Energy security and geopolitics in the arctic

The Arctic: Geopolitics, International Relations and Energy Security — A View from India 167 Neil Gadihoke 7.. LIST OF ACRONYMSAC Arctic Council AARI Arctic and Antarctic Research Instit

in the 21 st Century

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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

The image “Northwest Passage–Northern Sea Route,” seen on the front cover, is taken from the link: http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/arctic-sea-routes-northern-sea-route-and-northwest-passage; Hugo Alhenius, UNEP/GRID-Arendal.

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ENERGY SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE ARCTIC

Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st Century

www.Ebook777.com

The views and ideas expressed by the contributing authors of thisbook do not necessarily represent those of the Energy StudiesInstitute (ESI) and the publication of their chapters does not implythat ESI subscribes to or agrees with their expressed views and ideas

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List of Tables and Figures xiii

About the Energy Studies Institute xxv

Hooman Peimani

2 From White to Blue: The Shrinking Arctic Cryosphere 25

Shawn J Marshall

3 Possible Changes to the Russian Arctic Environment

under the Influence of Natural and Anthropogenic Factors 59

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Makeev

Section II: What Are the Stakes for the

4 The Transnational Arctic and Russia 95

Nadezhda Klimovna Kharlampyeva

vii

5 Norway and Russia: Neighbours with Strong Interests

Arild Moe

Section III: What Are the Interests for

the Non-Regional Large Economies? 165

6 The Arctic: Geopolitics, International Relations

and Energy Security — A View from India 167

Neil Gadihoke

7 The Arctic and Japan: Energy Security

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AC Arctic Council

AARI Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute

ACIA Arctic Climate Impact Assessment

ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

AMAP Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program

AO Arctic Ocean

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ATF Arctic Task Force

BAU Business As Usual

BB Billion barrels

bcm Billion cubic meters

BEAC Barents Euro-Arctic Council

Bq Becquerel, unit of measuring radionuclide content

BRC Barents Regional Council

CAFE Conservational Arctic Flora and Fauna

CBSS Council of the Baltic Sea States

CCS Carbon Capture and Sequestration

DDT Dichloro Diphenyl Trichloroethane

EC European Commission

ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

ENSO El Ni˜no-Southern Oscillation

EP European Parliament

EU European Union

FPU Floating Production Unit

ix

G8 The Group of Eight, a forum for the governments

of eight major economiesGHGs Greenhouse gases

Gt Gigatons

HM Heavy metals

IASC International Arctic Science Committee

IEA International Energy Agency

IMO International Maritime Organization

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IOR Indian Ocean Region

ISA UN International Seabed Authority

LNG Liquefied natural gas

mb/d Million barrels per day

METI Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry

MPC Maximum Permissible Concentrations

MPEC Maximum Permissible Ecological Concentrations

Msl Mean sea level

mtoe Million tons of oil equivalent

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCM Nordic Council of Ministers

NEAFC Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission

NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations

NSR Northern Sea Route

NSW Northern Sea Way

PSSAs Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas

SAO Search and Rescue in the Arctic

SCM Standard cubic metres

SDAG Shtokman Development AG

SEA Sea Economic Activities

SLR Sea level rise

SOC Steady organic compounds

STF Arctic Special Task Force

SWIPA Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic

tcf trillion cubic feet

tcm trillion cubic meters

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNCLCS United Nations Commission on the Limits of the

Continental ShelfUNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USA United States of America

USGC US Geological Survey

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

◦C Celsius degrees

◦F Fahrenheit degrees

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LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

2.1 Area and Volume of the Global Cryosphere (Sea Ice

Data is from 1979–2010 and Northern Hemisphere SnowData is from 1966–2010)

27

3.1 Evaluation of Annual Anomalies of the Air Temperature

and the Angular Rotation Speed of the Earth-Years ofConnection and Opposition of Jupiter and Saturn

4.3 The Potential of Continental Shelf Oil and Gas

Resources (billion tons of oil equivalents)

107

4.4 Oil–Gas Reserves in Russia’s Arctic Province (cubic

meters)

108

4.5 Potential and Available Gas Deposits in Barents–Kara

Province (trillion cubic meters)

109

4.6 Oil and Gas Deposits in the Russian Arctic and

Sub-Arctic

1104.7 The Principle of the ‘‘Format of Four Councils’’ 117

2.4 Arctic Sea Ice Area in September (106km2),

2.6 Greenland Ice Sheet Melt Area as Derived from

Passive Microwave Remote Sensing

Temperature Fluctuations Relative to theContemporary Situation in Different Provinces

of the Arctic

62

3.2 Fluctuations of Indirect Indicators of Air Temperature

for the Last Millennium

65

3.3 Change of Average Annual Air Temperature in the

(plots from top to down) Arkhangelsk, Naryan-Mar,Amderma, Marre-Sale, and Gyda Regions

66

3.4 Annual Changes of Normalized Anomalies of Average

Annual Air Temperature (Celsius)

Barrow Station (Alaska), 1997–2009

76

3.9 Thickness Change of a Seasonally-Thawed Layer in

Reindeer Deport Station (Canada), 1997–2009

77

3.10 Main Impact Areas within Land Catchment Areas of

the North and the Arctic of Russia

84

5.1 The Norwegian Continental Shelf 1295.2 Discoveries in the Barents Sea 1325.3 Norwegian Continental Shelf Boundaries 146

5.4 Continental Shelf Area of the Russian Federation in the

Arctic Ocean beyond the 200-Nautical-Mile Zone

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I acknowledge with appreciation the contribution of the Energy rity Division at the Energy Studies Institute of the National Univer-sity of Singapore, which helped organize a workshop on the Arctic

Secu-in 2011 that laid the ground for preparSecu-ing this book as well as otherrelated activities throughout that year and in early 2012 I thank itsresearchers, namely, Mr Nur Azha Putra, Mr Nicholas Koh ChungWei, Ms Mallika Naguran and Ms Su Liying In particular, Ms Su’sassistance with various aspects of the formatting and organizing ofthe book was critical for its completion I would also like to expressappreciation for the administrative support provided by ESI’s Assis-tant Manager, Ms Jan Lui

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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

1 Dr Hooman Peimani

Dr Hooman Peimani is a Principal Fellow and Head of the EnergySecurity Division at the Energy Studies Institute of the NationalUniversity of Singapore He specializes in energy (energy security)and security (regional/international and human security), particu-larly relating to South and West Asia, the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific region and the Arctic

Having worked at different senior capacities, Dr Peimani’s sified employment engagements in North America, Europe and WestAsia have included working for academic entities (e.g., Geneva School

diver-of Diplomacy & International Relations) and non-academic ones,such as energy corporations (e.g., Nord Stream, Switzerland), privateand public organizations (e.g., Canadian government) and nationaland international institutions (e.g., UNICEF, UNCHR, UNRISD andWHO) His employment experience includes over 20 years of researchactivities working for research institutes such as Jane’s Defence/UK,Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Centrefor International Cooperation and Security/UK and Arab PetroleumResearch Center/France He has extensive field experience in Westand South Asia and the Asia/Pacific region

Added to his years of experience as a freelance journalist working

for many newspapers (e.g., South China Morning Post and Moscow Times) and news agencies (e.g., Inter Press Service/Berlin, Inter- national Relations and Security Network/ Zurich and Eurasianet/

New York), he has contributed as an expert to many newspapers

(e.g., The Wall Street Journal ) and news agencies (e.g., Asahi bon, Bloomberg, Kyodo News, Platts, Reuters and UPI ) and/or been

Shim-xix

quoted by them Since the 1990s, he has made regular contributions

to many radio/TV programs (e.g., Deutsche Welle, BBC, CNA and CNBC ) His publications include 10 books, 27 chapters in books,

over 200 journal/newspaper articles, scores of government/UN uments/reports and several book reviews

doc-2 Dr Shawn J Marshall

Dr Shawn Marshall is a Professor in the Department of Geography

at the University of Calgary, Canada He is also a Canada ResearchChair in Climate Change, and a Research Associate with the Cana-dian Institute for Advanced Research (CIfAR) Earth System Evolu-tion Program

Dr Marshall studies glacier and ice sheet dynamics and globalglacier response to climate change, including field studies in moun-tain and polar regions This involves three-dimensional numericalmodelling of ice sheet dynamics in Greenland, Iceland and the Cana-dian Rocky Mountains Dr Marshall is the current Acting ExecutiveDirector of the Arctic Institute of North America He is a contribut-ing author to the IPCC and a lead author of the recent Arctic Moni-toring and Assessment Report (AMAP) He has published widely onglacier response to climate change, sea level rise, and snow and ice in

the climate system, including the recent textbook The Cryosphere.

Dr Marshall studied Engineering Physics at the University ofToronto and went on to do his PhD in Geophysics at the University

of British Columbia

3 Professor Viacheslav Mikhailovich Makeev

Professor Viacheslav Mikhailovich Makeev is a professor in the raphy Department of the State Polar Academy in Russia He majors

Geog-in Arctic research, Geography, Geology, Paleogeography, Ecology andNature Management

He has been Chair of the Nature Management Department at theState Polar Academy since 2000 He also heads the ecological securitysection of the Arctic Expertise Council across the Arctic regions ofthe Council of the Russian Federation (Parliament)

Professor Mikhailovich graduated from the Geography ment of St Petersburg University in 1963 He holds a PhD in

Depart-geomorphology and paleogeography He has participated in 25 polarexpeditions to the Arctic and spent a winter season in the Antarctic.

4 Associate Professor Nadezhda Klimovna Kharlampyeva

Associate Professor Nadezhda Kharlampyeva teaches courses on temporary Problems of World Politics, Arctic Political Methodology,Transnational Corporations and World Political Issues, InternationalOrganizations and Political Systems Processes at St PetersburgUniversity in Russia She also teaches in the Regional EconomicsDepartment of the Nevsky Language and Cultural Institute

Con-Over the years, she has worked for other educational entities,including the educational section of Sakha-Russian Diamond Com-pany, St Petersburg’s Secretariat of the Northern Forum NGO andthe City Investment Agency of the St Petersburg Government

Associate Professor Kharlampyeva is the editor of the Russian

Natural Science Academy’s Arctic Idea Journal She currently directs

research projects on Arctic policy sponsored by Russian grants.Professor Kharlampyeva has participated and organized numerousnational and international conferences and seminars She is an author

of the monograph, North-West Federal Area: External Affairs (2008)

(co-authored with N Markushina) and more than 40 science articles

on Arctic cooperation and Arctic policy

With a PhD in International Relations and Foreign Policy, she is amember of the Russian International Relations Studies Group (RISAMGIMO) and the International Arctic Social Science Association(IASSA)

5 Dr Arild Moe

Dr Arild Moe is a Deputy Director/Senior Research Fellow with theFridtjof Nansen Institute at Lysaker, near Oslo, Norway Most ofhis research has been devoted to Russia and the region, with specificinterest in the energy sector, mainly the oil and gas industry Dr Moehas also conducted research on offshore activities in the Barents Sea,Russian climate politics, and also Russian–Norwegian relations

In 1992, he was a consultant for the European Bank for struction and Development’s Energy Sector Technical AssistanceProject for the Baltic countries Presently, Dr Moe is directing a

Recon-long-term research project on energy developments in Russia andthe Caspian Region with participants from several Norwegian andforeign institutes He is also engaged in studies on broader Arcticpolicy issues as well as Norwegian policy in the high north Dr Moehas written extensively, including peer-reviewed articles and book

chapters His most recent research was published in Polar phy, Eurasian Geography and Economics, and the Arctic Review on Law and Politics.

Geogra-Dr Moe has undergraduate degrees in Political Science, RussianLanguage and Public Law and a PhD in Political Science from theUniversity of Oslo

6 Dr Danila Bochkarev

Dr Danila Bochkarev is with the Global Security team of theBrussels-based East-West Institute Before joining this Institute, hewas an Inbev scholar of EU-Russia relations at the Louvain-la Neuveand Leuven Universities in Belgium He also worked on China andCentral Asian affairs at the European Parliament

Dr Bochkarev studied international relations, history and ical economy in Paris, London and Nizhniy Novgorod (Russia) Inaddition to his PhD, he has several post-graduate qualifications ininternational relations

polit-He is the author of many academic publications and policy papers,and regularly contributes to international media and policy debates

on the EU, Russian and Eurasian energy, security and foreign policyissues Dr Bochkarev has several academic and professional distinc-tions, including being a Royal Dutch Shell and French Governmentscholar He is a native Russian speaker and is fluent in English andFrench

7 Commander Neil Gadihoke

Commander Neil Gadihoke is a Research Fellow at India’s premierthink tank, the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi

He has over 21 years of service in the Indian Navy and has held awide array of operational, training and staff billets He has an MSc

in Telecommunications and an MSc in Defence and Security Studies

He also holds an MBA in Human Resource Management

Commander Gadihoke has travelled to more than 25 countriesand is a keen follower of international geopolitics He has publishedarticles on geopolitics and security in various journals His presentresearch areas include the geopolitics of the IOR (Indian OceanRegion), climate change and its implications for security, and theunfolding future of the Arctic He has conducted research coveringissues such as ‘‘Climate Change: Implications for the Indian Navy’’and ‘‘The Emerging Scenario of Alternative Energies in the IOR’’.

He is a graduate of the US Navy Staff College, Rhode Island,USA where he was awarded the Zimmerman Gray Writing Awardfor the best research paper written by an international student duringthe 2004–2005 academic year Subsequently, Commander Gadihokewas awarded the Commendation Card by the Chief of the IndianNavy while serving at the Navy’s Directorate of Strategy, Conceptsand Transformation, where he was a member of the core team thatdrafted the Indian Navy’s Maritime Strategy He also served as NavalAssistant to the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Forces Com-mand and as Joint Director of Naval Telecommunications

8 Professor Hiroshi Ohta

Professor Hiroshi Ohta is a Professor at the School of InternationalLiberal Studies, Waseda University in Tokyo, where he teaches Polit-ical Science, Environmental Studies, Japanese Foreign Policy andGlobal Governance His research themes include global environmen-tal politics and policies, the concept of global governance, Japaneseclimate change policy, comparative studies of regional fisheries man-agement regimes, and civil society and political theory

Professor Ohta is a member of the Executive Board of theJapanese Chapter of the United Nations Studies Association.Previously, he sat on the Japanese Association of International Rela-tions’ Board of Advisors

His recent relevant publications include: ‘‘Japanese ClimateChange Policy: Moving beyond the Kyoto Process’’ in Hans G Brauch

et al (eds), Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security: Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks (Berlin:

Springer, 2010: 1381–1391) and ‘‘A Small Leap Forward: Regional

Cooperation for Tackling the Problems of the Environment andNatural Resources in Northeast Asia’’, in Martina Timmermann and

Jituso Tsuchiyama (eds.), Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Regional Steps towards Global Governance (New York: United Nations Univer-

sity, 2008: 297–315)

Professor Ohta received his PhD in International Relations fromthe Department of Political Science at the Graduate School of Artsand Sciences of Columbia University in New York City

ABOUT THE ENERGY STUDIES

INSTITUTE

Established as an autonomous research institute within the NationalUniversity of Singapore, the Energy Studies Institute (ESI) is apolicy-oriented research institute that seeks to produce independentand high quality research that stimulates and informs debate onenergy issues of key interest to policy makers, industries and thecommunity ESI endeavours to advance the understanding of local,regional and global energy issues through independent research andanalyses aimed at addressing, informing and influencing public opin-ion and policies Research activities at ESI address issues that are atthe intersection of energy economics, energy and the environment,and energy security

xxv

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to natural and periodic changes, which have been in place for millions

of years creating consecutive long or short phases of global warmingand global cooling Hence, the ongoing global warming is simply yetanother episode of warming based on the natural pattern of climaticchange being a characteristic of our planet caused mainly by terres-trial and celestial factors Unnatural factors caused by the activities

of the human race are not the causes of this phenomenon althoughthey may have some local implications, as the view holds Yet, globalwarming has now been accepted by the majority of scientists con-cerned with climatic changes and just about all governments as areal and expanding phenomenon with short-and long-term dire con-sequences should it continue Accordingly, the human-made emission

of greenhouse gases (GHG) is the main cause of this phenomenon.Within this context, the main problem is CO2, which is generated

1

Fig 1.1 Arctic Region.

Source: Author’s creation based on Arctic blank map by Radostaw Botev http://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Arctic blank map.png

primarily by the heavy global consumption of fossil fuels (oil, gas,and coal), a phenomenon that has been in place over the last twocenturies It has had various manifestations in different parts of theworld, including destruction of forests caused by frequent fires, rapiddepletion of water resources, desertification and rapid/permanentmelting ice The latter has been manifested in the rapid melting ofglaciers in different parts of the world (e.g., those of the Himalaya)and the melting of the Arctic ice

1.1 CONTEXT FOR THE ARCTIC’S DEBATE:

CHALLENGES

Hence, global warming underlies the Arctic debate, which is thefocus of this book, and has various implications ranging fromenvironmental to energy security While melting of some land-basedlarge concentrations of ice (glaciers) may have, at least initially, localimplications, the melting of huge floating Arctic ice is a major devel-opment with global implications In other words, this phenomenon,

if it continues, will pose formidable challenges, given its disastrousshort-and long-term environmental consequences, and will seriouslyquestion the survival of this planet and its living creatures in worst-case scenarios Apart from worsening global warming, which will sub-stantially diminish the world’s largest cooling source, the melting ofthe Arctic ice will eventually trigger a process affecting all glaciers tovarying extents, especially the one in Greenland, which is the world’slargest This process will prompt sea levels to rise over time at a ratefaster than what we are witnessing today The International Panel

on Climate Change (IPCC) projections are alarming enough for thebenchmark year of 2100 Thus far, the rise is projected to be 14.61inches (37.11 centimetres) and 19.13 inches (48.59 centimetres) forA1B1 and A1FI2 scenarios.3 The IPCC estimated that the Arcticcould be free of summer sea ice somewhere between 2050 and 2080,4and 10% (possibly as much as 50%) of the Arctic tundra could bereplaced by forests by 2100.5Apocalyptical results could be expected

in the case of a total melting of the Arctic ice, which, in turn, wouldmelt the Greenland ice and raise the sea level by 7 meters.6

1.2 OPPORTUNITIES: EXPLORATION

OF RESOURCES AND NAVIGATION

The gradual melting of the Arctic is surely serious because of all itsnegative environmental implications, not only for the Arctic region,but also for the rest of the world The resulting damage to the envi-ronment will eventually and inevitably affect other sectors, includingthe economic, political, and social ones Yet, in the short-and possibly

medium-term, the gradual melting of the ice could provide certainopportunities, such as energy extraction and mining, as the Arcticregion is rich in fossil fuels, particularly oil and gas, as well as miner-als Directly related to this, the possibility of ice-free sea routes, for

at least a few months of the year, through the Arctic could late intercontinental trade In short, this unfortunate environmentalevent could have certain benefits for a limited period of time, as will

stimu-be briefly discussed in the following sections

is still uncertain, though there are estimates, as to just how much ofthese resources are commercially retrievable given the high cost ofdeep sea oil/gas extraction in such a climatically-hostile environment.Nevertheless, based on mean estimates, the entire region — con-sisting of those areas within the Arctic states’ territorial bound-aries — and the rest of the region, including the disputed areas, has

at least 90 billion barrels of undiscovered oil.7The mean estimates forundiscovered natural gas and natural gas liquids are 47.2891 trillioncubic meters and 44 billion barrels, respectively.8

1.2.2. Minerals

The Arctic contains large quantities of various minerals, includingprecious metals and stones They include nickel, copper, tin, ura-nium, phosphate, lead, zinc, gold, apatite, alumina, iron ore, mica,titanium, phlogopite, vermiculite, niobium, tantalite, quartz, fluorite,barite, calcite, amethyst, amazonite, and diamonds.9Their estimatedvalue of US$1.5–2 trillion clearly indicates the reason for their impor-tance to the regional states.10 In this regard, the following examplesare noteworthy as they reflect the regional and global significance ofthe Arctic minerals In the American Arctic part, Alaska has major

reserves of minerals, plus large reserves of zinc and lead The Red Dogmine, for instance, is a zinc/lead mine located within the boundaries

of the Red Dog Mine census-designated place The world’s largestproducer of zinc in its heyday, and also the largest mineral producer

in the state of Alaska in 2009, accounting for 53.3% of its annualproduction, it now has the world’s largest zinc reserves At the end

of 2009, the most recent year for which data is available, the minehad reserves of 67.66 million tons of zinc of 16.6–20% grade and 67.66million tons of lead of 4.4–5.4% grade.11

Canada’s Arctic section is also rich in minerals For example, itsiron deposits are significant for their size and production capabili-ties, as evident in the case of an undertaking by the Baffinland IronMines Corporation Currently, this corporation is developing a largeopen pit iron mine in the Mary River area of Baffin Island, Nunavut,Canada, which consists of nine high-grade iron ore deposits.12Sched-uled to make its first commercial ore shipments in September 2014,the mine is expected to produce 18 million tons of iron ore per yearfor 20 years.13

The European Arctic section is rich in minerals similar to theNorth American section Iron ore is also in abundance here As aGreater Arctic country, Sweden contains the region’s largest iron-bearing area in Swedish Lapland, of which the total discoveredreserves (mainly magnetite and hematite) are estimated to be2,413 million metric tons.14 Norway also has large deposits ofiron ore, including about 1,000 million tons in its Northern part(Sør-Varanger) and a large reserve of iron ore has also recently beensurveyed at Kolari in northwest Finland.15

1.2.3. Northern sea route and North-West passage

The melting of the Arctic ice, if it continues, will result in part of theArctic becoming ice-free for a few months each year in the future

If this happens, it will be possible to navigate between the Atlanticand Pacific Oceans via the Arctic and thus through the NorthernSea Route via the Russian Arctic and the Northwest Passage viathe Canadian Arctic, which will be significantly shorter than thecurrently-used Southern Sea Route through the Suez Canal and the

Strait of Malacca.Today, the travelling distance for a ship from mansk in Russia to Yokohama in Japan via the Suez Canal is 20,554kilometres, but it would be only 9,232 kilometres through the Arctic(Northern Sea Route).16Likewise, the distance between South Koreaand the Netherlands is about 20,320 kilometres via the Southern SeaRoute, while it would be only approximately 14,720 kilometres viathe Northern Sea Route.17

Mur-Such a possibility could, and likely would, facilitate, indeed,encourage trade between Europe, North America and the Northeast-ern part of Asia (Asia-Pacific region) by reducing the cost of inter-continental exports/imports Heavy sea traffic through the Arctic for

a few months of the year would certainly contribute to large-scale airand water pollution, further contributing to the region’s warmingwith obvious negative environmental impacts on the Arctic and sub-sequently the rest of the world Apart from its environmental dimen-sion, such traffic could potentially and significantly affect sea traf-fic through the Southern Sea Route as Asian, European, and NorthAmerican countries with access to the Arctic sea routes would likelyhave a strong incentive to conduct part of their inter-continentaltrade through them during its few months of availability

Today, no one can predict the real extent of cargo and possibly oiland liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker traffic, through these routes

to determine the impact on the Southern Route To start with, scale commercial use of the Northern Sea Route, which is compara-tively more developed than the North-West Passage and thus morelikely to be used at a relatively significant scale in the foreseeablefuture, requires the route remaining ice-free for a few months a year

large-or at least a situation close to being ice-free requiring limited use oficebreakers to keep the route navigable This would enable unhin-dered navigation of large cargo ships and/or sea tankers Contingent

on the continuation of global warming, such scenarios are predicted

to happen sometime in the future, but the approximate date is puted by various scholars Thus, estimates for an ice-free NorthernSea Route in summer, prolonging the sailing season from the current20–30 days to about 120 days range from as early as 2013 to as late

dis-as 2080, but most estimates fall between 2040 and 2060.18According

to research carried out by Cambridge University, as presented byProfessor Peter Wadhams in 2011, the sea route could well be avail-able even sooner than 2013 as the whole North Pole could be ‘‘ice-free

in just a few years’ time, all gone by the summer of 2015.’’19The totaldisappearance of the Arctic Ocean by 2015 is of course a nightmarescenario given the calamitous consequences for which no country isprepared

One should hope that the required global efforts, hinging on asubstantial decrease of GHG emissions, will take place soon enough

to end or at least slow down global warming to avoid its catastrophiceffects, including a significant and steady melting of the Arctic ice.Nevertheless, if the melting of the Arctic ice continues, the availabil-ity of the Northern Sea Route for a few months a year will certainlydecrease cargo/tanker traffic via the Southern Sea Route for thosecountries with access to the Northern Sea Route, with obvious nega-tive economic implications for the countries along the Southern SeaRoute There should also be a decrease in the geostrategic impor-tance of this route and, by default, its respective countries How-ever, the mentioned negative consequences should be limited giventhat the bulk of intercontinental trade will have to be conductedthrough the Southern Sea Route in any case, given that the use ofthe Arctic routes, including the Northern Sea Route, would not be

a geographically feasible option for such trade involving SouthernEuropean, Southern American, West and South Asian and manyAsia-Pacific countries In particular, the large and growing intra-regional trade, such as that from the Asia-Pacific region, will stillhave to be done through the Southern Sea Route regardless of theavailability of the Arctic sea routes

1.2.4. Immediate and aspiring beneficiaries

Assuming that the current environmentally disastrous trend ues, the melting of the Arctic ice will open doors for certain economicactivities of not just regional, but also global significance, includ-ing oil and gas extraction, mining and intercontinental navigation.Without a doubt, the main immediate beneficiaries of such activitiesare the five littoral states, namely: Canada, Denmark/Greenland,

contin-Norway, Russia and the United States By virtue of sharing parts

of the region, they have direct access to it as well as opportunities

to expand into the unchartered and/or disputed parts of the Arctic.Moreover, the bulk of the region’s known mineral and energy (oiland gas) resources fall within their territories and exclusive economiczones (EEZ) These resources are unevenly distributed and leave cer-tain countries, such as Russia, in a much better situation than others.Indeed Russia has the largest share of the region’s energy resources.Parts of the region (mainly its sea sections) are disputed, pitting con-cerned littoral countries against each other, e.g., parts of the BarentsSea over which both Norway and Russia claim ownership Undoubt-edly, the five littoral states are very much interested in the prospect

of carrying out part of their intercontinental trade through the Arcticsea routes, if they become a reality By significantly decreasing theshipping costs of their trade, these routes are certainly too tempt-ing to be ignored, especially because all of them have been hardhit by the last decade’s financial/economic crises, continuing to thisdate The importance of the routes is also linked to a negative eco-nomic trend, which started most notably in the 1990s as a result

of the littoral states’ loss of their economic strength to the ing economies of Asia and Latin America For Russia, the SovietUnion’s fall and subsequent loss of its economic strength and also itssecured markets of the Soviet block and its non-communist allies areyet to be compensated Hence, lower export costs for Russian prod-ucts via the Northern Sea Route would certainly help Russia boostits exports and profit margins Concern about the negative impact

emerg-of global warming on the Arctic, particularly the rising sea levelsthat could affect the littoral states, is a major reason for Russia’scontinued interest in the Arctic

Apart from the littoral states, the countries of the Greater Arcticregion which share parts of the regional areas and resources, formthe second tier of the regional stake holders These are Iceland,Sweden, and Finland, which have access to much smaller parts ofthe region due to their geographical locations They are not in aposition to lay claim to the bulk of the region — disputed and/oruncharted areas — partly due to their geographical realities leaving

no possibility for claiming large shares of the regional territories,waters and mineral and energy resources In part, their economic,military, and political weaknesses compared to most of the five lit-toral states make a successful claim to the regional resources beyondtheir national territories and EEZs rather difficult, at least in theforeseeable future Yet, these countries surely have other interests inthe region, including the use of the Arctic sea routes if they become areality As trading countries, reductions in the costs of their importedand exported products will be good news for their small (Iceland)and comparatively small (Sweden and Finland) economies, whichare in need of a boost, to offset their losing ground to the emergingAsian and Latin American economies and the hard-hitting finan-cial/economic crises over the last decade To this, their environmen-tal stake in the Arctic as regional states along the lines mentionedfor the five littoral states should be added.

Furthermore, given that major parts of the Arctic Region do notfall within any group of countries’ territories and EEZs, they surely

do not belong only to the eight mentioned countries More important

than this, as mentioned earlier, the region’s environmental health isessential for the entire planet’s environmental health Hence, in real-ity, all countries can be considered stakeholders in the region How-ever, there is only a small number of non-regional countries capable

of entering the Arctic as active players They are concerned not justabout its melting ice, but also the potential of the region’s min-erals and oil and gas reserves These countries are mainly China,India, Japan, and South Korea, which, to varying degrees, haveestablished footholds in the Arctic, primarily up to this point, forscientific/environmental purposes However, as major global energyconsumers, they certainly have an eye on the vast regional oil and gasreserves which could potentially address some of their large and, inmost cases, growing energy requirements As it stands, none of thesestates has a declared plan to explore oil and gas in the Arctic, but allare interested in supporting such exploration through some form ofengagement, including investment, in the regional countries’ oil/gasdevelopment projects The same type of involvement is also conceiv-able in the region’s mining activities, of course to a much lesser extent

given that such engagement will not be crucial for their economies, atleast in the foreseeable future As major trading countries involved inintercontinental trade, these countries are certainly interested in theprospect of conducting a part of their trade via the Arctic sea routes,

if and when they are available Finally, they all share tal concerns, particularly but not exclusively, the prospect of risingsea levels, as such development will negatively affect their countries’large coastlines

environmen-1.3 ISSUES OF CONCERN

The melting of the Arctic ice is a matter of concern for various reasons.First and foremost and unsurprisingly, the single most important con-cern is the environment The melting will have major negative envi-ronmental implications affecting the sustainability of life in all itsforms, regionally and globally The disappearance of the Arctic, par-tially or completely, will further worsen global warming while leading

to rising sea levels, affecting all countries with a coastline and ularly the island states, which could even experience total submersiondepending on their locations and geological formations

partic-Second, the dramatic climatic change in the Arctic will encouragethe exploitation of the regional energy and mineral resources Theeconomic and financial importance of these resources, particularlyoil and gas, being two types of fossil energy in demand globally,will certainly lead to competition with predictable results In theirattempts to secure large shares of the regional resources, disputes,tensions, and conflicts will arise between and among the eight states

in the region, and the five littoral states, in particular The direct, butmost likely, indirect involvement of the non-regional states with anability to penetrate the region (namely, China, India, South Korea,and Japan) will further intensify the competition and affect regionaland global relations

Third, the possible opening of Arctic sea routes in a few decades

is yet another source of concern Contingent on their sustainedavailability, use of these passages, even for a few months a year,will substantially reduce the costs of exports for the large tradingnations with access to and ability to use these sea routes, providing

an obvious economic benefit, as discussed earlier These ing nations can potentially increase their exports by pricing theirproducts more competitively due to their lower shipping costs, andthereby expand their share in global markets For that matter, theissue of free and uninterrupted access to these routes will possiblytrigger competition over controlling them, pitting all the regional andnon-regional states with large and growing export capabilities andhaving suitable sea vessels, against each other Over time, disputesover access to and use of these routes could well turn into inter-state and, quite possibly, inter-regional conflicts affecting regionaland international relations.

export-Finally, military control and an arms race will likely be a product of the Arctic’s melting ice The region was militarized dur-ing the Cold War by the two major protagonists of the era, theUnited States and the Soviet Union, each leading a block of like-minded states and corresponding military alliances Providing a con-necting route between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the waterswere regularly frequented by their nuclear submarines The signif-icant American and Soviet military presence was supplemented byother regional countries as part of their defence policies When theUSSR collapsed in 1991, and the Cold War ended, the military sig-nificance of the Arctic declined, though all the regional states havemaintained some degree of military presence Especially since themiddle of the last decade, the possibility of oil, gas, and mineralextraction and shorter sea routes has rekindled interest in the Arctic.This development has justified a growing military presence, espe-cially but not exclusively, by Russia and the United States and/or areorganization of the regional military forces to adapt themselves

by-to the new realities in order by-to protect their respective nationalinterests Towards this end, the activities of the United States andRussia, as two military giants have been especially significant com-pared to those of the other regional countries The United Statesestablished the Thule Air Base in Northern Greenland after WorldWar II On 7 April 2011, changes made to the U.S military’s Uni-fied Command Plan shifted geographic boundaries and revealed thegrowing importance of the Arctic.20 The biggest change to the planassigns U.S Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) responsibility

for the North Pole and its surroundings USNORTHCOM and USEuropean Command will share responsibility for the Arctic Rus-sia’s significant military presence in the Arctic started in 1937 whenthe Soviet Union stationed the Red Banner Northern Fleet in Severo-morsk with access to the Barents and Norwegian Seas, and the Arcticand Atlantic Oceans; it is responsible for the defence of NorthwesternRussia.21 In March 2009, Russia’s National Security Council madepublic its plans to create a new Arctic military force to defend thecountry’s interests in the disputed polar region.22

As small players in the military realm, the other regional tries’ recent activities have been less impressive, reflecting their smallmilitary capabilities By and large, they have maintained their lim-ited regional military presence in the region, that started mainly inthe post-WWII era In the late 1950s, Canada set up the CanadianForces Station Alert on the Northern tip of Ellesmere Island to collectsignal intelligence It also created a permanent military command inYellowknife, Northwest Territories in 1970, with a view to treat theNorth as a single theatre of operations; today the country’s militaryresponsibility for the North falls under Canada Command created

coun-on 1 February 2006.23 In August 2009, Norway moved its centre ofmilitary operations from J˚att˚a to Reitan located outside of Bodø,thus ‘‘becoming the first Arctic state to headquarter its operationscommand in the High North.’’24Bodø is currently home to the coun-try’s main air force base, which deploys aircraft to monitor Russianjet exercises.25 Finally, Denmark’s military interest in the Arctic is

evident in its 2011 document entitled, ‘‘Kingdom of Denmark egy for the Arctic 2011–2020 ’’ This document has a stronger focus

Strat-on the tasks of the Danish Armed Forces in the Arctic providing forthem to be visibly present in and around Greenland and the FaroeIslands to enforce sovereignty and surveillance.26 Along this line, itsArmed Forces North Atlantic command structure will be streamlined

by the establishment of an Arctic Response Force.27

1.4 SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES

The Arctic is a vast area (21,000,000 sq km) consisting of the ArcticOcean covered by thick ice and surrounded by permafrost Parts

of the surrounding area are within the territorial limits of theeight Arctic countries No country, whether regional or non-regional,owns the Arctic Ocean while the regional countries bordering theocean, including Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the UnitedStates, each have 200 nautical miles of EEZ around their Arctic

Ocean coasts Upon ratification of the United Nations Convention

of the Law of the Sea,28 all the states falling within this categorycan make claims to extend their zone within ten years Pursued bymost of these countries, such claims could and probably would createdisputes and conflicts over the ownership of certain parts to whichmore than one regional country has laid claim This scenario would beeven more likely in the areas potentially rich in mineral and energyresources, which would be the main reason for a country to claimthem in the first place Hence, the efforts by the regional countries

to extend their ownership of the Arctic region will likely be a triggerfor disputes between and among the regional states Other potentialcontenders, which are essentially confined to only those non-regionalstates with a capability for a long-term engagement in the Arctic,namely China, Japan, South Korea, India and possibly Australia,would not have any strong grounds for claiming ownership of anypart of the region as they lack any geographical connection to it.Given this reality, the only potentially conceivable scenario could betheir laying such claim as part of a global claim of ownership overthe entire Arctic Ocean on environmental grounds, i.e., the necessityfor global governance of the region to ensure its survival as well asthe long-term survival of Planet Earth

1.5 POTENTIAL POLITICAL/MILITARY CONFLICTS

There is potential for political conflicts between and among theregional states The ownership of the region’s riches, including min-erals, especially oil and gas, could trigger such conflicts, adding toother potential triggers such as fishery rights However, such con-flicts are not inevitable as the region seems to have large enoughresources to provide a decent share to all the Arctic states Nonethe-less, developing the region’s resources is not and will not be an easyundertaking due to the hostile climatic conditions (extreme cold)