Informality In A Conflict Zone: A Case Of Construction Workers In Kashmir

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The next section (Section 2) provides a brief background on the geographical and political context of the region;[r]

INFORMALITY IN A CONFLICT ZONE: A CASE OF CONSTRUCTION

WORKERS IN KASHMIR Section 1: Introduction and background of the paper

―Every issue, every conflict has only one solution – development, development and only development We all should spend our energy on the development of the state‖i

The quote above is one of comments made by India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his recent inauguration of the multiple infrastructural projects – the controversial 330 MV Kishenganga hydroelectric power project, 14 km-long Zojila tunnel in Leh, and 42-km long Srinagar Ring Road – in Indian Administered Kashmir Economic development as a solution to the ‗Kashmir Problem‘ has been the main discourse propagated by the Indian State since the eruption of armed insurgency in the region during 1990s This narrative based on the notion of

‗Economic Peace‘ has been used by the Indian State to undermine and negate the basis of Kashmir as a political problem The development approach followed, drawn from neo-liberal development paradigms with central focus on attracting private sector investment through the development of efficient capitalist markets has shaped much of the conflict dynamic in the region since the last two decades This paper tries to understand informality in the frontier region

of Indian Administered Kashmir, and investigates the effect protracted political instability has on the nature of informality and issues related to work conditions, recruitment patterns, and cycles

of exploitation Post 2000 the share of construction sector has shown impressive increase due to housing boom facilitated by the banking sector, and the central government‘s development packages whose major component is infrastructure development Large scale migration of cheap labor force from states as far as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, etc is used in ambitious development projects such as railways, highways, tunnels, and hydro power projects Most of these projects are not completed in the specified time periods due to periods of inactivity emanating from the prevailing conflict in the region In this paper, we argue that uncertain and unpredictable political situation increases the precariousness of the migrant workers and plays a central role in further worsening the condition of the workers Further, the paper argues that we need to go beyond considering large scale temporary migration to Kashmir as just a construction boom, but rather see it as an outcome of neoliberal policies in the region The paper is based on

critical review of literature on migrant precariousness in politically unstable states, and field interviews conducted between 2017 and 2018 over several months in Kashmir valley with several policy makers, civil society and human rights activists, owners of industrial units and visits to construction sites In this study we employ 50 qualitative semi-structured interviews (in-depth interviews) selected through purposive sampling so as to include variety of migrant labor experiences in different sectors such as housing construction, industrial estates, and large infrastructure projects The interviews covered issues related to the reasons for working in Kashmir and nature of construction work engaged in, working experience in Kashmir, family background, socioeconomic status, recruitment process, impact of political uncertainty and how

it affects the working conditions, social security benefits and general views on the situation in the Kashmir Valley

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The next section (Section 2) provides a brief background on the geographical and political context of the region; Section 3 provides a snapshot of the impact of armed insurgency on the development of the region; Section 4 provides

a detailed discussion on post 2000 construction boom in the region; in Section 5, attention is given to the role of political uncertainty on migrant labor precariousness; and the last Section (Section 6) presents the overview of the above issues

Section 2: Background: Geographical and political Context

Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is the mountainous border state - strategically located and conflict ridden - situated in the extreme north of Indiaii It consists of three regions: Jammu, Kashmir and the sparsely populated Ladakh region Presently the state consists of 22 districts - 10 in Kashmir,

10 in Jammu and 2 in Ladakh The overall population of 12.5 Million is split between Jammu (43%) and Kashmir (55%) Kashmir having a Muslim majority of 97 per cent is vested with a good mineral base, significant power potential, and is famous world-over for its handicrafts, handloom products, horticulture produce and cottage industry J&K is primarily an agricultural economy with around 70 per cent of its population directly or indirectly depending on agriculture (Economic Survey of J&K, 2016) Given the harsh winters in J&K, the state has two capitals Srinagar city is the summer capital, while Jammu city is the winter capital

The state of J&K has been the reason for three short wars between India and Pakistan over the territory (1947, 1965 and 1999) Both India and Pakistan claim this region, and this contestation between the two countries since 1947 is known as the Kashmir conflict or sometimes as a "proxy war" between India and Pakistan with skirmishes around the Line of Control (LoC) Indian Administered Kashmir is also classified as the world‘s most militarised zone as well as the largest region occupied by security forcesiii The state of J&K is unique from other states of India

in many ways as it is the most controversial and strategic, it has a separate Constitution and it has

a special relationship with Indian Union as recognised by Article 370 which is supposed to protect the interests of the locals The state has the characteristics of a fragile State, and has suffered from armed conflict, ethnic tensions, human rights violations, low economic development, unemployment, poor governance, rigged elections, and widespread corruption Protracted political instability and the resurgence of massive popular uprisings since 2008 led by the Separatists during the years of 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2016 have impacted the local economy and hit the productive base of the economy

Section 3: Armed insurgency and its impact on economic development (1989-96)

In 1989, when armed insurgency started in J&K the central Government decided to appoint Jagmohan as the Governor of the state Jagmohan immediately dissolved the assembly and this led to a direct central rule in the state for a period of six years The armed insurgency has had a considerable negative impact on economic development of J&K as this phase was the most disturbing both economically and politically The state‘s economy suffered owing to long spells

of closure of industrial, commercial and other establishments The inflow of tourists which had reached a peak of 7.32 lakhs in 1987-88 slumped to a few thousands during early 1990s Heavy damage was also caused to vital public infrastructure which included educational institutions, bridges and culverts The disturbed conditions in the state reduced the recovery of taxes and revenues thus widening the gap of non-plan deficit (Government of J&K, 1998) Similarly, in the non-tax revenue the receipts on account of sale of electricity showed a drastic fall due to poor recovery on account of militancyiv The development profile of the region has been affected adversely during this period on account of substantial diversion of plan funds to the non-plan budget for meeting budgetary deficit (Government of J&K, 1994) At the same time, administration was under great stress and law and order system came under heavy weight of

security related expenditure Thus, during this period a considerable amount of expenditure which should have been invested in development activities was diverted towards non-development sectors

Section 4: Kashmir Post 1996: Economic Integration through migrant labor flows

In the year 1996 President‘s Rule was lifted after six years of violent conflict and elections were held in the state National Conference (NC) headed by Farooq Abdullah won the state elections

in 1996 and formed government in the state Chowdhary (2016: 130) states:

―Since the mainstream politics was totally de-legitimized in Kashmir, it was not an easy task for the National Conference to capture the political space The party also faced the issue of its own credibility It was held responsible not merely for co-opting with the Centre in manipulating the local politics but also for compromising the dignity of Kashmir‖

Since 1996, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building policies were followed in the strategically located and conflict-ridden Kashmir by both central as well as state governments The development approach applied was drawn from neoliberal development paradigms with central focus on attracting private sector investment through development of efficient capitalist markets Emphasis was given on good governance, security and private-sector led development The development approach used in Kashmir was drawn from World Bank‘s guided framework to reconstruct and build peace in post-conflict statesv This approach has been used in conflict states such as Bosnia, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Africa, etc Development approaches based on neoliberal development have failed to rebuild state legitimacy and economic development in post-conflict states as these states are not mature enough to be left to market forces (Barbara, 2008) Moore (2000) in the case of Africa argues that such a development approach can create more conflict than before

During the post – 2000 period, Kashmir witnessed an extreme dependence on mainland migrant laborers mostly from states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan According to the 2011 census, there are about six lakh non-local skilled and unskilled laborers engaged in specific sectors of the economy, mainly construction and manufacturing However, labor migration

remains largely understated and the state officials refuse to give estimates on mainland migrants, who are not registered residentsvi The literature on Kashmir has largely overlooked the migration dynamics in the region; instead much attention was given to the issues related to governance, secession movements, and militarisation Dominant explanations given by state officials and media state that labor migration is mainly due to higher wage rate, pleasant environment, and lack of skilled manpower in the region

Migration has been examined from many perspectives which are mostly neoclassical in nature (Lewis, 1954; Ranis & Fei, 1961; Harris & Todaro, 1970) The main argument of these mainstream economic theories is that migration of workers is caused by differences in wage rates between regions Such perspectives ignore the role of the state in the development context, and particularly the relation between land dynamics, the quest for employment and state policies The political economy approach to migration which concerns itself with explaining how a particular context of development causes labor movement and determines its character is critical in understanding the dynamics of labor migration It focuses on understanding how low wage flexible work force contributes to the process of capital restructuring and accumulation in the receiving country

As explained in this section, we need to go beyond considering large scale temporary migration

to Kashmir as just a construction boom, but rather see it as an outcome of neoliberal policies in the region In the case of Kashmir migrant labor flows play an important role in the larger process of national integration of the region with the Indian mainland and enable a projection of normalcy in the region As stated by one human rights activist:

Labour migration serves the purpose of providing a semblance of political and economic normalcy/peace in a region where elections are usually rigged and held under extreme militarization, and the state actors lack legitimacy on the ground (Interview, July 2017)

Post 2000 the shares of construction and manufacturing in NSDP show a divergence in Kashmir The share of construction has shown impressive increase due to housing boom facilitated by the banking sector, and the central government‘s development packages whose major component is infrastructure development (hydro power projects, railways, tunnels, etc.) The rationale behind

these packages seems to be more of a strategy for enhancing the defense infrastructure and geo-strategic interests of the Indian State in the region as very less quantum of aid has been allocated towards enhancing economic services A critical look at these packages raises several questions such as: What has been actual disbursements? Whether there is any time frame for completion of projects? How much goes to consultant salaries and who are these contractors? Where from supplies and materials are purchased? Where does the labor come from? Regarding 2004 package, policy maker and former state finance commission member Prof Nisar Ali argues that:

―that package was actually a big boost for Government of India in terms of power generation by NHPC in the State …It is the Government of India which was benefitted by that package and not J&K‖vii Navlakha (2005) claims that packages given by the central government do not aim at transforming J&K‘s structurally dependent economy instead they have led to more military buildup and economic centralization Construction sector does not have much impact on the growth of J&K economy as it has low forward and backward linkages as majority of raw materials are imported from other States In addition to this, it leads to leakages because majority

of laborers and contractors are from outside the region

According to David Harvey capitalism creates ‗new forms of accumulation‘ by continuous shifts

in movement of capital and labor across time and spaceviii One example of capitalism‘s changing spatiality is the increasing significance of flows of temporary migrant labor across countries and regions There is a growing literature on the relationship between neoliberal policies and temporary migrant labor in Middle East (Hanieh, 2010) In the case of Kashmir, the reliance on outside labor meant that their precarious situation would force them into subservience instead on depending on restive local labor force In the post 1989 period, J&K region has witnessed increasing occupation of land by army and other security agencies Jean Dreze states that the number of security forces in the region is ―estimated at 6,00,000 or so, for a population of six million — that‘s one soldier for 10 civilians‖ix In 2009, J&K Government revealed in state Assembly that different security agencies are illegally occupying a total of 8,55,407 kanals of land and the rights of 1,99,314 kanals of land have been transferred by the State government to the army and other agencies under local lawx Even the report by interlocutors for J&K appointed

by the central government noted that (Padgaonkar, 2012: 27):―… in a number of residential areas, the forces continue to occupy prime land, which is required to accommodate expanding

urban population, including for providing urban infrastructure‖ According to 11th Five Year

Plan Document (2007-12: 45): “154 industrial units have been occupied by the security forces

60 units have been vacated and 94 are still occupied 103 units have been assessed and 52 units are yet to be assessed for damages” Nabi &Ye (2015) argue that the army occupation of large

areas of land and its large presence in Kashmir has led to depeasantisation in rural areas of Kashmir

During this phase the experience of J&K was not only of civil war but also of forced economic liberalization The state was opened to national market facilitating an exploitation of hydropower resources as the ability of the state to fund its projects had eroded over time In the year 2000 a memorandum was signed by state government which handed over seven hydro power projects to NHPC (National Hydro Power Corporation) for funding, execution and operation over a period

of 10 years Data presented in the Lok Sabha by the Union Minister for power in March 2015, reveals that more than 40 per cent of the power generated by NHPC across the country flows from J&K alonexi These power projects are located in extremely militarized places where it is difficult for the locals to resist their displacement Suhail (2017) work on Kishen Ganga Hydro Power project shows corporate land grabbing (by NHPC) has led to depeasantization, dispossession, and damages to the local ecology at large These projects have to be implemented only during the summer months and often laborers leave the state due to curfews and separatist agitations

Successive Industrial Policies in Kashmir from 1995 till the recently announced Industrial Policy

of 2016 stress on the need to develop private sector in the state with the government playing a more central role by creating the enabling environment for private businesses and providing with support and protection against the risk and uncertainty caused by conflict Industrial estates were established to attract outside capital by offering them incentives such as tax concessions, lease of land for 90 years, and few workers‘ rights The rationale behind the creation of industrial estates was to generate employment and development of the region During our field visits to industrial estates in Kashmir we found that almost all of the industrial estates in Kashmir are surrounded by army camps outside their periphery In some of the industrial estates few units are occupied by security forces and some of the industrial estates such as Sumbal Industrial Estate are completely occupied by security forces (not even one-unit functioning) A striking feature of the estates

which are functioning shows that most of the labor working is employed from outside the state They come to work in these industrial estates as seasonal jobs which operate from March to October Migrant labor is mostly recruited through labor contractors and trade unionism is not allowed Further, industrial production is not connected with real local development as most of the raw materials are coming from outside the state (sub-contracting) which shows the dominance of the mainland capital in the industrial structure of the region The J&K Economic

Survey (2017: 15) states that: ―The Central package attracted major manufacturing houses to the state, mostly to Jammu, Samba and Kathua because of its proximity with the market, rail head and the raw material‖ The labor which works in these estates have been denied any right to

form trade union or benefits from social security As has been rightly pointed out by Pandita

(2004): ―Due to the current conflict, industrial relations have also changed in the private sector The threat of moving out has also gained special provisions for private industry; unions are not tolerated at all and any efforts at organizing lead to dismissals‖ From a theoretical perspective,

the specific process of emerging capitalist development in the frontier region of Kashmir can be

framed as ―militarized capitalism‖ Militarized capitalism refers to ‗high levels of military support and presence that make the expansion of capitalist production and creation of a labor force possible‖ (Ruwanpura, 2018: 426)

To sum up, in the case of Kashmir migrant labor flows not only play an important role in national integration but are also used to sustain an emerging process of capitalist development Militarisation eases the processes of capital deepening neoliberal policies in the region and at the same time dispossesses the locals by occupying their industrial estates and fertile agriculture land

or by imposing curfews These two need to be connected to understand why the region is unable

to absorb the growing labor force, and thus faces high unemployment rate and its dependency on mainland India

Section 5: Migrant labor amidst political uncertainties (2008-18)

Since June 2008, the region has witnessed resurgence of massive uprisings/agitations led by the separatists during the years of 2008 (Amarnath Land Row), 2009 (Shopian 'rape and murder' case), 2010 (2010's summer turmoil) and 2016 (Burhan Wani) adversely hampering the delivery

of public service and drastically slowing down the developmental activities During this phase

there were massive agitations and continuous lockdowns (hartals and curfews) for several months in these years Political repression and suppression of civil liberties was severe throughout this phase as they were undermined by the growing presence of security forces and the powers they enjoyed Amnesty International and J&K Coalition of Civil Society have documented on multiple occasions‘ gross and systematic human rights violations in the region The first ever report by UN on the Human Rights Situation in Kashmirxii cites impunity for human rights violations and lack of access to justice as key human rights challenges in the regioxiii The discursive power of the state to control its population through extreme militarization, uninterrupted curfews and surveillance plays a major role to counter local narratives Staniland (2013: 951) states:

―During periods of crises – but to a lesser extent in the absence of crises as well – newspapers are pressured, Facebook and phones are monitored, universities are tightly surveilled and controlled, and gatherings are banned Control over local media is striking, as editors and reporters claim that the owners of media outlets face direct government manipulation and sometimes intimidation‖

Most of the interviews with migrant laborers expressed hopelessness, conflict related trauma and everyday precarity in the face of high uncertain and unpredictable political situation prevalent in the region The migrant workers are working in a situation where no one knows what will happen the next moment and as such unique precarious labor arrangements emerge where a large proportion of migrant workers are lacking minimum wage protection, laboring in unsafe conditions, job insecurity, and living in overloaded dormitories These include fear of being harassed by local protestors or by security forces, the inability to cover travel expenses to move out of the region, and limited knowledge about the transportation system and safe escape routes Kelly and Wadud (2012) have rightly pointed out:

“Labour migrants in conflict zones are generally more vulnerable than the native population Migrants may not speak the local language or share the same culture and are often at the bottom

of the economic pyramid Their employers may be a party to the conflict, leaving the workers vulnerable to targeted attacks from opposing parties…migrant workers are just like any other civilians caught in a war zone: innocent and scared Their immediate proximity to danger and

conflict is balanced against the negative impact that losing their jobs could have on their families back home’

Large infrastructure projects in the region have to be implemented only during the summer months and often laborers leave the state due to curfews and separatist agitations Most of the laborers stated that they face everyday precariousness as they fear to go to working sites whenever there are hartals (shutdowns) or curfews, As reported by one laborer from Bihar:

We try our level best to come before 6 PM and then we don‘t leave our room On hartal days we leave

early for work or we don‘t come out of our rented spaces (Interview, September 2018)

Once prolonged agitations start the region often witnesses‘ curfews during which excessive security forces are deployed leading to curbs on movement and restriction on working hours Normal life comes to standstill as transport goes off the roads and commercial activities close down Due to this most of the laborers face job insecurity and leave the region without payment for the work already done, and they have to spend nearly Rs 3000 towards travel from Kashmir

to their place of origin, and back once situation becomes normal Recently, the region remained tense as a Delhi based NGO challenged the legality of Article 370 and 35A in the Supreme Court arguing that they should be scrapped, as it decimates against the citizens of J&K and the non-J&K citizens There were local protests against this petition and the separatist leadership threatened mass protests if Article 35A was tempered Judgment was on 30 August, 2018 and before that most of the laborers left fearing trouble Rajesh a 45-year-old from Bihar working as

a laborer in local housing construction since last 10 years stated that:

We were tense because everyone used to tell us that there will be problems if Article 35A is abrogated So many left due to tension and fear created by it We waited for 10 days then situation became normal

(Interview, August 2018)

In addition to the problems discussed above, the region often witnesses enforced communication blockades and gags by the administration with phone services and internet facilities being suspended for long durations This has a psychological impact on migrant labourers as they are not able to contact their family The same migrant reported that ―Our families get worried when our mobile phones don‘t work‖