0521801117 cambridge university press conflict and confrontation in south east asia 1961 1965 britain the united states indonesia and the creation of malaysia oct 2001

Withthe British offering support for US policies, and opposition to contempo-rary French calls for the neutralization of South East Asia, the Americanswere ready to adopt a tougher attit

to terms with the powerful forces of indigenous nationalism unleashed

by the Second World War The Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation – acrisis which was, as Macmillan remarked to Kennedy, ‘as dangerous

a situation in South East Asia as we have seen since the war’ – was acomplex test of Anglo-American relations As American commitment toVietnam accelerated under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations,Britain was involving herself in an ‘end-of-empire’ exercise in state-building which had important military and political implications forboth nations Matthew Jones provides a detailed insight into the origins,outbreak and development of this important episode in internationalhistory; using a large range of previously unavailable archival sources,

he illuminates the formation of the Malaysian federation, Indonesia’sviolent opposition to the new state and the Western powers’ attempts todeal with the resulting conflict

M A T T H E W J O N E S is a Lecturer in International History at RoyalHolloway College, University of London His previous publications

include Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942–44

(1996)

Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965

Britain, the United States and

the Creation of Malaysia

Matthew Jones

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São PauloCambridge University Press

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© Matthew Jones 2002

2001

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List of maps pageix

Preface and acknowledgements xi

Introduction: Britain, the United States and the

1 The Kennedy Administration, Indonesia and the resolution

2 The Greater Malaysia scheme I: the move towards merger 61

3 The Greater Malaysia scheme II: the Cobbold Commission

4 Britain, Indonesia and Malaya: from West Irian

5 The emergence of confrontation: January–May 1963 125

6 The path to the Manila summit, May–July 1963 150

7 From the Manila summit to the creation of Malaysia:

8 Avoiding escalation, September–December 1963 205

vii

Part III Denouement 233

9 The diplomacy of confrontation, Anglo-American relations

and the Vietnam War, January–June 1964 235

10 Escalation, upheaval and reappraisal,

1 South East Asia page xviii

ix

The Vietnam War, particularly for scholars of American foreign tions, has dominated studies of Western involvement in South East Asiaduring the 1960s The destructiveness and significance of that conflictmakes this entirely understandable, yet this emphasis has led to com-parative neglect for the major events and upheavals taking place else-where in the region Above all, another destabilizing conflict eruptedduring the course of 1963, as a new state, the Federation of Malaysia,was brought into being under the protective wing of its British patron,

rela-in the face of the hostility of its vast neighbour, Indonesia The

result-ing Malaysian–Indonesian konfrontasi (confrontation) saw a low-intensity

guerrilla war fought out across the inhospitable terrain of Borneo, tuated by raids into peninsular Malaya itself, as Jakarta tried to underminethe fledgling Federation before it could take root An official agreementending hostilities and resuming normal diplomatic relations between thetwo states was eventually concluded in August 1966, but in the meantimeboth had also witnessed profound internal transformations Singapore’srancorous departure from Malaysia in August 1965 spelt the end ofthe original conception of the Federation, while an attempted coup inIndonesia at the beginning of October gave the Army the opportunity itrequired to assert a dominance over national political life that was to lastuntil the end of the century While the public face of confrontation hasbeen the subject of notable scholarly study (the leading work in the field,

punc-based on open sources, is J A C Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia–

Malaysia Dispute, 1963–1966 (Kuala Lumpur, 1974)), less attention has

been paid to the British role in the conflict As the Americans ted ever greater resources (and eventually manpower) to the fighting inVietnam, the British were simultaneously engaged with substantial forces

commit-in supportcommit-ing Malaysia agacommit-inst the Indonesian military threat By late

1964 and early 1965, at a time when domestic pressures for reductions

in defence spending were intense and imperial contraction almost plete, the British found themselves maintaining around 68,000 servicepersonnel, 200 aircraft and 80 ships in the South East Asian theatre As

com-xi

one study of the end of empire has remarked, ‘Two centuries of

expan-sion into Asia had reached a bizarre finale’ (John Darwin, Britain and

Decolonisation (London, 1988), 287).

My interest in the British role in the origins and outbreak of tion, combined with the opening during the 1990s of official British gov-ernment records under the thirty-year rule, and the absence of any majorarchive-based study of this crucial phase of Western involvement inSouth East Asia, drew me into research for this book It soon becameapparent, however, that the study would need to be expanded and deep-ened to encompass the inevitable connections that existed between Britishpolicies, attitudes and perceptions of the South East Asian scene andtheir American equivalents, particularly if one was to appreciate conflict-ing Western responses to the regime of President Sukarno in Indonesia.Therefore, it would be necessary to extend my researches into Americanarchives and the policies and attitudes of the administrations of John F.Kennedy and Lyndon B Johnson Another perspective that would alsoneed to be more fully developed was an understanding of the process bywhich Malaysia was created In this context, it was required that aspects

confronta-of British colonial policy should be explored through the newly availableprimary source material and some fresh views offered on the negotiatingand bargaining process, both internal and international, that resulted inthe inauguration of the new Federation in September 1963

Hence, in the work that follows, an initial chapter introduces post-warBritish and American policies in their South East Asian setting, building

up to the arrival in office of the Kennedy Administration Part I of thebook goes on to trace two strands of Western policy, beginning with USefforts to cultivate closer relations with Indonesia under Kennedy, andthen moving on to examine the scheme for a ‘Greater Malaysia’ whichbegan to gather momentum from the spring of 1961 onwards By theend of 1962, when Part I closes, both Britain and the United States dis-played some satisfaction with their policies in the region A major Dutch–Indonesian dispute had been settled by American mediation, substantial

US aid to Jakarta was under consideration, and Sukarno’s regime showedsigns of moderating its behaviour In Vietnam, the counter-insurgency ef-fort appeared to be making progress, and Kennedy might consider that

a sought-after but elusive post-colonial regional stability was nearer insight From London’s perspective, the plans to form Malaysia were welladvanced and there were expectations of an orderly exit from colonialresponsibilities and a reduction of burdensome commitments

During 1963, these British and American hopes received severe blows

as Indonesian objections to Malaysia’s formation became clear, and thesituation in South Vietnam steadily deteriorated Part II follows the

diplomacy that accompanied the creation of Malaysia during this pivotalyear, and highlights the way Anglo-American policies came into conflictover how to respond to Indonesian belligerency By the time of Kennedy’sassassination, sharp disagreements had arisen, with Washington pressingfor a political solution to the dispute, while London resisted the notion

of making concessions to the Indonesian position and argued that morepressure should be put on Jakarta to desist from its attempts to subvertMalaysia

As Part III demonstrates, Lyndon Johnson’s assumption of the idency, combined with the imperatives of the struggle in Vietnam, helped

pres-to resolve some of the earlier tensions in Anglo-American relations Withthe British offering support for US policies, and opposition to contempo-rary French calls for the neutralization of South East Asia, the Americanswere ready to adopt a tougher attitude to Indonesia and affirm their back-ing for the British effort to defend Malaysia Meanwhile, the diplomacyand tactics of confrontation continued, and in September 1964 the con-flict threatened to spill over into a full-scale war as military clashes mul-tiplied Although they entertained doubts over the increasingly offensiveposture assumed by Washington towards North Vietnam, and began tosee the advantages that neutrality for the region might bestow, the Britishfelt they had little choice but to back US escalation in Vietnam WhenBritish plans were thrown awry by the sudden departure of Singaporefrom Malaysia in August 1965, and London contemplated a negotiatedsettlement to the dispute, it was the Americans who now insisted thatconfrontation with Indonesia be continued, so great had their aversion toSukarno’s international orientation become Within a few months, how-ever, dramatic upheaval in Indonesia heralded a gradual transformation

in Jakarta’s foreign policy, from strident anti-imperialism to one far moreconducive to Western Cold War interests Soon after, with the end ofconfrontation, Britain was able to take overdue steps to reduce and even-tually remove its military presence from the region altogether, at just thetime the American commitment was reaching its peak

As indicated, the focus throughout the book is on the roles and haviour of Britain and the United States, but their actions were invariablymediated through the key regional players, and hence I have tried also

be-to convey the essence of significant developments in Malaya, Singapore,the Borneo territories and Indonesia bearing on the external scene, aswell as to chart the course of confrontation itself In this way, the present

study differs in scope and approach from John Subritzky’s Confronting

Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian–Indonesian Confrontation, 1961–5 (London, 2000), a work

which appeared just as this book was consigned for publication, and which

concentrates primarily on the period 1963–5 Finally, in a conclusion tothe study which looks at the overall experiences of Britain and the UnitedStates in South East Asia during the 1960s, the point is emphasized thattheir policies had to work to accommodate the emergence of powerful lo-cal voices and impulses, increasingly suspicious of Western ‘advice’ anddetermined to chart their own course in international affairs Indeed,this period marks a stage where both powers were having to adapt andadjust their positions, and where a formal and visible presence ‘on theground’ was becoming positively harmful to the preservation of influenceand interests As the United States assumed even more onerous tasks inits mantle of global policeman, one of the chief sources of tension inAnglo-American relations during the 1960s was Washington’s pressure

on Britain to maintain a world-power role when British political leaderswere finally coming to appreciate the urgent need to shed an imperialpast and release themselves from their formal commitments, particularly

in the area ‘east of Suez’

I have incurred many debts over the past few years in the research andwriting of this book For stimulating and good-humoured discussions, Iwould like to thank Tony Stockwell, whose own documentary study ofthe creation of Malaysia will soon be appearing As ever, Philip Murphyoffered ideas on British colonial policy and much encouragementthroughout Among friends in the United States who provided supportand hospitality during two research trips, John Parachini stands out for hisgenerosity Correspondence with the late George McT Kahin enhanced

my feel for American views of Indonesia in the early 1960s Of rary participants, I am grateful to Sir James Cable, Walt W Rostow andthe late Lord Perth for sharing their recollections of the period with me.Crown copyright material in the Public Record Office is reproduced bypermission of The Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, whilethe Trustees of the Macmillan Archive allowed use of quotations from

contempo-the Macmillan diaries Parts of an article published in Journal of Imperial

and Commonwealth History were derived from chapters 2, 3 and 4, while

parts of an article for Diplomatic History were also drawn from material

used in chapters 9 and 10 Financial assistance for travel was ing from the John F Kennedy Foundation, as well as from the HistoryDepartment at Royal Holloway College, University of London, wheremany colleagues have been supportive and encouraging I have been for-tunate in having Elizabeth Howard and Sophie Read as my editors atCambridge University Press, as well as Margaret Berrill as copy-editor.Thanks are also due to the staff of the archives and libraries, listed inthe bibliography, that I have used in the preparation of this study As

forthcom-with my previous work on Anglo-American relations, I am indebted tothe late Christopher Thorne, who as my undergraduate tutor at SussexUniversity first sparked my interest in Western approaches, attitudes andpolicies in the Far East On a more personal note, I would like to thank

my wife, Amir, who has again helped to sustain me through this projectwith love and advice Providing a welcome and demanding distraction tothe task of writing-up has been the arrival of two children, and it is toAnya and Alexander that this book is lovingly dedicated

Brighton, 1997–2000 M A T T H E W J O N E S

ANZUS AUSTRALIA–NEWZEALAND–UNITEDSTATES

CAB CABINET(CABINET PAPERS AT THEPRO)

CCO CLANDESTINECOMMUNISTORGANIZATION(INSARAWAK)C-IN-C COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

CIA CENTRALINTELLIGENCEAGENCY

CRO COMMONWEALTHRELATIONSOFFICE

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ICJ INTERNATIONALCOURT OFJUSTICE

IMF INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

ISC INTERNALSECURITYCOUNCIL

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JIC JOINTINTELLIGENCECOMMITTEE

MCA MALAYANCHINESEASSOCIATION

MSCC MALAYSIASOLIDARITYCONSULTATIVECOMMITTEE

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NSC NATIONALSECURITYCOUNCIL

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OECD ORGANIZATION OFECONOMICCOOPERATION ANDDEVELOPMENTPAP PEOPLE'SACTIONPARTY

PKI PARTAIKOMMUNISINDONESIA(INDONESIANCOMMUNIST

PARTY)

PRC PEOPLE'SREPUBLIC OFCHINA

PREM PREMIER(PRIMEMINISTER'SOFFICE FILES AT THEPRO)

PRO PUBLICRECORDOFFICE

xvi

PRRI PEMERINTAHREVOLUSIONERREPUBLIKINDONESIA

(REVOLUTIONARYGOVERNMENT OF THEREPUBLIC

OFINDONESIA)

SEA SOUTHEASTASIA

SEATO SOUTHEASTASIATREATYORGANIZATION

SUPP SARAWAKUNITEDPEOPLE'SPARTY

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Madiun Bandung

Hongkong (Port.)

(Br.)

Gulf of Tonkin

Hanoi

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SOUTH VIETNAM

Danang

Saigon

CAMBODIA THAILAND

Phnom Penh Bangkok

Vientiane

L A

O

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UNION OF BURMA

Andaman Sea

Kuching

J a v a S e a

Gulf of Siam

Kra Isthmus

Haiphong

SUMATRA

xviii

IRIAN NEW GUINEA

TIMOR (Indon.)

(Port.) CELEBES

I N D I A N

O C E A N

BALI Jojakarta

Jakarta

Madiun Bandung

J a v a S e a

Gulf of Siam

SUMATRA

FOURTH DIVISION THIRD DIVISION

SECOND DIVISION

FIFTH DIVISION

FIRST DIVISION

BRUNEI

Malinau Kalabakan

Tawao Miri Seria

Brunei Limbang

Sibu Kuching

(EAST)

SABAH Lawas

Balikpapan

Jesselton

Labis Pontian

Riau Archipelago

xx

PORTUGUESE TIMORSULAWESI

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

and the South East Asian setting

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, both Britain and the United Stateswere still trying to adjust and come to terms with the tumultuous changesbrought to South East Asia by the effects of the Second World War Thedramatic events of 1941–2, when Japan, an Asian and non-white power,had confronted Western dominance in the region, had provided a power-ful new spur to local nationalist and revolutionary feeling and helped toundermine previous perceptions of European omnipotence and superi-ority As the struggle between Japan and her Occidental adversaries wasplayed out, the states and societies of South East Asia found themselvesafflicted by the direct effects of the fighting, a complete disruption of thepre-war social order, economic dislocation, occupation and the eventualreturn of the colonial powers in 1945 (the latter being seen by many as

a second occupation).1Moreover, the Japanese had brought with them

an ideology of Asian liberation from Western imperialism that struck achord throughout the whole area.2 By the end of the war, local resis-tance to Japan’s own imperial and racial pretensions had also emerged

in such areas as Indochina, Malaya and the Philippines In the window

of opportunity accorded by the sudden Japanese surrender in August

1945, nationalist leaders came forward to assert claims of independenceand statehood, transforming the local scene for the returning and muchweakened European powers, who despite all the signs that a reversion

to pre-war patterns of control and domination was no longer tenable,sought to further exploit the economies of the region and rediscover thegrandeur of an imperial past that had now run its course.3

In French Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies the result wasbitter conflict that merely served to feed the impulses of revolutionary

1 For a recent and penetrating analysis of the turmoil brought to one society by the

expe-rience of war and its aftermath, see T N Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of

Malaya (Cambridge, 1999).

2These themes are conveyed in Christopher Thorne, The Issue of War: States, Societies,

and the Far Eastern Conflict of 1941–1945 (London, 1985), 144–72.

3See e.g David J Steinberg (ed.), In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History (Honolulu, 1987), 349–55 and passim.

1

nationalism and make for a violent and divisive removal of formal nial rule Having done their best through the use of military force toextinguish the Republic proclaimed by Sukarno in August 1945, andunder steady international pressure, the Dutch reluctantly conceded in-dependence to Indonesia in December 1949, though still trying to blurthe issue by leaving behind them an elaborate federal structure (that waspromptly removed by Indonesia’s new leaders in 1950) In an even moreprotracted manner, the French were faced with a ferocious struggle withthe Communist forces of the Viet Minh, being eventually driven out of thenorthern part of Vietnam in 1954, but with international agreement on atemporary partition of the state at the Geneva Conference, leaving behind

colo-a preccolo-arious non-Communist governmentcolo-al structure in the south.Despite transferring power to nationalist elites in India, Pakistan andCeylon in 1947, and Burma the following year, the British had no in-tention of abandoning their own valuable colonial possessions in SouthEast Asia The pragmatic philosophy that guided the British approach tocolonial affairs made concessions to well-established and moderate na-tionalist movements preferable to the blatant use of coercion, but therewas no inclination among officials or ministers (either Conservative orLabour) to embark on a wholesale retreat from empire or to renounce aworld-power role after 1945.4The inescapable fact was that Britain hadglobal interests and responsibilities, nowhere more so than in South EastAsia, and these could not be easily discarded, even had this been de-sired One of those responsibilities was to help provide for the defence ofAustralia and New Zealand, a task so manifestly neglected, at least in theeyes of most Antipodean observers, in the run-up to the Japanese victories

of 1941–2 Reliance on the United States for their security during the war

in the Far East was reflected by the fact that Australia and New Zealandchose to conclude an exclusive defence pact with Washington in 1951,

in the form of the ANZUS Treaty This was the cause of some umbrage

in London, though not sufficient to offset the strong desire to preserveclose connections with Canberra and Wellington, and to devise commonpolicies towards security issues in South East Asia, shown in the liaisonbuilt up between military staffs after 1949 and the later establishment, in

1955, of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya.5

In the colonial sphere, there was a marked tendency on the part ofBritish officials to highlight the different rate of political, economic and

4See the authoritative discussion in John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat

from Empire in the Post-War World (London, 1988), 122–31.

5See Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968 (London, 1973), 23, 29; also, Peter Edwards, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s

Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts, 1948–1965 (Sydney, 1992), 163–9.

social development in each colonial territory, making some more readyfor the demands of self-government and eventual independence than oth-ers None of the prior conditions for rapid political advance, it was be-lieved, were as yet apparent in the territories for which the British heldresponsibility in South East Asia Moreover, in the minds of many Britishobservers, economic recovery and the expansion of British commercialactivity after the ravages of the war were inextricably linked with thepreservation and development of investments and trade in the area east

of Suez In this connection, Malaya assumed pride of place, with its duction and export of tin and natural rubber making it a vital source ofdollar earnings for the Sterling area.6Thus the British expended consid-erable efforts developing post-war plans for a new Malayan Union, with

pro-a centrpro-alized pro-administrpro-ation in Kupro-alpro-a Lumpur pro-and citizenship rights tended to the substantial Chinese and Indian populations, only to beforced into hasty reappraisal upon the scheme’s introduction in April

ex-1946 by the resultant uproar in the Malay community The subsequentemergence of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) set thestage for the development of communal politics in Malaya, and in Febru-ary 1948 the British exhibited their flexibility by substituting a Federationfor the Union, restoring some of the authority of the old Malay sultansover the individual states and removing the controversial extension of cit-izenship rights to non-Malays.7Nevertheless, eventual self-governmentfor Malaya within the Commonwealth, though promised, remained inthe far distance, while the outbreak of a large-scale insurrection by theMalayan Communist Party (MCP) in June 1948, backed by sections ofthe discontented rural Chinese community, gave the British authorities apressing new challenge and made early departure seem unlikely BeyondMalaya, North Borneo was accorded crown colony status in 1946 (havingbeen run since 1881 by a chartered company), and Sarawak was similarlytransferred from the reign of the Brooke dynasty despite a violent cam-paign of local Malay opposition Also administered separately as a colonywas the great commercial and strategic centre of Singapore, where thenew (and grand-sounding) post of Commissioner General for South EastAsia was created in 1948, with the job of coordinating regional foreign,colonial and defence policies With this new imperial dispensation camethe return in even greater numbers of colonial officials, military officers

6 See A J Stockwell, ‘Colonial Planning during World War Two: the Case of Malaya’,

Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2, 3, 1974.

7Principal works on this subject include J de V Allen, The Malayan Union (New Haven, 1967), A J Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union Exper-

iment, 1942–1948 (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), Albert Lau, The Malayan Union Controversy, 1942–1948 (Singapore, 1991).

and technical experts to South East Asia, adding to the impression thatthe British were consolidating and extending their position in the region.Entertaining many of the same condescending and racially charged at-titudes and assumptions about their role in the area as the Europeanshad previously shown, many Americans after 1945 felt a reinvigoratedsense of mission in the Far East Emerging from the war against Japanwith its power and reach incomparably enhanced, the United States ex-hibited a new confidence in the justness of its cause and the perfectibility

of its institutions and values Anti-imperialist sentiment during the waryears fuelled the idea that the United States was distinct and different inwhat it had to offer the region from the fading European powers (a self-image greatly reinforced by the grant of independence to the Philippines

in 1946).8 The American idea that it was now their turn to offer ership in Asia, with all the political and commercial advantages that thismight bestow, was manifested most immediately in the semi-regal occu-pation regime that General Douglas MacArthur introduced in Japan, andthe project of political and social reform that accompanied it, but couldalso be observed in the unsuccessful attempts made to mediate in theChinese Civil War The collapse of the Marshall Mission by early 1947led to the Truman Administration’s forlorn (and ambivalent) efforts toaffect the outcome of the subsequent fighting through large-scale aid tothe ailing Chinese Nationalist forces Although Washington’s core prior-ity remained containing Soviet power in Europe, the failings of AmericanChina policy only underscored the importance of promoting stability andopposing Communist penetration elsewhere in Asia, a point the Admin-istration’s domestic critics pushed repeatedly as the implications of theChinese Communist victory in October 1949 were absorbed Moreover,

lead-by the late 1940s, State Department analysts themselves were coming toappreciate that the markets and raw materials of South East Asia (as in thepre-war era) were essential to the economic recovery and future prosper-ity of Japan, while a strong and secure Japan, firmly in the Western camp,was seen as a fundamental component of the extension of containment

to eastern Asia as a whole.9

Having exhibited a hearty disdain and in many cases hostility to theEuropean colonial presence in South East Asia during the Second WorldWar, official American policy now had to balance its urgent desire for

8 Though the status of the Philippines remained, as one of Stanley Karnow’s chapter

headings terms it, one of ‘dependent independence’, see his In Our Image: America’s

Empire in the Philippines (New York, 1989) On the sense of an American destiny rooted

in the affairs of Asia, see Thorne, The Issue of War, 203–6.

9See e.g Andrew J Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to

Southeast Asia (Ithaca, 1987), 35–48, 127–40.

regional stability against the indigenous efforts being made to expel ern imperialism.10In Malaya, the fact that the British counter-insurgencycampaign was directed against the Chinese Communist guerrillas of theMCP made it relatively straightforward to take a supportive approach.

West-In West-Indonesia, on the other hand, the Dutch were active in suppressing

a republican nationalist movement that had widespread popular ing Moreover, Sukarno and his supporters had demonstrated their anti-Communist credentials by defeating an attempted uprising by theIndonesian Communist Party (PKI) at Madiun in September 1948 Byearly 1949, and after the Dutch had defied the United Nations (UN)

back-by launching a second military offensive against republican forces, theTruman Administration, fearful that Dutch belligerence was doing harm

to the West’s image as a whole, belatedly began to put pressure on TheHague to negotiate terms for full independence Threatened with the de-nial of Marshall aid funds, the Dutch were faced with little choice but

to accede Nevertheless, the American moderator at the subsequent ference sweetened this bitter pill by insisting that the new Indonesiangovernment accept the external debt of the old East Indies, and allowedthe Dutch to hold onto a remnant of their former empire in the form ofthe western portion of New Guinea (West Irian), a matter, as we shallsee, of great offence to Indonesian nationalists.11 In French Indochina,the Communist nature of the leading Vietnamese nationalist movementobviated any support by Washington for early independence, and by early

con-1950 the United States found itself extending military and economic aid

to French efforts to contain the Viet Minh insurgency.12With the People’sRepublic of China (PRC) also beginning to supply assistance to theVietnamese Communists, Vietnam became a front-line state as the ColdWar and the doctrine of containment was extended to Asia, the latter phe-nomenon confirmed by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, andthe subsequent sharp escalation of US commitment to the whole region

10 For a useful overview see George McT Kahin, ‘The United States and the Anticolonial

Revolutions in Southeast Asia’, in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye (eds.), The Origins

of the Cold War in Asia (Oxford, 1977), 338–61 Standard works stressing this theme

include Gary R Hess, The United States’ Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940–

1950 (New York, 1987), Lloyd C Gardner, Approaching Vietnam: From World War II through Dienbienphu (New York, 1988) and Robert J McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II (New York, 1999).

11 It is worth recalling the conclusions of one major study of these events: ‘To infer that

American policy towards the Indonesian revolution was motivated by a historic tion to colonialism would grossly misrepresent the American record in the East Indies

opposi-during the immediate post-war years’, see Robert J McMahon, Colonialism and Cold

War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–1949 (Ithaca,

1981), 304.

12See Gardner, Approaching Vietnam, 85–7; Rotter, Path to Vietnam, 199–203.

French failings in Vietnam provided a salutary lesson for the British,but they faced several key advantages when tackling their own problems

in Malaya, foremost of which was the geographical isolation of the surgents from outside means of support, the hostility of the socially con-servative Malay nationalist leadership to the aims of the MCP, and thefailure of the Communists to extend their reach beyond the minorityChinese community By 1952, the security situation was under control,but the pace of political change was beginning to accelerate as UMNOformed an alliance with two other parties, the moderate Malayan ChineseAssociation (MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress, and began to de-mand greater powers of self-government With the worst period of theEmergency having passed, the anti-Communism of the UMNO Allianceevident, and its popular support demonstrated by conclusive victory atthe July 1955 Legislative Council elections (winning 51 out of 52 avail-able seats), the British no longer felt it necessary to delay a progressivehandover of colonial controls Indeed, such concessions were advisable

in-if more radical voices within UMNO were to be stifled, or in-if the UMNOleadership was to be stiffened in its responses to the MCP’s overtures forpeace talks, made in late 1955.13At the constitutional conference held inLondon in January–February 1956, the British were ready to agree a rapidadvance to independence for Malaya, even though the communal basis

of the territory’s politics had not been surmounted and the guerrilla warcontinued, with the transfer of power to be complete by the end of August

1957 This concession was undoubtedly made easier by the fact that theAlliance, under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman, was ready tosee Britain continue to provide for Malayan internal and external secu-rity under new treaty arrangements, to preserve its Commonwealth links,and to offer a secure environment for British investments Explaining tohis Cabinet colleagues that constitutional change could not be deferredany longer, the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, argued in January1956: ‘The tide is still flowing in our direction, and we can still ride it;but the ebb is close at hand and if we do not make this our moment ofdecision we shall have lost the power to decide Not far off the Frenchhave shown us what can happen if such a tide is missed.’14

British readjustment to the threat to their Far Eastern interests sented by the emergence of the PRC (including worries over the anoma-lous position of Hong Kong) was reflected in their decision to recognize,

pre-13See A J Stockwell (ed.), Malaya, Part I: The Malayan Union Experiment, 1942–1948

(London, 1995), lxxii–lxxvii.

14 Extract from Cabinet memorandum by Colonial Secretary, January 1956, CAB

134/1202, reproduced in David Goldsworthy (ed.), The Conservative Government and

the End of Empire, 1951–1957, Part II: Politics and Administration (London, 1994), 389.

maintain contacts with and if possible accommodate the new regime

in Beijing, in stark contrast to the attitude adopted by the TrumanAdministration.15Despite the need to keep in general step with US policy,American off-shore and nuclear power being the ultimate guarantor ofthe Western position if a major offensive were launched by the Chinese,during the 1950s the British also felt the need to distance themselvesfrom their allies when imprudent and bellicose positions were adopted byWashington Clouding Anglo-American relations for much of the decade,above all, were concerns that the Eisenhower Administration, armed withits rhetoric of ‘massive retaliation’, might choose to escalate local conflictsinto a full-scale confrontation with either Communist China or even theSoviet Union itself, with all the catastrophic consequences that mightensue This difference in emphasis was shown in most graphic fash-ion during the Dien Bien Phu crisis of 1954, where British opposition

to forceful American ideas for concerted intervention, and their quent role at the Geneva Conference in promoting an agreement thatconfirmed Communist control of North Vietnam and ‘neutralized’ Laosand Cambodia under international supervision, was resented by many

subse-in Washsubse-ington as a prime example of appeasement.16 Post-war American relations in South East Asia had been brought to their lowestpoint, but in September 1954 the Americans received some compensationwith the formation of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),the United States, along with Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand,the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan, all now ready to subscribe to thenotion of collective defence against future instances of overt aggression.17Nevertheless, SEATO, though claiming to bring together Western andAsian perspectives on the security problems of the region, soon became

Anglo-a potent tAnglo-arget for AsiAnglo-an Anglo-and neutrAnglo-al critics of the militAnglo-arized forms

of containment that had been practised by the United States since theKorean War, and helped to antagonize the PRC British attitudes to-wards SEATO were ambivalent Following the trauma of the Suez crisis,Harold Macmillan’s premiership from January 1957 placed the high-est priority on reestablishing and then maintaining close relations withWashington by demonstrating Britain’s continuing usefulness in uphold-ing the global pattern of containment In this context, membership ofSEATO was felt to be a good marker with Washington that, after the

15See e.g Peter Lowe, Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies towards Japan,

China and Korea, 1948–53 (Manchester, 1997), 99–122.

16See e.g Lawrence S Kaplan, Denise Artaud and Mark R Rubin (eds.), Dien Bien Phu

and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations, 1954–1955 (Wilmington, 1990) and James

Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina (London, 1986).

17See Leszek Buszynski, SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy (Singapore, 1983).

uncertainties generated over Anglo-American relations in the Far East

by the Indochina crisis, the British were still prepared to play their part

in providing for regional security The alliance was assumed to providesome deterrent power and might allow greater access to closely guarded

US military planning and thinking towards the whole region (and where

a restraining British voice might be heard), while membership also brokeinto the exclusive ANZUS club On the other hand, SEATO entailedpotentially onerous (and ambiguous) obligations to respond to futurecrises in Indochina, where threats were often subversive and ill defined,and where Britain might find itself tied to the chariot-wheels of precipi-tate American action, especially if the other members were supportive ofWashington’s position Moreover, British aspirations to appeal to mod-erate and non-aligned Asian nationalism, where friendship with Indiawas considered vital, tended to be undercut by membership of SEATOand association with the policies of the US Secretary of State, John FosterDulles, whose portrayal of neutralism in the Cold War as nothing short of

a moral evil clung to perceptions of US attitudes throughout the period.18The suspicions reserved for SEATO by much Asian opinion, that itwas an intrusive military power bloc that served as another example ofthe West’s desire to establish the framework for how independent na-tions should order their external relations, raised immediate problemsfor British relations with Malaya Prior to independence, Tunku AbdulRahman had offered private assurances to British ministers that he in-tended to take his country into the alliance at an early date.19Neverthe-less, within UMNO there was grass-roots neutralist sentiment that wasliable to be strongly opposed to any such action, and after August 1957the Malayan Prime Minister preferred not to mention the subject at all.20More difficult was the domestic reception accorded the Anglo-MalayanDefence Agreement, which came into operation in October 1957, and al-lowed British and Commonwealth forces to retain their bases on Malayansoil to assist with external defence, but also to fulfil ‘Commonwealthand international obligations’, a catch-all phrase that the British antici-pated would cover SEATO-related activities.21By the end of 1957, theBritish High Commission in Kuala Lumpur was noting the strong voices

18See the discussion in Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and

the Anglo-American Relationship, 1947–56 (London, 1993), 177–9.

19 See e.g Lennox-Boyd minute for Eden, PM(56)43, 28 June 1956, PREM 11/4763.

20 See May 1957 paper, ‘The outlook in Malaya up to 1960’, prepared in the Commissioner General’s office, D1051/8G, FO 371/129342; see also Tory to Macmillan, no 3, 12 October 1957, PREM 11/1767.

21 ‘Note on the Malayan Defence Agreement’, Appendix A to PM(57)39, 12 August 1957,

reproduced in A J Stockwell (ed.), Malaya, Part III: The Alliance Route to Independence,

1953–1957 (London, 1995), 408–12.

of disapproval for the Defence Agreement apparent among the Malayrank and file of UMNO, and that it was

obvious that there is an influential group in UMNO who are Indonesian both inorigin and outlook and favour a policy of neutralism on the Afro-Asian model.Their views are reflected in important sections of the Malay language press Cleav-ages are, therefore, appearing among the Malays themselves and this is a source

of worry and weakness to the Tunku and his more responsible colleagues.22There was some annoyance in London when the Malayan Governmentsubsequently insisted that the Defence Agreement committed the British

to consult with the authorities in Kuala Lumpur over the movement ofBritish forces in Malaya and the operational use of their bases The re-sult was a private understanding that if British forces were engaged inSEATO operations (such as deployment exercises to Thailand), theywould have to be routed through Singapore first before continuing ontheir missions The Malayans later tried to reduce the sense of Britishirritation by maintaining that in a genuine emergency they would be pre-pared to turn a blind eye to such technical niceties, but the British wereconcerned that if Malayan reservations became widely known, the credi-bility of their military commitment in the eyes of other SEATO memberswould be reduced.23 In addition, and much to the disapproval of theCommanders-in-Chief (Cs-in-C) Far East, the British Government alsoagreed that official Malayan permission would have to be sought be-fore British forces equipped with nuclear weapons could be stationed onMalayan soil.24

The powerful currents of neutralism in Asia, and the attractions ofthe non-aligned movement, were also on the minds of policy-makers inWashington as they contemplated the state of their relations withIndonesia by the mid-1950s Hopes that the American role in the finalprocess that led to Indonesian independence would be acknowledged bythe formation of a close relationship with the United States were quicklydashed Jakarta’s strong preference for a policy of non-alignment wasconclusively demonstrated when in early 1952 the Sukiman Cabinet wasdisplaced under the pressure of public opinion after having accepted

US economic aid on terms which implied association with AmericanCold War policies.25 This was a worrying sign for the Eisenhower

22 Brief prepared by UK High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur, 13 December 1957, D1051/1, FO 371/135652.

23 For Malayan reassurances discussed by the Cabinet, see CC(61) 17th mtg, 23 March

1961, CAB 128/35.

24 This arrangement arose when the British Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, was indiscreet enough to inform a journalist during this sensitive period that British forces

in Malaya retained a nuclear capability; see material in PREM 11/1767.

25See McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, 321.

Administration, which acknowledged the vital strategic and economicplace held by Indonesia in South East Asia, and the importance of deny-ing it to Communist control; at one meeting of the National SecurityCouncil (NSC) in late 1954, when Dulles was explaining that the coun-try should be considered an ‘essential element’ in the off-shore islandchain of containment, the President exclaimed, ‘ why the hell did we

ever urge the Dutch to get out of Indonesia?’26Unease continued withIndonesia’s hosting of the Bandung Conference of non-aligned states

in April 1955, and was also exhibited over the domestic political bility that afflicted the Republic as it strove to build national unity andsatisfy the expectations for social and economic change that had been un-leashed by the revolutionary period of 1945–9 During the early 1950s,Indonesia laboured to superimpose a Western-style parliamentary system

insta-on a highly complex and diverse society spread across a vast archipelago Astring of fragile, inefficient and corrupt coalition governments in Jakarta,keen rivalry and feuding between the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)and the Islamic, loosely organized Masjumi party, and a lack of consensusover how Indonesia was to address the legacies of colonial rule helped tocreate a wave of disappointment, especially among the young who hadbeen so central to the vitality of the independence movement To add

to the fissures within the Indonesian political scene, in 1952 Masjumisplit, with the conservative Nahdatul Islam breaking off to form anotherparty, and taking with it much of Masjumi’s base in central and easternJava Meanwhile, the PKI, under the leadership of Dipa Nusantara Aidit,was staging a remarkable resurgence after its abortive 1948 rising and

building a mass base among the abangan villagers on Java In the 1955

parliamentary elections none of the main parties managed to achieve amajority, only adding to popular disillusionment with the political pro-cess Separatist tendencies in the Outer Island provinces were alsobeing fuelled by growing Javanese dominance of the expanding bureau-cracy of the Indonesian state, imbalances in the distribution of eco-nomic resources, and the resistance of regional commanders to efforts

to create a modern, professional and centrally controlled IndonesianArmy.27

Although he stood at the apex of the political system, and was theembodiment of Indonesian national pride and sentiment having led the

26Memorandum of discussion of 226th meeting of the NSC, 1 December 1954,

For-eign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, vol XII: East Asia and the Pacific, part 1

(Washington, 1984), 1005 Volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series are hereafter indicated by FRUS.

27Background on the Indonesian scene can be found in Herbert Feith, The Decline of

Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, 1962), and in J D Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (London, 1972), 240–78.

anti-colonial struggle, President Sukarno’s executive role was constrained

by the terms of the Provisional Constitution of 1950, and he grew ingly restless with inter-party squabbling, signs of disunity and the limits

increas-on his own powers Following visits to the Soviet Uniincreas-on and the PRC,

in October 1956 Sukarno began to attack the parliamentary system, ing for the burying of all the parties and a new approach of ‘GuidedDemocracy’ more suitable to Indonesian traditions With many Indo-nesians looking for firm presidential leadership as assertions of regionalautonomy spread on Sumatra and Sulawesi, in March 1957 the last party-based government collapsed and amid a swirl of political uncertainty waseventually succeeded by one headed by Dr Djuanda Kartawidjaja, withits members selected as individuals At the same time, the Army’s Chief ofStaff, General A H Nasution, managed to persuade Sukarno to declaremartial law in response to the regional unrest Henceforth the IndonesianArmy, itself a divided and faction-ridden body, was to play a direct role inpolitical affairs, with extensive powers being exerted over the bureaucracyand economy As Sukarno moved also to extend his prerogatives and ar-ticulate his vision of Indonesia’s political future built around a return to

call-a consensucall-al style of decision-mcall-aking, in July 1957 provincicall-al elections

on Java saw the PKI returned as the largest party with 27.4 per cent ofthe vote.28

Officials in the Eisenhower Administration were alarmed by these velopments, and the clear signs that Sukarno, far from acting to curb therapid growth of the PKI, was ready to play for its organizational backing

de-in his efforts to refashion Indonesia’s governde-ing de-institutions and to teract the influence of the Army The next general election was due in

coun-1959, and observers predicted even greater gains for the PKI When theNSC reviewed the Indonesian picture in August 1957, Allen Dulles, thehead of the CIA, was asked ‘whether Sukarno had gone past the point of

no return’; he ‘replied in the affirmative, saying that Sukarno had beenimpressed by his trip to Moscow, had concluded that the party system didnot work, and would henceforth play the Communist game’ Eisenhowertold the meeting, ‘The best course would be to hold all Indonesia inthe Free World The next best course would be to hold Sumatra if Javagoes Communist We should also consider what to do if all Indonesiavotes Communist.’ Reflecting the tone of the discussion was AdmiralArthur W Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS), whoremarked that ‘Indonesia was important enough to warrant drastic ac-tion by the United States to hold it in the Free World.’29The result of

28Most informative on this period is Daniel S Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy:

Indonesian Politics, 1957–1959 (Ithaca, 1966).

29 Record of 333rd mtg of NSC, 1 August 1957, NSC series, box 9, Ann Whitman File, Dwight D Eisenhower Library.

such deliberations was a decision by the Administration to begin a CIAeffort to provide covert support to the local anti-Communist militarycommanders on Sumatra and Sulawesi behind the movement for OuterIsland autonomy.30The intentions behind backing the Outer Island lead-ers were notably confused They included the hope that exerting generalpressure on the government in Jakarta would induce it to take strongermeasures against the PKI, the belief that the authority of Sukarno him-self could be challenged from the regions, and the expectation that if Javashould fall under Communist control a pro-Western fall-back position

in the Outer Islands might be created By the end of 1957, US officialshad managed to enlist the active support of Britain and Australia at thehighest level for this clandestine intervention in the internal politics ofIndonesia, and secret working groups were formed to coordinate theirjoint efforts.31

Events began to spin out of control in February 1958 when the rebels inthe Outer Islands declared a Revolutionary Government of the Republic

of Indonesia (PRRI), prompting the authorities on Java to begin militaryoperations against the dissident strongholds on Sumatra and Sulawesi.Over the next few months, covert aid continued to reach the PRRI rebelsfrom Western sources, but the Indonesian Government responded swiftlyand effectively to this threat to national unity, and by May 1958 seriousresistance in the Outer Islands was in the process of collapsing.32Covertaction had comprehensively failed to undermine Sukarno’s regime andmade it very uncomfortable for Indonesians who favoured closer con-tacts with the United States, while the capture after a rebel bombing raidover Ambon of Allen Lawrence Pope, an American pilot on the CIA pay-roll, compromised the posture of neutrality towards the civil conflict thatWashington had been publicly maintaining Moreover, it was becomingplain that the rebellion had actually elevated the status of the PKI, whichhad strongly supported the Jakarta Government’s military response Withall these considerations in mind, and guided by the advice of its new Am-bassador to Indonesia, Howard P Jones, the Eisenhower Administration

30 These developments have been traced in Audrey R Kahin and George McT Kahin,

Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New

York, 1995).

31 See record of conversation at British Embassy, Paris, 14 December 1957, N.A.(57)(Del)(Secret)1, CAB 133/304 The present author has combined British and American sources in his own account of these events, see ‘ “Maximum Disavowable

Aid”: Britain, the United States and the Indonesian Rebellion, 1957–58’, English

His-torical Review, 114, 459, 1999.

32 The latest, and most revealing, ground-level account of the CIA’s efforts to bolster the

rebels is given by Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert

Operations in Indonesia, 1957–1958 (Annapolis, 1999).

undertook a major turnaround.33Direct assistance to the rebels was cutoff, while new channels of dialogue were opened to the Indonesian Army,which after its recent successes against the rebels was now seen as thebest bulwark against the dangers posed by Communism in Indonesia.Responding to the overtures of anti-Communist Army leaders (and theprompting of the Pentagon), in the summer of 1958 US officials initiated

a modest military assistance programme Nevertheless, opinion in theState Department was still sharply divided over how far to extend aid,with John Foster Dulles, above all, concerned that Sukarno’s prestigeshould not be enhanced by such shipments.34

When, in September 1958, Djuanda’s Government, probably underArmy pressure, announced that the national elections due for the fol-lowing year were to be postponed, it appeared that the new approach

of the Eisenhower Administration was reaping some reward.35Over thenext two years, the United States continued to supply small quantities

of military equipment to the Indonesian armed forces, and to cultivateinter-service ties with the Army Such efforts were spurred by the knowl-edge that since early 1958 the Soviet Union had also begun to negoti-ate credits with the Indonesians for the supply of military equipment,with a particular emphasis on the Air Force and Navy (the former held

by US officials as being the arm most susceptible to Communist ence) Yet in this developing competition for influence, US policy-makersfaced one overriding handicap: the unwillingness of the Eisenhower Ad-ministration to support the Indonesian position in the ongoing disputewith the Netherlands over the status and disposition of the territory ofWest Irian, an issue left unresolved by the negotiations surrounding in-dependence in 1949 As it had been an intrinsic part of the NetherlandsEast Indies Empire, Indonesians regarded themselves as the rightful heirs

influ-to the terriinflu-tory, while West Irian had acquired an emotive significance asthe place where many pre-war nationalist agitators had been interned andsuffered at the hands of the colonial authorities.36The Dutch, however,preferred to point to the ethnic differences between the population of theNew Guinea interior and the predominantly Malay peoples of the rest

33See Howard P Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream (New York, 1971), 147–54.

34 See Robertson to Dulles, 30 July 1958, and attachments, Lot 62 D 68, RG 59 (this and all subsequent references to RG 59 are from the Department of State Records at the US

National Archives); see also memorandum of conversation, 1 August 1958, FRUS, 1958–

1960, vol XVII, Indonesia (Washington, 1994), 255–6; Special National Intelligence

Estimate, ‘The Outlook in Indonesia’, 12 August 1958, ibid., 258–9; Department of State (DOS) to Jakarta, 20 August 1958, ibid., 269–70.

35See FRUS, 1958–1960, XVII, 283.

36See Benedict O Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of

Nationalism (London, 1991), 176–7.

of the Indonesian archipelago, and maintained that a nascent Papuanself-consciousness should be left to develop free from incorporation inIndonesia (though the Dutch case was hardly helped by the minimal ef-forts made to develop self-governing institutions or indigenous politicalparties in West Irian, at least until 1960) Dutch refusal to reopen talks

on sovereignty throughout the 1950s, and the backing they received fromAustralia over maintaining a colonial foothold in South East Asia, was

a continual affront to Indonesian national pride and was effectively ploited for populist ends by both Sukarno and the PKI.37The Americans,however, preferred not to break with their European NATO ally on thiscrucial matter, and as a result it proved more difficult for them to winfavour among ruling circles in Jakarta

ex-The British had also extended considerable assistance to the CIA’scovert operations in Indonesia during 1958, the Chiefs of Staff (COS)

at one point instructing the Cs-in-C Far East ‘to give all possible aidwithin the policy of “maximum disavowable support” to the rebels’.38Among other forms of assistance, base facilities in Singapore had beenfurnished for some of the American resupply missions flown over Suma-tra This was done in the overall interest of Anglo-American relationsrather than through any confidence in American reading of the local In-donesian scene (though the then Commissioner General for South EastAsia, Sir Robert Scott, was an enthusiast for bringing about Sukarno’sdownfall).39British officials did feel concern over the expansion of PKIinfluence within Indonesia, but had no desire to see the territorial in-tegrity of the state destroyed, which might leave behind a Communist-dominated Javanese rump Instead, reflecting a belief close to the PrimeMinister’s heart, intimate cooperation with the Americans would againallow, it was hoped, the injection of alternative and moderating voicesthrough joint consultation, which could act as a counter to the more ex-treme views that tended to emanate from some quarters in Washington.Clandestine assistance was, moreover, extended to the Outer Island rebelswith the misgiving that if news should leak, the delicate situation inSingapore might be affected, where radical left-wing political activity andtrade union militancy was a cause of increasing alarm to the British colo-nial authorities in the middle and late 1950s

The main base for the deployment of British naval, air and militaryforces in the region, Singapore had been made a full crown colony inApril 1946 Maintenance of the Singapore base was seen as essential to

37The Australian position is covered in Glen St J Barclay, Friends in High Places: Australian–

American Diplomatic Relations since 1945 (Melbourne, 1985), 101–5.

38 See confidential annex to COS(58) 34th mtg, 15 April 1958, DEFE 32/6.

39 See Scott to Macmillan, no 702, 12 December 1957, DH1051/23G, FO 371/129531.

meet SEATO obligations, provide for the close defence of Malaya andsurrounding sea communications, and demonstrate a continuing com-mitment to Australia and New Zealand With a population that was

80 per cent Chinese, and possessing a well-organized labour movement,Singapore was, however, considered vulnerable to Communist subver-sion and left-wing influence, and the Governor held tight control overinternal security The Rendel constitution of 1955 introduced a largelyelected assembly to the colony, but British hopes that moderate voices ofpolitical reform would prevail were confounded with the rapid emergence

of David Marshall’s Singapore Labour Front, and its principal socialist val, the People’s Action Party (PAP) Both held strong anti-colonial viewsand competed for the allegiance of an increasingly radicalized Chinese-educated mass electorate Marshall’s victory at the 1955 elections wasfollowed by immediate demands for full self-government on terms thatLondon found impossible to accept, as they effectively involved transfer-ring control of internal security to Singapore ministers.40The breakdown

ri-of subsequent constitutional talks in London in April–May 1956 led toMarshall’s resignation as Chief Minister, and his place was taken by LimYew Hock The new Chief Minister was willing to act forcefully againstalleged Communist united front organizations in Singapore’s Chinesemiddle schools and in some of the trade union organizations, and inMarch 1957 a delegation from the colony travelled once more to Londonfor another constitutional conference This time a compromise agree-ment was reached which gave full internal self-government to Singapore,with Britain retaining control over questions affecting external affairs anddefence An Internal Security Council (ISC) would be formed to handlethis most sensitive of issues, to be composed of three British and threeSingapore representatives, while an additional Malayan member wouldhold a crucial casting vote The ISC was to be chaired by a new BritishCommissioner for Singapore (a role filled by the existing CommissionerGeneral for South East Asia) and its decisions on appropriate measures

to tackle subversion and unrest were binding on the local government

In an extreme case, the British still reserved the right to suspend the newconstitution and reimpose direct rule.41

Although they recognized the odium they might incur by refusing tomeet the demands coming from Singapore for independence, and thethreat to law and order that failure to make timely concessions could

40 See ‘Singapore’ memorandum by the Colonial Secretary for the Cabinet, CP(56)97, 14

April 1956, CAB 129/80, reproduced in Goldsworthy (ed.), The Conservative Government

and the End of Empire 1951–1957, Part II, 396–402.

41 Singapore developments are covered at first hand and in revealing fashion by Lee Kuan

Yew, The Singapore Story (Singapore, 1998), 224 and passim.

provoke, British ministers were not prepared to prejudice their free use

of the colony’s base facilities in the constitutional talks of 1956–7 Yetthey had gone far in meeting the needs of the new group of Singaporepoliticians that had appeared in the mid-1950s Such movement hadbeen made easier by the fact that leaders such as Lim Yew Hock, andthe dynamic young head of the rising PAP, Lee Kuan Yew, were commit-ted anti-Communists aware of the dangers that a more radical switch toChinese chauvinism could entail They also, in common with much lo-cal political opinion, shared the British view that separate independencefor Singapore was not a viable proposition, and that the key to ensuringthe territory’s future political stability and economic prosperity lay in amerger with Malaya.42Since the Second World War, British officials inthe region (with Malcolm MacDonald probably the most prominent) hadpromoted the idea of merger in a low-key manner During the discussionsover Singapore’s future in 1956 it had come to the fore as a key prereq-uisite before London would agree to give up sovereignty over the island

In March of that year, Lennox-Boyd was arguing: ‘ “Independence” forSingapore is a delusion A trading centre and port, however important,

at the mercy of world economics, with a large population and no naturalresources, could have no viable place as a full member of the Common-wealth or as a State on its own.’43

The immediate problem for any scheme of merger, however, was ant Malayan opposition Viewed from Kuala Lumpur, Singapore seemedplagued by strikes, riots and radicalism, while Malay (and UMNO) politi-cal dominance of the Federation could be threatened if it were enlarged toincorporate Singapore’s predominantly Chinese population.44The ever-leftward drift of Singapore politics was indicated by the results of theMay 1959 Legislative Assembly elections, which saw Lee Kuan Yew’sPAP winning 43 of the 51 available seats Whereas the British greetedLee’s victory and the formation of a PAP government with some equa-nimity, and quickly saw that the new Prime Minister was determined

adam-to tackle Communist subversion, the authorities in Kuala Lumpur were

42See Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: Political

Unification in the Malaysia Region, 1945–65 (Kuala Lumpur, 1974), 125 and passim.

43 See Colonial Office (CO) minute on closer association between the Federation of Malaya

and Singapore, 10 December 1952, CO 1022/86, reproduced in Goldsworthy, The

Con-servative Government and the End of Empire, Part II, 376–7, and ‘Singapore’ memorandum

by the Colonial Secretary for the Cabinet, CP(56)85, 23 March 1956, CAB 129/80, ibid.,

393 See also Brook memorandum for Eden, 19 April 1956, PREM 11/1802.

44 Of Malaya’s population of almost 7 million, about 3.4 million could be classed as Malays, about 800,000 as Indian, and over 2.5 million as Chinese, while there were approximately 1.2 million Singapore Chinese; figures are for December 1959 and derived from undated (but c 26 June 1961) memorandum SR(050)304, PREM 11/3418.