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Preface v Abbreviations and acronyms vii 1 Introduction: political and governance challenges 1 Kwandiwe Kondlo 2 Consolidating a developmental state agenda: a governance challenge 15 Mas

The Zuma

Administration

Critical ChallengesEdited by Kwandiwe Kondlo & Mashupye H Maserumule

© 2010 Human Sciences Research Council

Copyedited by Jacquie Withers

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Preface v

Abbreviations and acronyms vii

1 Introduction: political and governance challenges 1

Kwandiwe Kondlo

2 Consolidating a developmental state agenda: a governance challenge 15

Mashupye H Maserumule

3 Rural development under a ‘developmental state’:

analysing the policy shift on agrarian transformation in South Africa 51

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This book examines the challenges accompanying the transformation of the political economy and society of South Africa since 1994 – which now present challenges and prospects for the new administration that took office in May 2009 under the leadership of Jacob Zuma The book provides interpretation, critique and fresh perspectives on political and administrative dynamics since the birth

of democracy in 1994, to the era of the Mbeki administration (1999–2008), and then to the transition

to the Zuma administration That transition was led by the now deputy president, Kgalema Motlanthe, who provided ‘stop-gap’ presidency from September 2008 until the new president, Zuma, was sworn into office in May 2009

The Mbeki administration, which did not run its full term due to the ‘recalling’ of the president by the governing party, provides an important context for the debates on the developmental state, governance, service delivery and intergovernmental co-operation covered in the various chapters Chapter 1 introduces and contextualises the analysis and discussions advanced in the other chapters

of the volume It begins by examining macro-political and governance challenges facing young democracies in the world and narrows down to an analysis of the situation in southern and South Africa The challenges facing the Zuma administration are therefore located in a wider international and continental context

The challenges of building a developmental state in South Africa and delivering on the promise of land reform, agrarian transformation and rural development, are all located within the international and continental context of challenges facing democracy and state capacity to deliver public goods (the latter including, for example, safety and security, employment opportunities, housing, the rule of law, healthcare and so on) These challenges are amplified in the sections that deal with service delivery, intergovernmental relations and poverty reduction The issue of incoherence between traditional, informal and formal institutions as well as the constraints presented by this to the overall nation-building project are carefully explored and examined

To write a book that deals with challenges and prospects for the Zuma administration is a difficult enterprise not only because of the vastness and complexity of the subject but also because of the difficulties in finding the right register with which to convey the complexity; there are diverse issues to cover, some of which may not yet be ripe for scholarly synopsis The book necessarily leaves out many important topics, including the very important historical questions of nation state formation, and how the state has worked to define the meaning of being ‘South African’ and in so doing constructed an identity for itself Nevertheless, the book focuses on a few selected topics, which are key to the mandate and agenda of the new administration Prominent among them are the issues of the developmental state, rural development, socio-economic development, and service delivery

As captured by Mark Gevisser in an essay commissioned for the Mail & Guardian (19 December 2008–8

January 2009), some of the fundamental questions about the challenges of the Zuma administration that dominate in the public intellectual discourse, in this interesting era in the history of South Africa, are as follows: how will the Zuma administration ensure continuity while at the same time effecting

‘some sharp and much-needed changes’ in the country’s political, economic, social and public administration landscape? Will the Zuma administration be able to ‘steer economic policy through the straits of an international economic crisis while still meeting the needs of an increasingly expectant’

populace? These questions necessitate rigorous intellectual engagement It is in this context that it was deemed necessary to put together multidisciplinary perspectives – in the form of this volume – to deal with some of the questions raised as part of the public debate on the challenges facing the Zuma administration.

The book projects views into the future and explores the nature and scope of both the challenges and the prospects for the Zuma administration, with the intention of enhancing the intellectual depth and value of the debates on the subject This collection of different perspectives, seeks to stir up debate; it is not concerned with building consensus, but rather with stimulating thinking, challenging entrenched views and perceptions and breaking new ground

A note on government departments

The advent of the Zuma administration ushered in new and renamed government ministries and departments, as follows:

Department of Agriculture Department of Agriculture, Forestry and FisheriesDepartment of Land Afairs Department of Rural Development and Land ReformDepartment of Provincial and Local Government Department of Cooperative Governance and

Traditional AfairsDepartment of Housing Department of Human Settlement

Department of Water Afairs and Forestry Department of Water and Environmental Afairs

ANC African National Congress

ANCWL African National Congress Women’s League

ANCYL African National Congress Youth League

ASD alternative service delivery

ASGISA Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa

BEE black economic empowerment

C10 African Committee of 10

CBO community-based organisation

COPE Congress of the People

COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions

DFI development funding institution

DLA Department of Land Affairs

DoA Department of Agriculture

DPW Department of Public Works

DTI Department of Trade and Industry

EPWP Extended Public Works Programme

GDP gross domestic product

GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy

GFOA Government Finance Officers Association

IDP Integrated Development Planning

IMF International Monetary Fund

ISRDP Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme

LRAD Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development

MDG Millennium Development Goal

MEC Member of the Executive Council

MINMEC [Committee of] Ministers and Members of the Executive Council

MPCC multi-purpose community centre

NDR national democratic revolution

NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NGO non-governmental organisation

PALAMA Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy

PFMA Public Finance Management Act

PPP public–private partnership

PSC Public Service Commission

RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme

SACP South African Communist Party

SAMDI South African Management Development Institute

SMME small, medium and micro enterprise

SSDM shared service delivery model

UN United Nations

US United States

USA United States of America

YCL Young Communist League

Abbreviations and acronyms

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Kwandiwe Kondlo

C H A P T E R 1

Introduction: political and

governance challenges

Is the new administration in a catch-22 situation?

The administration of Jacob Zuma came to power in May 2009, following the victory of the African National Congress (ANC) in the fourth democratic elections in South Africa It could be argued that something amounting to a catch-22 situation may soon face the Zuma administration in more direct ways than was the case for previous administrations This will arise from the challenge of balancing legitimacy with effectiveness in the governance of the country The popular expectations and demands for improved delivery on the part of the state are a demand for effectiveness; without effectiveness, the legitimacy of the Zuma administration stands to decline With declining legitimacy, the new administration will further lose effectiveness; and so on in a downward spiral The character of this challenge to the Zuma administration cannot be divorced from the political character of Zuma’s victory From the ‘Polokwane moment’ (Fikeni 2009) to the 22 April 2009 elections and to the Union Buildings, the political character of Zuma’s victory and the long-term impact it is likely to have in the deepening

of democracy in South Africa, continues to generate debate It embodies an ‘uncertain hope’, as it both

unsettles and inspires the will of a divided polity The political victory of Zuma is what Critchley (2006), quoting Derrida, would term a messianic a priori; it is a promise to the masses of the poor, even if it

never defined itself as such The popular expectation that ‘a new transition and change’ is on the cards invokes the performative dimension of the ‘promise’ embedded in Zuma’s political victory, especially after 15 years of disappointed popular expectations Change or transition, though, is usually invaded

by that which it is not – in the same way that the invasion of ‘being’ by ‘non-being’ occurs in the coming

into ‘being’ (Kierkegaard 2009) Yet there is hope even beyond the promise of utopia

At the heart of Zuma’s victory is the promise of and hope for improved service delivery to the masses of the poor; the hope to have the voices of ordinary people heard in more meaningful ways than before

in the governance of the country; and the hope for pro-poor economic policy as implied by the idea

of a developmental state Added to this is the hope of getting the wheels of government to move faster, coherently and effectively Yet the challenge of the institutional capacity of the state and what

it will take to improve it so that it delivers on the electoral promises of the ANC, stands as an obstacle

to the ‘delivery of public goods’; perhaps it is the necessary antidote to messianic expectations of revolutionary change engendered by the rhetoric of the ruling party

The catch-22 situation of the Zuma administration is typical of the situation in young democracies

‘Lacking legitimacy they cannot become effective; lacking effectiveness they cannot develop legitimacy’ (Huntington 1993: 258; see also Kapstein & Converse 2008) In essence, this attests to the challenges of institutional capacity and organisation Southall describes the challenges in the case of

South Africa as an instance of deficit in ‘ideational capacity’ (Southall 2007: 19), that is, the degree to which the embeddedness and legitimacy of the state in state institutions, political practices and ideas

of individual members of society are eroded or lacking

State institutional capacity and performance are critical to building and enhancing the credibility and legitimacy of the state In South Africa the challenge arises, first, at policy level The fact that the gap between the time of policy formulation and that of actual implementation is vast, and that the disjuncture between the ‘policy talk and policy action’ is of great magnitude, creates a state of

‘non-simultaneous simultaneity’ (Benhabib 1994: 129; Block 1973), where the policy superstructures and practices they engender are non-synchronous and thus constitute a failing transformative praxis Policy pronouncements and formulations, though good on paper, do not find simultaneous expression

in the real practices of governance This is a key governance challenge for the Zuma administration

As the gap between ‘knowing and doing’ persists and becomes more difficult to bridge, corruption, which has now become so pervasive in the South African polity, grows into a permanent underworld

of democracy Corruption is the ‘antithesis of good governance’ and influences perceptions of the general citizenry about the legitimacy of the government (Camerer 1997) If these kinds of inadequacies continue, it is hard to see how rhetorical claims of a developmental state and the promises to deliver on land reform, agrarian transformation and rural development – issues that Chapters 2 and 3 examine in detail – will be realised in practice Reconfiguring Cabinet and establishing a new planning ministry in the Presidency, as already done by the Zuma administration, are all good signs but they do not amount

to ‘effective actions’ It is not enough to have good intentions; it only makes material difference to

‘mean well and also act well’

Sevice delivery is clearly the challenge of the Zuma administration Getting government departments

to function in an integrated and coherent way is going to be nothing less than a nightmare for the Zuma administration, because the problem is arguably not one of structures only but also of ethos and the integrity of state institutions For this reason, the volume includes a focus on public service delivery issues for the Zuma administration (Chapter 4); governmental relations in a maturing South African democracy (Chapter 5); and socio-economic development and poverty reduction in South Africa (Chapter 6)

Issues of perceptions and the appropriateness of institutional models, even though not adequately covered in the book, are very important The questions in this regard are as follows: are existing state institutional models appropriate to deliver on their mandates and do they create room for meaningful citizen participation? Are the institutions of the state perceived to be serving all citizens, irrespective of party political stripes and orientation, or are they perceived as favouring, even if inadvertently, special interest groups and constituencies so as to help reinvent and reproduce the power and hegemonic project of the ruling party? The deficit in South Africa’s democracy, a persistent political and governance challenge of previous democratic administrations, is inadequate delivery of material improvements in the lives of the majority of citizens This deficit is exacerbated by inadequacies in responding to the preferences of citizens at grassroots level, due to the gap that has developed between those who can make their voices heard and those who cannot (except under situations of noticeable mass protest) The degree of interaction between the government and citizens, the level of access to decision-makers and decision-making by citizens at grassroots level, especially those outside urban centres, is

a challenge to the Zuma administration

Perhaps there is a need, at this point, to frame the wider theoretical and political context Among the key questions one needs to ask, as a starting point, is the following: what are the key political and governance challenges facing democracies in the world today? The question is pertinent to a

young democracy like South Africa in this day and age, as there are growing concerns, worldwide, about the fate of the world’s young democracies (Kapstein & Converse 2008) In the light of the macro-perspectives that responses to this question may yield, a follow-up question could be: what are the political and governance challenges facing democracy in Africa, and South Africa in particular? This will then provide a proper perspective and the necessary context for examining, debating and understanding the political and governance challenges facing the Zuma administration

The questions raised above are part philosophical, part socio-historical and part political, and therefore require an analysis that traverses international, continental and South African contexts This is difficult

to achieve in a comprehensive way, especially in one small volume such as this As the title of the book indicates, the challenges examined in the book are on selected issues that are key to the ANC’s agenda

as indicated in both its 2009 election manifesto (ANC 2009) and in the State of the Nation address by President Zuma on 4 June 2009 (Zuma 2009) The chapters cover selected but critically important issues such as the developmental state; land, agrarian reform and rural development; service delivery; governmental relations; and socio-economic development and poverty reduction The present chapter broadly sketches the political and governance challenges faced by democracies in today’s world and shows how the challenges they imply touch on perennial questions running through the ‘veins’ of South Africa’s democracy

Democratic performance and state institutional capacity

State institutional capacity refers to the availability of ‘various necessary inputs and appropriate skills’ for operationalising state programmes (Chirawu 2004: 234), in order to deliver valuable ‘public goods’, which citizens have the right to expect from a legitimate state (Rotberg & Gisselquist 2008) State institutional capacity also means the manner in which ‘democratic institutions function’ as well

as the extent to which effective citizen participation and ‘control over policy’ are constitutive of the institutional capacity of the state (Huntington 1993: 9) The issue of the credibility, legitimacy and performance of state institutions is one of the key challenges faced by democracies all over the world today The challenge is manifested in different forms, depending on the particular time and context

of the democracy in question, but is a common variable in the package of challenges in the entire democratic world

The challenge in our days is not so much opposition to multi-party liberal democracy but rather the creation of responsive democratic states whose institutions function well – both in the ‘normative’ and administrative senses – and conduct activities and deliver ‘public goods’ according to the wishes of the citizenry (Back & Hadenius 2008; Huntington 1993) Worldwide, opposition to multi-party democracy has been on the decline, especially after 1989, the period celebrated by political philosopher, Francis Fukuyama, as having marked the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1992) and the establishment of Western liberal democracy as universal Of course, Fukuyama was strongly criticised by scholars from the ‘Left’ who argued that what happened to the countries in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, ‘owed more to their histories than to the ideology’ that they professed (Hill 1992: 8) A new configuration of global power at the beginning of the 21st century following the rise of China and India, and the return to power

of Japan and Russia, ‘ended’ Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ By all indications, we are now witnessing ‘the return of great power nationalism’ (Kagan 2008: 10) The incidence of the global economic ‘meltdown’ seems to give impetus to the idea of the ‘return of the state’ This is shown by the proliferation of state interventions in the economy, as is the case in ‘advanced’ democracies, including the USA This situation has sparked new claims – about the ‘return of history’ and the ‘end of dreams’ (Kagan 2008)

Yet the return of history and the end of dreams brings with it too the dashing of hopes A new era

of ‘global convergence’, which was signalled by the embracing of democracy in former communist

states, was regarded as marking the birth of new hope and a renewal of the liberal democratic project The ‘third wave’ of democracy (Huntington 1993), post-1990, confirmed this – it was dominated by insistence on the ‘minimalist state’, and less intervention in the free market With the recent return

of history, liberal democracy and free market fundamentalism seem to be going through a period of stress By 2008, it was estimated that almost half of the world’s most recent democracies were either struggling to consolidate or reverting to authoritarianism (Kapstein & Converse 2008) This began in the form of ‘power grabs’ by leaders in such countries as Bolivia, Georgia, Russia and Venezuela and extended further to situations such as were found in Fiji (2006), Thailand (2006) and Bangladesh (2007), where coups d’état occurred (Kapstein & Converse 2008) In South Africa there is still hope for the survival of democracy Yet South Africa seems to be looking ‘East’ for solutions; hence, in South Africa

we hear debate about the developmental state and, lately, nationalisation of the mining sector of the economy, and the question is: why?

In reality, history never ‘ended’, hence it has not ‘returned’ The concepts are only good as markers

of the dynamics of political economy and historical change Perhaps one important issue, now that democracy as a political system is hardly contested, is the disappointment of the hopes of the poor majority in many democratic states, an issue that raises questions about the correlation between democracy and the capacity of democratic states to deliver Back and Hadenius (2008) argue convincingly that ‘the global tendency over recent decades has been towards a growing gap’ (2008: 1) between democratisation and the administrative capacity of the state This is but one aspect of the institutional capacity of the state By the state’s administrative capacity, Back and Hadenius are referring to the existence of a rational bureaucracy geared towards impartiality, professionalism and accountability (Back & Hadenius 2008; Brynard & De Coning 2007)

Democratic institutions are fully established in many democratic states but a broad array of societal resources required to ensure control and participation from below are lacking Paul Ginsborg (2008), in

his pioneering work Democracy: Crisis and Renewal, demonstrates this point by examining democracies

in the European Union, where institutions are established but float above the people whom they are meant to serve In his critical assessment, he argues that:

in 1989 liberal democracy triumphed unqualifiedly over its now unpresentable opponent But at the moment of its global victory, many of its basic practices have been found wanting and many of its proudest boasts proved unfounded Today liberal democracy is highly vulnerable To protect it adequately, there is urgent need for theoretical discussion and practical innovation (Ginsborg 2008: 12)

De Sousa Santos and Avritzer (2007: ixii) describe the challenge as that of the ‘democratization of democracy’, which not only means widening the social basis of democracy and ensuring its resonance with the aspirations of the majority of citizens; but also, critically, how new complementarities or articulations between participatory democracy and representative democracy are identified and enhanced in democratic practice

The institutional capacity of the state is more than a matter of appropriate skills It involves the orientation of governance; how governance comes across and is felt by ordinary citizens; citizen participation; and ‘a rational bureaucracy’, which is effective and efficient in the delivery of public goods The institutional capacity of the democratic state is therefore crucial to democratic performance

In the context of neo-liberal democracy, the corresponding types of democratic institutions have only ensured the formalism of democratic processes without delivering the concrete, material dividends of democracy to the majority This situation, according to Van Beek, in East Germany, Poland and South Africa, has led to the rising phenomenon of ‘dissatisfied democrats’; a situation where the support for

democracy as an ideal is countervailed by the negative evaluation of how it works on the ground (Van Beek 2006).

There is an emerging view that in the case of the USA the institutional capacity of the state has been blunted and compromised by ‘big business’ (Reich 2009) This brings in another perspective about inhibitors and enablers to the institutional capacity of states These are derived from their location

in the international context This is a factor that, according to Van Beek, makes ‘sound economic policies and policy implementation alone not enough to ensure satisfactory performance’ (2006: 29) The incentives provided by the existing structure of the global political economy are a crucial factor without which democracies may stand or fall; and hence Kapstein and Converse correctly argue that

‘the international environment plays a more important role than is commonly appreciated’ (2008: xvi)

In other words, the institutional capacity of the state and the critical role played by institutions in a polity – something of the essence of governance – are products of both endogenous and exogenous factors, hence the importance of political leadership

In the case of emerging democracies the situation is even more challenging Added to these factors are the different legacies bequeathed to emerging democracies by pre-transitional circumstances The

‘initial conditions’ (Kapstein & Converse 2008) are critical to subsequent democratic performance (Van Beek 2006) Hence, the institutional capacity of the democratic state – enabled and augmented by a self-organising civil society, independent of the state and its political parties – is vital in addressing the challenges Heller and Isaac, referring to the experience of India, also indicate that ‘a free and lively civil society makes the state and its agents more accountable by guaranteeing that consultation takes place not just through electoral representation (periodic mandates) but also through constant feedback and negotiations’ (2007: 408) They conclude that the institutional capacity of the state is central to the effectiveness of democracy

These issues also apply, though differently, to the situation in Africa I say ‘differently’ in the African context because of the legacy of colonialism on the continent and its differential impact on the cultures

of its people Even today there is still reference to Francophone and Anglophone parts of Africa Most importantly, there is the ‘unique’ southern African context Former liberation movements such as Frelimo (Mozambique), SWAPO (Namibia), MPLA (Angola), ZANU (Zimbabwe) and the ANC (South Africa), even though still in power, seem to have come to preside over a gradually dying promise

of what they were once thought to epitomise (Saul 2008) Olowu and Mukwena (2004) explain the southern African context – the immediate context of the South African democratisation project, in other words, the context closest to and most definitive of the Zuma administration – as not only one where the continent’s middle-income countries are concentrated, but also where ‘the project of permanent white settler communities’ has meant that ‘governance regimes’ legitimise the inequalities associated with the colonial system (Olowu & Mukwena 2004: 7) They argue that it is not surprising that in southern Africa there is serious debate on issues such as the redistribution of land Chapter 3

of this volume, in which Mayende analyses the latest policy shift on agrarian transformation in South Africa, hits the very nerve of this issue to show the constraints and possibilities presented to the Zuma administration in the areas of land reform, agrarian transformation and rural development

At the heart of Africa’s challenges to democratic consolidation is the problem of fragmented institutions (Berman et al 2004) In part due to the manner in which the post-colonial African state was formed, formal and informal institutions have not evolved in a coherent manner Formal institutions (state sponsored, mostly inherited from colonialism), traditional institutions and informal institutions, based

on societal norms and often varying according to religion, ethnic identity and mode of production, remain fragmented and incoherent despite over four decades of efforts at institution building (HSRC

& PSU 2009) The problem exists not only in other parts of the African continent, but also in South Africa itself

In Chapter 5, on governmental relations in a maturing South African democracy, Mello emphasises the challenge for the Zuma administration represented by the distance – both geographical and other – between government and the more traditional, rural communities in South Africa The chapter touches on the role of traditional leaders and argues that they are ‘a missing link in intergovernmental relations’ Mello argues: ‘Sidelining traditional leaders in rural areas has proved to be a problem in South Africa…Where traditional leaders are custodians of the land where communities live, there have been development challenges resulting from disputes between councillors and traditional leaders.’ Thus, a key challenge for the Zuma administration is to further outline the responsibilities and position

of traditional leaders in the intergovernmental relations puzzle

A ‘deformed’ realisation of the developmental state?

Is South Africa headed for a deformed realisation of the developmental state? This is one of the questions to think about, given the absence of a combination of conditions critical to the realisation

of a developmental state including, among others, an efficient and effective bureaucracy that can deliver on its mandate Besides that, thus far policy direction and implementation seem not to have found coherence and refinement under the new presidential leadership It is, of course, still early, but all indications are that the landscape of policy remains characterised both by a tendency still to debate and discuss fundamental assumptions and by the resulting stalemate: a central tension is between conceptions of a developmental state as overtly pushing a pro-working-class agenda – as conceived by the Congress of South African Trade Unions – and conceptions of a developmental state premised on the ANC’s multi-class project, a project that inadvertently provides refuge for elite ambitions

So, I would argue, the realisation of the developmental state during the Zuma administration is likely

to be a deformed one Perhaps there will be useful lessons to learn A developmental state cannot be built in a rush; you also do not simply promise it and it occurs It is not a product of some obscure team

of party pseudo-intellectuals, who know it all because they are accredited by only ‘one god’ – their own party In a deeply divided society such as South Africa, the developmental state cannot be the outcome

of the hegemonic project of a single party; it can only be the product of collective efforts of a united polity (rather than a fractured polity) – the collective will of a people united around a single purpose The model and mechanics of the developmental state in South Africa seem at this stage perennially debatable within the ruling party itself, and it seems that the finalisation of the real micromechanics of the developmental state is likely to take a very long time Five years, then, is not enough for President Zuma, the ‘son of Hope’, to deliver on his promises Part of the problem is that there is not yet clarity and consensus on whether the notion of the developmental state in South Africa is meant to replace the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) ‘or whether the developmental state will formulate and implement policies that will co-exist with GEAR’ (Kagwanja 2009: xxxvi) In Chapter 2, Maserumule examines contending views in this regard within the Tripartite Alliance

Nonetheless, the idea of a developmental state stands very prominently in the list of promises that the ANC has made and continues to make to the majority of the poor in South Africa This can be traced back to the time of the ANC congress in Stellenbosch in 2002 and it gained momentum in the ANC

up to the time of the Polokwane national conference in December 2007 (ANC 2007a; 2007b) It also appeared as the cornerstone of the ANC’s election manifesto during the 2009 general elections (ANC 2009) When Zuma delivered his State of the Nation address on 3 June 2009, he also made reference

to a developmental state and the creation of an economically inclusive society in South Africa (Zuma 2009)

To transform the idea of a developmental state into reality, it is argued, the Zuma administration stands

on the precipice of hope; it also looks down into the abyss of disappointed popular expectations,

given the possibility that it may deliver a deformed developmental state A deformed realisation of the developmental state may occur despite the orientation and organisation of the state and its institutions The effective capacity of the state institutions, the coherent functioning and organisation of state institutions, and their relationship with non-state institutions and actors, as well as the participatory nature of governance, when all added together serve as critical aspects of the realisation of the idea

of a developmental state

Chapters 2 and 3 take the debate even further They both start by engaging the conceptual foundations

of the developmental state, to explore the various meanings attached to it The question of the institutional capacity of the state, most importantly the nature of the interface between administrators and politicians, emerges in their discussions as key to the realisation of a developmental state In an article entitled ‘Conflicts between Directors-General and Ministers in South Africa: A “Postulative” Approach’, Maserumule (2007) systematically examines this challenge during the Mbeki administration and observes that its frequent occurrence at the political–administrative interface impacted negatively

on the state’s capacity to deliver services to the citizenry Conflicts at the political–administrative interface pose a challenge to efforts aimed at building a developmental state Maserumule (2007) argues that such conflicts are occasioned by contradictions in the policies formulated to serve as framework for the management of the public service

In the case of land reform, agrarian transformation and rural development, in Chapter 3 Mayende emphasises the importance of focused political leadership and championship of rural development and agrarian transformation to enhance coordination, ensure more efficient resource allocation, and sharpen management focus on key deliverables Existing shortcomings relevant to the field of

implementation – e.g capacity within the cluster of government departments that have rural-related responsibilities, and the need for the state to allocate significant amounts of resources to training and capacity-building programmes – are some of the issues that Mayende examines in his chapter

He argues that the development of capacity in key areas such as project management, agricultural economics, extension, rural finance and marketing systems will help improve efficiencies in programme and project delivery At a micro level, capacity building should also be applied to the crucial level of extension officers and community development workers, as the grassroots-level cadres who would interface closely with the producers

The challenge of intergovernmental coordination

and the crisis of service delivery

In South Africa, as in many post-colonial situations, the state after independence was as it was inherited from the colonial and apartheid regimes Much of the functioning architecture of the previous state was kept intact and gradually amended, following the recommendations of public service review commissions that took place during the Mandela and Mbeki administrations Despite such amendments, it can be argued that the culture and ethos in the day-to-day running of government business has hardly changed Before one even talks of intergovernmental coordination (i.e between

governmental bodies), there must be intragovernmental integrity In fact, the anthropology of the

state, of professional cultures, of administrative conduits, and of the ethics of the public service is

a whole area of research that could inform and strengthen policy during the Zuma administration (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006)

Recently, much of the architecture of the state has been reconfigured and a new orientation in the organisation of national and provincial departments has emerged with the Zuma administration The Presidency now houses not only the deputy president, but also two new ministries: one for national

planning and one for monitoring and evaluation Yet the key question – and one that remains unanswered – is the extent to which the new reconfiguration of national government is designed to

be responsive, accountable and participatory, so that it is informed by (rather than simply seeking to inform) the will of the people whom it serves In addition to this, the calibre of the political elites who emerged subsequent to the 2007 ANC national conference in Polokwane, and the existing capacity

to lead state institutions during the Zuma administration, to serve ordinary citizens effectively, are other questions If each government department is saddled with what Mehta (2003) terms an almost

‘compulsive emphasis on endless formal procedures’, where layer upon layer of procedure provides oversight on various layers of decision-making, at what point does coordination take priority and the organic blending required for integrated delivery occur? These issues constitute another challenge for the Zuma administration

It does not matter how optimistic one may choose to be in the analysis of the Zuma administration, one cannot gloss over the fact that it is a seriously challenged one It could be said to exist in a ‘triple

temporality’ Barnard and Farred (2004), in their publication After the Thrill is Gone: A Decade of

Post-apartheid South Africa, invented the notion of ‘double temporality’ of the post-apartheid state to describe how the post-apartheid state continued to live in two historical realities at the same time; that is, the reality of Afrikaner domination and of the democratic state (Barnard & Farred 2004: 594) The concept refers to a situation where the present is dominated by continuities with the past The same analogy can be used to describe the situation of post-1994 democratic administrations It is argued here that the Zuma administration lives in three histories at the same time: the history of the Mandela administration, the subsequent realities created by the administration of former president Thabo Mbeki and, lastly, its own realities The new administration obviously cannot escape the shadows of the two preceding eras; the realities created by the politics and governance strategies of those periods are

a foundation for the new administration In other words, the fact is that, for the Zuma administration, the past will always tend to weigh heavily on the present; and shifting the realities created by past administrations is going to be a formidable challenge The dominance of the past in the present will pose challenges and opportunities; challenges that could indeed be overcome and opportunities that could indeed be lost

Zuma’s administration is perceived by the masses as the ‘delivery administration’ It came to power on the back of promises to the poor majority and on the ticket of improved service delivery to provide a

‘better future for all’ This follows the poor service delivery record of the Mbeki administration There are at least three major challenges The first is how to manage widespread and almost messianic expectations of revolutionary change – popular perceptions of Zuma as some kind of messiah, sent to save them; perceptions fed, incidentally, by the rhetoric of the ANC during the campaign for elections (which took place on 22 April 2009) The second challenge is the array of problems presented by the need to create a responsive government, that is, a government in which the voices of ordinary citizens, and their choices and aspirations, make it to policy decision-making The third challenge is creating a government that has the administrative capacity to deliver faster and better

Chapter 4 by Kanyane examines in detail the public service delivery challenges of the Zuma administration and outlines how service delivery could be if it were underpinned by a social agenda – that is, commited to realising the power of public service delivery to sustain and improve the quality

of life of communities He also interrogates the governance framework for public service delivery and argues for the importance of ethical leadership, especially at the level of local government, in order

to deal with pervasive corruption and inefficiency Kanyane further proposes the need to consider alternative service delivery approaches, including public–private partnerships and the shared service delivery model, as part of the solution to service delivery improvement; and he argues for the value

of monitoring and evaluation to be embedded in implementation To support the interventions

proposed in Chapter 4, Mello in Chapter 5 examines the framework that has been introduced with the aim of improving intergovernmental relations In line with Kanyane’s view on the importance of ethical leadership for service delivery improvement, Mello goes on to explore the importance of the ‘human factor’, which involves investment in human resource capacity in order to improve governmental relations (i.e not only relations between governmental institutions but also with non-state actors), thus in turn improving service delivery Mello argues that monitoring and oversight – and, where necessary, intervention – by national government are essential to ensuring that the lower spheres of government fulfil their constitutional mandates.

In summary, the most important challenge of the Zuma administration is not only at the institutional level, that is, at national level and in the Office of the Presidency; it is also at the levels of intermediate and local institutions and forums of consultation located at the interstices of state and society, where day-to-day forms of democracy either flounder or flourish (Heller & Isaac 2007) Analysing the local government experiences of Kerala in India, Heller and Isaac correctly observe that as the state ‘radiates out from the geographic and functional core of its authority, its effectiveness fluctuates dramatically’ (2007: 407) Hence, problems of service delivery tend to occur at local government level This is part of the challenge confronting developmental local government in South Africa The effectiveness of the state outside the national core of its authority will need to be felt through robust delivery of services

macro-Delivering on the promise of economic inclusivity

and poverty reduction

After 1990, as the economy began to expand, there occurred a steady rise in the investment–output ratio Simultaneously, there was a sharp decline in the share of wages in national outputs – in other words, income distribution worsened such that the rising investment–GDP ratio generated, instead, higher levels of inequality The problem that arises from the Mbeki era and confronts the Zuma administration, as a key challenge, is what Malikane refers to as the ‘disconnect’ between ‘the then rising investment–output ratio’, which was a success, and ‘worsening distribution of income’ (2007: 67) This resulted in a situation in South Africa where, despite five years of uninterrupted economic growth, poverty and inequality continued to grow and the gap between rich and poor continued to widen Besley and Cord argue that ‘growth is less efficient in lowering poverty levels in countries with high initial inequality or in which the distributional pattern of growth favours [the] non-poor’ (2007: 1) In other words, the core of the challenge is to make sure that distributional patterns of economic growth are oriented in such a way as to benefit the poor – to close the gap between the rich and the poor

Despite the immediate interventions that are required, perhaps a long-term view is the way to lasting solutions in this area The problem with long-term strategies, however, is that they do not have immediate electoral pay-offs, which ruling parties normally want in order to sustain their political power One hopes that the Zuma administration will be different in this regard – that it will not be limited to a partisan vision but will take a long-term view of strategic investment in education and skills development Empowering ordinary citizens with the requisite skills to navigate the vicissitudes of the market economy on their own is perhaps part of the solution

The democratic state, post-1994, despite the radical pretensions of the ruling ANC, cannot deal effectively with the challenge of poverty, as this challenge has implications for the reordering of socio-economic relations in South Africa The reordering of socio-economic relations is necessary, according

to Besley and Cord (2007), to deal with ‘high initial inequality’, which distorts the distributional effects

of economic growth in favour of the non-poor Kapstein and Converse (2008) argue that the character

of initial conditions, i.e pre-transformation conditions, affects – in fact determines – the performance

of young democracies To echo this point, Magubane (2004) casts the situation as ‘the dilemma the ANC is facing’ But how does fundamental reordering occur or how effective is gradual economic transformation? The change in socio-economic relations of power is the key project, which goes beyond the removal of institutionalised racial oppression The politics of poverty is essentially about differences in socio-economic power between individuals or groups in society ‘The battle against poverty is largely a question of creating the circumstances that enable an individual or group to gain power and emerge from poverty on a longer-term basis’ (Teunissen & Akkerman 2005: 2)

Green (2008) adopts a new angle He examines the notion that, in addition to these factors, the way markets operate exacerbates poverty and inequality And he argues that poor people need to exert influence and have a voice over the way markets and ‘institutions which govern them’ operate (Green 2008: 108) In Chapter 6, Mashigo focuses on socio-economic development and poverty reduction

in South Africa as a key challenge for the Zuma administration, and examines and debates these issues, including the ongoing – indeed increasing – marginalisation of those vast numbers of people

in South Africa stuck in the so-called second economy She offers exploratory ideas that could be useful in the design of policy solutions The point of departure, according to Mashigo, has to be the consideration of international best practice, which adopts group lending mechanisms to deal with underdevelopment and poverty International practices have shown that it is possible, through the relevant lending mechanisms, to provide credit to poor communities For example, the legal and regulatory environment in countries such as Bangladesh, Ghana, Kenya and Indonesia has permitted the establishment of specialised lending mechanisms or banking and financial institutions that target poor communities Examples are rural or community banks that are able to make sound savings and credit judgements because of their knowledge of the local community This is done through the establishment of informal groups, which are linked to the village bank

Of course this suggestion can only work if the proposed new partnership between the public and private sectors is defined and implemented As Mashigo argues, this involves government, in consultation with financial institutions, establishing prudent non-discriminatory lending criteria, especially in respect of creditworthiness and collateral, reforming laws on women and banking to ensure equality, developing simpler forms for contracts and applications, and creating an environment that reduces the risk profile of lending to poor (and low-income) communities On another level, especially if one takes

a longer-term view of the solution, the promotion of human capital accumulation through investment

in education and health is crucial Investment in education will empower the poor to navigate, on their own, the vicissitudes of the market economy Education and health are on the list of priorities of the new ANC government, post-April 2009 The extent to which the investment in education and health will be made, and the outcomes monitored and oriented towards critical measures of socio-economic development, remains to be seen

Overarching messages

In discussing South Africa’s democratic experiment, this book aims to maintain a delicate balance between appreciation and critique, and also to provide useful insights which could serve as advice for policy-makers and as food for thought for researchers

In terms of the volume’s overarching messages, the first and key message involves the inherent institutional difficulties the state faces in translating aspirations of liberation on the part of the masses into effective socio-economic outcomes The discussions in Chapters 2 and 3, on the developmental state, demonstrate this Second, it is clear that the mundane modalities of implementing the transformation agenda to yield quality material dividends to the poor majority are still cause for concern

This, it is argued, manifests in endless – often seemingly directionless – drifts in policy debate within the ruling party (the ANC and its Alliance partners), numerous strikes over wages, and widespread service delivery protests The issue, it seems, is that the transformation agenda, and the terms on which it is conducted, is still defined by the elites – it is not the agenda of the poor and marginalised that defines the character of change Hence, the demands made by the poor majority are not merely for delivery of public goods but also for an effective voice in the governance of the country Chapters

4, 5 and 6 convey the nature of the problems around service delivery, coordinated governance and poverty reduction The development and role of traditional institutions in strengthening democratic governance in rural areas is touched on in Chapter 5; this is very important for the development of a collective will, which is important in the life of a nation

Summary and structure of the book

The book consists of six chapters focusing on different but related topical issues identified by the authors as part of the challenge facing the Zuma administration Chapter 2 by Maserumule examines the need to consolidate a developmental state agenda as a critical governance challenge for the Zuma administration Maserumule offers various governance policy options that the Zuma administration could consider – in governing in a political context fraught with ideological contradictions and contestations – in defining a South African developmental state

On the one hand, the Left in the Tripartite Alliance, which constitutes an integral part of the coalition that secured Zuma’s victory as the president of the ANC at its national conference of December 2007

in Polokwane, and as president of the Republic of South Africa, propagates a more redistributive economic approach as part of the agenda for a South African developmental state On the other hand, there are those within the ANC who argue for the continuation of the Mbeki administration’s neo-liberal economic orthodoxy in repositioning South Africa as a developmental state As a dominant figure in the contemporary political scene in South Africa who emerged out of the traditional African countryside as a well-rounded personality and who operates in a modern environment, Zuma may be able to successfully navigate the two ideological extremes that Maserumule’s contribution enunciates

socio-as being in contestation with each other

The notion of a developmental state is further considered in Chapter 3 on rural development in South Africa In this chapter, Mayende presents a systematic analysis of the ANC’s ‘shift’ in paradigm on rural development and agrarian transformation, with specific reference to the question: to what extent does the new policy perspective provide a viable framework for accelerating the process of raising the living conditions of the rural masses and facilitating their integration into the national economy? The analysis explores the new policy positions in some detail, and then proceeds to identify and examine a range

of potential shortcomings, inconsistencies and self-evident lacunae Within this context, the chapter begins by analysing the concept of the developmental state and its role in driving rural development and agrarian transformation interventions, using as examples several East Asian countries that are generally considered as having succeeded in this regard The chapter then provides an overview of the country’s rather chequered experience in rural development and agrarian transformation policy and practice since 1994 The chapter highlights the inherent weaknesses associated with two key programmes implemented during this period, namely the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme and the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development sub-programme of the land reform programme The chapter explores the combination of factors that led to the failure of both programmes in making significant inroads into addressing the legacies of land dispossession, underdevelopment and economic stagnation, as well as widespread poverty and social marginalisation that continue to characterise South Africa’s rural areas The lessons that have emerged from these programmes are also highlighted and analysed

Chapter 3 further analyses some of the assumptions that are made in the new policy perspective with regard to the efficacy of rural development and agrarian transformation strategies – assumptions based

on subsistence and the promotion of ‘sustainable livelihoods’ versus surplus-oriented commercial production The wisdom behind the optimism shown for the success of such interventions within what Mayende terms the communal areas is also subjected to critical scrutiny In a discussion of the important issue of land acquisition, the chapter highlights a number of fundamental constraints, particularly the constitutional property clause and the willing-buyer, willing-seller policy, as well as major bottlenecks that could impede the shift towards an approach based on legal expropriation The chapter examines the challenges that could confront planned attempts at institutional restructuring, and discusses the importance of support for the targeted beneficiaries, and the renewed push for the establishment of viable and vibrant co-operatives, as important elements in giving impetus to enhanced delivery Due consideration is also given to key ‘cross-cutting issues’, such as the central position of infrastructural development, the role of indigenous knowledge, and gender, youth and disability, which are also deeply embedded within the rural socio-political and economic context within which the challenge

of rural development and agrarian transformation has to be addressed

Any discourse on the governance challenges for the Zuma administration without reference to the issue of service delivery would be incomplete, for enhancing the quality of life of the citizens through improved service delivery is one of the strategic imperatives of a developmental state This underscores the importance of service delivery, which is the focus of Chapter 4 Kanyane argues that the government, in the past decade and a half, focused too much on the physical infrastructure of public service delivery (i.e tangible public service delivery), overlooking its social (i.e intangible) impact

in sustaining the quality of life of the citizenry According to Kanyane, the challenge for the Zuma administration is, therefore, to focus seriously on both the physical and intangible developmental impact of service delivery – a challenge that has also been highlighted in the present chapter Kanyane argues for a more humanised and humanising public service that has as its vision empowerment and consciousness raising of the communities it serves

In Chapter 5, Mello deals with questions of governmental and intergovernmental relations, which are among the key imperatives in improving service delivery and important for achieving an integrated system of governance The issue of integrated planning and coherence in managing the affairs of government, as Maserumule points out in Chapter 2, was one of the fundamental challenges that beset the Mbeki administration In discussing various structures and processes that have been devised with the aim of improving intergovernmental relations, Chapter 5 focuses on the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (No 13 of 2005) and makes suggestions for further possible improvements Reflecting on various governmental relations challenges, Mello advises the Zuma administration to take seriously the challenges from the previous administration and learn lessons from these, with a view to improving governmental relations for the benefit of the South African people

Chapter 6 by Mashigo argues that poverty reduction is the mainspring of economic development and that it is important to put greater emphasis on it if the desired levels of economic development are

to be achieved In this chapter the critical factors that contribute to the persistence of poverty and underdevelopment, and the related challenges, are examined with the objective of determining what interventions can be put in place by the Zuma administration The chapter discusses the so-called first and second economies, particularly the second economy, what constitutes it and why it has become central in the discussions pertaining to underdevelopment and poverty alleviation

Chapter 6 focuses on the 2009 ANC election manifesto, which outlines the ANC’s commitment to transforming the country and/or society; the election manifesto emphasises nation building, support and respect for basic human and democratic rights, socio-economic rights, and the strengthening of

representative and participatory democracy (ANC 2009) The priority areas of the election manifesto, which include creation of decent work and sustainable livelihoods, education, promoting human health, the fight against crime, and rural development, are discussed Another priority area of the election manifesto, social security, is also considered.

Chapter 6 also looks at the global financial crisis and its impacts on South Africa Of particular importance

is the discussion of effective and sustainable rural development and poverty reduction strategies Financing strategies in South Africa are closely analysed and it is shown how existing strategies hamper the provision of such finance, particularly to poor households The chapter provides insight into how international financing practices have succeeded, through specialised financing/lending mechanisms,

in financing poor households Similar existing mechanisms in poor communities in South Africa are explored for possible lessons in this regard The chapter concludes with a focus on small/survivalist enterprise development

It is hoped that this book will make a valuable contribution to contemporary discourse on the Zuma administration

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C H A P T E R 2

Consolidating a developmental state

agenda: a governance challenge

The notion of a developmental state dominates in the formulation and the manner of presentation of the African National Congress’s (ANC) 52nd national conference resolutions of 2007 (ANC 2007c), which set the political context for the Zuma administration’s strategic policy orientation and direction In recalling the resolution of its 2002 national conference, the 2007 ANC national conference ‘highlighted the need for cadres to actively build a developmental state, capable of implementing the objectives

of the national democratic revolution (NDR), including the creation of a better life for all, addressing the legacy of apartheid colonialism and patriarchy, and acting as the driving force for socio-economic transformation’ (ANC 2007c) The concept of a developmental state and the commitment to styling the country along its imperatives have long been part of the political lexicon and strategic agenda of the ANC on the transformation of state and governance

In the context of South Africa, the imperatives of a developmental state require that, on the one hand, the quality of life of the citizenry is enhanced through improved service delivery and, on the other hand, citizen participation in the mainstream economy is maximised, particularly for those previously marginalised by the apartheid system These twin challenges preoccupied the Mbeki administration at the dawn of the second decade of democracy in South Africa, when its strategic transformation focus was on building a developmental state Empirical evidence, as presented in this chapter, indicates that the ANC government, during the Mbeki administration, scored significant achievements in some areas while failing dismally in others in the pursuit of a developmental state agenda

The Zuma administration is expected to consolidate the achievements of the Mbeki administration and correct its failures, while at the same time effecting the much needed changes for which the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) – the more left-wing organisations within the Tripartite Alliance1 – argue with regard to the social and economic dimensions of a developmental state The Alliance Left secured the installation of Jacob Zuma as the president of the ANC in the December 2007 Polokwane national conference Its support for Zuma is premised on the conviction that in him, the Alliance Left has found a voice that Mbeki obscurantism had vehemently condemned as ultra-Leftist So, to the Alliance Left, the rise of Zuma

to the presidency of the ANC, coupled with ‘the dramatic events of September 2008 [that] saw Mbeki [recalled] and several key ministers resign’ and the victory of the ANC in the 2009 general elections, with Zuma assuming the presidential leadership of the country, means ‘a victory against [the] neo-liberal orthodoxy’ of the Mbeki project (Pillay 2008: 12)

1 The Tripartite Alliance is the strategic political partnership of national liberation forces that comprises the ANC, SACP and COSATU, and which is led by the ANC (ANC 2007a; 2007c) In this chapter, the term ‘Alliance Left’ refers to the SACP and COSATU.

The intellectual influence of the Alliance Left within the ANC heralds a particular ideological paradigm

as its philosophical disposition gravitates towards a socialist agenda Such an ideological paradigm

is increasingly assuming preponderance in defining a South African developmental state that emphasises a redistributive socio-economic approach This is a variation on what most in the Alliance Left interpreted as the neo-liberal economic orthodoxy that characterised the governance orientation

of the Mbeki administration Generally, a sense of unanimity exists in the Tripartite Alliance about the need to reposition South Africa and configure it according to the imperatives of a developmental state Jeremy Cronin (SACP) underscores this in the debate with Ryan Coetzee (Democratic Alliance),

on whether a developmental state or a free market economy would be the right way forward for South Africa’s growth in the next 10 years.2

Cronin argues that in the mid-1990s a message that was drummed into the Alliance was that ‘for growth and development, markets should be liberated, the public sector downsized and contracted out’ This is a neo-liberal approach to building a developmental state that the Mbeki administration vigorously pursued, which contrasts with the Alliance Left’s propagation of a strongly state interventionist approach (Pillay 2008) The Mbeki administration envisaged an activist state that intervenes decisively in the economy with a generally progressive agenda The ANC and its Alliance partners’ ideological divergence on the meaning of a developmental state centres around the extent

of the state’s intervention in the economy

Because of competing ideological orientations accommodated within the Tripartite Alliance, there are fundamental differences of strategy relating to the realisation of a developmental state The Alliance Left argues for a more radical approach to a developmental state Further, what may be considered

as the ‘achievements’ of the Mbeki administration, in the pursuit of a developmental state agenda in certain areas, may not necessarily be understood and accepted as such by the Alliance Left, which now exerts more influence within the ANC and, inevitably, within the Zuma administration This presents

a political and ideological conundrum for the Zuma administration: on the one hand, much of the

thinking within the ANC emphasises continuity, whereas on the other the Alliance Left propagates changes whose tenor suggests a fundamental shift from the Mbeki administration’s strategic approach

(neo-liberal in orientation) in the pursuit of a developmental state agenda

Against this background, the crucial governance question for the Zuma administration is obviously how

it can navigate these two extremes This chapter problematises this governance challenge, reflecting critically on the Mbeki and Zuma administrations with regard to the challenges of consolidating a developmental state agenda At the outset, the notion of a developmental state is untangled This

is followed by reflection on the political philosophy behind, and the ideological antecedents of, the concept of a developmental state in South Africa The theory undergirding the developmental state is used as a framework for analysing the ANC government’s development trajectory under the Mbeki administration, and to provide a context for reflection on the challenges facing the Zuma administration in consolidating a developmental state The chapter highlights the challenge of governance in a political context fraught with ideological contradictions and contestations Arising out of the analysis are recommendations for various policy options that the Zuma administration could consider in defining a South African developmental state agenda

Untangling the meaning of a developmental state

The idea of a developmental state in contemporary political and economic discourse was introduced by

Chalmers Johnson, following the 1982 publication MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industry

2 J Cronin, Right road for growth, Sunday Times (15 May 2009: 9).

Policy 1925–1975 In this seminal work, Johnson analyses factors that undergird Japan’s successful war reconstruction and industrial renaissance, as a result of what Beeson (n.d.) describes as the efforts

post-of a ‘plan rational state’ (i.e a developmental state) Yet what is a developmental state? Johnson (1982) defines the developmental state as that type of state rationally planned in a manner that makes it possible and necessary for government to influence the direction and pace of economic and social development rather than leaving it to the dictates of the markets (see also Beeson n.d.; Castells 1992; Mkandawire 1998; and Sindzingre 2004) The Japanese prototype of state-led intervention, as explained

in Johnson’s work, has been emulated in countries such as France, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and, lately, South Africa (see Beeson n.d.; Fourie & Ngqunguwana 2005; Manuel 2005) 3

In a developmental state, the government establishes social and economic goals While the means of production are privately owned, the state intervenes to provide guidance, to ensure that utilisation

of the means of production is aimed at realising national interests A strong ‘state capacity’ is critically important as a distinguishing feature of a developmental state; it is achieved through the creation

of an inexpensive, efficient and effective public service, staffed by the nation’s brightest and best servants functioning without constraints, and capable of being innovative in addressing the social and economic needs of the citizens (Beeson n.d.; Evans 1998; Johnson 1982; Palidano 2000) The Northeast Asian states and Singapore are perfect examples of how the capacity of the state could be built to meet the challenges of a developmental state In a developmental state the government is always engaged in the perfection of market-conforming methods of state intervention in the economy to maximise business performance in the private sector A developmental state encourages and shapes co-operation with the private sector (Beeson n.d.; Evans 1998; Johnson 1982; Palidano 2000) Mahabane states that a ‘key component of [the] developmental state is industrial policy’ (2005: 8) Mahabane further quotes Rodrik, a professor of international political economy at Harvard University, to explain that the purpose of the industrial policy ‘is as much about eliciting information from the private sector

on significant externalities and their remedies as it is about implementing appropriate policies’.4

The idea of embedded autonomy or technocratic autonomy, which is one of the imperatives of a developmental state, is critically important in the implementation of industrial policy Embedded

or technocratic autonomy is about insulating the public service from political vagaries and allowing

it to autonomously craft strategic relationships and establish networks with the private sector and civil society (Beeson n.d.; Evans 1998; Mahabane 2005; Mkandawire 1998; Palidano 2000; Sindzingre 2004) Such relationships and networks are important in forging a common understanding of the development vision of the state among the ‘democratic sectors’, which, according to Clift (2003), refers

to governments, elected and appointed officials, media and major online portals, political parties, interest groups, civil society, the private sector, international governmental organisations and citizens/voters

More than two decades after its conception, the idea of the developmental state still dominates in contemporary discourses and evokes continued intellectual interest This is ostensibly because of the fact that it provides an epistemological framework to understand the stupendous economic growth performances of East Asian countries Sindzingre (2004) emphasises that the concept of the developmental state is still relevant in the contemporary world and could be used to understand the economic failures of developing countries; she suggests the possible importation of the imperatives

of the developmental state into countries grappling with socio-economic development challenges South Africa is one of the developing countries experimenting with the concept of a developmental state to achieve social and economic goals set by government

3 See also, I Mahabane, Welcome to the national theatre; farce is our forté, Sunday Times (17 April 2005: 8).

4 Rodrik cited in I Mahabane, Welcome to the national theatre; farce is our forté, Sunday Times (17 April 2005: 8).

The notion of a South African developmental state:

political and ideological context

The introduction of the concept of a developmental state in South Africa can be located politically and ideologically in the ANC’s political discourse on the democratic state, encapsulated particularly

in its discussion document, The State and Social Transformation, which was issued in 1996, two years

into the democratic dispensation This discussion document is one of a plethora of policy position papers that the ANC, as the political party in power, has produced and uses as the basis for formulating government policy To understand the nature and character of the political system of democracy in South Africa, an insight into the ANC’s strategic policy orientation is critically important

Following the ANC’s adoption of The Strategy and Tactics document in 1994 (ANC 1994b), The State and

Social Transformation (ANC 1996) was penned to reflect the governing party’s thinking in terms of the type of state that should be constructed to achieve what, in contemporary political jargon in South Africa, is termed the NDR Netshitenzhe (1996) explains NDR as ‘a process of struggle that seeks the transfer of power to the people’ by ‘removing the barriers that have been set by apartheid in terms of black people and Africans’ (in particular) access to the economy and services’ This has always been

the ANC’s vision of the South African state, as expressed in the Freedom Charter of 1955 (ANC 1955),

which was developed after wide consultation with the majority of people and documented their needs and aspirations

After assuming political power in 1994, the ANC explored various ways to achieve its strategic vision

as encapsulated in the NDR In 1994 the ANC came up with the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which was widely accepted, particularly within the Tripartite Alliance, as an important strategic milestone towards achieving the political vision of the NDR The RDP was the democratic government’s integrated policy framework for ‘socio-economic renewal, transformation and empowerment, to establish a systematic approach to the democratisation and development of the South African society’ (ANC 1994a: 4) The RDP was a detailed crystallisation of the needs of the people

that were initially expressed in the Freedom Charter (ANC 1955), which, as indicated, has always been

a strategic nexus of the ANC’s NDR.

The RDP envisaged the type of state that would play a leading role in creating a strong, dynamic and balanced economy to address the social, economic and political inequities bequeathed by the apartheid system of government Its strategic approach gravitated towards welfarism, which is a political system where ‘government undertakes the main responsibility for providing for the social and economic security of the state’s population’ (McLean 1996: 526) In the context of the RDP, a semblance of ideological unanimity prevailed in the conceptualisation of the developmental nature

of the state that South Africa should be, which had a redistributive socio-economic orientation In his parliamentary speech of 10 May 1994, Nelson Mandela, the first democratically elected president of the Republic of South Africa, proclaimed that ‘the RDP is a centre piece of what government will seek

to achieve, the focal point on which attention will be continuously focused’ (cited in Desai 2004).Habib observes that when ‘the ANC came into power in 1994 it inherited a nearly bankrupt state’ and was

at the same time ‘confronted with an ambitious set of expectations from the previously disenfranchised and an investment strike by the business community’.5 The fundamental question then was whether the RDP was the appropriate policy approach to deal with the existing governance challenge, as its solution lay largely in substantial investment in the economy Habib (in Ray 2009) further observes that

‘to get investment and growth going, the ANC felt it had to make a series of economic concessions,

5 Cited in M Ray, No middle road, Finweek (9 April 2009: 11–14).

most of which were captured in the GEAR [Growth, Employment and Redistribution] strategy’ (Ray 2009) In 1996 the ANC government introduced GEAR, which, when compared to the RDP, elicited much disapproval, mainly from the Alliance Left, civil society and activist intellectuals.

GEAR was introduced and presented as a fait accompli, by the Mandela Cabinet, among the ‘motive forces’ – which, in ANC political parlance, refers to those ‘that benefit when a revolution is victorious, and often push for its success’ (ANC 2007a: 18) GEAR is a product of a technocratic rather than a democratic process Habib explains that the Mandela Cabinet bypassed Parliament in the introduction of GEAR,

‘for they feared that their own comrades in the national legislature would defeat it’.6 In fact, the ANC’s highest decision-making body endorsed GEAR only after the government had already pronounced

on its adoption GEAR marked the inception of the so-called ‘1996 class project’, with Mbeki being referred to as its chief architect In the context of contemporary political parlance in South Africa, and for the purposes of this chapter, the 1996 class project refers to a package of market-based policies, the ideological inclination of which was to seek to modernise and model the ANC and government along neo-liberal lines To all intents and purposes, Mbeki, during the Mandela presidency, ran the administration of South Africa

GEAR engendered profound consternation in the Tripartite Alliance and enraged the Alliance Left COSATU and the SACP viewed GEAR as a fundamental policy shift from the RDP This view was shared by a myriad of civil society organisations and intellectual activists GEAR was strongly rejected

on the basis of being a neo-liberal conception replicating the structural adjustment programmes

of the Bretton Woods Institutions (i.e the IMF and the World Bank), which prescribed models of development for developing countries Desai (2004) captures this in the contention that ‘in practice, GEAR operated as a home-grown structural adjustment programme’ GEAR heralded ‘a fundamental

shift away from the statist service delivery models of the past where the state subsidised and delivered

municipal services…towards a neo-liberal service delivery model where the private sector dominates’ (McDonald & Smith 2002: 1) In the latter model, where GEAR operates, ‘the state acts as a service

ensurer rather than a service provider and [public] services are run more like business, with financial

cost recovery becoming the most effective measure of performance’ (McDonald & Smith 2002: 1) GEAR gravitated more towards the system of market economy as, among other things, it advocated neo-liberal development initiatives and practices such as privatisation, reduction of public expenditure and trimming the size of the public service to tractable proportions In a market economy, the role of government in shaping the national development agenda is minimal; ‘the wealth is owned privately and economic life is organised according to market principles’ (Heywood 1997: 402)

Because of its ideological grounding in neo-liberalism, GEAR strained the strategic nexus that holds the Tripartite Alliance together Mandela and Mbeki urged the Alliance Left to know its place and toe the line, suggesting that they were junior partners in the political marriage The exchanges within the Alliance were so acrimonious that at one point Mbeki declared that the opponents of GEAR reminded him of white right-wingers He labelled the SACP leadership as ‘fake revolutionaries’, ‘charlatans’, and

‘confidence tricksters’ determined to build themselves on the basis of ‘scavenging on the carcass of

a savaged ANC’ (Southern Africa Report Archive 1998) Mandela also unwaveringly maintained that GEAR was the fundamental policy of the ANC and would not change because of pressure from the

Alliance Left He instructed SACP delegates to stop singing ‘Asifune GEAR’, loosely translated to mean

‘we do not want GEAR’ The ANC and the government slammed the perspectives that criticised GEAR with the contention that it was a strategic intervention aimed at accelerating the pace of realising the objectives of the RDP

6 Habib, cited in M Ray, No middle road, Finweek (9 April 2009: 11–14).

At the 50 ANC national conference in 1997 in Mafikeng, which was the first political gathering of the organisation’s highest decision-making body since the adoption of GEAR in 1996, at a time when GEAR was the subject of fierce political contestations, the ANC unleashed its political and intellectual heavyweights, whose presentations in defence of GEAR led to its adoption without consideration of the perspectives of the Alliance Left This, coupled with the type of ANC leadership that the 1997 Mafikeng conference produced, and wide-ranging powers on various political and governance issues assigned to its presidency, meant that the 1996 class project was consolidated With Mbeki elected as its president, the ANC assumed ideological hegemony in defining and setting the agenda for a South African developmental state The Alliance Left lost in Mafikeng, but it continued with its mobilisation against GEAR as a strategic trajectory towards a developmental state It continued to unequivocally express its disapproval of GEAR, as a neo-liberal policy

Following the 1999 general elections and subsequent victory of the ANC at the polls, Mbeki became the president of South Africa As probably the ‘principal architect of the ANC’s neo-liberal strategy of appeasement towards capitalism, both local and global, as the presumptive engine of South African economic transformation’ (Southern Africa Report Archive 1998), GEAR became a distinguishing feature

of the Mbeki administration As Desai (2004) observes, with GEAR as the policy of government, ‘markets were opened, taxes to the rich were cut, state assets were privatised, services were commodified, and social spending was reduced’ GEAR placated the markets and the international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF Unsurprisingly, in reacting to GEAR, Pamela Cox, speaking in her capacity as head of the South African division of the World Bank, remarked that what the ANC government had done ‘to put South Africa on the right footing’ was ‘almost miraculous’ (in Desai 2004)

In his own words in the SA–US Business and Finance Forum, Mbeki reaffirmed his administration’s commitment to GEAR by stating that it would ensure the following:

Fiscal discipline through deficit reduction; continued liberalization of exchange controls; accelerated reductions on tariffs; tax incentives to fund training; accelerated delivery on the backlog of social infrastructure; maintenance of a stable and competitive exchange rate; labour market reform to increase the absorptive capacity of the economy; and the privatisation and restructuring of state assets…Fiscal discipline and curtailing inflation are necessary to restore confidence and create [the] basic environment within which growth can occur (in Desai 2004)

At most of the ANC national conferences that followed the Mafikeng one in 1997, the GEAR approach towards building a developmental state was consistently endorsed Although the voices of criticism against the neo-liberal orientation of the ANC subsequently appeared to have toned down, the Alliance Left worked hard to reclaim its position within the Alliance as an influential factor in policy issues The dismissal of Zuma as the deputy president of South Africa in 2005, following the conviction in court

of his financial advisor, presented an opportunity for the Alliance Left to consolidate its efforts in the battle for the soul of the ANC

In Zuma, the Alliance Left saw an alternative to Mbeki, who was considered intolerant of views differed from his own The Alliance Left aligned itself with Zuma and, together with the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), ANC Women’s League (ANCWL), Young Communist League (YCL) and established businesspeople within the ANC who felt marginalised by the Mbeki administration, provided enormous political support to Zuma; this helped secure his victory as the president of the ANC in the party’s December 2007 national conference in Polokwane

Zuma defeated Mbeki in a fiercely contested leadership battle for the top position in the ANC, with the position of deputy president of the party assigned to Kgalema Motlanthe and the secretary general

portfolio to Gwede Mantashe – all key former unionists and SACP members Matthews Phosa who, like Tokyo Sexwale, was an established businessperson who conspicuously supported Zuma as a candidate for ANC president, was made treasurer general Baleka Mbete became the national chairperson and Thandi Modise the deputy secretary general With the recalling of Mbeki as the president of South Africa in September 2008 and the subsequent resignations of the deputy president and a host of other ministers, Motlanthe assumed the presidency of South Africa and Mbete became his deputy, replacing Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.

The Motlanthe administration did not attempt to introduce much fundamental policy change but rather continued with the developmental state agenda set by the Mbeki administration This was not really surprising, given the interim status of Motlanthe’s presidency The role that Motlanthe played after the ANC recalled Mbeki should, however, not be underestimated or trivialised as merely keeping the presidential seat warm for the arrival of Zuma Gumede (2009) states that Motlanthe inspired public confidence during the difficult times of uncertainty after the recalling of Mbeki as the president of the country The Motlanthe administration set up ‘emergency teams to cushion job losses’, proposed

‘international solutions to the global financial crisis’ and actively encouraged ‘racial and political reconciliation’ (Gumede 2009: 32)

Motlanthe provided leadership in implementing some of the ANC’s Polokwane national conference resolutions, key among them being signing the legislation that dissolved the Scorpions, an elite investigation unit attached to the National Prosecuting Authority that built a case that led to the corruption charges against Zuma (which charges were eventually dropped) The ‘Motlanthe factor’ in the transformation of South Africa’s system of governance can be said to have had profound policy implications and should not be ignored; the Motlanthe administration played a critical role in ensuring

a smooth transition from the Mbeki administration to the Zuma administration It maintained stability

in government at the time when the spectre of instability reared its menacing head, following the recalling of Mbeki and subsequent resignations of some ministers who preferred to leave with him The contracts of some directors-general were also renewed as part of Motlanthe’s strategic approach

to maintaining stability in the administration of government

To some, the leadership that emerged at the ANC Polokwane national conference of 2007, coupled with the recalling of Mbeki, signalled the end of the 1996 class project As Pillay observes, the election of Motlanthe and Mantashe to key strategic positions in the ANC leadership because of their grounding in the Alliance Left, ‘strengthens the view that a space has been opened for a move away from the Mbeki Project, towards a more redistributive socio-economic policy trajectory’ (2008: 12) To other analysts, however, the Polokwane conference does not mean the end of the 1996 class project Jara (2008) argues that ‘the Polokwane shift to a developmental state is within the underlying logic of creative capital accumulation’ In explaining Jara’s observation, Maseti writes that ‘the 1996 class project has not been entirely eliminated or defeated in Polokwane; it has been partially dislodged politically but still leaves behind a very firm and solid policy foundation that the current ANC leadership will find extremely difficult to disentangle’ (2008: 45)

Much as there may be merit in both Jara’s (2008) and Maseti’s (2008) contentions, it would be nạve

to underplay the Alliance Left factor and its influence in the Zuma administration, especially with influential communist personalities such as Blade Nzimande (general secretary of the SACP), and Zwelinzima Vavi (general secretary of COSATU) This is even more so following the formation of the Congress of the People (COPE), which comprises the political personalities who played key roles in the Mbeki administration’s pursuit of the 1996 class project It would equally be nạve to conclude that Zuma’s victory in Polokwane automatically means that the Alliance Left has taken total control of the ANC The coalition that secured Zuma’s triumph in Polokwane is not a homogeneous entity in terms

of the ideological inclination of its constituents In fact, the only factor that brought together the class

of forces that comprise the alliance that supported Zuma was, as Pillay puts it, ‘a common antipathy towards the relatively aloof leadership style of Mbeki’ (2008: 12)

So, the SACP, YCL, COSATU, ANCWL and ANCYL, and a range of established businesspeople who felt marginalised by the Mbeki administration, represent divergent interests Their expectations and policy preferences would inevitably vary in so far as the Zuma administration’s pursuit of a developmental state is concerned As pointed out in the introductory part of this chapter, there are those within the ANC, especially those who were part of the 1996 class project, who prefer continuity with the Mbeki administration’s strategic approach to a developmental state and those, especially in the Alliance Left, who propagate a fundamental shift away from the previous system The attempt to navigate these extremes is a fundamental challenge for the Zuma administration And the fundamental question is whether it is possible to establish and consolidate a developmental state agenda premised on the imperative of the redistributive socio-economic approach to transformation, without changing the market-based stabilisation policies of the Mbeki administration.7

To provide a context for analysis of the challenge that the Zuma administration faces in consolidating

a South African developmental state agenda, it is important that the ANC government’s strategic approach in building a developmental state under the Mbeki administration be reflected upon from

a perspective informed by empirical data Consolidation is about solidifying what already exists; and

in the context of this chapter, this means what the Mbeki administration put in place The purpose in this regard is to determine whether that which exists is worth consolidating (continuity), or whether it must be corrected or discarded by the Zuma administration

The ANC government under Mbeki and the

developmental state agenda

As already mentioned, a country that seeks to assert itself as a developmental state must ensure that its developmental agenda is geared towards enhancing the quality of life of the citizenry and creating

an appropriate environment to maximise the participation of citizens in the mainstream economy

A developmental state is premised on two dimensions that are fundamentally important in its

conceptualisation, namely social and economic dimensions The social dimension of a developmental

state is about attempts to enhance the quality of life of the citizenry through the provision of social services, while the economic dimension is concerned with the maximisation of citizen participation

in the mainstream economy This understanding of a developmental state was emphasised at the conference of Senior Management Services (SMS)8 in 2004 and is used as a framework for analysis in this chapter

The purpose of the SMS conference was to engage with the concept of a developmental state, to ensure that the senior management of the public service clearly understood it so that they might align their roles with the developmental challenges facing South Africa, and effectively play their part

in the socio-economic development trajectory that the Mbeki administration was pursuing (Fourie & Ngqunguwana 2005) In addressing the conference, Trevor Manuel (2004) indicated that the definition

of a developmental state, as provided above, ‘applies to the South African government view of its role as a developmental state’, which prioritises ‘the removal of poverty and tyranny, the expansion

of economic opportunities and extension of services to the poor’ The two dimensions – social and

7 M Ray, No middle road, Finweek (9 April 2009: 11–14).

8 Building a developmental state: Bridging the gap between two economies: A public service response Conference of Senior Management Services held at the International Convention Centre, Cape Town (20–22 September).

economic – of a developmental state are used below as an analytical framework to help us understand how the Mbeki administration fared in the pursuit of a developmental state agenda, and to provide a context for reflection on the challenge facing the Zuma administration in this regard.

The social dimension of a developmental state

To realise the social imperative of a developmental state, which, in the context of South Africa, is about eradication of poverty and extension of basic services to the poor, it is important that the strategic capacity of the country’s system of government be enhanced As one of the fundamental characteristics

of a developmental state, a focus on strategic capacity is concerned with the democratic nature of, and people-centred and people-driven approach to, development and change To enhance the quality

of life of the citizens, it is important that government should, at all times, have a clear understanding

of their needs and expectations This can only be realised through engaging citizens in defining ‘a common national agenda and in mobilising all [of them] to take part in [its] implementation’ (ANC 2007a: 14)

The social dimension of the developmental state agenda of the ANC government has always been about poverty alleviation and the provision of basic services to the poor This is underscored in the RDP (ANC 1994a), which is generally considered a product of a people-driven approach to development and change It could be argued that this approach to change and the relative consensus among the

‘motive forces’ was spoilt with the introduction of GEAR and the emergence of the 1996 class project which dominated the Mbeki administration As noted earlier, GEAR was not the product of consensus It was imposed, and therefore not built on popular legitimacy Unlike the RDP, GEAR was rejected by the Alliance Left and much of civil society, on the basis of not being a people-centred and people-driven policy of government Instead of addressing the needs of the people, GEAR’s neo-liberal orientation placates the markets It is not biased towards the poor and failed to unite the ‘motive forces’ around the NDR and focus them in one direction It was in the context of the contestations that GEAR engendered

in the Tripartite Alliance that the Mbeki administration had to carve its strategic niche in the pursuit

of a developmental state

The ANC’s preoccupation during the Mandela administration had been on putting in place the organisational and policy framework to address the legacy of apartheid This was mainly about enhancing the organisational capacity of the state to ensure that the structures and systems of government were geared towards the realisation of the national agenda When Mbeki took over in

1999 his administration continued with the task of building the organisational capacity of the state, and its strategic transformation focus was largely on building the state’s technical capacity to translate the broad objectives of government into implementable programmes and projects to achieve a developmental state agenda The question is: how did the Mbeki administration fare in its pursuit of the social dimension of a developmental state? Attempting to answer this question is important in order

to provide a contextual framework for reflection on the challenges faced by the Zuma administration

in the pursuit of a developmental state

The Mbeki administration’s performance in social services provision

Paradoxically, with its GEAR approach to building a developmental state, the Mbeki administration appears to have scored significant achievements, which are, however, strongly contested in some quarters After five years of being the president of the country (which is a reasonable period to allow for assessment of the performance of the ANC government during his administration), Mbeki elaborated

on the successes of government in his State of the Nation address of 11 February 2005 He reported

to the nation that 90 per cent of the citizens eligible for social grants were then receiving them (Mbeki

2005) Writing in Service Delivery Review, the deputy president at the time, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka,

corroborated that the ‘beneficiaries of social grants increased from 2,6 million in 1994 to 9,7 million

in June 2005’ (2007: 14) The Public Service Commission’s (PSC 2007) State of the Public Service Report

further attested that efforts such as social security and social assistance programmes had reached many beneficiaries

At the time when Mbeki was recalled as president of the country in September 2008, the beneficiaries of social grants had increased dramatically to 12.5 million people, of whom 8 million were children (ANC 2009) This appears to be among the positive consequences of the Mbeki administration’s decision to create the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) to engender efficiency and effectiveness in the administration of social security services SASSA was established in 2004, in terms of the South African Social Security Agency Act (No 9 of 2004), as a public entity assigned the mandate of providing quality social security services, including payment of social grants to beneficiaries Its establishment enhances the organisational capacity of the state in the pursuit of the social imperatives of a developmental state agenda Gevisser writes that ‘Mbeki’s greatest victory, not often-enough hailed, is that his government significantly altered the profile of poverty in the country through the massive social-grant programme’ (2009: 17)

The PSC’s State of the Public Service Report (2007) advises that social security and social assistance

programmes need to be augmented by more sustainable efforts towards eliminating the second economy The report contends that there is still a huge challenge facing the government to reduce poverty through productive employment; the reduction of poverty through social grants is not

sustainable This is an important aspect of developmentalism in which the Mbeki administration appeared not to have fared well Although in Towards a Fifteen Year Review (ANC 2008) it is pointed out

that ‘the rate of unemployment continues to decline, estimated at 23% in 2007 compared to almost 40% in the beginning of 2000’, the reliance on social security of 12.5 million people implies that the Mbeki administration’s attempt to reduce poverty through productive employment failed In fact,

Mbeki accepted this, as he expressed in an interview with Essop Pahad in The Thinker (Pahad 2009)

The ANC also acknowledges the failure of its administration under Mbeki to deal with the challenge of unemployment This is implied in its 2009 election manifesto, in its promise of ‘quality jobs rather than low-wage employment opportunities’.9

Further, in the State of the Nation address of 2005, Mbeki reported that more than 10 million South Africans had access to potable water (Mbeki 2005) Mlambo-Ngcuka expatiated that in March 2004

‘42,7 million people out of an estimated 47,1 million population had access to basic water supply infrastructure or a higher level of service such as water in-house or in a yard’ (2007: 14) This is a remarkable achievement as the figure suggests that government had managed to provide water to 91 per cent of the population Notwithstanding the foregoing, Ray and Lund, citing a study by the South African Cities Network chairman, Andrew Boraine, state that ‘although the proportion of people with water increased between 1996 and 2002, the number of households with water in-dwelling decreased

by 121 565, partly due to the migration of 478 922 households out of backyard accommodation during that period’.10

In housing, according to the ANC election manifesto (ANC 2009), over 2 million subsidies were given

to the poor during the period 1994–2005; the beneficiaries in this regard:

increased from 325 086 between 1994 and 1998 to 1.6 million in 2005 This figure increased

in 2008, with over 3.1 million subsidised houses having been built, including 2.7 million free

9 M Ray, No middle road, Finweek (9 April 2009: 11–14).

10 M Ray & T Lund, Mission impossible, Finweek (28 February 2008: 12–13).

houses for the poor, giving shelter to an additional 14 million people Between 1994 and 2005 3.5 million homes were electrified (ANC 2009)

This, according to Mlambo-Ngcuka, rates as ‘one of the most significant achievements by this country and unprecedented internationally’ as ‘by May 2005, access to electricity was estimated at 71%’ (2007: 14) Between 2007 and 2008, according to the ANC election manifesto, about 80 per cent of households acquired electricity (ANC 2009)

Income inequities were also attended to as, according to Mbeki (2005), ‘a figure of 4.1 million households that lived on an income of R9 600 or less per annum in 2004 was decreased to 3.6 million households’ Consequently, the black middle strata, which is identified in the Strategy and Tactics document (ANC 1994b) adopted at the ANC’s 1994 congress as one of the strategic ‘motive forces’, ‘which possess the best political and ideological potential to lead and defend the process of transformation’ (ANC 1994b), emerged and assumed a conspicuous character In the context of government’s performance

as described in the above exposition, Mbeki (2005) concluded in his State of the Nation address that

‘51% of the goals that the ANC government set with specific timelines have been accomplished; 21% had been carried out with minor delays; and 28% had not been undertaken’ (see also ANC 2009 for more about the ANC government’s delivery track record)

The other achievements of the ANC government during the Mbeki administration are that ‘free primary health care has expanded and 1,600 more clinics have been built’ Further, ‘about 248 out of 400 public hospitals have been revitalised and refurbished; in the fight against HIV and AIDS, the anti-retroviral therapy programme enrolled more than 600,000 people’ (ANC 2009) However, according to Ray and Lund, mainly in the provincial hospitals, evidence of a severe shortage of doctors, nurses and medical supplies still persisted, with scores of buildings declared unfit as public health facilities.11

The achievements of the Mbeki administration are underscored in Towards a Fifteen Year Review (ANC

2008), which is an assessment of the impact of the ANC programmes in an attempt to realise the targets set in the 2004 election manifesto and the 2004–09 medium term strategic framework The review points out that ‘in the social sphere there has been substantial overall improvement in people’s lives through mainly well-targeted programmes to reduce poverty with regard to income, access to social services like housing and land’ (ANC 2008) However, the performance of the Mbeki administration

in the pursuit of the social imperative of a developmental state is, as pointed out above, a subject of contestation, and the debates on the issue are polarised In the Human Sciences Research Council’s

(HSRC) State of the Nation: South Africa 2005–2006, Southall’s (2006b) contribution asks an appropriate

question: can South Africa be a developmental state?

In engaging this question, Southall cites President Mbeki’s 2005 State of the Nation address in its entirety and does not contest its empirical accuracy per se with regard to the performance of government Hemson and O’Donovan’s (2006) contribution in the same HSRC publication raises an important point about the methodology used to gather information that is normally used as a basis for determining government performance They state that over-reliance in the reporting of government

performance on departmental statistics is inadequate and they suggest that national surveys should

be considered as an alternative The PSC’s State of the Public Service Report (2007) concurs with Hemson

and O’Donovan’s (2006) perspective, and states that the public service performance reporting system should strike a balance between ‘quantitative achievements such as the number of beneficiaries and the value that the services provided generate for the beneficiaries’, which ‘requires among others sound planning and focused evaluative studies’ (PSC 2007)

11 M Ray & T Lund, Mission impossible, Finweek (28 February 2008: 12–13).

Many of the Mbeki administration’s achievements are expressed in quantitative terms This approach in assessing the performance of government is typical in countries whose policy orientation is embedded

in neo-liberalism Their preoccupation in terms of measuring the performance of government is more with the ‘outputs’ than with focusing on the ‘outcomes’, which is about the impact of government action in enhancing the quality of life of the citizens Government performance cannot merely be understood on the basis of the number of things done Ganley and Cubbin (1992) explain that government performance for the most part does not have the characteristics of ‘countability’ Unlike

in the case of pure commercial business, where the production of tangible outputs can be measured,

it may sometimes not be possible to observe distinct units of government performance, which also cannot meaningfully be measured ‘on ordinary cardinal number scales’ (Ganley & Cubbin 1992: 32).Amassing statistics, and adding and raising them to the nth power to understand government performance, may be a flawed approach In the literature that is critical of the Mbeki administration – the framework of which literature is embedded in socialist thinking – the Mbeki administration’s achievements in realising the social imperatives of a developmental state are highly contested In fact,

it is contended in South Africa’s ‘new progressive magazine standing for social justice’, Amandla!, that

the Mbeki administration bequeathed social crisis to the country It states that:

Under Mbeki’s watch South Africa has become the most unequal middle income country in the world Obscene opulent wealth produces grinding poverty Since

1994 unemployment has more than doubled and poverty has worsened In this mix and partly as a failure of AIDS and health policy generally, SA has one of the highest infection rates in the world The depth of the social crisis is made worse by the difficulty

of overcoming apartheid geography that locks inequality and poverty into racially bound communities Deprivation of basic services such as housing, water, electricity and sanitation fosters feelings of disillusionment and political alienation The breeding grounds of violent crime are invested [sic] with young people whose dreams have been crushed by the violence of failed service delivery Add to this the failure of the post-apartheid education and schooling system that produces functional illiteracy on a mass level and the scale of the crisis becomes apparent.12

Since 1994 there have been many service delivery protests countrywide with most municipalities being unable to spend two-thirds of their capital budgets for service delivery Van Dijk and Croucamp (2007: 665) put the number of protests against municipalities at 51 between 1994 and 2004/05 They further state that the figure increased exponentially from 2005, with the former provincial and local government minister, Sydney Mufamadi, indicating that 90 per cent of the 136 municipalities in need

of financial assistance had experienced service delivery protests (Van Dijk & Croucamp 2007: 665) Mbeki (cited in Pahad 2009) accepted this as a consequence of his administration’s failure to build ‘an efficient and effective system of local government’ (Pahad 2009: 10) Ray (2009) estimates that 2 000 civic protests, some violent, about lack of service delivery occurred between 2007 and 2008.13

Notwithstanding statistical variations in the sources referred to above, service delivery protests that occurred during the Mbeki administration suggest fundamental flaws in certain areas of governance Many of these governance challenges are attributed to GEAR, which, through its approach on issues

of social services, emphasises neo-liberal variables such as privatisation and corporatisation of basic services (e.g transportation, water, electricity; and management of schools, healthcare and other services) on a user-fee and cost-recovery basis (see Desai 2004) In exposing the fundamental flaws in the commodification of basic services, McDonald & Smith illustrate that:

12 President Motlanthe: Few easy steps to restore confidence Amandla (Oct/Nov 2008: 17)

13 M Ray, No middle road, Finweek (9 April 2009: 11–14).

If 18 percent of the seven million people who are reported to have been given access to water since 1994 are unable to pay their water bills no matter how hard they try, then 1.26 million of these new recipients are unable to afford this water and an additional 1.2 million have to choose between paying for water and buying other essentials like food A similar percentage applies to the 3.5 million South Africans who have been given access to electricity (McDonald & Smith 2002: 11)

Some of the examples cited as the negative consequences of GEAR cannot, however, be attributed solely to the ANC government’s policy approach in advancing the developmental state agenda When the ANC democratically assumed power to govern the country in 1994, it inherited a huge backlog

of service delivery created by the apartheid system So, any analysis of the performance of the ANC government that factors in the empirical data pertaining to the years when the ANC was not yet in power, without disaggregating and locating the discourse within the correct historical context, is scientifically flawed This should not, however, be misunderstood as the rationalisation of the ANC government’s failure under the Mbeki administration in certain areas that are critically important in advancing the social agenda of a developmental state

The achievements of the Mbeki administration in the pursuit of the social imperative of a developmental state within the neo-liberal context of GEAR seem to be unsustainable and to impact negatively on social cohesion, which is about ‘a feeling of being together as one’ (ANC 2007a: 19) The achievements perpetuate the stratification of society into the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ The rich and, to a very great extent, the middle strata of the South African population, are the ones who seem to have benefited from the proceeds of the GEAR approach to building a developmental state Gevisser writes that Zuma exploited this anomaly in the Mbeki administration, strategically positioning ‘himself as the representative of all those who feel excluded from the banquet of victory’ (2009: 17)

Those with financial means are in a position of affluence and can afford commodified basic services, which are provided reliably to them solely because of their ‘rand power’ or ability to purchase This is

in contrast to poor-quality social services provided mainly in black townships and rural areas, where the majority of the people are poor This section of the South African population feels marginalised and is growing impatient with the neo-liberal approach to the development of the country, which creates ‘social distance’ in the citizenry.14 This Mbeki accepted in his statement that inequalities in wealth, income and opportunity continue to characterise the profile of South African society In his interview with Pahad, Mbeki said that ‘these inequalities increased rather than the opposite’ during his administration (Pahad 2009: 10)

The incidents of service delivery protests referred to above, which occurred largely in black communities, bear testimony to rising inequality Zuma, whose campaigning for the ANC displayed empathy for the plight of the poor seems to have ignited new hope in this community In the article

Jacob Zuma, the Social Body and the Unruly Power of Song, Gunner (2009) explores the wider political

implications of the song ‘Umshini Wami’ (‘My Machine Gun’), which Zuma has used in his campaigns

since early 2005, and explains how it helped him to prominence and ‘demonstrated a longing in the body politic for a political language other than that of a distancing and alienating technocracy’ (2009: 27) Gunner finds that this song, in the contemporary political context, reverberates with the poorer section of the population, ‘who have yet to taste the honey of a South African democracy’ under the Mbeki administration (2009: 27) According to Ray, ‘Zuma rose to power because of angry reactions by the ANC’s grassroots constituency against a black elite Mbeki had assiduously propped up’.15

14 In the context of this discourse, ‘social distance’ refers to a real and imagined distance in lifestyle, interaction and even geography between the rich and poor.

15 M Ray, No middle road, Finweek (9 April 2009: 11–14).

Many of the challenges of the ANC government under the Mbeki administration, as reflected upon in

this chapter, are acknowledged in the document Towards a Fifteen Year Review (ANC 2008), and include,

among other things, a weakening value system, increasing inequalities, high youth unemployment, poor quality of social services and economic exclusion And as already mentioned, Mbeki accepted the failure of his administration with regard to these aspects The Mbeki administration’s failures constitute

a challenge for the Zuma administration, which must correct them In addition to the aspects already mentioned, Mbeki further pointed out that his administration had failed with regard to the following:empowering the people with disabilities and in ensuring their respect by the society

as a whole; mobilising people in the localities they live in to ensure that they work especially with the police services to radically reduce such contact crimes as rape, abuse of women and children, murder, assault causing grievous bodily harm; as well as other crimes, such as house-breaking and theft; ensuring the effectiveness of the Moral Regeneration Campaign; and inspiring the majority of the people in South Africa to adhere to a common patriotism in a meaningful manner consciously sharing a common national identity, with the country enjoying ever growing social and national cohesion (cited in Pahad 2009: 10)

The technical and organisational capacity of the state during the Mbeki administration

The social imperative of a developmental state necessitates a strong public service system, which is contingent upon establishing appropriate intellectual capital and organisational capacity to advance its agenda Intellectual capital is about the quality and relevance of knowledge in people In building the technical capacity of the state or establishing its intellectual capital, the role of the higher education institutions becomes critically important The fundamental question that ought to be asked is whether the quality of higher education in South Africa befits the imperatives of a developmental state Does

it generate a contextually relevant knowledge and produce the required calibre of graduates armed with the necessary knowledge to drive a developmental state agenda? Answering these questions would be the subject of a separate research endeavour Suffice it to say that the debate on the higher education system in South Africa often indicates that it produces functionally illiterate graduates whose knowledge is incongruent with the imperatives of a developmental state (Maserumule 2005; Vil-Nkomo 2009)

The issue of building the technical and organisational capacity of the state was given substantial consideration during the Mbeki administration In his 2007 State of the Nation address, Mbeki said:

…in the period leading up to 2009, the issue of the organisation and capacity of the state will remain high on our agenda; and what has emerged, among others, as a critical area for strategic intervention is the content of training that public servants receive

in various institutions and the role of the South African Management Development Institute (SAMDI) (Mbeki 2007)

This state of affairs necessitated the reconstitution of SAMDI – an organisation assigned the mandate

of building human capacity in the public service through training and development interventions – into the Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA) This move is said to have been among the attempts to enhance efforts to establish the intellectual capital appropriate for building a strong public service system

To advance a developmental state agenda the public service should be staffed by the brightest and best servants, with development-oriented knowledge, skills and attitudes In this regard, Orkin explains that PALAMA’s main deliverables are to ‘heighten, and improve the quality of, management

development for senior executives in the public service; and to massify the provision to junior and middle managers, towards better meeting the service delivery challenges of a developmental state’ (2007: 4) With the PALAMA approach to enhancing state capacity, the strategy is to move from the SAMDI approach of provision of training to facilitation of training; from competition with other training providers to collaboration with them; and from selective coverage in terms of training offerings to massified coverage (Orkin 2007).

Only time will tell whether PALAMA’s strategic approach to training and development will enhance the technical capacity of the state through the production of the required calibre of public servants, imbued with the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes, and able to intervene more strategically

in the economy and produce the intended developmental state This is given that there are serious skills shortages in the public sector, which seem to have assumed intractable proportions, according

to Ray and Lund.16 The statistical data from the Department of Public Service and Administration (2007/08) suggests that the country needs 42 300 skilled and highly skilled state employees Coupled with the vacancy rate for largely professional and managerial positions, which the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation’s recent study puts at 30 per cent in the provincial administrations, the foregoing appears to be a serious challenge in enhancing state capacity

Renowned economist Iraj Abedian is cited by Ray and Lund as having observed that ‘the total vacancy rate across all departments and levels of government could be perilously close to 300 000’ Further, as Ray and Lund argue, this means that during the Mbeki administration state capacity ‘remained tight, resulting in [a] cumulative backlog of social and capital expenditure’.17 This Mbeki acknowledged in

his 2007 State of the Nation address (Mbeki 2007) In response to the PSC’s State of the Public Service

Report (2007), Mbeki stated that ‘…we still have a lot of work to do to build a stable and a highly motivated public service We need to achieve the deeply transformative objectives of the national democratic revolution’ (Mbeki 2007) Quoting Manuel (finance minister at the time), SAMDI argued that in a developmental state public servants are:

the servants of the people and the champions of the poor and the downtrodden; their sense of service delivery is always focused on eradicating poverty and social deprivation and they look at their careers in the public service as a calling and not an opportunity

to accumulate wealth or self-serving elitism (SAMDI 2006: 10–11)Given the concessions that the ANC made in the interests of national reconciliation, particularly when the new constitutional order was negotiated, it is not necessarily easy to have the calibre of public servants with the attitudinal inclination that Manuel describes above When the new constitutional order was negotiated in the early 1990s, the National Party managed to successfully negotiate for the insertion of a clause in the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No 2000 of 1993) to

‘safeguard the jobs of the white civil servants’ who were in the employ of government before the ANC took over power in 1994, and to ‘allow for a coalition of government between the Afrikaner Nationalists and the ANC ministers’ (Sampson 1999: 467–468)

The integration of a racially defined administration without, on the one hand, any retrenchments and with, on the other hand, employment of previously disadvantaged people who had been discriminated against by the apartheid policies, bloated the public service sector Efforts to rationalise it could not yield any anticipated results for a leaner public service because of the ‘protectionist clause’ in the Interim Constitution (1993) and the fact that government in South Africa is the biggest employer Given the socio-economic and political history of the country, it is not easy to trim the public service, which is

16 M Ray & T Lund, Mission impossible, Finweek (28 February 2008: 12–13).

17 M Ray & T Lund, Mission impossible, Finweek (28 February 2008: 12–13).

highly unionised, with COSATU wielding great ‘worker power’ and in partnership with the ANC within the Tripartite Alliance As Pillay observes, ‘COSATU has approximately 1.8 million members, and is by far the largest union federation in the country’ (2008: 13) As the ruling party, the ANC treads carefully in taking policy decisions that may be perceived as being inconsistent with the interests of workers These dynamics pose a serious challenge to the ANC government in creating an inexpensive, efficient and effective public service staffed by, as already argued, the nation’s brightest and best servants capable

of being innovative in addressing the social and economic needs of the citizens

Another related challenge pertains to the reorientation and reskilling of the public service (especially those who were part of the apartheid system), in line with the imperatives of a developmental state and the tenets of democracy, and the conflicts encountered at the political–administrative interface There are still those in the public service with the attitudinal inclination that suggests a refusal to embrace the new basic values and principles of public administration – values and principles whose

paradigmatic antecedents are ingrained in the African philosophy of humanism, which is ubuntu

Incidents of racism around issues that pertain to service delivery are regularly reported in the media, which clearly shows that some in the public service still attempt to live in the past For some, a sense of

Batho Pele in the service delivery interaction with citizens is non-existent At the political–administrative interface, incidents of conflict between ministers and directors-general abounded during the Mbeki administration; some of the conflicts were even systemic and often culminated in the loss of excellent administrators or managers as a result of fallings-out with their political heads

In an article entitled Conflicts between Directors-general and Ministers in South Africa: A ‘Postulative’

Approach, Maserumule (2007) systematically examines this phenomenon and observes that it is becoming a frequent occurrence at the political–administrative interface, and impacts negatively on the state’s capacity to deliver services to the citizenry Conflicts at the political–administrative interface pose a challenge to efforts aimed at building a developmental state Maserumule (2007) further argues that these conflicts are occasioned by contradictions in policy formulated to serve as framework for the management of the public service The following explanation and discussion may be necessary

In 1999 the Department of Public Service and Administration published Public Service Regulations that came into effect on 1 July of the same year These Public Service Regulations empowered ministers

to create and abolish posts, and recruit, appoint, transfer and discharge employees The rationale behind the introduction of these regulations was to ensure that the departments would have more flexibility in managing their staff According to Mpumi Skosana, then Deputy-Director-General in the DPSA, ‘the new regulations [then] were aimed at improving public service delivery by eliminating unnecessary bureaucratic red tape’.18 However, a closer look at these Public Service Regulations indicates contradictions with the Public Finance Management Act (No 1 of 1999 as amended) The Act put greater emphasis on the responsibility of managers – directors-general in particular, as the heads of administration – to manage in a manner intended to achieve efficiencies and effectiveness

in the operational performances of government departments It gave the directors-general increased power and authority in terms of the management of their departments This resulted in a situation where, on the one hand, the Public Service Regulations of 1999 empower ministers with the authority

to manage their departments while, on the other hand, the Public Finance Management Act empowers directors-general Ramaite, the former director-general of the Department of Public Service and Administration, cautioned that these contradictions in the policy initiatives would without a doubt herald ‘more conflicts at the level of political administrative intervention’ (1999: 289) This much plays itself out frequently in government and compromises effective governance, particularly in this critical

18 Cited by SAPA, Ministers to get new powers, Sowetan (23 June 1999).