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Abbreviations AAN Archiwum Akt Nowych AMSZ Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych ARM Archiwum Rady Ministrów BArch Bundesarchiv BBC British Broadcasting Corporation bcm billion cubic

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Falk Flade

Energy Infrastructures

in the Eastern Bloc

Poland and the Construction of Transnational Electricity, Oil, and Gas Systems

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Falk FladeEnergy Infrastructures in the Eastern Bloc

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Harrassowitz Verlag Wiesbaden

Studien zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Ostmitteleuropas

Herausgegeben von Werner Benecke, Christoph Boyer, Ulf Brunnbauer, Uwe Müller, Alexander Nützenadel und Philipp Ther

Band 26

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Falk Flade

Energy Infrastructures

in the Eastern Bloc

Poland and the Construction of Transnational Electricity,

Oil, and Gas Systems

2017

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Ostmitteleuropas«, whose volumes 1–16 have been published in the Berliner

Wissen-schaftsverlag

Scientific Advisory Board:

Roman Holec, Jerzy Kochanowski, Claudia Kraft, Rudolf Kučera, Torsten Lorenz, Ágnes Pogány, Béla Tomka, Hans-Jürgen Wagener

All volumes of the series go through a peer-review process

Cover Illustration:

Left side: Worker of the construction company Energopol at the Polish section of the So͡iuz gas pipeline near Kharkov in eastern Ukraine, 1976 © Polska Agencja Prasowa/Mariusz Szyperko

Right side: View of the Druzhba pipeline and the power transmission line Mir in the Zakarpattia region, 1965 © Polska Agencja Prasowa/ITAR-TASS

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen

Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet

über http://dnb.dnb.de abrufbar.

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche

Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the internet

at http://dnb.dnb.de

For further information about our publishing program consult our

website http://www.harrassowitz-verlag.de

© Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co KG, Wiesbaden 2017

This work, including all of its parts, is protected by copyright

Any use beyond the limits of copyright law without the permission

of the publisher is forbidden and subject to penalty This applies

particularly to reproductions, translations, microfilms and storage

and processing in electronic systems

Printed on permanent/durable paper

Printing and binding: Hubert & Co., Göttingen

Printed in Germany

ISSN 1867-6596

ISBN 978-3-447-10904-8

e-ISBN 978-3-447-19676-5

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for Inna

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© 2017, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-10904-8 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19676-5

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Content

Figures and tables 7

Abbreviations 9

Acknowledgement 13

1 Introduction 15

1.1 Prolog 15

1.2 Object of study 18

1.3 Literature overview 20

1.4 Research questions and theses 24

1.5 Methods and sources 26

1.6 Theoretical approach 27

1.6.1 Large Technological Systems 27

1.6.2 Critical assessment 34

1.6.3 Applied concepts 35

1.7 Outline 37

2 Energy infrastructures in pre-war Poland 38

2.1 The heritage of the Galician oil industry 38

2.2 Plans and endeavors in the 1920s 40

2.3 The Central Industrial District 42

2.4 Summary 46

3 Initiating cross-border energy infrastructures 47

3.1 Historical background 47

3.1.1 Implementation of planned economies 48

3.1.2 Modes of cooperation during post-war Stalinism 49

3.1.3 The Marshall Plan and the foundation of the CMEA 51

3.2 The beginning of cross-border cooperation 54

3.2.1 The energy-hungry Hungarian aluminum industry 54

3.2.2 Negotiating four-sided electricity deliveries 55

3.2.3 The pricing debate 57

3.3 The Standing Commission for Electric Energy 59

3.3.1 Gidroproektʼs proposal 62

3.3.2 Teploėlektroproekt’s proposal 64

3.4 The electricity network Mir 66

3.4.1 The Central Dispatching Organization 68

3.4.2 The electricity hub Mukachevo 70

3.4.3 Early plans for East-West electricity deliveries 71

3.5 Summary 72

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4 The Druzhba oil pipeline 75

4.1 Changing energy consumption in Eastern Europe 75

4.1.1 The chemicalization campaign 76

4.1.2 Oil import forecasts and the transport question 77

4.2 Pipeline construction 80

4.2.1 The planning procedure 80

4.2.2 Construction work 84

4.2.3 Western obstruction 89

4.2.4 Consequences of the Druzhba pipeline 93

4.3 Extending the pipeline network 96

4.3.1 The second Druzhba pipeline 97

4.3.2 Plans for additional in- and outlets 101

4.4 Summary 103

5 The Soi͡uz gas pipeline 106

5.1 The Complex Program 106

5.2 Soi͡uz as a flagship project? 109

5.2.1 Posting of workforce 113

5.2.2 Joint purchases of Western products 120

5.2.3 The International Investment Bank 122

5.2.4 Repercussions of the Polish debt crisis 127

5.3 Further system growth without integration 130

5.4 Summary 132

6 Stagnation in the East European nuclear energy sector 135

6.1 Impacts of the oil crises 135

6.1.1 Excursus: the discussion about Soviet subsidization 141

6.2 Ambitious plans for the electricity network Mir 143

6.2.1 New institutions and agreements 143

6.2.2 The General Scheme for the Long-Term Development of Mir 147

6.2.3 Joint construction of the NPP Khmeľnit͡skiĭ 153

6.3 The “NPP Żarnowiec under construction” 158

6.3.1 Initial plans for a Polish NPP 158

6.3.2 Crumbling cross-border supply chains 160

6.3.3 The Chernobyl disaster 163

6.3.4 Growing counterculture 165

6.3.5 The end of the “NPP Żarnowiec under construction” 170

6.4 Summary 172

7 Impacts of changing institutional frameworks 175

7.1 Electricity sector 175

7.1.1 Transition from Mir to ENTSO-E 176

7.1.2 Nuclear plans in Poland 179

7.2 Gas sector 185

7.2.1 Supply security versus transport autarky 186

7.2.2 The post-socialist gas infrastructure 189

© 2017, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-10904-8 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19676-5

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Content 5

7.3 Oil sector 194

7.3.1 Diversification attempts despite low vulnerability 195

7.3.2 The Druzhba pipeline: worn out or indispensable? 196

7.4 Summary 198

8 Conclusion 200

9 Color plates 209

10 Bibliography 216

10.1 Archival sources 216

10.2 Interviews 217

10.3 Official documents 217

10.4 Web-published material 217

10.5 Secondary literature 218

11 Index 231

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ISBN Print: 978-3-447-10904-8 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19676-5

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Figures and tables

1.1: Polish import dependency on oil and gas (1990–2018) 17

1.2: Polish gas imports from Russia (1990–2014) 18

2.1: Planned 150 kV electricity network in COP (1937) 43

2.2: Gas pipeline network in COP (1939) 45

3.1: Electricity deficit of the Hungarian aluminum industry (1956–60) 56

3.2: Cross-border transmission lines between CMEA countries (1960) 209

3.3: Electricity consumption of CMEA countries (1955–65) 61

3.4: Saving potential of a unified electricity network (1959) 67

3.5: Intrabloc electricity deliveries (1962) 69

3.6: Cross-border transmission lines between CMEA countries (1967) 210

4.1: Planned oil imports of CMEA countries from the Soviet Union (1957–60) 77

4.2: Oil import demands of CMEA countries from the Soviet Union (1960–75) 78

4.3: The Druzhba oil pipeline (1964) 211

4.4: Planned oil imports through the Druzhba pipeline (1962–75) 82

4.5: Cost estimates for the Druzhba pipeline (1959) 83

4.6: Planned pipe supplies for the section Kuĭbyshev-Mozyr’ (1959) 85

4.7: Construction costs of the Druzhba pipeline (1964) 95

4.8: Forms of transport of Polish oil imports (1968–75) 97

4.9: Oil transport through the Druzhba pipeline (1970–75) 100

4.10: The extended Druzhba pipeline system (1975) 211

4.11: Share of Soviet crude oil exports to CMEA countries (1960–89) 105

5.1: The Soi͡uz gas pipeline (1979) 212

5.2: Sections of the Soi͡uz gas pipeline (1975) 212

5.3: Energopol’s engagement in the Soviet Union (1975–85) 117

5.4: Number of employees in the Soi͡uz project (1977) 119

5.5: Polish share of total construction costs of the Soi͡uz pipeline (1981) 124

5.6: Credits raised by the IIB for the Soi͡uz project (1978) 125

5.7: Soviet share of oil and gas supplies to CMEA countries (1973–80) 134

5.8: Energy self-sufficiency of CMEA countries (1950–78) 134

6.1: Soviet gas import prices (1973–77) 138

6.2: World market and intrabloc crude oil prices (1972–82) 140

6.3: Key numbers of the Polish energy system (1960–90) 148

6.4: Planned nuclear power production capacity in CMEA countries (1976–90) 149

6.5: Projected 750 kV network of the Mir electricity grid (1990) 213

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6.6: Financial assessment of Mir network (1975) 150

6.7: Electricity exchange between CMEA and neighboring countries (1981) 214

6.8: Share of nuclear energy in CMEA countries (1970–90) 151

6.9: Polish contributions to the Khmeľnit͡skiĭ NPP (1979–85) 154

6.10: Key numbers of planned NPPs in Poland (1985–2000) 159

6.11: Scheme of a NPP with VVER technology 215

7.1: Energy intensity in EU and CEE countries (1992–98) 176

7.2: Attitude towards NPPs in Poland (1987–2013) 181

7.3: Government targets for nuclear energy (2010–35) 183

7.4: Projected Polish energy mix (2030) 184

7.5: Energy import dependency in Poland and Germany (1995–2013) 186

7.6: Capacity of gas pipelines from Russia (2015) 189

7.7: Oil imports of Visegrád countries through the Druzhba pipeline (2012) 197

8.1: Poland’s transnational cooperation regarding energy infrastructures 208

© 2017, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-10904-8 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19676-5

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Abbreviations

AAN Archiwum Akt Nowych

AMSZ Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych

ARM Archiwum Rady Ministrów

BArch Bundesarchiv

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

bcm billion cubic meters

BEMIP Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan

BPS Baltic Pipeline System

CBOS Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej

CDO Central Dispatching Organization

CEE Central and Eastern Europe

CIGRÉ Conseil International des Grands Réseaux Électriques

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CMEA Council of Mutual Economic Aid

CoCom Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy

ComInform Communist Information Bureau

COP Centralny Okręg Przemysłowy

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union

DIN Deutsches Institut für Normung

EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

EC European Commission

ECT Energy Charter Treaty

ENTSO-E European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity ENTSO-G European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas

EU European Union

FDJ Freie Deutsche Jugend

FSRU Floating Storage Regasification Unit

GARF Gosudarstvennyĭ Arkhiv Rossiĭskoĭ Federat͡sii

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GDR German Democratic Republic

GIPL Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania

GKĖS Gosudarstvennyĭ Komitet po Vneshnim Ėkonomicheskim Svi͡azi͡am Glavgaz Glavnoe Upravlenie Gazovoĭ Promyshlennosti

GNP Gross National Product

GOĖLRO Gosudarstvennai͡a Komissii͡a po Ėlektrifikat͡sii Rossii

GOST Gosudarstvennyĭ Standart

GWh gigawatt hours

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

i.e id est

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IEA International Energy Agency

IIB International Investment Bank

ISO International Organization for Standardization

km kilometer

kV kilovolt

kWh kilowatt hour

LIBOR London Interbank Offered Rate

LNG Liquefied Natural Gas

LTS Large Technological System

m meter

Minėnergo Ministerstvo Ėnergetiki i Ėlektrifikat͡sii

Mingazprom Ministerstvo Gazovoĭ Promyshlennosti

Minneftegazstroĭ Ministerstvo Stroiteľstva Predprii͡atiĭ Nefti͡anoĭ i Gazovoĭ

Promyshlennosti

mm millimeter

MW Megawatt

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEL Nordeuropäische Erdgasleitung

NPP Nuclear Power Plant

OAPEC Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-operation

OPAL Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung

OSZhD Organizat͡sii͡a Sotrudnichestva Zheleznykh Dorog

PCI Project of Common Interest

PERN Przedsiębiorstwo Eksploatacji Rurociągów Naftowych

PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna

PGNiG Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazowe

PiS Prawo i Sprawiedliwość

PO Platforma Obywatelska

PSE Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne

PZPR Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza

RBMK Reaktor Boľshoĭ Moshchnosti Kanaľnyĭ

REPCO Russian Export Blend Crude Oil

RGAE Rossiĭskiĭ Gosudarstvennyĭ Arkhiv Ėkonomiki

SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands

SLD Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej

TEN-E Trans-European Energy Network

TPA Third Party Access

UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

© 2017, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-10904-8 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19676-5

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Abbreviations 11

UNIPEDE International Union of Producers of Electrical Energy

US United States

VVER Vodo-Vodi͡anoĭ Ėnergeticheskiĭ Reaktor

WiP Wolność i Pokój

ZMS Związek Młodzieży Socjalistycznej

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ISBN Print: 978-3-447-10904-8 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19676-5

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Acknowledgement

Working on a PhD project over the course of almost five years has brought me in contact with a broad range of different people Some of these contacts were temporary, others will hopefully last for the rest of my life These people supported the project in a practical or intellectual way in working groups and archives, at conferences and workshops

My supervisor Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast had the largest influence on my PhD project She turned my attention to energy history, which became my own hobbyhorse in the following years In addition, I largely benefited from her extensive scientific network The reviewer of this work, Heiko Pleines, helped me to improve important aspects of my study thanks to his constructive criticism

As a member of a doctoral college, I profited from regular colloquia, field trips as well as the exchange with my fellow doctoral candidates Although all of them had their own disciplinary focuses, there was always the opportunity to discuss the advantages and pitfalls

of our lives as PhD students This is true especially for Anna Maria Steinkamp as well as Hanna Malik, with whom I shared a study room Jonas Grygier’s hospitality and permanent readiness to help facilitated my start as a PhD student The Hanns Seidel Foundation provided all of us in an uncomplicated manner with the necessary long-term scholarships

This study would not have been possible without archive stays in Warsaw and Moscow Next to conference trips all over Europe, these visits formed the most interesting part of my research Thanks to grants from the local German Historical Institutes, I was able to work and live in these capitals for several months My respective supervisors Jens Boysen (Warsaw) and Matthias Uhl (Moscow) provided me with helpful information about the func-tioning of local archives Without this information, I probably would not have found important sources, although archive employees were helpful everywhere The German His-torical Institutes’ staff gave practical support regarding administrational issues and housing

I appreciate the readiness of my private hosts in Moscow and Warsaw to share their flats with strangers like me

Furthermore, I would like to thank other scholars, who supported my PhD project Jürgen Wagener commented in detail on the entire study The realization of some of these points further improved the quality of this book Vincent Lagendijk gave helpful feedback

Hans-on my theory chapter Łukasz Dwilewicz provided me with fast and competent answers Hans-on details concerning Polish energy history Lorenz Lüthi generously shared valuable archive material with me Jeronim Perović gave helpful comments, which improved the chapter regarding the Druzhba pipeline Philipp Zessin-Jurek supported me with his overall insights

in the field of scientific work I am also grateful to Paweł Bożyk as well as Andrzej Karpiński, both of whom agreed to share their wealth of experience with me in the form of telephone interviews

Moreover, I would like to thank the staff of the Center for Interdisciplinary Polish Studies, which became an inspiring working environment for me My thanks to my former colleagues

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in the pol-int project, especially to Dorothea Traupe and Andrzej Ceglarz for their ment and kindness I am also grateful to the then head of the Hannah Arendt Institute, Günther Heydemann as well as Hannelore Georgi for their initial support to get my PhD project started

engage-Finally, I would like to thank the publisher for accepting my work The publication was generously supported by a grant of the Viadrina International Program for Graduates

I dedicate this book to my wife

outcome of this endeavor

Falk Flade Frankfurt (Oder), August 2017

© 2017, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-10904-8 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19676-5

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1 Introduction

This study covers a time range spanning from the late 19th century to the latest developments

in the European energy sector Of particular interest is the socialist period The following

chapter will introduce the reader to the overall idea of this work Special attention will be

paid to both the subject and the research approach The general aim is to illustrate the

topi-cality of this study as well as the applied working methods

1.1 Prolog

Energy dependency has been on top of the political agenda in Poland for more than a decade

This is true not only for the Polish energy policy but for Polish politics in general

Govern-ments formed by the political parties Prawo i Sprawiedliwości (PiS) as well as Platforma

Obywatelska (PO) highlighted the dangers arising from energy dependency.1 Standpoints

differed insignificantly and mainly referred to the question of a more cooperative approach

at the European Union (EU) level or a more autonomous stance This is a remarkable fact

considering the ideological cleavages in Polish politics One of the main reasons for this

re-latively stable consensus has been the steady rise of the oil price2 and the aggressive

comeback of Russia as a great power since the year 2000

The years 2005 and 2006 constituted a major turning point in Polish energy politics for

three reasons First, the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis revealed that Russia is ready to exploit

its position as the main gas supplier for members of the Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS) as well as Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)3 with the goal of achieving political

advantages Although similar crises had occurred in CIS countries before, this time the

poli-tical motivation in the context of the Orange Revolution was obvious Second, the crisis

con-curred with the accession to power of PiS in late 2005, which was willing to politicize the

issue of energy dependency Reactions of the new government included the decision to

construct a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal4 and the demand for a solidary energy

policy at EU level labelled “Energy NATO.”5 Third, in summer 2005, West European and

1 Earlier governments addressed the topic rather broadly The SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej)

government released a corresponding document in January 2005 Ministerstwo Gospodarki i Pracy

(2005): Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2025 roku Warsaw

2 The price for one barrel of Brent crude oil increased from 10 US $ in December 1998 to 144 US $ in July

2008

3 By CEE, I will refer to former socialist countries in Europe (except the GDR), which are not members or

associates of CIS: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,

Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia

4 Kubiak, Krzysztof (2010): Polska wobec importu skroplonego gazu ziemnego Szanse – zagrożenia –

wyzwania In: Mickiewicz, Piotr; Sokołowska, Patrycja (eds.): Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Europy

środkowej Toruń, p 204

5 Lang, Kai-Olaf (2006): Mit Sicherheit Polens Energiepolitik zwischen europäischer Solidarität und

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Russian gas companies agreed to construct the Nord Stream pipeline in order to establish a

direct link between the Russian supplier and consumers in Western Europe From a Polish

point of view, this was unacceptable because Poland and other countries of the region would

lose their importance as transit countries The West European-Russian agreement spurred

fears that CEE countries could be left alone vis-à-vis Russia, since their status as transit

countries was a decisive trump in order to counterweigh energy dependencies Warnings of

a new “gas curtain” were issued referring to the potential of Nord Stream to divide old and

new EU member countries.6 The medial climax was a statement by Radosław Sikorski, then

Polish defense minister, who compared the German-Russian cooperation concerning the

Nord Stream pipeline with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact preceding the Second World War.7

This sequence of events reoccurred in a similar pattern several years later, this time under

the leadership of PO Once again, yet another Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis was the trigger

After the disruption of gas supplies seriously affecting CEE countries, a heated debate

con-cerning the Polish energy security took place in the Sejm in January 2009 Member of

Parliament Paweł Kowal found the clearest words:8

“For years, they have been saying that Russia could cut off gas [deliveries], but in

reality would never do it Now it did They tried to convince us that it is enough to

have good relations to Gazprom […], not to meddle in disputes with Russia, but to sit

quietly and feel safe No matter what to think about this approach, today we already

know that this is not relevant any more Last week’s incidents hit the quiet CEE

count-ries the hardest.”

Several months later, the Polish government published a strategy paper on energy policy

Next to energy efficiency, supply security and diversification of energy supplies ranked

highest.9 Furthermore, the construction of a nuclear power plant (NPP) figured prominently

in the document, although the idea had already been proposed several years earlier Further

hopes were set on shale gas deposits in northern and eastern Poland The National Geological

Institute proclaimed that shale gas would be able to ensure energy security for several

decades.10 The Energy Union proposed by Donald Tusk in 2014 in parts resembled the

Energy NATO, which had been discussed in 2006 Once again, solidarity and a common

bargaining position towards major energy suppliers were at the heart of the proposal.11

Beyond that, another pipeline project circumventing CEE countries again caused widespread

political turmoil The extension of the Nord Stream pipeline poses the same threats as its

russischer Abhängigkeit In: Polen-Analysen 2, pp 5-6

6 Młynarski, Tomasz (2011): Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku Mozaika

interesów i geostrategii Cracow, p 139

7 Kloth, Hans Michael (01.05.2006): Indirect Hitler comparison Polish minister attacks Schröder and

Merkel In: Spiegel Online

(http://www.spiegel.de/international/indirect-hitler-comparison-polish-minister-attacks-schroeder-and-merkel-a-413969 html, accessed October 28, 2016)

8 Sprawozdanie stenograficzne z 33 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Informacja Prezesa

Rady Ministrów na temat bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Polski w związku z przerwaniem dostarczania

gazu ziemnego z Rosji przez terytorium Ukrainy, 09.01.2009, p 305

9 Ministerstwo Gospodarki (2009): Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2030 roku Warsaw, pp 4-5

10 Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny (2012): Ocena zasobów wydobywalnych gazu ziemnego i ropy naftowej

w formacjach łupkowych dolnego paleozoiku w Polsce Raport Pierwszy Warsaw, p 5

11 Wenerski, Łukasz (2015): Die Energieunion aus polnischer Perspektive Polen-Analysen 167, p 2

© 2017, Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & Co KG, Wiesbaden ISBN Print: 978-3-447-10904-8 - ISBN E-Book: 978-3-447-19676-5

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Prolog 17

predecessor ten years ago Therefore, it is not surprising that the Polish government returned

to proposals, which had already been discussed a decade earlier.12

Figure 1.1: Polish import dependency on oil and gas (1990–2018)

How intense is the Polish energy dependency? According to the International Energy Agency

(IEA), it is no exaggeration to call Poland import-dependent, especially regarding oil and gas

supplies As Figure 1.1 shows, almost 100 percent of oil was imported in the last two decades

Domestic oil production is very small, covering only a few percent of the country’s overall

demand Concerning the demand for natural gas, around one third is produced domestically

Additionally, natural gas imports have increased in the past decade, reaching a level

compa-rable to that in the year 1990 However, it is important to keep in mind that Poland still

heavily relies on domestic coal In 2012, 56 percent of the primary energy demand and 90

percent of electricity production were covered by brown and hard coal.13 Oil and gas are

important raw materials for the chemical industry and of fundamental importance for the

transport sector Therefore, substitution is possible only to a certain degree In general, the

Polish energy mix strongly resembles that of other CEE countries like Bulgaria, the Czech

Republic, or Estonia, with a high share of coal or peat and a significant import dependency

regarding oil and gas Other CEE countries additionally use further energy sources like

nuclear energy (e.g Slovakia, Hungary) or hydropower (e.g Latvia) Nonetheless, a high

12 After parliamentary elections in October 2015, when PiS won a majority of seats, different stakeholders

relaunched proposals on the construction of a gas pipeline from Norway to Poland

(http://www.cire.pl/item,124474,13,1,2,0,282827,0,poprawa-plusy-i-minusy-gazociagu-norweskiego html#, accessed October 28, 2016) as well as an oil pipeline from Ukrainian Brody and

Polish Płock

(http://www.cire.pl/item,124619,1,1,2,0,283018,0,polska-moze-zreanimowac-projekt-odessa-brody-gdansk html#, accessed October 28, 2016)

13 Grzeszak, Adam (2012): Energie – Herausforderung für Polen Polen-Analysen 109, p 5

Source: author’s illustration, based on numbers in IEA (2014): Energy supply security

Emergency response of IEA countries Paris, p 359

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import dependency regarding oil and gas is a common feature of most of the CEE countries

due to small domestic deposits

It is the single-source dependency which makes these high levels of oil and gas imports

problematic In the Polish case, this is true for both oil and gas However, due to a different

functioning of the oil and gas markets, the debate on energy dependency focuses on natural

gas Gas is mainly traded on the basis of long-term agreements and tied to a pipeline

infra-structure.14 Although diversification has been a primary energy policy goal for years, high

investment costs and long investment periods complicate reorientation This explains why

the Russian share of Polish gas imports is still high As Table 1.2 reveals, the Russian share

still accounted for 75.7 percent in 2014, although it has been constantly decreasing since

1990 The lower level of imports from Russia in the mid-2000s was related to a higher share

of central Asian countries like Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan However, even in this case,

Poland was still dependent on Russia, because central Asian gas reaches Poland via the

Russian pipeline network

Table 1.2: Polish gas imports from Russia (1990–2014)

1.2 Object of study

The main object of this study are transnational energy infrastructures in the Eastern Bloc as

well as their implications for Poland in the short and long run The first installment of a

cross-border pipeline network connecting production regions in Russia and central Asia with CIS

and CEE countries as well as Western Europe was established in the late 1950s Especially

in this early stage of transnational cooperation, planned economies were lacking the tools as

well as the experience of how to organize this cooperation and to establish prices for

cross-border energy deliveries These problems were first and foremost related to the restricted

foreign trade possibilities of planned economies Nevertheless, energy transport

infrastruc-14 However, the increasing share of LNG traded on spot markets and shipped with tankers has the potential

to fundamentally change market conditions in the long run

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Object of study 19

tures were considerably extended in the following decades in order to supply European

count-ries with Soviet oil and gas Compared with Czechoslovakia or the GDR, which were more

industrialized and, therefore, in need of energy imports, Poland was not a forerunner

regar-ding the construction of cross-border energy networks in the 1950s and 1960s Only in the

1970s the country increasingly participated in such endeavors The emerging energy

trans-port infrastructure also included oil and gas pipelines as well as electricity transmission lines

In contrast to West European countries, however, storage capacities as well as diversified

import infrastructures were regarded as unnecessary in Eastern Europe The infrastructural

heritage, consisting of pipelines, compressor stations, and other technical components

deter-mines the high Polish oil and gas import dependencies until today Due to long investment

periods in the energy sector as well as considerable investment costs, this situation is

changing slowly Therefore, it is necessary to take a closer look at the history of transnational

energy infrastructures to better understand the existing situation in the Polish energy sector

The term Eastern Bloc denotes the time and space of my research The Eastern Bloc

enve-loped countries in Eastern Europe where socialist or communist parties were in power

between the later 1940s and 1989/1991 Since long-term developments are in the focus of

this work, the time frame will be extended to the periods before and after the socialist time

with special regard to the Polish case The study follows a historical periodization and takes

into account those neighboring socialist countries, with which Poland cooperated the most,

i.e the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia

The subject can be further tightened down to transnational energy infrastructures,

consti-tuting a central part of the Eastern European energy sector According to the historians Erik

van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser, transnational energy infrastructures are still an

underde-veloped field of research, although historians widely acknowledge the fundamental role of

transnational networks The decisive influence of infrastructures is assumed but still not

analyzed.15 Applying this topic to the time and space described above, the research gap

becomes even more obvious The historian Vincent Lagendijk points to the fact that the

majority of research on energy infrastructures is conducted from a national perspective and

usually pays attention to the United States (US) and Western Europe.16 The historians Klaus

Gestwa and Stefan Rohdewald shared this opinion and explicitly mentioned energy

infra-structures in the Eastern Bloc as desiderata.17

A proper way to approach this research gap is to focus on the institutions responsible for

planning, constructing, and operating cross-border energy networks Contemporary studies

point to the Council of Mutual Economic Aid18 (CMEA) as a decisive decision-making body

15 Van der Vleuten, Erik; Kaijser, Arne (2006): Prologue and introduction: transnational networks and the

shaping of contemporary Europe In: Van der Vleuten, Erik; Kaijser, Arne (eds.): Networking Europe

Transnational infrastructures and the shaping of Europe 1850–2000 Sagamore Beach, p 7

16 Lagendijk, Vincent (2008): Electrifying Europe The power of Europe in the construction of electricity

networks Amsterdam, p 22 Examples are: Nye, David (1990): Electrifying America: social meanings

of a new technology 1880-1940 Cambridge Kaijser, Arne; Hedin, Marika (1995): Nordic energy

systems Historical perspectives and current issues Canton Shamir, Ronen (2013): Current flow The

electrification of Palestine Stanford

17 Gestwa, Klaus; Rohdewald, Stefan (2009): Verflechtungsstudien Naturwissenschaft und Technik im

Kalten Krieg In: Osteuropa 59/10, p 14

18 Sometimes Council of Mutual Economic Assistance Especially in Western literature also Comecon

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with regard to oil and gas pipelines or electricity transmission lines.19 The CMEA existed for

more than 40 years and was deeply involved in the energy sector in general as well as

trans-national energy infrastructures in particular By focusing on the CMEA, I can avoid some of

the pitfalls of exclusive micro- or macro-approaches concentrating on case studies or the

national level Especially in the case of transnational infrastructures, this seems to be a

reasonable approach.20

1.3 Literature overview

Next to the Warsaw Pact, the CMEA was the most important international organization of

Eastern Bloc countries and an important planning body in the energy sector.21 Founded in

1949 and dissolved in 1991, the CMEA reflected the political and economic ups and downs

in the Eastern Bloc The administrative structure included the Executive Committee, the

Secretariat, Standing Commissions as well as CMEA sessions regularly held in East

European capitals Additionally, meetings of first secretaries or heads of government of

CMEA member countries taking place immediately before CMEA sessions had a decisive

influence on decision-making

Due to the CMEA’s long existence, considerable size, and significant impact, the

corres-ponding literature is immense Plans by Nikita Khrushchëv, First Secretary of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), to transform the CMEA into a supranational planning

authority, significantly piqued the interest of Western researchers Especially the Sino-Soviet

split and the successful Romanian blockade of Khrushchëv‘s plans attracted closer

attention.22 Valuable monographies written by East European authors appeared with regard

to the 25th anniversary of the CMEA in 1974 Moreover, the CMEA Bulletin had been

published by the CMEA secretariat since 1975 Although these works are politically biased

and often mask decisive debates, they provide a detailed overview.23 Intensified integration

efforts of CMEA countries and the rapprochement between East and West invited further

19 Ruban, Rostyslav (2013): The European natural gas supply, under particular consideration of gas transit

Dissertation Berlin, pp 119-120 Newnham, Randall (2011): Oil, carrots, and sticks: Russia’s energy

resources as a foreign policy tool In: Journal of Eurasian Studies 2/2, p 135 Balmaceda, Margarita

(2002): EU energy policy and future European energy markets: consequences for the central and east

European states Mannheim, p 4

20 For a detailed elaboration, see the methods section

21 Full members included Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, Albania

(active participation until 1961), the GDR (since 1950), Mongolia (since 1962), Cuba (since 1972), and

Vietnam (since 1978)

22 Hoffmann, Emil (1961): COMECON Der gemeinsame Markt in Osteuropa Opladen Uschakow,

Alexander (1962): Der Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe (Comecon) Cologne Kaser, Michael

(1967): Comecon Integration problems of the planned economies Oxford

23 Boroch, N et al (1975): RGW Bilanz u Perspektiven Berlin Faddejew, N (1975): Der Rat für

Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe Berlin Hegemann, Margot (1980): Kurze Geschichte des RGW Berlin

Ėkonomicheskoe Sotrudnichestvo Stran-Chlenov SĖV Informat͡sionnyĭ Bi͡ulleten’ (1975-1991)

Moscow

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Literature overview 21

interest New cooperation mechanisms like the Complex Program, the International

Invest-ment Bank (IIB), or International Economic Organizations came into focus.24 In order to

assess the intensified cooperation, an exact knowledge of legal frameworks and regulations

was needed Lawyers in East and West published collections of basic CMEA documents and

other international economic institutions.25 Interaction and mutual influences between the

CMEA and individual member countries were of scientific importance, too Poland26 as the

second largest member country with considerable political weight drew researchers’

particu-lar interest Aside from politics, economic aspects such as the impact of the country’s debt

crisis as well as the Polish coal sector on intrabloc trade were discussed.27 In the last years of

the CMEA’s existence, several East European scientists and economists, who often dealt

throughout their entire working life with the CMEA, published their experiences and insider

knowledge, providing helpful insights.28 Another relevant source of information are

biblio-graphies, stemming from the 1990s.29 The mentioned literature provides a general idea of the

overall history of the CMEA, which is necessary for a detailed work on the energy sector in

CMEA countries

Although Western scholars had occasionally discussed questions related to the Eastern

European energy sector,30 the issue gained center stage in the course of the oil crises In

24 Ribi, Rolf (1970): Das Comecon Eine Untersuchung über die Problematik der wirtschaftlichen

Integration sozialistischer Länder Zurich Bröll, Werner (1975): Comecon (Rat für gegenseitige

Wirtschaftshilfe) Der Integrationsversuch sozialistischer Planwirtschaften Munich Bethkenhagen,

Jochen; Machowski, Heinrich (1976): Integration im Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe Entwicklung,

Organisation, Erfolge u Grenzen Berlin Damus, Renate (1979): RGW, wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit

in Osteuropa Opladen Brabant, Jozef van (1980): Socialist economic integration Aspects of

contemporary economic problems in Eastern Europe Cambridge

25 Rüster, Lothar (1978): Grunddokumente des RGW Berlin Mentz, Dieter; Pfeffer, Joachim (1982): Die

rechtliche Regelung der internationalen Energiebeziehungen der RGW-Länder Munich Uschakow,

Alexander (1984): Internationale Rohstoffabkommen im RGW In: Gutmann, Gernot; Thalheim, Karl;

Wöhlke, Wilhelm (eds.): Das Energieproblem in Ostmitteleuropa II: Energiepolitik und Energieverbund

in den mitteleuropäischen RGW-Staaten Marburg, pp 93–113

26 Although the historically correct term is “Polish People’s Republic,” I will use the term “Poland” to refer

to the Second Polish Republic, the Polish People’s Republic as well as contemporary Poland for brevity’s

sake

27 Uschakow, Alexander (1982): Die Stellung Polens im Rat für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe In:

Gutmann, Gernot; Thalheim, Karl; Wöhlke, Wilhelm (eds.): Integration im Rat für Gegenseitige

Wirtschaftshilfe (RGW) Das Beispiel Polens und der ČSSR Marburg, pp 51–62 Gabrisch, Hubert

(1984): Das polnische Interesse am RGW In: Schönfeld, Roland; Altmann, Franz-Lothar (eds.):

RGW-Integration und Südosteuropa Munich, pp 189–198 Trzeciakowski, Witold (1986): Polska w RWPG

Wrocław Ptaszek, Jan (1987): Współpraca PRL z krajami RWPG w sferze produkcji materialnej

Warsaw

28 Zwass, Adam (1988): Der Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe 1949 bis 1987 Der dornige Weg von

einer politischen zu einer wirtschaftlichen Integration Vienna Różański, Henryk (1990): Spojrzenie na

RWPG Wspomnienia, dokumenty, refleksje 1949-1988 Warsaw Korbonski, Andrzej (1990): CMEA,

economic integration, and perestroika, 1949-1989 In: Studies in Comparative Communism 23/1, pp 47–

72

29 E.g Brine, Jenny (1992): Comecon The rise and fall of an international socialist organization Oxford

30 Wessely, Kurt (1962): Tendenzen in der Energiewirtschaft des Ostblocks I: Sowjetunion In: Osteuropa

8-9, pp 578–584 Idem: II: Das Verhältnis der Ostblockstaaten untereinander In: Osteuropa 11-12, pp

813–818 Bröll, Werner (1968): Die energetische Integration des RGW-Raumes In: Osteuropa Wirtschaft

1, pp 26–49

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general, scholars were interested in the energy sectors of individual socialist countries, the

functioning of intrabloc energy trade, and the pricing mechanism.31 In particular, the impacts

of the oil crises in East and West were assessed Whereas the West had managed to restrict

energy demand, the energy intensity of East European economies further increased, because

austerity measures yielded only limited results.32 Of course, East European scholars observed

the considerable impacts of the oil crises, too However, this question had been perceived as

only one aspect of a much broader “energy and fuel problem,” under discussion since the

1960s This problem was unleashed by the socialist industrialization with its focus on

energy-intense industry sectors, leading to a significant growth of energy demand Already since the

1960s, the Soviet Union had pointed to increasing production costs and proposed new forms

of cooperation.33 One form were joint investments in the Soviet fuel and raw materials sector

Such endeavors were of particular interest for researchers Due to the uneven distribution of

oil, gas, iron ore, or asbestos deposits, which were located mainly in the Soviet Union, East

European planners faced considerable theoretical and practical problems of socialist foreign

investment.34

Western scholars started observing the problems of the Eastern Bloc’s energy sector after

the oil crises In the 1980s, a considerable amount of research works was published

Especi-ally the Soviet Union’s role as the main energy supplier for East European as well as West

European countries was discussed Of special interest was the Soviet reaction to rocketing

global energy prices, significantly raising the opportunity costs of energy supplies to Eastern

Bloc countries Growing Soviet hard currency needs to buy grain and technology on global

31 Bethkenhagen, Jochen (1977): Die Zusammenarbeit der RGW-Länder auf dem Energiesektor In:

Osteuropa Wirtschaft 22/2, pp 63–80 Park, Daniel (1979): Oil & gas in Comecon countries New York

Dietz, Raimund (1984): Die Energiewirtschaft in Osteuropa und der UdSSR Vienna Kaser, Michael

(1985): Energy trade within Comecon In: Fink, Gerhard (ed.): Socialist economy and economic policy

Vienna, pp 215–230 Reisinger, William (1992): Energy and the Soviet Bloc Alliance politics after

Stalin Ithaca

32 Dobozi, István (1981): Policy responses to the energy crisis East and West In: ACES Bulletin 23/1, pp

25–66 Saunders, Christopher (ed.) (1980): East and West in the energy squeeze Prospects for

cooperation London Jansen, Paul (1984): Energiepolitik unter dem Eindruck der beiden Ölpreiskrisen

Die Beispiele der ČSSR, DDR, Polens und Ungarns In: Gutmann, Gernot; Thalheim, Karl; Wöhlke,

Wilhelm (eds.): Das Energieproblem in Ostmitteleuropa II: Energiepolitik und Energieverbund in den

mitteleuropäischen RGW-Staaten Marburg

33 Jakuschin, A (1971): Zusammenarbeit der RGW-Länder zur Lösung des Brennstoffproblems In:

Aussenhandel 1, pp 5–8 Dembowski, Jacek (1974): Problemy surowcowe we współpracy krajów

RWPG In: Gospodarka Planowa 1, pp 21–25 Gorywoda, Manfred (1978): Współpraca krajów RWPG

w gospodarowaniu surowcami Warsaw Kozlov, Igor’ (1980): Ėnergeticheskoe khozi͡aĭstvo stran SĖV:

problemy i perspektivy sotrudnichestva Moscow Gwiazda, Adam (1981): Energetyczna współzależność

krajów RWPG In: Handel Zagraniczny 26/5, pp 25–30 Sydow, P et al (1981): Wirtschaftliches

Wachstum europäischer RGW-Länder Ziele – Bedingungen – Aufgaben Berlin, Chapter 4

34 Wyczański, Paweł (1977): Systemy wspólnego finansowania inwestycji krajów RWPG Warsaw

Hannigan, John; McMillan, Carl (1981): Joint investment in resource development Sectoral approaches

to socialist integration In: East European economic assessment II: regional assessments Washington

D.C., pp 259–295 Żukrowska, Katarzyna (1981): Wspólne inwestycje krajów RWPG, ich efektywność

i znaczenia dla społeczno-gospodarczego rozwoju tych krajów Warsaw Schönfeld, Roland (1984):

Gemeinsame Investitionen im RGW und die Beteiligung der südosteuropäischen Mitgliedsländer In:

Schönfeld, Roland; Altmann, Franz-Lothar (eds.): RGW-Integration und Südosteuropa Munich, pp 101–

126

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Literature overview 23

markets made oil and gas exports to Western Europe more attractive, although a large-scale

redirection of energy supplies away from socialist partners was not feasible, either.35 Beyond

that, Western researchers noticed the paradox of growing energy shortages in the Soviet

Union itself Reform attempts under General Secretaries Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail

Gorbachëv had not succeed to uncouple energy demand from economic growth, and the

energy-rich country was experiencing a lack of energy Scholars speculated about the Soviet

Union transforming from a major energy supplier into an energy importer as well as the

implications of this development for the West.36

Another relevant branch of literature referred to the political dimension of the energy

crisis in the Eastern Bloc Western researchers discussed the Soviet Union’s implicit

subsi-dies to its socialist allies in the form of lower energy prices.37 The Soviet Union’s outstanding

role as energy supplier seemed to be an appropriate policy tool to keep the smaller Bloc

countries in line According to the economists Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, the largest

subsidies in the form of low energy prices went to loyal countries like Czechoslovakia and

the German Democratic Republic (GDR), whereas Poland and especially Romania received

the least favorable conditions in the 1960s and 1970s Another important factor was that

energy supplies were usually paid with goods like machines and technical equipment, which

were not competitive on global markets However, later research qualified these findings and

pointed to the decisive influence of the CMEA pricing mechanism in intrabloc trade.38 By

including the 1980s in the evaluation period, the implicit subsidies almost disappeared Due

to the delayed adaptation of intrabloc prices to world market prices, oil-importing CMEA

countries had to pay for Soviet oil even more than the world market price since the

mid-1980s The discussion was related to the general question of the Soviet Union’s role as a

hegemonic power From the very beginning of its existence, the CMEA had been interpreted

35 Böhm, Edward (1980): Die Rolle der Sowjetunion in der Brennstoffwirtschaft des RGW Hamburg

Russell, Jeremy (1981): Energy in the Soviet Union: Problems for Comecon? In: The World Economy

4/2-3, pp 291–314 Bethkenhagen, Jochen (1983): Die Auswirkungen der Ölpreissenkungen auf die

UdSSR und die übrigen RGW-Länder Cologne Hardt, John (1984): Soviet energy policy in Eastern

Europe In: Terry, Sarah (ed.): Soviet policy in Eastern Europe New Haven, pp 189–220 Hewett,

Edward (1984): Energy, economics, and foreign policy in the Soviet Union Washington D.C Brezinski,

Horst (1984): Wirtschaftliche Fragen des Energieverbundes im Ostblock In: Gutmann, Gernot; Thalheim,

Karl; Wöhlke, Wilhelm (eds.): Das Energieproblem in Ostmitteleuropa II: Energiepolitik und

Energieverbund in den mitteleuropäischen RGW-Staaten Marburg, pp 61–91 Czakainski, Martin

(1984): Die Energieversorgung im RGW Stand, Probleme, Perspektiven In: Osteuropa 34/6, pp 440–

453

36 Johns, Lionel; Sharfman, Peter; Goldberg, Ronnie (1981): Technology and Soviet energy availability

Washington D.C Stern, Jonathan (1983): East European energy and East-West trade in energy In:

Belgrave, Robert (ed.): Energy – two decades of crisis Aldershot, pp 1–90 Jentleson, Bruce (1986):

Pipeline politics The complex political economy of East-West energy trade Ithaca Gustafson, Thane

(1989): Crisis amid plenty The politics of Soviet energy under Brezhnev and Gorbachev Princeton

37 Marrese, Michael; Vanous, Jan (1983): Soviet subsidization of trade with Eastern Europe A Soviet

perspective Berkeley Lavigne, Marie (1983): The Soviet Union inside Comecon In: Soviet Studies 35/2,

pp 135–153 Marer, Paul (1984): The political economy of Soviet relations with Eastern Europe In:

Terry, Sarah (ed.): Soviet policy in Eastern Europe New Haven, pp 155–188 Brada, Josef (1985): Soviet

subsidization of Eastern Europe: The primacy of economics over politics? In: Journal of Comparative

Economics 9/1, pp 80–92

38 Kramer, John (1990): The energy gap in Eastern Europe Lexington, pp 29-30

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by some scholars as a Soviet instrument to tie together and steer the smaller socialist countries

in Eastern Europe The CMEA’s establishment as a response to the Marshall Plan seemed to

support this interpretation This assessment was discussed throughout the Eastern Bloc’s

entire existence.39 Due to direct access to the archives and involved decision-makers, this

point of view was qualified in the 1990s The Soviet Union’s increasing inability to impose

its policies as well as the soft bargaining power of smaller CMEA countries was brought into

focus.40 In the 2000s, the discussion concerning Soviet hegemonic power in relation to energy

deliveries again intensified and was applied to the Russian energy policy as well This was

directly related to Russia’s repeated misuse of energy supplies as a political pressure

instrument.41 One of the main aims of this policy is to stabilize the Russian influence in CIS

countries, colloquially labeled in Russian politics as “near abroad.” The notion of special

relations to neighboring countries like Belarus, Ukraine, or Kazakhstan and to a lesser degree

to CEE is based on the close cultural and political ties between these countries However, the

asymmetric division of political and economic power for at least the last three centuries has

decisively shaped this relationship.42

1.4 Research questions and theses

The general idea of this work is to examine the establishment of transnational energy

infra-structures in the Eastern Bloc and their implications for Poland In particular, I will focus on

three question blocks Whereas the first block refers to the organizational and economic

dimensions, the second block concentrates on the power structures behind the examined

projects The third block relates to the impacts on Poland as well as the country’s role in these

endeavors

(1) How did participating countries cooperate in planning, constructing, and operating

transnational energy infrastructures? Which actors were involved and who was the driving

force? Which role did Poland play in these endeavors? Which problems did occur during

planning, construction, and operation? How did CMEA countries finance the projects? How

did modes of cooperation develop and change over time?

39 Gumpel, Werner (1976): Der Rat für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe als Instrument sowjetischer

Hegemonie In: Osteuropa 11, pp 997–1006 Meier, Christian (1986): Der RGW

Wirtschaftsgemein-schaft oder Instrument sowjetischer Hegemonialpolitik? Cologne

40 Stone, Randall (1996): Satellites and commissars Strategy and conflict in the politics of Soviet-Bloc

trade Princeton Herzog, Gerd (1998): Schwäche als Stärke: Bargaining Power im RGW Berlin Ahrens,

Ralf (2000): Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe? Die DDR im RGW – Strukturen und handelspolitische

Strategien 1963–1976 Cologne

41 Balmaceda, Margarita (2004): Der Weg in die Abhängigkeit Ostmitteleuropa am Energietropf der

UdSSR In: Osteuropa 54/9-10, pp 162–179 Beckmann, Elisabeth; Fidrmuc, Jarko: Oil price shock and

structural changes in CMEA trade Pouring oil on troubled waters? Munich Closson, Stacy (2011): A

comparative analysis on energy subsidies in Soviet and Russian policy In: Communist and

Post-Communist Studies 44/4, pp 343–356

42 An analysis of Russia’s relationship with CIS or CEE countries in the context of postcolonial theory could

be revealing For an introduction see Moore, David (2005): Is the in postcolonial the in

post-Soviet? Toward a global postcolonial critique In: Desai, Gaurav; Nair, Supriya (eds.): Postcolonialisms:

an anthology of cultural theory and criticism New Brunswick, pp 514-538

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Research questions and theses 25

(2) Why did cross-border energy infrastructures in the Eastern Bloc come into being? Which interests drove the involved countries, especially Poland and the Soviet Union? How large was the room for maneuvering of the smaller CMEA countries? Which kind of bargai-ning process took place in this asymmetric partnership?

(3) What were the short- and long-term implications for Poland? Did these infrastructures spur Poland’s integration into the Eastern Bloc? Do existing transnational energy infrastruc-tures adversely affect today’s Polish energy security? Was there a continuity of Polish energy policy before, during and after the socialist period?

I propose three theses by referring to the above question blocks Their validity will be verified on the basis of material presented in the following chapters and finally assessed in the conclusion of this work

(1) Modes of cooperation concerning the planning, construction, and operation of national energy infrastructures have changed over the decades They developed in parallel

trans-to the overall evolution of socialist integration efforts Regional forms of cooperation in the

1950s were soon incorporated into the CMEA, leading to a significant expansion of CMEA structures in the 1960s and 1970s Cooperation forms like credit lending or workforce posting developed due to the Soviet Union’s growing reluctance to further scale up oil exports to CMEA countries The establishment of new trade institutions in the 1970s allowed for an enhanced intrabloc burden sharing as well as large-scale imports of Western technology However, the success of the new cooperation forms was limited by obstacles characteristic

of the socialist foreign trade like the dysfunctional pricing mechanism The global oil crises amplified disintegration tendencies Consequently, cooperation fell back to a bilateral level

in the 1980s The dissolution of the Eastern Bloc fundamentally changed the framework for cross-border cooperation regarding oil, gas, and electricity networks

(2) Cross-border energy infrastructures in the Eastern Bloc came into being for economic reasons They served the interests of energy-hungry CMEA countries, which preferred plan- nable and affordable energy imports from the Soviet Union The alternative to buying oil on

the global market was far less attractive to energy-importing CMEA countries due to price increases after the oil crises as well as the impossibility to pay with “soft” goods Taking into account the chronic shortage of convertible currencies, paying with uncompetitive “soft” goods was a decisive advantage for energy-importing CMEA countries The Soviet Union refrained from overly exploiting its advantageous position in the field of energy supplies, although this position strengthened after the oil crises Despite this asymmetric partnership, smaller CMEA countries were able to enforce their interests at least partially and, therefore, limited the Soviet Union’s position of power

(3) In contrast to other CMEA countries, Poland was more reluctant to increase energy imports because of considerable domestic coal deposits Due to its economic advantages and necessities, however, Poland increasingly participated in transnational energy infrastructure projects Consequently, the Polish energy mix slowly changed over the decades and implied

growing import dependencies Only after leaving the Soviet sphere of influence at the ning of the 1990s, existing import dependencies appeared on the political agenda Energy security in connection with transnational energy infrastructures became more pressing after Russia’s exploitation of regional energy dependencies as a policy tool This fact significantly influences today’s Polish energy policy

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begin-1.5 Methods and sources

In order to address the micro level, I will conduct three case studies This work will describe

and try to assess the economic as well as political impact of the crude oil pipeline Druzhba

(Friendship) constructed from 1959 to 1964, the natural gas pipeline Soi͡uz (Alliance)

constructed from 1975 to 1979 as well as the electricity network Mir (Peace), which was

under construction from 1958 until the late 1980s The inclusion of micro studies is a proper

way to complete the macro perspective of national governments and the meso perspective of

international organizations like the CMEA.43 The mentioned projects suit well as case studies

for two reasons First, each of them was of high economic and political relevance and left

significant traces Second, they cover different time periods, allowing me to track changing

modes of cooperation in order to follow up continuities as well as discontinuities When

comparing oil, gas, and electricity infrastructures, however, it is necessary to keep in mind

the differences between the three energy carriers, although all of them rely on transport

networks.44

Next to the secondary literature, this work is based on diverse sources from archives in

Warsaw, Berlin, and Moscow The archive material originates from Polish, Soviet, and East

German ministries of energy, industry, construction, economy, international trade, or central

planning boards as well as from the CMEA and its branch organizations as well as other

institutions directly related to the construction of transnational energy infrastructures

Although the CMEA material is well accessible, it usually does not openly address

contro-versies In contrast to this, documents generated by government administrations and

desig-nated for internal use occasionally describe problems and disputes Unfortunately, the archive

material regarding the Polish participation in the Soi͡uz pipeline project is incomplete Polish

minutes of proceedings of the corresponding intergovernmental commission terminate at the

end of 1975 for unknown reasons Perhaps this was related to the transformation of the Polish

Ministry of Mining and Energy into the Ministry of Energy and Nuclear Power in March

1976 Consultations with archivists from the Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN) in Warsaw as

well as smaller archives of corresponding ministries produced no results However, meeting

records of the mentioned intergovernmental commission could be found in Moscow as well

as Berlin Although the genuine Polish standpoint is missing here, that material is used to

bridge the gap in the Polish archival material This fact further adds to the broad, transnational

perspective of this work taking into account all CMEA countries, even though Poland will

43 The idea of the CMEA as a meso-level institution is adopted from Misa, Thomas: Retrieving

sociotechnical change from technological determinism In: Smith, Merritt; Marx, Leo (eds.): Does

technology drive history? The dilemma of technological determinism Cambridge, pp 139-140

44 With regard to transport, oil is the most flexible energy carrier of the three, since it can be shipped by very

different means of transport like horse wagons, trains, tankers, or pipes Gas transport is mainly tied to a

pipeline infrastructure This fact is decisive for the oil and gas market structure Whereas gas markets in

North America, Europe, and East Asia are largely separated, there is a functioning global oil market

However, technical progress regarding LNG makes gas transport increasingly flexible Long distance

electricity transport on the basis of alternating current is viable, too, although electricity transport always

includes power losses With regard to storage, however, electricity is disadvantaged if compared to oil

and gas, since large-scale electricity storage is still not feasible, although pump storage hydropower plants

represent a second-best solution

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Theoretical approach 27

be of central importance Nevertheless, country names in the text are listed in an alphabetic

order

Concerning the transliteration of Cyrillic anthroponyms and toponyms, I will apply the

transliteration rules of the American Library Association Following the source material, the

Russian version of toponyms in the Soviet Union is transliterated until the year 1991 I

refrained from transliterating toponyms with a well-established English spelling like

Moscow, Lviv, or Chernobyl

In an attempt to complement the archive material, I conducted two interviews with experts

in the Polish energy sector in 2015 These interviews pay attention to the subject’s historical

as well as contemporary dimension The interviewees were found according to snowball

sampling Since said material is not at the heart of this work, I refrained from dwelling on the

methods of qualitative interviewing Nevertheless, the interviews provide some instructive

historical insides as well as revealing opinions on today’s Polish energy policy The

interviews were conducted in Polish and are in the author´s possession

1.6 Theoretical approach

The first section of the following paragraph will describe the theoretical approach, which

seems to be most suitable for studying transnational energy infrastructures Nevertheless,

some shortcomings and ambiguities have been detected, which are assessed in the second

section The third section will specify the concepts of the research approach applied in this

work

1.6.1 Large Technological Systems

The Large Technological System (LTS) framework constitutes a proper way to approach the

research subject of energy infrastructures scientifically The historian of technology Thomas

Hughes first substantiated this approach in his seminal work “Networks of Power” published

in 1983.45 In the following decades, a growing number of social scientists from different

research fields added theoretical and empirical material The main idea is to study not only a

single artefact, like a pipeline, but the entire technical, economic, political, and cultural

constellation Initially, Hughes focused on electric power systems, since such systems

“embody the physical, intellectual, and symbolic resources of the society that constructs

them.”46 This reveals the broad understanding of LTSs as sociotechnical systems, a term

often used as a synonym for LTSs

In order to describe the complex interrelation between technical core and social context,

Hughes coined the expression “seamless web.”47 This metaphor emphasizes the idea of

inseparable ties between core and context and was meant to protect researchers from

techno-logical determinism, i.e the notion that technical forces exclusively determine social and

cultural changes For Hughes, the best way to approach an LTS was to focus on so-called

45 Hughes, Thomas (1983): Networks of power Electrification in Western society; 1880–1930 Baltimore

46 Ibid., p 2

47 Hughes, Thomas (1986): The seamless web: technology, science, etcetera, etcetera In: Social Studies of

Science 16/2, p 285

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system builders, who solved crucial technical as well as non-technical problems in order to

develop the system within an existing institutional framework Famous examples are

indivi-duals like Thomas Edison, Samuel Insull, or Henry Ford, usually inventors, engineers,

managers, and entrepreneurs in one person

Besides the basic idea of LTSs as sociotechnical systems, Hughes and others proposed

further definitions, periodizations, and extensions of the concept According to him, a system

“is constituted of related parts or components These components are connected by a network,

or structure, […] The interconnected components of technical systems are often centrally

controlled, and usually the limits of the system are established by the extent of this control.”48

Therefore, such components can be physical artefacts like turbogenerators, transformers, and

transmission lines but also such diverse structures as mines, nuclear power plants,

manufac-turing firms, utility companies, laboratories or investment banks In later works, Hughes also

focused on non-physical artifacts like research programs and regulatory laws.49

These diverse components are part of one system, because they are controlled by or at

least interact with the technical core to fulfill a common goal A horizontally arranged system

includes components of the same function such as several power plants, whereas a vertically

arranged system is based on components of a functional chain like a coal mine and a power

plant Components are connected by in- and outputs and are often organized in smaller

subsystems Hughes also made a distinction between the words “technical” and

“technologi-cal.” The term “technical” is applied to physical artifacts, whereas “technological” is the

contact zone between the technical and social world formed by institutions, values, interest

groups, social classes, and political or economic forces.50 Consequently, in this work, I will

apply the term “Large Technological System,” because it includes both technical and social

aspects, although other researchers often use “Large Technical System.”

Further definitional ambiguities are related to the L in LTS Hughes did not try to define

this aspect, leaving it to the intuition of individual researchers Other scientists searched for

a clear definition but hardly succeeded.51 The advantage of this ambiguity is that the LTS

approach can be applied to such diverse objects as railroads, telegraph and telephone, the

videotext, national air control, and even the European organ transplant system In order to

structure this diversity, Bernward Joerges suggested distinguishing between “large technical

networks” and “large technical programs” like the Manhattan Project, the Aswan dam, or the

fusion reactor.52 However, the focus remained on energy and especially electricity systems

48 Hughes: Networks of power, p 5

49 Hughes, Thomas (1993): The evolution of Large Technical Systems In: Bijker, Wiebe; Hughes, Thomas;

Pinch, Trevor (eds.): The social construction of technological systems New directions in the sociology

and history of technology Cambridge, p 51

50 Hughes, Thomas (1994): Technological momentum In: Smith, Merritt Roe; Marx, Leo (eds.): Does

technology drive history? The dilemma of technological determinism Cambridge, p 103

51 Bernward Joerges proposed the following definition: “complex and heterogenous systems of physical

structures and complex machineries which (1) are materially integrated, or ‘coupled’ over large spans of

space and time quite irrespective of their particular cultural, political, economic and corporate make-up,

and (2) support or sustain the functioning of very large numbers of other technical systems, whose

organizations they thereby link.” Joerges, Bernward (1988): Large technical systems Concepts and

issues In: Hughes, Thomas; Mayntz, Renate (eds.): The development of Large Technical Systems

Frankfurt/Main, p 24

52 Joerges: Concepts and issues, p 27

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Theoretical approach 29

Another relevant aspect of the LTS approach is a periodization of the growth of

socio-technical systems After comparing the development of the Berlin, Chicago, and London

electricity systems, Hughes distinguished some prevalent characteristics and proposed the

following development stages of LTSs:53

Invention and development: inventor-entrepreneurs play a dominant role and provide the

germinal LTS with economic and political conditions, enabling further growth in a given

sociotechnical environment Inventor-entrepreneurs promote the relatively simple invention

in order to create a system that is able to function in a complex reality

Technological transfer: the system is adapted to different local, regional, or national

environments and assumes widely varying styles under different geographical, political,

legal, and historical conditions Agents of change are inventors, entrepreneurs, organizers of

enterprises and financiers

System growth: critical problems have to be solved in order to compete with alternative

systems Dominant system goals are rationalization, efficiency and capital intensification

Momentum: the system has stabilized and consists of a growing number of physical

arti-facts in which considerable capital has been invested Professionals additionally strengthen

the system with their specialized skills Companies, government agencies, and education

institutions shape and are shaped by the technical core of the system

Due to the inclusion of earlier development stages, the momentum phase is of particular

interest and strongly resembles the idea of historical path dependencies.54 Therefore,

momentum is also the most debated stage and will be of significance for this work, too A

closer look can be helpful to better understand the concept In accordance with classical

mechanics, momentum depends on the mass and velocity of an object and stays constant if

not influenced from outside This causality is called the law of conservation of momentum

Regarding the LTS approach, this means that the size and endurance of a system largely

determine its stability Stability can finally result in lock-in, where it is hard to change the

fundamental direction or modes of operation of the system In such a case, the self-sustaining

momentum can only be changed by shocks from within or outside According to Hughes, the

advantage of the concept is the fact that it avoids technological determinism as well as social

construction, since neither do technical forces determine social and cultural changes nor do

social forces determine technical changes.55 Rather, social developments shape and are

shaped by technology This is what Hughes calls technological momentum

53 Hughes: Networks of power, pp 14-17

54 When using the term “historical path dependency,” I refrain from referring to the path dependency theory

itself A conscientious application of this theory would require concentrating on key concepts like

bifurcation points, positive feedbacks, or lock-in, which is not possible in this work Nevertheless, there

are some revealing intersections between the LTS approach and the path dependency theory For the

application of the path dependency theory in the field of LTSs, see for example Ambrosius, Gerold;

Franke, Christian (2015): Pfadabhängigkeiten internationaler Infrastrukturnetze In: Jahrbuch für

Wirtschaftsgeschichte 56/1, pp 291-312 Cowan, Robin (1990): Nuclear power reactors A study of

technological lock-in In: Journal of Economic History 50/3, pp 541-567 Unruh, Gregory (2000):

Understanding carbon lock-in In: Energy Policy 28, pp 817-830 Raven, Rob; Van der Vleuten, Erik

(2006): Lock-in and change Distributed generation in Denmark in a long-term perspective In: Energy

Policy 34, pp 3739-3748

55 Hughes: Technological momentum, p 102

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Hughes stressed that the suggested development pattern is not simply sequential or linear

but can overlap or turn back Furthermore, this periodization referred to the specific case

study of local electricity networks in Berlin, Chicago, and London In order to generalize

development patterns, LTS scholars proposed three general questions to be answered.56 Do

different technical systems develop along the same sequence of phases? How does the

nati-onal context regarding economic, legal, or political aspects influence the development of a

given type of technical system? To what extent is it possible to construct a comprehensive

model of system development, covering different technologies as well as different national

contexts?

As a growing number of researchers gathered diversified empirical material,

periodiza-tions became more detailed However, the initial development pattern proposed by Hughes

was not fundamentally changed An invention phase was still at the beginning of the

develo-pment This initial stage is marked by radical or conservative inventions, which inaugurate

completely new systems or improve existing ones Empirical evidence suggests that

stakeholders of an existing system usually support conservative inventions, since radical

inventions do not contribute to the growth of the system already in place.57 In the

development phase, the new system is adapted to the economic, political, and social

surroundings In this phase, so-called reverse salients have to be overcome Reverse salients

are technical or organizational anomalies, which arise during an uneven evolution of system

components Because all components in a system are functionally related, changes in one or

more components cause overall imbalances due to a suboptimal interaction System builders

identify and try to solve the underlying critical problems, which makes reverse salients an

important factor for system stagnation as well as system growth.58 The subsequent innovation

phase adds further components, enabling the system to compete with alternative systems In

the final consolidation phase, the system has acquired momentum and is less dependent on

its environment.59

As new technologies related to digitization or renewable energy sources have gained in

importance since the late 1980s, challenging the momentum of well-established LTSs, the

scientific discussion has increasingly tended to include a phase of recession or depression

into the periodization of LTSs Consequently, there emerged a debate concerning the question

whether or not growth is an inherent characteristic of LTSs Thomas Hughes suggested that

technological systems over time increasingly manage to incorporate their environment in

order to eliminate sources of uncertainty.60 The concepts of load factor and economic mix

56 Hughes, Thomas; Mayntz, Renate (1988): Foreword In: Hughes, Thomas; Mayntz, Renate (eds.): The

development of Large Technical Systems Frankfurt/Main, pp 6-7

57 Hughes: Evolution of Large Technical Systems, pp 57-58

58 Mayntz and Schneider identified three different types of Revers Salients First, technical weak points

directly restrict the system capacity and usually trigger technical improvements Second, overload

problems are often solved by further system extension Third, organizational problems exceed technical

weak points and overload problems, requiring a broader solution Mayntz, Renate; Schneider, Volker

(1995): Die Entwicklung technischer Infrastruktursysteme zwischen Steuerung und Selbstorganisation

In: Mayntz, Renate; Fritz, Scharpf (eds.): Gesellschaftliche Selbstregelung und politische Steuerung

Frankfurt/Main, p 81

59 Hughes: Technological momentum, p 108

60 Hughes: Evolution of Large Technical Systems, pp 52-53

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Theoretical approach 31

were seen as drivers for this kind of growth.61 Ingo Braun and Bernward Joerges asserted that

even rare examples of failure could be interpreted as a proof for the growth thesis According

to them, the American railroad or English canal system failed, because they were superseded

by more efficient ones.62 Other scholars pointed to the fact that the further growth and success

of LTSs was closely related to the establishment of modern hierarchically organized states

Centralized states provided the necessary coordination and control to further extend systems

such as rail, electricity, or telephone, which in turn stimulated further centralization of state

structures.63

However, evidence suggested other possible scenarios Rising opposition in Western

societies towards power concentration and technification has caused social upheavals since

the 1970s The trend towards centralization was not only true for nation states in general but

also for electricity generation in particular Closely tied to the administrative structure,

electricity production tended towards centralized, large-scale systems As a reaction to this

trend, discussions about decentralization and regionalization gained importance in Western

societies A decisive reason for the growing disapprobation was the ecological as well as

economic impact of potential failures of evolving LTSs Anti-nuclear movements are just the

most obvious examples Joachim Radkau argued that specialized expert groups, which

con-tribute to system stabilization in the momentum phase, unintentionally add to this discomfort

By developing their own highly specific discourses, they get separated from the broader

public communication Over time, it is hard for non-professionals to understand these

spe-cialized discourses, possibly leading to mistrust.64 Such phenomena persuaded researchers to

extend the LTS periodization schemes Hughes called the described phenomenon

“counterculture” and traced its roots back to the Second World War.65 Other researchers

proposed the idea of stagnation as a phase of evolving systems, since some LTSs clearly

experience periods of non-growth or decline They wondered about the causes of stagnation

and failure of some systems while others manage to recover.66

In order to differentiate the momentum stage, Todd La Porte introduced yet another idea

When the technical complexity of a growing LTS increases, control and management

mechanisms have to become increasingly sophisticated, too So-called high reliability

organizations controlling the LTS operate in sensitive social and political surroundings

61 These concepts are also derived from the field of electricity supply The term load factor is related to the

fact that until today electricity cannot be stored economically on a large scale Therefore, utility managers

are eager to match supply and demand as closely as possible Otherwise, a high capacity share stands idle

for long periods The underlying idea of the term economic mix is similar In order to decrease electricity

generation costs, utilities combine less efficient power plants to carry peak load and more efficient power

plants to carry base load Therefore, utilities usually tend to diversify their power plant complex in order

to include coal-fired plants for base load as well as gas and hydropower to cover peak load demand

62 Joerges, Bernward; Braun, Ingo (1994): Große technische Systeme – erzählt, gedeutet, modelliert In:

Braun, Ingo; Joerges, Bernward (eds.): Technik ohne Grenzen Frankfurt/Main, pp 31-32

63 Mayntz, Schneider: Entwicklung technischer Infrastruktursysteme, pp 96-97

64 Radkau, Joachim (1994): Zum ewigen Wachstum verdammt? Jugend und Alter großer technischer

Systeme In: Braun, Ingo; Joerges, Bernward (eds.): Technik ohne Grenzen Frankfurt/Main, p 98

65 Hughes, Thomas (1989): American genesis A century of invention and technological enthusiasm

1870-1970 New York, pp 21-22

66 Summerton, Jane (1994): Introductory essay: The systems approach to technological change In:

Summerton, Jane (ed.): Changing Large Technical Systems Boulder, p 17

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because the applied technologies are characterized by a high failure potential The risk further

increases when the LTS functions in a vast geographical area, connecting heterogeneous

regional and ethnic cultures If these control and management mechanisms lack the necessary

effectivity, the consequence can be an erosion of hierarchical authority, a rapid increase in

costs of organizational, economic and social integration as well as growing bureaucratic

apraxia.67 Originally, apraxia was derived from neurology and meant the inability of a person

to perform tasks or coordinated movements due to brain damage If transferred to the field of

LTSs, it describes an increasing loss of control by the administrative center responsible to

operate the LTS in a proper way Concepts like apraxia qualify the strong assumption of

LTSs’ unhampered growth implied by momentum and close the gap between the theoretical

concept and the reality of the late 20th century

There is still another aspect concerning the development of an LTS So-called

contingen-cies have the power to push sociotechnical systems in new directions and even break their

momentum In general, contingencies are all kinds of political, economic, social, technical or

natural events which occur outside the system Such events of large proportions can take

place at every development phase Examples from the LTS literature are wars, crises,

politi-cal revolutions, or technipoliti-cal catastrophes At such times of radipoliti-cal change, new system

builders try to influence the sociotechnical system As Per Högselius points out, it is

important to take into account the development phase of the system In contrast to young

systems, a mature system with significant momentum may resist change.68

In addition to the causes for the growth and decline of LTSs, their geographical extension

attracted the attention of scholars Renate Mayntz and Volker Schneider identified a general

tendency towards cross-border connections following the establishment of national systems

Transnational growth displays similar patterns as national developments, which were

oriented towards the integration of regional networks However, due to a missing

supranati-onal authority, cross-border interconnections are realized by self-organization and voluntary

agreements.69 On the basis of empirical material, further generalizations of transnational

growth were made Arne Kaijser analyzed trans-border integration of electricity and gas

networks in Scandinavia and proposed four categories of international infrastructural

cooperation: (1) purely technical linking across national borders, (2) economic and legal

frameworks for cross-border exchanges, (3) common technical standards, and (4)

harmonized institutional regimes.70

However, the research on transnational energy systems necessitated further extending the

LTS tool kit, since earlier works had concentrated on young development stages Instead of

individual system builders like Edison and Ford, so-called institutional system builders came

into focus Institutional system builders are international organizations, state governments,

67 La Porte, Todd (1994): Large Technical Systems, institutional surprise and challenges to political

legitimacy In: Derlien, Hans-Ulrich; Gerhard, Uta; Scharpf, Fritz (eds.): Systemrationalität und

Partialinteresse Baden-Baden, pp 437-438

68 Högselius, Per (2006): Connecting East and West? Electricity systems in the Baltic region In: Van der

Vleuten, Erik; Kaijser, Arne (eds.): Networking Europe Transnational infrastructures and the shaping of

Europe; 1850–2000 Sagamore Beach, p 247

69 Mayntz; Schneider: Entwicklung technischer Infrastruktursysteme, p 78

70 Kaijser, Arne (1997): Trans-border integration of electricity and gas in the Nordic countries 1915-1992

Polhem 15, pp 8-9

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Theoretical approach 33

or interest groups, pushing forward the construction of large-scale networks like railroads,

roads, or electricity grids.71 These organizations are platforms for discussion and negotiations

between parties of member countries with diverse interests Therefore, the focus on

instituti-onal system builders necessarily links natiinstituti-onal and internatiinstituti-onal perspectives Especially the

research into infrastructures is fertile ground for studying the work of supranational actors

like international organizations, global firms, or transnational regulatory institutions, because

they engaged in transnational infrastructure programs Scholars proposed a precise research

agenda by suggesting foci on (1) the ideological framing of transnational infrastructures, (2)

the sociotechnical system building practices, and (3) negotiation processes among involved

parties.72

Related to the concept of institutional system builders, there was another addition to the

LTS approach By coining the term “hidden integration,” Thomas Misa and Johan Schot

wanted to draw attention toward the linking and delinking of trans-border infrastructures and

the circulation and appropriation of products, systems, and knowledge They suggested that

the movement of goods, information, services, and people would establish new ties among

users and citizens.73 Researchers emphasized that the overall aim of these transnational

approaches was not to exclude national perspectives but rather to combine them

Transnati-onal networking processes were important arenas for discussion and significantly influenced

politics, economy, and societies Such processes reflected the intense interaction between the

national and transnational level.74

These fertile extensions of the LTS approach triggered a whole series of studies focusing

mainly on Western Europe and the evolution of European integration from a technical point

of view Vincent Lagendijk explored the development of an increasingly integrated West

European electricity network and the ideas that lied behind this endeavor.75 In recent years,

researchers have increasingly paid attention to historical developments in Eastern Europe

applying some aspects of the LTS approach like hidden integration or system builders Per

Högselius focused on East-West relations in the Cold War and described in detail, how and

why the first gas pipelines between the Soviet Union and Western Europe had come into

being.76 Ivaylo Hristov shed light on the question of how Bulgaria’s nuclear power system

developed in the context of transnational nuclear networks within and beyond the Eastern

Bloc.77 Nevertheless, it is still open for discussion if the LTS approach, which had been

developed on the basis of studies on infrastructures in market economies, can be successfully

applied to phenomena in the specific environment of planned economies

71 Van der Vleuten, Erik (2006): Understanding network societies: Two decades of Large Technical System

studies In: Van der Vleuten, Erik; Kaijser, Arne (eds.): Networking Europe Transnational infrastructures

and the shaping of Europe; 1850–2000 Sagamore Beach, p 305

72 Van der Vleuten, Erik; Anastasiadou, Irene; Lagendijk, Vincent; Schipper, Frank (2007): Europe’s

System Builders: The contested shaping of transnational road, electricity and rail networks In:

Contemporary European History 16/3, p 328

73 Misa, Thomas; Schot, Johan (2005): Inventing Europe Technology and the hidden integration of Europe

In: History and Technology 21/1, pp 12-13

74 Van der Vleuten, Kaijser: Transnational networks, p 5

75 Lagendijk: Electrifying Europe

76 Högselius, Per (2013): Red gas Russia and the origins of European energy dependence Basingstoke

77 Hristov, Ivaylo (2014): The communist nuclear era Bulgarian atomic community during the Cold War,

1944-1986 Amsterdam

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1.6.2 Critical assessment

A weakness of the LTS approach is the ambiguous definition of its main object of study, the

Large Technological System This fact has been repeatedly criticized by scholars.78 The

reason for this is the high diversity of case studies referring to the LTS approach A

genera-lization as a necessary starting point for a precise definition of LTSs was rejected by several

researchers They pointed to the fact that the examined cases were too specific and

historically unique.79 Other scholars in turn urged for a generalization in order to identify a

general pattern on which to build a theory They in turn bemoaned the “endemic” descriptive

historiography.80 Researchers have increasingly accepted this diversity and stopped to aim

for a universal definition of LTS.81 Apart from the ambiguous definition, Erik van der

Vleuten drew attention to the double meaning of LTS On the one hand, LTS refers to a

category of phenomena On the other hand, it is a research methodology He stressed that the

LTS approach was meant to be applicable not only to LTSs themselves but to any other kind

of technology, too Therefore, a distinction between those two meanings would be

advisable.82

Another point of criticism was the fact that many studies primarily focused on stories of

successful LTSs and neglected cases of failed technological innovation This asymmetry

eventually contributed to the notion of a rather linear system growth.83 A reason for this could

be that the detection of failed approaches especially in early development stages is difficult

Usually, they are forgotten after a while, leaving few traces in individual and collective

memories These circumstances further contribute to the bias towards success stories

Furthermore, researchers criticized that users are largely absent in LTS studies.84 The same

is true for ecology as an independent research topic in LTS discourses.85 In sharp contrast to

managers, engineers, or regulators, the influence of users as well as ecological thinking was

disregarded In the last years, however, some progress has been made to overcome these

topical restrictions.86

Another weakness of the LTS approach is the unspecified interaction between the

environment and the sociotechnical system By proposing the concept of contingencies,

which are historical events with a strong impact on the further development of the LTS,

researchers indicated the huge importance of the outside world for system growth However,

this concept is not well-elaborated, and it is up to the individual researcher which events to

78 Joerges; Braun: Große technische Systeme, p 7 Van der Vleuten, Erik (2004): Infrastructures and societal

change A view from the Large Technical Systems field In: Technology Analysis & Strategic

Management 16/3, p 400

79 Radkau: Zum ewigen Wachstum verdammt, p 52 Joerges; Braun: Große technische Systeme, pp 22-23

80 Bijker, Wiebe; Pinch, Trevor (1993): The Social construction of facts and artifacts In: Bijker, Wiebe;

Hughes, Thomas; Pinch, Trevor (eds.): The social construction of technological systems New directions

in the sociology and history of technology Cambridge, p 22

81 Van der Vleuten: Understanding network societies, p 282

82 Van der Vleuten: Infrastructures and societal change, p 399

83 Bijker; Pinch: Social construction of facts and artifacts, p 22

84 Summerton: The systems approach to technological change, p 17

85 Joerges, Bernward (1994): Reden über große Technik Berlin, p 31

86 On the crucial influence of consumers on the design and development of LTSs, see Oldenziel, Ruth; Hård,

Mikael (2013): Consumers, tinkerers, rebels The people who shaped Europe London: Palgrave

Macmillan

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Theoretical approach 35

classify as contingencies Some contingencies proposed by the LTS literature, such as the

nuclear disasters at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl, occurred inside the system,87 while other

phenomena such as the First World War or the oil crises developed in a global context

How-ever, there is a difference for the further development of a system whether the shock came

from inside or outside Causes of external shocks are not under the control of system builders

In order to clarify this ambiguity, I propose the wording “internal” and “external” shock

instead of the vague term “contingency.” Consequently, I will apply these two terms to events

occurring inside or outside the system, with a significant impact on the further development

of LTSs

In general, the LTS approach provides a suitable framework for structuring the field of

research Although Thomas Hughes initially focused on the development of young

socio-technical systems, other scholars increasingly broadened the scope of attention This

exten-sion is crucial for my own research, since the focus is not on the very beginnings of energy

infrastructures but on cross-border linking and de-linking of already established national

networks This study will test some of the instruments offered by the LTS tool kit In doing

so, the LTS approach can direct attention to phenomena at the macro, meso, and micro level

of transnational energy infrastructures in the Eastern Bloc

1.6.3 Applied concepts

The aim of the preceding two sections was describing and assessing the LTS approach

However, I will not use all the concepts offered by the LTS tool kit for my research on energy

infrastructures in the Eastern Bloc In the following section, I will explain which concepts

could be revealing for my research and to which historical phenomena I will try to apply

them

The concept of institutional system builders is well-suited to approaching the issue of

international cooperation in the Eastern Bloc concerning the construction of cross-border

infrastructures The CMEA was the major platform for discussion, although debates were

usually not straightforward, and crucial decisions were regularly made on the bilateral

inter-governmental level

The concept of reverse salients can provide revealing insights, since it points to technical

or organizational frictions hampering the further evolution of the entire system What kind

of reverse salients did emerge, and in which way did the CMEA as an institutional system

builders try to overcome them? An example is the IIB, established by CMEA countries in

1970 to overcome financing bottlenecks regarding major investment projects like the Soi͡uz

gas pipeline

The notion of technological transfer will highlight examples of technologies transferred

from the West to the Eastern Bloc and asks how they were adapted there A famous example

is the Soviet Water-Water Energetic Reactor (VVER) technology colloquially called

Eastinghouse, because it was an adaption of the Westinghouse light water reactor West-East

technology transfers were a large-scale phenomenon in the context of major construction

projects in the Eastern Bloc The subsequent adaptation within bloc-wide frameworks shaped

by political, legal, or historical factors resulted in diverse technological styles An example

87 For an insightful analysis of the Three Mile Island accident near Harrisburg, see Perrow, Charles (1984):

Normal accidents Living with high-risk technologies New York: Basic Books

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