Chapter 9 - Externalities and Property. In chapter 9 we will investigate how the allocation of resources is affected when activities generate costs or benefits that accrue to people not directly involved in those activities. We will see that if parties cannot easily negotiate with one another, the selfserving actions of individuals will not lead to efficient outcomes.
Trang 1Externalities and Property
Rights Chapter 10
Trang 2Learning Objectives
1 Define negative and positive externalities and
analyze their effect on resource allocations
2 Discuss and explain the Coase Theorem
3 Explain how the effects of externalities can be
remedied and discuss why the optimal amount of
an externality is almost never zero
4 Illustrate the tragedy of the commons and show
how private ownership is a way of preventing it
5 Define positional externalities and their effects, and
show how they can be remedied
Trang 3External Costs and Benefits
• An external cost is a cost of an activity that falls
on people other than those who pursue the
activity
– Also called a negative externality
• An externality is the name given to an external
cost or external benefit of an activity
• An external benefit is a benefit of an activity
received by people other than those who pursue the activity
Trang 4Externalities Affect Resource
Allocation
• Externalities reduce economic efficiency
– Solutions to externalities may be efficient
– When efficient solutions to externalities are not
possible, government intervention or other collective action may be used
Trang 5Honeybee Keeper – Scenario 1
• Phoebe harvests and sells honey from her bees
– Bees pollinate the apple orchards
• No payments made to Phoebe
• The bees provide a free service to the local
farmers
– Phoebe is giving away a service
• Private costs are equal to private benefits
When external benefits exist, maximizing private profits produces less
Trang 6Honeybee Keeper – Scenario 2
• Phoebe harvests and sells honey from her bees
• People at a neighboring school and nursing
home are bothered by bee stings
• The bees are a nuisance to the neighbors
– Phoebe is not paying all the costs of her honeybees
• Private costs are equal to private benefits
When external costs exist, maximizing private profits produces more
than the social optimum
Trang 7Social MC
2.0
8,000
Trang 8Positive Externality for
MBSO
C
QSO C
MC
QP VT
MBP VT
Private Equilibrium
Social Optimum
Trang 9Effects of Externalities
With externalities, private market outcomes
do not achieve the largest possible economic surplus
Cash is left on the table
Trang 10Remedying Externalities
• With externalities, private market outcomes do
not achieve the largest possible economic
surplus
– Cash is left on the table
• For example, with monopolies, output is lower
than with prefect competition
– Introduction of coupons and rebates expands the
market
• With externalities, actions to capture the surplus are likely
Trang 11Abercrombie the Polluter –
Scenario 1
• Abercrombie’s company dumps toxic waste in the river
– Fitch cannot fish the river
– No one else is harmed
• Abercrombie could install a filter to remove the
harm to Fitch
– Filter imposes costs on Abercrombie
– Filter benefits Fitch
• Parties do not communicate
Trang 12Abercrombie's Filter Options
§ Abercrombie does not install the filter
§ Marginal cost of filter to Abercrombie is $30 per day
§ The marginal benefit to Fitch is $50 per day
§ There is a net welfare loss of $20 per day
Trang 13Abercrombie the Polluter –
Scenario 2
– Fitch pays Abercrombie between $30 and $50 per
day to use the filter
– Net gain in total surplus of $20 per day
Abercrombie's Gains $100 / day $130 / day
Trang 14The Coase Theorem
• The Coase Theorem says that if people can
negotiate the right to perform activities that cause
externalities, they can always arrive at efficient
solutions to problems caused by externalities
– Negotiations must be costless
• Sometimes those harmed pay to stop pollution
– Fitch pays Abercrombie
• Sometimes polluter buys the right to pollute
– Abercrombie pays Fitch
• The adjustment to the externality is usually done by the party with the lowest cost
Trang 15Abercrombie the Polluter –
Scenario 3
• Abercrombie’s company produces toxic waste
– Laws prohibit dumping the waste in the river
UNLESS Fitch agrees
– New gains matrix
Abercrombie's Gains $100 / day $150 / day
Trang 16Abercrombie the Polluter –
Scenario 3
• Abercrombie can pay Fitch up to $50 per day for the right to pollute
– Fitch will accept any offer over $30 per day
• In this scenario, polluting is the right thing to do
Abercrombie's Gains $100 / day $150 / day
Trang 17Laws Can Change the Outcome
• Suppose the law makes polluters liable for the
cost of cleaning up their pollution
– Polluters get lower incomes
– Non-polluters get higher incomes
Abercrombie's Gains $100 / day $150 / day
Trang 18Shared Living
• Ann and Betty are evaluating housing options
– 2-bedroom apartment for $600 per month OR
– 21-bedroom apartments for $400 per month each
• If the costs were the same, Ann and Betty would be indifferent between the two arrangements
• The externality here is Ann's telephone usage is high – She would pay up to $250 per month to be able to use the phone whenever she wants
– Betty would pay up to $150 per month to get better phone access
– No second phone line is possible
Trang 19Benefits and Costs of Shared
Living
Total Cost of Separate
Apartments Shared Apartment Total Cost of Rent Savings from Sharing
§ Live together if the benefits exceed the costs
Problem Ann's Cost of Solving the
Problem
Betty's Cost of Solving the Problem
Least-Cost Solution
Ann's phone
usage Pay Ann $250 to decrease usage Pay Betty $150 to tolerate Ann
Ann pays Betty
$150 per
Trang 20Net Benefit of Shared Living
• Ann and Betty will live together
$200 per month $150 per month $50 per month
Trang 21Dividing the Rent
• Betty would spend $400 per month to live alone
– The cost of tolerating Ann's phone use is $150 per
month
– Betty will be willing to pay up to $250 = $400 - $150
to live with Ann
• Above $250, she will be better off living alone
• Ann is willing to pay up to $400 per month, the
cost of living alone
Trang 22Dividing the Surplus
• Betty's maximum rent is $250
• Ann's maximum rent is $400
• If they divide the surplus ($50) equally,
– Betty pays $225 = $250 – $25
– Ann pays $375 = $400 – 25
Trang 23Legal Remedies for
Externalities
• If negotiation is costless, the party with the lowest cost usually makes the adjustment
– Private solution is generally adequate
• When negotiation is not costless laws may be
used to correct for externalities
– The burden of the law can be placed on those who have the lowest cost
Trang 24Examples of Legal Remedies
for Externalities
• Noise regulations (cars, parties, honking horns)
• Most traffic and traffic-related laws
– Car emission standards and inspections
Trang 25Three Cases
Free Speech
• U.S First Amendment
recognizes the value of
open communications
that has a net cost
Planting Trees
• Government subsidizes trees on private property
flooding and landslides
in the atmosphere
Basic Research
• Millions of dollars spent
by central government yearly
Trang 26Optimal Amount of Negative
of pollution
Trang 27Taxes and Subsidies
• When transaction costs prohibit negotiation:
– Negative externalities result in overproduction
– Positive externalities result in underproduction
• A per unit tax on output can move the market to the socially optimal output when there is a
negative externality
• A per unit subsidy on output can move the market
to the socially optimal output when there is a
positive externality
Trang 28Quantity (tons/year)
12,000 1.3
Pollution Tax
$1,000 / ton
Taxing a Negative Externality
Tax Private MC + Tax
12,00 0
Trang 29Subsidizing a Positive
Externality
12 Quantity
MC
Subsidized Demand Subsidy
12
8
14 10
16
Trang 30Tragedy of Commons
• When use of a communally owned resource has
no price, the costs of using it are not considered
– Use of the property will increase until MB = 0
– This is known as the tragedy of the commons
• Suppose 5 villagers own land suitable for grazing
– Each can spend $100 for either a steer or a
government bond that pays 13%
– Villagers know what everyone before them has done
– Steer graze on the commons
– Value of the steer in year 2 depends on herd size
Trang 31Payoff For a Steer
• Using the information in the table below, each
villager makes a decision
• The fourth is indifferent between the two assets
Trang 32What the Villagers Did
• The village has 4 steer feeding on the commons for one year
– At the end of the year, 4 steer sell for $113 each
• Total revenue for the village is (5) (113) = $565
– Outcome is the same as 5 bonds
• They could have done better
Trang 33Tragedy of the commons is the tendency for a resource that has
Trang 34The Effect of Private Ownership
• The villagers decide to auction off the rights to
the commons
– Auction makes the highest bidder consider the
opportunity cost of grazing additional steer
– Villagers can borrow and lend at 13%.
– One steer is the optimal number
• Winning bidder pays $100 for the right to use the commons
Trang 35The Effect of Private Ownership
• The winning bidder starts the year
– Spends $100 in savings to buy a yearling steer
– Borrows $100 at 13% to get control of commons
• The winning bidder ends the year
– Sells the steer for $126
• Gets original $100 back
• $13 opportunity cost of buying a steer
• $13 interest on loan for the commons
• Economic surplus of the village is
(4 x $13) + $26 = $78
Trang 36Property Rights and the Tragedy of
Commons
Blackberries in the Park
berry ripens
property
they are fully ripe
it were a private good
Trang 37Positional Externalities
• Highest compensation goes to the best performer
– Standard is relative, not absolute
• Each player increases spending to increase
probability of winning
– Sum of all these investments > collective payoff
• Total payout is fixed, so players' group has no gains
Trang 38Football Players Take Steroids
• Smith and Jones compete for one $1 million contract – Each has 50% chance at the contract
• Smith and Jones have a Prisoner's Dilemma
Jones's Options Smith's
No Steroids 2nd best for each Worst for Smith
Best for Jones
Steroids Best for Smith
Trang 39Positional Externalities
• Relative performance determines reward
– Positional externalities occur when an increase in
one person's performance reduces the expected
reward of another
• A positional arms race is a series of mutually
offsetting investments in performance
enhancement that is stimulated by a positional
externality
– A positional arms control agreement attempts to
limit the mutually offsetting investments in
Trang 40Examples of Positional Arms
Control Agreements
• Campaign spending limits
• Roster limits
• Arbitration agreements
• Mandatory starting dates for kindergarten
• Social Norms as Positional Arms Control
Trang 41Externalities and Property Rights
Externalities and Property Rights
Effects of External Benefits