What does the Vietnam War tell air power theorists and strategists about the viability of coercive air power as a strategic tool

In modem vvars and conilicts, coercive aừ powcr has bccn comnionly utilised by states in order to attack thcir adversaries. The fact that the United States conductcd t[r]

VNU Jo jm a l of Science, Social Sciences a n d \ ỉu m an ities 25, No.5E (2009) 57-62

What does the Vietnam War tell air power theorists and strategists about the viability o f coercive air power as

a strategic tool?

Tran Diep Thanh*

C ollege o fS o c ia l Sciences and Humanities, VNU

336 Nguyên Trai, Thanh Xuan, Hanoi, Vietnam

Rcccived 09 December 2009

Abstraci In modem vvars and conilicts, coercive aừ powcr has bccn comnionly utilised by states

in order to attack thcir adversaries The fact that the United States conductcd this strategic air

offensive with four air bombmg campaigns known as Rolling Thundcr, Frcedom Train,

Linebacker I, and Lincbackcr II against North Vietnam during thc Victnam War American air

power thcorists and strategists point out two latter had effective goals bccausc thcy used deniaỉ

strategy attacking military targets Convcrsely, many thinkers asscrt that none o f them were

successíul The paper examincs clcarly this by analysing the impacts o f these air attacks on the

United States and North Vietnam Ultimately, the Vietnam War tells air powcr strategists that the

United States did not get thc main purposes which were to compel thc North to support the

insurgency in the South and dcstroy its civilian morale On the contrary, North Victnam achieved

the primary goaỉ that its adversary had to wilhdraw all military and civil pcrsonncl out of South

Vietnam and !hc North won ihis war in April 1975

Since W orld W ar II, cocrcive a ir p o w e r has

bcen considcrcd as a crucial ìnstrum ent vvhich

‘states may still conduct stratcgic air offensives

against their adversaries’ [1, p 103] In the

V ietnam War, it is no doubt that th e United

States utilised coercive theory in o rd c r lo attack

N orth V ietnam , ‘for the p u rp ose o f altering

H anoi’s behaviour on the b a ttle íìe ld and

position at the ncgotiating ta b lc ’ A dđitionally,

there arc a num bcr o f dcbatcs and controversies

w hich analyse and arguc ‘vvhen co ercio n will

succeed or f a ir [1, p.103) T h e author, Pape,

* Tcl.: 84-4-35587060

E-maiỉ: quytrandang@ yahoo.com

found that the success o f coercion theory in general, o f thc V ictnam W ar in particular results from the usc o f air pow er to exploit the

o p p o n e n rs m ilitary vulnerabilities, not civilian vulnerabilities [ l , p.104] On thc contrary, other researchers criticise thosc air attacks failed com pletely becausc they did not coerce North

V ietnam to halt thc infiltration o f men and supplies into South V ietnam [2-4] Furtherm ore, after the final air force strike know n as Linebackcr II in 1973, Hanoi achieved the prim ary goal that the U nited States had to vvithdravv all m ilitary and civil personnel out o f South V ietnam in accordance with the Paris A ccords T his lcads to thc fact that the

58 T D Thanh / VNU Ịoum al o Ị Science, Social Sciences and H um anities 25, N o 5E <2009) 57-62

South V ietnam cse G overnm ent collapsed and

North Vietnam ultim atcly won this w ar in April

1975

T he aim o f thc paper is to respond to the

question: vvhat does the V ietnam W ar tell air

pow er theorists and strategists about the

viability o f coercive air pow cr as a strategic

tool? T he papcr will bc* divided into three

sections In section one, a b rie f overview o f

coercion theory is going to be considered

Subsequently, thc coercion thcory w hich was

applied in four air force cam paigns throughout

the V ietnam W ar will bc presented in section

two In the last section, thc im pacts o f these air

attacks on the U nited States and th e Northern

Vietnam ese are going to bc analysed

1 A brief ovcrvievv of cocrcion theory

Firstly, it is nccessary to notc that in the

ordinary term ‘co ercion’ rcfers to 'th c use o f

threats or orders to m akc som e one do

som ething that do not want to d o ’(l) In the

m ilitary tcrm, it is ‘cfforts to change the

behaviour o f a S ta te by m anipulating costs and

beneíĩts’ [1, p 106] Theroíbre, the c o e rã o n

strategy o f air pow cr thcory m eans the assailant

typically seeks to com pel reduction o f political

aims, agrecm cnt to a ccasc-fưe, w ithdraw al o f

forces, o r even surrendcr, by states that retain

the capacity for continucd m ilitary operations

According to Pape, thcrc

are iour basic stratcgies o f cocrcive air power

such as: punishm ent, dcnial, risk, and

decapitation [5, p.30]

1.1 P unishm ent stratcgy

(1> Lor 'II Diclionary o f conlemporary English (new

edition; '.rcctor, Dclla Summer) Harlow: Longman,

c2003 XVII p.289

T h is strateg y conccnlrates o n the use o f ai) force to attack d ư cctly thc civ ilian targ ets o f ar adversary so as to b reak ‘th e p o p u latio n ’í

m orale o r to íòm ent an uprising against the opposing g o v c m m e n t' [5, p.3 0 ] T h e strateg> was supportcd by G iulio D ouhet, Hugh

T rcnchard, and W illiam “ B illy” M ichel Furtherm orc, thcsc authors address that it can

be u tiliseđ to dcstroy ihc e n e m y ’s vvill to íĩght They assert that dcm olishing ‘an e n em y ’s war-

m aking cap ability through attacks on its econom ic ‘vital cen tcrs' w ould disrupt Ìts social fabnc and lead to a collapse o f m o ral' [6, p.2]

1.2 Dí’niaI slrategy

T he second stratcgy íocuscs on not civilian vulnerability, but m ilitary vulncrability The goal o f thc stratcgy is lo n eutralise the enem y’s

m ilitary p o ten tial bcío rc it can be brought to bear on the battleH eld [ 1, p 111 ]

1.3 R isk s tr a te g y

R isk strategy includcs utilisation o f air íbrcc

so as to achieve thc lcvel o f risk faced by an adversary, thus attcm pting to lcverage an adversary’ fear o f ‘futurs costs in order to coerce action in the p rcsen t’ This strategy is the m ođcl o f T h om as Schelling Also, Abbot [5, p.31) críticises that it 'ío c u s e s alm ost solely on integration w ith a punishm ent strategy’ which Pape has dcm onstratcd Ít is a poor choice o f coercivc strategy bccausc hc bclieves it will fail

to coerce an advcrsary ínto action

1.4 D ecapitation strategy

John W ardcn is the author o f this strategy

w ho advocatcs thc use o f a ir force against key leadership and com m and and control targets, thereby achieving ‘paralysis’ o f a larget s decision m aking w ithout resort to ửie massive force requirem ents o f more traditional denial or

T D Thanh ! VNLI loum aỉ o f Science, Socinl Sciences and Humnnities 25, No.5E (2(X)9) 57-02 59

punishment strategies (W ardcn 1992 cited in (5,

p.32|

W ith relating to thcsc stratcgies o f cocrcivc

air power thcory, Papc also points out ‘cocrcion

through civilian vulncrability is unlikely to

succeed C onversely, coercion through

miiitary vulnerability is som etim es possible,

because thcre is often a close relationship

bctw ecn thc battlefield and thc hom c front’ [1,

p l 12] M oreover, hc found that ‘denial strategy

less cffective a gucm lla strategy than a

conventional, o r m ccham scd, w a r strateg y ’ [5,

p.38] He tested these hypotheses in a particular

case study: the V ictnam W ar T h roughout thc

\var, the U nited States applied m ainly t\vo

stratcgies: punishm cnt and dcnial strategy As a

result, thc author has analysed the failure or

success o f four cocrcivc air cam paigns which

the United States em ployed to attack the

Northern V ictnam cse These air strikes are

going to bc prescntcd clcarly in the next

section

2 Four air attack canipaigns in thc Vietnam

VVar

In thc V ictnam War, from 1965 to 1973 the

United States applicd thc theory o f airpow er

cocrcion with four air bom bing cam paigns

knovvn as R olling Thunder, F reedom Train,

Linebackcr I, and Lincbacker II As considcred

briefly above, the tvvo form er strikes failed

bccausc thcy aim ed at civilian vulnerability On

thc contrary, the tw o latter attack s destroyed

military targets so thcy w ere succcssíul

However, it is thc fact that this is not correct

fully Hence, th cy arc going to be analysed

respectively

With rcgard to the form er, after tvventy- thrcc A m cricans w ere attacked and killcd in

Q uy Nhon at the beginning o f February 1965, President o f U nited States, Lyndon Johnson officially ordercd the sustaincd air campaign know n as “ Rolling T hunder" on 13 Pebruary [6, p.59] Somc offìcials, particular Maxwell Taylor<2) advocated this strikc as an important strategy in order to brcak thc N orth Vietnamese vvill to support the insurgency; to boost South

V ietnam ese m orale; and to limit North

V ietn am 's physical capability to support the Southern m surgencies [6, p.59] Purtheim orc, Papc analyscd that thc m ain aim o f Rolling Thunder ‘vvas intended to cocrce the North into stopping infiltration o f m en and supplied into the South and into negotiating a peacc settlem ent’ [ I , p l 13]

Rolling T h u n d cr was implem entcd significantly in four phascs during threc years (from 1965 to 1968) T he A m erican air forcc pounded N orth V ietnam vvith hundreds o f thousands o f bom bs aim ing at a list o f ninety- four targets w hich G eneral C urtis LeM ay(3) planed He stated that had all targets been attacked we w ould have bom bcd the North

V ietnam ese “back into the Stone A ge” (LeM ay

1965 citcd in M ilne [7, p 184] and Clodfelter [6, p.77] C onsequently, aftcr those phascs

‘nearly all o f N orth V ietnam ’s ìnduslnal war potential had been d estro y cd’ [Dyke: 27 cited in Pape [1, p.123] A lthough all industrial and econom ic targets w erc demolished significantly, the air cam paign failed to achieve the m ain goal In fact, H anoi continued lo funnel men and m aterial southw ard and North

V ietnam still survived [1, p.65) In response to the failure o f R olling T hundcr, Pape [1 p 124) has explained that it failed because none o f the

2.1 R olling Thunder a n d F reedom C am paìgns

<:> Chairm an o f thc Joint C h icĩs o f Staff, then Ambassador

to South Victnam.

(3) Head o f a Pcntagon Planning Study.

6 0 7' D Thanh / VNU Ịournal o f Science, Social Sciences and Humanities 25, No.5E (2009) 57-62

stratcgics could exert much lcvcragc against

North V ictnam Though thc cam paign cxploited

punishm cnt vulnerability, N orth V ietnam ’s

industrial scclor was not highly valued asset so

‘Rolling T hunder did not pose high risks to the

civilian cconom ic as a w h o le \ A lso, the author

dem onstrates that ‘the risks to population

centers w crc lovv’ [1, p 125) T hereíore, as a

report o f thc C entrc Intelligcnce A gcncy stated:

‘thcrc is no cvidcncc that the air strikes ha ve

significantly w cakencd popular m orale’ [7, p

193)

Sim ilarly, thc U nited States cm ployed the

lattcr to strike continuously POL (Petroleum , oil

and lubricants) storagc arcas in the North

Again, Prcedom T rain cam paign did not havc

the cíTcctivc result as thc Presidcnt Richard

Nixon A dm inistration’s advisors had predicted

Hanoi had no intcntion o f pulling back from the

offensive and Ilenry K issinger' ihough that

‘Hanoi was so close to v icto ry , it no longer

needcd cvcn thc prctcnse o f negotiations’

(Kissingcr: 1175 cited in Pape [ 1, p 134)

2.2 Linebacker I a n d Linebacker II cam paigns

Due to the N orth V ietnam cse activities in

the Soulh, thc U nited States uscd other coercive

air attacks knovvn as Lincbackcr I (from M ay to

O ctobcr 1972) and II (betw een 18 and 29

Deccm ber 1972) so as to com pcl ‘H anoi to halt

its convcntional offensive and acccpt a stand-

still ccasc-firc agreem ent' [1, p 132]

Particularly, Prcsident Nixon though that the

íìnal cam paign w ould bc a chancc to ‘use

m ilitary pow er effectively to w in this w ar’ [6,

p.184) Likew ise, K issinger declared “ peace is

at h a n d \ followed by the resum ption o f talks,

lcđ many A m ericans to speculate that the \var

w ould cnd by C hristm as’ [6, p 191 ]

1 National Sccurity Advisor

Papc concludcd that thcsc a ir strik es had tht positivc outcom e bccausc thcy cocrced th€

N orth to agree a ncgotiatcd cea seíire One ol them ‘played in a kcy rolc in d eíeatin g the

N orth ’s ground offcnsive and so com pclled Hanoi to acccpt U S tc n n s fo r thc pcace accords' [1, p.141) Furtherm orc, as the author has dem onstrated they aim ed at m ililary targets rathcr than civilian and econom ic ones so they were successíul cam paigns D uring Linebacker

II, ‘aircraít dcm olishcd 191 storage vvare houscs Electric pow er gcncratm g capacity fell from 115,500 to 29,000 kilovvatts, and the raids reduced POL supplies by o n e -fo u rth ’ [6,

p 194-95) L incbacker II did not bom b directly civilian population so it ‘causcd few civilian casualties1 [6, p 192)

T o sum up, the fact that four cocrcive air strikcs wcrc cm ployed to bom b N orth Vietnam

so as to achicve u.s objectivcs rh c re are somc cxplanations w hich intcrprct the lailure and success o f these cam paigns in general, Linebacker II in particular [2, p 278-90) Some researchers argue only L incbackcr I and II succccdcd in the w ar [1, p 104-5) Others criticise nonc o f thcm w cre cffcctive This is going to bc contm uoưsly cxplaincd more in the following section: thc im pacts o f these air attacks on V ictnam and its advcrsary

3 The impacts of thcsc air attacks ơn thc United States and North Victnam

3 1 The U nited States

T he American air lorccs bom bed Norlh Victnam in ordcr to get thc main purposes

H ow evcrf aftcr thcsc attacks th c U nited States did not achieve them com pletcly For example

o f this is the R olling T hunder cam paign Aíter

it had finishcd, N orlh V ictnam did not abandon the Southern insurgcncy O n the contrary,

T.D Thanh / V N U Ịoum al o f Sàence, Social Sciences and Humanities 25, No.5E (2009) 57-62 61

North Vietnam had thc T ct O ffensivc m 1968

vvhich vvas *a psychological defeat for thc

U nited States’ [6, p 139] Purtherm ore, W alt

RostơNV2 claimed sim ply threatening North

V ictnam 's ìndustrial basc w ould com pel the

North to‘ seek peace In fact, bom bing industry

did not ha ve clĩccts because N orth VictTiam had

only a fcw factories and they vvere quickly

dcstroyed [7, p.201) Subscquently, the northem

part o f Vietnam reccived more economic

assislance from H an o i’ com m unisl allies: the

Soviet Union and China [7, p 129) As a result,

President Johnson announced a unilateral

restriction o f bombing, m ade a call íor peace

negotiation, and finally addcd that he vvould not

seek a second term as President [7, p.200]

W ith relating to Lincbacker I and II,

Prcsident N ixon ordered lo use them ‘to vvin the

w a r \ They avoided bom bing civilian targets by

lascr-guidcd smart bom bs and thcy only vvanted

‘the people o f Hanoi to h ear the bo m b s’ [6,

p 184) However, they destroyed the B ach Mai

H ospital which w ould be protected by

International H um anitarian Law r and othcr

civilian population areas o f the Capital This

lcads to the fact that they received concurrently

intcm ational and dom estic criticism dism ayed

both m ilitary and civil leadership [6, p.191) At

the sam e time, the N orthern V ietnam m ilitary

dow ned m any B -52s and m odem aircraíì

íìghters by SAM s (surface-to-air m issiles) and

anti aircraft guns T he A m erican air force had a

heavy loss o f B-52s - A m erican ’s m ightiest

w ar-planes - vvould create the antithesis o f the

psychological im pact that N ixon desired [6,

p.187) T hereíore, U S C ongress did not want

: C hairm an o f thc State D epartm ent Policy Planning

Council

3 ‘The Prcsident sanctioned strikes a g a in s t the Bac Mai

com m um cation cc n tc r in thc C a p i t a l h cart’ (Clodfcltcr

1989: 190) !n fact, the Presidcnt had w rong iníbrm ation

bccauằc it vvas thc N ational Hospital and it vvas bombcd

scvcrcly four timcs.

A m ericans to intervrene in the vvar and the

C ongress voted by a m ajority to cut o ff all funds for m ilitary operations and the safe withdrawal o f A m erican troops [6, p.192]

Finally, the U nited States had a com m itm ent to w ithdraw A m erican íorces and civil personnel out o f the Southern Vietnam This is the p n m ary aim o f N orthern Vielnam ese leaders becausc they believed that ThieiTs govem m ent could not survive i f abandoned by the U nited States [6, p.197] Ultim ately, the South surrendered soon in 1975 as Hanoi predicted

3.2 N orth Vieínam

T here is no doubt that the U nited States was the assailant and they launched coercive air pow er to bom b the N orth o f Vietnam A fter those strikes, not only m ilitary and economic targets w ere destroyed, but also a huge o f civilians w ere attacked, killed and injured severely H ow ever, N orth V ietnam had three advantages: a settlem ent w ould end American involvem ent; an accord vvould legally permit Hanoi to m aintain troops in the South; an agreem ent w ould involve minim al loss o f face [6, p 199)

In addition, because o f the Ư S’ w ithdraw alt

H anoi achieved the pnm ary objective was reunification o f V ietnam w hich President Ho Chi M inh pursued and President Johnson failed

to see [8, p.353) A lso, N orth V ietnam and the

N ational Liberation Front utilised ílexibility

m ilitary and diplom atic strategies to vvin the war It is im portant to note that N orth Vietnam won the final air cam paign, Linebacker II so this strike also is w idely called ‘the Dien Bien Phu battle in the a ir’

6 2 T D Tĩuìtĩlt / VNU Ịoum aì o f Science, Soáal Sciences and Humaniỉies 25, No.5ỉl (2009) 57-62

C o n clu sio n

As Roscn [9, p.87) states ‘vvars are

com plex, and thc Vietnam W ar was no

ex cep tio n ' T hereforc, this ansvvers correctly

the question: w h at docs thc V ietnam W ar tell

air povvcr stratcgists and theorists about the

viability o f coercivc air pow er as a strategic

tool? C ocrcive thcory is not alvvays as an

eíĩectiv e ìnstrum cnt in cvcry case In the

V ietnam W ar, it is clearly doubt that four air

cam paigns w erc successĩul Som e researchers

criticise only tw o o f thcm failed bccausc they

bom bed civilian population T w o latter had

eíĩcctiv e goals: L m cbacker I and II vvhich used

dcnial stratcgy [1, p 104-5) H ow ever, nonc o f

thcse cam paigns succccdcd M any m ilitary

strategists and thcorists pointed out that the use

o f air povvcr in thc V ietnam W ar vvas

controversial from thc start [2, p.272)

In analysing the im pacts o f these attacks on

the U nited States and N orth V ietnam , the

U nited States did not achicvc the m ain purposes

w hich w ere to com pcl the N orth to support the

insurgency in th e South and destroy thc civilian

m orale Purthcrm orc, the N ixon adm inistration

had to w ithdraw all m ilitarv and civilian

pcrsonnel On thc contrary, V ictnam still had

thc main goal o f uniíying ihe country The

lesson o f thc V ictnam W ar is as A m erican

lcaders and m ilitary strategists had

underestim atcd th e traditional spirit o f

V ictnam ese pcoplc Also, this affirm s that

hum an factor p lay s a đccisive role in m odem

vvars and conílicts

R eíeren ces

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W a r \ International Security, 15, 2 (1 9 9 0 ), 103- 146.

[2] L co n ard , R , ‘ L c a m in g from H isto ry : L incbacker

II a n d u s A ir P o rc c D o c trin e ’, The J o u m a ỉ 0j

M ilitary H istory, 58, 2 (1 9 9 4 ), 2 6 7 -3 0 3 [3] V ict H u n g (2 0 0 7 ), ‘ 'D ic n Bicn P hu trcn k h o n g ’ -

35 n a m n h ìn lai ( ‘th c D icn B icn P hu b a ttlc in thc

a ir’ - a rcvicvv aftcr th irty fiv c y c a r s ) \

h ttp ://v ic tb a o v n /P h o n g -su /D ie n -B ie n -P h u -trc n -

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n a m sau , k y cuoi (H a n o i o f th c T vvelvc-day w ar

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h ttp ://v ic lb a o v n /P h o n u -su /K v -c u o i-H a -N o i-cu a -

1 2 -n g a v -d c m -v a-3 5 -n am -sau /2 0 7 6 0 7 3 7 /2 6 2 /

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[5] A b b o t, S D , ‘A ir P o w cr S tra tc g y a n d the

P ro b lcm o f C o c rc io n ’ in W rag c, s (cd),

Im m acuỉate Warfare: participations rejìect otì the air campaigns over Kosovo, A/ghanistan,

a n d Iraq, VVcstport, C o n n c c tic u t, an d London:

Praegcr, 21-50, 2003

[6] C lo d fcltcr, M , The Lim its o f A ir Pow er: The

Am erican Bơom ing o f North Vietìiam, Ncvv

Y ork: T h e F rcc P ress, 1989.

[7] M ilnc, D t ‘” O u r c q u iv alcn t o f g u c m lla

w arfarc": VValt R o sto w an d th c B om bing o f

N orth V ic tn a m ’, The J o u m a ì o f M iỉitary

H istory\ (7 1 ) Ja n u a ry 2 0 0 7 , 169-203.

[8] Crovvcll, L t ‘T h m k in g ab o u t th c V ictnam W a r’ (R e v ie w E ssay ), The J o u m a ỉ o f M ilitary History\ 6 0 ( A p n l 1996), 3 39-357.

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83 113