Chapter 6. Indonesia’s Non-Cooperation to Address Armed Robbery against Ships
6.4 Indonesia’s Non-Participation in the Defence Cooperation Agreement with Singapore
Although the Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrol arrangement has been a success, the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that was signed by the two states’ Ministers of Defence on April 2007 was not. The DCA required Indonesia to provide Singaporean Armed Forces sites for individual and joint air, land, and naval military exercises.849 Indonesia was required to provide air space, code named Alpha areas, to be used for air combat manoeuvring, weapons firing, and overland flight training space. These areas included air space above Pekan Baru in Riau, which is located in the Strait of Malacca, adjacent to Malaysia and Singapore.850 The DCA also obliged Indonesia to provide areas, code named Bravo, for naval exercises that would involve the use of naval gunfire support systems, firing of arms and missiles.851 The agreement also obliged Indonesia to provide training grounds for army exercises. The agreed location for the army training site was the Batu Raja Training Area, South Sumatra.852 In addition to the provision of war exercises sites, the agreement required Indonesia and Singapore to restore and maintain areas and facilities used for exercises including the Air Combat Manoeuvring Range and Baturaja Training Area; operate and develop an Air Weapon Range facility; provide naval technical assistance to the Indonesian Navy; and provide the Indonesian Armed Forces with
848 Article 12 and 13 of the ReCAAP agreement
849 Xinhua (27 April 2007)
850 Xinhua (23 February 2007)
851 Detik News (28 May 2007)
852 Detik News (28 May 2007); Xinhua (23 June 2007)
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sustainable access to Singapore Armed Forces military training facilities, simulator training, academic courses and technology.853
As explained in Chapter Five Indonesia has cooperated extensively with various states, including Singapore, in dealing with armed robbery against states. The question to pose here is: what could explain Indonesia’s rejection of the DCA with Singapore?
Neorealism would expect that the calculation of relative gains would influence Indonesia’s decision not to join the DCA. Neorealism suggests that because of Indonesia’s status as a middle power it would be less likely to cooperate with a near-peer competitor such as Singapore. Bearing this in mind, does the evidence confirms the neorealist expectation?
The DCA indicates that the calculation of relative gains was consistent with Indonesia’s decision not to join the agreement. However, the relative gains calculation cannot offer a sufficient explanation because, as explained in Chapter Five, Indonesia did cooperate with near-peer competitors (as shown in the case of the two coordinated patrol agreements with Singapore and Malaysia and the Malacca Straits Patrol agreement).
A constructivist might argue that shared identity would have some influence on Indonesia’s decision to participate or not to participate in a cooperation agreement.
Following this argument, the question is could Indonesia’s decision not to cooperate in the DCA advance the constructivist expectation on the role of shared identity? This case shows that Indonesia’s decision not to cooperate in the DCA was not in line with the constructivist argument on the role of shared identity. According to the constructivist notion of shared identity since Singapore and Indonesia are ASEAN member states cooperation between the two would be expected to take place. In contrast to this expectation Indonesia cancelled the agreement.
Proponents of a bureaucratic politics approach would argue that competing preferences among government actors would shape Indonesia’s rejection of the DCA. Indonesia’s decision not to join the DCA was not consistent with the bureaucratic politics analysis. If the conventional interpretation of bureaucratic politics was to have some bearing in explaining Indonesia’s non-cooperation then competition between actors might have taken
853 Xinhua (27 April 2007); Detik News (28 May 2007); Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (26 January 2013)
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the following forms. The two key ministries in the negotiation of the DCA were the MoD and the MFA. Among the two Ministries the MoD, particularly, would be expected to oppose the negotiation of the DCA in the first place. Although the agreement provides assurances on Singapore’s sustainable training assistance, the absence of the DCA would not have serious implications for the Indonesian Armed Forces. The existing links between the two armed forces would allow the Singapore armed forces to provide training assistance to their Indonesian counterpart and contribute significantly to the development and maintenance of training facilities.854 In contrast to the bureaucratic politics literature expectation the Indonesian MoD preferred to cooperate because by joining the DCA Indonesia could obtain Singapore’s commitment to take part in the Extradition Treaty.855
The MoD and the MFA did not obtain substantial benefits from the DCA. The lack of benefits for promoting the DCA for the MFA and the MoD was even more apparent at domestic level. On the domestic front the two ministries’ preferences were met with strong opposition from the Parliament. Members of Parliament asserted that the terms of the agreement were highly in favour of Singapore.856 Parliament members from opposition parties including the National Mandate Party (PAN), the National Awakening Party (PKB), the United Development Party (PPP), the Golkar Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) urged the government to cancel the DCA.857
As the issue become more politicized the Riau Islands local government officials and legislators felt it necessary to raise their objections over military exercises in their vicinity to the President, the Minister of Defence and Parliament.858 They raised their concern that military exercises which involved the use of war equipment could harm the local population and cause environmental damage.859 This is despite their support of Indonesian armed forces large scale national joint military exercises and Indonesia-Singapore bilateral
854 Antara (22 September 2007)
855 Interview IG21; Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs (2008:
55); Indonesian Parliament (21 September 2006)
856 Deutsche Press-Agentur (20 March 2009); Xinhua (18 September 2007); Xinhua (14 June 2007);
Xinhua (12 June 2007)
857 Xinhua (12 June 2007); Xinhua (18 september 2007); Indonesian Parliament (25 June 2007);
Indonesian Parliament (17 September 2007); Xinhua (23 February 2007)
858 Xinhua (24 May 2007); Antara (2 August 2007); Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs (2008: 24)
859 Indonesian Parliament (28 May 2007); Xinhua (24 May 2007); Antara (2 August 2007)
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routine maritime exercises that involved the use of fast patrol boats and heavy armaments in their area.860
Responding to the growing opposition at domestic level both ministries presented the DCA as both a beneficial arrangement and a necessary trade off to gain the Extradition Treaty.861 Despite the mounting opposition both ministries did not immediately cancel the DCA, instead they proceeded with negotiation on implementing arrangements of the defence treaty.862 In 2007, however, Singapore’s rejection of the retroactive application of the Extradition Treaty for 15 years set back the negotiation of the DCA.863 For Indonesia, Singapore’s action removed the side payment of Indonesia cooperating. The Indonesian Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono stated that Singapore’s rejection of the retroactive application of the Extradition Treaty suggested that the city state had dropped the DCA.864 He explained that both agreements were signed as one package, thus, if one failed the other would be discontinued.865 Indonesia decided to freeze both agreements indefinitely in late 2007.866
It could be argued that the neoliberal account of the absolute gains consideration provides a useful explanation to understand Indonesia’s rejection of the DCA. Although the DCA is not a costly cooperation the initiative also did not offer sufficient incentives. The DCA brought low incentives for Indonesia’s counter sea robbery efforts because without taking part in the DCA the Indonesian armed forces already had access to Singapore’s military training facilities, academic and technical courses and technology.867 Even though the DCA provides a better deal for Indonesia in term of cost sharing, because Singapore agreed to finance 90 per cent of the costs for the development and maintenance of army training ground in Baturaja (South Sumatra) and air combat training facility in Seabu
860 Antara (8 September 2012); Antara (10 September 2012); Suara Karya (13 April 2010)
861 Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (26 January 2013); Indonesian Parliament (25 June 2007);
Indonesian Parliament (17 September 2007)
862 Xinhua (14 June 2007); Antara (22 September 2007)
863 Antara (19 September 2007); Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs (2008: 55)
864 Jakarta Post (28 December 2007); Kompas (8 February 2008)
865 Antara (8 July 2007); Straits Times (26 July 2007)
866 Jakarta Post (28 December 2007)
867 Antara (22 September 2007); Singapore MoD (7 June 2001); Singapore MoD (30 October 2001);
F.D. Poerwoko (2 July 2007); Xinhua (27 April 2007); Detik News (28 May 2007); Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle ( 26 January 2013); Suryadinata (1998:102)
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(Pekanbaru),868 before the signing of the agreement Singapore already bore most of the expenditures to develop and maintain these facilities.869 The Minister of Defence confirmed this in an interview, according to him if the agreement failed: “it would have no implication because the two countries had already been” conducting joint exercises and cooperating for a long time before the DCA.870
Indonesia decided to join because of the side payment of this agreement. In exchange for the DCA, the Singaporean government agreed to sign an Extradition Treaty that has long been desired by Indonesia.871 All previous administrations have failed to secure the Extradition Treaty.872 Indonesia tied the negotiation of the DCA together with the Extradition Treaty. During the negotiation Indonesia and Singapore discussed the DCA and the Extradition Treaty as one package.873 Indonesia has long sought an Extradition Treaty with Singapore to prosecute around 80 businessmen that fled the country with government bailout funds worth US$ 87 billion during the 1997/1998 financial crisis.874 Following the signing of the DCA and the Extradition Treaty Indonesia proposed for the implementing arrangement for the naval exercise areas (Bravo Areas) to be discussed together, the same way the two countries have discussed the implementing arrangements for Alpha I and Alpha II training areas.875 During the negotiation Singapore requested the naval training to be conducted once a month for 15 days each, in contrast, the Indonesian Minister of Defence demanded that the frequency of training be limited to 4-6 times in a year in recognition of the impact on the environment and local fishermen.876 Singapore was persistent that negotiation of such an arrangement was unnecessary because Indonesia did not raise this matter prior to the signing of the DCA and the Extradition Treaty.877 Singapore's position was that the two agreements “were already settled, and the terms
868 J. Kristiadi (17 July 2007)
869 Poerwoko (2 July 2007)
870 Antara (22 September 2007)
871 Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs (2008: 55); Indonesian Parliament (21 September 2006); Xinhua (27 April 2007)
872 Jakarta Post (28 December 2007)
873 Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs (2008: 55); Indonesian Parliament (21 September 2006); Xinhua (27 April 2007)
874 Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs (2008: 55); Surya Citra Televisi (SCTV) Liputan 6 (26 June 2007); Indonesian Parliament (28 May 2007); Indonesian Parliament (17 September 2007); Deutsche Press-Agentur (20 March 2009); Xinhua (27 April 2007a);
Xinhua (27 April 2007b); Deutsche Press-Agentur (27 April 2007)
875 Antara (10 July 2007)
876 Kristiadi (17 July 2007); Jakarta Post (14 December 2007)
877 Singapore MoD (16 July 2007)
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cannot be changed casually or piecemeal, without risking the whole package of the Extradition Treaty and DCA unravelling.”878 Singapore then proposed a standard operating procedure for the naval exercise area without involving the Indonesian MoD in the negotiation.879 Indonesia’s dissatisfaction continued when Singapore rejected making the Extradition Treaty retrospective for 15 years and this then led to Indonesia’s decision to cancel the DCA.880 As Singapore did not approve the retroactive application of the DCA the city state took away the only side payment wanted by Indonesia. This led to Indonesia’s subsequent rejection of the DCA.
In term of the costs of cooperation the DCA did not introduce significant changes to Indonesia’s counter sea robbery activities. The agreement did not delegate authority to review, interpret rules and resolve conflict to a tribunal or an independent third party.881 In addition, as explained in Chapter Two at unilateral level Indonesia has conducted maritime patrols, military exercises, dissuasion programmes and allocated resources including manpower, vessels and aircraft to deal with sea robbery. At bilateral level the DCA only provided a continuation of a number of activities that Indonesia and Singapore have conducted prior to the establishment of the DCA. Military exercises between the two countries have existed since 1974 when the two navies started their bi-annual military exercise code named the Eagle Exercise. Indonesia and Singapore military exercises also include an air force joint exercise called the Elang-Indopura (since 1980), armed forces annual exercises called SAFKAR-INDOPURA (since 1989) and the Fighter Weapon Instructor Course to train combat pilots (since 1999).882 Indonesia has also provided training areas for the Singapore armed forces before the signing of the DCA in 2007.883 These areas include Baturaja as the location for army training, Kayu Ara, West Kalimantan and Natuna, Riau Islands as the location for naval exercises and Siabu, Riau for air force joint exercises.884 These military exercises, held under Indonesian jurisdiction, have used combat equipment, weapons, bombs and jet fighters.885 Most training facilities have been built by the two countries. Indonesia and Singapore developed the Air Weapons Range
878 Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs (13 June 2007)
879 Antara (10 July 2007)
880 Jakarta Post (28 December 2007); Kompas (8 February 2008)
881 Section C of the Indonesia-Singapore Defence Cooperation Agreement
882 Singapore MoD (7 June 2001); Singapore MoD (30 October 2001); F.D. Poerwoko (2 July 2007);
Staf Umum Operasi Markas Besar Angkatan Laut (2004:38)
883 Indonesian MoD (2003: 80); Antara (8 July 2007)
884 Antara (19 January 2006)
885 Sunday Times (17 September 2000); Poerwoko (2 July 2007); Suryadinata (1998:102)
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facility (1989), Air Combat Manoeuvring Range facility (1991), Military Training Area (MTA) and Overland Flying Training Area (OFTA) that are located in Pekanbaru Air Base.886 Indonesia and Singapore are provided a 40 per cent allocation to use these facilities and the remaining 20 per cent is reserved for maintenance.887 Initially the costs of development and maintenance of equipment were borne equally by the two states. This arrangement changed in 1995 with Singapore responsible for 75 per cent of the costs.888 Having surveyed the changes posed by this agreement it is argued that the agreement generated low sovereignty costs. It does not limit Indonesia’s authority to govern its territory or introduce an independent third party to implement rules or resolve disputes. As previously discussed, Indonesia was not required to do much more than what it already did under the arrangement. Most activities covered by this agreement have been conducted by the two countries since 1970s. The lack of changes also suggests that the DCA generates low implementation costs. The government is not required to make additional investment to comply with the DCA because Indonesia’s policies are already in line with the agreement’s requirements.
To summarize, since its formulation the DCA did not offer any core benefits to support Indonesia’s counter sea robbery efforts. The only ancillary benefit sought by Indonesia from the DCA was Singapore’s approval of the Extradition Treaty. Therefore, when Singapore refuse the retroactive application of the Extradition Treaty the city-state eliminated the only side payment wanted by Indonesia from the DCA.