The political economy of confict in south asia

Katada editors THE FINANCIAL STATECRAFT OF EMERGING POWERS Shield and Sword in Asia and Latin America Md Mizanur Rahman, Tan Tai Yong, Ahsan Ullah editors MIGRANT REMITTANCES I

The Pol i i cal Economy of

Mat t hew J Webb and Al ber t Wi j eweer a

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The Political Economy of

Conflict in South Asia

Editorial matter, selection, introduction and conclusion © Matthew J Webb and Albert Wijeweera 2015

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Matthew J Webb and Albert Wijeweera

2 The Economics of Conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tract

Syed Serajul Islam

3 The ‘Political Economy’ of Sikh Separatism: Ethnic Identity,

Federalism and the Distortions of Post-Independence Agrarian

Jugdep S Chima

4 The Political Economy of the Ethno-nationalist Uprising in

Farhan Hanif Siddiqi

5 Nepal’s Protracted Transition: Explaining the Continuing

Pramod K Kantha

6 India’s Indigenization of Military Aircraft Design and

Manufacturing: Towards a Fifth-Generation Fighter 93

Michael B Charles and Elisabeth Sinnewe

7 The Political Economy of Pakistan’s ‘War on Terror’ 114

Howard Brasted and Zahid Shahab Ahmed

8 Terrorist Activities and Financial Market Performance:

Albert Wijeweera

9 Greed, Grievance and Violent Separatism in South Asia 149

Matthew J Webb

10 The Himalayan Ranges, Glaciers, Lakes and Rivers: An

International Ecological, Economic and Military Outlook 171

Lavanya Vemsani

11 Defence, Security and the Economy in South Asian

Christos Kollias and Stephanos Papadamou

12 A Survival Analysis of the Onset of Peace in South Asia 211

Ali C Tasiran and Zainab Kazim Ali

Matthew J Webb and Albert Wijeweera

12.1 Non-parametric Kaplan–Meier survival functions

12.2 Non-parametric Kaplan–Meier survival functions

of the termination of Asian wars 221

Tables

4.1 Employment of Balochistan-domiciled persons in

gas-producing and distribution companies 70 6.1 Current products of Hindustan Aeronautics

6.2 Potential Indian air power in 2025 107 7.1 Costs of war in Pakistan 2001–2014 128 8.1 Summary statistics of major variables for

terrorist-related incidents in Sri Lanka 1986–2009 142 8.2 Test for ARCH effects in analysis of terrorist-related

8.3 Results of GARCH(1,1) model in analysis of

terrorist-related incidents in Sri Lanka 144 11.1 Comparative development indices for South Asian

11.2 Comparative development indices for South Asian

states vis-à-vis regional averages 194 11.3 Military manpower in South Asia 1989–2010 197 11.4 The defence burden in South Asia 1988–2010 199 11.5 Variance decomposition results used in the analysis of

defence spending of South Asian states 203

12.1 Wars by location and length 217 12.2 Ordered spells and durations of Asian wars 219 12.3 Distribution of Asian wars by termination type 220 12.4 Descriptive statistics of variables for all Asian wars 222 12.5 Cox proportional model estimates for all outcomes

us to several other authors who kindly agreed to do the same Others who assisted through their encouragement and support include Hamad Karki, Mark Hayman, Brian Bielenberg, Gwyn Rees and Stephen Levine The volume is lovingly dedicated to Sayuri, Jamie and Mia Webb, and Nandani, Chandana and Saduni Wijeweera

Notes on Contributors

Zahid Shahab Ahmed is Head of the Department of Peace and Conflict

Studies & IR at Centre for International Peace & Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST) in Islamabad He received his PhD in Political and International Studies from the University of New

England (UNE), Armidale (Australia) He has an MA in Peace Education from the United Nations Mandated University for Peace (Costa Rica),

and an MA in Sociology from the University of Agriculture Faisalabad (Pakistan) For over a decade, he has been publishing on a range of issues, especially relating to peace and development in South Asia He is

the author of Regionalism and Regional Security in South Asia: The Case of SAARC (2013)

Zainab Kazim Ali is Senior Lecturer at Middlesex University She has a

PhD in Mathematics from the University of Manchester Her main ests are the determinants of wars and problems related to Pakistan In addition, she has conducted research into Hausdorff and Box Dimension

inter-of fractals with disjoint projections as well as Dynamical Systems

Howard Brasted is Professor of History in the School of Humanities and

Director of the Asia Pacific Centre at the University of New England His interest in South Asia began at Edinburgh University where he embarked

on a PhD in 1968 researching Irish connections with India From 1972

to 1973 he taught units on British and Indian history at Edinburgh University before moving to UNE in 1974 From 1984 he became actively involved in the promotion of South Asia Studies in Australia as he took

on the joint roles of Secretary of the South Asian Studies Association

of Australia (1984–2002) and Editor of South Asia (1984–2001),

posi-tions which he held for almost 20 years Having published widely on a range of topics from Indian nationalism to labour standards in Asia, he currently researches in the field of contemporary Islam and coordinates

a postgraduate programme in Islamic studies

Michael B Charles is currently a member of the Southern Cross Business

School, located within Southern Cross University (Gold Coast Campus, Queensland), where he is also the School’s Higher Degree Research Director Michael completed his PhD at the University of Queensland in

2003 on a theme pertaining to military policy in the ancient world and

has written extensively on military topics Before joining Southern Cross University in 2007, he lectured in international business (Asia Pacific and the European Union) at Queensland University of Technology, where he also received a master’s degree in International Business Studies Among his many duties, he currently teaches a unit on the broader Asia Pacific business environment His current research covers many divergent fields, but mainly includes research on transport, energy and environ-mental policy, public values and infrastructures, systems in transition, military history, and classics and ancient history He also maintains a keen interest in science and technology policy

Jugdep S Chima is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Hiram

College Previously he was a Lecturer in the Department of Political

Science at the University of California , Berkeley and Associate Editor

for South Asia with Asian Survey He is the author of The Sikh Separatist Insurgency in India: Political Leadership and Ethnonationalist Movements (2010) His previous research has appeared in Asian Survey , Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics , Review of International Studies , Small Wars & Insurgencies , and Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

Syed Serajul Islam is Chair and Distinguished Professor of the

Department of Political Science of Lakehead University , Canada,

recipient of Lakehead University’s Distinguished Researcher Award (2008) and Distinguished Instructor Award (2009) and a past recipient

of an American Fulbright Fellowship He received his PhD from McGill

University and has taught at the University of Dhaka , McGill University

and in the US, Malaysia, Singapore and other countries He has published nine books and nearly 80 refereed research articles and is a member of the editorial board of several international journals

Pramod K Kantha is Associate Professor of Political Science at Wright

State University , Dayton, Ohio He teaches courses on Politics of Developing Nations, Politics of Nationalism, Democratic Transitions and Politics of South Asia Kantha’s PhD dissertation was on partisan compe-tition and democratic transitions in India, Nepal and Pakistan He has published extensively on Pakistan, India and Nepal His latest publica-tions include the book chapters ‘Maoist-Madhesi Dynamics and Nepal’s

Peace Process’ in Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, Revolution in the Twenty-First Century (2009) and ‘Corruption, Governance in South Asia’ in Corruption

in Comparative Perspective (2012) and Nepal and Bhutan in 2013 (2014)

Christos Kollias is Professor of Applied Economics at the Department of

Economics, University of Thessaly , Greece He currently serves as Editor

of Defence and Peace Economics , as an Associate Editor of The Economics

of Peace and Security Journal and as member of the editorial board of the International Journal of Economic Sciences and Applied Research He has

published papers on topics of defence economics, arms races, terrorism, public economics and economic policy in a number of journals and collected volumes

Stefanos Papadamou is Assistant Professor of Economics of Money

& Banking at the Department of Economics, University of Thessaly , Greece He holds an MSc from the University of York , UK, and a PhD from the University of Macedonia , Greece His research interests are mainly focused in the economics of money and banking During 1999–

2003 he was CEO of the brokerage company Finaccor Analysis His work

has been published in journals such as Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting , International Review of Economics & Finance , European Journal of Political Economy , Economic Modelling , Southern Economic Journal , Journal

of Economics and Business , International Journal of Finance and Economics , Applied Financial Economics , Applied Economic Letters , and Defense and Peace Economics

Farhan Hanif Siddiqi is Research Fellow at the Middle East Research

Institute (MERI) in Erbil, Iraq Prior to joining MERI he was Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University

of Karachi He specialises in ethnicity and nationalism and is the author

of The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements (2012)

Elisabeth Sinnewe currently holds a postdoctoral research fellowship

at Southern Cross Business School following the award of her PhD in

2013 and her master’s degree in Professional Accounting in 2009 Before joining Southern Cross University as Teaching Fellow in 2009, Elisabeth held several finance-related positions in Germany and Canada following the completion of her bachelor’s degree at RheinMain University of Applied Science in Wiesbaden, where she majored in accounting/finance and economics While her main research focus firmly lies in the accounting and finance domain, she has a strong interest in broader international economic matters, particularly with respect to the South-East Asian area

Ali C Tasiran is Senior Lecturer at Middlesex University and Professor

of Statistics at Birkbeck College , London University He is currently working at the Middle East Technical University Northern Cyprus Campus (METU NCC) and has a PhD in Econometrics from Gothenburg

University His main interests are in the determinants of wars and the Global Peace Index

Lavanya Vemsani is Distinguished Professor of Asian History and

Religious Studies at Shawnee State University , Portsmouth, Ohio She has also taught in the School of Social Sciences in the Department of Religious Studies, and Comparative Literature at McMaster University

(Hamilton, ON) and St Thomas University (Fredericton, NB) in Canada

She graduated from Osmania University , Hyderabad, India with an MA and went on to complete two doctorates in history and religious studies (from the University of Hyderabad , India and McMaster University ) Her research interests include Hinduism, Jainism and other popular religions

of India, early modern women in India, the early history of India and classical and modern literature of India

Albert Wijeweera is Senior Lecturer in finance in the Southern Cross

Business School at Southern Cross University , Gold Coast, Australia He has a PhD in economics from the University of Tennessee and an MSc in quantitative finance from the University of London His career history

includes positions with the University of New England , The Petroleum Institute , Abu Dhabi and the University of Peradeniya , Sri Lanka He

has extensive experience in conducting applied econometrics research

and his recent publications have appeared in Applied Economics , Applied Financial Economics , Global Economy Journal , Journal of Developing Areas , Applied Economics Letters and Defence and Peace Economics

Matthew J Webb is Assistant Professor of Politics at the Petroleum

Institute , Abu Dhabi He has a PhD from the Australian National University , an MEd from Charles Sturt University , an MPPM from Monash University and an MA from Victoria University of Wellington

He is a fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland and of the Royal Society of Arts , a member of the editorial board of

Defence and Peace Economics and has taught at universities in New

Zealand, Australia, Japan and the United Arab Emirates His research interests include the normative and explanatory dimensions of violent separatism in South Asia, especially Kashmir, and the effects of military spending on South Asian economies He has been a frequent visitor to

the subcontinent since 1991, is the author of Kashmir’s Right to Secede (2012) and has published in a range of journals including South Asia , Contemporary South Asia , Global Economy Journal , Defense and Security Analysis and Defense and Peace Economics

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1

Introduction

Matthew J Webb and Albert Wijeweera

The costs of conflict

South Asia comprises the states of Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bhutan, Pakistan, Nepal and Afghanistan It is an area of enor-mous opportunity, staggering diversity but also pervasive poverty and instability Home to 1.64 billion people – roughly 24 per cent of the world’s population – South Asia is an important and emerging market that has averaged an impressive rate of real GDP growth of six per cent over the last 20 years (International Labor Organization, 2013) The region’s economic importance is heightened by its geographical posi-tion adjacent to China and South East Asia and astride trade routes between these markets and those of Africa and Europe Consequently,

it is unsurprising that the rest of the world has started to wake up and take notice of the region, particularly following the 2008 global finan-cial crisis when emerging markets in Asia and Latin America were looked

to as the engine rooms of global economic growth While the economies

of North America and Europe languished with high levels of debt, low

or negative growth and spiralling unemployment, the economies of Asia and the Pacific experienced an economic renaissance with impressive rates of economic growth and investment This led some to speculate about the relative decline of Western economic and political dominance and the advent of an ‘Asian century’ which, for many, meant a Chinese century However, as growth in China has slowed, and old enmities and competing territorial claims have threatened regional stability in Northeast Asia, attention has recently refocused on the economies of South Asia and their significance to the global economic order

Indeed, after East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia experienced the fastest economic growth of any region in the last decade A recent

World Bank (2012) report addressing South Asia’s remarkable economic progress highlighted the region’s high rates of employment growth (800,000 jobs were created every month between 2000 and 2010) and increasing intra-regional trade flows (intra-regional imports and exports

as a percentage of overall trade increased by 4.4 per cent in the 2006–

2009 period) However, despite this impressive progress and South Asia’s growing importance to the global economy, a disconcerting array of contradictions and weaknesses threaten to derail its rise to prominence The same World Bank report summarized the region’s challenges as: high rates of poverty (South Asia has the world’s largest concentration of poor and more than 500 million people live on less than US$1.25 a day); food insecurity (more than 330 million people are under-nourished); rising economic inequality and gender imbalances (South Asia accounts for more than 50 per cent of the world’s missing girls); high sovereign debt ratios as a percentage of GDP (more than 60 per cent in 2010); poor governance (all South Asian states experience high levels of corruption and poor service delivery); energy shortages; and rising inflation

Not included within this list, but nonetheless a major determinant

of South Asia’s economic potential, are the effects of military conflict Much of the recent attention focused on South Asia has been in conse-quence of the American-led involvement in Afghanistan and subsequent efforts by the international community to transform it from a failed state However, conflict in a variety of guises has been an important variable in the economic development of all the states that make up South Asia Sharing a common political heritage as former possessions, outposts or allies of the British Empire, the formation and development

of South Asian states have been marked by numerous wars, rebellions and attempted secessions The 1947 partition of the sub-continent, in which an estimated twelve million people were displaced and at least several hundred thousand killed, marked the birth of modern-day India and Pakistan but not the end of the religious tensions that precipitated this momentous event An enduring legacy of bitterness and rivalry saw a further partition in 1971 with the creation of Bangladesh and on-going conflict that has resulted in India and Pakistan fighting four wars in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 Furthermore, with the exception

of the Maldives and Bhutan, the states of South Asia have also faced sustained and violent internal rebellions From the separatist campaign

in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tract region to the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, Maoist uprising in Nepal, Baloch separatism in Pakistan and a myriad of separatist and ideologically inspired insurgencies in India, the territorial integrity and viability of the states of South Asia have been

severely tested These internal conflicts have been exacerbated by the intersection of regional rivalries with sub-national demands for political reform as neighbouring states sought strategic advantage through inter-ference in each other’s domestic affairs For example, India provided significant assistance to rebels in East Pakistan to facilitate the creation

of Bangladesh, as well as Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka, and is accused by Pakistan of also abetting unrest amongst its Baloch and Mohajir popula-tions India, for its part, charges Pakistan with having trained, funded and equipped separatists in Punjab and Kashmir and has joined many other states in questioning the nature and extent of Pakistan’s involve-ment with Islamic extremist groups, such as the Taliban

This brings us to the topic of this book – the relationship between conflict and economics in South Asia Conflict – both domestic and inter-state – has been recognized as exerting a negative economic effect, with one study that analysed data from 1960–1999 suggesting that states that experienced civil war experienced an annual 2.4 percentage point decline in their GDP growth rate (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003)

In the case of South Asia, states have allocated increasing resources to defence spending from US$23 billion in 1988 to US$60.2 billion in

2013 when measured in constant 2011 US dollars, with India’s spending accounting for US$47.3 billion of this total (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013) Indeed, the military occupies a dispro-portionately large segment of central government spending in South Asian states, estimated at ten per cent in Afghanistan and Bangladesh,

15 per cent in India and Sri Lanka and 18 per cent in Pakistan This is compared to a relatively meagre 3.2 per cent in conflict-affected states worldwide (World Bank, 2011) Moreover, South Asia suffers a higher degree of human loss in comparison to other conflict-affected regions because of the number of conflicts it experiences as well as their length and severity In 2008 four South Asian states (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka) were amongst the top ten states in the world that experienced direct deaths from armed conflict (Iyer and Santos, 2012) Similarly, in 2009 approximately 20,000 people in South Asia died directly as a consequence of armed conflict – more than a third of the worldwide figure for that year (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010)

In addition to direct government expenditure and loss of life, the heavily militarized and conflict-affected states of South Asia suffer from other economic maladies including high levels of government indebt-edness, low tax revenues and high dependency on foreign aid (Iyer and Santos, 2012) that combine with the consequences of conflict to cast a

pall over the region’s future Of particular concern is the nexus between economic under-development and continued conflict, and the mutu-ally reinforcing effect that each exerts upon the other evidenced by the frequently pursued strategy of inflicting economic harm to win conces-sions from opponents Separatists and other state opponents frequently engage in tactics such as the destruction of government offices, killing

of state employees and targeting of infrastructure in an attempt to reduce the state’s ability to collect revenue while also imposing a direct financial cost through the destruction of property and investments The damage wrought by the suicide attack on the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in 1996 by Tamil insurgents, for example, extended beyond the 41 Central Bank employees killed in the attack to the paralysis of Sri Lanka’s financial system for months afterwards Indeed, the direct economic costs of conflict exist in addition to the human costs that can also have knock-on economic effects through, for example, lives lost, able-bodied workers permanently disabled, property destroyed, reduced investment, misallocation of government resources from essential serv-ices to less-productive sectors, diminished job opportunities, forced migration and environmental degradation However, rather than dimin-ishing the scale or costs of conflict by weakening an opponent’s ability

to continue hostilities and raising the opportunity costs of doing so, attacks on economic infrastructure frequently have the opposite effect

as economic and political life are increasingly militarized and violence escalated

The economics of conflict

Economics – or the study of the consequences of choices made concerning the production, distribution and consumption of scarce resources – is relevant not only to the consequences of conflict in South Asia, but also its causes By shedding light on the motives and decisions of elites and ordinary participants to engage in violence, economic analyses may significantly assist in understanding the causes of conflict This is because many of the costs and benefits of conflict are foreseeable, measurable and, therefore, subject to calculations of rational self-interest States and other actors do not precipitate, enter into or continue a violent conflict without some consideration of the potential risks and rewards of doing

so Arms are purchased, positions staked out, threats and ultimatums issued and violence enjoined for a reason In addition, once the die is cast and the consequences – intended or otherwise – begin to accrue, then the effect upon the willingness of actors to continue or de-/escalate

a conflict may be profound Even disputes motivated by primarily economic considerations – for example, the resource-poor territory of Kashmir that is coveted by India and Pakistan primarily for its strategic and ideological significance – may produce economic consequences capable of affecting the conflict’s trajectory and balance of power in the wider region In summary, regardless of the underlying motiva-tions, decisions to engage in, continue or end a conflict are amenable to economic analysis

Despite the utility of economic inquiry to understanding the causes and consequences of conflict, scholarship on the economic dimensions

of conflict in South Asia has been remarkably sparse in comparison to other regions Africa, for example, has been widely studied and provides

an interesting context in which to examine the relationship between conflict and development given the contrasting economies of the region that include both resource rich and poor states as well as numerous examples of states (e.g., Mozambique, Angola and Uganda) that appear

to have ‘turned the corner’ by ending seemingly intractable wars and embarking on programmes of economic development and moderniza-tion In contrast, perhaps because South Asia’s economic significance has only recently become apparent and many of its conflicts continue

to appear intractable, examination of the economic dimensions of conflict in the sub-continent has been much more limited While some areas of study, such as the economic dimensions of India and Pakistan’s nuclear arms race, have received considerable attention (e.g., Dittmer, 2005; Ganguly and Kapur, 2010), there is generally a dearth of economic analysis of conflict in South Asia, particularly of a kind that ties sub-national (micro) drivers of conflict to broader, national and regional (macro) factors This is despite the role of economic considerations in ending two of the most bloody and enduring conflicts in South Asia

in Sri Lanka and Nepal; economic and military assistance from China were significant factors in the Sri Lankan government’s victory over Tamil separatists, while addressing economic grievances were crucial to convincing Nepal’s Maoists to disarm

conflict including regional and (sub-)state perspectives The varied and multi-dimensional character of conflict in South Asia requires a broad perspective that includes non-/state actors, inter-/intra-state conflicts and rebellions versus secessions – all of which are addressed within the volume In addition, we have attempted to strike a balance between specificity and generality by including a range of studies that focus on particular instances of conflict and their economic antecedents and consequences in detail, while complementing these with other analyses that take a wider, national and regional perspective The selection of a suitable theoretical approach was a more vexing Given the multi-di-mensional character of conflict in South Asia, a plurality of theoretical approaches is required to say anything of substantive importance on the topic Different instances of the same type of conflict frequently exhibit dissimilar characteristics and have widely divergent causes and effects For example, the dynamics, causes and trajectories of sub-state political mobilization and rebellion are significantly distinct from those that characterize inter-state conflict and geo-strategic rivalry At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that sub-state conflict

in South Asia is frequently tied to, and cannot be addressed in isolation from, national and regional contexts Consider, for example, the assist-ance given to separatist movements in neighbouring states as a strategic tool to achieve regional dominance discussed earlier, or the imagery of

an Islamic caliphate stretching from the Middle East to South East Asia that serves as a powerful recruiting tool for Islamic extremists as well as those who oppose its creation Just as broader ideological and national objectives are frequently played out on a local stage, the agendas of ethnic and religious sub-groups are also influenced by national decision-making in an iterative and constantly emergent process

Nonetheless, we recognized early on that something more than geographical proximity and the assumptions of rational self-interest that characterize economic analysis would be required as a conceptual thread

to link the constituent chapters of the volume together After much eration, we settled on the inclusion of a variety of mainstream approaches centred on several recurrent themes arranged in ascending order of scope Accordingly, the volume begins with analyses of sub-state conflicts in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tract, the Indian state of Punjab, Pakistan’s province of Balochistan and the Maoist uprising in Nepal Collectively these analyses challenge the twin dichotomies – greed versus grievance and primordialist versus situationalist – that have come to dominate the scholarly literature on explanatory theories of sub-state violence State-wide analysis is provided in the subsequent three chapters addressing

delib-attempts to indigenize Indian defence production, the economic sions of the ‘War on Terror’ in Pakistan and financial consequences of terror attacks in Sri Lanka during that country’s bloody, three decade long civil war Finally, the scope is widened in the remaining four chap-ters to a regional focus that examines the role of diaspora in some of South Asia’s separatist campaigns of violence, the environmental conse-quences of development and conflict in the Himalayan ranges, econo-metric analyses of the effects of military spending in South Asia and why wars there are so prolonged and destructive

Chapter 2, by Syed Serajul Islam, examines post-independence opment in Bangladesh which, because of its relative homogeneity, was expected to exhibit little domestic violent conflict Contrary to expectations, however, economic strategy became a battleground issue between the ruling elites that, when coupled with ideological strug-gles over national identity, outstanding grievances from the country’s

devel-1971 war of independence, Islamic radicalism and other issues, exerted

a considerably negative economic effect and undermined national unity Examining the inter-play of economic and political factors while assessing the effects of government policy, Islam takes a critical look at the causes of violent separatism in the Chittagong Hill Tract region and rejects simplistic primordialist accounts that attribute the conflict to the distinct ethno-cultural identity of the region’s inhabitants Instead,

he argues, while ethnic and cultural diversity are important to standing the conflict, they acquired their significance in consequence of political and economic neglect and mismanagement

This multifaceted approach to separatist violence is continued in Chapter 3 where Jugdep S Chima turns our focus westward to the Indian state of Punjab which experienced a particularly bloody sepa-ratist insurgency from the mid-1980s to 1990s Focussing on agricul-tural reforms and their effects upon Punjab’s disproportionately rural economy, Chima examines the effects of these changes upon political mobilization, the prevailing economic class system and their salience

to understanding the separatist violence that continues to plague India Amongst the factors identified as responsible for the conflict are a rise

of the economies of scale necessary for profitable farming, lopsided government policies that over-emphasized agricultural output and the fusion of these and other economic factors with calls for political decentralization Consequently, argues Chima, satisfactorily accounting for Punjab’s descent into violence requires a hybrid approach that cuts across conceptual divisions between explanatory theories that empha-size rational self-interest (greed) and remedial justice (grievance)

The intersection of issues pertaining to economic development with political and ethnic factors to foment separatist violence is continued

in Chapters 4 and 5 In Chapter 4, Farhan Hanif Siddiqi invites us to consider the contrast between Balochistan’s fabulous natural wealth, on the one hand, and its lack of social and economic development, frac-tious tribal structure and troubled relationship with Pakistan’s govern-ment, on the other Arguing that perceived inequities in the distribution

of benefits from the exploitation of these resources fuelled popular resentment at official maladministration and neglect to provoke separa-tist sentiments, Siddiqi presents a detailed examination of Balochistan’s tribal politics to emphasize the essential role of economic factors in understanding the conflict This hybrid approach that examines how economic and political factors interact to foment conflict, while also holding the promise of an end to violence, is continued in Chapter 5

by Pramod Kantha Investigating the reasons behind Nepal’s current political deadlock – a legacy of a long-running Maoist insurgency from

1996 to 2006 in which grievances pertaining to economic opment played an important causal role – Kantha highlights how polit-ical, economic and ethnic factors have frustrated a stable and enduring settlement to Nepal’s crisis Although the conflict has officially ended, domestic stability has been elusive with a failure by Nepal’s Constituent Assembly to write a new constitution and its subsequent dissolution in

under-devel-2012 By examining the linkages between economic and political factors Kantha highlights the often self-fulfilling aspects of conflict that prevent the economic progress necessary to avert a return to hostilities

In Chapter 6, Michael B Charles and Elisabeth Sinnewe widen the discussion from historical accounts of intra-state conflict to a national, state-wide level through an examination of India’s attempt to indi-genize defence production via a case study of the development of a fifth-generation Indian air fighter Examining how various economic, political, organizational and strategic factors have combined to influence the development of India’s defence industry, Charles and Sinnewe remind us of the dynamic inter-play of factors pertinent to conflict and how these can have far reaching and frequently difficult-to-predict outcomes India’s decision to indigenize defence design and manufacturing is in consequence of a calculus of perceived economic benefits, external threats and strategic advantage If successful, the programme might yield significant economic and strategic benefits for India while achieving a balance of air power between it and China that stabilizes the region If unsuccessful, however, the result could

be an enormous waste of resources by a country in which poverty

remains a serious impediment to development or even an escalation

of tension with China

The dilemma of how to prosecute a conflict in a manner that does not prevent satisfaction of the pre-conditions for its conclusion it is taken

up in the subsequent two chapters In Chapter 7, Howard Brasted and Zahid Shahab Ahmed examine the economic costs of the US-led war on terror for Pakistan Conventional wisdom holds that order and security are pre-requisites for, or at least proportionately related to, economic development, investment and growth In contrast, Brasted and Ahmed show how Pakistan’s attempts to root out violent extremism have hampered its economic performance by reducing foreign investment and diverting precious economic resources from critical areas of human development such as education and health care The result is a vicious cycle where continued participation in the war on terror, even with US aid and assistance, perpetuates an image of Pakistan as an unfavour-able business and investment destination with negative effects upon the state’s ability to deliver basic resources that empower the state’s enemies

as proving a credible alternative to it

In Chapter 8, Albert Wijeweera examines the national economic effects

of terrorist attacks during Sri Lanka’s long civil war through an analysis of share price movements subsequent to each attack The chapter also intro-duces the first of three econometric studies in the volume that employ advanced statistical analyses to test hypotheses Since the 1930s mathe-matical economics has become increasingly in vogue to the point where, today, narrative economics has been largely displaced Consequently, we felt it important to include econometric analyses to enhance the volume’s scholarly robustness while widening its potential audience In each of the three econometric chapters we have made a conscious effort to make the analysis accessible from a lay perspective Hence, although readers may find the nuances of the statistical models employed less germane, the hypothesis and results of these chapters should nonetheless be of interest

to a general readership Wijeweera’s chapter emulates this approach by applying advanced quantitative modelling to the simple hypothesis that terror attacks exerted a negative impact on Sri Lanka’s economy by degrading business fundamentals (workforce, infrastructure, etc.) and confidence While he finds that the overall economic effect of political violence is negative, this is mediated by a range of factors with implica-tions for both governments and their opponents Crucially, Wijeweera’s findings resonate with those of other chapters in the volume by under-scoring the complex and multifaceted role that economic factors play in

a conflict’s trajectory at both the local and national level

In Chapter 9, Matthew J Webb broadens the volume’s focus further

in a comparative study of separatist movements in India and Sri Lanka, and the global diaspora that supported these movements, to include

a critical look at greed and grievance accounts of violent separatism While these theories are sometimes portrayed as offering opposing accounts of violent separatism, they nonetheless share an economic dimension; whereas greed theories’ emphasis upon a rational actor model mirrors that of economic theory, distributive justice pertaining

to economic resources (e.g., territory, jobs and natural endowments) is a frequent component of justice-seeking, grievance models Arguing that outside assistance in the form of neighbouring states and diaspora are an important element in explaining a separatist movement’s longevity and success, Webb claims that at first glance South Asia’s separatist move-ments appear to fit neatly under the rubric of justice-seeking groups However, because grievance cannot satisfactorily account for the partici-pation and support of external third actors – especially diaspora – in these conflicts, grievance-based accounts that emphasize claims of distributive justice must be supplemented with nationalistic factors that can satisfactorily explain why those who have not been aggrieved none-theless feel compelled to participate in a conflict

This region-wide focus is continued in the remaining three chapters

of the volume In Chapter 10, Lavanya Vemsani reminds us through a study of the Himalayas of the crucial impact of conflict upon the envi-ronment, and the potentially destabilizing economic and social effects that this can have The source of major rivers that fertilize much of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and the states of Southeast Asia, the Himalayan ranges are also heavily militarized and a territorial flashpoint for the three major powers in the region – China, India and Pakistan Failure by these states to put aside their disagreements and develop a programme to address the environmental degradation that has occurred

in consequence of the region’s militarization now threatens an ical disaster capable of producing an economic calamity on an unim-aginable scale affecting almost every state in South and South East Asia Vemsani’s analysis also re-emphasizes the interdependency and multi-facetedness of economic and other factors in the analysis of conflict

ecolog-in South Asia by highlightecolog-ing how the impact of economic ment on natural environments can promote peace or, if not properly managed, prolong conflict

In contrast, Chapter 11 by Christos Kollias and Stefanos Papadamou returns us to the realm of econometrics by considering the various guises that conflict has adopted in South Asia as well as its negative effects upon

economic growth Using a comparison of different South Asian states, they quantify the costs of conflict through an examination of the diver-sion of valuable and scarce resources from the more-productive health sector to the less-productive military sector Finding that military spending

‘crowds out’ (reduces) spending in more-productive sectors, Kollias and Papadamou highlight the often high opportunity costs of conflict The inverse of the theme that ‘war does not pay’ is pursued in Chapter 12 where Ali C Tasiran and Zainab Kazim Ali investigate why wars in South Asia are so prolonged and cost so many lives Using a duration analysis they examine the economic, demographic, political and military determi-nants of inter- and intra-state conflict with a view towards developing a model to predict future conflicts Their main finding that higher economic growth reduces the length and destructiveness of wars in (South) Asia ends the volume on a suitably optimistic note by suggesting the possi-bility of a less violence-afflicted future for the region if it can maintain its remarkable economic transformation

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Hoeffler, A & Reynal-Querol, M 2003 Measuring the Costs of Conflict Working

paper, Centre for the Study of African Economies and St Antony’s College Oxford:

University of Oxford

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[Online] Available: http://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-database

[Accessed 2 February 2013]

International Labor Organization 2013 Global Employment Trends 2013: Facts and Figures for South Asia [Online] Available: http://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/global-employment-trends/2013/WCMS_202316/lang – en/index.htm [Accessed 29 January 2013]

Iyer, L & Santos, I 2012 Creating Jobs in South Asia’s Conflict Zones: Policy Research Working Paper 6104 The World Bank

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in the Asian Century , Washington, DC: The World Bank

sepa-to be nationally homogeneous Yet, it has not been free from conflicts Rather, it inherited the major characteristics of Alavi’s ‘post-colonial state’ (Alavi, 1973) and consequently began to face issues and conflicts

on both internal and external fronts Today, Bangladesh is internally divided on a wide variety of internal issues including: national iden-tity; Islamism versus secularism; an ethnic separatist movement in the Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT) region; the treatment of minorities; corrup-tion; and a host of horizontal and vertical divisions Consequently, any author seeking to study conflict in Bangladesh is, sadly, spoilt for choice Moreover, if the focus of the study is narrowed to economic dimen-sions then the choice does not become any easier; all these conflicts have significant economic dimensions that could potentially under-mine national economic growth and stability However, among internal conflicts the demand for autonomy by the indigenous tribes of the CHT region stands out as primarily attributable to economic factors and, consequently, is the focus of this chapter

The causes of intra-state conflict may be explained from a variety

of perspectives A significant contemporary debate concerns the rival positions of ‘primordialists’ (Armstrong, 1982; Birch, 1989; Brass, 1991;

Brown, 1994; Connor, 1984; Horowitz, 1985; Isaacs, 1975; Smith, 1993) and ‘situationalists’ Primordialists regard ethnic movements

as a manifestation of a persisting cultural tradition based on dial sources of ethnic identity In contrast, situationalists such as Gurr, Lake, Rothchild, Jackson, Penrose, Brass, Newman, Weiner, Huntington, Young, Hechtor and others interpret these movements as a response to differential treatment

To explain, primordialists believe that individuals are fundamentally ethnocentric and exhibit a trust and preference for members of their own cultural group and, conversely, a distrust towards other cultural groups in the same society Ethnic identity is, therefore, interpreted by primordial-ists as a given, or a natural phenomenon with an unavoidably territo-rial aspect Smith, for example, in discussion of the relationship between collective identity and territory highlights ‘the acquisition of a particular piece of territory, which was felt to “belong” to a people as they belonged

to it’ (Smith, 1993, p 52) The inclusion of a territorial element to the development of collective identities is significant not least of all because

of territory’s fixed and limited nature, as well as that of the cally valuable resources that it contains In essence, then, primordialists argue that in a society divided by various ethnic and cultural groups it

economi-is common to experience inter-group conflict and, therefore, separateconomi-ist tendencies Heraclides, for example, notes that ‘[e]thnic identity is the essential independent variable that leads to political assertiveness and militant separatism, regardless of the existence of inequality or domi-nance’ (Heraclides, 1991, p 8)

Situationalists, on the other hand, hold the view that an individual may be a member of a minority ethnic group without necessarily having a conscious attachment to it However, a situational threat arising from historical, socio-economic or political circumstances may arouse an otherwise dormant ethnic consciousness For example, the colonial creation of the modern state, or the demographic/political/economic dominance of the majority group, may lead a minority to form what is known as a ‘defence group’ premised upon perceptions of self-identity and a separate consciousness that distinguishes members

of the group from the majority population Among situational nations of inter-group/state conflict the economic perspective has slowly moved to the centre stage of research in recent years Scholars such as Collier, Berdal, Malone, Kaldor, Keen, Klare, Ballentine, Sherman, Brown and many others believe that economic factors are

expla-a pervexpla-asive feexpla-ature of current forms of conflict expla-around the world expla-and economic transactions link these conflicts with the global economy

Brown, in particular, has identified three broad economic factors of internal conflicts: (a) economic problems arising from high levels of unemployment and rampant inflation; (b) discriminatory economic distribution premised on morally arbitrary factors such as class or ethnicity ranging from unequal economic opportunities, dispropor-tionate access to natural resources and vast differences in standards of living; and (c) the trials and tribulations of economic development and modernization which raise individuals’ economic and political expec-tations to unrealizable levels that lead to mounting frustration (Brown, 1996) and, where there is a significant gap between expectation and achievement, Huntington’s ‘instability and disorder’ (Huntington,

1968, p 275) Gurr has also come to the same conclusion, arguing that if a state exploits resources and oppressively deprives a group then the group’s members develop sentiments of alienation and frustration that may be exploited by elites to foment separatist tendencies An important component of this explanation is the concept of propor-tionality, that is, the greater the degree of deprivation, the greater the frustration and alienation and, therefore, the higher the likelihood

of separatism and conflict developing (Gurr, 1993) In the following analysis I examine the application of these situationalist assumptions

to the separatist insurgency in the CHT Specifically, I argue that, while the people of the region are indeed ethno-culturally and historically distinct from the majority Bengali population, this distinctiveness, and the separate identity that it engenders, has only become politic-ally significant because of economic exploitation and neglect by the Bangladeshi state Absent these economic grievances, ethno-nation-alist sentiments would be inadequate to mobilize the population of the CHT region behind a radical, separatist agenda and acceptance of the high costs that violently pursuing this agenda against the much better armed and equipped Bangladeshi state entails

The foundations of conflict in the Chittagong Hills Tract

Bordering Myanmar (Burma) and India, the CHT region consists of ten per cent of the land (5.095 sq miles) and 0.45 per cent of the total population of Bangladesh The geographical isolation of the region has contributed to the development of a distinct cultural identity amongst its inhabitants According to the provisional returns of the

2011 census the total population of the region is 1,587,000 – more than 50 per cent of which are tribal peoples of Sino-Tibetan descent divided into 13 sub-tribal groups and mostly Buddhists, Hindus or

Christians (Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, Riang, Murang, Lusai, Bunjogees, Pankhos, Kukis, Chak, Khumi, Mro and Kheyang The Chakmas, Marmas and Tripuras constitute 90 per cent of the tribal population) (Shelley, 1992; Lewin, 1892; Huchinson, 1872; Bernot and Denise, 1957; Bessaignet, 1958) This is in contrast to the vast majority of Bangladeshis who are Bengali Muslims Since 1971 when Bangladesh became an independent nation state, the peoples of the CHT have demanded increased political autonomy or independent statehood and have waged a guerrilla war towards achieving these objectives After four decades of struggle it appears they have been successful in achieving partial autonomy, but not independence In the following section I outline the historical development of this campaign while highlighting the economic factors that have led to violent calls for independence Finally, I examine the various strategies

of the Bangladeshi state to address separatism in the CHT, again lighting the crucial role of economic issues in determining the success

high-of these

The CHT region was ceded to the British East India Company in

1760 but was administered as a separate and independent region for strategic reasons It was ruled by tribal chiefs who collected revenues for the British government which, in return, did not interfere in the customs and regulations of tribal life In 1900 the British colo-nial government declared the CHT region to be an excluded area and replaced the existing Mughal land tenure system with a hierarchy

of three positions: Chief, Headman and Karbary , allowing the tribes

to remain segregated from the Bengalis of the region Chiefs were equivalent to tribal rajas, while a Headman was a representative of the Chief in charge of a ‘Mouza’ comprising a number of villages Each village head was called a Karbary This separation continued when, in

1935, the British government declared the CHT region to be a totally excluded area with the result that it remained largely isolated from the anti-colonial and anti-British nationalism developing across the Indian subcontinent However, on the eve of India’s independence the British government decided that India would be partitioned and, in order to maintain geographical contiguity, the CHT would be given

to Pakistan Unsurprisingly, the people of the CHT were concerned about the proposed union with predominantly Muslim Pakistan and argued that as Buddhists, Christians, Hindus and animists, the logic

of the ‘two-nation’ theory that was to be the founding ideology of Pakistan did not apply to them Instead, they wanted to either join India – as most other tribal areas of Assam and northeast India were

asked to do – or form a Princely state with other tribal areas of Assam

A delegation of CHT tribes met the leaders of the Indian Congress to press their demand for union with India However, despite the support

of the Indian Congress, the Bengal Boundary Commission headed

by Cyril Radcliffe awarded the CHT region to Pakistan The rationale behind this decision was ‘the whole economic life of the people of the CHT depends upon East Bengal … There are only one or two different tracts through the jungle into Assam, and it would be disas-trous for the people themselves to be cut off from East Bengal … In

a sense, Chittagong, the only port of East Bengal, depends upon the CHT.’ (Hodson, 1969, p 350) Indeed, the Congress leadership made every effort to include the CHT into India with correspondence on the subject between senior Congress leaders such as Sardar Patel and Lord Mountbatten (Phadmis, 1981; Hodson, 1969) Consequently, in

a great historical irony, the economic issues that underpin porary separatism in the CHT were preceded by a range of alternative economic imperatives that led to the political union with Bangladesh that separatists in the CHT today aim to undo

The inclusion of the CHT region into the state of Pakistan marked the beginning of hostilities between the state and the tribes which had already hoisted the Indian flag which was subsequently lowered by the Pakistan Regiment Indeed, since the inception of the Pakistani state the people of the CHT have been branded as ‘pro-Indian’ leading to

a complete reluctance amongst the Pakistani leadership to politically accommodate the CHT leaders Nonetheless, after independence the Pakistani government did not take any drastic measures regarding the CHT region because it was preoccupied with other political issues that eventually led to the collapse of the civilian government in Pakistan and the beginning of a military regime in 1958 The military government, headed by General Ayub Khan, proclaimed the Constitution of Pakistan

in 1962 which changed the status of the CHT region from an ‘excluded area’ to a ‘tribal area’ for the first time However, in 1963 the first amend-ment to the Constitution of Pakistan eliminated the tribal area status

of the CHT region Additionally, a number of legal rulings eroded the special status of the CHT and further integrated the region into Pakistan much to the chagrin of its residents and leaders For example, the Dhaka High Court struck down Rule 51 of the CHT Manual which had given the District Magistrate the power to expel non-tribal people from the CHT; the Court ruled that the provision of expulsion of non-tribals from the CHT was unconstitutional because it violated citizens’ fundamental right

to freedom of movement as stipulated in the Constitution of Pakistan

Another amendment to Rule 34 of the Manual was promulgated which gave property rights to non-tribals who had resided in the area continu-ously for 15 years (Mohsin, 1995; Kamal, 1995) These constitutional orders and decrees deepened the sense of alienation among the people

of the CHT region from the Pakistani state

Economic issues of land ownership coupled with others pertaining to development accelerated the divide between the CHT and the Pakistani state For example, once the administration of the CHT region was integrated with the central administration, the Pakistani government attempted to accelerate the process of industrialization in the CHT To this end, a hydroelectric project – the Kaptai Dam – was constructed on the Karnafuli River in the Rangamati District of the CHT to facilitate the rapid industrialization of East Pakistan Although some industries bene-fited from the project, the dam brought devastation to the tribal popula-tion through the flooding of 400 square miles, including 54,000 acres

of arable land that was 40 per cent of the district’s total acreage (Islam, 1978; Zaman, 1984) The consequence of these changes was to disturb normal patterns of livelihood and destroy the economic self-sufficiency

of the hill economy Due to the shortage of arable land, food tion decreased and people either moved uphill into the jungles or fled across the border with India to Tripura and Mizoram The government subsequently decided to rehabilitate displaced families by giving land from its reserve holdings However, in total the government was able to allocate only 20,000 acres of flat agricultural land of relatively inferior quality to settle 11,761 of the 18,000 displaced families Each displaced family received only three acres of land that was, on average, half of their original landholding (Islam, 1978) Consequently, nearly 100,000 people were displaced without adequate compensation or rehabilita-tion Moreover, even by the government’s own estimates, the compen-sation offered was manifestly inadequate; whereas it had estimated US$59 million would be needed for compensation, only $2.6 million was actually distributed The sentiments of injustice and alienation that this inadequacy engendered were exacerbated by allegations that the Revenue Compensation Office (which was fully staffed by Bengali offi-cials) was engaged in corruption and discrimination between the tribes-people and Bengali settlers It was further alleged that Bengalis were the first to receive payment, whereas the tribals had to bribe officials to get their compensation (Lintner, 1990b)

In addition, the Kaptai Dam did not benefit the tribals to any great extent with less than one per cent of them employed in industries gener-ated by it and most of the business generated from dam-related projects

being dominated by Bengalis For example, in the areas around Kaptai Lake fishing became the primary source of livelihood for tribal cultiva-tors However, they could not get a fair price for their catch because all commercial fishing was controlled and regulated by Bengalis who paid

an unfair price to tribal fishermen According to one study, 69 per cent

of tribes-people felt that their food and economic crises were the result

of the construction of the Kaptai Dam, 89 per cent said that they had been displaced by the inundation of their homes and land, 87 per cent said that they faced serious trouble building new homes, 69 per cent complained about insufficient compensation and the corruption of government officials, 78 per cent complained of having no oppor-tunities for jobs on the project and 93 per cent said that they had been better off before the Kaptai Dam (Chowdhury et al., 1979) The construction of the Kaptai Dam heightened feelings of deprivation among the indigenous inhabitants of the CHT who justifiably attrib-uted their economic woes, social degradation and political radicalism

to the impact of the dam on their livelihoods and culture However, the government of Pakistan remained indifferent to the massive human sufferings of the tribes-people

After its independence in 1971 the government of Bangladesh continued the policies of the government of Pakistan in the CHT, adopting political and economic policies that continued to alienate the tribal peoples of the CHT (Mey (ed.), 1984) For example, the Constitution of Bangladesh made no special provisions for the CHT region, and the first national budget of Bangladesh in 1973 made no developmental allocations for the CHT On the contrary, in the name

of national development the government adopted measures to exploit the land and forest resources of the CHT which further antagonized the tribal peoples In light of past experience it was quite natural for the tribes-people ‘to distrust the development projects of the state, for in each instance, they had been the victims of the state-sponsored projects

of progress and development’ (Mohsin, 1995) The Constitution of Bangladesh also declared the nationality of the people of Bangladesh as Bengali (Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972a), rather than Bangladeshi, which denied the separate identity of the tribes-people and endorsed a unitary system of government that ruled out a separate legislature or degree of regional autonomy for the CHT Subsequently, when Ziaur Rahman (Zia) came to power in 1976, he changed the provision of ‘Bengali’ to ‘Bangladeshi’ which should have been acceptable to the tribes-people However, Zia’s Bangladeshi nation-alism was different to the tribal leaders’ expectations of it Whereas

the tribes-people expected a Bangladeshi nationality to develop in the context of a secular nation, Zia’s Bangladeshi national identity was based

on the Muslim identity of the majority Bengali population (Hossain, 1991) The Zia regime also eliminated the principle of secularism from the constitution replacing it with ‘the principles of absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah’ (Constitution of Bangladesh, 1976) This process of Islamization (and, thereby, Bengalization) was continued in the eighth amendment to the Constitution of Bangladesh in 1988 in which Islam was declared the state religion (Islam, 2001) Consequently, instead of being an integrative force, these changes deepened the sense

of alienation of the tribes-people, who felt that religion and economic development were being used as tools of domination by the majority Bengalis

Perhaps most importantly, however, the migration of Bengalis continued after the independence of Bangladesh The natural migra-tion of Bengalis to the CHT region was not opposed by the indigenous people because the settlers did not come as land-grabbers However,

in 1979 the pattern of migration changed from a ‘natural’ to a ical’ one The government decided to move landless Bengali families to

‘polit-government-owned khas (reserved land) in the CHT region in phases In

the first phase it decided to settle 30,000 families and give each family five acres of land as well as financial support for the first few months The second phase was initiated in August 1980 when each family was given either 2.5 acres of arable land or 4 acres of poorer quality land By the end of 1984 an estimated 400,000 Bengalis had settled in the CHT region Thus, whereas in 1948 the tribal people had formed 98 per cent

of the population of the CHT and Bengalis the remaining two per cent,

by 1962 the Bengalis constituted 12 per cent, and by 1991 this figure had risen to 50 per cent (Montu, 1980) These political moves had severe economic impacts that alienated the tribal people The settle-ments grossly violated their traditional land rights because the Bengalis were settled on lands traditionally farmed by indigenous tribes They also violated Rule 39 of the CHT Manual which stated that the District Magistrate was obliged to consult the Chiefs or Mouza headmen before making decisions regarding land distribution and ownership In the words of Kazi Montu, ‘the Bengalese settlers appears to them as avar-icious intruders and plunderers who are forcibly evicting the hillmen from their ancestral homesteads and grabbing their lands, controlling retail trade and marketing, monopolising the transport operations in the area, dominating the fishing industry, seizing every opportunity for their own economic advancement and ruthlessly exploiting the hill

people’ (Montu, 1980, p 1510) In fact, the intrusion of the state into the economic activities of the CHT region, undertaken in the name of national development, marginalized the indigenous people and made them suspicious of development initiatives and the Bangladeshi state in general, precipitating a violent insurrection against the majority society (Zaman, 1984)

Mobilization and insurgency

The seeds of conflict that began in the CHT region during the 1960s took some time to transform into a separatist movement reaching a climax in the 1970s Initially, the leaders of the movement mobilized support inside the tribes and then gradually sought the support of external sources The main external support came from India, although moral support came from some international agencies Mass mobiliza-tion was also assisted by the large number of educational institutions set

up in the CHT region during the 1960s which increased the literacy rate among tribes-people to 50 per cent (Ishaq (ed.), 1971) with the Chakma tribe being the main beneficiary of the spread of education The result was a literate and politically conscious middle class that opposed the autocratic Pakistani government and their social and political structures The consequent social regeneration and political awakening created

by these educational changes produced ethnic solidarity amongst the tribal peoples of the CHT rather than integration with the modern-izing Pakistani state (Tolumin, 1990; Welch (ed.), 1967) Alarmed, the state initiated a co-option strategy, and some of the tribal elite – such

as the Chakma Raja, Tridiv Roy – were accommodated by the Pakistani ruling elite However, the motives behind this policy were exploitative and manipulative rather than beneficent; in order to aid Naga and Mizo insurgents in India the government of Pakistan needed the support and cooperation of tribes in the CHT region

Despite the devastating effects of the Kaptai Dam and the effects

of increased literacy and a heightened sense of ethno-cultural darity, mass mobilization against the Pakistani state remained elusive However, some students influenced by Marxist ideology sought to create

soli-an exploitation-free society in the CHT region Consequently, in 1957

an underground Pahari Chhatra Shomity (Hill Students Association)

was created under the leadership of Maobendra Larma In 1970 Larma formed the Rangamati Communist Party (RCP) to bring about a revo-lutionary transformation of tribal society (Shelley, 1992) Larma was subsequently arrested and jailed which increased his popularity among

the tribes During the 1971 War of Liberation of Bangladesh, the people

of the region were divided The Chakma Raja, Tridiv Roy, supported the Pakistan government, and those loyal to him were in solidarity with Pakistan On the other hand, though Larma remained quiet, some

educated youths joined the Mukti Bahini (Freedom Fighters) When the

Pakistani Army surrendered on 16 December 1971 the Indian Army conducted operations in the CHT region and rounded up as many as 1,000 Mizo activists who were fighting for the independence of Mizoram (Hussain, 1971)

Subsequently, Bengali freedom fighters began to attack those tribes that had collaborated with the Pakistani regime, torturing innocent tribesmen and razing their homes In retrospect this marked a turning point in the development of separatist sentiments in the CHT When these atroci-ties reached a climax in February 1972, a delegation of the tribes led by Larma – the lone elected representative to the Bangladesh Parliament from the CHT – called on President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) and made the following political and economic demands: (a) autonomy

of the CHT region including its own legislative assembly; (b) retention

of Regulation 1900 in the Constitution of Bangladesh; (c) continuation

of the tribal chiefs’ offices; and (d) a constitutional provision restricting the amendment of Regulation 1900 and imposing a ban on any further migration of outsiders into the region (Ahsan and Chakma, 1989) All these demands were unacceptable to Mujib, who advised Larma that the tribes should forego their ethnic identities by merging with the Bengalis (Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972b) Mujib’s expressed opinion about tribal identity was given wide publicity in the CHT region and, frustrated with Mujib’s unresponsive attitude toward the tribes, Larma returned to Rangamati and formed an umbrella tribal

political party known as Parbotta Chattagram Janasanghati Samity (PCJSS)

Its armed wing was called the Gono Mukti Fouj (People’s Liberation

Army), popularly known as the Shanti Bahini (Peace Force) (Shelley,

1986) Subsequently, proclamation of the Constitution of Bangladesh in December 1972 reconfirmed Mujib’s intention of emphasizing Bengali nationalism with an emphasis on Bengali language and culture as key principles of the new, Bangladeshi state Larma refused to endorse the constitution and stated:

This constitution does not recognise the existence of other national communities in Bangladesh … It makes no mention about the CHT The British had given recognition to our separateness, the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan duly recognised our separate status … but

from the Constitution of Bangladesh we have not gained anything

… it comes as a surprise to me that the framers of Constitution have forgotten my land, my people … We have been deprived of our rights … You cannot impose your national identity on others I am

a Chakma, not a Bengali I am a citizen of Bangladesh, Bangladeshi You are also Bangladeshi but your national identity is Bengali … They [tribal people] can never become Bengali (Government of Bangladesh, 1972)

Consequently, Larma walked out of Parliament and began to mobilize the tribes for an armed movement based on communist ideology and tactics The movement enjoyed extensive support among the Chakma tribes and others as well The mobilization process was slow but steady The armed cadre initially consisted of hard-core party activists and co-opted members of the Civil Armed Forces who were hiding in the jungle and had access to large caches of arms and ammunition left by the fleeing Pakistani Army School teachers indoctrinated students by emphasizing their differences from the people from the plains and pointing out their economic and cultural domination by the Bengalis (Van Schendel, 1992) Mass mobilization behind the movement’s objectives was also assisted by socialist propaganda where the dominant, Bengali society was viewed as an oppressive class and the movement was portrayed

as waging class-war for the liberation of the oppressed community Consequently, class and ethnicity were blended to define the move-ment’s ideology and motivation to maximize mobilisation which also stressed the post-secession prospects for economic development (Kamal, 1995; Ahmed, 1993) The movement received a boost from statements

by Mujib regarding the promotion of the Tribals as Bengalis (Chakma, 1986) and a 1974 bill passed by the Bangladesh Parliament that declared Bangladesh a uni-cultural and uni-lingual nation state

By the 1980s splits had begun to emerge in the movement due, in no small measure, to Larma’s leadership style which others found uncom-promising, rigid and blind to geopolitical realities and needs In 1982 Priti Kumar Chakma, a powerful member of the Central Committee, advocated a quick solution to the crisis, even if it amounted to joining the Indian Federation as a state (Kamal, 1995) However, Larma did not endorse such an idea because he considered India to be a hegemonic and imperialistic power and instead insisted on continuing the struggle under the banner of socialist ideology Priti Kumar Chakma responded

by forming a parallel organization called the Jana Sanghati Samity

(People’s Solidarity Association) The two groups clashed and Larma

was assassinated in 1983 Fearing reprisals from the Larma group, most members of the Priti group eventually surrendered to the Bangladeshi Security Forces, and Priti Chakma was given protection by the Indian government and granted political asylum (Kamal, 1995)

The failure and success of government responses

The government of Bangladesh, which initially pursued a ‘control’ model against the separatists, has since the late 1980s followed a

‘persuasion’ model of compromise and conciliation by providing some autonomy to the region and accommodating the elites in central and local administration Under the control model the government attempted to eliminate the separate identity of the tribes and populate the area with Bengalis in order to modify the region’s demographics

in the government’s favour In addition, the government also took massive development projects to strengthen its hold on the area (Shelley, 1986) aimed at ameliorating the centuries-old neglect of the area Hoping that rapid development of the region would bring economic benefits to the people and reduce the gap between the core and the periphery, in 1973 the government decided to set up a separate board for the development of the CHT which was finally established in

under-1976 The major objectives of the board were ‘[t]o encourage the local participation and decentralization of decision-making in the prepar-ation and implementation of development programs throughout the CHT’ (Mohsin, 1995) In order to achieve the objectives, many new schools, colleges, roads, hospitals and cottage industries were estab-lished in the region However, the tribes viewed the development projects negatively, particularly the educational institutions which they believed were part of a state-sponsored programme of mental regimen-tation in order to acculturate the tribes-people to Bengali culture and integrate them into the mainstream of Bangladesh society They also alleged that the roads were built in order to provide easy access to the region for the military and allow unbridled exploitation of the CHT’s abundant natural resources Complaints also arose due to inadequate tribal representation on the CHT Board and a lack of consultation with local communities in the formulation of development strategies Other measures failed due to inadequate implementation and popular support, for example in 1983 the government provided entrepreneurs with special incentives for investing in the area – tax relief, interest reductions on bank loans and 12-year tax holidays – but since the tribal people lacked necessary capital and skills, these incentives primarily

benefited the Bengali business community (Islam, 1997) The use of economic benefits to strengthen the government’s position vis-à-vis the tribals also extended to the strategy of populating the CHT with Bengalis who were provided with numerous benefits and incentives in

a policy of internal colonization Once the Shanti Bahini started killing

Bengali migrants, the government sent the security forces and army into the area, and full-scale guerrilla war ensued Subsequently, the army began to act independently of the civil administration, and regular reports emerged detailing extrajudicial killings, destruction of villages, plunder, rape and torture committed by the army By 1981 continuous

clashes between the army and Shanti Bahini had created thousands of

casualties which led to an exodus of approximately 70,000 tribal people

its demands which were: (a) self-determination within Bangladesh with

a separate legislature; (b) restitution of all lands taken by Bengali grants since 1970; (c) constitutional arrangements for the preservation

immi-of the indigenous cultures and their identities; (d) free movement and commerce within the district; (e) freedom from official harassment; and (f) a paramilitary force recruited from among the ethnic groups (Islam, 1997) In response the government partially conceded to these demands and approved a bill on 1 March 1989 which signified the first real hope for an end to the vicious and bloody conflict Accordingly, the CHT was divided into three districts: Rangamati, Khagrachhari and Bandarbon In each district a directly elected local council responsible for civil administration (including the appointment of the police) was established The chairmen of the councils – invariably tribesmen – were given the rank of deputy minister The councils were entrusted with the power to approve or prohibit the transfer or sale of land rights and also to repossess land fraudulently or corruptly obtained Furthermore, the tribes were given special quotas for government service as well as for admission into schools, colleges, and universities (Government of Bangladesh, 1993)

However, these steps did not satisfy all members of the Shanti Bahini

First, it was alleged that the District Councils Act of 1989 was inadequate because it had no constitutional basis as an act of Parliament and, so, could be replaced or changed at any time Secondly, the act was conspicu-ously silent on the issue of Bengali settlers Third, and finally, there was

no provision to return land occupied by Bengalis Consequently, the

militant members of the Bahini continued their underground

opera-tions, demands for full autonomy continued to be made and most gees remained in Tripura (India) (Lintner, 1990a) Then, in July 1992, the government constituted a nine-member committee on the CHT to recommend a solution to the government This gesture was reciprocated

refu-by the PCJSS, who unilaterally declared a three month cease-fire ning in August 1992 Until March 1996 seven rounds of talks were held between the committee members and the PCJSS leaders, but nothing was achieved Finally, in October 1996 the government formed a new 11-member committee on the CHT and, after a year of meetings and negotiations, a peace accord was signed on 2 December 1997 which has thus-far brought some degree of stability to the region despite strong protests by opposition political parties and extremists in the Shanti Bahini

The most salient feature of the accord was the establishment of a CHT Regional Council comprising local government councils of the Three Hill Districts The council’s 22 members were to be elected for five year terms by members of the Three Hill District Councils and chaired by

a tribal with the status of a State Minister Of the council members, two thirds would be elected from among the tribal population with a special quota for each tribe, and the remaining third elected from the non-tribal population of the CHT The Regional Council’s main func-tion is a coordinating one with regard to development activities in the three Hill Districts, general administration, law-and-order, NGO activi-ties, and disaster-management and relief programmes In the event of

a lack of harmony or any inconsistency its decision is final Additional features of the 1997 peace accord included that the government would give special priority to, and provide an additional budget allocation for, the implementation of existing projects and formulation of new projects for development of the CHT Moreover, any new law in connec-tion with the CHT could only be enacted in consultation with, and on the advice of, the Regional Council It was further agreed that the PCJSS members would surrender their arms and the government grant them general amnesty Each family of the repatriated members of the PCJSS was to be given Taka 50,000 (US $1,000) in one lump sum for rehabili-tation Previous bank loans and interest were to be waived and former employees reinstated in their jobs in government and other autono-mous bodies The government also agreed to continue the quota system and make special provision in the civil service and higher education for the tribal population