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Tài liệu Location and Rents: The Indifference Principle, Submarkets and Land Use Segregation pptx

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Tiêu đề Location and Rents: The Indifference Principle, Submarkets and Land Use Segregation
Trường học Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Chuyên ngành Real Estate
Thể loại Bài giảng
Thành phố Cambridge
Định dạng
Số trang 21
Dung lượng 86,26 KB

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CU MIT Center for Real Estate Week 2: The Urban Land Market, location, rents ,prices.. E MIT Center for Real Estate Empirical Studies of Location and Land Prices e.g.. Land Rent Negativ

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CU) MIT Center for Real Estate

Week 2: The Urban Land Market, location, rents ,prices

¢ Ricardian Rent with Commuting

¢ Land Supply and Urban Comparative

Statics

¢ Spatial capitalization of Ricardian Rent

¢ Multiple land users, market competition,

“highest use” segmentation

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E MIT Center for Real Estate

Empirical Studies of Location and Land Prices (e.g Waddell)

Sometimes the relationships are complicated

Land Rent

Negative Value of Proximity ,

— Positive Value of Access

Distance from Highway

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CU) MIT Center for Real Estate

1) R(d) = R(b) + k(b - d)

d = any “interior” location

b = Most “marginal or farthest location

Q = “Best’’, most central location

k = annual commuting cost [inc time]

per mile from “best” or central location

2) R(b) = “replacement” cost [annualized]

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E MIT Center for Real Estate

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E MIT Center for Real Estate

Components of Housing Rent

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j MT Center for Real Estate

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E MIT Center for Real Estate

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j MT Center for Real Estate

7) Population growth at rate 2g implies

boundary [b] growth rate of g [see previous

8) Hence Ricardian Rent for existing

structures located at (d) in time t:

R,(d) = (4,g + c) + k(b, — d)

[d<b,]

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E MIT Center for Real Estate

Expansion of Housing Rent as the city grows and the border

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j MIT Center for Real Estate

9) Price of existing structures at (d) in time t

is PDV of Rent With discount rate 1:

P,(d)= r,q1 + c1 + k[b, —- dị] + kb,g/J1-g]1

term1l= value of land used perpetually in

agriculture term2= value of constructing structure term3= value of current Ricardian Rent term4= value of future growth in

Ricardian Rent

[note that d<b,, and 1>g]

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CU) MIT Center for Real Estate

10) Spatial multipliers or capitalization rates With much effort the price/rent multiplier today for existing structures 1s:

P,(d)/R,(d) = 1/i + kbpg /i[i — g] Ro(d)

AS we examine farther locations where rent

is lower this implies a greater price

multiple

With no growth [g=O0] the multiple is the

inverse of the discount rate — at all locations

More? Capozza/Helsley

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CU) MIT Center for Real Estate

11) Like land rent, land price is a residual

from structure price, for existing structures

p,(d) = [P,(d) -c/]/q

What about the price of land beyond the

current border (b,) In t years from now the

border will have expanded to b,e®'

Inverting, land at distance d> b, will be

developed in T = log(d/b,)/g years from

now

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CU) MIT Center for Real Estate

12) Hence for d>b, the value of land has two

components: the discounted value of

agricultural rent until developed, plus its

value once developed — discounted to now

po(d) = PDV,_ „ (r,) +e"! pr(d)

=r/i +e kb,g/[i — glig For locations d=by,e®! which will be

developed at T years hence

Notice that as g hits zero the last term vanishes Where are land prices most

volatile as g fluctuates?

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E MIT Center for Real Estate

The components of Land Prices

Current

Location Value

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CU) MIT Center for Real Estate

Numerical Example

¢ Parameters: N=2million, g=.25 acre (.0004

square miles), k=$200 per mile per year,

c=$7000, i=.07, r,=$1000 per year, V=1.0

¢ Solution:

b = 20 miles R(O) = $11,250, R(b) = $7250

r (0) = $17,000 (acre), r(b) = $1000

If g=.02, then:

P(b) = $127,000, P(O)=$184,000 r(b) = $105,000, r(0) = $334,000

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CU) MIT Center for Real Estate

The Four variables of the simple model do quite well in explaining the large difference in average house prices between US metro areas

Kansas City MSA 209.7 66,500 493,485 602,347 22.1

San Antonio MSA 182.6 57,300 349,330 451,021 29.1

San Francisco CMSA 267.3 257,700 1,970,549 2,329,808 18.2

Tampa MSA 191.3 71,300 638,816 869,481 36.1

Adapted from DiPasquale and

Wheaton (1996)

“HH, household

CMSA, Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area MSA, Metropolitan Statistical Area

PRICE = -298, 138 + 0.019HH + 152,156 HHGRO + 1,622 COST R2=.76

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E MIT Center for Real Estate

13) Suppose that Population is not growing but k is, because

of increases 1n income and transport costs

k, = kee 14) Hence Ricardian Rent for existing structures located at

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CU) MIT Center for Real Estate

17) Suppose there are two groups of

households with different commuting costs [days/week, value of time ]

R,(d) = R(b) + k,(b - d)

R,(d) = R(b) + k,(b-d),_ k, >k,

18) Location equilibrium involves giving all the best locations [closest] to the group that values it most (1) Highest use implies that this group is willing to pay more for all

houses from 0 to m Group 2 gets m to b

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E MIT Center for Real Estate

19) Hence in equilibrium

R,(m) = R(b) + k,(b - m)

R,(O) = R,(m) + k,(m - Q),

20) Determining b,m depends on how many

households of each type there are: n,, n,

m = [n,q/ nV]!

b = [(n,+n, )q/ VV]!

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E MIT Center for Real Estate

Housing Rents and Land Use Competition

with 2 Household types [1,2]

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CU) MIT Center for Real Estate

patterns do we see in dense urban mixed

use?

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