Many non-profit and trade associations provide private sector support to the aviation security industry. The Radio Technical Commission on Aeronautics has been previously mentioned as one such example. Another example is the Safe Skies Alliance, which provides reviews of technolo- gies such as PIDS, and also sponsors the authorship of aviation security procedural guides such as the Recommended Airport Security Guidance for Airport Planning and Construction.
Safe Skies sponsors the Program for Applied Research in Airport Security (PARAS), an industry-driven, applied research program that
develops near-term practical solutions to security problems faced by airport operators. PARAS is managed by Safe Skies, funded by the FAA, and modeled after the Airport Cooperative Research Program of the Transportation Research Board. Contractors conduct the research and are selected through a competitive proposal process (PARAS Program/Safe Skies, n.d.).
Some products already available from Safe Skies include: a guidebook for criminal history record checks and bedding, a companion guide to the US Customs and Border Protection’s airport technical design standards, airport breach classification and best practices, an employee inspection synthesis and a quick guide for airport cyber security.
After 9/11, the US TSA required airport operators, air carriers, and indirect air carrier operators to be trained as security coordinators for their company or operation. However, the government does not provide such training; instead the training is provided by the private sector and in many cases through industry trade organizations such as the AAAE, or Airports Council International. The trade organizations also assist airport and aircraft operators with representation with policymakers, and often provide seminars in meetings to allow a community of practitioners to share best practices.
CONCLUSIONS
The private sector has long played an important role in securing aviation.
The international model for screening is characterized by the use of private sector personnel providing front-line screening and security functions supported by government employed police personnel for those times when armed intervention is necessary. The use of private sector personnel is cost effective for the airport and aircraft operators, but their use in the US was called into question after September 11, 2001. While the 9/11 Commission did not point to screening as a security failure that resulted in the attacks, it did point to significant shortcomings in their overall performance.
However, in an industry with tight profit margins (i.e. aircraft operators) or when public funds are involved (airport operators in certain circum- stances) performance will meet, but not exceed, regulatory requirements.
The requirements for private contracts in the US pre-9/11 were well below the levels required in many European countries.
While the US TSA and US law allow for privatized screeners both public sentiment and reluctance on the behalf of airport operators, along with a lengthy and difficult approval process through TSA, has resulted in very slow growth of private sector screening providers.
The role of the private sector for air transport security 83 Security screening and airport access control and credentialing (e.g.
identity management) technologies are primarily provided by private sector industries, but in order to be effective, there must be trust between the government and private sector so that industry can develop technol- ogies to meet existing and projected threats. Additionally, access control and identity management systems must be protected from cyber-attack in order to remain effective. Perimeter security also falls under the general heading of security technologies. While there have been few attacks on aviation where attackers have access the airfield or aircraft by way of the perimeter (compared to other pathways), the industry is seeing a rise in perimeter intrusions. The industry is seeing more companies develop- ing perimeter intrusion products for the aviation industry, but without a regulatory requirement, few airport operators have shown an interest in adopting them.
The role of private industry in research and development is critical to identifying evolving threats and counterterrorism measures. Government- funded research projects conducted by academia, non-profit and trade associations, and in some cases research firms and for-profit corporations have provided (and continue to provide) a body of best practices for the aviation security industry.
Private companies can often provide efficiencies in cost, innovation, and timely delivery of technologies and personnel, which are not possible within the government ranks. Additionally, while policymakers create the policies, and airports and aircraft operators are expected to carry out the requirements of those policies, it is the private sector that develops the technologies and provides the personnel needed to fulfill the regulatory requirements.
NOTES
1. It was later established by the US National Transportation Safety Board that TWA 800 was an aircraft accident.
2. The FAA did not expressly prohibit knives with blades under four inches, as the agency did not consider knives to be menacing, most local laws allowed carriage of such knives, and many knives would have been difficult to detect unless the sensitivity of the metal detecting technologies in use at the time was greatly increased – which would also have had the effect of slowing down the screening lines (Kean and Hamilton, 2004, p. 84).
3. The security system is not set up to detect fake weapons or bombs, particularly if they are innocuous items that are later constructed, post checkpoint, to resemble an explosive device.
4. Categories related to the number of annual passenger boardings, known as enplanements.
5. Category notations are at the time of the 2001 ATSA passage.
6. Notably, TSA does not report the performance of the checkpoints staffed by TSA per- sonnel, so it is difficult to determine if ‘average performer’ is above or below TSA-staffed checkpoints.
7. A state-controlled company or enterprise.
8. The US procedure is to swap out the flight crew member with a flight attendant for the duration of the time the pilot is out of the cockpit.
REFERENCES
FBI (n.d.). ‘16 Critical Infrastructures’. Retrieved May 2, 2016, from https://www.
infragard.org/.
GAO (2001). ‘Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve Security at the Nation’s Airports’. US General Accounting Office 2001:
No. GAO-01-1162T.
Gore, A. (1997). White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, Final Report to President Clinton. Retrieved from www.fas.org/irp/threat/212fin~1.
html.
ICAO (2011). International Civil Aviation Organization: Annex 17 (9th edn).
Montreal: ICAO.
Kean, T.H. and L. Hamilton (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report. Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.
McCartney, S. (2016, April 28). ‘The Air-traffic System US Airlines Wish They Had’. The Wall Street Journal, pp. D1–D2.
PARAS Program/Safe Skies (n.d.). Retrieved May 2, 2016, from https://www.
sskies.org/paras/.
Powell, G.L., L.A. Tyska and L.J. Fennelly (2003). Casino Surveillance and Security:
150 Things You Should Know. Alexandria, VA: ASIS International.
Price, J.C. and J.S. Forrest (2013). Practical Aviation Security: Predicting and Preventing Future Threats (2nd edn). Waltham, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.
RTCA (2015). Standards for Airport Security Access Control Systems (Rep. No.
RTCA DO-230F). Washington DC: RTCA.
RTCA (2016). Online Store. Retrieved May 1, 2016, from http://www.rtca.org/
store_product.asp?prodid=1129.
Sylves, R.T. (2015). Disaster Policy and Politics: Emergency Management and Homeland Security (2nd edn). Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Trento, S.B. and J.J. Trento (2006). Unsafe at Any Altitude: Failed Terrorism Investigations, Scapegoating 9/11, and the Shocking Truth about Aviation Security Today. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press.
6. The challenge of air cargo security
Douglas Brittin
INTRODUCTION
The world has changed dramatically in the past 25 years, with the need for increased security an ever-present factor. Although the air cargo industry (the ‘Industry’) continues to grow and remains a robust and integral ele- ment of global commerce, changes in security requirements have imposed a high cost along the way. It is nearly impossible to calculate the millions of dollars the Industry has spent, especially in the past 10 years, as a result of continually increasing security measures required by regulators at the global, regional, or national level. The current threat environment dictates the need for secure measures, and through these the Industry can protect its brands, assets and people, and of course the flying public. As such, Industry must continually strive for measures that find a balance between good business practices and providing realistic results, while protecting the high value of global commerce traveling the air cargo supply chain.