In a number of the reported countries the excessively detailed rules on advertising and information are increasingly criticised as counterproductive if they lead to constantly extended lists of information catalogues. However, this line of thinking is also contradicted as it would provide liberalists an too easy argument to reduce constraints imposed on businesses.
The multiple critiques and compelling analyses of behavioural scientists make it difficult to leave the existing consumer information models as they are. All the more since most of the national reporters, especially those from the EU countries, con- clude that it will be difficult to consider disinformation as a result of a trader’s compliance with mandatory disclosure rules, an unlawful practice. The national legislators and the European legislator alike still seem not to be fully affected by those critiques. In most of the reported countries there is no or little evidence of in depth moves to deal with the problem of information overload or risks of disinfor- mation as a result of the manner in which the information is provided or its quantity.
Far from stating that no initiatives are taken in this respect at both national or EU-level an overall approach to address the shortcomings of the consumer informa- tion models is lacking. For instance initiatives at EU-level to rationalise information are rather piece meal and mainly focused onfinancial services. Despite the‘fitness check’-evaluation of consumer protection directives at EU-level demonstrated
significant problems with consumers’understanding of standard terms and condi- tions, the European Commission, in response to these problems, confines itself to investigateways to improve the presentation of mandatory information requirements and the standard terms and conditions. This could eventually lead to a set of uniform key principles if the self-regulatory approach proves unsatisfactory.418Furthermore, as regards the simplification of rules, the European Commission’s‘fitness check’-- evaluation has established that there islimited potential for reducingsome of the information requirements (sic).
Further legislative guidance in and beyond the EU is often lacking and by necessityfilled in by courts. As a result, the CJEU strengthened the transparency standards of information. However, legislative guidance on how to apply the rather vague principles in the existing legislation, consolidating the approach of the CJEU, could help make it easier to understand and apply the transparency requirement.419 It has been argued above that there is no reason to abandon the consumer information model as such nor is there any reason to straightforwardly abandon the normative average consumer benchmark used in those models. Conversely, proposals to adjust the normativity of the overall benchmark are generally wel- comed.420 One cannot deny the economic orientation of legislation tailored to consumers and the fact that legislation is often limping behind economic develop- ments. But rather than abondoning the model, the new economic and legislative environment in which consumers operate necessitates refinement of the information model and its benchmark.
To that aim research outcomes of psychological or interdisciplinary research421 must be taken into account since they can help to find out what information consumers effectively need for making better decisions. Building further upon these research outcomes, consumers arguably may well want to make more respon- sibility themselves with the help of information about core elements, such as price, characteristics of goods and services, and core consumer rights. Although further research should be done, it could be envisaged to require traders to provide con- sumers with standardized short and simple pre-contractual information about the core issues and only the core issues,422 separately from the mandated extended
418Report of the Fitness Check of EU Consumer and Marketing Law (2017), p. 86.
419See on this topic, Report of the Fitness Check of EU Consumer and Marketing Law (2017), p. 86.
420Proposals to adjust the benchmark of information rules towards more specific groups of vulnerable consumers must be addressed in this light. Despite all critiques based on the illiteracy, innumeracy and lack of salience of groups of consumers, one should be very careful in lowering the average benchmark (see however for a plea in that direction, Duivenvoorde (2014), pp. 213–224, who at the same time indicates that the German approach, well-known within the EU for adhering to a lower consumer benchmark, is over-protective. When set too low, the very existence of consumer information legislation might be called into question and consumerist paternalism luring. Also the precise cost a reform of this size entails for market participants is a convincing argument, especially since costs imposed on businesses are likely passed on to consumers in commercial relationships.
421For instance linguistic studies on simplification and readability and psychological studies on human processing of commercial information in digital environments etc.
422It must be noted that core issues and core terms of contracts are not (necessarily) the same.
disclosure where additional voluntary information could be provided. Also the merits of a limited set of information particulars disclosedin the appropriate time and form(differentiation between pre-contractual information and information after the conclusion of the contract) must be further investigated.
In that regard, interesting initiatives taken at national level deserve further attention. In some of the reporting countries there exists already an obligation on businesses to make some information prominent, that is to bring certain key infor- mation to the attention of the consumer. This requirement to inform consumers about important contract (core and others) terms prominently is worthwhile pursuing. In this regard, also reasonable consumer expectations could gain weight, as emphasized in some of the national reports. With respect to food characteristics the Multi Traffic Light System is interesting. Also the multiple warnings which result from the codes of conduct in some of the reported countries and which focus on the manner in which key information elements are communicated might be endorsed.
Technological developments place this debate in a new context. Within the digital market contexts recent initiatives concerning layering of information with the use of pop-ups and hyperlinked texts and specific prohibitions of excessive use of hyper- links in an effort to increase the reader-friendliness of information could be helpful.
The use of pop-ups and hyperlinked texts ensures that the most important informa- tion for the consumer is provided upfront in a form of summary disclosure. It allows consumers to have more easily and more conveniently access to information and to retrieve in function of their specific needs a broader range of information. Also the application of the CARE-principle to and the development of digital comparison tools could contribute to a better insight in market developments. Enhanced com- parability on the basis of essential key elements could further contribute to the effectiveness of information requirements.
Furthermore, the multiple initiatives in the reported countries to educate con- sumers may be welcomed, but instantly urge to realism. They are often quite costly, mainly function on a purely voluntary basis and are sometimes used to stifle other initiatives to improve the effectiveness of consumer rules. Furthermore, it cannot be denied that any consumer-targeted education approach will not help where the most fundamental skill for processing written information is missing. In some of the EU countries these skills of average teenage consumers is according to recent surveys in strong decline.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that new initiatives to improve the con- sumers’understanding of information disclosed in the market is complex and must take full account of the legal and economic context wherein transactions between businesses and consumers take place. Therefore the search for improved consumer information will constitute an ongoing balancing exercise between rationalisation, simplification and timing of information. An increased openness from legal scholars towards revealing insights from behavioural sciences may shed new light on the debate, especially on how consumer law and policy could be re-shaped to reflect more accurately the way consumers really behave, rather than how they ought to behave on the basis of a purely rational consumer model or conversely according to third parties who know better.
However, zest for action may not detract from the important cost factor. All modifications made to the existing model must therefore be subject to a careful impact assessment, including an assessment of the costs of introducing new infor- mation obligations on top or in place of the existing ones.
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