Tài liệu Organization-internal Transfer of Knowledge and the Role of Motivation: A Qualitative Case Study pptx

& Case StudyOrganization-internal Transfer of Knowledge and the Role of Motivation: A Qualitative Case Study Thomas Kalling* Institute of Economic Research, Lund University, Sweden This

& Case Study

Organization-internal Transfer of

Knowledge and the Role of Motivation: A Qualitative Case Study

Thomas Kalling*

Institute of Economic Research, Lund University, Sweden

This paper reports a case study of a knowledge transfer programme in a manufacturing MNC, and suggests that firm-internal knowledge transfer programmes are exercises requiring a great deal of recipient motivation In contrast to existing theory, which has a tendency to address the role of cognitive factors such as tacitness, causal ambiguity and absorptive capacity, this paper suggests that motivation needs to be in place first In the studied case, differences in local per-ceptions of transfer ventures, aspiration and strategic ambitions, internal competition, the view

on the nature of knowledge and local communication seem to explain success and failure in transfer ventures If motivation is not in place ‘naturally’, it can be managed in different ways, including local and corporate management control routines as well as organization struc-ture Consequently, we argue that knowledge transfer theory should not presume that organi-zational units are interested in the knowledge transferred, or that knowledge is always ‘good’ Knowledge is contextual, meaning it fits certain operations and strategies better, even in instances where intra-organizational units are homogeneous Hence motivation is central to transfer success Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION

Knowledge transfer within an organization may be

thought of as the process by which an organization

makes available knowledge about routines to its

members, and is a common phenomenon that can

be an effective way for organizations to extend

knowledge bases and leverage unique skills in a

relatively cost-effective manner With the

increas-ing resource-based focus in strategy research,

knowledge and ways to develop and leverage it

have become key strategic issues (Barney, 1991;

Peteraf, 1993)

Much of the research focuses on cognition, the

nature of knowledge and organizational issues, in

describing success and failure of knowledge trans-fer Although there are debates about the finer details of the roles of these factors, the factors that are highlighted are relatively common from study

to study However, there are relatively few in-depth studies of the ways in which people involved

in knowledge transfer ventures behave, how they perceive these ventures, and whether these factors are connected to the subsequent success or failure

of knowledge transfer Thus the purpose of this paper is to provide some insight into how knowl-edge transfers are perceived and managed by those involved, and how this perception can affect learn-ing strategies and subsequent success

The paper is structured in the following way The next section discusses and summarizes theory

on knowledge transfer, and the following section holds a discussion of the interpretive methodology applied Then follows an empirical section describ-ing a knowledge transfer initiative, framed by the

Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/kpm.170

*Correspondence to: Thomas Kalling, Institute of Economic

Research, School of Economics and Management, Lund

Univer-sity, P.O Box 7080, SE-220 07 LUND.

E-mail: thomas.kalling@ics.lu.se

structure provided by interpretations of accounts.

We have interviewed more than 30 managers and

employees in SCA Packaging (a European paper

packaging supplier), representing both the sources

and recipients of transferred knowledge, about the

programme The effects of the transfer programme

have also been measured, enabling comparison

between successful and unsuccessful plants In

the subsequent sections we discuss the possible

explanations to transfer success and its relation to

existing knowledge transfer theory

THEORY

Knowledge transfer theory has obvious overlaps

with general knowledge management, the latter

being defined as the individual and organizational

activities by which organizations develop or

lever-age their knowledge base The specific focus of

knowledge transfer is the processes by which

mem-bers within an organization learn from each other,

without interacting with the environment

Knowledge transfer theory attempts to explain

the factors that drive or hamper transfer But in

terms of the dependent variable, the majority of the

empirical research has used ‘accomplished transfer’

(von Hippel, 1994; Darr et al., 1996; Szulanski, 1996),

rather than, say, product quality, or even

perfor-mance effects (exceptions include Ingram and

Baum, 1997; Levin, 2000; Tsai, 2001, McEvily and

Chakravarthy, 2002) Accomplished transfer has

been measured in different ways Sometimes it is

based on individual assessments about whether

the transfer has been successful, requested through

questionnaire surveys (Szulanski, 1996) In other

studies, accomplished transfer has been measured

in terms of whether routines have been improved,

for instance whether labour cost per unit of output

has been improved (Epple et al., 1991)

The explanatory factors are subject to greater

variation The nature of the transferred knowledge

is often addressed as an important factor (von

Hippel, 1994) For instance, the more tacit and

com-plex, the more difficult it becomes to accomplish

transfer (Simonin, 1999; Argote et al., 2000; McEvily

and Chakravarthy, 2002) The more ambiguous the

causes and effects of the knowledge, the more

dif-ficult it is to transfer (Szulanski, 1996, 2000; Stein

and Ridderstra˚le, 2001) Besides the knowledge

transferred itself, the cognitive abilities of both

the source of knowledge (Foss and Pedersen,

2002) and the recipient (Gupta and Govindarajan,

2000; Tsai, 2001) are key factors Absorptive and

retentive capacity of the recipient, i.e how well

equipped they are to take in, absorb, and apply

the knowledge, is of course central in transfer situations (Szulanski, 1996; Simonin, 1999; cf Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) Furthermore, the value

of the stocks of knowledge at the source is a poten-tial factor The more valuable it is, the more likely it

is that the recipient will attempt to use it (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000) The absorptive capacity will determine whether it will work or not Another factor, related to competitive advantage, is the uniqueness and inimitability of the knowledge If knowledge transferred internally can also be trans-ferred externally, to competitors, for instance through personnel migration or intelligence activ-ities, there is a risk that the effects, say on costs, can be duplicated by competitors This can lead

to cost reductions across the industry, meaning there is a risk that price and profit levels are reduced overall Here, the commonalty of knowl-edge across actors will determine the risks of fail-ure (Zander and Kogut, 1996)

Another risk refers to drawbacks that result from the articulation of knowledge necessary in order to

be able to transfer it Articulation requires simplifi-cation, which means that finer aspects of the knowledge might have to be removed or be unin-tentionally lost (Boisot et al., 1997) Some argue that the risks associated with articulating and transferring tacit knowledge are so high that it is more effective to avoid transferring such knowl-edge and accept the higher costs associated with coordinating a diverse set of organizational skills (Grant, 1996) However, it has also been argued that organizations must try to diffuse knowledge, otherwise it will be difficult to reap the leveraged benefits of knowledge (Sanchez, 1997)

Apart from cognitive factors, organizational con-text is often addressed Geographical or perceived proximity helps intensify communication between individuals in different units Phone calls, meetings and personal acquaintances across units are nor-mally associated with successful transfer (Epple

et al., 1991; Darr et al., 1996; Ingram and Baum, 1997) Intensive integrative practices, such as cross-functional meetings and broad participation from multiple functions further increase the chances of successful transfer (Hoopes and Postrel, 1999) The richness of communication channels (integrative mechanisms such as liaison positions, task forces and interpersonal familiarity) is another factor (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000), as is the pre-exis-tence of social subnetworks, referred to as the inter-relations between organizational members, tools and tasks (Argote and Ingram, 2000) In terms of interrelations, arduousness (ease of communication)

as well strategic similarity (the extent to which units are related strategically) impact transfer success

(Szulanski, 1996; Tsai, 2000) Unsurprisingly, the

relative network centrality of the recipient, defined

as the number of communication linkages the unit

has, is positively associated with transfer as well

(Tsai, 2001) Furthermore, the perceived

trust-worthiness of the source of the knowledge is

reported to be a factor (Tsai, 2000)

A third group of factors falls under motivation

However, the role of motivation appears debatable

and is less clear, according to research Relatively

few empirical studies claim that motivation is

important Stein and Ridderstra˚le (2001), drawing

on Polanyi (1962), suggest that motivational

pro-blems, such as unwillingness to absorb or share

knowledge, could be dealt with through

socialisa-tion, compensasocialisa-tion, documentasocialisa-tion, tolerasocialisa-tion,

com-munication and rotation Motivation was also found

to drive source units to transfer knowledge (Gupta

and Govindarajan, 2000), but not all studies have

been able to corroborate this, either because they

have not studied it, or because they found it to be

unimportant Szulanski (1996) studied a range of

factors and found no link between motivation and

transfer accomplishments Cognitive and relational

factors were more important and therefore,

Szulans-ki suggested, it is better to stimulate learning

capa-cities and relations than incentives In a subsequent

study (Szulanski, 2000), the downsides to

motiva-tion were elaborated upon Highly motivated

adop-ters might ‘exacerbate problems of implementation

by prematurely dismissing outside help, expanding

seemingly straightforward modifications into major

projects, making unnecessary modifications to

pre-serve pride of ownership and status or to let out

hidden resentment , or switching to new

prac-tices at a suboptimal moment because of unchecked

enthusiasm’ (Szulanski, 2000, p 24)

Thus, the theories on knowledge transfer rest

solidly on cognition, organizational context, and,

to a lesser extent, motivation With this as a

plat-form, a very simple theoretical frame of reference,

this paper aims to shed light on perceptions of and

actions in relation to knowledge transfer, and

whether and how this influences success or the

antecedent factors of cognition, organization and

motivation

METHODOLOGY

This is a case study, and the object of study is the

transfer of manufacturing knowledge in SCA

Packaging (SCAP) Epistemologically, the study

bears resemblance to grounded theory approaches

(Glaser and Strauss, 1967), but deviates slightly in

its focus on interpretation rather than positivistic

findings We do not claim to be able to generalise the empirical findings to a larger population, but simply to highlight things in relation to existing theory about the ways in which knowledge transfer can be perceived and managed and how it might influence the results of transfer processes Further-more, we deviate from grounded theory in our use

of an a priori theory as guidance Grounded theory

is normally seen as purely inductive, free from the-ory or preconceptions Some claim that a clear mindset is important in order to avoid interpreting

in accordance with existing theories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978), whereas others (Miles, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994) claim that an a priori theory is important for positioning emergent theory and stimulating analysis This study acknowledges the latter logic and takes its starting point in the theories described above (see interview guide, Appendix A) However, the overarching ambition is to be able to develop or refine knowl-edge transfer theory, which is done through a ‘pat-tern-matching’ method (Yin, 1994)

THE CASE

The reported case concerns a corporate-spanning knowledge transfer programme initiated in SCAP

in 1997 The objective of the programme is to spread best production practices throughout the plants in order to improve performance in the less well-performing plants The programme is referred to as an exercise in improving production skills with the result that cost improvements (less labour and raw material per unit of output) and price or sales volume improvements (through stan-dardized qualities, reliable supply) are anticipated SCAP has over 200 plants, but only some 40 (per 2001) are included in the programme discussed in this paper The plants (profit centres) are spread across Western Europe, primarily The knowledge inherent in the programme is absorbed both intern-ally (from knowledgeable plants) and externintern-ally (from the field of science, consultants, alliance part-ners, machine suppliers etc.), and is continuously growing and updated Knowledge may be articu-lated as production methods and procedures, or

as recommendations, suitable under certain condi-tions and for certain machine types Methods to reduce machine downtime, improve maintenance routines and eliminate waste are examples Meth-ods are documented in memos, reports and in data-bases, accessible over the corporate intranet and direct distribution Three basic outputs are mea-sured per machine: average machine speed, direct productivity and waste; these results are reported

monthly from plants to head office Each machine

team sets targets annually, and follows up

perfor-mance regularly Benchmarking is made feasible,

and plants who want to improve performance on

a particular machine can easily track sister plants

across Europe who are performing well on that

machine, and approach them for their experience

and solutions Successful machine teams are

awarded annually, on the basis of their

improve-ments, at an award ceremony attended by top

man-agement and runner-up machine teams The

programme is administered centrally, by a

techni-cal department, including technitechni-cal experts as

well as one data administrator At plant level, the

production manager is normally responsible for

internal communications and the performance

RESEARCH DESIGN

The main data collection method used was

inter-viewing We basically asked respondents how

they perceived the programme and its pros and

cons, which the success factors are, if and why

they have succeeded, their view on the nature of

knowledge, the way they manage the system

cen-trally and locally, organizational interrelations,

control routines, local team work, and so forth

(see Appendix A for the interview guide) We

singled out five to six people at six of the plants

(the general manager, the production manager,

the sales manager, a supervisor, and one or two

operators), located in different countries in Western

Europe We also interviewed staff at the central

technical department In total 36 interviews were

made, all personal Interviews were

semi-struc-tured, including some closed questions and some

open to ensure exploration Here, the factors given

by theory were further investigated, but we also

asked open-ended questions regarding

respon-dents’ views One researcher conducted all the

interviews, but fellow researchers assisted in the

interpretation of accounts, checking too radical

interpretations

Interviews lasted between 60 and 200 minutes,

and the average run length was approximately

120 minutes Interviews were taped and

tran-scribed Where appropriate, for instance regarding

accounts of events, we used respondent validation

(Van de Ven and Poole, 1990) to ensure reliability

Interviewees were selected in order to provide a

broad representation of those involved The case

company has no direct influence on the

intervie-wees sampled

To provide a context for the relative success of

each unit we also studied up-front what sort of

improvements that had been made, at each of the

40 plants Had they succeeded in improving average machine speed, direct productivity and waste? This is of course an important issue if one

is interested in determining whether the local per-ception and management of the knowledge transfer programme potentially affects the results As it turned out, four successful plants had improved significantly on waste performance The other two failed to improve at all In terms of average machine speed, even the two less successful plants managed to improve a few percent, but nowhere near the other four, which improved in a range between 15% and 40% In terms of direct produc-tivity (annual output per full-time equivalent machine workers), one of the two less successful did improve on par with the average of the other four, but the other unsuccessful plant actually experienced a reduction of productivity of 20% (The six plants are briefly described in Appendix B.)

In accordance with the grounded approach, the structure of the presentation of the empirical find-ings below is based on observations, not primarily

on pre-existing theory, and on six dimensions in relation to which successful and unsuccessful plants differed

EMPIRICAL INTERPRETATIONS

In the empirical study, we enquired about a range

of different potential factors behind transfer success

or failure Six such factors appeared to discriminate: the perception of the transfer programme, aspira-tions and strategic ambiaspira-tions, the view on (firm-internal) competition, the view on the nature of the knowledge transferred, programme management and control, and local communication This section

is structured accordingly The (theoretical) areas where successful and unsuccessful plants did not dif-fer are not discussed here, but later in the overall comparison between empirical findings and theory Local perceptions

The way that local managers and workers viewed the programme, in terms of their associations and the extent to which they liked it or not, differed between plants The two less successful plants, referred to as plant 1 and plant 2, saw the exercise more as a ‘stick’ and a competition that they could never win, rather than a carrot None of the ten respondents in plants 1 and 2 expressed a positive view

The fact that not just methods but also the results of their application (machine speed, direct

productivity and waste levels) were measured

meant that some plants potentially blurred the

focus ‘It is a performance measurement, a control

device for managers who do not know production

well, to set targets for machine men I cannot see it

as a carrot, it is a stick’ (supervisor) ‘It is merely a

section of the annual productivity budget’

(produc-tion manager)

Several respondents claimed they saw it as a

competition that they could never win, and that

they might not even want to win it, or at least not

be awarded for it ‘The worker of the year approach

doesn’t fit our culture, we are not used to being

given vases and dinners for doing our job, and

we are a bit too shy to be put on pedestals’ (general

manager) Furthermore, the two plants indicated

that the results-orientated approach did not take

local differences into account ‘I can’t see that it

contributes a lot to the situation we are in, we don’t

primarily need more production improvements,

we need to focus on winning new customers’

(gen-eral manager)

In comparison, the four successful plants

dis-played a different view They focused both on the

results and the methods, and embraced, to a

great-er extent, the benchmarking opportunities ‘It is

about knowledge and benchmarking’ (operator)

‘It is a knowledge base that has helped us survive

over these years’ (general manager) ‘It is a library

of methods’ (production manager) They did

acknowledge that there had, previously, been fears

that the programme was a corporate control

exer-cise designed to push up productivity ‘There was

a fear initially that it was just a big stick, but that

view is gone now’ (supervisor) Respondents also

indicated that the programme has become integral

in day-to-day routines ‘It is institutionalized now

It is a way of living’ (production manager) ‘It has

helped us develop team spirit, it is in the minds of

the workforce’ (operator) The majority of

respon-dents expressed positive experiences However,

some respondents indicated that their level of

activity in terms of searching, absorbing and

apply-ing new methods was slightly declinapply-ing ‘I haven’t

been very active lately in checking which new

methods there are’ (production manager)

Aspiration and strategic ambitions

Because each plant investigated was run as a profit

centre and was normally measured (by corporate

headquarters) on operating margin and/or return

on operating capital, there was substantial leeway

and autonomy for local units to decide upon local

strategies Corporate headquarters normally

allowed plants to work out for themselves how to

generate the margins and returns required, but supported in specific areas, such as customer con-tacts, technology development and information systems Therefore, local aspirations and strategic intents had strong impact on whether central initia-tives (such as the reported knowledge programme) are being picked up locally

Consequently, less successful plants did not see production performance as an item on the strategy agenda ‘We have other priorities here at the moment, like developing our customer base The advice is important, but obviously I am not familiar with it I don’t think we need that production knowledge today’ (general manager) Another gen-eral manager said ‘We don’t have time We are not active enough, definitely not.’ This was true also where the programme fits the local strategy ‘It fits our volume strategy well, but we simply don’t have the energy’ (general manager) Respondents also claimed that they have identified more general inabilities to take on new methods ‘Whenever we try to change things here, there are obstacles prolonging implementation Things simply die, and so does motivation’ (supervisor) Furthermore, practical arrangements facilitating participation were limited ‘I don’t know of anybody who has been trained on how to use the intranet We have

a computer somewhere that accesses the intranet but I don’t know where it is’ (supervisor)

In the successful plants the situation was differ-ent They prioritized the programme, despite per-ceived time limitations ‘I am deeply involved in working with taking in new methods’ (general manager) ‘I am not too active but I have appointed someone to be active for me We don’t use the intranet properly, though It is a time issue’

(gener-al manager) ‘We now have screens at each of the machines, where they can access the intranet Each team also has formal gatherings where they exchange knowledge’ (supervisor) ‘I use the intra-net several hours a week to seek for new methods But there is a time issue’ (production manager) The view on internal competition

The competitive nature of the programme was addressed by many respondents, and it was a par-ticular area where views differed The programme was designed as a competition, with official results and annual award ceremonies The programme management stressed competition in their commu-nications Posters with formula-one depot teams, rowing-boat teams and javelin-throwers stressed the sports-related component of the programme, intent to make employees aware of the value of competition, teamwork and sportsmanship

‘Merchandise’ such as printed T-shirts, armbands

and baseball caps were distributed and further

emphasized an athletic profile

The weaker plants did not see competition as an

incentive, partly because they were too far from

being best in the corporation at the outset ‘Playing

in Division three you don’t really think about

Pre-mier League Many of our guys have given up

com-peting’ (production manager) ‘We only have one

machine with a chance to win, they might be

com-petitive, I don’t know really’ (general manager)

Another factor was priority: ‘We’re not driven by

being best’ (general manager) ‘There is always

someone somewhere who has better possibilities

and knowledge than we do’ (supervisor) In an

interesting twist of the competition concept, an

operator stated that ‘competition is good here in

the sense that it makes us wanting not to be the

worst’

Successful plants embraced internal competition

‘The people’s perception of competition is

impor-tant’ (general manager) ‘The transfer programme

means we can now compete on a constructive basis

across the company’ (supervisor) ‘The definitions

we use are now agreed upon by everybody in the

company That was not always the case in the old

days’ (production manager) ‘I don’t think the guys

think about it constantly, but they are very proud

when they get awarded’ (general manager)

Plant-internal competition is still important for the

successful plants: ‘We compete with ourselves in

relation to last year and we compete between shifts’

(supervisor) In certain plants, competition is

dee-ply rooted An operator at a plant in the former

Eastern Europe said: ‘We are used to socialistic

competition, to be benchmarked and compared,

and to setting targets and making plans, and being

rewarded or punished depending on our results.’

The view on the nature of knowledge

Another factor that plants appeared to view

differ-ently is the nature of the knowledge transferred

The programme clearly was an attempt to explicate

what previously (and to some still is) viewed as

tacit knowledge While all respondents admitted

that the knowledge required to run any particular

machine efficiently was not completely explicit,

there were some differences in whether there is a

point in trying to articulate and make transferable

such knowledge

It appeared that less successful plants perceived

production knowledge to be more tacit and

diffi-cult to articulate, than did successful plants—they

did not trust the articulated knowledge as forming

the only basis on which to develop work routines

As a consequence, they saw little reason in even trying to make use of it ‘We have a complex pro-cess that we cannot write down There are many parameters to think of We once tried to list all the parameters to consider but it is impossible’ (general manager) ‘There is a large proportion of tacit knowledge that cannot be taught or trans-ferred’ (supervisor) ‘There are many variables, each machine has its own quirky bits’ (operator)

‘A lot of it is very tacit, we see that when certain, more experienced people are replaced’ (production manager)

Respondents in successful plants displayed a dif-ferent view ‘There is a certain tacit component but

I want to break it down’ (production manager) ‘We wrongly believe it to be a form of art rather than bringing it closer to science Some of it is art but

we overplay that’ (production manager) ‘Quite a lot can be written down We can improve by writ-ing thwrit-ings down’ (supervisor) Successful plants also addressed motivational factors ‘Motivation drives learning here’ (operator) ‘There is a tacit component, but then you need motivation to be able to take it in, it is a learning curve to pass’ (pro-duction manager) ‘The fact that others [less suc-cessful plants] say knowledge is tacit only means they are not skilled or motivated enough to grasp

it, doesn’t it?’ (supervisor)

Programme management and control The way the knowledge transfer programme was managed also differed between plants The idea

of the central programme management was that,

at the least, plants should make yearly plans for each machine, outlining performance targets, and monitor and feedback progress both to the central programme administration and to local staff Their ambition was that production managers should be involved in the local assessments, if not the general manager

The less successful plants indicate less activity in this respect than the others ‘I am involved in the planning exercise only, once a year I never discuss these figures explicitly with my boss but we do dis-cuss productivity on a quarterly basis Our actual results are reported to me by someone at head office One of our guys enters the data on the intra-net’ (general manager) ‘We don’t display perfor-mance figures on the notice board nowadays’ (production manager) ‘I have meetings with key operators an hour every three weeks where we might cover it’ (production manager) ‘I look at the figures quarterly and focus on highlights I go through it with the production manager then too’ (general manager) ‘We don’t really discuss the

figures explicitly, we used to The programme is on

the backburner’ (supervisor)

Successful plants did it differently The local

management was more involved ‘I discuss these

things regularly with production management, at

least once a week I go in ad hoc when needed’

(gen-eral manager) ‘I get regular updates to be able to

inform my sales guys about current production

performance’ (sales manager) ‘I follow it up daily

and have meetings with key staff three times a

week when we discuss it Monthly I go through it

with all staff’ (production manager) ‘I

communi-cate daily with operators and they really react

upon it I have daily meetings about downtime,

overproduction and so on The planning exercise

is dealt with rigorously with shift leaders and the

teams We have broken down annual targets into

quarterly to get better control’ (production

man-ager) ‘Within the shifts we talk about it when

new data is displayed All workers know about

the performance’ (operator)

Local communication

A final factor relates to plant-internal

communica-tion of efforts and results It appeared that the less

successful plants sensed an urge to improve

com-munication of what is being done and achieved

within production to other stakeholders

Improve-ments of activities other than production appear to

be perceived as potentially conflicting with

produc-tivity improvements Functions such as Sales or

Logistics appeared not to embody or understand

the principles of the knowledge transfer

pro-gramme, and as a consequence, support and

atten-tion were limited ‘Sometimes, the producatten-tion

figures are interpreted by people who do not

have the whole picture’ (production manager)

‘There is too much focus on productivity, you

can-not forget the market side, and we need to invite

the sales people’ (general manager) ‘We must

com-municate better with Sales We need to

communi-cate it better with customers’ (sales manager)

‘We need to communicate better across plants’

(supervisor) Production too was seen as lacking

in understanding of the programme implications

‘We must communicate better with the production

people, they don’t understand it very well here

They must understand that this is something that

makes things easier for them’ (supervisor)

Communication was not seen as an issue in the

more successful units No respondent indicated

that communication is a problem ‘I am involved

on a monthly basis or if there is an ad hoc debate

about something between Sales and Production’

(sales manager) ‘We are informed about our

production performance and if it suits our pur-poses we will communicate it one way or another

to our customers’ (sales manager)

DISCUSSION

The empirical interpretations of accounts of percep-tions and acpercep-tions in relation to knowledge transfer give some indications in relation to existing theory, discussed below

The empirical interpretations that there are six types of differences between plants that succeed with internal transfer of knowledge indicate that such corporate initiatives need to consider not just cognitive factors, but also factors connected to motivation and local and corporate management control principles or routines Indirectly, the orga-nizational context can be seen as a factor as well

In knowledge transfer theory, cognitive factors such as the nature of knowledge and the absorptive capacity of recipients are key ‘knowledge barriers’ (von Hippel, 1994; Szulanski, 1996; Simonin, 1999) This study implies that cognitive factors, such as causal ambiguity and tacitness, and absorptive and retentive capacity, are affected by motivation The stronger the motivation to learn, the more likely it is that individuals will work harder on try-ing to learn and pick up new knowledge Trytry-ing to make explicit what might be seen as tacit, at least partly, may improve learning Here, motivation is absolutely central; what else will trigger learning,

if we assume that local knowledge and abilities are naturally inflexible? Thus we propose that motivation may be a factor behind cognition in the first place

Furthermore, the differences in motivation, in the reported cases, are also evident in local perceptions

of transfer programmes, by the local aspirations and strategic ambitions, by the view on internal competition and partly in the internal communica-tion Those who perceive the programme as an opportunity to learn, rather than as a ‘stick’, suc-ceed Those who see a direct fit with the existing local strategy and those who aspire to improve their performance, are likely to be more keen on using the transferred knowledge Furthermore, the will to compete, with other shifts and other plants, also appears to be a motivator In a sense, the lack of communication in the unsuccessful plants also highlights a lack of motivation among local managers If those involved in or affected by knowledge transfer do not understand the purpose and the contents of it, if they cannot see the reasons for it, they are likely to be less motivated to support and contribute

For all these factors, motivation is central

Moti-vation drives cognition, and if cognition is not there

motivation might help Motivation in turn can be

driven by many things: a weak position

perfor-mance-wise, or by a generic will to learn and

improve If this ‘natural’ motivation is not in place,

local management control efforts may create the

incentive General managers and production

man-agers can set targets, monitor and feed back to

those involved to stimulate activity In the reported

case, we saw that successful plants had very active

local management in all these aspects

Further-more, should local management not be active

enough in inspiring their work staff, corporate (or

middle if that is the case) management control

could help instead In the above case, the corporate

involvement in terms of stimulating local

manage-ment was primarily through the award routine

The regular financial reporting between general

managers and their superiors did not focus very

much on the knowledge transfer programme,

unless the general manager included it himself

The management control factor can thus be seen

as a way to create an incentive to learn, when there

is no natural desire to do so—hence it is again a

factor connected to motivation

The role of incentive shines through in the

empirical material It also relates to corporate

man-agement control principles and indirectly to

organi-zational context The reported company is

decentralized in the sense that local units are

con-trolled financially, only, and local management has

great leeway and is expected to formulate

strate-gies themselves Horizontal communication

between plants is desirable but difficult with a

profit centre structure which forces each unit to

car-ry all their costs In the vertical dimension, a fairly

remote relation between plants and their superiors

at corporate level further isolates the local unit

Under such circumstances, local motivation is a

make-or-break factor

In relation to theory, this paper is strongly

focused on the role of motivation and incentives

Motivation is seldom referred to as an explanatory

factor in knowledge transfer theory Szulanski

(1996, 2000) found no or limited support for

motiva-tion being a factor, and reasoned that it may be

because motivation is also associated with uncritical

commitment A few, like Gupta and Govindarajan

(2000) and Stein and Ridderstra˚le (2001) claim it is

important Gupta and Govindarajan (2000), for

instance, do discuss the role of incentives and

cor-porate coercion in stimulating motivation Huber

(1991) does not discuss motivation but claims that

internal distribution of information is triggered by

the view on the relevance of the information, the

power of the recipient, the level of workload and resources available In comparison, this study has provided some insight on how motivation or lack

of motivation can occur and be managed in transfer situations We also suggested that if motivation is not in place naturally, management control routines and organizational context may substitute These factors are slightly more popular in theory (Epple

et al., 1996; Simonin, 1999; Argote and Ingram, 2000), while others claim they are unimportant (Szulanski, 1996)

In order to get a more detailed discussion of the role of motivation, we need to consult more general knowledge management and organizational learn-ing theory However, even within the so-called organizational learning track (cf Fiol and Lyles, 1985; March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993) the focus on learning is fairly cognitively biased Con-sequently, Fiol and Lyles refrain from discussing motivation but suggest that learning is driven by strategy, structure, culture and the environment

As an interpretation, at least the first three of these can be said to be connected with the concept of motivation They set the boundaries of learning

by defining business, norms and beliefs, and orga-nizational infrastructure Similarly, Nonaka (1994) discusses organizational learning and suggests that there are three factors that induce commitment

in an organizational setting: intention (sense-mak-ing, intentionality), autonomy (autonomous organi-zational members that interact can help stimulate

‘unexpected opportunities’ for learning) and fluc-tuation (a discontinuous environment can generate new patterns of interaction and hence stimulate commitment to learn) Other than these factors, the so-called not-invented-here concept refers to situations where potential recipients of knowledge lack the incentive to learn, primarily because they

do not sense that sources of knowledge have the proper level of authority, and that their own knowledge base has a stronger authority (Katz and Allen, 1982, Hayes and Clark, 1985) Katz and Allen, in particular, stressed the role of the per-ception of oneself as an authority as a key obstacle

to learning

But despite the slightly stronger focus on motiva-tion within general organizamotiva-tional learning theory, there is little discussion about motivation in knowl-edge transfer theory In a sense, existing theory on knowledge transfer appears to assume that all units within an organization are interested in a particular piece of knowledge, and that if they are not, they will be forced directly by corporate command to recognize its importance It also appears as if exist-ing theory assumes that new knowledge is always

‘good’ In the case above, units are highly similar in

terms of machinery and so on, but they have

differ-ent strategies, even in such simple dimensions as

the choice of generic strategy (Porter, 1980) Some

go for a low-cost strategy, others are working on

acquiring customers through differentiation The

knowledge in question appears not to be an

appro-priate fit for both equally well In organizations

with greater heterogeneity, this will be emphasised

even further The proposition that theory

subcon-sciously makes these assumptions is also reflected

by the fact that most of them see the objective of

knowledge transfer to be accomplished knowledge

transfer rather than improved performance A

number of the mentioned texts, like Epple et al

(1991), Darr et al (1996), Szulanski (1996), Tsai

(2000) and Stein and Ridderstra˚le (2001) use

accom-plished transfer as dependent variable Exceptions

include Zander and Kogut (1995), Ingram and

Baum (1997) and Tsai (2001), who all study the

effects of transfer on competitive advantage,

survi-val and profitability It should also be noted that

the knowledge transfer theory we have taken into

account is explanatory in nature There are, as

yet, few theories aimed at outlining the finer causal

structures that exists between knowledge and

suc-cessful knowledge transfer

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper is to increase the

under-standing of how knowledge transfers can be

per-ceived and managed, and how choices can affect

success We have studied a particular knowledge

transfer programme in a manufacturing MNC,

and tried to investigate what differences there

were between units that succeeded and those

who did not While theory on knowledge transfer

suggests a number of different factors of which

almost all touch upon cognitive matters, the six

overarching factors found to be relevant in this

case all had a connection to motivation

Conse-quently, we argue that theory should take into

account these factors among others, not least

because it might be that motivation is a factor in

overcoming obstacles provided by causal

ambigu-ity, absorptive capacity and the tacitness of the

knowledge to be transferred Motivation is of

course not a new concept in the world of

manage-ment research, but it is in relation to theory specific

to organization-internal knowledge transfer The

not-invented-here concept (Katz and Allen, 1982;

Hayes and Clark, 1985) and other concepts

con-nected to motivation have occasionally been

referred to, but with limited explanatory power

(Szulanski, 1996) In this case, this did not surface

as a particular factor Motivation aspects were dif-ferent in character

This suggestion also provides some input to managers It is very important to pay attention and provide flexibility to make sure there is moti-vation among both sources and recipients in trans-fer situations This could be done through enforced control mechanisms and a less decentralized struc-ture, but it appears more efficient to stimulate it by making sure recipients understand the value of the knowledge in question, and by fitting the contents and presentation of knowledge in a way that suits recipients Benchmarking exercises, with internally public methods and output results, awards and recognition, team-building efforts, is one way of sti-mulating motivation

A case study of this kind obviously has some limitations in terms of generalization to population Instead, we discuss findings in relation to existing theories and propose extensions or refinements in relation to it (Yin, 1994) A one-case approach also means the character of the particular case has a strong influence The particular pieces of knowl-edge (hands-on production-related knowlknowl-edge), organization (deep decentralization, financial con-trol), strategies (local), the heterogeneous, local, character of markets, and so forth, have an impact

on the interpretations This might explain why this study focuses motivation so much In a setting where knowledge is transferred between, say, two departments in a functional organization, things might be different even if this case alone gives a strong argument why motivation should be part

of a knowledge transfer theory

The case is representative of a typical, fairly mature, manufacturing industry spread out across European cultures, and interview respondents appear to display views that may well be relevant

in other industries as well In that sense, it is not unlikely that the suggestions here are applicable elsewhere What we have suggested is that motiva-tion is important and should be understood and managed Furthermore, we have suggested ways

in which these problems can surface and how they can be managed We would argue that on this level of discussion, the findings are probably relevant in other transfer settings, especially if they are industrial and if the organizational context (decentralization, financial control, size) is similar Considering the nature of the knowledge trans-ferred, it is clear that some of it is specialized whereas some is fairly simple in nature But in spite

of that, the findings and suggestions made here are probably independent of the type of knowledge in question It could be that more tacit knowledge will encounter other factors and lead to different

situations Generally speaking, the case operations

are not so specialized that we cannot discuss

knowledge transfer and the role of motivation in

the way that we have The role of motivation is

probably as important in a chain of hotels or

super-markets, a software vendor or a consulting

com-pany, regardless of the nature of knowledge The

method of analysis is generalization to theory,

and given the level of abstraction in theory, we

should be able to discuss knowledge, knowledge

transfer, motivation and other concepts in the

way we have here, albeit taking into consideration

what settings the findings were taken from

In terms of future research, there ought to be

plenty of opportunities, considering the increasing

popularity of knowledge transfer and similar

meth-ods of learning Cases such as SCA Packaging

high-light the need to understand better the role of

motivation, and what corporate managers can do

to stimulate it Both case studies, cross-case studies

and quantitative studies will be relevant, regardless

of which factors and independent and dependent

variables one is interested in

APPENDIX A INTERVIEW GUIDE

1 The view on the Knowledge Transfer

Pro-gramme (KTP)? E.g a knowledge base, a

bench-marking data base, a competition, a mindset, a

social ritual, gatherings etc

2 What is the plant attitude now and how has it

evolved over the years?

3 The value of KTP?

a Is KTP valuable to the plant? Examples?

b How has it changed since 1997?

c In what way is it valuable? Standardized

behaviour, improved work, control,

impro-ved performance, competitive advantage?

4 What aspect makes KTP valuable? (Grade each,

1–5)

a The knowledge it contains

b The competition

c The social incentives/arrangements

d The benchmarking/Getting a picture of

where we stand

e Being best in the group

f Integrating autonomous plants, a more

uni-fied organization

g A control device for central and local

man-agement

5 KTP and the Business model:

a Effects on activities and organization? Any

function that suffers while others prosper?

b Effects on the offering: Quality (e.g product

mix, standardisation, poor product quality,

delivery performance etc) or Costs (less labour per output, less raw material con-sumption etc)

c Customer attitude: do they know about KTP?

d Suppliers? Are they involved in any way?

e Competition?

6 Strategic context:

a Describe the plant strategy

b Does KTP support or constrain the plant strategy?

c Is or could KTP be giving you competitive advantage?

d Could you have good performance without the KTP?

7 How would you describe the production knowl-edge made available in KTP?

a Does KTP performance reflect desired perfor-mance?

b Is KTP knowledge relevant to the plant?

c Is KTP knowledge well documented and pre-sented?

d Is the KTP knowledge documentation expli-cit or does it require further input from local staff to be comprehensive?

e If it requires local input, is this input easily documented?

f Does KTP knowledge help you improve operations?

g Does KTP knowledge help you challenge your strategies?

h Do you actively search for knowledge?

i Do you always understand how to use the new knowledge?

j Is it reliable?

k Does it have to be proved elsewhere before you take it in?

l Easy or difficult to understand?

m Easy or difficult to apply?

n Does it come from reliable sources?

8 How do you act when you apply ‘new’ knowl-edge?

a Provide some examples of the plant having identified a weakness and actively having solved the issue by using KTP knowledge?

b Are all machine groups equally good on tak-ing on and applytak-ing new knowledge?

c What, in your view, distinguishes between groups’ abilities to assimilate and use KTP knowledge? Which are the success factors?

9 Submitting knowledge:

a What contributions has the plant made to the KTP knowledge base?

b Is the plant active? Examples?

10 Local KTP work What is done to improve KTP performance:

a Roles and duties? Authorities?