Chapter 5. Indonesia’s Cooperation to Address Armed Robbery against Ships
5.7 The ASEAN Regional Cooperation to Combat Sea Robbery: ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF)
Regional cooperation against armed robbery against ships is primarily conducted under two ASEAN forums: the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF).753 Indonesia has been actively involved in initiating and convening meetings, as well as proposing drafts of the cooperation agreement under the two ASEAN frameworks. Indonesia participated in the formulation of the ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security and proposed the establishment of the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) during the ASEAN Standing Committee meeting in Vientiane in 2005.754
The ARF is a dialogue and consultation forum on political and security issues that draws together the ASEAN member states and its dialogue partners including Australia,
752 Sondakh (2004: 22; 2006:88); Purnomo (2004:36)
753 Jailani (2005: 56); Indonesian MFA (2009:1)
754 Indonesian MFA (2009:1); Indonesian MFA (26 August 2009)
Bangladesh, Canada, China, India, Japan, the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Timor Leste, and the United States. The discussion of sea robbery in the ARF has been carried out through ad-hoc activities and subsumed under general discussion on transnational crimes for some years.755 A leap forward took place in 2003 when participating states endorsed the ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security during the 10th ARF meeting in Phnom Penh. Since then the ARF has conducted various meetings to discuss maritime security and carry out maritime exercises.756
The ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security requires participating states to cooperate at bilateral and multilateral level to combat armed robbery against ships; consider IMB proposal on prescribed traffic lanes for large super tankers with naval escort; provide technical and capacity building assistance to countries that need help; share information; develop regional anti armed robbery against ships training; encourage member states’ shipping communities to report incidents to the relevant coastal states; review progress on efforts to combat sea robbery; establish a legal framework for regional cooperation to combat piracy and armed-robberies against ships and welcome the IMO discussion pertaining to the delivery of criminals who have committed crimes on a ship on the high sea or in the EEZ.757
Outside of the ARF, Indonesia also demonstrated its leadership at the ASEAN level by driving forward the proposal for the establishment of the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) in 2005.758 The AMF is designed to improve the region’s confidence building measures and capacity building and, in the long run, the AMF is expected to be a maritime dispute settlement forum in the region.759 It requires states to exchange information; carry out capacity building programmes such as educational and training programme; cooperate in maritime surveillance programmes; exchange naval personnel; cooperate to halt transnational crimes including sea robbery, smuggling and illegal fishing; and improve
755 E-mail correspondence with ASEAN Secretariat-Security Cooperation Officer, ASEAN Political Security Community Department, 30 June 2010
756 Indonesian MFA (2009:14-21); Jailani (2005:69)
757 ASEAN (17 June 2003)
758 Indonesian MFA (2009:1); Indonesian MFA (26 August 2009)
759 Indonesian MFA (2007: 2,4); Indonesian MFA (26 August 2009)
cooperation among law enforcement and conduct other collaborative activities not only in the area of maritime security but also marine environment and safety of navigation.760 Neorealism would point to the role of relative gains calculation in informing Indonesia’s cooperation in the ARF or the AMF. In line with the calculation of relative gains, Indonesia would not be expected to cooperate with its near-peer competitors. Given the narrow power disparity between Indonesia and its near-peers, if a cooperation agreement brings greater benefits to its competitors Indonesia’s survival could be at stake. Following this lead, could Indonesia’s cooperation be explained by the relative gains consideration?
Indonesia did not show any sensitivity over relative gains when proposing initiatives and taking part in the ASEAN cooperation frameworks to halt sea robbery. In contrast to the neorealist expectation regarding the calculation of relative gains Indonesia was willing to cooperate not only with larger or smaller states but also near-peer states such as Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore who also joined the ARF and the AMF.
Constructivism might be expected to argue that shared identity would influence Indonesia’s participation and non-participation in a cooperation agreement. According to constructivism cooperation is likely to take place among states that shared the same identity. Is it the case that shared identity shape Indonesia’s cooperation in the ARF and the AMF? Indonesia’s participation in the two ASEAN initiatives does not reflect the constructivist argument regarding the role of shared identity. Although the ARF and the AMF involved non-ASEAN states Indonesia chose to join the two arrangements.
Bureaucratic politics is an alternative explanation to consider. This line of reasoning emphasises the role of competing preferences among self-interested government actors in informing states’ cooperation. Does Indonesia’s participation in ASEAN counter sea robbery initiatives advance such an argument? With respect to bureaucratic politics the evidence shows that Indonesian governmental actors’ preferences were not informed by competing self-interest. Arguably, if bureaucratic politics matter we would expect for competing preferences to play out in the decision making process. At domestic level the dialogue forums to discuss ASEAN maritime initiatives were led by the MFA and involved representatives of the Navy, the MoD, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, and the MoT. It could be argued that the MFA could have turned down the ARF and the AMF
760 ASEAN (9 October 2012); Indonesian MFA (2007:63)
counter sea robbery cooperation because the two initiatives would not deliver any benefits to the ministry. In addition, involving more parties, in particular, non-littoral states in these initiatives could complicate the MFA’s diplomatic efforts to manage the cooperation to deal with sea robbery.761 The Navy and the MoD on the other hand would support the initiative. They do not need to make additional investment in both initiatives because - as shown earlier in this chapter – Indonesia had already joined various bilateral and sub regional arrangements with both littoral and user states and these ministries could receive additional benefits from both the ARF and the AMF.
The evidence, however, shows that there were no competing preferences between the MoD, the Navy and the MFA. Their active engagement to drive forward the AMF and participate in ARF activities was not derived from the benefits that this cooperation could provide their ministries.762 The aggregate incentives of cooperation for the entire country were the prime driver for the cooperation. Government officials from the Indonesian MFA, the MoD, Navy, the Marine Police and the MoT confirmed this in interviews.763 As an MFA official put it, “our main consideration is how [ASEAN] cooperation initiatives add value to our maritime security efforts, and provide benefits to Indonesian maritime agencies.”764 Through this cooperation framework Indonesian maritime agencies can draw on assistance from extra regional states to deal with sea robbery and other security threats.765
Indonesia’s participation in these arrangements is best explained by the neoliberal argument regarding the absolute gains consideration. In terms of the calculation of absolute gains the benefits offer by ASEAN counter sea robbery initiatives exceed the costs of cooperation. The regional initiatives arguably generate two benefits for Indonesia. First, cooperation provides Indonesian maritime agencies with access to capacity building programmes including maritime exercises and training carried out as part of ARF and AMF activities. This is a core benefit for Indonesia’s counter sea robbery measures. The ARF includes not only the ASEAN member states but also developed states including the U.S., China, Japan, Canada, Australia and South Korea that provide “technical assistance and capacity-building infrastructure,” extending training and offer equipment to
761 Interview IG40, Antara (25 September 2006)
762 Interview IG04; Interview IG05; Interview IG09; Interview IG14; Indonesian MFA (26 August 2009).
763 Indonesian MFA (2007:3); Interview IG05; Interview IG09; Interview IG14; Interview IG40
764 Interview IG40
765 Indonesian MFA (2007:2-3); Interview IG40
Indonesia.766 Second, regional cooperation allows Indonesia to achieve specific policy goals in domestic maritime security without having to make additional investment. The AMF and the ARF forums assist Indonesia in dealing with not only with the issue of armed robbery against ships but also with a number of security concerns that lie at the heart of the government’s priority list including illegal logging, illegal fishing and smuggling.767 Indonesia’s efforts to shape ASEAN initiatives to suit its security concerns are particularly apparent in the attempt to deal with smuggling of arms. The smuggling of arms into the country has exacerbated internal conflict in the archipelago. These illicit weapons are smuggled from Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Cambodia to Indonesia.768 Through regional cooperation Indonesia receives coastal coordination, exchange of information and monitoring support from the participating states to halt the trafficking of firearms to its territory.769 Indonesia regarded ASEAN member states assistance in dealing with smuggling highly. However, this benefit can only be considered as an ancillary benefit. It is an additional benefit that Indonesia gained from the cooperation, beyond assistance in dealing with armed robbery against ships.
The ARF Statement and the AMF do not generate high cooperation costs for Indonesia.
These arrangements do not change Indonesia’s counter sea robbery efforts. The two arrangements do not introduce cross border pursuit or joint patrols. The ARF Statement only seeks “to encourage” parties where and when possible to take action prescribed in the statement.770 It only requires parties to take various actions to address piracy and armed attacks against ships after taking into account their sovereignty and sovereign rights.
Similarly, the AMF only provides guidelines and recommendations on member states pertaining to the existing and future maritime cooperation activities that states may or may not follow.771 Member states use the forum only to discuss and exchange views on maritime cooperation.772 Activities mentioned in the ARF Statement and the AMF arrangement have been conducted by Indonesia unilaterally, bilaterally and trilaterally with other littoral states and extra regional states prior to the launching of these cooperation arrangements. Therefore, it is concluded that the initiative causes a low degree of
766 ASEAN (17 June 2003); Indonesian MFA (2007:2)
767 Indonesian MFA (2007:3); Indonesian MFA (26 August 2009); I. Yusuf (2004: 25); S. Martosetomo (2004: 28-29); Huxley (2002: 72)
768 Yusuf (2004: 25); Martosetomo (2004: 28)
769 Interview IG04; Interview IG05; Indonesian Embassy in Canberra (8 May 2003); Jakarta Post (26 August 2010)
770 ASEAN (17 June 2003)
771 ASEAN (9 October 2012); Indonesian MFA (2007:63)
772 ASEAN (9 October 2012)
sovereignty costs. After the establishment of both initiatives Indonesia largely conducts similar counter sea robbery practices that had been carried out prior to their introduction.773 The implementation of both the ARF Statement and the AMF also posed low economic costs to Indonesia. This is because at the domestic level Indonesia is not required to make substantial changes to meet the ARF and the AMF cooperation requirements.774 Indonesia’s resources and policies are already in line with the ARF and the AMF requirements.
In summary, Indonesia decided to participate in the ARF and the AMF because the two ASEAN initiatives do not oblige Indonesia to make any changes at domestic level and provide substantial benefits by providing access to capacity building programme, coastal coordination and monitoring support from the participating states to address smuggling of weapons to Indonesian territory.