Harmonizing the different interests of farmers in sharing water resources in the lower mekong delta of vietnam

Harmonizing the different interests of farmers in sharing water resources in the Lower Mekong Delta of Vietnam Case study in Tra Vinh province Phan Thi Xuan Tham MSc Thesis WM-WCM.1

Harmonizing the different interests

of farmers in sharing water

resources in the Lower Mekong

Delta of Vietnam

Case study in Tra Vinh province

Phan Thi Xuan Tham

MSc Thesis WM-WCM.16-04

Student number 47135

April 2016

Harmonizing the different interests of farmers

in sharing water resources

in the Lower Mekong Delta of Vietnam

Master of Science Thesis

Hans van der Kwast

This research is done for the partial fulfilment of requirements for the Master of Science degree at the

UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education, Delft, the Netherlands

Delft April 2016

Although the author and UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education have made every effort

to ensure that the information in this thesis was correct at press time, the author and IHE do not assume and hereby disclaim any liability to any party for any loss, damage, or disruption caused by errors or omissions, whether such errors or omissions result from negligence, accident, or any other cause

UNESCO-© Tham Phan 2016

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

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Abstract

The Mekong Delta of Vietnam is not only home for more than 18 million Vietnamese people but also the "Rice bowl" of Vietnam as it supplies about 50% food production in Vietnam Despite playing such an important role, the Mekong Delta of Vietnam is facing several challenges in sustain its prosperity Firstly, the water demand in the future keeps increasing in the whole basin so that water scarcity may happen in the very downstream at the Delta of Mekong River Further, there are burgeoning developments of hydropower dams in the Mekong basin which would significantly influence on water regime at the downstream Moreover, the improper in planning has caused the constraint in sharing water resource among users in the Mekong Delta The top-down water governance and sectoral interest planning are claimed that are lack of stakeholder participation This leads to the poor coordination in operating and allocating resources which impacts on the contradicting interests of the users

The hypothesis of this study is to examine the possibility of bring a platform where stakeholders are involved in the planning process so that the conflicts of interests among users can be mitigated The case study is chosen in the Tra Vinh Province It is covered by the two main tributaries of the Mekong River where it meets the sea The rice cultivation and aquaculture farming are practiced simultaneously At some convergence area of sweet and brackish water, other farmers are dynamically changing the crops that best fit their interests In that impact sphere, the irrigating operation does not meet all needs of users

Interestingly, there are vivid contradicting interests, the farmers do not percept as they are And they do not seem to be interested in organizing themselves to influence the planning by the Government Tracing the causes which may cause the low level of farmers’ participation, the main reasons are originated form social historical and economic aspects Meanwhile, the institutional arrangement also plays the core characteristic which manipulates involve stakeholders

Keywords: Mekong Delta Vietnam, conflict of interests, water planning and allocation, water governance

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Acknowledgements

Through six month of my thesis, I am deeply indebted to Professor Frank Jasper who restlessly fosters me with my studying He always kindly listens and gives advice to me as a respectful father Without his guidance and patience, I would not complete pursuing my dream to reach the end of the master program of water conflict management which is challenging to my academic background The door to the office of Hans van der Kwast was always open when I ran into a trouble with GIS And, thanks to the financial support for the field work which was provided by Niche Program via the coordination of Dr Wim Douven (project coordinator) and

Mr Ho Long Phi (director of WACC) I haven’t meet him, but through email Dr Dang Kieu Nhan (Can Tho University) gave me valuable insights about the Mekong region which I am much appreciated

I would like to express my gracefulness to Mr Pham Kim Long (Tra Vinh University) and his family, Mr Nguyen Van Ke, Mr Nguyen Van Dung the motorbike driver and my friend Tinh who helped me to conduct the field research in Tra Vinh province Without their support, I would not have the great experience

Also, I would like to express my profound appreciation to Robbert Vis who patiently gave me comments and tirelessly encouraged me And thanks to my brother-in-law Phan Manh Hung (fellowship at the TUD) who supports me spiritually and studying reflections while I am a thousand miles away from home

Finally, I am cherished to be brought to this life by my late parents I must voice gratitude to

my sisters and family in Vietnam for providing me with unfailing support and continuous encouragement throughout my studying in the Netherlands And my life in the Netherland would be meaningless if I do not have amazing friends, staffs and colleagues in Unesco-IHE Thank you

Tham Phan

April 2016

2.3 Organizational Structure of Water Management in Vietnam 13

3.3.1 Natural conditions of the case study in Tra Vinh Province 24

4.2 The conflicts of interests among managerial agencies and users in water

4.3 The interest of public participation in water management of the farmers 40

Appendix A The map of sluice gates and dykes in Tra Vinh province 61

Appendix F State management on the Water Sector at national level 68Appendix G State Management on the Water Sector at local level 69Appendix H An overview of institutions evolve in Water Sector in Vietnam 70

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List of Figures

Figure 1: Compare export value and production of Rice and Aquaculture, 2012 2

Figure 2 Responsibilities of authorities in Water Management of Vietnam in national level 5

Figure 3: The three dimensions of Integrated Water Resources Management 11

Figure 4: Organisation of Vietnamese Political System (Source: Wailbel, 2010) 12

Figure 5: Organizational setup of irrigation management in Can Tho city Source Benedikter and Waibel (2012) 16

Figure 6: Process of stakeholder participation 20

Figure 7: Conceptual framework of the study 21

Figure 8: Research approach 23

Figure 9 Hierarchy Administrative Organizational structure of the Government 30

Figure 10: Different elevation brings different interests to the rice farmers 32

Figure 11: The different interests caused by the inconsistent sowing schedule in adjacent communes which share the same irrigation scheme 33

Figure 12: Inconsistent planting of rice cultivation in the same tertiary canal 34

Figure 13: Land use changing in the unplanned region 36

Figure 14: Operating irrigation plan for shrimp and rice farmers in sphere of impact 37

Figure 15: Sharing canal in the intensive shrimp farming poses a high risk of virus and diseases between ponds 39

Figure 16: Land locked areas out of the canal system face difficulties with the livelihood 40

Figure 17: The distribution of responders in term of tribes and gender 41

Figure 18: The education ranking of the interviewees 42

Figure 19: Farmers’ perception about contrasting interests in sharing water resource 43

Figure 20: Farmers react water scarcity 43

Figure 21: Interests of farmers in setting up a platform for harmonizing water issues 44

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List of Tables

Table 1 Characteristics to categorize the identification of goods 8 Table 2: Methodology matrix 22

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Abbreviations

DARRD Department of Agriculture and Rural Development

DORNE Department of Natural Resources and Envionment

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

GDP Gross Domestic Product

ICOR The Incremental Capital-Output Ratio

IHIC Irrigation and Hydraulic Infrastructure Company

IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management

MARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

MORNE Ministry of Natural Resources and Envionment

MRC Mekong River Commision

PT- MoaRD Promote Trading of Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

SEA Strategic Environmental Assessment

SIWRP Southern Institute of Water Resource Planning

SSC Southwest Steering Committee

VFA Vietnam Food Association

VN-GSO Vietnam General Statistics Office

to bloom in the region since 1987 There was about a 20% area increase of aquaculture land at 777.450 ha in 2010 compared to the year of 2005 (VN-GSO, 2010) Aquaculture production of the Mekong Region increased from 444.394 tons per year in 2001 to 2.742.888 tons in 2010; that contributes to about 88% of total national aquaculture production (PT- MoaRD website, 2014) Occupying only 12% total area of the country, but Mekong Delta region contributes the proportion of 50% food production in Vietnam including 51% of rice paddy production, 55%

of the national fisheries and fruit production and 61% of total national export value (VN-GSO, 2003) And almost 80% of the livelihood of the Mekong population is farming and directly related to agriculture sector (Orr et al, 2012)

Both rice cultivation and aquaculture play an important role in the daily practice of the people

in the Mekong region However, their existence and profits seem to contradict in this region

The profit that aquaculture brings to the farmer is outweighing rice farming, for instance, Figure

1 shows that the export value of aquaculture is almost double of the rice export value,

meanwhile, the export production is a half fold less in the period of 2012 In recent years,

aquaculture expands in the Mekong Area in land cultivation as well as production, especially, the land of brackish aquaculture (dominating by shrimp farming) is almost double of those of fresh one (SIWRP, 2011) This means the hydraulic infrastructures which favour rice production does not favour brackish aquaculture anymore As a result, there was the unavoidable conflict between rice farmers and shrimp farmers in Bac Lieu province when some

of the shrimp farmers had to alter to different crops that have low yields or less economics generation, while others had to abandon their lands and even some farmers blocked secondary canals to stop fresh water from going into their field to protect shrimp farming (Gowing et al, 2006) Moreover, in some places, shrimp farmers dispose of wastewater after cleaning their pond directly to the canal where other shrimp farmers and rice farmers use the water for their farming activities (Thijs C., 2015) Without treatment of the wastewater, this impacts to water quality so that the shrimp diseases likely proliferate plagues and pests among the shrimp ponds

In addition to that, both rice intensified cultivation and aquaculture intensified production likely pose a risk of aquatic ecosystem degradation in the long-term (Gowing et al, 2006)

In a wider extent, the Mekong River which feeds the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, is sharing the upper part with 5 other countries, so dam and irrigation developments of these upper countries likely pose risks to the Mekong Delta’s activities First, there are 24 operational dams and 12 proposed mainstream dams and other 88 tributary dams that may bring the significant change the regimes of fisheries and irrigation in the Mekong River (SEA of MRC, 2010) The dam

Figure 1: Compare export value and production of Rice and Aquaculture, 2012

development is forecasted the main cause of protein losses in the region (Molle F., Foran, T., Kakonen, M., 2012; Orr et al, 2012) This means the water needed for aquaculture and husbandry to compensate the protein demand is inevitably increasing in the whole region Second, in the book of Water Resources and Food Security in the Vietnam Mekong Delta (Cosslett, 2013) only 6 full dam operations in Lancang River of China may reduce 160 – 165 million tons of sediment that reach the Mekong Deltas yearly which accounts about 50% of the present load One of the possible impacts that Francis Molle (2012) also claimed is that the sedimentation plays an important role in preventing the coastal erosion In addition to these challenges, there were plans to transfer water from Mekong river system to irrigate the dried land of the Northern China and Northeast Thailand (Cosslett, 2013) which possibly cause sweet water shortages in the Mekong Delta region Therefore, the rice cultivation’s prosperity in the Mekong Delta Vietnam bears major drawbacks

1.2 Problem statement

The different interests of water users and uses in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam are affected internationally, nationally and locally Firstly, water allocation between the Mekong riparian countries has been claimed stress forthcoming years There are about 60% of the population which accounts equivalent to 48 million inhabitants directly depending on the Mekong Delta River resources for their food and livelihood (Orr et al., 2012), and the population of the delta region will increase twice to approximately 144 million people in 2050 under the scenario of constant growth (Pech S., Sunada, K 2008) Then, water demands for irrigation, urban and industry keep raising in accordance with the population and development growth (Ringer C., 2001)

Secondly, the national development plan of Vietnamese Government has promoted agricultural activities in Mekong Delta Region since 1986 However while the rice production was stimulated centrally, shrimp growing developed spontaneously According to the Vietnam Institute of Fishery Economics and Planning (VIFEP, 2009), a daughter organisation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), the aquaculture conditions of the Mekong Delta are facing many challenges and difficulties that hamper the growth unsustainable, for example: lack of planning or the planning does not meet actual farming activities, the social issues when altering land-use from rice to shrimp farming (possibly the bureaucratic issues impact on farmers and distort the development), the farming infrastructure and irrigation system does not align with the shrimp aquaculture In the dry season, the conflicts controversy between the need for sweet water for rice cultivation and brackish/saline water for shrimp cultivation is manifesting at various levels: between zones, between schemes and within schemes and even within one tertiary canal This calls for far going co-ordination arrangements

Thirdly, Moller and Phan (2005) claim that there is a lack of coordination and collaboration in the water sector between national and lower level operating authorities The mandates of water agencies are overlapping and institutional frameworks are fragile so that there is "room for manoeuvre" in implementation and sanction in lower levels (Wailbel, 2010) In addition, the development planning of the Mekong Delta was done through many actors and stakeholder through a top-down process (Nguyen, 2010b) Not only two main actors namely the Ministry

of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) and Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), but also other related Ministries have joined to make a development plan for the water sector in general and for the Mekong Delta in particular Figure 2 (Nguyen, 2010b) sketches agencies’ responsibilities involved in water resources management in Vietnam Also, before the merger with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry

of Fisheries had issued some other projects and decrees which were contradicting with the new planning and regulations (VIFEP, 2009) Moreover, the water sector is under the institutional reform which includes the merger/transfer the mandates and responsibilities of MARD to MONRE The transformation left many issues in the governance aspects, for instance: the resistance of administrative engines, the overlap of the mandates of MARD and MONRE, the issued Decrees and regulations are interwoven (Waibel, 2010)

In sum, from the angle of top-down governance, water managing activities in the Mekong Delta region likely do not promote public participation For instance, the centralized water management of the Mekong Delta Vietnam is very complicated to understand and the planning process is operationally and institutionally characterized by bureaucratic constraints (Waibel, 2010) Also, poor level of collaboration among national level and provincial level catch attention of many studies (Kirbly et al, 2010, Hirsch, 2006) There are likely limited instruments

to solve the different interests among farmers who do rice, vegetables, fruits and aquaculture at the grassroots level and the level of co-ordination is questionable In this case to study the feasibility of bringing the grassroots a platform function for making decisions on sharing water resource is an important aspect

1.3 Science gap

There are countless researches and studies on improving the effective development of River Basin Organizations (Barrow, 1998) One of the key changes of a good integrated river basin management is to enable stakeholders participate in the process of decision making and water resource planning at the lowest level appropriately (Jaspers, 2003) However, according to Waibel (2010), decentralization in Vietnam tends to centralize at provincial level and that prevents the local level to participate in the decision making process, even though many efforts and programs are launched with the help of many international donors Also, Kirby et al (2010), indicate that public participation is limited in water resources management of the Mekong region and the Mekong Delta of Vietnam particularly Moreover, Fritzen (2006) indicated that Vietnamese decentralized institutions are incoherent and there is a lack of delegation to local stakeholders Thus, it seems there is a gap between theories and daily practices with regard to the context of RBOs in the Mekong Vietnam

In this circumstance, this research will be conducted on the hypothesis that the decentralization

in Vietnam steps to the provincial level only; and the grassroots level seems be ignored to participate in the decision making process of water resource planning So the question is relevant whether water user associations or similar organizations could be set up at the grassroots level in the Mekong Delta area in Vietnam to trigger the participation of the farmers

in allocating, maintaining and operating the sharing of water resources among themselves?

1.4 Research objectives

The focal point of this study is to examine the how water is shared and allocated at the grassroots Hence, there are few objectives need to be done to get this aim One of the main objectives of this study is to analyse the institutions of water management of the Mekong Delta Vietnam (i), what are the causes of the conflict of sharing resources (ii) and to identify the possibility of a framework, which involves a participatory decision-making process to harmonize the different interests of farmers in the Lower Mekong Delta of Vietnam The case study is chosen in Tra Vinh province located between two major rivers of the mouth of Mekong River that are Tien River and Hau River Tra Vinh Province is the epitome of fresh and salty delineation in Mekong Delta where rice and shrimp and other crops are practiced

simultaneously

Specific objectives

• Analysis of institutions of water governance in the Mekong Delta in Vietnam in order

to identify how water resource is planned

• Identify why the planning arrangements are not meeting the reality of water use in the research areas leading to conflict

• Analyze the character of the different interests between farmers

• Identify and analyze factors influencing the process of making water allocation decisions by local authorities

• Propose an approach that helps farmers at their level to take part in these making processes

decision-1.5 Research questions

Central research question

How is water resource allocation planning taking place in selected areas of the Mekong Delta

in Vietnam? How is it implemented? And why are the planning arrangements failing in coordinating diverse water uses? How can they possibly be improved?

Specific research question

Question 1: Which main actors are involved in water management at the local level in the Mekong Delta Vietnam?

Question 2: What is the character of the controversy between rice and shrimp farmers? How do these actors interact with each other? And who makes the decisions on water allocation?

Question 3: What are challenges of the planning and or implementing the plan? How do the situations impact on the local farmers? How do farmers see their role in the planning and implementing?

Question 4: Are farmers willing to participate in the making of decision? What do they think about water user associations?

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Governance the common

The common pool resources (CPR)

The definition of the CPR is: “A common-pool resource, such as a lake or ocean, an irrigation system, a fishing ground, a forest, or the atmosphere, is a natural or man-made resource from which it is difficult to exclude or limit users once the resource is provided, and one person’s consumption of resource units makes those units unavailable to others” (Ostrom, 1993) So, the CPR’s characteristics are excludability and rivalry From these two features, the goods are divided into four categories: the toll or club goods, the private goods, the public goods and the common pool resources

Table 1 Characteristics to categorize the identification of goods

Frank van Laerhoven (Lecture slide, 2015)

In the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, the water in the canal system is the common pool resources Still the canal system and the hydraulic infrastructure are owned by the Government is the public goods In this case, the linkages between the water and the system which differentiate CPR and public goods are vague as the farmers cannot access to water without the physical infrastructure The mainly focus of this study is looking at water as a CPR to the local farmers

in the region

The tragedy of the commons

Hardin is popular with his metaphor of grazing field Each herdsman contributes the proportional fee for the husbandry If one overgrazes one herd, has to pay for a fine However, the fine just costs a fraction of the benefit that one overgrazed herd brings Then, the farmer keeps overgrew his herds So do the other farmers in the village The collective action of these farmers leads to the high risk of the grass land degradation Further, the whole village will face the tragic of having no grass for cattle grazing in future That is how Hardin explained about the tragedy of the commons Ending of his metaphor is said “freedom in the commons brings ruin to all” (Feeny D., Mccay B.J., 1990) Also, Ostrom (1999) said the commons may highly faces the degradation because it cannot exclude people to use the resources, and one consumes the CPR will limit the other’s uses Because the property right is not identified, so each individual wants to use more the CPR as if he or she doesn’t use it, the other may use it anyhow Each individual action accumulates to the point that the CPR is at the risk of overuses and degradation And the bringing affect is called the "tragedy of the commons" (Ostrom, 1999)

Governance the commons

Hardin (1968) proposed that there are two ways to prevent the tragedy of the commons is to privatization which means alter the commons into private property; or to socialization meaning make the commons as the public goods By doing so, the resources could be used in better manners because the privatization increases the excludability and rivalry, meanwhile the socialization is put the commons under the State management However, Feeny and Mccay (1990) argue that these two measures could not resolve some exclusive problems For instance, they give the typical example about the privatizing in oil pumping in the USA that one has the right ownership a land, the owner has the tendency of accelerating the oil pumping doubly from the pools underneath in order to make fast profit over their investment Or, the quotas for fishing

in the Africa water are facing the highly failure and cost in bringing enforcement on what had done about the quotas (UN Africa, 2009)

Elinor Ostrom (1990) added a third way to avoid the tragedy of the commons which “is the design of durable cooperative institutions that are organized and governed by the resource users” In her work, she described the eight design principles that characterize successful long enduring irrigation system in different regions They are included: the first rule is to the limited

boundary of the CPR which is consumed by a group of users; the second rule is to equalize the contributions and sharing among the users based on the physical condition; the third rules of

“collective choice arrangement”; the fourth and fifth rules are the monitoring and enforcement

as those aim to regulate the behavior of the users and; the sixth rule is to develop a graduated

“conflict resolution mechanism”; the seventh rule is to legitimate the organization institutionally and the last one is the nested organizations which jointly and influentially managing the CPR The crafting principles are empirical found existing in many places of the world, for typical examples: the cases study in the Zanjeras of northen Philipines, the Thulo Kulo in Nepal and the Huerta of Valencia in Spain, Ostrom assumed that the CPR can be sustainably self-governanced by the group of users This can be derived from the increase of the stakeholders’ involvement and stakeholders’ participation of the proposed principles In other words, it encourages decentralization

However, the designed principles also got criticism The boundary seems opaque in term of the physical condition, administration and social interaction (Cox M et al, 2010) The principle two, three and four got the main critique of the complexity that social aspects are embedded in the institutional arrangement (Cleaver F., 2012) Cleaver (2012) queries successfulness, transparency and the inclusion of the stakeholders’ participation approach in the crafting principles in CPR management which is named the mainstream institutionalism The mainstream institutionalism proposes a normative concept in CPR while the critical institutionalism further the perception of the flexibility, fuzziness and complexity which contextualize the institution design

The debates of different approaches in governance the commons keeps unabated Still, looking for the applicable one that sustainably maintain the socio ecological system is contextual in practice

2.2 Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM)

Where water is, where the human civilizations are shaped Water is not only the human right but also the postulate of human prosperity Water is the CPR that attracts enormous attention that needs to get “good” governance as the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan once declared in 2001: “Fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future” The concepts of water governance are determined, and among that the concept of integrated water resource management (IWRM) is promoted widely

IWRM concepts

Water is vital element in sustain human life and bio-sphere It is also one of the fundamental drivers of economic and social development Moreover, there is no unique features of other resources as water as its fugitive Hence, water is the commons that is controversial to

governance and specifically in terms of allocation (Molle F., 2008) The five paradigms of water resource management have been described from the pre-modern toward the concepts of integrated water resources management over the period year of 1850 to 2000 onward by Tony Allan (IWRM Lecture note, 2015) On this trend, water is assumed that it should be managed

in the holistic ways According to Savenije and Van der Zaag (IWRM Lecture note, 2015), the concept of IWRM can be understood as the process that involves users of multi-sectors in the process of planning and managing water resources sustainably with regard to physical conditions That is the idea of the four dimensions is introduced so that water resources could

be managed as a whole (Figure 3) Listed the four dimension are the water resources, water

users, spatial scales, and temporal scales and patterns Another definition, “IWRM is a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (GWP, 2000) Ideally, IWRM concept is toward the achievement of three key principles namely equity, ecological integrity and efficiency (IWRM Lecture note, 2015) In the training manual of Cap-Net 2005, managing water resource by IRWM concepts could bring “coordination and collaboration among the individual sectors, plus a fostering of stakeholder participation, transparency and cost-effective local management” Also, the principle 2 of the Dublin Conference 2002 emphasize on “a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policymakers at all levels” in water resource management (Cap-Net, 2005) All in all, IWRM is believed the good approach in governing water compressively and holistically which involves all stakeholders’ participation One of the main critical elements of IWRM implementation is stakeholders’

Figure 3: The three dimensions of Integrated Water Resources Management

Source: (IWRM Lecture note, 2015)

participation which is believed to bring transparency, accountability and sustainability Yet, there are some argues that IWRM concept are facing several challenges

The implementation of IWRM

IWRM is accepted internationally the best concept to confront with the burgeoning challenges The first challenge is the IWRM is considered good approach while its definition “ill-defined”; and this leads to the inappropriate implementing plan (IWRM Lecture note, 2015) Secondly, IWRM requires the synchronous capacity and resources from involved sector in the planning which is hardly compliant evenly Thirdly, there is not enough attention to structure measures that develops the infrastructure before non-structure measures that manages water resources in the sphere of IWRM concepts Moreover, Giordano and Shab (2014) recently assume that IWRM developing circle has reached its declined stage as giving a number of cases that putting water-centric did not solve the real life problems The diverted suggestions are presumed that water resource management should take into account the physical, social and political circumstances

Figure 4: Organization of Vietnamese Political System (Source: Wailbel, 2010)

The concept of IRWM adopted since the 1990s in Vietnam, and the country first issued the Vietnam Law of Water in May 1998 that attempted integrate IWRM concept in its law The guideline law is claimed to brings the implementation flexibly which complies with the above principles However, the IWRM becomes fragment because of “result of the peculiar structural features of the contemporary state in Vietnam” (Waibel et al, 2012) The governmental bureaucracy engine is structured of heavily administrative units from top-down The higher line agency can give orders to the lower one, yet the other way around is impossible And the same line position of the agencies could not give commands to each other Molle and Hoanh (2009) assumes that water management and planning in Vietnam, or particularly on the Red River Basin of Vietnam have been done dominantly by sectors In the case, MARD was trying to make strategic plan that utilize water resource for its development targets Also, water sector management is claimed to be centralized at the provincial level with its lack of participation (Waibel et al., 2012, Fritzen S., 2006) The nested system of the governmental engines is

complicated in practice The figure 4 schematizes this system which involves the state agencies

2.3 Organizational Structure of Water Management in

Vietnam

According to the current legislation of the Water Law issued on June 2012, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MONRE) shall be directly responsible for the State managing of the water resource The related Ministries, ministerial-level agencies and People Committees at the provincial level shall coordinate the State management tasks in regard to water issues that stimulate their mandates The research institutes function as the advisory units that helps their mother agencies making planning and decisions At local levels, People’s Committees (provincial level) shall be responsible for state management in regard to water resources within their boundaries Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DONRE) at provincial level function as the advisory units for Provincial People’s Committee The organizational structure of institutions that operate the State management are vertical

(Indicate in the red circle in Figure 4) Legitimately, MONRE manage water resources at macro

perspectives while MARD coordinates with MONRE to perform the State tasks Practically, subnational level, the water managing mandates are under the leadership of the provincial People Committee by which People Council contemplates

The difference between the formal and informal practices of the organizational structure are due to the ongoing development and reform of the Constitutions The establishment of MARD has been through four times merge from six ministries since 1945 As it long history development, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) used to be in charge

of food production and security, water resource development, fisheries and aquaculture and rural area planning Up till present, the agency’s mandates still main focus on the water resources and other issues related to the water resource development that favor agriculture

development and flooding However, since the establishment of the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MONRE) in 2002, some of the responsibilities of MARD transferred to MONRE There are the overlaps between these two Ministries’ mandates (Loan, 2010) which highly cause the mis-cooperation and conflicts among the water management agencies (Molle and Hoanh, 2009) The organizational structure of line agencies namely the Ministries and ministerial-agencies in the national level is merged some units at the provincial level also can lead to the clashing between the national level and provincial level The nesting

of the functional agencies, the advisory agencies and the academia institutes among sectors cumulatively makes the situation more complicated (Illustrated in the annex B, C, and D) Also, the reform of Constitution in 1992 drives the reforms of multi-sectors in Vietnam There are merges and re-divide causing the overlap of responsibilities Consequently, the laws and regulations have changed, revised, amended and/or replaced (Loan, 2010b) As the results, there

is likely no accountability in the implementation and sanctions procedure (Wailbel 2010, Molle and Hoanh, 2009)

MONRE and MARD are the two main agencies in managing and exploiting water resources Refer to the historical development planning of the Government, agriculture has been promoted tremendously which delegates the significant role of MARD However, since the Reform 1992, MARD is losing its benefits and interests that create the resistance to change and underneath the constraints may be some driving forces and power relation Waibel (2010) cited Bach Tan Sinh said “In Vietnam, the informal rule is more important than the formal one … and … what

is on paper is different to reality” (extract from Waibel (2010) of the oral communication Bonn 31.03.2009) In this transformation of the institutional arrangements in Vietnam at the local level, who actually influence on water resource management and allocation still need to analyze

Integrated Water Resource Management in Vietnam

Water management sector of Vietnam started to develop since 1998 when Law on Water Resources, then issued a new Law on Water Resources included principles of IWRM such as river basin management, environmental flows, and water quality management Follow that, other ordinance Laws also introduced to align with the Law on Water Resources However, the reform of water sector management in Vietnam is facing tremendous challenges These issues can be categorized in these parts:

- The Law on Water Resources is kind of semantics Hence, different stakeholders interpret the Water Law differently at the lower level (Waibel, 2010) As the results, there are more than 300 legal documents (Laws, Government’s Decrees, Circulars and Joint Circulars of MARD, MONRE and other ministries, Decision of Provincial People’s Committee) were issued

by the Government in order to explain procedure and regulations and ensure the sustainability uses and development of the natural resources including water resources (Loan, 2010b)

- The legal framework is fragmented and overlapped among legal documents and involving agencies (Loan, 2010) The Ministry of Natural Recourse and Environment obtains the mandates that manages the natural and water resources However, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) is in charge of infrastructures which related to water development and operation and maintenance In addition to that, other related Laws and Ordinances have tied in issues about environment conservation, such as: the Law on Land 2003 and the Law on Environmental Protection 2003 (MORNE’s responsibility), the Law on Fisheries 2003 (MARD’s mandates), the Law on Inland Waterway Navigation 2004 (the Ministry of Infrastructure mandates), etc…As these reasons, the collaboration among actors is moderately low

- Decentralization of water management stay at provincial level (Hirsch, 2006 and Fritzen, 2006) As the water sector is on the transition age, the systems of top-down management and delegated lower level responsibilities between national and local agencies are struggling to move forward That is the reason why at the lowest level as grassroots have no space in this arrangement and as result in low level of public participation

- There is lack of public participation and awareness in the planning and management process of water resource (Hirsch, 2006) According to Waibel (2010) and Benedikter and Waibel (2013) studies, the participatory role and involvement of the grassroots is shadowy even though Grassroots Democracy Decree was promulgated since 1998

Below figure indicates how the power stay at provincial level This is the matrix of stakeholders that influence on institutional arrangement in operating a community’s based-organization in Can Tho city in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam (Benedikter and Waibel, 2013) In Decision No 151/2007/QD-CP on the organisation and operation of cooperative groups said:

…cooperative groups (tổ hợp tác) are financially autonomous organisations (tự chủ tài chính) that are organized and operate according to the principles of voluntariness ( tự nguyện), equality (bình

đẳng), democracy (dân chủ) and common welfare of its members (cùng

có lợi) The decree further defines cooperative groups that need to have a minimum of 3 members and need verification from the People’s Committee of their commune (The Government of Vietnam, 2007)

To establish the community’s based-organization, there are several steps and procedures need

to be gone through As showed in the figure 5, the local authorities have a relative high weight

in making the decision of the community’s based-organization establishment

In overall, IWRM is claimed to “exists on paper, but has not been transformed into practice” in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam (Wailbel et al., 2012) Meanwhile in the Red River Delta, IWRM

is accepted to some extent that brought certain successfulness in water management but has not changed the institutional confusion (Giordano M., Shah T., 2014) And the one critical aspect

in IWRM is the one in which the stakeholders’ participation is rigorously promoted

2.4 Harmonizing the competing interests

From the three entries about in the chapter, the main discussion aims at the decentralization within the concepts listed are governance the commons and IWRM The convergence of the

Figure 5: Organizational setup of irrigation management in Can Tho city Source Benedikter and Waibel (2012)

two theories is the idea of decentralization So, the terminology of decentralization can be defined as: “the process of explicitly transferring tasks and competencies – either indefinitely

or for an indicated period of time – from the centre of authority to other departments, agencies

or administrative levels in order to organise or implement a government function” (UNEP, 2014) One mainstream approach in resource management is to decentralize Ostrom and other mainstream researchers endorse the crafting design principles in water governance which promote the participation at the appropriate lowest level The forms of water users associations (WUAs) and other community-based organization is assumed to involve stakeholders in planning and implementing the resources management sustainably (Merry D., 1996) The fundamental goal of these stakeholders’ participation organization is to allocate water According to Dinar, Rosegrant and Meinzen-Dick (1997) water user-based allocation is one of the water allocation mechanisms through which water resources are managed by local people with local norms and local institutions However, Cleaves (2012) criticizes localism and social characteristics are embedded in the self-governance systems which are driven by power and political relations Water user associations (WUAs), one form of Water user-based organizations, are a non-government organization that consists of water users in a sub-catchment (IWMI, 2003) at a lower level that could also rather be “based on rational considerations” than shear hydrological boundaries (Jaspers, 2003) WUAs enable the users to participate in the decision making process of planning, managing, maintenance and conflict solving Basically, WUAs have several features that are considered strong namely an appropriate organizational structure for the WUA, users’ participation, autonomy and accountability, transparency and clarity of roles (Howarth et al, 2005) In another spectrum, Ostrom and Garner (1993) claim that a self-governance organization as a representative water user association can work It depends on the condition of resources, and social and historical aspects, many WUAs have variations They are to be adapted to local conditions and normally kick-off as simple local historical fora or partnerships for decision making or conflict resolution

In another spectrum, technical interventions are dominantly used to mitigate the conflicts For example, technical solutions that are proposed to solve allocation problems in the Mekong Delta

of Vietnam In 2001, the shrimp farmers revolted against the allocating schedule from the local authorities and broke one major dam in Bac Lieu Province, because they were in need of salty water to come to their shrimp land while the marine intruding prevention dyke systems are designed to promote rice production (Kakonen, 2008 and IWMI, 2013 and Kam et al, 2001) Since that incident, attention was focused on harmonising the conflict of water using purposes between rice and shrimp farmers in the Mekong Delta Vietnam, particularly in Bac Lieu Province There is a model that uses GIS and Hydraulic-Salinity Model to envisage scenarios

of sluice gates operation in the different conditions of hydrology (Hoanh et al, 2001) Principally, the results of this model are to delineate the boundaries of brackish water by computing data of water level, discharge and salinity within the network of canals, river and hydraulic structures After that, the operation plan of sluice gates helps to mitigate the

contradicting water quality requirements of rice and shrimp farming Also, with the help from donors, the ad hoc organisation namely Regional Water Management Alliance was built to help

to coordinate and operate the plan as produced by the model In addition to that, another intervention was proposed to reduce the conflict That was land-use changing in which new farming techniques were presented to farmers – who changed their farming patterns However, this ad hoc organisation is claimed to be in decline in operation by researchers from the International Water Management Institute and the International Rice Research The researchers came back to visit the Regional Water Management Alliance but it was merged with River Basin Organization (possibly Cuu Long River Basin) And Hoanh said “there have not been any major problems, like before Most farmers are satisfied with their land-use systems and the current water management” It could be implied that the farmers probably found ways to alter their method of making livelihood which may alleviate conflicts issues This should be investigated further

Since Vietnam has adopted the IWRM in its water management Thus, it is also assumed that Integrated River Basin Management should be applied in managing the water resources in the country Based on the concept of IWRM, Integrated River Basin Management emphasizes on the decentralization of decision making and stakeholders’ participation (Jaspers, 2003) A River Basin Organization can be defined as an implementation institution that helps to achieve the goals of IWRM and IRBM concepts Vietnam also was setting up three pilot River Basin Organizations which IWRM should perform through RBOs including the process of planning, managing and resolving conflicts of water resources which results in (a) multi-purpose development; (b) an integrative role for the drainage basin unit; (c) the acceptance of interventions to promote development (Barrow, 1998) Stakeholder participation closely link

to decentralization or water management at the lowest appropriate level (Jaspers, 2003) This platform brings stakeholders together which likely succeeds in building consensus among stakeholders As consequences, conflict may be avoided at the early stage and it builds trust which possibly increases the level of collaboration among stakeholders Below is the figures 6 that show the ladder of characterization of stakeholder participation (Arnstein, 1969)

Synthesis of the above literature review, the conceptual framework of this study is illustrated

in the figure 7 below Under the overarching concepts of IWRM and governance the common,

the real situation of legal framework, the institutional agencies and the physical – economic context will be examined to look for a solution which conciliate the conflicting interests in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam The hypothesis of seeking the improving way of

socio-water allocation in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam is to study the feasibility of setting a platform which harmonizes the conflicting impact sphere in the region by bringing all stakeholders’ participation The conducting research is included two main parts One, studying the institutional arrangements actually happen at the sub-national level, or put it another words from the provincial level downward Two, a survey with the local farmers to capture the trigger

of the participation level

Figure 6: Process of stakeholder participation

3.2 Qualitative research and approach

To achieve the mentioned objectives, qualitative research methods and survey are used to conduct the work The qualitative approach helps to analyse the institutional arrangement and its social consequences within water sector in the Mekong Delta Also, to conduct the survey

in the field work, the questionnaires will be developed to make semi-structure interview with key stakeholders/farmers and group interviews with farmers The table below shows how this approach coordinates to attain sub-objectives and research questions Methodology matrix

Figure 7: Conceptual framework of the study

Table 2: Methodology matrix

The process of doing this study is described in the figure 8 The first steps of this study is to

comprehend the context that trigger the proposed hypothesis by doing literature review Second step is to conduct the field study and explore what matches between the hypothesis and reality Also, this phase is important to reflex on the desk research in the previous step Lastly, conduct the result of the field study and the outcomes of the research

identify how water

resources are planned

• Which actors are involved in water management at local level in the Mekong Delta Vietnam? And who are the affecting and the affected?

• How do these actors interact with each other? And who makes the decisions on water allocation?

• Peer-reviewed papers

• Grey literature

• Conference presentations

• Fact sheets

2 Identify why the

planning arrangements

are not meeting the

reality of water use in the

research areas that led to

(provincial level)

• Committee reports

• Newsletters

• Fact Sheets

3 Identify and analyse

factors influencing the

process of making water

• Mapping

4 Propose an approach that

helps farmers at their

level take part in these

Figure 8: Research approach

3.3 Case study description and data collection

3.3.1 Natural conditions of the case study in Tra Vinh Province

Tra Vinh province locates at the coastal line of about 65 km in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam The total area is 2.292 km2 with 1 city and 7 districts Tra Vinh province is cover by Hau River and Co Chien River1 Tra Vinh province plays a vital role in sea transportation in the Mekong region on Vietnam since it connects Can Tho city to Ho Chi Minh City via Tra Vinh canal that transports goods domestically and internationally The climate of the region is tropical with characterises of high precipitation of the average from 1,400 - 1,600 mm; annual average temperature from 26 – 27oC, average humidity 80 - 85%/year This area is less affected by storms and floods, but pose to high salinity intrusion in the dry season The rainy season starts

from May to November and dry season from December to April next year Lying at the coastal

1 Co Chien River is a branch of Tien River Hau River and Tien River are the two main tributaries of Mekong River at the Mount when it reaches the sea

Map 1: The map of Tra Vinh Province Source: Tra Vinh Portal Website

area, Tra Vinh Province affected by semi-diurnal tides If the tides combine with the trade wind from the East, the saline intrusion may infringe farther toward inland through the woven canal system The map 1 shows the administrative map of Tra Vinh Province

3.3.2 Socio-economic conditions

The population of Tra Vinh province is 1.007.743 in the end year of 2010; and the yearly average increased rate is 1,13% in accordance with the period of 2006-2010 The average population density is roughly 430 people/ km2 The population distributes unevenly among districts for details, the highest density is in Tra Vinh city (about 1.490 inhabitants/ km2 ), the lowest concentration is in Duyen Hai district (about 256 inhabitants/ km2 ) (Tra Vinh DOPI, 2010) In the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, Tra Vinh is one of the province that has a high population of the Kmer tribe The Kmer accounts for 29% of the population2 while the majority

of Kinh tribe is at 69% and the other proportion are Chinese and others tribes Surprisingly, in Tra Cu districts the Kmer inhabitants occupies approximately 70% Similarly as most of the other provinces in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, Tra Vinh province is experience the out-migration at -67% (Garchegen et al, 2012)

At the end of 2010, the property ratio of Tra Vinh province is 23,68% which is significantly high compared to of the national average standard of 9,45% Also, the disparity poverty rate of Kmer tribe is almost double that indices of the Kinh tribe

The GDP per capital of Tra Vinh province is about 15 million vnd (nominated value) in 2010 which is about 68% of the national average of this indicator in the same year The GDP contribution of the economic sectors are 43,85% agriculture; 23,59% industry and 32,56% services in 2010 The closer look at the economics contribution of agriculture sector, indicated that more than 70% of the value came from crops farming; of those husbandry and services are 15,12% and 14,33% respectively The total value of crops cultivation contributes to the province GDP highly crude value, the rate of refined services put marginal added value to this

3.3.3 Study conducting

With the local government

To understand the planning and implementing of water allocation in this area, the local authorities are interviewed from the commune level to the district level From the provincial level, people of DARD, DONRE and IHIC Company are interviewed From the district and commune level, the people from the agricultural office are being asked as they directly interact

2 The Kmer inhabitant occupies around 1,5% of the total Vietnames population in 2009 (GSO)

with farmers and practice the regulations and plan at the grassroots level daily The questionnaires are used to ask the local agencies can be found in the appendix I

With the local farmers

The survey will be taken along the salinity map of surface water in Tra Vinh province The aim

of the field research is to examine the different interests of the farmers in sharing water in the area of which the salt level flux is from 2-16gram/litter seasonally and geographically A sample

of 60 farmers has been interviewed with open-structure questionnaires (the details of the questionnaires with the farmers are supplied in the appendix H) According to the administrative map, the survey is performed in three districts namely Cau Ngang, Chau Thanh and Tra Cu There are 20 interviewees in 6 communes called An Quang Huu, Luu Nghiep Anh, Tan Son, Tap Son Ngai Xuyen and Phuoc Hung in Tra Cu district The number of 26 respondents are recorded in 6 communes of Nhi Truong, Hiep My Tay, Hiep My Dong, My Long Nam, My Long Bac and Vinh Kim of Cau Ngang district And the rest interviewed farmers are in 6 communes namely Phuoc Hao, Luong Hoa A, My Chanh, Hung My, Hoa Loi, No Luc, and Chau Thanh town in Chau Thanh district

As the South Nam Mang Thit project has built since 2006 has not being finished yet, some farmers at the head-tail benefit from this dikes and sluice gates system infrastructure while some others at the end-tail are not (Vietnam Agriculture Newspaper, 2015) The survey also studies the perception of farmers in the area about the operation of this hydraulic infrastructure to their farming activities and the degree of participation In addition, one actor from the academia of the Tra Vinh University is also asked to give some remarks about the overall situation The content of the questions is furnished in the appendix I

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

4.1 Water management and planning from bottom-up views

Before discussing the water planning and development in Vietnam, the socio-economic development plans would prioritize according to the long-term target of the Country that is to boost the economics and development It is apparent assumption that the benefits of economics would outweigh and manipulate the other sectors to match its will On the local weekend magazine of Saigon Entrepreneur on September 2011, the gathering of many economics experts discussed the situation of how the planning procedure in Vietnam has been done In this news, they claimed that the lack of coordination between national strategies and provincial implementation has led to the economics resources got dispersion The incoordination is assumed that planning procedure had been done improperly from the top-down as well as from bottom-up which caused difficulties in implementation and operation One economics experts

of this publisher Mr Huynh Buu Son said: “There were many illusory planning projects and initiatives which only were made to get the investment and budget from the Government” According to Dr Vu Thanh Tu An - Research Director of the Fulbright Economics teaching Program in Ho Chi Minh City, he said the planning is overlapped between sectors and twisted with the implementation For another illustrating, Mr Nguyen Van Son – an economic expert particular about Mekong Region complained the unscientific planning of GDP and ICOR3 at the provincial level Hence, it is very complicated to gain commitments and accountabilities However, with the help of Unicef, Ministry of Planning and Investment (Unicef, 2013) issued

a new planning guidebook to support the central government, provincial governing engines, and the local authorities design strategies, missions, objectives, solutions, activities, etc… in a holistic way Hopefully, the above situation will move to a new page of revolution

As mentioned about the leading economic benefits before, Water Planning and Development are influenced accordingly There are two points that might explain this influence: the improper planning procedure, the lack of coordination among sectors and the incoordination between authorized agencies Firstly, from the top layer, the Government and the national Congress discuss the planning with different Ministries and congressmen publicly based on a set of the

3 ICOR is a ratio that measures the inefficiency of an investment It can be defined as “the marginal amount of investment capital necessary for an entity to generate the next unit of production” More information can be found

at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/icor.asp

proposed Initiatives from all sectors These Initiatives is suggested from the provincial level It seems the planning converges information vertically and horizontally Nevertheless, the top-down dominate the whole process regardless the natural, physical and human resources That may explain that every regular meeting of the Congress always has fails in reaching the development targets by the public and the media Moreover, it is said that the reports to the Congress likely set a precedent of the report make-ups For example, in the Winter-Spring crops

of 2015, the salinity was so high that impacted about 10.000 ha of rice paddies (Travinh government website, 2015) Yet, this event didn’t mention in the annual report 2015 of Tra Vinh province And for the next year planning, they just put total arable land for rice cultivation lower at 232.000 hectares compared to 237.321 hectares in the previous year Also, in the year

of 2015, rice paddy area was out of planning about 4,2%, if in comparison with the previous year this rate is roughly 9% but it seems not to admit the failure of planning processes Another example, the national water supply and sanitation program in this region are reported in the angles of budget disbursement and transferring projects to the local authorities which so-called meet the national target of clean water for the community at the rate of 80% cover Yet, there are no reports on how the efficiency of these projects after the transferring It aligns with the field findings that 2 water supply plants in Nhi Truong ward, Vinh Kim ward, in Cau Ngang Districts have stopped to operate for over 3 years after about 2 years operation Also, there is about 85% of household water resource groundwater in the sample of 60 correspondents is pumping in Tra Vinh province

Secondly, in the new planning manual (Unicef, 2013) the main actors in the procedure are Ministry of Planning and Investment and Ministry of Finance The other Ministries play less importance roles, for example, to catch economics growth indicator Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development hold more resources and investment than the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment According to MARD report (MARD website, 2014), in the period of 2004 – 2013 the investment on Agriculture and rural development sectors accounts for 48.5% proportion of the total governmental investment budget Moreover, in the figures, MOPI and MOF are presence as the coordinator in the water management in Vietnam (Loan, 2010a)

Thirdly, the over-crossed mandates between MONRE and MARD divide the responsibilities in Water Resources Management At the glance of provincial level, the role of DONRE presumes likely vague in managing water resources both surface and ground water based on the semi-structure interview with the local officers in DARD and DONRE in Tra Vinh province There are few indicators that can explain this point:

- The office of DORNE does not have the mandates to regulate or manage the water infrastructure and surface water, for instance, the dikes, sluices gates, tertiary canal development, etc… Via the interview with Mr Tran Thanh Phong – vice director of Office of Water and Marine Resources in DORNE Tra Vinh province He said, DONRE just has the title

of managing water resources, however, DARD is in charge of surface water exploitation for

agriculture purposes He explained that DONRE only issues license for ground water exploitation to water supply companies and industrial zones This is the only main activity that DONRE directly manages water related issues When being asked if he knows about farmers have been pumping groundwater for their crop farming, he admitted that “we” knew that issues Infer from that, DONRE mandates is likely constrained at the local level

- Interviewing with Mr Nguyen Truong Chinh – director of Planning and Financial Office in DARD in Tra Vinh province hesitated to give feedbacks about how the water is planned and allocated in this region Firstly, when being asked about water allocation for crops and agriculture production, he evaded toward this issue by saying the operation planning of canal and sluices gates are mandates of the Irrigation and Hydraulic Infrastructure Company (IHIC) which is under the management of Tra Vinh People committee Therefore, he implied that DARD could not interfere in the operation process Secondly, he ignored the main driver and main actor when being asked about the farmers have been pumping groundwater for their crops especially the third crops; and he added that groundwater manipulation is the mandates of DARD and MARD Hence, combine with the interview with DARD people, it can be assumed that the legal framework has “the room for maneuver” Trace back in the Water Law 1998, there is no specific remarks about groundwater protection

- Interviewing with Mr Nguyen Van Ke – head officer of Irrigation Office of Irrigation and hydraulic infrastructure Company (IHIC) in Tra Vinh Province, he supplied the Announcement number 518/SNN-KT on 04th November 2015 that issued by DARD Tra Vinh about the schedule for sowing rice production in the province for the period year of 2015-2016 Mr Nguyen Van Ke said that based on this sowing plan, his office will make the planning for the Irrigation Units at district levels to operate accordingly by issues the Planning Document number 05/KH-CTCTTL-QLKT on 16th November 2015 However, he also furnished that his office got Announcement number 566/KH-SNN on 16th November 2015 from DARD Tra Vinh directly for the planning the irrigation planning It can be seen that DARD plays an importance role in water allocating and hydraulic infrastructure at the provincial level

From the grassroots level, agriculture planning and water allocation are not considered as it is Mrs Nguyen Thi Linh works at the agriculture office of Nhi Truong People Committee Ward, Cau Ngang District said about the agricultural situation of this area has many presses First, she explained about the approval for the production planning for the area she is in charge is imposed

by the district authorities According to collected data about rice cultivation land and rice productivity, and other crops farming, Ms Linh would plan the target for the next year However, she hesitated to tell that most of the proposed targets given from the commune levels are edited imposingly from the higher level Second, she mentioned about the program called changing crops which are less thirsty crops for El Nino phenomena mitigation and climate change adaptation She got the instruction from upper-line authorities to implement the program And to the extent scope that she can do is to encourage farmers to alter the crop types,

raise the awareness of climate change and El Niño phenomena She told the story that some farmers don’t follow the advice on crops or plan in the regions where water shortage is forecasted And they accept the high risk of water scarcity for their crops Moreover, she furnished there are hardly have any programs that connect the farmers, business sectors, and the government For instance, when being asked if there are any incentives to help the farmers

to change the crops, she listed few reasons that difficult to solve beyond her administrative units She claimed that farmers ask her back to whom will they sell the harvested crops, and who will help them with the farming techniques These kind of questions are out her mandates

to answer the farmers Thirdly, she confirmed that the operation plan of sluice gates and water allocation is not consulted between the district irrigation office and commune agricultural offices within it This leads to some economics loss in some region few years ago For example, the sowing plan is set and forced to perform from the district level to lower level Yet, in reality even there was delay in sowing time in different communes and even in districts, the irrigation operation still followed the instructed plan This incoordination among sectors at the local level

is result of not considering planning from bottom-up direction

Below is the figure show the policy and the planning are made within the organizational structure

Figure 9 Hierarchy Administrative Organizational structure of the Government