Communication campaigns and national integration in chinas market economy era reviving the national soul

Yanru Chen1 3 Communication Campaigns and National Integration in China’s Market Economy Era Reviving the National Soul... A generally accepted observation about the Chinese intellectu

Communication Campaigns and National Integration in China’s Market Economy Era

Yanru Chen

1 3

Communication Campaigns and National Integration

in China’s Market

Economy Era

Reviving the National Soul

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015947415

Springer Singapore Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

© Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016

This work is subject to copyright All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part

of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission

or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer Science+Business Media Singapore Pte Ltd is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Contents

1 Introduction 1

1.1 Introduction 1

1.2 In Search of China’s National Soul: Is the Nation Falling Apart? 5

1.2.1 Ideological Schism—Is There an Identity Crisis? 6

1.2.2 Party-State-Nation: Consequences of Structural Differentiation 11

1.2.3 Historical Discontinuity—A Spiritual Vacuum 13

1.2.4 Substantive Conflicts—Does the Nation Seem Fair to All? 16

1.3 Reaching the Soul of the Nation: Empirical Justification for Study 17

References 19

2 Theoretical Foundations of the Study 21

2.1 Literature Review 21

2.1.1 Communication in National Development 21

2.1.2 Mass Mobilisation and National Integration: The Role of Communications 24

2.1.3 Mass Campaigns—an Old Topic, a New Perspective 28

2.2 Theoretical Horizons of the Study 30

2.2.1 An Overview of Prospect 30

2.2.2 Further Elaboration on Theoretical Significance of the Study 33

References 37

3 Empirical Approaches to the Study 39

3.1 Again, What Is This Study? 39

3.2 Approach to the Analysis 40

3.2.1 Why These Specific Cases? 40

3.2.2 Main Sources of Data 42

3.2.3 Basic Analytical Procedures 43

3.3 Possible Outcomes 44

References 44

4 A Nation in Action: Communication and China’s Bid for Year 2000 Olympics 45

4.1 Introduction: A Moment of Experience of the Nation 45

4.2 Analysis: From the Bid to a Collective Experience of the Nation 46

4.2.1 Nationalising a Wish for the Bid: The Media as Articulator 47

4.2.2 Declaring—Displaying National Will: The Media as Facilitator 52

4.2.3 Demonstrating National Work: The Media as an Integrating Interpreter 58

4.2.4 Final Presentation of Wish—Will—Work: The Nation Experienced as One 65

4.2.5 Re-affirming National Strength and Redefining National Mission 72

4.3 Conclusion 77

References 79

5 Beyond the Planned Campaign: Construction of the “Nation” in the Bid for Olympics 83

5.1 Awareness—Activation–Action: Constructing a “Nation” 83

5.1.1 Spreading Awareness, Stimulating Participation—The Bid Links the Nation 84

5.1.2 Activating Awareness of the Bid: Relating the Individual to the Nation 86

5.1.3 Action in Support of the Bid: Mass Participation in the Nation 88

5.1.4 Aligning All the Chinese: Projecting All-inclusiveness of the Nation 94

5.2 “The Whole China Is Mobilised”—Featured in Foreign Eyes 97

5.2.1 IOC’s Appreciation of Beijing’s Bid Report 97

5.2.2 IOC Members’ Quoted Impression of Beijing/China 97

5.2.3 Reporting on the Other Bidding Cities: Beijing Is Strong! 98

5.2.4 International Expressions of Support—Integrated into National Strength 100

5.2.5 Covering Objections to Beijing: National Will Re-affirmed 101

5.3 Conclusions 102

5.3.1 Defining the Nation: The Bid as a Process of National Integration 102

5.3.2 Idealism—Pragmatism–Idealism: Metamorphosis of Promotional Thrust in Relation to the Nation 103

5.3.3 The Media’s Integrating Framework for Reporting and Interpretation 104

References 105

6 In Memory of Mao: Re-making a Nation Maker 109

6.1 Introduction 109

6.1.1 The Emergence of Mao Craze in the 1990s 110

6.2 The Commemoration: Integrating Straying Sentiments Under One Head 112

6.2.1 Re-placing Mao’s Ideologies—Official Line: Continuity from Mao to Deng 113

6.2.2 Re-interpreting Mao’s Ideologies—Academic Line Integrated with Party Line 119

6.2.3 Re-enacting Mao’s Personal Image: Mao and His People as One 121

6.2.4 Mass Participation 126

6.3 Conclusions: Integrating Mao into Post-Mao China 127

6.3.1 A Non-campaign Campaign: Notes on the Process 127

6.3.2 Levels of Integration Manifest in the Process 127

6.3.3 The Campaign and the Identity—Strength—Mission of the Nation 129

References 130

7 Revealing the National Soul: 50th Anniversary of Victory Over Japanese Invasion 133

7.1 Introduction: A Fully Planned Case 133

7.2 The Analysis: History as Resources for National Integration 135

7.3 Re-enactment of History: A Portrait of Collective Resistance 137

7.3.1 Telling the Story: And Telling You How to Read It 137

7.3.2 Dramatising History 140

7.3.3 Displaying History 141

7.4 Interpretation of History: How to Place the Actors in the Portrait 143

7.5 Abstraction of Patriotic Theme from History: Interaction Between the People and the “Nation” 146

7.6 Direction for the Campaign: Towards a Guided Conception of the Nation 148

7.6.1 Official Directives 148

7.6.2 Media Editorials as Directives for Education 152

7.7 Sublimation: The Moments Glorified—Reaching the Soul

of the Nation 154

7.8 Immortalisation: Preserving References to the National Soul 156

7.8.1 Mass Participation in Creating National Memory 156

7.8.2 Cast in Stone: Physical Concentration of National Memory 158

7.8.3 Into Personal Memory: Knowledge Contests 158

7.9 Conclusions 159

References 162

8 Conclusions 165

8.1 Changing Environment of Campaigns 165

8.2 Comparative Analysis of Mechanisms of Campaigns 169

8.2.1 National Time and National Space: Grounded Concepts 171

8.3 Campaigns and the Construction of “Nation” 173

8.4 National Integration—Concertedness; Continuity; Compatibility 176

8.5 Role of the Media in the Campaigns 179

8.6 “Communications and National Integration” Revisited 182

References 189

9 Revelations from Recent Campaigns 191

9.1 A Campaign that Started After Its Conclusion: Bid for Year 2008 Olympics 192

9.1.1 The Bidding Campaign Became a Celebration Campaign 194

9.1.2 Comparing the Bid for Year 2000 Olympics and Bid for Year 2008 Olympics 200

9.2 Demonstrating National Strength: 50th Anniversary of the PRC 203

9.3 Strengthening the Party: Celebrating CCP’s 80th Anniversary 205

9.4 Calls for National Unity and Stability: Three Campaigns Against Negative Forces (1999–) 209

9.4.1 Harnessing National Emotions: Campaign Against U.S Hegemony 210

9.4.2 Promoting National Integration: Campaign Against “Two Nations Theory” 213

9.4.3 Uniting All Against One Evil: Campaign Against Falun Gong Cult 215

9.5 All People of One Heart: Campaign Against the Flood in 1998 219

9.6 Revelations on Propaganda Techniques from the Campaigns 225

9.7 Concluding Remarks 229

References 232

Bibliography 235

List of Tables

Table 4.1 People’s Daily special forum on Olympics 51

Table 4.2 Cable messages of support from mass organisations 71

Table 4.3 Chinese State Leaders’ direct messages in support of Beijing 79

Table 5.1 Reports of support for Beijing’s bid from Hong Kong Chinese 95

Table 5.2 Reports of support from Chinese in regions other than Hong Kong 95

Table 5.3 Media reports on IOC members’ visits to Beijing 99

Table 5.4 Themes of media reports on other bidding cities 100

Table 6.1 Official forums commemorating Mao 115

Table 7.1 Theoretical abstractions of patriotism 147

Table 7.2 Directives for patriotic education from leaders and experts 149

Table 8.1 A summary comparison of three campaigns 173

To any nation in the world, patriotism is a banner that never fades; to any era in history, patriotism is a theme that never vanishes; to any people, patriotism is a torch that never fails

to bring their hearts together …Patriotism is the spiritual propeller for building a strong, socialist China.

Yin Yungong, “Patriotism”, in Guangming Daily,

3 January 1993

1.1 Introduction

This study is the outcome of long-term systematic observation of China’s national events, combined with reflections on the possible effect (or lack of it) of such events which might create a spiritual bond holding the nation together for the purpose of development Specifically, the chunk of this study consists of analy-ses of three national campaigns: bid for year 2000 Olympics, commemoration of Chairman Mao’s 100th anniversary, and celebration of the 50th anniversary of China’s victory over Japanese invasion The main concern is whether and how these campaigns figured in the process of spiritually integrating the nation, as well

as the role of the media in the processes

In the larger social context, impetuous forces of a market economy have been pulling at individuals and institutions and tearing at the social and cultural fab-ric in all directions besides that of striving for the national good (Watson 1992) Politically, this trend has not been explicitly acknowledged by the national leaders, who albeit revealed their concern with the challenge in their public emphasis on the urge to forge a stronger cohesive force and cultivate “socialist” and “traditional Chinese” virtues which value collectivism above pursuit of individual interests

Former Premier Li Peng’s Report on Government Work (Li 1993) included such evidence

Introduction

© Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016

Y Chen, Communication Campaigns and National Integration in China’s Market

Economy Era, DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-733-8_1

As two scholars documented in their survey research on the impact of munication on cultural change in China, the cultural tradition has been under-mined, first by decades of revolution and then by Western cultural influences filtered through the media (Chu and Ju 1993) To phrase it in the words of the Chinese literati, whose personal observations find sporadic expressions in newspa-pers, magazines, and other public occasions, while the nation moves toward mate-rial modernisation, the spiritual dimension of life, i.e its soul, is quickly divorced from its body Vaguely, if ever, defined, a national “soul” is believed to be a neces-sity to the progress, prosperity, and preservation of the nation.

com-The same argument is perhaps more convincingly and eloquently made by Chinese social scientists who have been engaging themselves in a reflective national soul-searching process For example, a member of China’s intelligentsia observes that the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) had sunk the nation in political tumult and social unrest (Zhang 1995) He argues that the Revolution destroyed the faith of two generations in a collective ideal, and collapsed the pillar of moral-ity, which found its root in both China’s cultural heritage and Western thought that had left its mark on the Chinese society in the century following the opium war in the 1840s The socialist ethic that the Party had been trying to cultivate in and among the Chinese citizens in the utopian Maoist nation-state had been more quickly eroded than built In sum, his overall picture of public morality and the spiritual state of the nation was rather gloomy

Apparently the Chinese government has been alarmed by this increasingly widely perceived problem (Selden 1993; Shirk 1993) The mere fact that the observant and critical few had been clamouring for the lack of popular concern with this problem is an indication of its perceived severity The persistent, repeated emphasis by national leaders on building a “socialist spiritual civilisation” accom-panying economic development may be interpreted as an indication of their con-cern with the spiritual state of the population (Cody 1997; Zhang 1997) The term as well as the ideas it connotes has come to be taken for granted, as part of the commonsensical knowledge in China A call for enhancing spiritual civilisa-tion came shortly after the Sixth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

14th National Congress in 1996, which passed a Resolution on Building Socialist

Spiritual Civilisation (CCPCC 1996) To the average Chinese, such as a factory worker or an adult student in college, such a campaign call was essentially a harping on the chord of upgrading public morality

How do specific campaigns/national events reflect upon the government’s effort

in implementing this policy? In what ways are the functions of the media related

to the attempt to “revive the national soul?” Ultimately, what is “national tion” and how does communication figure in its process? These are the central questions to be answered in this book, and will be phrased in more rigorous terms

integra-as the chapters unfold

One of the major steps taken by the central government was the national patriotic education campaign launched in March 1993 It is also an ongoing pro-gramme intended for being carried over into the twenty-first century After nearly two years of deliberation by central leaders, educational experts, and members

of the public, policy guidelines were issued in official directives distributed to the whole population regarding the measures to enlighten the youth so that they will “know our China, love our China, and build our China” (Central Propaganda Department, 1994).

The media were reckoned upon as an important tool for patriotic education, to complement the formal indoctrination in schools and work units To get a feel of the campaign before delving into the conceptual levels of the questions, several features selected from China Central Television reports might serve as illustrations

of joint efforts by the government and the media to educate the population as to—

What is China? What is she to me? What am I to Her?

Feature 1 Anticipating a historic moment in the nation’s history

Time: Towards midnight, 23 September 1993

Venue: A street in Beijing

Actors: CCTV reporters and passers-by

CCTV reporter: The International Olympic Committee is about to cast the fateful

votes on who gets to host the Year 2000 Olympics What is on the minds of the Chinese people at this moment?

Passer-by: I hope China will win We will win the Bid!

Comment: The entire nation is hoping China will win the Bid

(Source: CCTV special report, 23 September 1993)

Feature 2 Attending a daily ceremony featuring the nation

Time: 5:15 am, May Day 1995

Scene: Flag-raising ceremony in Tiananmen Square, Beijing

Actors: People flocking to watch the ceremony on a voluntary basisCCTV reporter: What does the ceremony invoke in your mind?

– Attending this ceremony gives me a sense of our national strength

(Source: CCTV news, 1 May 1995)

Feature 3 Visiting a historic site bearing witness to the nation’s history

Time: Children’s Day, 1995

Scene: Marco Polo Bridge in suburban Beijing, where the first shot of

anti-Japanese war was fired in 1937Visitors: Representatives of outstanding youngsters attending national

conference of Young PioneersCCTV reporter: What do you see here during the visit that strikes you the most?

– I have found our national spirit of resistance against all adversities—I am proud

of being a descendant of such a nation

– I have found our goal—goal for our generation

– I realise our responsibility to history: we are to build our nation for a better future; we are to make a new history

– Shared wish: may there be eternal peace in the world and eternal prosperity in our country

(Source: CCTV news, 1 June 1995)

A first note to be made of the three features should regard the functions of the media Beyond the theoretical conceptions in the discipline of communication, such as “gatekeeper”, “agenda-setter”, we see that the media’s function in relation

to national history can be thus captured: witness, memory, and reminder.

As is also seen from the brief unfolding of these past scenarios, there was a

dis-tinct and almost uniform expression of wish and will for the future of the Chinese

nation Such expressions had been evoked by special events and ceremonies turing patriotic education

fea-Of the numerous features printed in or aired through the Chinese national media, these particular three were selected to highlight the introduction to research focus The first featured a moment of the nation “looking forward” to an extraordi-nary event; the second featured an otherwise mundane daily practice of “salute” to the nation; the third featured a “reflection” upon the nation’s history

The style of presentation chosen for this introduction helps to capture the main thrusts in the well-orchestrated activities and news reports thereof during the national patriotic education in the new era From the above illustrations we can read the following messages out of the minds of these targets of the campaign: our nation is everything to me; I am proud to be part of this big family; our fore-fathers had sacrificed all to make this nation, and our historical mission is to build the nation and make it strong and competitive among the host of nations At the level of rhetoric, such elicited responses do seem to indicate some effect desired

by those who had orchestrated the campaign

Feature three concluded with a good wish on the part of the youngsters who are affectionately labelled by the media as the “flowers of our nation” and the “hope

of our future” It was a direct echo to the Chinese national government leaders’ stated goals for the nation in broadest terms typically pronounced on diplomatic occasions: we seek peace and progress, which should also be the predominant theme of development for all the other countries of the world Could such a media-staged expression be taken as an indication of “effects” of the government-initi-ated patriotic education campaign on the youthful targets, who have never lived in periods of great national security crises such as war times nor experienced cycles

of engulfing national political turmoil such as the Cultural Revolution? Or the young people, after having been exposed on a voluntary and/or compulsory basis

to the repeated media messages featuring the themes and goals of this campaign, which was officially launched in 1993, have internalised the political language deemed most proper to speak into a TV camera?

Beyond such speculations, the role of the media is not to be overlooked in positioning individual events in a perspective of history and placing the partici-pants in relation to the nation A reasoned observation underlying this study is that the media could to some extent focus national attention on the making of the nation’s history, in addition to arousing people’s consciousness of experiencing their nation (e.g Feature 2) Further exploration and elaboration on this point will

be pursued through case analyses in the chapters on findings

1.2 In Search of China’s National Soul: Is the Nation

Falling Apart?

A generally accepted observation about the Chinese intellectual tradition is that the clamour for reviving the national soul via cultural changes, political revolu-tion, or economic development is usually first uttered by concerned scholars, media critics, and educators (Goldman 1987; Lin 1994) This was perhaps most true about the decades following China’s failure in the Opium War in the 1840s

At the turn of the twentieth century and in the 1930s, in fact all the way up to the founding of the People’s republic, Chinese intellectuals had constantly engaged themselves in national soul searching with the purpose of finding a way to revive the nation This was especially true at times when China was threatened by exter-nal forces or suffered defeat at the hands of foreign powers (Lin 1994) But under the Communist rule, we must qualify the observation by taking into account the crucial fact that scholars, critics, and educators may be organised by the Party and the state to air concerns about national soul as well

An example presented itself on the national CCTV on 30 November 1993, at a forum hosted by the Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Radio, Film and Television, Central Propaganda Department of the CCP, and Beijing Municipal Government The forum convened a number of scholars, educators and media critics for dis-cussion on the airing of patriotic movies targeted at young audience across the nation Together they expressed the like opinion that the spiritual cultivation of the Chinese youth had become an increasingly pressing concern, lamenting young people’s lack of knowledge about and interest in China’s history and culture, espe-cially the heroic deeds of the founding fathers who had begotten the People’s Republic

During the televised forum, some scholars expressed their concern about a depressing phenomenon, which can be more aptly summed up as the “divorce”

of the nation’s “soul” (spiritual dimension) from her “body” (material sion) Some exclaimed: how can we immerse ourselves in materialistic pursuits and lose sight of the long-term spiritual loss? Morality is degenerating; nothing evokes any lofty feelings any more! One author indicated that China had always lacked one kind of spiritual regulating force, that is, a religion A belief system that holds something up to be sacrosanct, for which people are ready to die He complained against the romantic bubbles and violent plots which stuffed the popu-lar entertainment media

dimen-On the surface, the experts were airing concerns about individual morality

In essence, they implied that the people are bearers of the national soul and should individual morality be eroded, the nation will be deprived of its soul, i.e a spiritual regulating force that holds the nation together and keeps it going

Some experts at the forum seemed to hold such an assumption: what used to work in educating us to love our nation decades ago should still work today on

a different generation At the forum, media professionals who had participated in the production of the 100 movies selected for airing featuring the patriotic theme also gave their view based on personal experience and reflection They held in high regard these movies, some black and white made in the 1950s, as good agents

of education, the content of which was said to have inspired in them a patriotic passion

Echoing their observation, educators at secondary and tertiary levels thus expressed their view at the same forum: children know so little about our nation’s culture and history The national heroes we admired and emulated when at their age are now totally forgotten The kids are dreaming of instantaneous rise to fame and gain, like the pop stars And the media have a fair share of responsibility for this tendency The 100 selected movies depict the heroic deeds of our predeces-sors and had educated a whole generation of youth decades ago They are what the children need today to expand their reference frame, to understand their nation better

In sum, a gloomy air floated above the spiritual state of the nation’s youth, and the general populace, for that matter What happened to the “spirit” or

“soul” of the nation? To explore the disintegrating forces, begin with the deepest background

1.2.1 Ideological Schism—Is There an Identity Crisis?

The above discussion unfolded a concern with the lack of a cohesive force holding the nation together Winding its way into expression through cultural producers,

it had its deeper root grounded in ideology, and has not eluded the attention of China’s national leaders

A move towards market economy in China had been a topic of academic and political debates since the mid-1980s (Ding 1994; Shih 1995; Solinger 1993), and steps had been taken in a small way since then to experiment with the idea (Ogden

1989) It was only in late 1992, after the CCP’s 14th National Congress, that such

a transition on a national scale was officially pronounced in policy terms, with oretical justification based on Deng Xiaoping’s theory of “building socialism with Chinese characteristics” (CCPCC 1993)

the-As a point of departure, the official adoption of a market economy policy, accompanied by corresponding changes in policies on matters of political thinking, cultural values, social life, etc., could be anticipated to spiritually unsettle the nation’s population to varied extents

What are the repercussions of such an unsettling process?

A nation in economic transition and social transformation is a most vivid tration ground of conflicts between the passing and emerging ideologies, values, pursuits, and even beliefs Conflicts are bound to be fierce between entrenched interests and superseding ones Such competing interests would find expression through many outlets, one of which are the media But given the current owner-ship and control the state government still has over the national media in China, it would be overly optimistic to expect individual, local, regional interests competing against national goals to find a corresponding amount of expression in the media.However, to China watchers overseas and to domestic commoners alike, the gap has become evident between the Party’s version of Marxist ideology which had been the one ruling force under which China was governed for decades past and the idea of a market economy which is capitalistic by origin and practice One political scientist in the China field even attacked, “It is capitalism with Chinese characteristics!” (Vohra 1994, p 46) In no attempt to take issue with this theo-retically derived claim, we are albeit justifiably alarmed to the distinction Do the Chinese people believe that they are headed towards a “socialist market economy” leading to material prosperity and spiritual progress? Does the Chinese govern-ment have a compelling need to project the Chinese image to the international community as one that is still a “socialist country”? The answer to this second question is probably yes, based on other scholars’ analysis of the legitimacy of the

illus-CP and the state government, which is grounded in Socialism (Dittmer and Kim

1993; Gregor 1995)

The conflicting requirements of ideological legitimacy and national identity (Dittmer 1992), though temporarily reconciled by way of the CCP’s balancing between market pragmatism and ideological socialism, nonetheless intensified after 1992 For decades before, China had defined itself as a leader of the Third World countries with twin identification as a member of the socialist bloc Its international role had largely emanated from a given Chinese national identity While this is still the case, China’s quest for national identity is not a purely domestic problem (Shih 1990) With the radical change in the Communist Bloc countries, China has increasingly resorted to a self-definition as a developing nation A question then follows: who should define national identity? Scholars (e.g Fitzgerald 1994) warn us against an overly state-centred notion of national identity They make a distinction between mass identifications that derive from

a sense of commonality and those identifications promoted by the elite to justify policies or to manipulate the populace At a national level, identity influences attitudes and policies since it is the psychological foundation for a country’s roles and behaviours in the world Here we may note that national campaigns could be a ground where such distinctions become salient

At the level of the individual, then, is there anything detrimental to national coherence and development if the population by and large believes and feels justified in pursuing ends following the individualistic values inherent in a market-oriented way of life?

The final question is crucial and central as it gave rise to the larger patriotic education campaign, part of which is being studied Invariably, the editorials in

People ’s Daily and commentaries issued by the official Xinhua News Agency

addressing the importance of a cohesive force drawing the people together for a national goal would make an emphatic note in summary form Specifically, the message is that the further the nation advances into constructing a market econ-omy, the more pressing and relevant it is to uphold, advocate and propagate social-ism, collectivism, and patriotism Noteworthy is the fact that in certain emulation campaigns promoting role models who personify devotion to and sacrifice for the nation, the keynote used to abstract their spiritual essence to the level of philo-sophical values and outlooks on life is patriotism Further, the ideal of patriotism

is stretched to cover a wide range of virtues labelled “traditional” and “Chinese” (Chen 1999)

How to interpret this unprecedented emphasis on patriotism that is not coupled with other ideologies as was the case in the past?

At the ideological level, the previous isms have basically vanished from the

Chinese media and hence from the national vocabulary A spiritual vacuum appears in the spiritual sphere of national life Once lifted as a force to rule, it cannot be restored or reinstated, for the minds of the people have been exposed

to all the alternatives open to them, the influence of foreign cultures included Yet given the above reasons, the need for the state to keep harping on the same chord of a lofty socialist ideology still exists Since the early 1990s, the Party and state leadership have been invoking the famous slogan “only Socialism can save China” Even just a few months before Deng Xiaoping’s famous inspection tour of Southern China which ultimately set the economy free for the market, the national media were still alerting the population to the danger of peaceful (subtle) evolu-tion (transformation) towards capitalism (Cheng 1994)

A possible role of the media is to be used as an instrument to perceptually oncile the two conflicting ideologies, i.e socialism and the pragmatism accom-panying market economy The argument is that market economy, by virtue of its prerequisites, tends to undermine the already declining, if not defunct, faith in socialism (Gregor 1995) The paradox is that this spiritual erosion can in turn con-tribute negatively towards the building of market economy at its fledgling stage In order to fully develop market economy and maximise output to increase national wealth and strength, it is still necessary for at least some members of the popula-tion to work on a self-sacrificial basis for the national goal (Li 1993), because the government at this stage does not yet have the financial capacity to offer full mate-rial reward for all the work that needs to be extracted

rec-Therefore, for a pragmatic reason of mobilising the population to work for a material goal, the government is confronted with the challenge to project an image and a message through various means of education that socialism (ideology) and market economy (policy) can be integrated in action

Perhaps it is on this logical ground that patriotism can be used to gloss over the ideological schism

1.2.1.1 Defining Patriotism

Definitions are as numerous as scholars, as universal in the last analysis as the number of nation each individual can belong to—one For a nation with a long his-tory and weighty cultural heritage like China, whose definition should count? Or,

to be more relevant to the study, whose definition should be propagated through the mass media for widest appeal to the largest possible number of people? Many

prominent Chinese in history have written lengthy treatises to indoctrinate the

people on what it means to be patriotic, and many prominent Chinese have risen

at critical moments to act on what they believe to be patriotism and have become

illustrations of the doctrine Among our contemporaries, Li Yanjie should be

counted as one, if not the one, most quotable source if our aim is to locate a most inspiring and agitating definition Li was a professor at Beijing Teachers’ College who established his unintended fame among the young people at home and abroad with his prolific lectures and speeches on patriotism He has been recognised and delegated by the national government as an unofficial ambassador to draw the young people’s hearts and minds towards their nation “Patriotism is love for one’s home nation It is a deepest sentiment and affection cultivated and fortified over thousands of years Such love is deeply rooted in the hearts of the people, and becomes a monumental moral force of righteous courage” (Li 1981, p 157)Under no demand to make his definition universally applicable, we may take note of the four main factors implied in it First, by Chinese cultural standards it

is defined in terms of sentiment Surely, a psychologist will use the term “affect” instead Second, it is considered as ingrained in a nation’s culture and history Third, it is believed to be innate in people’s thinking and emotion Fourthly and most importantly, it is believed to carry with it a kind of forceful strength which,

if ignited with spiritual dynamites, can amount to explosive effects in collective endeavour Such ignition is no more or less than the agitating effect of mass prop-aganda expounded upon by Lenin (Yu 1963a) This study allows us a chance to see whether and how such patriotism might work, or be worked up, under what conditions

Doob (1964) makes a useful distinction between nationalism and patriotism What appears to be nationalistic fervour to outside observers may well be, in a domestic context, manifestations of patriotic sentiments With the premise that the three main ingredients of a nation as an object of patriotism are land, people, and culture, Doob defines patriotism as a conscious conviction of a person that his own welfare and that of the significant groups to which he belongs are depend-ent upon the preservation or expansion of the power and culture of his society As for nationalism, it could be an ideological commitment to the pursuit of unity, a consciousness on the part of individuals or groups of membership in a nation, or a condition of mind in which loyalty to the ideal or to the fact of one’s national state

is superior to all other loyalties The case analyses in this study might produce new insight

As a sentiment capable of being translated into action, patriotism as a subject for indoctrination and illustration through many avenues including the media

should be taken as the Party and the state’s effort at appealing to the people in the name of the nation But what is the nation?

1.2.1.2 Defining the Nation

Historically, this term in the context of China’s recent past used to encompass the package of Party, state, military, and the people This has been the standard mention used by China’s national leaders and media when they refer to the entire population on important occasions Disputably, political philosophers contemplat-ing the definition of nation had over time equated it with either the people or the government (Fitzgerald 1994) Surely, by modern democratic definition, the peo-ple represented by the government constitute the nation Perceptually, the formula should look as follows which might come closest to representing the currently most salient contour of China:

In other words, the Party and the military have faded from the media light—understandably, though, given the pragmatic nature of economic reform and revival which exhibits itself in most policies from the state This direction

lime-of this formula has yet to be tested in the three case studies, which will reveal whether it is well grounded, and whether the combination is vertical (top–down), horizontal, or circular, or otherwise

Here we are again confronted with the issue of ideological legitimacy To cal scientists, nation is a sociopsychological concept referring to a self-conscious and self-differentiating community bound together by common history and soli-darity, while state is a legal concept referring to an internationally recognised political entity possessing tangible territorial, demographic, and governmental attributes One of the major functions of the state is to express a sense of political and social identity of its citizens (Dittmer and Kim 1993)

politi-It goes without saying that Marxism has always been associated with the Communist Party It is also an established fact that the ideological affiliation of China today as is pronounced in diplomatic interactions with other nations is still socialism But given the corruption among some Party officials, which is now taken as a fact, some pessimistic Western scholars observe that the CP has to a deplorable extent been discredited (Ogden 1989; Ding 1994) And following the collapse of the Communist Bloc, some pessimists have hastened to announce Communism as an ideological failure To the Chinese public, it is presumably dis-credited as well, even though by sound logic ideology should be separated from its bearer—political organisations

If the validity and reliability of an ideology reside solely in its workability in practice, the current ideology being promoted by the Chinese government is a pragmatic one—patriotism In Chinese, the words ideology and ism are used inter-changeably, and patriotism is a universal ism that transcends not only spatial but also temporal boundaries, i.e valid in any given period in history In so doing, the

Nation = People + Government

state is essentially de-ideologising the nation, which might lead partially to ing its own credibility by reducing the association with Stalinist Communism and increasing the perceptual link with a non-partisan ideology—patriotism.

restor-By now it becomes clear that the farthest backdrop on China’s national stage today is the above-analysed ideological conflict To be more accurate, it is tension between the orthodox socialist ideology and the unorthodox market economy pol-icy In the language of researchers, it is the incompatibility between theory and methods To adapt Festinger (1957)’s theory of cognitive dissonance and extrapo-late it somewhat inappropriately to the national scale, there are only two possi-ble ways to conflict resolution: modify the ideology or modify the policy—at least perceptually through the media, so that the two would appear to be integrated Or,

an evasion of solution is to gloss over by way of manipulating the interpretation

of facts reported through the media, akin to inflating or discounting the weights

of certain evidence in historical research and justifying errors in hard-core social scientific research through statistical means

For China today, the option of evading the solution is more reliably discernible

in practice, as the ensuing chapters will show How can it be done? National paigns, by virtue of their orchestration and firm direction, will inevitably become

cam-a conveniently mcam-allecam-able dcam-atcam-abcam-ase or genercam-ator of ncam-ationcam-al knowledge fecam-aturing whatever theme they serve to highlight, rendering other issues relatively obscure The media’s involvement throughout the process can only make it more intriguing

a subject for analysis

1.2.2 Party-State-Nation: Consequences of Structural

Differentiation

If the relationship between intellectuals and the state is a barometer of the political climate of a nation, what does the following statement imply: “Chinese intellectu-als can no longer regard Party, state and nation as one” (Dittmer and Kim 1993,

p 268)

China’s increasing structural differentiation between the Party and the state and the society has been noted by a few scholars as an inevitable phenomenon of economic modernisation (Watson 1992; Wu 1996; Yeh 1992)

As was briefly explained above, China is more than the sum total of all the Chinese people Moreover, it is more than the aggregate of party, state, and society Drawing on the Durkheimian notion that a social entity has its own life and organisational needs distinguishable from the sum of its constituent parts, Kim and Dittmer (1993) argue that national identity is the characteristic collec-tive behaviour of the national system as a whole, in interaction with other sub-national, national, and international systems, flowing from the totality of shared attributes and symbols of a solidarity political group known as the nation-state

It involves national essence—the core sentiments and symbols of the state—with which a mass of people most commonly identify and on this basis they contract to

live together and act in concert to defend their common identity It is this essence

we have to get at, perhaps through studies of such cases as the bid for Olympics, where China as a nation was “manifestly” interacting with other nations (as opposed to other less noticed interaction such as business cooperation)

National identity theories seek to define the conditions for the state–citizenry relationship both in terms of what the state is and in terms of what the state does Analogous to personal identity, national identity cannot be constructed or enacted

in isolation It becomes fully activated when faced with external threats or tunities (Dittmer and Kim 1993) This axiom justifies the selection of three national campaigns for this study

oppor-Identity mobilisation encompasses the enactment of a nation’s national essence

It can link the symbolic and behavioural dynamics of a people, their nation sate, and the world at large (Dittmer and Kim 1993)

Accepting the premise that national identity enactment is changing and tion specific, this study builds on the argument that national campaigns are one major type of such situations which tend to facilitate the enactment of a nation’s identity, which is the basis for national integration apart from state coercion.This disquisition on national identity is cited to shed light on the relation-ship between the structural elements of the Chinese nation Works are few which specifically address the structural differentiation in China accompanying economic reform and liberalisation (Saich 1995), but are nonetheless illuminating

situa-At a theoretical level, Perry (1994) raises the question whether the post-Mao economic and political reforms have been producing a significant change in the relative power of state and society in favour of the latter Goldstein (1994), on the other hand, attacks China’s political institutions and observes that they are becom-ing less coherent, less legitimate, and less effective

Liu (1992) makes the point in a more forthright manner He maintains that the departure of Mao Zedong from the Chinese political stage marked the end of myth making in China, and a true China emerged from behind the mask of pseudo-model nation, revealing all its diversity and individual dynamism Instead of one country, we now see regions, provinces, communities, and social groups differing significantly from one another in their socio-economic profiles He argues that in the midst of such profound change, communications, being both the vehicle and the essence of political, social, and economic process in any society, provides a strategic point to observe, analyse and assess China’s development

Liu (1992) concludes that the liberating effect of communication in China since the 1980s reveals the true state of China’s development and integration—“a diverse, plural, and partly segregated society” (p 140) The past nationalism cre-ated by ultra-Leftist propaganda turns out to be artificial, and important groups in society, such as intellectuals, new entrepreneurs, and the public in various ways declare their alienation from the state Occupational, ideological, and social iden-tifications have been established by newly rising social groups such as dissidents and migrants These are what Liu considers as the potential building blocks of a new nationhood, which will be much more substantial and enduring than the artificial ones created by propaganda

To confound the situation, political volatility resultant from power struggle within state leadership and regional disparities in the extent of development add

to the obstacles blocking the emergence of a genuine Chinese nationhood (Liu

1992, p 140) In other scholars’ words, China faces a major identity crisis (Kim and Dittmer 1993)

Labelling China a “nationless state”, Fitzgerald (1994) distinguishes between official history preserved by the state and the records in the immense repositories

of cultural memory, including today’s modern media He perceives an try between state and nation—the ideological foundations and the direction in which the country is heading However, the state reserves the right to define the nation and to specify its relationship to the state Overall, though, probably out

asymme-of no choice, more recently there has been a wider recognition asymme-of the distinction between the Party and the state, and between the state and the nation (Link 1994;

Su 1994)

1.2.3 Historical Discontinuity—A Spiritual Vacuum

According to Link (1994) in his writing on national identity, many Chinese lectuals feel distraught with the lack of a “point of purchase” in their spiritual life

intel-in the money-first ethos that has recently prevailed intel-in Chintel-ina He observes that the era is long gone when ideological pronouncements from the centre were accepted

at both rhetorical and practical levels White (1995) observes that with the ening of party organisations and the virtual demise of study groups at the grass-roots level, which used to serve as the transmitter of a central ideology, most individuals and institutions are free to ignore the once prevalent unifying core Moreover, with the moral authority and political power of the centre diminished

weak-to some extent, local work units and governments are far more independent than before (Wu 1996) What does such independence mean? At least in part it means that the previous thread of ideology woven into the fabric of national life and dominant in regulating individual relationship with the state is no longer function-ing Individualism, however, had never been a point of purchase in the life of the majority of Chinese people, and it has proven less than something they can hold

on to today

An ensuing problem is that there is no publicly accepted set of moral values to define proper behaviour Intellectuals speak of an ideological crisis and a spiritual crisis, lamenting that the traditional moral ideologies are no longer playing their due role in China (Link 1994)

And for individuals, a sense of emptiness within can be as much of a lem as the lack of external symbols Kim and Dittmer (1993)’s work touched upon a series of three belief crises—the crisis of belief in Marxism, the crisis of faith in socialism, and the crisis of trust in the government, which they consider

prob-to be chipping away at the acceptance of the People’s Republic as an authentic socialist state The question of how the Chinese nation should act out its identity

will be put to test in the study of the first of the three cases, China’s bid for year

2000 Olympics

What about the “make-money” ideology? While affirming its benefits as a short-term ideology to develop a poor country, Link (1994) disclaims it as a stop-gap that leaves deeper and inevitable questions such as: what makes China distinc-tive? Does China really need, in a modern world, another moral–social–political cosmological core both to set it apart and to hold it together? This question has entered scholarly reflection by both Western and Chinese social scientists (e.g Lin

1994; Zhang 1995) Without evading this question, a quick review of the change and continuity in the national identifying core in China’s recent history might be helpful

Such a unifying core binding the masses together during the pre-1949 tionary era was an ideal, a simple ideal that all people should be fed and clothed and employed, and that under the leadership of the Communist Party (Wou 1994)

revolu-It continued into the mid-1950s, during which period an eager push at the ideal to its extreme distorted China’s underdeveloped reality and led to a national catas-trophe In the ensuing 10 years till the outburst of the Cultural Revolution in

1966, the aggravated Chinese reality in the midst of political struggles and incited class hatred, which retarded national development, gradually deviated from the ideal Another 10 years that followed witnessed national turmoil in all scales and spheres, which paralysed the national economy in the midst of a clash between China’s national ideal and national reality (Zhang 1995) To what extent, if at all, has the past ideal of common prosperity been revived and revitalised to re-charge the population with zeal for development after Mao? That is another way of ask-ing whether an ideal or ideology is functioning as the identifying core in China today

Given the fact that the mature segment of China’s population had previously been intensely indoctrinated with the socialist ideology, the government cannot afford to cognitively disorient them thoroughly from their old norms It is not so true that a popular faith in the old isms still exists, but it is true that a good number

of the people, including officials, cherish strong nostalgia for certain past values and virtues, ways that are reminiscent of the benefits of past socialist ideology So there is a pressing need to integrate the past with the present, to provide a sense of historical continuity in order to justify the new policy to the population, especially those members who have suffered from the side effects of such policy and become disillusioned with the increasingly fierce competition and increasingly indifferent attitude towards interpersonal relationships

On the one hand, the drive for a modernised future is strong and compelling

On the other hand, the nostalgic pull from at least part of the history left behind

is lingering It may best be found by locating what objects invoking memories of the past are most keenly pursued and cherished In the words of a China watcher (Cheng 1994), one of the symbols unifying the attention of the largest num-ber of Chinese people in the early 1990s had been the late Mao Zedong, repack-aged in popular cultural activities and products The phenomenon has not found unanimous explanation One explanation that has found more echo than do others

is this: the popular sentiment expressed seemingly towards Mao as is now bolised in cultural products is but a guise for the inexpressible nostalgia for the less materialistic bond between people during his time This explanation must be accepted with much caution More reflection on China during the Mao era would suggest that this is a distorted picture of the past, indicative of an attempt to grasp some uniting sentiment that can hold the people together, who are now pushed by the market force into highly individualistic pursuits of gains and, on such competi-tive grounds, are more likely to be foes than friends.

sym-An alternative explanation could be that current China in transformation is undergoing a new round of identity redefinition According to Liu (1992), national spiritual “disintegration” could encompass several dimensions: (1) national iden-tity in crisis; (2) legitimacy of government in question; (3) the government having difficulty initiating and sustaining economic development

Before addressing the question of which one of the above best describes the Chinese case, we may reason by concession and ask other questions: what was the main source of China’s identity 10 or 20 years ago? 100 years ago? 1000 years ago? In the recent past, ideology was the source of identity In the further past before the Communist revolution, culture was the source of identity

A third-generation overseas Chinese in Singapore with a basic amount of knowledge of China’s history thus answered the question regarding identity:

“For an old nation like China, people do not really need to be told what they are Culture and history are so ingrained in their life that it will live by itself” (Personal interview, 15 December 1995, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore) Upon first hearing, that comment almost devastated the central argument under-pinning this study, to the extent of overthrowing its main thrust However, second thoughts reminded us that the long history of unsettling class struggles and revolu-tion had disconnected the people from their cultural tradition and historical legacy (Chu and Ju 1993) At the current historical juncture when a vacuum appears in the nation’s spiritual atmosphere and hence in the hearts and souls of the people,

it would be a legitimate juncture for resorting to the history and culture of the Chinese nation for a possible source of identity

Enough disquisition has been produced on national identity, but for this study a workable and simple definition should be “what we are as a nation, ideologically, historically, and spiritually” Further, we look into what functional components the nation encompasses—the government and the people are bearers of national identity Again, disputing definitions on linguistic grounds alone is much ado

about nothing The core of the matter lies in the source of such definitions—by

academics? by the media? by national governments? by the people who exercise their common sense? Further pursuit of this topic can easily distract our atten-tion into the area of cultural anthropology and defeat the focused effort As such definitions bear on this project, if the discussion on ideological schism strikes the point on “what should our nation believe in”, the issue of historical continu-ity could hopefully lead to a new look at “how have we come to be what we are today?”

1.2.4 Substantive Conflicts—Does the Nation Seem Fair

to All?

An article in Weekly Digest (22 May 1995) contrasted two figures: one million

people, out of the 1.2 billion in China, had achieved the status of millionaires or above, while another 70 million people were still struggling below the poverty line, not counting the 12 million urban poor News appeared frequently in the popular media such as evening newspapers and entertainment magazines on how a few individuals rose to stardom overnight, while millions of hard workers who till the field and work the assembly lines remained obscure It is no longer news now

to see new towns being established in the generally prosperous coastal provinces, while the livelihood of the residents in the generally backward inland regions and provinces is being threatened by deserts inching towards them, their economic development hampered by lack of advantages exclusively enjoyed by the coastal provinces That was one main reason why, in the year 2000, the central govern-ment called for a major development of Western China in the twenty-first century.Increasing social inequality, a natural result of economic reform, is yet increas-ing as the newly unleashed market force gathers momentum In the absence of an economic equaliser, resentment arises from the population formerly conditioned

by planned economy and accustomed to egalitarianism Geographically or socially disadvantaged, the poorer sectors of the population air a loud cry for fulfilment of basic needs Maintaining the psychological equilibrium of the nation becomes a pressing task The question is how it can be done

The official policy of fine tuning the relationship between “reform, ment, and stability”, which has become a household phrase, though referring to both political and social stability, has a stronger emphasis on the latter The pro-nounced guideline for national propaganda through the official media was set in

develop-1993 to cultivate a sense of national unity (CCTV news, 1 January develop-1993)

What symbol, what action, what spirit, could be used by the media as a vehicle

to “unite” the prosperous and the poor, the greater and the lesser, the advanced and the backward, for national development, a goal being attained under the leadership

of the current government which eagerly seeks allegiance?

From a daily record kept of national media events over a period of years since

1992, three cases emerged that are relevant to this study To recapitulate, they include the bid for Year 2000 Olympics in 1993, the commemoration of Mao’s 100th birthday at the end of the same year, and the celebration of the 50th anni-versary of victory in anti-Fascist war Here are superficial rationales before further analysis The first case involved the entire nation in concerted action, the media being the centre stage presenting China acting as a nation For the second case, the media were both a locale and a stage for the re-enactment of the national memory

of a great man who made the great nation (a little overstatement, but symbolically justified) The third case was a special national occasion staged through the media for the purpose of reinterpreting history to serve the present and revive the national spirit of unity against adversity, with which the population might be equipped for the future

Could it be mere coincidence that, defined in relation to history, the witness,

memory, and reminder functions of the media were prominently projected in the

three respective cases? For the Bid, the media served as a national witness in tion to playing other roles For the second case, the media served the three func-tions combined, though the memory function seemed more evident, in that Mao’s image and person and works and exploits, while being presented through the media and projected through expressions of public sentiments, were being stored

addi-in the media record For the third case, the remaddi-inder function was most manifest

in the fact that historical facts were reinterpreted in view of the current need for national spiritual unity This designation is rather superficial, and has yet to find proof in the evidence rallied under the three cases

1.3 Reaching the Soul of the Nation: Empirical

Justification for Study

China as a nation is never indifferent towards its ideological and spiritual crises

On the part of the intelligentsia, according to Lin (1994), national soul searching involved voluntary confessions about weaknesses in China’s national character, lamentations about such defects, heightened concerned consciousness about the welfare of the nation, and reorientation of China’s “soul” towards modern human-ism All of these tend to be reflected in the intellectual discourse exploring the identity and destiny of China Such a quest has its historical antecedents in the last part of the nineteenth century after China’s desperate military defeat in the hands

of strong foreign powers, which provoked the Chinese intellectuals to search for a strong “core” to prop up the nation The quest, on and off, took a winding path in the century that followed, depending on the changing relationship between intel-lectuals and the state

On the part of the public, a spontaneous Mao Craze, especially in the way of mass popularity with songs and souvenirs from Maoist era in the early 1990s, has been interpreted as a sign of nostalgia for the Maoist days, even for the Maoist ideology which stressed equality in distribution (Liu 1992; Cheng 1994) To stretch the interpretation a bit further, it might be said that the Chinese people were groping for a point of purchase to fill their spiritual void

On the part of the state, one after another round of non-political campaigns have been launched since the early 1980s when the crisis of belief was first posed

as a serious challenge to the nation The pronounced goals were to either weed out undesirable external influences on the ideological atmosphere of the nation or

to strengthen the domestic bond of affection and devotion to the nation (Gregor

1995; Rosen 1993; Shi and Zhang 1991)

No clear evidence suggests a distinct policy formation process for the current national patriotic education campaign involving the media, the government, edu-cational institutions and others But there was a deluge of concerted calls from all sectors of society through the media in the beginning of each year since 1993 that

marked the national start of the programme The role of communication and how

it interacted with national integration during the three campaigns selected is the central concern of this book But it must be noted again that no claim was made

by the state or the media that any of the three campaigns was a planned part of the programme Meanwhile, several other campaigns have been launched since the time this study was conducted, and they will be duly but briefly examined in the Epilogue

The four areas of tension previously discussed are areas in which the country might be torn apart spiritually The government may not conceive of the issues in

these terms But it makes sense to say that national integration can be ently translated into creating a sense of oneness of the nation among the entire

conveni-population For China, it may encompass one official ideology (the theory of

building socialism with Chinese characteristics), one overarching policy (market economy), one official sacred canon (Deng Xiaoping’s works), one (set of) pre-dominant ideology (patriotism, socialism, collectivism), one national goal (pros-perity for all), etc

But above all, a sense that the nation is spiritually united in perfect strength for

a unified mission may be more directly relevant to integration The media can play

a part in injecting such a sense into the people by presenting carefully selected stories in favour of this theme But presumably, a more effective way is to organ-ise national campaigns or events in which certain national symbols can be readily used as universal appeals to the whole population Further, such campaigns/events must invite the participation by virtually the entire population So in the first place there must be some elements about the campaigns to which every citizen can relate himself Then of course these elements must have a direct bearing on the Chinese nation, be it history, culture, economic strength, political sovereignty, or whatever else Needless to say, such campaigns must have a strong and distinct spiritual dimension, since they in part serve to divert the population from an obses-sion with material pursuits

In other words, these events, organised mostly through the media, in part by the media, and in part for the media, could serve as foci of national attention and par-ticipation, which ideally should give the people a strong sense of being an integral part of the nation

The background for all these events is the larger ongoing patriotic education campaign, and one baseline belief supporting the theory to be advanced through this study is this: one main purpose and/or effect of the campaign is to generate and propagate knowledge about the nation How does it work? Before approach-ing these questions, a reflective look at the existing literature on relevant topics is a must, as well as is an attempt at theory building

Chen, Y R (1999) Creating a new man, creating a new nation: The media and the making of

role models in China’s market economy era Journal of International Communication, 6 (2):

90–105.

Cheng, C Y (1994) China’s economic policies after the CCP 14th party congress Journal of

Developing Societies, X (1): 7–17.

Chu, G C & Ju, Y (1993) The Great Wall in ruins: Communication and cultural change in

China State University of New York Press.

Cody, E (1997, January 31) Beijing campaigns for a spiritual civilisation International Herald

Tribune, p 4

Ding, X L (1994) The decline of communism in China: Legitimacy crisis, 1977–1989

Cambridge University Press.

Dittmer, L (1992) Sino-Soviet normalisation and its international implication, 1945–1990

Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Dittmer, L., & Kim, S S (1993) In search of a theory of national identity In Dittmer, L & S S

Kim (Eds.), China’s quest for national identity (pp 1–31) Ithaca: Cornell University Press Doob, L.W (1964) Patriotism and nationalism: Their psychological foundations New Haven

and London: Yale University Press.

Festinger, L (c1957) A theory of cognitive dissonance Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Fitzgerald, J (1994) The nationless state: The search for a nation in modern Chinese

national-ism The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs.

Goldman, M (Ed.) (1987) China’s intellectuals and the state: In search of a new relationship

Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Goldstein, A (1994) Trends in the study of political elites and institutions in the PRC The

China Quarterly, 139, 714–730.

Gregor, A J (1995) Marxism, China, & development: Reflections on theory and reality New

Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Kim, S S., & Dittmer, L (1993) Whither China’s quest for national identity? In Dittmer, L.,

& S S Kim (Eds.), China’s quest for national identity (pp 237–289) Ithaca: Cornell

University Press.

Li, P (1993) Report on government work Beijing: People’s Publishing House.

Li, Y J (1981) On patriotism Collection of speeches Beijing: People’s Publishing House Lin, T Q (1994) A search for China’s soul In W M Tu (Ed.), China in transformation (pp

171–188) Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Link, P (1994) China’s “core” problem In W M Tu (Ed.), China in transformation (pp 189–

205) Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Liu, A P L (1992) Communications and development in post-Mao mainland China In B J

Lin & J T Myers (Eds.), Forces for change in contemporary China (pp 120–141) Taipei:

Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University.

Ogden, S (1989) China’s unresolved issues: Politics, development, culture NJ: Prentice-Hall Perry, E J (1994) Trends in the study of Chinese politics: State-society relations The China

Shi, H Jo., & Zhang, Y H (1991) Communication and development in China In F L Casmir (Ed.), Communication in development (pp 177–198) New Jersey: Ablex.

Shih, C Y (1990) The spirit of Chinese foreign policy: A psycho-cultural view London:

Macmillan.

Shih, C Y (1995) State and society in China’s political economy: The cultural dynamics of

socialist reform. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Shirk, S (1993) The political logic of economic reform in China Berkeley: University of

California Press.

Solinger, D (1993) China’s transition from socialism: Statist legacies and market reforms

Armonk, NY: M E Sharpe.

Su, S Z (1994) Chinese communist ideology and media control In C C Lee (Ed.), China’s

media, Media’s China (pp 75–88) Boulder: Westview Press.

Vohra, R (1994) Deng Xiaoping’s modernisation: Capitalism with Chinese characteristics!

Journal of Developing Societies, X (1), 46–58.

Watson, A (Ed.) (1992) Economic reform and social change in China London & New York:

Routledge.

White, G (1995) The decline of ideocracy In R Benewick & P Wingrove (Eds.), China in the

1990s (pp 21–33) Macmillan Press Ltd.

Wou, O Y K (1994) Mobilising the masses: Building revolution in Henan Stanford, CA:

Stanford University Press.

Wu, A C (1996) The political implications of the CCP’s “Socialist market economy” proposal

In B J Lin & J T Myers (Eds.), Contemporary China in the post-cold war era (pp 22–40)

Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

Yeh, M D (1992) The party-state and society in mainland China: A brief review In B J

Lim & J T Myers (Eds.), Forces for change in contemporary China Taipei: Institute of

International Relations, National Chengchi University.

Yu, F T C (1963a) Mass persuasion in communist China London & Dunmow: Pall Mall Press Zhang, G (1997, January 31) Ten trends of development in China’s spiritual civilisation Lianhe

Zaobao, p 14.

Zhang, L F (1995) Lopsided development and countercurrent: Ideal distorted reality (1949–

1956) In Y M Li (Ed.), Social changes in China in transformation: Reports from unofficial

sources in mainland China Taipei: Times Cultural Publishing Enterprise Ltd.

The background introduction in Chap 1 suggests that this study must draw on the literature in the following areas: the role of communication in national devel-opment, the role of communications in national integration, mass communica-tion and mass mobilisation campaigns in China, and Chinese communication in the market economy era It may also adapt relevant concepts on nation building, nationalism, and patriotism The review of the literature under each section con-cludes with reference to specific applicability to the current study

2.1 Literature Review

2.1.1 Communication in National Development

Definition of the term development has accumulated a voluminous amount of ings To serve the specific purpose of this study, only a few most relevant ones are

writ-to be presented and discussed here Goulet (1971) gives a broad definition of what the term should mean:

freeing men from nature’s servitude, from economic backwardness and oppressive technological institutions, from unjust class structures and political exploiters, from cultural and psychic alienation–in short, from all of life’s inhumane agencies (p 17)

Here development is defined in an active state of affairs, that is, the strife to overcome underdevelopment Such a continual process of unfolding changes implied in the definition leaves room for varying interpretations depending on the national context In China today, the greatest majority of the population have either partially achieved or are striving towards these goals Schramm (1964), in con-trast, defines underdevelopment in terms of the incomplete utilisation of resources,

be them human, material, or capital A more recent synthetic redefinition of the

Theoretical Foundations of the Study

© Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016

Y Chen, Communication Campaigns and National Integration in China’s Market

Economy Era, DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-733-8_2

concept is provided by Mowlana (1990), who reiterates the distinction between development and modernisation in the Western sense He calls for an end to its all-encompassing function in connoting widely different processes such as “modernisa-tion”, “Westernisation”, “industrialisation”, “economic growth”, “political change”,

“nation building”, and scores of other economic, political, social, and cultural activities and changes (p 4) Reviewing the evolutionary path of research in the role of communication in national development in the past four decades, he notes

in particular Pye (1966) and Pool (1977)’s distinction between political and nomic development Further, he defines political development as primarily a pro-cess of national integration, as movement from less to more national unity To him, development means more than mere economic growth and the implementation of technological innovations; structural changes are also necessary He also affirms the sociological view that values and attitudes must change prior to economic growth and development Current China is undergoing such swift changes in economy that compatible norms and values must be cultivated alongside the development

eco-After tracing the liberation and emancipation movements in some Third World countries in the 1960s and 1970s, Mowlana (1990) arrives at an eclectic definition

of development Development means “the entire gamut of processes and means by which a social system moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory in some way toward conditions regarded as humanly better” (p 34).What is the role of communication in national development? Schramm (1964) proposes three functions for the media in development: watchman function, pol-icy function, and teaching function More specifically, the mass media can widen horizons, focus people’s attention, raise aspirations, and create a climate for devel-opment In the decision process, they can help indirectly to change strongly held attitudes or valued practices, facilitate interpersonal communication, confer sta-tus, broaden the policy dialogue, enforce social norms, form tastes, affect attitudes lightly held, and help in all types of education and training

An inevitable challenge to communication during the process of development is that the people’s expectation may outgrow the nation’s economic capability How should the communication apparatus take on the challenge? Lerner (1972) thus summarises the main objectives of development communication: (1) to meet the demand for social justice; (2) to shape expectations in ways that maximise satis-faction and minimise frustrations; (3) to sustain a dynamic equilibrium between the socio-economic and the psychocultural components in a rapidly changing situation

Synthesising across a wide range of definitions and concepts, Mowlana (1990) focuses on values and belief systems that permeate the developmental process He proposes that development and communication are not to be separated, but should

be taken as interrelated terms, i.e development is communication and tion is development Assigning ordinary dictionary definition to communication as

communica-“to make known” and development as communica-“to unfold” (p 35), he defines the phrase

development communication in terms of unfolding of knowledge.

Mowlana’s definition seems to defy conventional wisdom about development communication, but the deeper reflections it provokes are revealing When a nation undergoes changes in domestic conditions and international status during the process of development, which incur changes in people’s lives, does not the changing nation unfold new knowledge about itself? In that sense, development

is communication in which both the state and the population participate Current China offers a social laboratory in which Mowlana’s conception can be illustrated

To refer back to Chap 1, national campaigns in particular can be regarded as the

occasion upon which knowledge about the nation is generated/unfolded.

Setting the research agenda for development communication in China, Chu (1977) emphasises analyses of the institutional, structural changes which the Chinese Communist Party had introduced in China for social and economic devel-opment and examination of the roles which a mix of communications channels, including mass media, Party organisations, and formal and informal groups at the grassroots level, had played in the structural change processes His own work

on radical change through communication in China exemplifies his proposal According to him, development, in any form, requires the unlocking of human energy and creativity in order to utilise available material resources Based on Lerner’s reasoning that systemic social change will generally involve communi-cation change as the communication structure is an intrinsic part of social struc-ture, he argues that one can hope to change a social system by first changing the patterns of communication Schramm (1964) maintains that the means and channels of communication can be effectively utilised as instruments to induce planned social change Pye (1963) would have agreed to this view, for earlier on

he had maintained that the structure of a communication system with its more or less well-defined channels is the skeleton of the social body which envelopes it Understanding the patterns of communication will take us a long way towards understanding a social system

In short, development means the building of new social institutions, to be ported by new normative behavioural patterns—new values, new beliefs, and new actions In this sense, development necessitates communication, because it is only through the communication process that the new patterns of interaction can be depicted, elicited, and reinforced (Chu 1977)

sup-New institutions, being a network of new role relations, cannot be established

by administrative orders or political means alone They will become established only through sustained behavioural participation as well as firm value-attachment

by the participants involved (Chu 1977) In the case of current China, the ing structural differentiation accompanying economic reform has been subtly altering the way in which the nation is governed Some scholars may dispute this argument, but with some concession we have to accept that at least the way has changed in which the Chinese people’s minds and moves are ruled The new insti-tutions are girded by new norms and ideas adapted for national development In the general absence of mass political campaigns in current China, events such as the bid for year 2000 Olympics, commemoration of Mao’s 100th anniversary, and celebration of the 50th anniversary of victory over Japanese aggression provide

increas-showcases in which we may examine the role relations between the state, the national media, and the people The reason is obvious: in such national events, yet

to be determined whether they amounted to full-fledged campaigns, all the tional ingredients of the nation were activated in interaction with each other The media served as one of the most important sites where such interaction took place

func-At this point the discussion carries over into a related area: mass tion in development In fact, as bearers of national identity, both the government and the masses may participate in the unfolding of knowledge about the nation in development, and the mass mobilisation in national development may in one way indicate national integration, which is more of a process than a distinct goal

participa-2.1.2 Mass Mobilisation and National Integration:

The Role of Communications

Mass mobilisation in China for both revolution and development has been a topic

of enduring interest, though substantial researches are few in total number (e.g Bishop 1989; Cell 1977; Chu 1977; Houn 1961; Wou 1994; Yu 1963a)

In his seminal work on communication and radical social transformation in China, Chu (1977) sets forth two preconditions for the initiation of mass participa-tion in the nation’s political and economic processes First, there must be a change

in the major social institutions to remove the old barriers that stand in the way

of mass mobilisation This would require a social structural change Second, there must be a transformation of the traditional values and beliefs that hold the Chinese back from fully utilising and organising their own resources This would require a change of cultural ethos, of personality; in short, the creation of the new Chinese Man To bring about the desired changes, the CCP then employed the instrument

of communication—the sharing of messages, sentiments and intent among the people so that they could be aroused to act like one man, in a way desired by the Party authorities Such practice reflects on the Chinese philosophy of mass mobili-sation: to get all people to act alike and work for one goal

The other facilitators during such process of communication, however, may have changed over time, especially after the inception of China’s economic reform For example, the small group meetings which had once served as a major channel for applying normative pressure to comply to the Party norms, as well

as mutual surveillance in closely-knit interpersonal communication networks

in China’s work units typical of the pre-reform era—both institutions have been greatly weakened, and in many instances they are no longer functioning This observation is but an extension of what was described in Chap 1, i.e organisa-tional political communication is no longer an active determinant of the outcome

of mass mobilisation or the initiation of mass participation The swiftly rising media have taken their place to reach the people more directly Such a new situ-ation contradicts Chu (1977)’s finding more than 20 years ago that the means of

mobilisation involved a high intensity of interpersonal communication In other words, mobilisation of social pressure from the mass of people through a combi-nation of group communication and coercion, which had helped the communists

to topple landlords and businessmen and led to a fundamental change in the social structure decades ago, are no longer the chief means to mobilising participation.Mass participation in China during the Maoist era was seen as predicated on

an unprecedented mass ideological conversion (Yu 1963a), conversion to a ing ideology which the Chinese believed had the power to determine action Chu (1977) says that in a communist state solidarity and achievement depend upon ideological unanimity Such unanimity is in turn the result of mass persuasion by means of indoctrination and propaganda (p 259)

unify-Yu (1963a)’s description of the sociopsychological condition of the Chinese population at that time may still be valid today People were then engaged in the baffling process of searching out new relationships with their fellow men and in striving to find their appropriate places in a new society, the dimensions of which they could not yet fully grasp Today a significant majority of the Chinese popula-tion is also confronted with the perplexity in a changeable socio-economic milieu, which is quite beyond the grasp of the individual If they were compelled to pic-ture themselves as members of a nation which in turn belonged to a wider world of modern nations during the 1950s and 1960s, how are they to picture themselves in relation to China today? Are they to identify themselves with the Party, the state,

or the nation? Yu (1963a) argues that the relationship between citizen and polity is never static even in a well-established country, for

individuals are constantly engaged in adjusting and re-evaluating, either restlessly and erratically or gradually and persistently, their sentiments, emotions and judgments about their collective identities (p 3).

Considered crucial to nation building is the relationship between the tions of mass communications and the patterns of political change At the mass level, however, attention should be given to the need for the masses to have a sense

institu-of popular involvement, and emotional identification with the national life

If Yu (1963a)’s prescription is still true that the two fundamental concerns with mass mobilisation are changing attitudes and reducing the gap between the rul-ing elite and the less modernised masses, mobilising mass participation takes on yet another coloration Confronted with possible ideological schisms and historical discontinuities, how are the Chinese Party and state to revive a sense of national identity, which requires a feeling of continuity and stability over time? Yu’s analy-sis designates the politician’s role as articulator of the collective identity Here we may ask whether the current state leadership will assume such a role

This question leads to yet other questions During the pre-reform era, all the Chinese people were guided to live within the same organised totality of beliefs and sentiments within the groups, instead of developing clearly delineated divi-sions of labour and specific role relations The Party had fostered the unions, which required individuals in different positions to work together in an undifferen-tiated manner The various components of society were not held together primarily

by interdependence, but rather, all depended on the Party structure for direction and guidance through its vast and efficient communication networks (Chu 1977) Today, however, social structural differentiation has come to be recognised along with finer divisions of labour, and as the directives from above lose their absolut-ist power to a visible extent, what are the propeller of mass mobilisation and the source of national integration?

Schwartz (1994) observes that one answer is to pursue some form of moral education anchored on what is culturally distinctively Chinese Chu (1977)’s observation that continuous ideological indoctrination could eventually provide a unifying theme to bind the mass of people together seems to be still in vogue with the Chinese state leadership, which has launched the long-term patriotic education programme

A succinct definition of the parameters of development proposed by Chu (1977) on the empirical basis of the Chinese case may be revealing: “It involves the continuous release and utilisation of human and material resources” (p 265) The mass energy for pursuit of individualistic ends, long suppressed during the Maoist era, has now been released How to harness such energy and channel it into national development? The question is frequently driven back to the point of a uni-fying, cohesive force

It is imperative to examine whether what had been described and prescribed in the previous literature on communication in China has changed

As Yu (1963a) argues, the best place to start an investigation of the theory and policy of communication in a communist country is the communist ideology itself

He considers three aspects of the Chinese communist ideology especially tant in the realm of communication: class consciousness, the mass line, and unity

impor-of theory and practice In current China, however, class-consciousness as a cept is obsolete, and the endless ideological struggles of the past, often premised

con-on class hatred incited by propaganda, are no lcon-onger an instituticon-on of governing and mobilising the population The mass line emphasises the government’s trust

in and reliance on the manpower of the masses, and has been a long tradition of the Communist Party since the revolutionary days Though it is still an impor-tant ingredient of the Party and the state’s policies, mass mobilisation tends to be pursued on a different basis, without an appeal against an external enemy such as imperialism or a domestic class enemy As for the unity of theory and practice, it

in essence refers to the congruence and integration between the Party’s guiding ideology and its policies

The purpose of propaganda has also shifted from its past goal to “awaken, heighten, and sharpen the class consciousness of the masses” (Yu 1963a, p 261)

to the contemporary emphasis on educating the population with the economic struction goal of the nation and fuelling their positive enthusiasm towards such goals (Chu 1994) One most recent statement to that effect was made by delegates

con-to the CCP’s 15th National Congress in September 1997

Not only have the goals and conditions for mass mobilisation changed in China, but also changed are the targets of such mobilising efforts—a significant

segment of the population had not been previously exposed to such campaigns

or the ideologies they sought to promote And peasants, who used to be the main targets of mobilisation for the sake of nation building decades ago (Liu 1971), have become mainly the object of the diffusion of scientific technology Today, even farmers may not subscribe to ideological study for study’s sake They regard the urge to feed and prosper themselves as their top priority Moreover, with the decentralisation of state leadership, the power to plan and implement mobilisation campaigns may no longer totally reside with the central government Further, the openness of a market economy system is bound to have its share of influence on the media system (Chu 1994), which has now more than one master: besides influ-ence from the state government, there is the market force whose dictate they must heed (Hao and Huang 1996) This last point has captured only initial investigation

by communication scholars, and hence the current study has a chance to further explore it

By Liu (1971)’s definition, national integration in the 1960s encompassed the process of integrating the individual into the nation’s political process, and inte-grating media content and structure with the political structure Our current concern with national integration refers to mass concertedness in action, histori-cal continuity in the nation’s guiding ideology and policy, and the compatibility between the ideological and material/pragmatic realms of national life

The idea of national integration and the idea of mass mobilisation converge

on one point, i.e participation, or involving the largest possible number of ple in a national process by means of communication Mobilisation in its original sense referred mainly to marshalling manpower and material resources and bring-ing them together against adversities in war times In the current Chinese con-text, greater emphasis of mobilisation is placed on the spiritual dimension, which requires the mobilisation of symbolic resources such as vivid images signifying the nation, in order to summon the human resources to best utilise the potential of the nation’s material resources

peo-Chu (1977) maintains that the more people are allowed to participate in the process of change, through extensive communication, the less likely the course of development will be disruptive to the society as a whole The lack of grassroots members’ demand for changes in their positions in the overall social structure dur-ing the Maoist era was ascribed to a sense of participation and a feeling of national purpose Of course, what is not to be neglected is the capacity of the Chinese peo-ple for tolerance and patience even in situations of severe stress But has this also been changed under the new economic circumstances? Chu and Ju (1993) attrib-ute such tolerance partly to structural constraints in the traditional Chinese soci-ety, and such propensity is now called into question as the norms and values once dearly upheld are changing

Given the perplexities arising from the discontinuity in belief and ioural patterns identified over the past decades, it becomes imperative to examine whether and how communication figures into the creation of a nationally unifying spiritual force

behav-2.1.3 Mass Campaigns—an Old Topic, a New Perspective

In the beginning of the 1970s, for social scientists China offered something like a laboratory test of the limits of what propaganda could do (Liu 1971) This state-ment still holds water today The changes throughout the Chinese society today are

of no less consequence than those 30 years ago What is sharply different about the nation is the current absence of an orthodox unifying ideology and the removal

of ideological coercion Coercion used to come in package with mass persuasion.Propaganda research, which flourished after World War I, has not explained the frustration of propagandists who have attempted to educate for good causes (Baruch 1976; Clews 1964) It is a challenge to as well as an opportunity for this study

Liu (1971) observes that Chinese bureaucrats had limited faith in mass suasion, and they believed instead that a long period of education was needed to cultivate a degree of intellectual sophistication in the people This belief stemmed from the Maoist philosophy that the mass media, coupled with grassroots oral par-ticipation, could transform the Chinese population Today, the traditional propa-ganda model is pronounced obsolete by some scholars (Yu and Huang 1996), who base their observation on grounds that a market economy precludes the past closed-nation environment in which top-down communication was the one line of information traffic that could dominate the nation These claims are theoretically grounded, but campaigns that involve a significant amount of communication are the real solid ground on which such claims can be re-examined

per-So far the post-Mao Chinese leadership has not presented any equally cal elaboration on mass propaganda But there are apparent changes in practice,

canoni-in that the canoni-incessant study meetcanoni-ings, discussion groups, little red books, and ing loudspeakers used by Maoist propagandists to change the population are no longer in use If past propaganda campaigns built around interpersonal commu-nication and small-group processes were successful mainly because there was an inadequate media structure for national communication (Liu 1971), the effect of national campaigns today remains to be examined, at a time when media abound.Liu (1971) interprets the hidden motive for Maoist reliance on propaganda as partly an attempt to cope with a real problem under circumstances where other resources were lacking He observes that the real problem was the national inte-gration of a backward country almost totally lacking the prerequisite conditions for the creation of a nation, e.g a common language, adequate roads, literate peo-ple, effectively organised bureaucracy, and a media system All these have changed

blar-to varied extents since Liu’s seminal work was written The full-fledged media structure which was then absent is now established (Lee 1994)

Yu (1963a) sees mass mobilisation campaigns as processes of mass persuasion, while Liu (1971) maintains that to some degree such mass persuasion had served

to create national consciousness, a must towards national integration Liu’s (1971) book examines the organisation and conduct of agitation and propaganda in China, both in its normal bureaucratic manifestations and as it worked during the mass

campaigns Our task today is to examine the current type of mass campaigns under the new national conditions.

One of Liu (1971)’s arguments is noteworthy in reflection on China’s current situation He argues that when political control over the country was no longer

in danger, the government might decide on long-term integration strategy such

as fostering identification instead of penetrating the population through coercive means If so, what should be the integrating strategy for China today?

The main thesis in Liu (1971)’s work is very important Citing the Western experience as an example, he observes that the media were to reinforce the exist-ing national unification and identity created originally by a social infrastructure Although the mass media in China helped the communist regime extend its cen-tralisation over widespread regions and disseminate some basic facts about its official ideology, the media did not succeed in creating fundamental national inte-gration because of China’s economic underdevelopment and political instability

In short, the media cannot create national integration by themselves

Now we reach the concern with the concrete strategies of mass mobilisation campaigns In the past, the media were used to play upon the symbol of a threat-ening foreign enemy—U.S imperialism, and they focused popular attention on the excitement of developing China Does this practice remain the same? The end result was a much-enhanced national awareness (King 1966; Liu 1971), and it helped to mobilise the people for being integrated into new institutions National identity, once activated through campaigns, had its own “momentum and inertia” (Liu 1971, p 177)

Next come studies on the objective, planning, implementation, and effects Past campaigns were launched by the CCP to mobilise the Chinese people to par-ticipate in its political and economic programmes Such a mass campaign usu-ally consisted of a series of organised, planned actions for a particular purpose

An ad hoc command organisation was usually created for each campaign, and a large number of people were mobilised to engage in highly visible, intensive, and concentrated activities (Liu 1971; Cell 1983) To some degree all campaigns had the function of creating a new value system As for the stages of the campaign,

it went from mation—review (Liu 1971) This was true of the last large-scale mass campaign appealing to people’s patriotic sentiments during the pre-reform era that followed the crisis incurred by the failure of the Great Leap Forward, for the government was attempting to stabilise the population (Liu 1971)

decision—announcement—transmission—fermentation—legiti-As for the effects of past campaigns and why they were effective, the tions offered by Liu (1971) included the inadequacy of the mass media, the abun-dance of popular enthusiasm, and the absence of other political, economic, and cultural institutions that would enable the people to participate in the new nation

explana-In other words, mass campaigns were the main avenue by which people could participate in the nation Today, however, multitudes of other media are compet-ing with mass campaigns as channels of information, possibly with rivalling mes-sages This may affect the effects of the campaigns

Liu (1971) thus captures the long-term effects of mass campaigns: ing a mass political language, creating a mass experience of organisation and co-ordinated action, the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialisation and behaviour While this study does not surmise on the long-term effects of the campaigns studied, past conclusions still help to shed light on current perceptions of effects.

disseminat-We may borrow, however, Cell (1977)’s definition of mass mobilisation paigns in China as an organised mobilisation of collective action aimed at trans-forming thought patterns, class/power relationships, and/or economic institutions and productivity He stresses that such campaigns were part and parcel of China’s development strategy, and that at the core of China’s developmental goals was the commitment to decreasing inequality This invites second thought on the current situation, when the explicit Party policy under Deng Xiaoping’s guideline is to prosper part of the population first, which inevitably widens the gap of inequality.This study looks into the extent to which national events might serve the func-tion of a temporary “equaliser” that each individual feels equally related to the nation

cam-2.2 Theoretical Horizons of the Study

2.2.1 An Overview of Prospect

A major assumption underlying the above reviewed literature is that in order to spiritually integrate a nation for fulfilment of a development goal, mass mobilisa-tion is a must

Writings on nation building, mass mobilisation, and communication for national development have been drawn upon as conceptual resources for possi-ble explanations of China’s effort at national integration, contributing to the con-struction of a new or refined perspective of the role of communication in national integration Fundamental definitions such as nation, patriotism, integration will be derived from analysis of empirical data, modifying the commonsensical version presented in the preceding chapter

A primary argument that serves as the peg of this study is that at a time when the once popular regard for ideologies is completely giving way to pursuit of material gains, national integration can no longer be imposed through the use of ideological pressure It has to be achieved on different grounds and levels, mostly

in the spiritual spheres of national life When coercive measures have fallen out of public favour, communication will logically play a more important role in national integration This study seeks to capture and picture that role in the context of national campaigns

To buttress this argument, a reference should be made to the pre-1949 Communist revolution era when the ideal of emancipating the masses from

economic oppression was the fuel with which the propaganda machinery charged the population to mobilise them for united action against the foe of the Communist Party Surely, the word ideal invites multiple definitions, but it may well be more revealing to view it in relation to ideology and image Following the distinction between “ideal” and “image” made by Boorstin (1961) in his classic work on the American dream, “ideal” in the Chinese revolution referred to a lofty goal pre-sumed for the benefit of the largest number of people, i.e providing for the mate-rial welfare of the masses Before 1949, it was literally an ideal, in that it had not yet been realised, which the Communist propagandists held up to encourage the people into contributing to the revolution by striving for the ideal.

Following the founding of the People’s Republic, endless political struggles on ideological grounds started During the ensuing three decades, an incessant sup-ply of ideologies and conflicts thereof was fed to the population, engaging the people in ideological warfare Was mass mobilisation attempted and achieved in this period? Theoretically, it is easy to distinguish this period from the pre-1949 period Excitation is a term that comes closer to representing the state of mass mobilisation at that time That is to say, an effect of propaganda and agitation was

to keep the entire population in an excited state, which logically made the thoughts and emotions of the people toward the government and the Party manifest in the turbulent wave of affairs, readily discernible by the leaders

Evidently, during the two eras captured in the above paragraphs, there was tle expressed concern on the part of the propagandists with what was “China”, or

lit-a sense of nlit-ationlit-al identity independent of politiclit-al lit-and ideologiclit-al identity Being socialist seemed more important than being “Chinese” It is perhaps fair to say that the primary source of each Chinese individual’s identity was ideological rather than cultural For example, most Chinese who grew up in the 1950s and 1960s would easily recall that their identity was either “successors to the Communist cause” or “Chairman Mao’s good children”, etc., rather than “Chinese” (e.g Wilson et al 1979) As for the matter of national image, the government was more deeply entrenched in the war against Western national images, e.g labelling the Western nations “capitalistic” or “imperialistic” There is little empirical evidence systematically documented thus far showing in what ways China actively sought

to project its own national image, or identity, for that matter

A possible unintended finding of this study is whether or not the chief thrust

of the patriotic education campaign under way since the 1990s can be categorised

as ideal-oriented or ideologically charged or image-based or overlaps of more than one of these In other words, after the failing of obsolete ideologies in China, which had been featured in the pre-reform political campaigns, what kind of prop-aganda model or machinery works at present—if there are any? This is a reflective application of Yu (1963a)’s observation that the best starting point for analysing a communication system is the ideology of the larger system

The time period selected for the main part of the study is 1993–1995, the first three years after China’s most recent policy of constructing a socialist market went into effect Disintegrative factors had always been at work through the fibres of the Chinese society at all times in history (Chu and Hsu 1983; Chu and Ju 1993)