediBjity and to prevent Southesstem Europe's further destabilization AAs the world’s sole remaining superpower, the United States military today performs on a global basis essentially the same imperiat policing

‘ask thatthe British military performed within the British empire To be

mie onder, they therefore have a strong

not just to restore

sure, the rest of the world is hardly 9 formal, territorial empire of the United Staes, Bur there is an American empite nonetheless: informal Voluntarily associated, and resting om politieal and cultural aezetion a5,

‘much as on military and finaneial clout Spores of states and hundreds of millions of people around the world look to the United States for leadership and security, and itis in America’s stategic interest that they dos

Predictions are always dangerous in international politics, but the Gulf War of 1991 may be the last of its Kind for the United States, Saddam Hussein di sot expect war with America when he invaded Kuwait, But his erushing defeat established US conventional military supremacy for all the World to see, and itis difficult eo imagine a non

‘Westen siate being so obtuse as wo eallenge the United States on its own riltary terms Asymmetric approaches to neutalizing or defeating American military power ae the most appealing wf doing so— point acknowledged in the Pentagon's Joint Visiow 20202 Such approaches

‘worked in South Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somlia—al filed sates—and came elose to working in NATO's War against Serbia—s failing if not yet failed slate, During the past decade, the Pentagon has been called upon to intervene in or against one failing or failed state after snother—Somali, rai, Bosnia, Serbia, and where it has encountered resistance, it has been resistance offered by non-state ators operating unconventonally or state acioss pursuing non-military strategies to reduce potential U.S nilitary effectiveness

None of this is argue that the United States can dispense with preparation for large-scale eonventional war with other slates, The history

ff Intemational polities is full of surprises, Maintaining conventional itary supremacy deters in the short-term and offers long-term insuran against the emergence of aspiring military peer competitors To abandon

‘preparation for conventional warfare would simply invite others to retuen

fo it, Moreover, the possibility of conventional war on the Korean Peninsula, in the Persian Gul and across the Taiwan Strait eannot be entirely dismissed In each of these areas, however, adversaries are conclusively outclassed by the United States and is allies Regional

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raking in the United States This aversion has been especially

‘pronounced with respect 10 intervention jn stall wars, because such Wars rarely involve direct threats to manifestly vital U.S interests, Inervention

Js usually conducted in the general interest of global ofder and stability and often involves politically messy military enforcement of “peace” on

‘those who have no vested interest init, As such, public tolerance for such Interventions and their potential for casualties is dramatieally fower—or at Teast believed to be so by political and military elites—dhan for war on behalf of “real” interests Exen those comimitied to the use of fre on behalf of promoting American values as opposed to protecting U.S, vie interests take the pessimistic view that the American people are

‘unwilling to accept significant casualties on behalt of toppling dictators terminating genocide, and restoring evil order This pessimist in turn hhas bred an American military timidity: traditionally uncharacteristic of great power behavior and ultimately injurious to protection of U.S, Strategie interests,

Elite casualty phobia, manifest for at east a decade but never more slaringly tha in the war apainst Serbia has been much discussed in recent yes The fact of elite casualty phobia is notin dispute itis reflected in

‘te Pentagon's obsession with lence protection and confirmed by recent polling data There is, moreover, substantial evidence that both political and military elites have convinced themselves that the American puilic’s intolerance is significantly higher and mone insractable than i setually the case, lites nonetheless make the use-oforce decisions,

‘A strong aversion to casuallcs is, of course, rooted in American history and political culture, Americans value the individual much more

‘than they do the state, and they have always sought, and with considerable suecess it might be added, co substiute technology for blood in bate, But

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stomach for casualies, and therefore that use of foree in situations of optional intervention should be prepared to sacrifice even operational elfectiveness for the sake of casually avoidance This convition produced almost a decade of American strategie feckless in the former Yogoslavia, culminating in a NATO war against Serbia in whieh force protection as accorded priority over mission accomplishment, The resule-a bizare disconnoct between political ends and military means in

‘whieh an exclusive and initially vinid deployment of air power quickly provoked an seceleration of the very Setbian ethnic cleansing of Kesovo

‘that formed NATO's immediate eausus bell

Consider the joint testimony of Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Henry Shelon: “the paramount lesson feed from Operation Alegre is that the well being of our people must remain our first priority." I indeed this was the premier lesson, then U.S troops should never be exposed o combat inthe firs place They should be kept at họne-—beder yet, demobilized Or, at minimum, as in Operation Allied Force, policy makers should confine America’s enemies to those ineapable of shooting back in the air while simultaneously offering those enemies nothing to shoot at on the ground, Consider also the postwar caution of NATO'S then Supreme Allied Commander, General Wesley Clark: “in an air campaign you don’t

‘want I0 lose airerat because when you start 10 lose these expensive machines the countdown stats against you The headlines begin to shout, "NATO logps @ second aiteraft” and the people ask, “How long can this goon"

‘The presumption of public casualty intolerance—regardless of stances except for wars of rational survival—prompis use-of-foree aversion It also removes foree as a tool of coercive diplomacy,

‘undermines the military ethic of self-sacrifice and mission accomplishment, disconcerts allies, emboldens enemies, anc puts et risk foreigners who seek Ameriea's protection To be sure, it was Serbian thugs who victimized the Albanian Kosovars, but he later were also vietinized, if inditectly, by NATO's casualty phobia,

Indeed, csaly pola Tee 4 pertaps wily mispersned lessor ofthe Vitam War hal unfortunely shed hy he presen US politcal nd miltaryladeip The lesson of Vietnam sot the pubic tbooueimolrance of esl, but aes ta the American people's ice of whence Megson sh aioe ceri pried siengh inte Asks Son isle popes oF lack Baie vanl + seibisy on of skies Tie ho Oe end Ti bí ki» stave ny Py ben sre Ineo whl inert ar not stake observes Rich K: Bt “What Cri for maining ple spp 9 [he newson ef esas perse buccal nan ncontsve wa casuals Ute publics {stein feted indefinitely, foro eer, god, or aehevable pues CẢ The coningent eau of the public's casaty elm, hewiy Infuenend by pri leehip ia obliing ble epson, Ieper Ha ee yah a en inp dp fe Whis ee a Peon i ee Tho peddenidledcebir tú le corcheheresofeonbi may

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