Capitalism and Family Function

Gillis’ discussion of the impact of capitalism on the family provides the prelude to a necessary consideration here of a more thoroughgoing (though highly contested) economic analysis of the reasons for family change and the shift towards individualism. In this, Gary Becker argued that both the development of the breadwinner/housewife family model and the shift of focus away from the family unit on to the individual, were rational and functional responses to the advent of capitalism.127

Becker posited that traditional pre-capitalist societies in Europe were static; they had limited information and knowledge, and technological change was slow. Families provided protection against uncertainty, acting

From the Family to the Individual 61

128 Compare the work of Beck and Beck-Gernsheim and Giddens, discussed in this chapter, section III.C.ii.

as informal insurance systems, sharing good and bad fortune amongst their members. They were held responsible for the acts of their members, sharing both praise and shame accordingly, and therefore closely monitoring behaviour. Families ‘warranted’ the honesty and good conduct of their members in order to secure jobs, places and apprenticeships for them. Wealthier families viewed marriage as a means of forming favourable alliances with others, and so took a close interest in how matches were made and expected the individuals concerned to assent. The information on which marital choices were based concerned the reputation and wealth of the family, not the per- sonality and behaviour of the individuals. Amongst poorer families, by con- trast, there was greater autonomy in economic and social choices made by individual members, as the family itself had little to lose from the decisions taken. A person might seek to move away from the family in order to better himself and avoid his progress being thwarted by its low status.

Becker contrasted such societies with ‘modern’ societies. He drew no dis- tinction between those formed by industrialisation and ‘late modern’ societies in which consumption and services are primary,128 focusing instead simply on capitalist societies. In such societies, he argued, markets facili- tate trade and production, stimulating change in technologies, incomes and opportunities; people become more mobile in order to take advantage of these. Developed laws of contract replace the previous reliance on family

‘certification’ of workers, while the availability of market credit, savings vehicles and insurance enables the individual to develop his capital and self-insure against risk. The family and kin become less important, and less concerned, to monitor individual behaviour. As individuals move away to secure better economic opportunities, the family becomes less able to super- vise them anyway. Family members therefore develop more autonomy over decision-making, including choice of partner. Personal, rather than family, compatibility becomes more central to that choice. However, because personal traits (as distinct from family characteristics) are harder to assess prior to the marriage, there is greater disappointment with the marital experience, and greater propensity to divorce and try again in the marriage market, as witnessed by higher divorce rates. With economic activity underpinned by more complex technology and bodies of knowledge and taking place increasingly outside the home, parents need to invest more in their children’s education and training to equip them for the outside world. The additional cost this imposes means that they will have fewer children but of higher

‘quality’. Becker suggested that the shift to love as the basis for choice of marital partner and the greater investment in a smaller number of children

129 The suggestion of greater emotional closeness in the modern era is strongly contested: see the critiques of Stone, for example, noted in this chapter, section III.C.i.

130 In the academic literature, see eg, RE Bellah et al, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1996).

131 Becker (n 127) 244.

132 ibid ch 2. The approach is very similar to Talcott Parsons’ analysis of the American family in the mid-20th century: see T Parsons and R Bales, Family: Socialization and Interac- tion Process (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956).

133 Becker (n 127) 27.

134 J Lewis, The End of Marriage?: Individualism and Intimate Relations (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2001) 45.

in the family explain a perceived increase in emotional closeness and affec- tion within the nuclear family in modern societies.129

All of this reflects the view that an increased emphasis has been placed on the individual in modern societies. More recent political and popular debate has seized on this perspective to argue that western societies have become

‘selfish’, and accordingly unwilling to make the sacrifices needed to ‘make marriage work’ or to ‘put the children first’,130 but Becker argued that ‘individualism replaced familialism because many family functions in traditional societies are more effectively handled by markets and other organizations in modern societies’.131

Becker’s analysis suggests one explanation for the impact that the broad shift from a traditional to a capitalist society might have had on family relations, but his understanding of the division of labour within the family and of altruism within it has been the subject of considerable and justifiable criticism.

i. The Sexual Division of Labour within the Family

Becker’s argument is that specialisation of labour within the family via the separate roles of breadwinner and housewife is the most efficient way of allocating time and effort within the family in capitalist societies.132 On his view, it makes sense for men to devote more time and effort to building up their investment in the market, and for women to put their effort into investment in the family. He understood marriage to be a reciprocal relationship, whereby the husband gained from his wife’s domestic labour (the content of which will vary according to their social class) and the wife gained from the husband’s labour in the market. He thus defined marriage as ‘the term for a written, oral, or customary long-term contract between a man and a woman to produce children, food, and other commodities in a common household’.133 One can see here, as Jane Lewis has explained, the idea of an ‘efficient and stable family form in which the obligation to maintain was clear for men and the obligation to care was clear for women’.134 As David Kynaston described the bargain in 1950s Britain,

marriage was a contract, a well-understood lifetime arrangement based on mutual interest. … At the heart of that mutual interest was usually a very traditional

From the Family to the Individual 63

135 Kynaston (n 75) 583.

136 Becker (n 127) 245–54.

137 ibid, 21.

138 For an excellent critique of the contrary tendency to claim altruism as inherently femi- nine, see P Tsoukala, ‘Gary Becker, Legal Feminism, and the Costs of Moralizing Care’ (2007) 16 Columbia Journal of Gender & Law 357, 392–93.

139 For a detailed discussion of Becker and his feminist critics, see A Estin, ‘Can Families Be Efficient? A Feminist Appraisal’ (1996) 4 Michigan Journal of Gender & Law 1; Tsoukala (n 138).

140 White v White [2001] 1 AC 596. See ch 7, section II.A.

141 Tsoukala (n 138).

division of labour: the husband as breadwinner, the wife as homemaker, even if she was in part-time paid work. ‘While he is at work she should complete her day’s work—washing, ironing, cleaning or whatever it may be—and she must have ready for him a good meal’ …135

In Becker’s view, in the late twentieth century, this model broke down as women increasingly went into the labour market, because the rewards there outweighed those available from investment in the family. In turn, children became even more expensive because of the cost their care imposes on career development and lost earnings. The gain from marriage was reduced because there was less benefit in the sexual division of labour. Divorce, cohabitation and birth outside marriage therefore became viable alternatives to traditional marriage for both men and women. The provision of welfare benefits to lone parents, pensions to the elderly and a free education system (and, one might add, in the UK, a National Health Service), all provide alternatives to the traditional reliance on the family for support and care, resulting in (or perhaps contributing to) greater financial independence for women to walk away from unsatisfactory relationships and the greater distancing between parents and their adult children.136

Becker’s approach is inherently sexist. For example, he regarded the division of labour as ‘partly due to intrinsic differences between the sexes’,137 with women biologically committed to the production and feeding of children (through giving birth and breast-feeding). Moreover, in discussing altruism within the family, he denoted the ‘altruist’ as the husband and the

‘selfish beneficiary’ as the wife (and any children).138 More seriously, perhaps, his thesis has been condemned as merging the positive and the norma- tive, as ignoring issues of power and inequality, failing to reflect the reality of women’s lives within the family, particularly the burden of care work that they assume, and taking as historically inevitable that which is socially constructed.139 Nonetheless, as Philomila Tsoukala has argued, his work is important not only in recognising that domestic work in the family has pro- ductive value (which has been important in providing financial recompense for the caring role carried out by many wives and partners),140 but also in providing tools of analysis to explore the financial positions of parties to a relationship and to test out the implications of imposing or removing the financial obligations imposed upon them.141

142 L Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500–1800 (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1979), especially ch 6 from which the quotations in the text are taken.

143 For a devastating critique, see A MacFarlane, ‘Review’ (1979) 18 History and Theory 103.

144 For example, C Hill, ‘Sex, Marriage, and the Family in England’ (1978) 31 Economic History Review 450 questioned the extent to which evidence about the upper classes can be assumed to apply to those lower down the social scale. For discussion of the position relating to the lower social classes, see J Gillis, For Better, For Worse: British Marriages 1600 to the Present (New York, Oxford University Press, 1985); and for consideration of the merchant class, see R Grassby, Kinship and Capitalism: Marriage, Family, and Business in the English- Speaking World, 1580–1740 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001).

145 M Ingram, Church Courts, Sex and Marriage in England 1570–1640 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987) 142.

146 J Bailey, Parenting in England 1760–1830: Emotion, Identity, and Generation (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012).

The Ostensible Purpose of the Decree

The Effect of the Decree after 1884