Chapter 17 - Public choice theory and the economics of taxation. Learning objectives of this chapter include: Conveying economic preferences through majority voting; government failure; tax philosophies and the tax burden; tax shifting, tax incidence, and efficiency losses from taxes.
Trang 1Public Choice Theory and the Economics of Taxation
Chapter 17
Trang 2Chapter Objectives
• Conveying economic preferences through majority voting
• Government failure
• Tax philosophies and the tax
burden
• Tax shifting, tax incidence, and
efficiency losses from taxes
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Trang 3Majority Voting
• Can result in inefficiency
–Over or underproduction of a
public good
–Individuals think only of
themselves
–Strength of preferences ignored
• Interest groups
• Logrolling
Trang 4Majority Voting
Inefficient Majority “No” Vote
Inefficient Majority “Yes” Vote
$700
$250
$200
$100
$350 $350
Adams
Adams
Benson
Benson
Conrad
Conrad
“NO” “NO” “YES” “YES”
“YES” “NO”
MSB > MSC
$1,150 > $900
Inefficient Since
“NO” Wins!
MSB < MSC
$800 < $900
Inefficient Since
“YES” Wins!
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Trang 5Majority Voting
• Paradox of voting
–Paired choice majority voting
–Flawed procedure
–Outcome depends on vote order
• Median voter model
–Politicians appeal to the middle
–Extremes pick the middle
–Implications
Trang 6Government Failure
• Special-interest effect
–Pork-barrel politics
• Rent-seeking behavior
• Clear benefits, hidden costs
• Limited and bundled choice
• Bureaucracy and inefficiency
• Imperfect institutions
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Trang 7The Tax Burden
• How should the tax burden
be apportioned?
• Benefits-received principle
• Ability-to-pay principle
• Progressive tax
• Regressive tax
• Proportional tax
Trang 8Types of Taxes
• Personal income tax
• Sales tax
• Corporate income tax
• Payroll tax
• Property tax
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Trang 9Tax Incidence
• Who really pays the tax?
• Excise tax
–Tax burden depends on elasticity –Inelastic vs elastic
• Efficiency loss of an excise tax
–Deadweight loss
–Depends on elasticity
–Transfer of surplus to govt.
Trang 10Tax Incidence of an Excise Tax
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
14
P
Quantity
(Millions of Bottles Per Month)
S
D
Tax $2
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Trang 11Tax Incidence
• Why impose an excise tax?
–Discourage consumption
–Redistributive goals
–Reduce negative externality
• Burden of the excise tax?
–Depends on elasticity
–Availability of substitutes
Trang 12Tax Incidence and Elasticity
0
P
Q Q
P
0
Tax Incidence and Elastic Demand
Tax Incidence and Inelastic Demand
Smaller efficiency loss with inelastic demand
S
S
Q 2
P 1
P e
P a
P 1
P i
P b
a a
b b
c c
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Trang 13Tax Incidence and Elasticity
0
P
Q Q
P
0
Tax Incidence and Elastic Supply
Tax Incidence and Inelastic Supply
Smaller efficiency loss with inelastic supply
S
S
P 1
P a
P e
P 1
P b
P i
Q 1
a
a
b b
c c
Trang 14Efficiency Loss of a Tax
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
P
Quantity
(Millions of Bottles Per Month)
S
D
S’
Tax $2
Tax Paid by Consumers
Tax Paid by Producers
Efficiency Loss (or Deadweight Loss)
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Trang 15Incidence of U.S Taxes
• Workers bear full burden of:
–Social security tax
–Medicare tax
–Income tax
• Burden of corporate income tax:
–Stockholders (short run)
–Workers (long run)
Trang 16U.S Tax Structure
• Federal tax system progressive
• State and local system is
regressive
• Overall tax structure slightly
progressive
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Trang 17Taxes on General Consumption
Percentage of GDP, 2005
Iceland Denmark Sweden New Zealand
France Germany
Italy Canada Japan United States
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
• Sales tax, excise tax, value-added tax
Trang 18Government Failure
• Examples of pork barrel politics
–Chicago “wilderness” program
–Bison meat, cauliflower, and
pumpkin supports
–Catfish as livestock spending
–9,300 special projects in 2003
–Waste and fraud in Katrina relief spending
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Trang 19Key Terms
• public choice theory
• logrolling
• paradox of voting
• median-voter model
• government failure
• special-interest
effect
• earmarks
• rent seeking
• benefits-received principle
• ability-to-pay principle
• progressive tax
• regressive tax
• proportional tax
• tax incidence
• efficiency loss of a tax
Trang 20Next Chapter Preview…
Antitrust Policy and
Regulation
17-20