are currently operating through political and popular constitutionalism in all three areas, we conclude that Vietnam is presently moving in a direction that offers more prospects for con[r]
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DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3010724
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Trang 2Diverging Trends in the Socialist Constitutionalism
the two East Asian party-states have been pursuing increasingly distinctpaths towards the future Although history records that Vietnam has taken
pat-tern exists whereby some of Vietnam’s more independent moves occur
Fu Hualing, Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law; Jason Buhi, Visiting Assistant Professor, Peking University School of Transnational Law (Shenzhen) The authors would like to thank John Gillespie, Keith Hand, Andrew Harding, Pip Nicholson and Wang Chenguang for their comments on the earlier versions of this paper.
1
We assert that China has been growing more insular since the 18th Party Congress in
2012, while Vietnam has been trending more open since its 11th Party Congress in 2011.
Code During the 1940s, Chinese advisers shaped the stance of the Communist Party of Indochina For a compilation of various historical notes, see John Gillespie and Albert Chen, Legal Reforms in China and Vietnam: A Comparison of Asian Communist Regimes
Vuving, The Impact of China on Governance Structures in Vietnam (Bonn: German Development Institute, 2008).
3
Vietnam, like China, attempted a near-wholesale importation of the Soviet political-legal system but remained closer to Moscow upon the Sino-Soviet split in 1968 Relations deteriorated as the countries fought a border war in 1979 Deference reappeared in the
but the Vietnamese counterbalanced that with more internationalist initiatives after 1989,
Trang 3at such a geopolitically inspired crossroads right now, as China pursues
scale, the two systems invite comparison because they share common
appar-atuses are subordinate to the leadership of a communist party whosesupremacy is entrenched in the national constitution Both claim to becommitted to building a socialist rule of law that offers protection ofhuman rights, although the substance differs greatly from Western
trans-formations after liberalising policies under the banner of developing a
as many major laws were borrowed from or inspired by multilateral institutions in the
assistance of friends across the world, especially of the socialist and neighboring countries ’
from the new Constitution of 2013 Similar language was removed from the new Article 12
defence policy (i.e., having no formal military alliances, not allowing any foreign military bases
on Vietnamese territory, and not relying on other countries in combat operations) See Ankit
http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/after-hysy-981-a-u-s-vietnam-alliance.
5
6
The Preamble of the 1982 Constitution explicitly entrenches the leadership of the CCP
Viet-namese Constitution notes the leadership of the VCP, while Article 4 declares that the
constitution-socialist-republic-vietnam-amended-2013.
in Randall Peerenboom et al (eds.), Human Rights in Asia (London: Routledge, 2006); Sonya
Watch, available at www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/vietnam.
8
Both are middle income countries, although China is at the higher-middle end of the per capita income scale (USD 7,589) while Vietnam is at the lower-middle end (USD 2,052).
In terms of GDP per capita (nominal), China ranked 78/184 in 2014 with USD 7,589
Trang 4Noting these similarities, several comparative studies have been
international constitutional discourse and is therefore still open to opment Conventional liberal criticism of constitutional law in Leninist
not outline and establish a system that functions to constrain the realpolitical power of (or behind) the state, especially through an independ-
provi-sions are the decrees justifying the exercise of absolute political power by
If true, theChinese and Vietnamese constitutions are ineffective and inconsequen-tial Yet these critiques cannot explain why such meaningless consti-tutional provisions are robustly debated and frequently resorted to,with varying degrees of effectiveness, by aggrieved parties, both throughthe courts and on the streets, as discussed below
history demonstrates that once inspired there is little the people of China
Vietnam in 2014 was where China was in 2006 IMF ranking available at www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/compare?country=cn#coun try=cn:vnm.
Index (HDI) provides another apt comparison In 2013, China was ranked as a high development country with a HDI score of 719, while Vietnam was a middle development country with a score of 638 Once again, Vietnam in 2013 was about where China was in
tent/human-development-index-hdi.
9
See e.g., Gillespie and Chen, Legal Reforms in China and Vietnam; John Gillespie and Pip Nicholson, Asian Socialism and Legal Change: The Dynamics of Vietnamese and Chinese Reform (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2005); Teresa Wright, Accepting Authoritarianism:
The Transition from Socialism in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge versity Press, 2008); Dosch and Vuving, The Impact of China on Governance Structures in Vietnam.
Uni-10
‘Constitutions without Constitutionalism’, in Albert H Y Chen (ed.), Constitutionalism
in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
Trang 5or Vietnam cannot achieve The party-states, having codified normativerights, face credibility crises if they violate the peoples’ expectations byignoring those undertakings for too long Indeed, constitutional inter-pretation, enforcement and/or reform sometimes legitimately occur
consti-tutionalism (wherein citizens spontaneously assert ownership over stitutional interpretation and compel a dialogue and a settlement with
can be used to capture popular demands within the authoritarian system,the latter may be more worrisome to authoritarian rulers, as the spon-
demonstrating a nascent constitutional awareness among
declares goals to be achieved in the future, including a system of democratic political representation, as well as a wide range of political, social and economic rights Balme and Dowdle refer to China’s constitutionalism as ‘development potential, not developmental
Constitu-tionalism in China (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p 10.
Constituent Power and Fundamental Law [Zhi Xian Quan Yu Gen Ben Fa] (Beijing:
14
Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
Robert P George (eds.), Constitutional Politics: Essays on Constitution Making, Maintenance, and Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p 44; Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2004); Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defense of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Bui Ngoc
International Journal of Constitutional Law 950.
Trang 6the public outside of the party-states’ master plan.16
Inspired citizens areincreasingly usurping judicial roles by interpreting and implementingconstitutional rights through online mobilisations, peaceful vigils, reli-
demands have made constitutional supremacy a subject of lively
between party-state and society Indeed, a diverse range of legal and
consti-tutional studies concern the distribution and exercise of political power,then research on the Chinese and Vietnamese constitutions must venture
The failure to exploresuch avenues is fatal to an academic understanding of different nationalgovernance schemes, comparative scholarship generally and, specifically,
to the aspirations of citizens and reformers in socialist states who seek todevelop ties to mainstream constitutional discourse
This Chapter provides an overview to a comparative study of Sino–Vietnamese comparative constitutionalism by exploring the bases ofthree core substantive pillars of socialist constitutionalism: insistence
on Party leadership, reliance on socialist rule of law and adaptation topopulism After considering several examples of how constitutional rules
16
Engage the Constitution: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Constitutional Review Proposals
‘Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy: Problem or Paradigm?’ (2005)
19 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 185, 204.
constitutions are the supreme law of the land (Art 5, 1982 Chinese Constitution; Arts 4,8,9, 2013 Vietnamese Constitution), but the lack of rigorous judicial enforcement does not necessarily mean the constitution is an empty letter.
19
Judicial enforcement is obviously preferable as it is more transparent, structured and formal; political and popular constitutionalism are both characterised by opacity and informal trade-offs, while popular constitutionalism can be informal or occasionally
20
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1542463 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.1542463, 41.
Trang 7are currently operating through political and popular constitutionalism
in all three areas, we conclude that Vietnam is presently moving in adirection that offers more prospects for convergence with international
tolerant of civil society than its Chinese counterpart That being the case,
we predict that, for the foreseeable future, Vietnam will likely continue todepart from the increasingly insular Chinese model of constitutionaldevelopment
6.2 Leadership of the Communist Parties
At a foundational level, there have been few structural changes to theauthoritarian Chinese and Vietnamese party-state constitutional orders,
in spite of the pervasive social and economic reforms of the last three
Party leadership is a prime directive consistently entrenched in boththe Chinese and Vietnamese national constitutions, clearly declared intheir respective Preambles and core text The respective Chinese Com-munist Party (CCP) and the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) mon-
centralism and prohibit threatening discourse
Though Party leadership cannot be changed through any legal means,the organisation of that power is significantly different in China andVietnam While decisive and effective implementation characterisesboth countries, the Vietnamese party-state is presently more open to
Chi Minh Thought, calling for a tripartite separation of powers and guaranteeing
K W Taylor and John K Whitmore (eds.), Essays into Vietnamese Pasts (Ithaca, NY:
23
Article 4 of the Vietnam Constitution (2013) makes the party the vanguard and tative not only of the Vietnamese working class, but of the whole Vietnamese people and nation, further narrowing the legal space to exercise the right to pluralistic and freely contested elections Article 65 follows the government lead in enshrining a new legal
Trang 8constructive debate within the Party forum, as evinced by having morediffuse executive authorities and a more competitive selection process formembership in its Central Committee.
Indeed, both nations feature a party-state that operates on the basis ofdemocratic centralism This ensures a decisive decision-making process,
implemen-tation is swift, owing in part to a denial of separation of powers and a lack
of mechanisms through which formal checks and balances can be
defined by international institutions – simply measures whether a regime
effectiveness is a necessary condition for successful constitutional and legalreform, as strong leaders in the Confucian tradition are well positioned fornation-building, demonstrated by the cases of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan
effective states have strong institutions to rely upon and competent
becomes a question of political values and will
24
As the 2014 Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Promoting the Rule of Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding] explains, China will not admit any separation of powers and will not tolerate any institution to have a veto on the Party ’s decisions English translation and Chinese original available at https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/ 10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehen sively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/.
25
of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implemen-
https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/ge.pdf.
p 335.
28
meas-ures governance ability via six indicators: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control
of corruption China and Vietnam performed the best in government effectiveness
Trang 9It is perhaps on those bases that several meaningful and consequentialdifferences between the political designs of the two party-states isemerging Since the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, the CCP has dem-onstrated a much higher concentration of political power in the hands of
a smaller number of men, while the VCP has demonstrated signs ofpolitical diffusion, splitting into contesting blocs As a result, the nascentchecks and balances within the Vietnamese system are more apparent.Former Chinese President Hu Jintao found the trend so disturbing that
he felt compelled to issue an internal Party document:
criticis[ing] the Vietnamese authorities for moving ‘too quickly toward inner-party democracy’, even warning that a destabilising Mikhail Gorbachev-like figure could come to power The CCP also banned public discussion of Vietnam’s reforms, deploying party intellectuals to argue publicly against such a political development in China.29
This fear likely emanates from the fact that developments in Vietnamindicate the emergence of more political constitutionalism, as there ismore intra-party democracy in the VCP than the CCP
At the level of elite politics, the commanding heights of Vietnam’sparty-state feature a broader policy-making coalition involving more
unify command of the party-state: President of the State, General tary of the CCP and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Thatmakes the officeholder, now Xi Jinping, incredibly powerful Meanwhile,
income country, Vietnam clearly outperformed other similarly situated countries in
improve World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, Government Effectiveness, available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc.
Com-munism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p 238.
30
Compara-tive Politics 409.
Trang 10in Vietnam, the posts are separate: the Prime Minister, the President andthe General Secretary of the VCP are separate positions held by separate
conser-vative faction at the 12th National Congress of the VCP in 2016, politicalobservers indicate that those three individuals can and have represented
Power is also more diffuse throughout the legislative organs of theVietnamese party-state For example, the ultimate political power inChina rests in the CCP Politburo (twenty-five members before October2018) and especially its Standing Committee (currently seven members,down from nine in 2013), with the Central Committee (205 full members
2,987 representatives of the National People’s Congress, that is a total ofroughly 3,395 representatives for 1.3 billion people, each representing435,000 souls In Vietnam, the 150-strong VCP Central Committee hasbeen grappling for power with the smaller Standing Committee (fifteenmembers), while the state’s National Assembly contains 498 members.That amounts to roughly 660 people presiding over 90 million souls, orone representative for every 136,000 people
The VCP’s broader Central Committee has been a relevant decisionmaker since the demise of General Secretary Le Duan in 1986, with someclaiming that it is superior to a Standing Committee that has been
Indeed, that Central Committeehas grabbed attention for an ability, though rarely manifested, to reject
The Central Committee’s apparent power was demonstrated in October
2012, when it reversed a Politburo decision initiated by General SecretaryNguyễn Phuˊ Tr
_
ong to discipline Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng for
_
ong’srecommendation of two persons to the Politburo in May 2013, opting
Nguyen Phu Trong; and the Prime Minister is Nguyen Tan Dung.
Trang 11for its own favoured candidates.37 Another unprecedented vote of noconfidence for twenty top party officials was overcome by Prime Minister
Meanwhile,across the divide, senior members of the National Assembly have boldly
should adopt a bicameral legislature, with the National Assembly serving
While corruption, patronage and factional politics are common issuesfacing both the CCP and VCP, power is much more centralised in theCCP, where political competition is much less visible
While what we know of these events clearly suggests significantinternal power struggles, this broader coalition enables wider political
China There is, for example, no formal, competitive procedure forjoining Politburo or the Standing Committee in China, and the rejectionrate of nominees to the ceremonial Central Committee is only between
4 to 8 per cent However, in Vietnam, the gap between nominatedcandidates and elected members in the Central Committee is 23 per cent
of decision makers composed of more representative competing factionscan produce different political consequences and so, in Vietnam, thepolitical process appears relatively more open, more representative ofdiverse interests and potentially more accountable to the larger society
competi-tion make the VCP more accountable, both horizontally and vertically,
effect in making the atmosphere surrounding legal processes more parent There has been more competition between the Party and thestate, and disagreements among different state organisations can beopenly manifested In one famous case, the Vietnamese police promul-
2015, available at system/.
Trang 12Hanoi government suspended registration of motorcycles in some of the
The restriction inspired deep hostility and resistance
and public debate over constitutional property rights The Hanoi ernment and the police held their ground, but the Ministry of Justice andNational Assembly eventually threatened legal challenges, forcing them
In contrast, CCP elites are more monopolistic and retain more sive and institutionalised control over state apparatuses, even overridingstate organs in making and implementing decisions The CCP is deeplyembedded in government departments, and exercises routine political
groups’, which cut across any perceived boundary between Party and
Chinese state organs, and are increasingly asserting political control in
There also appears to be a stronger political will for, and deeper
Vietnamese chose to ratify a new constitution in 2013, rather than amendthe old During the debates, the National Assembly took a strong position
final decision against its adoption, elements of Vietnamese society took a rich discussion of constitutional review that advanced the concept
under-of building such an independent constitutional adjudication forum quite
43
Vietnam-NetBridge, 21 February 2013, available at http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/ 66904/vietnam-will-have-constitutional-council-or-constitutional-court-.html; Vietnam
news.vn/in-bai/240346/na-deputies-discuss-constitutional-council.htm.
Trang 13far.49To date, the only known comparable example in China was for aretired Chief Justice to call for the creation of a similar institution at a
The CCP largely associates such suggestions asheresies associated with colour revolutions, to be perpetrated by Western
be liberalising its perspective on consultation, input and debate since
2013, China has opted to go in the opposite direction, rendering the
Intriguingly, the Vietnamese are currently debating procedural rulesboth for holding public demonstrations and voting in referendums Theformer is meant to actualise a limited and issue-specific freedom toassemble granted in article 25 and has been boosted by recent nationalist
the right to vote in a referendum to any person over eighteen years old in
was broadcast live on national radio and TV, drew great attention from voters around the
50
news/NewsFullText.aspx?NewsId=70635&NewsType=0.
51
According to Hand, one of the main reasons not to introduce a constitutional committee
constitutional committee will further generate citizen activism and offer a forum for
Supervision Models and Prospects for a Constitutional Supervision Committee in China:
discussion, commonly referred to as seven prohibitions It is telling that the Party
‘Document No 9: The Party Attacks Western Democratic Ideals,’ Wall Street Journal China Real Time Report, 27 August 2013.
53
Dang Ngoc Tung, president of the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor, and Tran Thi Quoc Khanh, a Hanoi deputy, also said they agreed with the suggestion that the Bill on
Trang 14any referendum declared by the National Assembly (article 70) andorganised by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly (article74) Although there have not been any referendums to date, the matterwas warmly debated at a series of three conferences in 2015, including bylegal academics and members of the Ho Chi Minh City Bar Associ-
move would be a remarkable leap in socialist constitutional development
People’s mastery’ (article 2) and assist the VCP in developing ‘close tieswith the People’, ‘submitting to People’s supervision’, and assure that the
In any event, it is probable that the Central Committee will continue toaggregate power after the upcoming 12th National Congress in 2016 ifDũng ascends to Party Chairman and the Central Committee can defendand maintain its ability to conduct confidence votes on top party officials
In concert, these developments indicate that the VCP appears to berelatively more open-minded and pluralistic in its exercise of politicalpower within its authoritarian context, rendering its current state of
6.3 Commitment to Socialist Rule of Law
Both China and Vietnam advocate the development of a so-called ist rule of law Since shedding their totalitarian approach decades ago,both parties have been more reluctant to exercise naked political power.They instead resort to legal institutions to manage and coordinate mas-sive socioeconomic transitions and maintain credibility Legal reform
social-in authoritarian states is a contradictory process, however, because itcan generate tremendous societal demand for individual rights and
28354/lawmakers-want-law-on-demonstrations-to-be-passed-next-year.
paper to the government focused on narrowing substantive matters capable of sion to referendum Foreign speakers from Sweden, Canada, and the United States presented alternative views, and the chairman announced that twenty sample referendum
55
Trang 15government accountability Thus, while the party-states employ law toachieve certain objectives, they attempt to limit legal reform so as to
proceeding in a more internationalist fashion, however, as it has been
human rights
What comprises socialist rule of law is the subject of much debate.What classifies the Chinese and Vietnamese orders as ‘socialist’, perhapsmore than anything else, is their self-identification; what separates themmost obviously from European models is their Leninist political struc-ture Leninism includes a doctrine positing that vanguard communist
completely discern and represent their common interest As Nathan put
of interests’ which makes democracy and accountability redundant and
of this doctrine in China and Vietnam during the period of economicreform, which was accompanied by the surfacing of diverse, pluralisticsocial interests Having recognised the perennial existence of socialconflict, the parties must design rules and institutions to manage andpreserve harmony Both the CCP and the VCP have managed develop-ments in response to complex socioeconomic circumstances and, as aresult, there have been visible expansions or contractions of constitu-
The main thread of constitutional change has been an emphasis on therule of law and individual rights in promoting social and economicdevelopment In China, significant constitutional amendments includethe recognition of the privately-owned economy in 1988, the promotion
of rule of law and construction of a socialist state of rule of law in 1999,
Committee’s Fourth Plenum in 2014 recommitted China to further
Constitution of 2013 contains significantly more phrasing of substantive