China soft power and international relations

Figures and tablesFigures 2.1 A comparison of the soft or hard effectiveness of country A 9.1 distribution of public opinion in 16 countries on China’s economic 9.2 distribution of mains

China’s Soft Power and International

Relations

China’s soft power has attracted considerable attention in the recent decade In this volume, scholars from the UK, Europe, the United States, Singapore, Aus-tralia, Hong Kong and mainland China, including a number of well- established and well- known analysts on China, examine the main areas where China has made noticeable advances in its appeal and influence These include China’s foreign policy discourse, international communication, cultural diplomacy and foreign assistance In addition, the Chinese concept of soft power, foreign policy strategy and the relationship between its international standing and that of the United States are closely analysed This volume covers some of the most recent development and critically assesses China’s soft power It offers an assessment

of China’s efforts to cultivate its international image, as well as a critique of Nye’s theory of soft power It draws on case studies of Chinese diplomatic prac-tice and utilises world opinion polls This volume offers a theoretical and empiri-cal perspective on the discussion on soft power, with a particular focus on China’s soft power

Hongyi Lai is Associate Professor, School of Contemporary Chinese Studies,

University of Nottingham and a Senior Fellow of the China Policy Institute, the University of Nottingham

Yiyi Lu is a Senior Research Fellow at the China Society of Economic Reform

and an Associate with the New Diplomacy Platform

China policy series

Series Editor

Zheng Yongnian

China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, UK

1 China and the New International Order

Edited by Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian

2 China’s Opening Society

The non- state sector and governance

Edited by Zheng Yongnian and Joseph Fewsmith

3 Zhao Ziyang and China’s Political Future

Edited by Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne

4 Hainan – State, Society, and Business in a Chinese Province

Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard

5 Non- Governmental Organizations in China

The rise of dependent autonomy

Yiyi Lu

6 Power and Sustainability of the Chinese State

Edited by Keun Lee, Joon- Han Kim and Wing Thye Woo

7 China’s Information and Communications Technology Revolution

Social changes and state responses

Edited by Xiaoling Zhang and Yongnian Zheng

8 Socialist China, Capitalist China

Social tension and political adaptation under economic globalisation

Edited by Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne

9 Environmental Activism in China

Lei Xei

10 China’s Rise in the World ICT Industry

Industrial strategies and the catch- up development model

Lutao Ning

11 China’s Local Administration

Traditions and changes in the sub- national hierarchy

Edited by Jae Ho Chung and Tao- chiu Lam

12 The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor

Culture, reproduction and transformation

Zheng Yongnian

13 China’s Trade Unions – How Autonomous Are They?

Masaharu Hishida, Kazuko Kojima, Tomoaki Ishii and Jian Qiao

14 Legitimating the Chinese Communist Party since Tiananmen

A critical analysis of the stability discourse

Peter Sandby- Thomas

15 China and International Relations

The Chinese view and the contribution of Wang Gungwu

Zheng Yongnian

16 The Challenge of Labour in China

Strikes and the changing labour regime in global factories

Chris King- chi Chan

17 The Impact of China’s 1989 Tiananmen Massacre

Edited by Jean- Philippe Béja

18 The Institutional Dynamics of China’s Great Transformation

Edited by Xiaoming Huang

19 Higher Education in Contemporary China

Beyond expansion

Edited by W John Morgan and Bin Wu

20 China’s Crisis Management

Edited by Jae Ho Chung

21 China Engages Global Governance

A new world order in the making?

Gerald Chan, Pak K Lee and Lai- Ha Chan

22 Political Culture and Participation in Rural China

Yang Zhong

23 China’s Soft Power and International Relations

Edited by Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu

China’s Soft Power and

International Relations

Edited by Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu

This first edition published 2012

by Routledge

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Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada

by Routledge

711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

© 2012 Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu for selection and editorial material;

individual chapters, the contributors.

The right of Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu to be identified as the authors of the

editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been

asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs

and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now

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from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or

registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation

without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging- in-Publication Data

China’s soft power and international relations/[edited by] Hongyi Lai and

Yiyi Lu – 1st ed.

p cm – (China policy series; 23)

Includes bibliographical references and index

1 China–Foreign relations–21st century 2 China–Foreign relations–

Philosophy I Lai, Hongyi, 1965– II Lu, Yiyi, 1970–

JZ1734.C57 2012

327.51–dc23

2011041861 ISBN: 978-0-415-60401-7 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-203-12209-9 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

4 The quandary of China’s soft- power rhetoric: the “peaceful- rise”

concept and internal debate 64

8 Debunking the myth of China’s soft power: changes in

China’s use of foreign assistance from 1949 to the present 138

M e R R I d e N v A R R A L L

9 Is China rising at America’s expense? Anti- Americanism

and pro- China sentiments in global public opinion 170

Z I X I A O Y A N G , d A v I d Z W e I G , A N d Z H e N G X U W A N G

10 China’s foreign policy as a rising power in the early

twenty-first century: the struggle between taoguangyanghui

and assertiveness 191

S U I S H e N G Z H A O

Figures and tables

Figures

2.1 A comparison of the soft or hard effectiveness of country A

9.1 distribution of public opinion in 16 countries on China’s economic

9.2 distribution of mainstream public opinion in four types of

country on China’s economic and military rise (2005) 1779.3 Public opinion in 16 countries toward China, the United

9.4 National and individual correlates of public opinion in

Tables

3.1 China’s overall “favourability” trends, 2002–2010 533.2 China’s military and economic image, June 2010 54

5.2 Confucius institutes/classrooms worldwide, 2004–2010 93

5.4 Perception of influence of Chinese culture in Asia- Pacific 96

9.1 definition and description of dependent and independent

9.2 Binary logistic regression results of public opinion in 16

9.3 Multinomial logit model of the choices of four types of

Notes on contributors

Hongyi Lai is associate professor and PhD programme director of School of

Contemporary Chinese Studies, the University of Nottingham, United dom He received his Phd in political science from UCLA He was a senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore His research covers China’s domestic and international political economy His scholarly publications in english include seven books, 18 refereed journal

King-articles, and 17 book chapters His books include The Domestic Sources of China’s Foreign Policy (Routledge), Asian Energy Security: The Maritime Dimension (Palgrave Macmillan), Reform and the Non- State Economy in China (Palgrave Macmillan), and China into the Hu- Wen Era (World Scient-

ific) His articles have appeared in major journals in studies of China and the

third world, such as China Quarterly, The China Journal, Modern China, The Journal of Contemporary China, and Third World Quarterly.

Yiyi Lu is Senior Research Fellow at the China Society of Economic Reform

and an Associate with the New Diplomacy Platform She is the author of

Non- governmental Organisations in China: The Rise of Dependent Autonomy (Routledge) and co- editor of Politics of Modern China: Critical Issues in Modern Politics (Routledge) She is currently working as project lead for the

Carter Center’s Access to Information Project in China and is a regular

blog-ger for the Wall Street Journal.

Dominik Mierzejewski is an assistant professor in the East Asia Department,

the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Łódź in Poland He is the author of various articles on contemporary international

relations published by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the nal of Contemporary Eastern Asia.

Jour-Cheng (Jason) Qian is a fellow of the Harvard Negotiation Project (HNP) at

Harvard Law School and research associate at the Harvard Business School (HBS), where he concentrates on the study of Chinese negotiation methodolo-gies and their applications in contemporary Sino- USA negotiations At HNP, his research focuses on China’s approach to international negotiations as well

as its efforts in mediating regional conflicts, in particular the North korean

nuclear crisis At HBS, he studies China’s negotiating behaviours in cross- border business negotiations and its culture’s impact on negotiation processes

His articles have appeared in Asian Affairs, The International Herald Tribune, The Boston Globe, The Philadelphia Inquirer, The San Francisco Chronicle, and The Korean Herald.

David Scott teaches Asia- Pacific International Relations at Brunel University

He is the author of three related books, a trilogy covering China’s past,

present and future roles in the international system: China and the tional System 1840–1949 (SUNY), China Stands Up: The PRC and the Inter- national System (Routledge), and “The Chinese Century?” The Challenge to Global Order (Palgrave Macmillan) His research interests include the rise of

Interna-China and India, the role of geopolitical location and constructivism, and the

impact of images and perceptions He is the managing editor of Asian Security.

Merriden Varrall is a Phd candidate in anthropology through the Macquarie

University in Sydney, Australia and the Free University in Amsterdam, The Netherlands Her primary research interest is Chinese foreign aid policy from

a constructivist perspective, using anthropology as a means to better stand policy motivations and goals She has a background in Australian Gov-ernment policy- making and international aid and development at the UN office in China She has a Master’s degree in international relations from the Australian National University and a Bachelor’s degree in Social Inquiry/Communications and International Studies from the University of Techno-logy, Sydney, with honours in Chinese studies

under-Zhengxu Wang is Deputy Director and Research Fellow at the China Policy

Institute, University of Nottingham He received his PhD in political science from University of Michigan in 2005 His current research projects on China include the democratic values of citizens, institutional changes and political reforms in political system, and politics of governance His research articles

are also published in major academic journals such as the Journal of temporary China, the Japanese Journal of Political Science, and the Interna- tional Review of Sociology He is a regular contributor of political commentaries to the Singapore- based Chinese daily Lianhe Zaobao and the Beijing- based magazine Caixin From February 2009 to the present, he is

Con-directing a €1.4 million research project on the Chinese public perception of the european Union and three Marie Currie Fellowships on political changes and government reform in China

Zixiao Yang is a Research Assistant at the Hong Kong University of Science

and Technology His research interests include public opinion surveys, national images, and quantitative and qualitative research methods

Chi Zhang is a lecturer in the department of Marxism Studies, National defense

University of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army His research interests

are international political economy, Chinese politics, and Chinese foreign policy He received a PhD in Politics from the University of Nottingham in the Uk, an MA in International Political economy from the University of Warwick in the Uk, and a BA in International Politics from the University of International Relations in Beijing, China.

Suisheng Zhao is professor and executive director of the Center for China–US

Cooperation at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of

Denver He is the founding editor of the Journal of Contemporary China and

is the author or editor of nine books or monographs His most recent books

include Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law versus ization (M e Sharpe), A Nation- State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford University Press), Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior (M e Sharpe), China and Democracy: Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China (Routledge), and Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the Crisis of 1995–96

Democrat-(Routledge)

Yongnian Zheng is professor and director of the East Asian Institute, National

University of Singapore He was professor and founding research director of the China Policy Institute, the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom

(2005–2008) He is the editor of China: An International Journal and East Asian Policy He has studied both China’s transformation and its external relations His papers have appeared in journals such as Comparative Political Studies, Political Science Quarterly, Third World Quarterly, and China Quar- terly He is the author of numerous books, including The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor (Routledge), Technological Empowerment (Stanford University Press), and Globalization and State Transformation in China (Cambridge University Press), and co- editor of 12 books on China’s

domestic development and international relations He has been a columnist

for Xinbao (Hong kong) and Lianhe Zaobao (Singapore) for many years,

writing numerous commentaries on China’s domestic and international affairs

David Zweig is chair professor in the Division of Social Science, Hong Kong

University of Science and Technology and president of the Hong kong Political Science Association He holds a PhD in political science from the

University of Michigan His most recent publications include Globalization and China’s Reforms (co- edited with Zhimin Chen, Routledge), “China’s Global Hunt for energy” (co- written with Bi Jianhai, Foreign Affairs), and Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages (Cornell

University Press)

Most of the chapters in the volume are selected from papers presented at two of the annual International Forums for Contemporary Chinese Studies organized by the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies (SCCS), University of Nottingham All chapters have been revised and updated in line with comments

We would like to thank the following institutions and individuals for their support – the SCCS for providing a platform for scholars around the world to share their research on contemporary China; Yongnian Zheng for the inclusion

of this volume in the China Policy series; the Routledge editorial team, cially Peter Sowden and Jillian Morrison, for their support and especially their understanding during the prolonged process of editing and completion

espe-Hongyi LaiYiyi Lu

This volume aims to address this deficiency in the literature and to distinguish itself from the few existing studies It offers a critique of Nye’s theory of soft power on the basis of international poll data on the major powers, as well as on Chinese diplomatic practice Moreover, it examines China’s soft power from perspectives such as its official discourse, public and cultural diplomacy, foreign aid, and political strategies in the course of its rapid ascendance on the world stage Finally, it also analyzes constraints on the expansion of China’s soft power and international perceptions of China’s economic and international rise

in the light of its development up to 2010

Existing literature on China’s soft power

A number of books on China’s soft power have been published, most of which are edited volumes These studies have advanced our understanding of several aspects of China’s soft power These aspects include the popularity and the causes of soft power in China, Chinese efforts to expand soft power in the world, especially in South East Asia, Africa, and to a lesser extent Latin America, as well as the tools China has employed to advance its soft power These tools include official discourse, culture, and to a lesser extent, trade Two studies attempt to discuss the effects of Nye’s soft power theory in China, as well as its limits The following sections will review these studies in light of these aspects

It is noted in the literature that soft power has gained considerable currency in the official and scholarly discourses in China Mingjiang Li reported the result of his survey of Chinese articles published in Chinese journals and periodicals that were collected in a large database called the China National Knowledge Infra-structure (CNKI) database It was found that the annual number of the articles with reference to “soft power” in the article text averaged about eight during 1994–2000 This number jumped to 53 during 2000–2004, and continued to grow to 314 during 2005–2007.1 During 2004–2007, Chinese top leaders, includ-ing President Hu Jintao and Chairman of the Chinese Political Consultative Con-ference Jia Qinglin, stressed in several high- profile meetings that that China should strive for its soft power.2 The reasons behind the popularity of the concept

of soft power could be traced to China’s need to fend off the China threat ment, and to assure the world about the peaceful nature of a rising China3 and that soft power had been “embedded” in Chinese traditional ideology, culture, and foreign strategies.4

Next to the popularity of soft power in China and its reasons for this, China’s efforts to cultivate soft power have formed the bulk of discussion in the literat-ure Indeed, in one of the most noticeable publications on China’s soft power, Joshua Kurlantzick described China’s cultivation of a good image in the devel-oping world.5 Similarly, Kurlantzick, Zhu, and Wibowo documented China’s soft power building in Africa, South Korea and Australia, and South- East Asia They noted China’s recent success in this regard in these regions, especially in Africa.6 Similarly, Ding provided an overview of China’s attempts to polish its image and project its soft power around the world.7

In particular, several tools employed by the Chinese government to dize its soft power have been examined by a number of scholars The tool kit in China’s soft power diplomacy includes 1) its reassuring political discourse; 2) its diplomatic conduct including self- restraint over controversial issues; 3) cultural and public diplomacy; and 4) trade and assistance Grill and Huang noted that culture (including the Confucius Institute), domestic values and policies (espe-cially the Chinese model of development), and foreign policy (including “good neighbor” policies, international peacekeeping, and international aid) became resources of China’s soft power.8 In his overview of China’s soft power endeav-ors, Kurlantzick took note of China’s use of discourse, cultural, publicity, and business tools in cultivating a good image in the developing world, especially South- East Asia and, to a much lesser extent, Latin America and Africa.9 Ding also identified three main tools of soft power: the appeal of political values asso-ciated with domestic performance; “diplomatic fineness”; and external attraction

aggran-of the culture Specifically, in examining the cultural and public diplomacy tools for soft power, he reviewed China’s promotion of Chinese language learning abroad, the popularity of its popular culture abroad, and some of the Chinese efforts up to 2007 for polishing its image through the media.10 In another collec-tion of studies, Kurlantzick emphasized China’s use of personnel training and energy deals for gaining popularity in Africa Zhu echoed Kurlantzick’s earlier finding by pointing to China’s use of economic interdependence, peaceful

diplomacy, and political, social, and cultural exchanges in forging closer ties with South Korea and Australia.11

In summary, tools that have been explored include policy discourse cially “peaceful rise”), conduct of foreign policy, economic diplomacy and trade, and cultural and public diplomacy Tools that have been less frequently explored include China’s model of economic development, China’s overall strategies for managing its external relations, and its mediation of regional crises (such as that

(espe-in the Korean Pen(espe-insula) Indeed, Wibowo noted the ris(espe-ing popularity of the

“Beijing Consensus” in South- East Asia and its significance for the admiration

of China in the region.12 Zhongying Pang also assessed the pros and cons of China’s model of development.13

The mainstream literature of China’s soft power by and large focuses on the empirical cases of the popularity of soft power in China and the major tools China has used to cultivate soft power and polish its image abroad Thus, the literature largely follows what Mingjiang Li called “the behavioral approach” of soft power, which actually focuses on the “soft use of power.”14

The existing literature on China’s soft power has offered only sporadic ical examination of Nye’s concept of soft power Li was dissatisfied with the fuzzy boundary between hard and soft power In about four pages of the intro-ductory chapter of his edited book, he made two interesting points First, culture, ideology, and values needed not be the sole tools of soft power, as they might not generate attraction, persuasion, appeal and emulation (APAE) Second, hard power did not necessarily produce coercion, threat, intimidation, and induce-ment; it could also result in APAE.15 Similarly, Yongjin Zhang was also not content with Nye’s ambiguous conceptualizations of soft power and advanced similar criticisms about Nye’s claims of culture being a source of soft power and economic strengths and military resources as sources of hard power Zhang was equally unimpressed with the existing literature by questioning its claims about China’s soft power He countered that China had not been able to play any crit-ical role in setting the agenda of key international organizations (IOs) and that it had been largely conforming to the rule of these IOs, by Nye’s conceptualiza-tion, that would reflect the absence of China’s international soft power.16

A more rigorous critique of Nye’s soft power theory is offered in an edited volume to which Nye contributed the second and concluding chapters.17 Nye admitted that he had overstated the intangibility of resources, that hard and soft power resources were interchangeable, and that the failure to distinguish power behavior, i.e soft power- enhancing conduct, from power resources, i.e culture, values, and diplomacy, posed a challenge for the application of the concept of soft power He offered an explanation for the evolution of his concept of soft power in the context of scholarly dissatisfaction with realist and neo- realist theo-ries and the Bush foreign policy Nevertheless, he admitted that “soft power is

an analytical concept, not a theory.”18

Despite making the aforementioned advances, the existing literature on China’s soft power has left several noticeable gaps to be filled On the analytical front, it is necessary to offer a clear explanation about what contributes to a

nation’s soft power and how these soft power resources may be linked with those

of hard power In addition, the analytical implications and limits of Nye’s concept of soft power can be further explored Furthermore, how diplomatic responses to international events may also erode a nation’s soft power has been largely ignored in the existing literature Among the aforementioned studies, only Li’s edited volume has made useful progress, but that progress is still limited

On the empirical front, in line with the aforementioned analytical issues, the Chinese case can be further examined.19 Moreover, several additional resources

of China’s soft power can be analyzed, and the Chinese case can be considerably updated The latter is particularly important, as China, arguably the fastest growing economy, has been also experiencing the quickest change in its interna-tional influence and international circumstances It has also been rolling out new initiatives aiming at great soft power Many latest developments related to China have not been accounted for by existing literature These developments may help

us to better understand the concept and ingredients of soft power, as well as the progress and limits of China’s soft power In addition, Chinese policies on foreign assistance, one of the critical components of its soft power, have yet to

be closely investigated Even though existing literature has discussed the course on peaceful rise, it can be further examined and the latest developments

dis-on the issue can be kept up- to-date The Chinese political discourse, such as that

in the official Chinese discourse on world order, needs to be explored antly, one of the latest Chinese official concepts in this arena, i.e harmonious diplomacy for a harmonious world, needs to be critically assessed Preliminary discussion on China’s international communications have been undertaken, but a more systematic analysis utilizing recent cases such as the media coverage of the riots in Tibet and Xinjiang is needed Similarly, the latest developments in China’s cultural diplomacy in the last three to five years can be updated to advance the existing studies on the topic, and its effectiveness should be assessed critically using up- to-date survey data.20 In a similar vein, the image of China around the world in the recent years is reflected in rich and useful international surveys, but this topic has been underexplored, and so have the factors under-lying the changing image of China Finally, the overall strategy of China in man-aging its rise also needs a closer analysis This volume hopes to fill these gaps The following sections will first examine Nye’s concept of soft power, its limits, and resources, and factors that help bolster soft power will be discussed This will be followed by an analysis of the main tools, initiatives, and major constraints of China’s soft power Finally, a synopsis of the remaining chapters

Import-of the book will be provided

Soft power: concept and elements

Nye’s soft power notion has gained widespread currency in foreign policies of the United States as well as many countries, including China As Parmar and Cox noted, a Google search found 93 million sites that mentioned soft power.21

In this segment on the concept, means, and resources of soft power, Nye’s

primary publication on the topic, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, will be scrutinized, and the Pew world opinion surveys of 2002, the

main empirical data on soft power of major power which Nye himself cited, will

be utilized In addition, similar surveys on the worldwide opinions of major powers in the world will also be cited

According to Nye, soft power means “getting others to want the outcomes” that the power- holder wants and soft power “co- opts rather than coerces” others.22 In this chapter I adopt this definition of soft power However, I do not necessarily agree with all the other points of Nye that will be examined, espe-cially on his insistence that soft power originates from three resources that are soft by nature

Nye emphasized that soft power differs from command power, which other scholars coin hard power Command power is “the ability to change what others do” and relies on coercion, usually through military force, or inducement, usually through payment Soft power, as a co- optive power, is exercised through

“the attractiveness of one’s culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices.”23

Specifically, Nye identified three resources of soft power: culture, political values (which also include living up to one’s values), and foreign policies.24 As far

as foreign policy is concerned, Nye maintained that foreign policy should be seen

as legitimate and moral in the world and that it includes public, bilateral, and tilateral diplomacy.25 He also suggested that the behavior for mediating soft power consists mainly of attraction and agenda setting.26 However, much of Nye’s dis-cussion focused on popular culture, political values, and legitimate foreign policies (including public diplomacy) and was conducted largely in the context of the effectiveness of US foreign policy compared to that of other nations

Nye rightly called our attention to the importance of gaining international support and legitimacy for a nation’s foreign policy and of cultivating a positive image of that nation He also shed light on the relatively soft components of power, including culture and values, as well as soft aspects of power, such as appeals and attraction

However, one can question his components of soft power If soft power, as co- optive power, operates through attraction to other peoples, then the sources of attraction Nye listed seem to miss ones that are more important It is possible that other people or nations are attracted to the United States for its military might, economic prowess, and trade opportunities, or for technological advance-ment, not merely for its pop culture, values, and diplomacy, and look to the United States as a worthy leader Arguably, it is even more likely that other peoples and nations respect the United States as a consequence of these hard power resources rather than the three soft power resources Nye noted This point

is particularly pertinent in East Asia and to a lesser extent South- East Asia A public opinion survey in early 2008 suggested that Japanese and South Koreans thought that America had far greater soft power than China, and that Indonesians and Vietnamese believed US soft power had the edge over that of China.27

In the following sections, I will develop this criticism of Nye’s notion of soft power resources by utilizing international public opinion data In his aforemen-tioned book, Nye cited the percentage population of nations surveyed that held a favorable view of the United States and the approval ratings for US foreign policy (from 1965 to the 1980s) as a gauge of US soft power He also referred to the five dimensions of American attractiveness among 43 surveyed nations in

Pew Global Attitude Project’s What the World Thinks in 2002 These

dimen-sions, in rank order, included technological and scientific advances; music, movies and TV (or popular culture); ideas about democracy; ways of doing busi-ness; and ideas and customs However, Nye only emphasized popular culture and democratic ideas as resources of soft power.28 In order to have a comprehen-

sive understanding of the Pew surveys and the What the World Thinks in 2002 report, I reproduce summary findings of the major dimensions of US popularity

in the world from the surveys in Table 1.1

When the surveys were conducted in 2002, the United States and its allies had not launched the Iraq War and thus the United States still enjoyed considerable popularity for itself (63 per cent) and for its anti- terror war (61 per cent) It was clear in 2002 that the strongest dimension for the worldwide admiration of the United States laid in its technological and scientific advances (an average of 75 per cent of respondents of all nations), which Nye did not mention at all as a key resource of soft power It is not clear whether Nye regarded this more as a resource of hard power Nevertheless, as technology and science have been long hailed as the most important feature of any civilization, regardless of its values

or social systems, advances in this regard would inevitably invite admiration from around the world, such as the Soviets enjoyed after the successful launch of Sputnik 1, the first man- made satellite, into space in October 1957

Worldwide data, as well as regional data (such as Africa and Eastern Europe), apparently suggested that the best predictor of US popularity was the popularity

of its core foreign policy (its anti- terror war in the survey) An average of 61 per cent of the public surveyed favored the US- led war on terrorism The percentage was similar to that which had a favorable view of the US (63 per cent) This is a point that Nye glossed over, but did not emphasize Other positive dimensions for the popularity of the United States included its popular culture and demo-cratic ideas, which both registered support from an average of 50 per cent respondents among surveyed nations However, three other dimensions appeared

to harm, rather than help, US popularity These were US ideas of business tice, the spread of US ideas and customs, and the perceived US role in reducing rich–poor gaps In these three dimensions, especially the latter two, the average approval from worldwide respondents was 49 per cent, 32 per cent, and 20 per cent, respectively These findings indicate that even though culture and political values may be sources of soft power, they are less important than Nye suggested and are less likely to generate respect from other nations than foreign policy and technological and scientific capacity

At this point it is worth noting that, as critiques argue, Nye fails to appreciate the difficulty in distinguishing soft power resources from hard power resources

Table 1.1

Had a Favorable Opinion of the USA Admired US Technological and Science Advances Favored US-led War on Terrorism Liked US Popular Culture Liked US Ideas of Democracy Liked US Ideas of Business Practice Thought Spread of US Ideas and Customs Was Good Thought USA Reduced Rich/poor Gaps Average of Columns 2–7

pdf Note The data in the table are percentages

Table 1.2

Thought the nation’s influence was positive (%)

Thought the nation’s influence was negative (%)

Percentage of net positive (positive minus negative)

Per Capita GDP (US$, 2009)

Aid/gross national income, 2008 (%)

Technology and science, in particular, can be used to build not only economic clout but also military might, as demonstrated by US precision- guided bombs and global surveillance They can also contribute to softer aspects of national power, such as providing high- quality education and research, thereby attracting talented scientists and international students Furthermore, foreign policy and its effectiveness can be hardly separated from the military force and economic resources that the nation commands Moreover, technological and scientific advances are closely linked with economic resources, as the former requires con-siderable financial resources.

Nye used the international popularity of nations extensively in discussing the effectiveness of soft power of nations We can thus take poll data on the popu-larity of nations as a rough proxy of the soft power of nations Polls were con-ducted by GlobeScan for BBC World Services in 21 countries in North, Central and South America, Western and Southern Europe, Africa, Russia, China, India, Japan, South- East Asia and Australia between 30 November 2009 and 16 Febru-ary 2010 Taking into account the percentage of respondents having a mainly positive view of major nations, as well as the net percentage of respondents with positive views (i.e the percentage of those who had a positive view minus the percentage of those who had a negative view), Germany, Canada, Japan, UK, and France emerged as the top five most respected nations in the world On average, 49 to 59 per cent of respondents in the 21 polled nations had a mainly positive view of these nations, and these nations enjoyed a remarkable net average positive impression of 30 to 45 per cent In comparison, only an average

46 per cent of respondents in 21 nations viewed the United States favorably, and

a net average of 12 per cent of respondents saw the superpower positively In addition, these five nations have been in the top positions in polls since 2005 What do these nations have in common? The top three nations, namely, Germany, Canada, and Japan, are not known in the world for their active and interventionist military policies, although Japan has arguably the second best equipped and most modernized army (the Self Defense Forces) in the Asia- Pacific region after the United States The UK and France do have a modernized and powerful military, but have only deployed them infrequently on a massive scale in wars after the Second World War

These five nations, especially the top three, apparently share the following characteristics First, they are all among the most economically developed nations in the world Their per capita GDP in 2009 ranged from US$35,165 to US$41,051 They were among the 20 richest nations and among the ten largest world economies in 2009

Second, all give a massive amount of overseas development aid (ODA) (or foreign aid), in total and especially in terms of the ratio to GDP In 2008, the foreign aid from Germany, Canada, Japan, the UK, and France was nearly US$13.9 billion, US$4.7 billion, US$9.4 billion, US$11.4 billion, and US$11 billion, respectively The ratio to GDP was 0.38 per cent, 0.32 per cent, 0.18 per cent, 0.43 per cent, and 0.39 per cent, respectively, among the highest in the world after the Scandinavian countries However, foreign aid contributions from

the latter, though the highest ratios, were smaller with respect to the total amount.

The United States did provide the largest amount of foreign aid, amounting to US$26 billion in 2008 However, this amount was dimmed by two shortfalls First, it constituted only 0.19 per cent of its GDP, lower than all of the aforemen-tioned five nations except for Japan Furthermore, a large chunk of its foreign aid flew into nations that were the major focus of its foreign policy, including trouble spots in the Islamic world, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Egypt, Pakistan, and Palestine, as well as Colombia, which was harassed by drug traf-ficking The aid to these areas amounted to about 30 per cent of its total aid Given that the nations with the largest populations of poor people include India, China, Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Pakistan and given that the aforemen-tioned US aid- receiving nations had a relatively small share of the world’s poorest citizens, the political objectives of the US aid was quite apparent

In contrast, aid from the aforementioned five nations tended to target the nations with the largest proportion of the world’s poor, consisting of India, Ethi-opia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, China, Pakistan, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka Even though Afghanistan and Iraq received aid from these five nations, they did not receive as much from them as they did from the United States Viewed in this light, the foreign aid from these five nations target poverty reduction more and political agendas less than that of the United States.29

Third, these five nations, like the United States, are very strong in gical and scientific capacity This is reflected by the heavy financial input these nations make to research and development (R&D) In 2006, the ratio of domestic expenditure on R&D to GDP in 2006 was 2.51 per cent in Germany, 1.97 per cent in Canada, 3.33 per cent in Japan, 1.78 per cent in the UK, and 2.12 per cent

technolo-in France These were similar to the United States, whose ratio was 2.6 per cent

As these five nations were ranked among the ten largest economies in the world

in 2009, they have an astounding amount of R&D expenditure that allowed them

to develop an impressive capability On the other hand, once again, we can see the inseparable link between one of the strongest component of soft power, i.e capabilities in technology and science, and hard power resources (i.e economic resources that enable high R&D expenditure)

Finally, these nations tend to advocate a non- military approach to solving major international problems Their emphasis is on political advocacy, political dialogues, political and economic pressures and sanctions, economic assistance, and the promotion of cultural and social exchanges They are reluctant to resort

to force in resolving outstanding international conflicts

Taking these findings into account, soft power reflects a nation’s ability to handle international issues through non- violent means This ability usually rests

on the nation’s economic resources and technological and scientific capacity The tools a nation can employ to advance its soft power include skilful diplo-macy that minimizes the use of force, helps tackle outstanding international issues, such as poverty, and polishes its image through exports of popular culture

and political values, such as political, economic and social rights, the rule of law, and political representation.

Nye’s notion of soft power resources thus underestimates the importance of economic resources, humanitarian foreign aid, and technological and scientific capacity for a nation’s soft power In addition, as one of the chapters in this book argues, his concept of soft power suffers from relativity and vagueness, and underestimates its interconnectedness with hard power

Cultivation and limits of China’s soft power

In the following sections, the attention and major references of Chinese leaders

to soft power and their political programs and policies to promote soft power will be documented This is followed by a brief analysis of the main tools they use to improve China’s soft power, as well as the clear limits and obstacles in this endeavor

As early as 1993, Nye’s concept of soft power was introduced by scholars in China In that year Wang Huning, a professor in the elite Fudan University in China, suggested that culture could be a major source of China’s soft power.30 A search on the most widely used search engine, Baidu, found that by December

2010 there were over 14 million websites containing the Chinese term soft power

(ruan shili) This concept has been applied not only to the nation, but also to

localities, local government, and enterprises Clearly, soft power has become a trendy term for publicists, scholars, officials, and even entrepreneurs in China

Leadership view on soft power

In late May 2004, the Chinese leadership was exposed to the concept of soft power in the thirteenth group study session of the Politburo of the Chinese Com-munist Party (CCP) Two articles on the session were published in the official

weekly of the Chinese government, Outlook (liaowang) They revealed not only

the relation of the study session to soft power, but also the rationale of official thinking on soft power According to the first article, the aim of the study session was to advance philosophy and social sciences in China and to discuss the Chinese model and the Beijing Consensus This article defined soft power as the international appeal and attraction of one nation’s culture, values, social system (or political system), and developmental model It reported that the Chinese leadership decided to develop China’s philosophy and social sciences because they were components of China’s soft power The second article, entitled “China needs soft power,” made the following noteworthy points Soft power, compris-ing culture and ideology, was becoming increasingly important in the competition among nations China should thus cultivate its own soft power The aim of China’s soft power was to gain international recognition and respect China could utilize the quintessence of its traditional culture in developing its soft power, such

as the emphasis of harmony, according to Premier Wen However, in its quest for soft power China would be obstructed by the cultural hegemonism of the United

States, which attempted to impose its popular culture and political values on the other nations.31

In October 2007, in his keynote speech to the Seventeenth Congress of the CCP, Party General Secretary and President Hu emphasized the point mentioned

in these articles that culture had become an increasingly important source of national cohesion and creativity and of overall national power He declared that the Party should “enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural rights and interests.”32

In July 2010 the Politburo held the twenty- second group study session At the session, President Hu Jintao reiterated the importance of culture for comprehen-sive national power He stressed the Party’s decision to deepen the reform of cultural institutions in order to develop a thriving culture and enhance China’s cultural soft power.33

In October 2010, the Central Committee of the CCP promulgated its proposal for the Twelfth Five- Year Plan covering 2011–2015 Article 9 of the proposal concerned culture It called for a great development of culture and an increase in national soft power through inheriting quintessential elements of traditional culture, domestic innovation, exports of cultural products, and external media initiatives.34

Official tools to enhance soft power

In line with my adopted definition of soft power and the aforementioned data analysis, economic clout serves as a bedrock for a nation’s soft power In the past three decades, China’s economic power, reflected in its GDP, has been growing rapidly Thanks to this rapid economic growth, China’s GDP in 2009 was 18.6 times that of 1978 The world ranking of China’s nominal GDP increased drastically from number ten in 1978, when the reform started, to number two in 2010 These impressive economic changes and rapidly growing economic powers give China expanding resources to develop its soft power programs and initiatives, hire able people to man the programme, and help finance necessary activities In addition, China’s growing economic influence in the world has attracted growing admiration around the world, especially from the developing world and emerging markets China’s abilities to develop first- class infrastructures, such as high- speed rail and express ways, overnight has drawn respects and awe even from many in the developed world Meanwhile, a growing percentage of the public worldwide believes that the economic power balance is shifting from the United States to China The Pew opinion polls in 20 countries found the average percentage of the population regarding China as the world’s largest economy grew from 20 per cent in 2008 to 31 per cent in 2010, whereas that naming the United States declined from 50 per cent to 43 per cent.35

In line with Chinese economic success, the attention of both foreigners and Chinese to the so- called China model of development has grown considerably in the recent years As stated above, in the Politburo group study session in 2004,

Chinese scholars and leaders were exposed to and aware of the discussion on the Beijing Consensus, coined and roughly spelled out by Joshua Cooper Ramo, which the Chinese preferred to term “China’s model” and to spell out more meticulously In recent years, outstanding scholars in China have exchanged their views on China’s model and published their works.36 A growing number of scholars in China claimed that China’s model of development constituted a com-ponent of China’s soft power as it appealed to developing nations.37

Foreign aid is by itself a component of economic power and an element of hard power as mentioned above However, as the high international respect for Germany, Canada, Japan, the UK, and France indicates, foreign aid, when used properly, can greatly enhance the international image, influence and attraction of nations and their soft power In the recent years, with an increasing economic clout, China has stepped up its foreign aid, especially towards Africa According

to one report, China’s foreign aid grew from RMB1.68 billion in 1991 to RMB7.47 billion (or US$912 million) in 2005, and its ratio to GNP (gross national product) grew from 0.04 per cent to 0.22 per cent In the last half of the twentieth century, China’s foreign aid to Africa amounted to RMB44.4 billion, equivalent to 30 per cent of China’s total amount of RMB120.773 billion.38 It was estimated in 2006 that China’s spending on financing infrastructure and eco-nomic cooperation abroad amounted to US$16.5 billion.39 China’s aid has helped

it to project a positive image in the aid- recipient nations China’s image in Africa

is largely positive, despite frequent criticisms of China’s economic initiatives in the West In 2010, 86 per cent of Kenyans and 76 per cent of Nigerians polled

by the Pew research team viewed China positively, and these percentages were among the highest in the 21 countries surveyed.40

In line with the official emphasis on culture as a source of national power, public diplomacy, especially cultural diplomacy has become of the primary tools for China to develop its soft power Public diplomacy, according to a defi-nition cited by Joseph Nye, means interactions aimed “not only at foreign gov-ernments, but primarily with nongovernmental individuals and organizations.”41

Another definition, adopted by the US Department of State, refers to public diplomacy as “government- sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television.”42 In China, public diplo-macy often assumes the form of cultural diplomacy, as publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television, as well as sports, are classi-fied as culture in China As will be documented and analyzed in two chapters

of this volume, China’s official cultural diplomatic initiatives include izing programs and activities for cultural exchanges, overseas media coverage, and showcasing China through movies and athletic stars Many of these activ-ities are not new in form and content For example, the international ping- pong games China engaged in played an indispensable role in the normalization of China’s ties with Japan and the United States in the early 1970s What is new was that they have received strategic attention from Chinese leaders as a con-stant and more important component of China’s external initiatives In

particular, the official promotion of learning the Chinese language through the Confucius Institute was launched in 2004.

In the recent years, the concept of public diplomacy itself has gained attention

from senior Chinese officials In early 2010 the magazine Public Diplomacy Quarterly (gonggong waijiao jikan), devoted solely to public diplomacy, was

launched by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People Political sultative Conference, which is a united front platform to represent various func-tional and social groups in China The chief editor, Zhao Qizheng, vice chairman

Con-of the Committee, was a former minister Con-of the State Council Information Office

He developed interests in public diplomacy under the influence of scholars in international relations in leading universities in China.43 Around August 2010, the first research center on public diplomacy in China was also established at the Beijing Foreign Studies University Zhao serves as the honorary head of the center, which aims to be a think tank on the topic and to provide intellectual support for China’s public diplomacy It held the first International Forum on Public Diplomacy in Beijing in September 2010.44

In addition, a relatively recent official initiative is the use of official discourse

on China’s foreign policy As two chapters in this volume demonstrate, China has made frequent use of official terms, such as “responsible power” (since the late 1990s), “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development” (in the early and mid- 2000s), and “harmonious world” (in the late 2000s) The Chinese governmental emphasis of these preferred roles for China purports to show that China will try

to avoid military conflict with neighboring countries and will respect the tional order in the course of its rise This official discourse helps assuage inter-national fear regarding a rapidly rising China to some extent, as seen in the close ties between China and South- East Asia during most of the 2000s

interna-Chinese assessment of their soft power

It would be useful to see how the Chinese elites assess the status of China’s soft power Here two reports will be cited This does not mean to be a thorough over-view of all the Chinese assessments Nevertheless, these assessments offer highly useful references for the Chinese own assessment of their soft power

In January 2009 the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) published a research report on China’s culture Several aspects of China’s culture and cultural activ-ities were ranked internationally: modernization of cultural activities was ranked fifty- seventh, which reflected a level equivalent to developing countries; cultural competitiveness was ranked twenty- first, which implied the status of a medium- level power; and cultural influence was ranked seventh, which suggested a status

of major powers The tone of the CAS report was cautiously optimistic.45

In contrast, certain Chinese scholars in international relations are more mistic For example, a Chinese scholar cited the Pew global opinion surveys in

opti-2005, the Lowe Institute poll of Australians in opti-2005, and the BBC surveys of 21 countries in 2005 He argued that China earned more respect from the world public than did the United States and Russia, and that this demonstrated the

upward trend of China’s soft power amidst the decline of US soft power The researcher, however, cautioned that these poll results did not capture fully and accurately the status of China’s soft power.46

Softness of soft power: the limits of China’s endeavor

As discussed above, China has made considerable advances in the past decade in utilizing a variety of political, cultural, and economic tools to advance its soft power and polishing its international image In particular, it has gained attraction

in the developing world In the 21 countries surveyed in the Pew global opinion polls in 2010, on average 49.5 per cent of the public viewed China favorably, up very slightly from 2008 and 2009 In particular, 54.4 per cent of respondents in the developing nations and emerging markets viewed China favorably As high

as 57.8 per cent of the public in Latin America, Southeast and South Asia, and Africa held a positive view of China.47

Nevertheless, China does face numerous constraints in expanding its soft power The constraints include 1) suspicion from the West and China’s neigh-bors, especially in North East Asia regarding a rising China; 2) China’s contro-versial diplomacy; 3) China’s expansion of military power, which causes uneasiness from some of its neighbors, including those in Southeast Asia; 4) restrictions on international communications; and 5) Chinese as a difficult lan-guage to master for foreigners Given the limited space, only constraints two and four will be discussed

First, let’s examine China’s controversial diplomacy In the recent two years, three seemingly stern gestures from China have aroused uneasiness from the international community In July 2010, a US source and a Japanese news agency revealed that senior Chinese officials told the visiting US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg in March that the South China Sea constituted a core national interest of China This news seemed to generate discomfort among Southeast Asian nations adjacent to the South China Sea.48 This development served to undo the friendly ties with Southeast Asian nations that China had cul-tivated since the early 1990s through painstaking efforts, including soft power initiatives such as “good neighbor” diplomacy and cultural exchanges In North East Asia, China’s response to a string of military actions involving North Korea earned unhappiness from the United States, Japan, and especially South Korea The Cheonan warship of South Korea was sunk in March 2010 After a multina-tional investigation concluded in September, South Korea blamed this on a North Korean torpedo In April 2010 South Koreans surveyed in the Pew polls

as having a favorable view of China declined to 38 per cent, the lowest since

2002 Then again in November 2010, in response to South Korean military cises and shelling near its territorial water, North Korean troops fired around 170 artillery shells and rockets at Yeonpyeong Island controlled by South Korea, killing two soldiers and two civilians and injuring 19 there Many countries con-demned or disapproved the North Korean shelling In the wake of the Cheonan sinking and even the shelling of Yeonpyeong, China refrained from publicly

exer-criticizing North Korea and penalizing it In December 2010 the US media trayed China as encouraging Pyongyang to embark up an adventurist military course.

These developments suggest a critical soft spot in China’s soft power When international developments expose the sharp differences between China and other nations over critical issues and when China cannot take action deemed necessary by the international community, no soft power initiatives can suffice

to avoid the international damage of China’s image

Second, let’s examine China’s restrictions on media As will be discussed in two chapters of this volume, in recent years China has inaugurated overseas media channels and programmes to step up its media coverage in order to polish its image abroad, especially in the developed nations However, as China’s media enjoys less freedom and has less experience and skills than its Western counterpart, it is indeed an uphill battle for the Chinese media to gain acceptance

by overseas audience for its usually positive coverage of China, especially the skeptical West

In addition, China’s endeavor for soft power also faces a set of internal straints These constraints include 5) popular and ethnic protests; 6) inadequate protection of individual rights; 7) lack of the rule of law; 8) inequalities; 9) cor-ruption; 10) low moral standards and values Due to limited space, the discus-sion to follow will only briefly discuss constraints five to eight, as they relate to China’s model of development It has been widely reported that in recent decades popular protests have been increasing in frequency and size in China, as urban and rural Chinese protested in public or in front of governmental offices

con-In addition, large riots by Tibetans broke out in Lhasa in 2008 con-In 2009 a deadly riot largely involving Uyghurs, followed by retaliation by the Han, broke out in Urumqi The causes of these protests are complex, but protests usually have to

do with violation of economic and social rights, increasing inequalities, for example, between the ethnic groups and the Han in Tibet and Xinjiang, and a genuine lack of the rule of law and abuse of power by officials These protests, when covered by media inside and outside China, tend to call into questions the so- called China model of development Without doubt, China has experienced miraculously rapid growth since 1978 However, growing social discontent and protest are also apparent, pointing to severe shortfalls in China’s model.49 These issues also limit the appeal of the Chinese model of development, especially in developed nations Finally, it is worth mentioning that since Obama was elected

as US president, the international popularity of the United States has increased

In the BBC polls in 2010, on average 46 per cent of the public in the 28 nations polled expressed a positive view of the United States, compared to an average of

34 per cent that viewed the superpower negatively The United States thus enjoyed a net 12 per cent positive support from the international public In con-trast, an average of 41 per cent of the public expressed a positive view of China and 38 per cent viewed it unfavorably, leaving a mere 3 per cent positive support The United States thus clearly enjoyed greater popularity than China from the international public (Table 1.2)

Synopsis of the book

In this volume, each of the ten chapters focuses on a unique aspect of China’s soft power and a rising China, and provides an in- depth analysis of that aspect

Of the ten chapters, the first seven are devoted to analyses of China’s soft power These aspects include the views of the elites on soft power and resources and initiatives to enhance soft power; China’s diplomatic strategy, such as multilat-eralism, economic diplomacy, and the good- neighbor policy; the evolution of China’s public discourse regarding a desirable world order; the origin and change in use of the peaceful rise concept in public discourse; cultural diplo-macy; international communications; and challenges for China’s soft power endeavors to promote a harmonious world Of the remaining three chapters, one discusses the rationale of China’s foreign aid, which could significantly help to project China’s soft power; another analyzes the international perception of a rising China, which may be regarded as a rough measure of China’s soft power; and another examines China’s strategy for managing its rise on the world stage Most of these chapters give a fairly up- to-date coverage of these issues, while providing balanced, informative, and insightful analyses

The following is a brief overview of the contents of the book Chapter 2 offers a critical analysis of Nye’s soft power theory by emphasizing the dynamic and interactive nature of soft power as defined by Nye Drawing on the Chinese case, Yongnian Zheng and Chi Zhang propose the hard, soft, and bargaining powers and propose three perspectives of viewing power resources They discuss China’s multilateralism, economic diplomacy, and good- neighbor policy, and the external influence of the Chinese model

Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to key concepts in the Chinese official discourse

on the desired international order, which could help the outside world to gain a sense of China’s official view about what a rising China should do Both the official discourse and these concepts profoundly shape China’s soft power In Chapter 3, David Scott discusses the evolution of these key concepts from the

1990s to the present, including multipolarity (duojihua), multilateralism (duobian zhuyi), “democratization of international relations” (guojiguanxi minzhuhua), “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi), “peaceful development” (heping fazhan), and “harmonious world” (hexie shijie) In Chapter 4, Dominik Mierze-

jewski tracks the lively but subtle domestic discussions on one of the best- known concepts in the discourse, “peaceful rise,” and analyzes the impact of the debate

on subsequent changes in the official reference to the term

In Chapter 5, Hongyi Lai gives an overview of a series of largely cultural tiatives undertaken by the Chinese government in augmenting its soft power, including cultural exchanges, movies, athletic stars, martial arts, cultural and natural heritage sites and tourism, international Buddhism forums, scholarships for foreign students, the promotion of learning the Chinese language, and over-seas media programmes He also assesses its effectiveness and limits by utilizing global opinion poll data from the past decade In Chapter 6, Yiyi Lu analyses China’s international image and efforts to improve China’s international

communication capacity in order to enhance its image Utilizing information lected through interviews of informed witnesses, she describes the obstacles in China’s endeavor In Chapter 7, Cheng (Jason) Qian focuses on the new devel-opment of China’s foreign policy as captured in the concept of “harmonious diplomacy.” He addresses some common misunderstandings of China’s new diplomacy, as well as key questions concerning the success and sustainability of this harmonious diplomacy.

In Chapter 8, Merriden Varrall turns our attention to China’s foreign assistance Tracing China’s foreign assistance programs and policies since 1949, she argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Chinese leaders have not consistently used foreign assistance as a tool of soft power either in the past or at the present time Only in the mid- 1990s did the Chinese leadership start again to consider using foreign assistance as a tool of soft power to help achieve its international goals, and its use has been far more limited than has been assumed She argues for a broader understanding of China’s foreign policy motivations and the means

Chapter 9 provides a quantitative analysis of the worldwide perception of China

by investigating the relationship between pro- China sentiments and anti- Americanism Zixiao Yang, David Zweig, and Zhengxu Wang find that most people around the world have a positive attitude towards China’s economic rise, but not its military rise If China is perceived mainly as an economic actor, then the respondent is likely to both approve China’s rise and be pro- USA By contrast, if an individual mainly sees China as an increasing military power, then his or her pro- American sentiments will often mean disapproval of China’s rise Most frequently, however, when it comes to the perception of China as a whole, those holding a positive view about China are also likely to be supportive of the United States

In Chapter 10, Suisheng Zhao discusses China’s strategy of managing its rise

on the world stage, and puts our discussion in the context of the rise of big powers and its political implications He notes that China tries to strike a delicate balance between expanding China’s international influence and taking on more responsibilities on the one hand and continuing to play down its pretence to being a global power and avoiding confrontation with the United States on the other

Notes

* The author would like to thank Yiyi Lu for her helpful comments.

1 See Mingjiang Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect,” in

Mingjiang Li (ed.), Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics

(Lanham and Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009), pp 22–4.

2 See Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect,” pp 22–4.

3 Ibid, pp 31–2; Yong Deng, “The New Hard Realities: ‘Soft Power’ and China in

Transition,” in Li (ed.), Soft Power, pp 65–9; Sheng Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden

Wings: How China Rises with Soft Power (Lanham and Plymouth: Lexington Books,

2008), Ch 1, pp 17–8.

4 Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings, Ch 2.

5 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the

World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

6 See Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Soft Power in Africa,” Zhiqun Zhu, “China’s Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia,” and Ignatius Wibowo, “China’s

Soft Power”), Success and Neoliberal Agenda in Southeast Asia,” in Li (ed.), Soft

Power, pp 165–84, 185–206, 207–24.

7 Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings, Ch 7.

8 Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power,’ ”

Sur-vival, Summer 2006, 48(2): 17–23.

9 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 2007.

10 Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings.

11 See Zhu, “China’s Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia,” in Li (ed.,)

Soft Power, pp 185–206.

12 See Wibowo, “China’s Soft Power Success and Neoliberal Agenda in Southeast

Asia,” in Li (ed.), Soft Power, pp 207–24.

13 See Zhongying Pang, “China’s Soft Power Dilemma: The Beijing Consensus

Revis-ited,” in Li (ed.), Soft Power, pp 125–42.

14 See Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse,” pp 7–10.

15 Ibid, pp 3–7.

16 See Yongjin Zhang, “The Discourse of China’s Soft Power and Its discontents,” in Li

(ed.), Soft Power, pp 45–60.

17 Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox (eds), Soft Power and US Foreign Policy:

Theoret-ical, Historical and Contemporary Perspective (London and New York: Routledge,

Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power,’ ” Survival, Summer 2006, 48(2):17–36.

21 Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox, “Introduction,” in Soft Power and US Foreign

27 Christopher B Whitney and David Shambaugh, Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008

Multinational Survey of Public Opinion (The Chicago Council of Global Affairs,

2008).

28 Nye, Jr., Soft Power, pp 33–72.

29 Information of the destination of aid of these nations comes from the following website: www.oecd.org/dataoecd, accessed 3 December 2010.

30 See Wang Huning, “Zuowei guojia shili de wenhua: ruan shili” (Culture as National

Power: Soft Power), Fudan xuebao (Fudan Academic Journal (social sciences), 1993,

3: 75–96, cited in Men Honghua, “An Assessment of and A Strategy for Enhancing

China’s Soft Power,” in Men Honghua (ed.), Zhongguo: Ruan Shili Fanglue (China’s

Soft Power Strategy) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2007), p 15.

31 See “Tisheng ruan shili: jiedu zhongyang zhengzhiju di shisanci jiti xuexi” (“Enhance China’s Soft Power: Interpreting the Thirteenth Group Study Session of the Politburo

of the Central Committee”) and “Zhongguo xuyao ruan shili” (“China Needs Soft Power”), http://dangxiao.jmu.edu.cn/show.asp?id=1156, accessed 3 December 2010.

32 “Hu Jintao Calls for Enhancing ‘Soft Power’ of Chinese Culture,” 15 October 2007, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6287138.html, accessed 6 Decem- ber 2010.

33 “Hu Jintao: Shenhua wenhua tizhi gaige, zengqiang Zhongguo wenhua ruan shili” (Hu Jintao: Deepen Reform of Cultural Institutions and Strengthen China’s Cultural Soft Power), www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2010/07–23/2422727.shtml, accessed 5 December 2010.

34 “Tuidong wenhua da fazhan da fanrong, tisheng guojia ruan shili lie ru zhonggong shi’er wu guihua jianyi” (Furthering Great Development and Great Thriving of Culture and Enhancing National Cultural Soft Power Is Included in the Central Com- mittee’s Twelfth Five- Year Plan), www.fjnet.com/yw/tj/201010/t20101028_170936 htm, accessed 5 December 2010.

35 Pew Global Opinion Project, Obama More Popular Abroad Than at Home, Global

Image of US Continues to Benefit (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 17 June

2010), p 7.

36 See, for example, Yu Keping, Huang Ping, Xie Shuguang, and Gao Jian (eds),

Zhong-guo moshi yu “Beijing gongshi”: Chaoyue Huashengdun moshi (China’s Model and Beijing Consensus: Beyond Washington Consensus) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian

chubanshe, 2006).

37 See Men Honghua, “An Assessment of and A Strategy for Enhancing China’s Sot

Power,” in Men Honghua (eds), Zhongguo: Ruan Shili Fanglue (China’s Soft Power

Strategy) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2007), pp 34–7.

38 Figures come from the following presentation: Li Xiaoyun, “China’s Foreign Aid and Aid to Africa: An Overview,” www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/7/40378067.pdf, accessed

3 December 2010 Data on China’s aid may vary with sources.

39 Elena L Pasquini, “China’s Foreign Aid Strategy, Part 3/5,” 24 November 2010, www.devex.com/en/articles/china- moves-to- enhance-aid- transparency, accessed 7 December 2010.

40 Pew Global Opinion Project, Obama More Popular Abroad Than at Home, pp 52–3.

41 Nye, Soft Power, p 107.

42 The source is reportedly the US Department of State, Dictionary of International

Relations Terms, 1987, p 85 See “What Is Public Diplomacy,”

www.publicdiplo-macy.org/1.htm, accessed 8 December 2010.

43 Conversation with a professor in international relations in Beijing, September 2010.

44 “China’s First Public Diplomacy Research Center Established in Beijing,” http:// english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7120534.html, accessed 8 December 2010.

45 “Zhongkeyuan fabu Zhongguo xiandaihua baogao 2009” (The Chinese Academy of Sciences Publishes A Report on China’s Modernization, 2009), www.cas.cn/zt/kjzt/ bg09/mt/200910/t20091027_2637126.shtml, accessed 8 December 2010.

46 Fang Changping, “Zhong Mei ruan shili bijiao” (“A Comparison of China’s and US

Soft Power”), in Men Honghua (eds), Zhongguo: Ruan Shili Fanglue (China’s Soft

Power Strategy) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2007), pp 160–5.

47 Pew Global Opinion Project, Obama More Popular Abroad Than at Home, Global

Image of US Continues to Benefit (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 17 June

2010), p 52.

48 One Chinese analyst regarded the leak of the Chinese talk about the South China Sea as a core national interest as an intentional ploy by the US to drive a wedge between China and Southeast Asian nations and to allow the US to reclaim its declining influence in the region The author’s conversation with a senior Chinese military analyst, summer 2011.

49 For a discussion of the topic and an assessment of the Chinese model of development, refer to Hongyi Lai, “Uneven Opening of China’s Society, Economy, and Politics:

Pro- growth Authoritarian Governance and Protests in China,” Journal of

Contempor-ary China, November 2010, 19(67): 819–35.

2 ‘Soft power’ and Chinese soft

power

Yongnian Zheng and Chi Zhang

In recent years, the concept ‘soft power’ (ruan shili) has frequently appeared in

Chinese media, policy and academic circles With the rise of China, more and more people inside and outside China are paying increasing attention to Chinese soft power, although they may have different understandings of the concept Since the beginning of this century, Beijing’s soft power in international rela-tions has been emerging How China exerts its soft power, or how Chinese soft power is manifested, becomes an important question for the scholarly commun-ity In explaining Chinese soft power, another fundamental and critical question needs to be addressed: what kind of theoretical perspective or thinking is appro-priate to be adopted in analysing soft power in international politics? So far, most Chinese academic discussion on soft power has been based on the popular concept of soft power developed by Joseph S Nye Scholars tend to accept the concept without any doubt In fact, whether this concept is analytically useful or persuasive is a key issue worth examining

ical perspective, and then examines Chinese soft power in the past decade from an empirical perspective We hold that there are defects in Nye’s popular soft power concept, which make it not persuasive enough We propose an alternative interpre-tation of soft power – the dynamic analysis of soft power and hard power in inter-national relations We argue that whether a power resource is soft or hard depends

This chapter first discusses soft power in international politics from a theoret-on the perceptions and feelings of various actors in specific situations The soft or hard effectiveness of the same power resource may be viewed differently by dif-ferent actors or in different situations; such effectiveness is not always fixed and can change with the times and changing international environments Due to the varying degrees of acceptance, power can be generally divided into hard power, soft power and bargaining power Analysis should look at the soft or hard effec-tiveness of a power resource from three perspectives: horizontality, verticality and relativity In recent years, Chinese soft power has been mainly manifested in two aspects One is China’s foreign policy and international behaviour, characterised

by multilateralism, economic diplomacy and a good neighbour policy The other is the external influence of the Chinese model on the developing world

This chapter consists of four sections The first section briefly examines Nye’s soft power discourse and some recent Chinese academic discussions on soft

power The second section presents a critique of Nye’s soft power theory The third section provides an alternative interpretation of soft power, elaborating the dynamic nature of the soft or hard effectiveness of power resources in interna-tional politics Lastly, the fourth section explains how Chinese soft power is manifested on the world stage recently, before reaching a conclusion.

Nye’s soft power discourse and the Chinese academic

discussion on soft power

There is an interesting phenomenon Some Western scholars developed theories

or concepts with policy orientation, which have not been widely accepted or applied in Western academic circles due to their shortcomings or loopholes; however, in some developing countries including China, such discourses have quickly become widespread Typical examples are the theory of ‘the clash of civilisations’ developed by Samuel Huntington and the soft power theory by Nye Taking the latter as an example, many Chinese scholars and media have largely accepted this concept without much consideration, paving the way for it

to become a very popular discourse across the entire Chinese academic circles Nevertheless, it seems that there are somewhat different understandings of soft power among different scholars within China Notably, in China, the use of the soft power concept could be different between political and international rela-tions circles and other circles such as the media In this chapter, the discussion of soft power focuses on the studies of politics and international relations in China The following paragraphs provide a brief comparison and commentary on Nye’s soft power discourse and the Chinese academic discussion on soft power

Nye invented the concept of ‘soft power’ and developed the soft power theory.1 According to him, soft power is increasingly important in world politics The United States should use what he called smart power, i.e a combination of hard power and soft power, to realise its foreign policy goals He wrote that

‘power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants.’ A country’s hard power rests on inducements (carrots) and threats (sticks), such as military power and economic power, while its soft power rests

on three resources: ‘its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its ical values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign pol-icies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)’.2

polit- Inpolit- general,polit- therepolit- arepolit- threepolit- significantpolit- contributionspolit- ofpolit- Nye’spolit- softpolit- powerpolit- theory To begin with, it emphasises the growing importance of the ‘soft’ aspect

in a state’s foreign policy and international behaviour Second, it offers a new theoretical and policy concept, providing a valuable inspiration for the media, policy and academic circles around the world Furthermore, it calls for the US government to adjust its foreign policy and international behaviour

Nevertheless, there are three flaws in this theory The first is self- contradiction regarding the concept of soft power and hard power The second is that some arguments in this discourse are not in accordance with the reality of international politics The third is that the range of those soft power resources mentioned by

in the next section

In comparison, the scope of Chinese scholars’ use of soft power concept is wider than Nye’s soft power theory For example, Nye’s soft power theory is an international politics or foreign policy discourse But his Chinese counterparts’ discussion of soft power covers both foreign policy and domestic policy Also, Nye’s explanation of US soft power focuses on American popular culture and political model, while Chinese scholars’ discussion of Chinese soft power focuses on China’s traditional culture and its economic development model, and touches upon China’s national cohesion, social justice, political reform, anti- corruption, moral level and so on So far, to a certain extent, many Chinese scholars’ discussion of soft power largely introduces, adopts and enlarges Nye’s soft power concept, in order to explain Chinese soft power.3 Therefore, when they learn and apply this theory, their discussions simultaneously expose the merits and the drawbacks of Nye’s soft power discourse Owing to this theory’s loopholes, it might be difficult to provide further inspiration for Chinese aca-demic research on the soft power model or the Chinese government’s effort to promote Chinese soft power in the international society

A critique of Nye’s soft power theory

When Nye put forward his soft power theory, it was strongly oriented towards

US foreign policy He wisely reminded Washington to pay much attention to the use of soft power in international politics Undoubtedly, his discourse is con-structive and valuable for the improvement of US foreign policy and the realisa-tion of US national interests For example, soon after the inauguration of the Obama administration, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton declared that Wash-ington would increasingly use so- called ‘smart power’ to deal with international affairs However, from the academic perspective, there are three shortcomings in Nye’s soft power theory In this sense, the persuasiveness of this discourse is rather limited

First, there is self- contradiction in Nye’s soft power theory On the one hand,

he made a too simple division of power into soft power and hard power cepts Briefly, hard power is coercive or command power, while soft power is co- optive or attractive power Both military power and economic power are typical examples of hard power, while culture, political values and foreign pol-icies are the three resources of soft power.4 On the other hand, in line with the reality of international politics, he pointed out that ‘hard and soft power are related and can reinforce each other’.5 Thus, a country’s strong economic and military power promotes its soft power;6 similarly, its decreasing hard power affects its soft power As Nye wrote:

con-A country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose its ability to shape the international agenda as well as its attractiveness And some countries may be attracted to others with hard power by the myth of

invincibility or inevitability Both Hitler and Stalin tried to develop such myths.7

Hence, he held that ‘hard power can sometimes have an attractive or soft side’,8

and moreover that ‘sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire spectrum of behavior from coercion to attraction’.9

In other words, the effectiveness of a certain power resource can be regarded sometimes as ‘soft’ and sometimes as ‘hard’, no matter whether it is military power, economic power or another type of power This is the reality of interna-tional relations But Nye’s sober understanding of such reality contradicts his definition of soft power and hard power Even military power and economic power, which are viewed as hard power by Nye, can have their ‘soft’ side Unfortunately, Nye did not provide a clear, logical and persuasive explanation to this contradiction in his soft power theory

At the same time, he made a simple partition of the policies and behaviours of hard and soft power For instance, the policies and actions of military power include coercive diplomacy, war and alliance; those of economic power include aid, bribes and sanctions; and those of soft power include public diplomacy and bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.10 However, in many respects, such policies

as coercive diplomacy, alliance, aid and sanctions are largely implemented through bilateral or multilateral diplomacy In this sense, the policies and behav-iours of hard and soft power in Nye’s theory overlap with each other This is another self- contradiction in his soft power discourse Notably, such unavoidable overlap reflects the reality of international politics, in that the effectiveness of a power resource can be either soft or hard

In brief, the too simple conceptual division of soft power and hard power is the biggest flaw of Nye’s soft power theory To some degree, he followed static thinking to match a certain power resource (e.g military, economy, culture, political value, foreign policy) somewhat mechanically with the label of ‘soft power’ or ‘hard power’ Therefore, without considering different actors’ feelings about the same power resource, it could be difficult for such static thinking to produce persuasive analyses on soft power and hard power that are in line with the empirical evidence

Second, some analyses in Nye’s soft power theory are not in accordance with the reality of international relations For example, when explaining the useful-ness of soft power, he wrote: ‘A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its exam-ples, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it.’11 This argument is a critical viewpoint in his soft power discourse, but is difficult to be proven by the reality of international politics For instance, a number of coun-tries in the world admire American democracy and freedom, emulate some American policies and aspire to the high- level openness and prosperity of the United States But this phenomenon does not support the assumption that these states want to follow the United States’ foreign policy There is no definite cor-relation between the two In fact, some countries aspiring to American prosperity

and democracy may choose not to follow or even to oppose Washington’s foreign policy, because of considerations of their own national interest The very limited number of states following the United States and joining the so- called

‘coalition of willing’ during the 2003 Iraq War is a good example

In a word, Nye took it for granted that some countries’ admiration for ican democracy and political values can automatically lead them to follow US foreign policy and international behaviour, thus helping Washington realise its aims in world politics This logic is unrealistic and not supported by empirical evidence

Third, from the perspective of social sciences, Nye’s description of the scope

of soft power resources is not scientific enough, because he didn’t make a clear distinction between soft power resources in international politics and soft power

resources in other domains In his book, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, there are two chapters (Chapter Two and Chapter Three) describ-

ing (potential) resources of America’s soft power and others’ soft power In these, he tended to make a boundless enlargement of the scope of soft power resources to include those with few implications for world politics and state behaviour Just to name a few, according to Nye American soft power resources include: being the world’s largest recipient of foreign immigrants; being the world’s top exporter of films and TV programmes; attracting more overseas stu-dents than any other country; being the number one book publisher in the world; ranking foremost for Nobel Prizes among all countries, its popular culture being attractive, and so on Similarly, when enumerating Europe’s soft power resources, he listed Nobel Prizes, music sales, book sales, life expectancy, over-seas development assistance, popular music, and so on Again, when demonstrat-ing Japan’s soft power resources, he mentioned the number of patents, book sales, music sales, development assistance,12 life expectancy, and so on As for China’s soft power resources, Nye mentioned the novelist Gao Xingjian who

was born in China and won the Nobel Prize for Literature, the film Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, the National Basketball Association star Yao Ming, and

so on.13

Following such logic, the list of soft power resources can go on and on, and is limitless More importantly, most of these soft power resources listed by Nye do not have important implications for international politics or state behaviour Taking music or films as examples, it is not difficult to understand that some Chinese people’s enthusiasm for American popular music does not mean that the Chinese government will follow or support the American government’s foreign policy; similarly, the welcoming of Chinese films by some American audiences does not exert a significant influence on the United States’ policy towards China

To a certain degree, Nye’s excessive enlargement of the scope of soft power resources makes his soft power theory more difficult to be used scientifically to analyse international political phenomena, especially the foreign policy and international behaviour of a given sovereign state

In particular, he put American popular culture, including American popular music and Hollywood films, under the domain of American soft power

resources However, these resources may actually offer much less help for Washington to reach its foreign policy goals than Nye expected For instance, the same people who are fond of American music and films can also join anti- American demonstrations A good example of this occurred during the Iraq War, when a large- scale anti- war/American movement spread across many countries that are heavily influenced by American popular culture, such as some US allies

in Europe and Asia- Pacific These social movements produced obvious impacts

on some states’ attitudes towards the United States and the Iraq War, and directly challenged the prestige and reputation of then British, Spanish and Italian gov-ernments that closely followed US foreign policy and sent troops to Iraq Imme-diately after the change of cabinets, Spain and Italy decided to withdraw their troops from Iraq Even the then Blair cabinet of the United Kingdom, under mounting domestic pressure, had to declare a withdrawal of military forces from Iraq Hence, although Nye regarded American popular culture as a critical soft power resource for the United States, this resource provided little help for Wash-ington on the Iraq War issue

As to the phenomenon that American popular culture does not always help the American government to realise its aims in world politics, Nye gave a brief explanation: ‘popular culture, because it is not under direct control of govern-ment, does not always produce the exact policy outcomes that the government might desire’.14 But this explanation is unpersuasive The key does not rest with whether those resources are under direct control of government Even some eco-nomic and military tools that are under direct governmental control do not neces-sarily produce outcomes desired by the government Thus, a better explanation for the phenomenon might be that popular culture, although it is welcomed by many people, does not have significant implications for foreign policy- making and state behaviour Speaking realistically, sovereign states are still the major players in international relations, and national interests are the most important factor they consider when formulating foreign policy

In short, on the one hand, Nye expanded the scope of soft power resources too much and exceeded the sphere of international politics; on the other hand, he tried to use this concept to explain issues in international politics Therefore, the effectiveness of this effort and the persuasiveness of his soft power theory are doubtful

The usefulness of Nye’s static or rigid interpretation of soft power and hard power is limited for the study of international relations An alternative discourse

of soft power and hard power is therefore necessary We believe that there are

no absolute soft or hard power resources in world politics Compared to Nye’s static thinking, dynamic thinking is more suitable to be applied in the analysis of the soft or hard effectiveness of power resources in international politics No matter what kind of power resources there are, the key is how to use them The same power resource, for different actors in different situations or used in differ-ent ways, can lead to different soft or hard effectiveness

An alternative interpretation of soft power and hard power

We propose dynamic thinking of soft and hard power in international politics Whether a power resource is soft or hard depends on the feelings and perception

of the specific actor on which this power resource acts, whether it be a country, a government, an interest group, a social class, etc The soft or hard effectiveness

of a certain power resource is often a relative perception by an actor in a specific international environment In this sense, due to varying degrees of acceptance, power can be generally divided into hard power, soft power and bargaining power; and analysis can look at the soft or hard effectiveness of a power resource from three perspectives: horizontality, verticality and relativity

First, if an actor is forced by a power resource to accept a result that it dislikes,

or is negatively affected by a power resource, such a power resource can be viewed

as hard power for this actor For example, during the Second World War, the Fascist military power was a typical hard power for those countries invaded or occupied by the Fascists; similarly, anti- Fascist military strength was a hard power for Fascist regimes After the end of the Cold War, the American government and some US- dominated international organisations, like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, forced some developing countries through various measures to implement domestic reforms based on the Washington Consensus: such external force often appeared as hard power for those developing countries Second, if an actor actively seeks or is willing to accept a power resource, or

is positively influenced by a power resource, such a power resource can be seen

as soft power for this actor For instance, some relatively weak countries seek military shelter from a powerful country; such military protection indicates soft power effectiveness for these weak countries Another example is the Marshall Plan, which can be felt as soft power for those US allies in Western Europe Also, China’s construction of the Zambia–Tanzania railway in the 1970s, at the request of the then Zambian and Tanzanian governments, can be regarded as soft power for the two African countries

Third, sometimes, a power resource is neither coercive enough to force an actor to accept it, nor so attractive that this actor actively seeks it; instead, the actor exerting this power resource has to bargain and negotiate with the actor on which this power resource acts, so as to reach an agreement and realise an outcome The effectiveness of such a power resource is between that of soft and hard power Thus, this power can be defined as bargaining power It often appears in bilateral and multilateral negotiations in international institutions For example, China made a proposition to establish the China–ASEAN (Association

of Southeast Asian Nations) Free Trade Area and carried out bilateral or lateral negotiations with ASEAN states Such Chinese effort can be viewed as bargaining power for ASEAN countries Another example is North Korea’s nuclear issue Washington is not able to realise its aims on this issue by simply using hard power or soft power Therefore, it needs to exert bargaining power and conduct multilateral talks with relevant regional states or even bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang directly