Gas, oil and the irish state understanding the dynamics and conflicts of hydrocarbon management

Abbreviations xiJCCNRA Joint Committee on Communications, Natural Resources and Agriculture, also referred to as the Oireachtas Committee MCC Mayo County Council MPE Ministry of Petroleu

Gas, oil and the Irish state

Gas, oil and the Irish state

Understanding the dynamics and conflicts

of hydrocarbon management

Amanda Slevin

Manchester University Press

The right of Amanda Slevin to be identified as the author of this work has been

asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 Published by Manchester University Press

Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA

www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for

ISBN 978 1 784 99274 3 hardback

First published 2016

The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Typeset by Out of House Publishing

Part I: The Corrib gas project 7

1 Politics and pipelines: emergence of the Corrib gas conflict 9

Part II: History of Ireland’s oil and gas experience 45

3 What gas and oil? The early days of the Irish regime (1957–75) 47

5 A new millennium, a new approach (2000–14) 78

Part III: Ireland in a global context 97

6 Global trends in state resource management 99

7 Ireland’s licensing regime in an international context 117

8 Norway and Ireland: too different to compare? 130

Part IV: Ireland’s approach – analysis, consequences

10 Consent, coercion and consequences of the Corrib gas conflict 187

11 Back to the future? Towards a new model for Ireland 195

Figures

1 Map of the area, from Centre for Public Inquiry (2005) ‘The great

Corrib gas controversy’ Dublin: Centre for Public Inquiry

2 Government take for oil, from Johnston, D. (2008) ‘Changing

fiscal landscape.’ Journal of World Energy Law and Business,

Tables

2 Summary of changes to Ireland’s licensing system (1959–2014) 90

3 Wells drilled offshore and onshore Ireland (1959–2012) 92

7 Trends in trade union density, Ireland (1975–2007) 171

Gas, oil and the Irish state is a book about different journeys – how the Irish

state developed its approach to hydrocarbon management; the diverse ences of a rural community in North West Ireland; Norway’s journey and how it diverges from Ireland’s; and, to a lesser extent, the path I’ve taken in researching these topics The story of how my research came to fruition is a long one, in-volving countless people who contributed in many ways, including Ted Fleming who saw potential and encouraged me to undertake this research as the basis of

experi-my PhD; members of the Irish Research Council who awarded me a uate scholarship to conduct this research; and Kieran Allen, an excellent PhD supervisor who guided, motivated and supported me through a challenging yet rewarding academic adventure Thanks are also due to friends, colleagues and staff in the School of Sociology, University College Dublin who provided invalu-able assistance, particularly my doctoral studies panel (Kieran Allen, Tom Inglis and Michael Punch) and Alice Feldman

postgrad-A significant number of people participated in this research and I am indebted

to you all By sharing your insights, knowledge and experiences you made this project unique, meaningful and worthwhile As agreed during data collection,

I have not named you all in an effort to maintain confidentiality but you know who you are and my gratitude for your contribution is beyond words I  am beholden to everyone who assisted me during data collection, including Mary Horan, Micheál and Caitlin O’Seighin, Des Brannigan, and Synnøve Hageberg and colleagues in the Norwegian Petroleum Museum (Stavanger) who facilitated access to their library My sincere thanks go to: the staff of Manchester University Press for bringing this book into production; Helge Ryggvite and Laurence Cox for insightful, helpful and thorough feedback; Frank Connolly (Centre for Public Inquiry) and Daniel Johnston (Daniel Johnston and Co.) for providing valuable diagrams for this publication

Acknowledgements ixI’m very fortunate to have some great friends and thanks to all of you who helped edit an earlier version of this book (particularly Kevin, Sinead, Andy, Aline, Sinead, Sam and Niamh) Thanks are due to friends who inspired and sup-ported me throughout the research and writing processes (Siobhan, Paula, Marty, Roisin, Necip, Cat and activist friends), those who helped put a roof over my head (Charlene, Andy and Maire) and work mates for their encouragement I am espe-cially grateful to Niamh, Veljko and Arnie for their wonderful friendship, warm welcomes in their home, and persuasion to nail things to walls which aided the writing process.

I’d like to thank, or perhaps blame, my dear cousin Kevin for my interest in this research topic Kevin’s life-long activism and his deep commitment to social justice has been a huge source of inspiration throughout my life My deepest grat-itude goes to my family for always being there – my parents Tommy and Marie, siblings Chrissy and Pauric, Noel, and members of my extended family including Michael, Karen and Eileen – thank you for supporting me through the hardest periods while helping me appreciate and celebrate milestones, achievements and everyday happy moments – my research would not have been completed without your love, support and encouragement

ABP An Bord Pleanála, the national planning authority

AIB Allied Irish Banks

AIOC Anglo Iranian Oil Company

bpd Barrels per day

CAO Compulsory Acquisition Order

CER Commission for Energy Regulation

CEO Chief Executive Officer

Co County

CPI Centre for Public Inquiry

CSO Central Statistics Office

DCENR Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources,

previously DCMNRDCMNR Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources,

previously DMNRDICE Department of Industry, Commerce and Energy, previously

Department of Industry and CommerceDMNR Department of the Marine and Natural Resources, previously

DICE and the Department of the MarineEIS Environmental Impact Statement

EMD Exploration and Mining Division

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EU European Union

GAO Government Accountability Office (US)

GSOC Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission

IDA Irish Development Authority

INPC Irish National Petroleum Corporation

IOC International oil company

IOOA Irish Offshore Operators Association

ITGWU Irish Transport and General Workers Union

Abbreviations xiJCCNRA Joint Committee on Communications, Natural Resources and

Agriculture, also referred to as the Oireachtas Committee

MCC Mayo County Council

MPE Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (Norway)

NBIM Norges Bank Investment Management

PAD Petroleum Affairs Division

POD Plan of development

PPT Petroleum production tax

PRRT Profit resource rent tax

PSA Petroleum Safety Authority (Norway)

PSC Production sharing contract

RPC Resources Protection Campaign

SAC Special Area of Conservation

SC Service contract

SDFI State Direct Financial Interest (Norway)

SFWP Sinn Féin the Workers Party

SI Statutory Instrument

SIPTU Services, Industrial, Professional Trade Union

SPA Special Protection Area

TD Teachtaí Dála (deputy), member of Dáil Éireann

1960 Act The Petroleum and Other Minerals Development

Act (1960), Government of Ireland

1975 terms Ireland: Exclusive Offshore Licensing Terms (1975),

Department of Industry and Commerce

1992 terms Licensing Terms for Offshore Oil and Gas

Exploration and Development (1992), Department

of the Marine and Natural Resources

2007 terms Licensing Terms for Offshore Oil and Gas

Exploration, Development and Production (2007), Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources

Acreage Sections of a state’s territory in which hydrocarbon

exploration or production is permitted; ‘opening

up acreage’ means a state has invited companies to apply for authorisations in pre-defined areas either offshore or onshore Ireland’s acreage (onshore and offshore territory) is divided into numbered blocks

An Garda Síochána ‘Guardians of the Peace’, the Irish police forceBord Gáis State body responsible for gas distribution

Bunreacht na hÉireann The Irish Constitution

Córas Tráchtála Irish Export Board (IEB)

Concession An approach to state resource management

in which a state concedes ownership of its hydrocarbons to oil companies in defined areas, in exchange for financial returns such as tax and/or royalties; similar to a licensing regime

Dáil Éireann The Irish House of Representatives, one of

two Houses comprising the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) The other House is Seanad Éireann (the Senate) Dáil Éireann is the House from which

Glossary xiiithe government is formed and members of the Dáil are known as Teachtaí Dála (TDs), or DeputiesDownstream Oil industry activities which include refining and

marketing of hydrocarbonsFiscal terms Economic components of the system adopted by a

state to manage the exploration, development and production of its hydrocarbons

Gardaí Members of the Irish police force are Gardaí

(plural); an individual member is a GardaGovernment take Share of revenue a state receives in remuneration

for the production of its resources May take the form of royalties, taxes, or other mechanisms for securing a share of revenues

Licensing system The resource-owning state grants licences and

authorises oil companies to conduct exploration and production activities If hydrocarbons are discovered and produced, ownership of the resources is transferred from the state to the companies in exchange for a pre-agreed financial return A modern version of a concessionary system

Midstream Activities such as transportation in the oil industryNon-fiscal Non-financial elements of agreements between

states and oil companies such as phases of a work programme, duration of authorisation, and commitments to drill wells

Oireachtas Irish Parliament

Production sharing An approach to state resource management in

which the state shares in hydrocarbon production Generally entails a sharing of production

(hydrocarbons or profits) between the state and oil company; some ownership and control of the resources may be transferred from the state to the oil companies upon production

Seanad Éireann Irish Senate

Service agreement Also known as a service contract; a model of state

hydrocarbon management in which oil companies agree to produce hydrocarbons as a ‘service’ to the state Ownership and control of the resources remain with the state and oil companies receive a set fee or pre-agreed share of resources in payment for production of resources

xiv

State participation State participates in hydrocarbon exploitation in

partnership with oil companies Can take several forms including direct state participation through

a national oil company; production by the private oil company with the state contributing financially and then sharing in the proceeds;

or carried interest, whereby the state’s costs are borne by the oil company while the state receives

a predetermined share of profitsTánaiste Deputy Prime Minister

Taoiseach Irish Prime Minister

Upstream Exploration and production activities in the oil

industry

‘Hail Mary full of grace the Lord is with thee … aaoohhh you’re hurting me, take your hands off me …’

‘Clear the road …’

‘Whose cops? Shell’s cops …’

‘You have no right to stop people going to work …’

As the sun rose over a narrow country road in Erris, Co Mayo (North West Ireland) in October 2006, these utterances were a small selection of those accom-panying the actions of Gardaí (members of An Garda Síochana, the Irish police force) as they dragged protestors from a sit-down demonstration in the middle of the road Comprising elderly farmers, middle-aged housewives, fishermen, teen-agers and political activists among others, the protestors were corralled at the side of the road, encompassed within a wall of fluorescent yellow police jackets From sounds of chanting and loud praying the aural backdrop shifted to crying and angry yelling as Gardaí physically held back protestors and waved through a convoy of vehicles that had been parked further along the road Carrying staff and construction materials, these trucks, buses and cars were bound for Ballinaboy and the site of the Corrib gas processing terminal – a hub for protests against the Corrib gas project since the jailing of the ‘Rossport Five’ in June 2005

As one of many protests against the Corrib gas project, the involvement of An Garda Síochána in that day’s demonstration served to problematise the state’s role

in the advancement of the development, provoking serious questions: if residents were so opposed to the Corrib gas project, why was the project going ahead? Why were Gardaí using force against Irish citizens to clear the way for Shell’s fleet? And, after five years of opposition to the project, how had it come to a stand-off between local people, the police and multinational oil companies?

Despite each stage of the Corrib gas development being vehemently tested by local people and their supporters, on 29 December 2015 Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources Alex White (Labour Party) granted Shell permission to operate the Corrib gas pipeline Rather than

fireworks marking the advent of a new year, residents were subjected to intense gas flaring on 31 December as Shell began to process gas in the Ballinaboy ter-minal Completion of different phases of the project correlates with worsening conditions for some of those opposed to the development, a number of whom were incarcerated in recent years Others have sustained lasting physical and psy-chological injuries as a result of their resistance Meanwhile some of those who support the project have experienced social isolation and other difficulties due to their position.

How did a rural region in the West of Ireland come to experience such wide-ranging, negative outcomes? This book offers some explanations and exam-ines the evolution of the Corrib gas conflict, revealing the environmental, health and safety concerns initially underpinning resistance It also highlights how the dispute exposed wider issues surrounding the Irish state’s management of its gas and oil Problematic elements of the state’s approach include the transfer of con-trol and ownership of state owned hydrocarbons to private companies; lenient fiscal terms which result in minimal economic returns to the Irish state; and the use of state and private actor coercive force against citizens As a microcosm of the Irish state’s approach to the management of its gas and oil, the Corrib gas project and associated conflict illuminate topics which go to the core of Ireland’s socio-economic composition and the functioning of its state This book offers insights into how and why the Irish state developed such a flawed model

Covering a time frame from 1957 to 2014, this book presents the first prehensive study of the Irish state’s approach to hydrocarbon management, span-ning three interconnected levels of analysis (micro, meso and macro) Examining subjects that are simultaneously empirical and ideological, historical and current, the focus of this book extends beyond decision-making processes within the state system to their impacts on people’s lives in communities Attention is paid to occurrences internal and external to the Irish state, leading to the identification

com-of specific factors that have shaped how the state manages its gas and oil

This book is based on primary and secondary data gathered through four research methods:  documentary research, interviews, observations and case studies Documentary research focused on policy, fiscal and licensing systems in Ireland and other countries, with attention paid to literature on state hydrocar-bon management and government take Interviews were a key method of data collection and I conducted interviews with thirty stakeholders from the spec-trum of interests surrounding Irish hydrocarbons (including politicians, civil servants, oil industry representatives, journalists and civil society groups, such

as those supporting and resisting the Corrib gas project) Within the book all research participants are referred to by pseudonyms to maintain anonymity, as agreed during data collection Observations were an integral element of data col-lection and I conducted observations at twenty key events, including: state and industry sponsored conferences on Irish hydrocarbons; the 2010 oral hearing

Primary data from this research are incorporated within every chapter of this book, providing the richness and complexity necessary to understand how and why the Irish state manages its resources in the manner adopted.

Overview of book

This book contains four integrated parts and each comprises a vital component

of Ireland’s story Part I focuses on the Corrib gas project and discusses the gence and escalation of the conflict in tandem with the diversity of opinions to-wards the development Consideration is given to efforts at consent formation juxtaposed with legislative changes that enabled the advancement of the project

emer-in spite of significant opposition While acknowledgemer-ing how the oil companies’ actions exacerbated the conflict surrounding Corrib gas, this part emphasises the state’s role via legal and policy frameworks and problematises the state’s in-volvement through policing, the judicial system and belated fora for community engagement I argue defects in the state’s model of hydrocarbon management ultimately laid the foundations for this ongoing dispute and suggest the state’s flawed approach has led to emergent controversies surrounding potential on-shore gas production by hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’) and possible near-shore oil production in Dublin Bay

The second part offers a contemporary account of Ireland’s oil and gas ence Comprising three chapters, this part traces the development of the state’s model of hydrocarbon management from 1957 to 2014 Empirical detail is provided on the design and implementation of Ireland’s licensing regime, con-textualised with reference to exploratory and exploitation activities, related eco-nomic and political events, and trends in state resource management globally Summarising key issues inherent to the Irish state’s management of its gas and oil, I  establish landmarks in Ireland’s petroleum history and reveal a consist-ency in the state’s approach despite changes in political leadership I also exam-ine more imperceptible occurrences and demonstrate how changes to Ireland’s model of hydrocarbon management reflect prevailing economic ideologies such

experi-as Keynesianism and neoliberalism, thus connecting the state’s approach with shifts in political economy, nationally and internationally

Contextualising Ireland globally is the aim of the third part which opens with

an overview of global trends in state resource management Offering a succinct history of the growth of the petroleum industry, chapter six outlines the emer-gence of four main approaches to state resource management globally (conces-sions, production sharing, service contracts (SCs) and licensing systems) An examination of those models reveals the interrelatedness of approaches taken by states and shifts in political economy globally One can see how different models are influenced by internal and external forces, for example, ideological and actual struggles over control and ownership of resources which are appraised in relation

to the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the liberal counter-wave’ (Ryggvik, 2010) that occurred in the 1980s

‘neo-Dominant approaches to state resource management are considered in an applied way in chapter seven through attention to their outcomes in the form

of ‘rent’ or ‘government take’ Utilising secondary data from international ies of ‘government take’, I emphasise how Ireland’s model of resource manage-ment is unique both in terms of it being a licensing system (used in fewer than half the countries with hydrocarbon production worldwide) and its low rates of government take (one of the lowest in the world) This chapter underscores the distinctiveness of the Irish model, raising further questions around why Ireland’s approach is quite exceptional

stud-Tracing the evolution of the Irish model within a global context offers new knowledge on the Irish approach Nevertheless, more comprehensive under-standings can be gained through contrasting Ireland’s model with that of another country Opening with a presentation of arguments against a comparison of the Norwegian and Irish frameworks for hydrocarbon management, chapter eight

uncovers some of the discourses underpinning industry, political and state bureaucracy perspectives on the two models It also reveals weaknesses in these standpoints and stresses the value of comparing both countries’ approaches as a mechanism for developing a critique of the Irish model The resultant appraisal begins with an overview of socio-economic and historical similarities between the two countries, progressing to a summation of the political, social, economic and ideological influences that moulded the Norwegian model This analytical structure is then applied to the Irish context and I articulate specific factors con-tributing to the Irish model of hydrocarbon management

In the book’s final part, I discuss how the phenomenon of Irish state carbon management has macro, meso and micro level impacts, is shaped instantaneously by global, national and local forces, and bears all the hall-marks and contradictions of a state functioning within neoliberal capitalism

hydro-I also outline the real-life consequences of the state’s model of hydrocarbon management as manifested in the Corrib gas conflict Chapter eleven brings the book to a close by arguing that Ireland’s approach to the management of its gas and oil is fundamentally flawed and, unless modified, will continue to

Introduction 5cause difficulties in relation to the Corrib conflict and other areas which face potential hydrocarbon exploitation Although Irish state hydrocarbon man-agement can be interpreted as an outcome of a state functioning within neo-liberal capitalism, the state’s approach has been moulded in particular ways

by specific factors Therefore, tangible elements of the state’s approach can be altered in order to eradicate weaknesses and maximise advantages for citizens

of Ireland as owners of the gas and oil

Given the real-life implications of the state’s approach and the critical theories underpinning this analysis of the phenomenon, this book concludes with a series

of empirically grounded recommendations around how the state’s model can be transformed to ensure lasting benefits for Irish society

The Corrib gas project

Politics and pipelines: emergence of

the Corrib gas conflict

It’s been a horribly difficult, desperate … damaging sort of project for the whole community up there For people from both sides and there’s all sorts of perspectives

up there, all sorts of different views

(Thomas,1 former Minister for Communications,

Energy and Natural Resources)

Ah sure Corrib is a disaster … for everybody … the people involved on all sides It’s

no good for anybody the way it’s been dealt with badly

(Andrew, supports the Corrib gas project)

The one thing on which supporters and opponents of the Corrib gas project can agree is that the project has become a debacle that has embroiled a rural com-munity in North West Mayo for over a decade Corrib gas was discovered in

1996 and its developers and some politicians originally presented it as a panacea for the socio-economic woes of the region Niamh, a retired school principal, recalled how the project was ‘presented first as the great good news story of the decade and it was going to change everything in the area It was going to reverse emigration, it was going to provide all sorts of jobs and quality of life, you know there’d be loads of stuff happening’ However, the reality of the project has had

an opposite effect and Corrib gas has become synonymous with social upheaval, remaining unproduced nearly twenty years after discovery

Early days of the project

On 15 November 2001 a petroleum lease permitting the production of Corrib gas was granted to a consortium of companies comprising Enterprise Energy Ireland (EEI) (45 per cent share), Statoil (36 5 per cent) and Marathon (18.5 per cent) As the first production lease granted in thirty years, Minister Frank Fahey described the petroleum lease for Corrib as ‘a milestone in Irish offshore exploration and production’ (Department of the Marine and Natural Resources (DMNR), 2001) Corrib was the most significant hydrocarbon discovery off the coast of Ireland

since the 1970s, and Enterprise2 and its partners were eager to bring the gas field into production The field was estimated to contain 870 billion cubic feet of recover-

able (sales) gas (Dancer et al in Wood Mackenzie, 2014, p.21)

The Corrib gas field is located approximately 90 km off the Mayo Coast and the consortium planned to develop Corrib as a subsea tie-back which meant ‘about seven wells will be completed and tied back to a central gathering manifold which will connect to the main offshore pipeline’ (EEI, 2001) With subsea technology development of the field would be ‘entirely underwater with no above water structures’ (McGrath, 2001) The developers planned to use an offshore pipeline

to transport the unprocessed gas from the seabed to Broadhaven Bay, where it would make landfall at Glengad Beach (the foot of Dooncarton Mountain).Once the raw, odourless gas was brought ashore, the consortium intended piping it from Glengad, through Sruwaddacon Estuary to the inhabited area

of Rossport, where the pipeline would again make landfall From Rossport, the pipeline would run parallel to Sruwaddacon Estuary until it reached an onshore terminal in Ballinaboy3 where the gas would be processed, odourised and trans-ported to customers through the Bord Gáis (state body responsibility for gas distribution) network of pipelines The onshore pipeline route and processing

Broad Haven

Sruwaddacon Bay Ballinaboy Site

R314

N59

Figure 1 Map of the area

Politics and pipelines 11terminal were central components of the companies’ plan of development (POD) submitted to the Petroleum Affairs Division (PAD, state department responsible for hydrocarbon management) as the basis for the development, production and processing of Corrib gas While the companies worked directly with the PAD to progress their plans for Corrib gas, people in the area began to hear about the project in an ad-hoc way.

Ted, a retired teacher later jailed as one of the ‘Rossport Five’, said the first notice of Corrib gas he encountered was an article announcing the gas find by

Mike Cunningham (former Statoil director) in the Western People around 1998

However, it was not until April 2000 that Ted gave more consideration to the ject, prompted by an informal plea from a ‘man in the Department of Fisheries’ who contacted and warned him ‘there was a study about to be done, an environ-mental study about to be done and unless someone from the area mentioned the in-shore fisheries that there would be no study done on the in-shore fisheries’ (Ted, former school teacher)

pro-Ted sent a note to some local fishermen advising them about the forthcoming environmental impact study and for the time being took no further action

A fisherman for over thirty-five years, Joe became concerned about the project after reading the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) – an outcome of the offshore environmental study ‘I went through a bit of it and it was very compli-cated so I sent it over to a marine biologist in the University of Southampton This biologist produced an independent report on the EIS which stated there was a cocktail of chemical from the outfall pipe going into Broadhaven Bay’ (Joe) This was of huge concern for Joe: ‘I’ve two sons involved in the fishing and I wanted that tradition to be carried on and they wanted to do it anyway, when I saw they were interested in fishing I wanted to protect it for them.’ Spurred on by these concerns and his desire to protect this ‘way of life’ for his family and others, Joe began asking questions about the project and in early 2000 co-founded the Erris Inshore Fisherman’s Association (EIFA) which later opposed the development in the planning process

A school principal in a primary school, Niamh had some prior awareness

of issues surrounding gas and oil due to conversations in the late 1990s with a former oil industry worker who had alerted her to ‘how awful the giveaway terms were’ While Niamh knew there were limited benefits to the Irish state from its gas and oil, she hadn’t been aware of plans for the development of Corrib gas – ‘I had only heard about it through word of mouth … I certainly would have checked public notices and local news [papers] … and it wasn’t in that.’

The question of public consultation and information provision was one Niamh put to the developers during the first public meeting held in McGrath’s pub in the summer of 2000 Niamh described this event as a ‘public presentation’, say-ing it couldn’t be described as either an information meeting or a consultation meeting as ‘it was really just showing us pictures’ The absence of mechanisms for

systematic consultation with the community, in tandem with growing concerns around the potential environmental impacts of the project, served to create an atmosphere of mistrust which was compounded by the developer’s actions fol-lowing this meeting.

Lack of consultation

Several local people articulated a sense of an outside entity being imposed upon this rural area and this sentiment appeared to grow as the project advanced Ted (retired teacher) viewed the summer of 2000 as the start of the ‘invasion’ The ‘in-vasion’ included gas company personnel frequenting local pubs, ‘buying booze for people and coming on with their models [of the project infrastructure]’ (Ted)

In Ted’s view, these workers ‘were putting on a display and their models and that, they were so completely out of place and they were so completely irrelevant to the area … the invasion has started but I found it so absolutely pathetic.’ When asked

if the company’s effort to build consent by approaching people in the tioned informal ways could be considered consultation, Ted answered ‘no’ The topic of consultation (or lack of) is a factor identified by most interviewees as contributing to the emergence and escalation of the controversy over Corrib gas.According to Charles, a consultant who works with the PAD, Enterprise ‘def-initely weren’t for talking to the locals about what was going on’ Worthy of note

aforemen-is how the state did not place any obligations on the companies to consult with those living in the area Aidan, a civil servant, explained that before companies submit an application for planning permission there’s ‘an opportunity … to in-formally, or from a developer’s point of view, to voluntarily be influenced’ This

‘voluntary engagement’ is at the companies’ discretion and they are not expected

to undertake thorough consultation with host communities Jim (an educational psychologist living in the area) suggests Enterprise ‘came in rather naively’ with

a view of ‘the local community here that being such a peripheral area it would be easy to sway the community to their way of thinking and that all that they had to

do was dispense some largesse around the place’

Jim felt the company was ‘quite cute really’ because they tried to get the Church on their side in the early days of the project, ‘I remember the priests talking positively about it, this new discovery of gas … in a very positive way

to their congregations … but … there wasn’t any sort of real consultation with the community.’ Given the influence of the Catholic Church within Irish society, the support of clergy for the project could prove important for securing wider

acceptance of the development Citing Nic Ghiolla Phádraig (1995), Share et al

(2007, p. 510) suggest ‘Irish Catholics continue to practice their religion and port their church’s political positions’ because of the Church’s power, namely in the form of ideological control and control of significant material, organisational and human resources Jim, however, dismissed the idea of priests consciously, or

Politics and pipelines 13unconsciously, trying to build consent for the project saying ‘there wasn’t any-thing malicious in what the priests were doing’ In Jim’s opinion, the priests ‘felt this was a real opportunity for Erris, an opportunity for employment, develop-ment and so forth … they welcomed it’ Nevertheless, ‘I don’t think the priests really asked the difficult questions at that stage and didn’t realise that there would

be difficult questions to answer and that … some real consultation and analysis

of the project had to take place before the community could give their assent or otherwise’ (Jim)

Explaining why he supported the project, Fr Adam, a priest in the Kilmore-Erris parish in Mayo (west of the Corrib gas terminal and pipeline), said he thought

it had ‘the potential to help social and economic development of this region’ However, this view was not shared by all the local clergy While he and other priests ‘had an interest in the issue and learning about it’, Fr Donal, parish priest for the Kilcommon parish (where the pipeline and terminal would be located), had ‘environment concerns … issues about pollution … where I live at home was beside Broadhaven Bay and we always had a lot of dealings with our surround-ings, our beaches, our inlets, our fishing’ Fr Donal later became an active figure

in campaigns for the terminal and pipeline to be located elsewhere

Within the wider Erris region, some people became interested in the opment because of the potential benefits it could bring, yet others were cautious about the project and the involvement of members of the Catholic Church Ted (former teacher) suggests Enterprise was ‘meeting the important people, the bishop, the parish priest … and the people in the golf club They thought that these were the people who had influence.’ Some interviewees regarded corporate engagement with local authority figures (including priests and business owners)

devel-as an effort to get the local elite onside, thereby helping to sway public opinion

in favour of the project Such a perspective is not unfounded as in Irish society

a ‘middle layer of teachers, priests, or local dignitaries’ can help secure the alty of people below them to ensure that ‘society’s rules’ are embraced by a wider population (Allen, 2007, pp. 243–4) However, in this case attempts to get local leaders and clergy onside, as a mechanism for securing widespread support for the project, were not very successful and as people began to learn more about the project, local opposition began to build

loy-Issues with the onshore terminal and pipeline

The issues for the people were, I  suppose, safety first of all, the safety of the project, the safety of the pipeline, the safety of the terminal … and it is adja-cent to Carrowmore Lake which is the source of all our water in Erris and cer-tainly there have been scares already in the early days with mercury and so forth And I think the risk to our water supply is probably the biggest risk we have and certainly over the longer period … so safety was one issue, the other issue

was damage to the environment and I  think the third issue was what benefit would it be to either this community or to Ireland as a whole? (Jim, educational psychologist)

Issues surrounding safety, regulation, supervision, pollution, potential mental devastation and questionable benefits from production of Corrib gas were some of the topics underpinning rising concerns and opposition to the project The proximity of the gas pipeline and terminal to homes, schools and local busi-nesses was also a cause of worry for local residents Upon moving to Kilcommon parish in 2005, Fr Donal became aware of how close the pipeline would be to some homes (70 m in places) and he recalled people articulating ‘difficulties they would have in having to live beside a high pressure, raw gas pipeline’ At that stage the anticipated pressure in the onshore pipeline was up to 345 bar, over four times the pressure of gas in the national grid.4 Opposition to the project had a more visceral basis for some people When talking about the first thing which concerned her about the project, Niamh replied ‘at the beginning, the very beginning, through the middle and at the end, is place It’s the tenet of place.’ This concern for, and connection to, her physical environment influenced Niamh’s response to the pro-ject While Niamh doesn’t live beside Sruwaddacon Estuary5 occasionally she’d drive past it and ‘it was sufficient for me to know that place was there, I absolutely loved it, always loved it … [a] place that is sustaining in itself’ For Niamh the loca-tion of the terminal and pipeline was problematic on environmental grounds and she was unhappy with the absence of consideration of residents’ needs

environ-The diverse range of issues articulated by people living in the vicinity of the proposed terminal and pipeline also included threats to a natural environment wholly entwined with a community’s sense of self and place As the chairman

of the first oral hearings noted, ‘the imposition of the development would nificantly alter the character of the area … it would form a dominant intrusion

sig-on the experiences, way of life, and pattern of activities of the local community’ (Moore, 2002, p. 155) The growing opposition on these grounds was exacerbated

by various ‘mistakes’

‘Mistakes’

Fr Adam, a project supporter, suggested Enterprise made some mistakes and

‘sought to rush the project ahead without proper consultation with the nity’ Recounting a conversation with Enterprise’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO)

commu-in 2001, Fr Adam said he’d emphasised a need to undertake more consultation with members of the community, provoking the response ‘we haven’t all that much time, the gas has to flow by 2003’

When interviewed by this author, that former CEO did not articulate issues around consultation and pressures to bring the project into production as

Politics and pipelines 15mistakes Rather, in his view, Enterprise made two mistakes The first was hir-ing an English company to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), which was a ‘really, really bad idea, that was really stupid’ Enterprise’s second

‘mistake’ concerned the company’s refusal to honour an informal agreement reached in the 1970s whereby oil companies would hire a certain number of Irish rig-workers when operating offshore Ireland Peter suggested that when Enterprise refused to hire Irish workers (and were under no obligation to do so) the Services, Industrial, Professional Trade Union (SIPTU) consequently ‘took on this whole “Enterprise are anti-Irish view” … that was a mistake and that created

a bad atmosphere in the press … about 1998’

Peter’s comments illustrate how some stakeholders viewed decisions like the two previously outlined (choice of company, conclusion of arrangement with SIPTU) as factors leading to the dispute, as opposed to fundamental issues sur-rounding location and absence of consultation with residents Nonetheless, appraising seemingly micro level occurrences can provide insights into wider power dynamics and struggles, for example, those between the oil industry and trade unions globally As Nore and Turner (1980a) point out, confrontations be-tween capital and oil workers are the most direct form of class struggle within the oil industry and, in the case of the Corrib gas project, Enterprise’s failure to preserve the acquiescence of a large trade union created difficulties as the project progressed Indeed, the description by some commentators of ‘mistakes’ as being the primary cause of the conflict, serves to minimise the dispute to a micro level

of individual decisions, detracting attention from meso and macro level forces which, as we’ll discuss later, are ultimately responsible

From Peter’s perspective, there were no questions of mistakes in relation to the location of the terminal and pipeline, which were fixed from the early days: ‘no-body puts terminals offshore … the terminal is in a perfect location … it was used

as a peat … research station all through the ’40s and ’50s … it’s not a pristine ronment’ Peter conceded the location of the infrastructure might be problematic for those living nearby, adding ‘it’s the same as saying if someone decided to build

envi-a fenvi-actory neenvi-ar your house you wouldn’t be henvi-appy with it, of course not Nobody

is ever happy about having industrial development near them but industry has to

go somewhere.’

Enterprise maintained its stance on the terminal, supported by the state via the PAD as the promoter and regulator of hydrocarbon activities When asked if the PAD had given consideration to alternative locations such as an offshore ter-minal, Charles, a consultant who reviewed the plan of development for Corrib, replied consideration had been given ‘but there wasn’t a good reason to change

it  …  because the plan was perfectly ok’ Aidan (a civil servant in the PAD), explained ‘the model of an onshore terminal was clearly the model that was going

to be advanced on the basis of it being seen as the safest model’ (for the oil panies as offshore processing is riskier) In addition to revealing a rigid stance on

com-the location, com-these interviewees demonstrated a belief that as com-the technological and engineering elements of the POD were satisfactory the project should go ahead, with little consideration given to the deeply felt concerns of those who lived in the vicinity of the terminal and pipeline.

With its decision made that Ballinaboy would be the site of the processing minal, Enterprise, and later Shell, appeared unswerving in its position, creating additional tensions in the community

ter-Planning permission for the gas terminal

On 30 April 2001, Enterprise submitted its application to Mayo County Council (MCC) for planning permission to build the gas terminal (six months before being granted a petroleum lease to produce Corrib gas) Even at that early junc-ture, the issue of project-splitting began to arise Project-splitting is a process whereby constituent parts of an integrated project are examined separately, rather than the project and its cumulative impacts inspected as a whole

Concerned with assessing the effects of public and private projects on the ronment, EU Directive 2014/52/EU (22) states: ‘in order to ensure a high level of protection of the environment and human health, screening procedures and en-vironmental impact assessments should take account of the impact of the whole project in question, including, where relevant, its subsurface and underground, during the construction, operational and, where relevant, demolition phases’ This was not the case with Corrib as the offshore infrastructure, offshore section

envi-of the gas pipeline, onshore section envi-of the pipeline and the onshore gas processing terminal were examined separately, and by different bodies in some cases This meant the cumulative impacts of the entire project were not scrutinised

In 2001 Enterprise sought planning permission for the gas terminal, separate from the onshore section of the gas pipeline even though the pipeline was a key part of the project infrastructure and necessary to transport the gas to the ter-minal Permission for the pipeline’s offshore section and other necessary authori-sations6 were later sought from different government departments

Local opposition to the project was becoming more vociferous and several objections to planning permission for the terminal were submitted to MCC Nevertheless, MCC’s Senior Executive Planner granted permission for the ter-minal, stating the development would not be ‘contrary to the proper planning and development of the area’ if the proper mitigation measures and conditions attached to planning permission were followed (Gannon, 2001, p. 3) Gannon emphasised the ‘strategic importance of the development’ and local and national government policies to justify her decision on the development The Planner did, however, acknowledge ‘the main impact of the proposed development is the introduction of a large industrial complex into a rural landscape’ and the mini-misation of impacts on the four designated conservation areas in the vicinity of

Politics and pipelines 17the site was dependent on the successful implementation of pollution control and run-off control measures (Gannon, 2001) She also referred to potential issues surrounding the proposed plan to remove large quantities of peat (over 600,000 cubic metres) and fill during construction.

MCC granted permission for the gas terminal subject to sixty-six conditions but residents immediately appealed this decision to the national planning au-thority An Bord Pleanála (ABP) A two-week oral hearing ensued, chaired by ABP Senior Planning Inspector Kevin Moore

The first oral hearing

The first oral hearing on the gas terminal was held from 18 February to 1 March

2002, featuring submissions from Enterprise, local residents and other observers Following the hearing, ABP Senior Planning Inspector Kevin Moore produced a comprehensive report on the event and detailed the main issues inherent to the proposed gas terminal A key issue was the ‘development concept’ for producing Corrib gas and the socio-economic, ecological, cultural, health and safety, visual, public safety, tourism and traffic impacts of the project

Project-splitting was another fundamental problem for Moore and he referred

to ABP’s limitations ABP was restricted to assessing the proposal for the terminal and not other components such as the method of production (which impacted on the location of processing facilities), or the offshore and onshore sections of the gas pipeline Moore also discussed the fragmentation of responsibilities between government departments and Acts, particularly the Environmental Protection Agency Act (1992) which precluded ‘the Board from considering appeals re-lating to the risk of environmental pollution from an activity which requires an Integrated Pollution Control Licence’ (Moore, 2002, pp. 167–8) This meant ABP could not consider particular elements of environmental risks as this was the responsibility of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which allocates Integrated Pollution Control Licences

In a scathing report, Moore challenged the very basis upon which MCC granted planning permission and stated there was no immediate need for the exploitation

of Corrib gas as Ireland’s energy needs were met by production from Kinsale and supplies from the UK (2002, pp. 57–9) He questioned anticipated gains from the project, arguing it would bring limited benefits to the ‘disadvantaged region’ whilst Corrib gas would ‘be wholly used outside’ the area, providing security of

supply for the Cork-Dublin gas distribution system (ibid.) Meanwhile, the state,

through Bord Gáis, would bear the cost of laying the pipeline connecting Corrib gas from the terminal to the main distribution network in Galway

Moore was particularly critical of the ‘development concept’ at the core of the project (Enterprise’s choice of subsea technology to produce the gas offshore7)

as it determined how far the unprocessed gas could be transported (the further the distance from wellhead to the processing site, the higher the risks), which

in turn influenced the proximity of an onshore terminal to the wellhead Moore advocated thorough investigation of other options, favouring gas processing on

a shallow water platform with the gas piped to an onshore reception terminal

As processed gas can be transported longer distances, locations other than Ballinaboy could be chosen for the reception terminal with a reception terminal posing lower health, safety and environmental risks than an onshore processing terminal

Arguing the proposed development ‘defies any rational understanding of the term “sustainability” ’ (2002, p. 167), Moore recommended that planning permis-sion for the terminal be refused Moore stressed the development of the terminal

at that time and in that form was not of ‘national strategic importance’, adding

‘there is no merit in permitting this large industrial development on the wrong site’ Furthermore, ‘it is critically important to apply the best development con-cept and to seek out a terminal site that minimised such adverse environmental impacts that would arise with the current development proposal’ (Moore, 2002,

pp 167–8)

Grounds for refusal

Concluding ‘the current proposed site is unequivocally an incorrect choice’ and

‘the proposed development would be contrary to the proper planning and

de-velopment of the area’, Moore (ibid.) recommended the refusal of planning

per-mission on six grounds, which included: the utilisation of benefits from the gas would primarily occur outside Co Mayo; the onshore siting of the terminal did not constitute the optimum solution or orderly development; and the develop-ment would be situated in an ‘unspoilt, rural setting of scenic and ecological value’ which lacked public services and essential facilities Moore was concerned about the ‘unacceptable risk to members of the public’ posed by the proximity of the development close to residential properties and areas of public use He also articulated issues around the site development works, particularly the excavation and movement of peat, which meant the proposed development would ‘endanger the health and safety of the general public in the vicinity of the site, seriously in-jure the amenities of the property in the vicinity, and adversely affect the use of the regional road’

The sixth ground on which Moore recommended refusal of planning sion related to siting of the terminal (a ‘highly obtrusive development’) close to Carrowmore Lake (designated as an Area of Special Scenic Importance) which would ‘detract from the rural character and scenic amenities of this area of outstanding natural beauty and would interfere with protected views’ (Moore,

permis-2002, pp. 167–8) In Moore’s view, the development would seriously injure the

Politics and pipelines 19amenities of the area and would conflict with MCC’s policies and the Mayo

County Development Plan (ibid.).

Following Moore’s report (30 May 2002), ABP deliberated the planning sion appeal and sought further information from Enterprise in relation to alterna-tives, peat stability, visual impact and health and safety The Board requested that the developer pay attention to possibilities for a shallow water offshore terminal and an onshore receiving terminal elsewhere in Co Mayo, suggesting Killala/Ballina or Westport/Castlebar (urban areas with existing industrialised sites)

permis-Re-opening of the oral hearing

The Board’s request for further information led to the re-opening of the oral ing from 25 November to 10 December 2002, resulting in a twenty-two-day hear-ing – one of the longest in the Board’s history In response to ABP’s requirement for a comparison of alternatives, a letter from Enterprise’s new Managing Director Andy Pyle8 argued the Corrib field would only be viable if developed as a subsea tie-back Pyle claimed alternatives were not economically viable and suggested capital costs for other options could cost an additional €360 million and a 40 per cent increase in annual operating costs (Moore, 2003, pp. 197–204) A report

hear-by Enterprise discussed the possibility of offshore processing, deducing such a development concept ‘imposes greater risk levels on the workforce, has a signif-icantly greater environmental impact, requires €361 million additional capital,

and incurs higher operating, decommissioning and abandonment costs’ (ibid.).

Enterprise’s submission provoked a highly critical response from Moore who argued the company did not fully investigate alternatives, as requested Moore (2003) stated the company only compared two types of remote inland termi-nals (a processing and reception terminal) both of which would be situated at Ballinaboy and not other locations In its limited study, the company considered cost differentials between the original plan (unprocessed gas transported 80 km from the wellhead to landfall with an 8 km distance to the onshore processing terminal) versus the unprocessed gas being piped to a shallow water platform for processing (with this treated gas then piped to a reception facility at Ballinaboy for connection to the national gas grid) The company did not investigate other locations for either a processing or reception terminal nor did it properly respond

to the Board’s request for further information on alternatives ‘The applicant’s sponse completely avoided this comparison … the context of the shallow water option was clearly avoided … the dismissive response on the non-viability of the alternative [without in-depth study] was issued as the reason for a total avoidance

re-of the Board’s actual request’ (Moore, 2003, p. 208)

In a similar vein to his 2002 report, Moore’s conclusions and tions from the re-opened oral hearing took a strong position on the proposed development and he reiterated his difficulties with the company’s lack of sufficient

attention to alternative locations and development concepts He highlighted how the proposed subsea tie-back would be the second longest in the world (92 km) and focused on the applicant’s own evidence which illustrated that in projects similar to Corrib, the pipelines were all tied back to offshore processing plat-forms, not land-based terminals like the one proposed by Enterprise (Shell) In doing so, Moore emphasised the uniqueness of the proposal and stressed how ‘the developer has not proved that the alternative option [shallow water processing platform with gas piped to an alternative reception location] is unviable’ (p. 350).Furthermore, ‘the applicant’s own gas field to landfall studies and the earlier option to provide a dedicated pipeline to Dublin at the developer’s expense would indicate the available reserves in the Corrib field allow for serious consideration

of alternatives beyond that which is proposed’ (Moore, 2003, p. 350) As Moore pointed out, Enterprise had initially considered building a pipeline from Mayo

to Dublin to add Corrib gas to the national gas distribution ring as there were limited options for connection to the network elsewhere Concluding his report

on the re-opened hearing on the terminal Moore (2003, p. 354, emphases added) argued:

From a strategic planning perspective, this is the wrong site; from the perspective

of government policy which seeks to foster balanced regional development, this is

the wrong site; from the perspective of minimising environmental impact, this is the wrong site; and consequently from the perspective of sustainable development, this is the wrong site.

Arguing the development would result in ‘an unacceptable risk environment being imposed on the local community’, Moore stated there would be ‘serious disbenefits accruing to the community of north-west Mayo by the siting of the development at Ballinaboy’ and he recommended refusal of planning permission

for a second time (ibid.).

Informed by Moore’s reports, ABP refused planning permission for the gas terminal on the grounds of problems posed by peat excavation, movement and storage onsite (2003a) ABP ruled that the proposed peat repositories neces-sary to store 650,000 sq cubic metres of peat removed during terminal con-struction had a high risk of failure and would constitute an unacceptable risk

to the health and safety of the local community and the general public; would constitute an unacceptable risk of pollution of salmonid waters in Glenamoy River, Sruwaddacon Bay and Broadhaven Bay; and would seriously injure the amenities of property in the vicinity (ABP, 2003b) However, ABP did not accept Moore’s grounds for refusal on other grounds, namely visual impact, the devel-opment concept not being the optimum solution, and health and safety issues

In its concluding note, ABP noted that alternatives were available for the opment of the Corrib gas field

devel-Politics and pipelines 21While local people celebrated the refusal of planning permission for the ter-minal as a victory (Siggins, 2010a), the company did not let the decision get in the way of its plans for the Corrib gas field.

Plans progress, regardless of planning permission refusal

On the surface, the Irish state appeared as a distant entity bearing no bility for increasing tensions over the project even though the state was impli-cated by its functions as resource-owner and regulator It would later become clear, however, that the Irish state was taking an active role in facilitating the de-velopment of the project whilst those living in the affected area were challenging planning permission for the gas terminal

responsi-In 2000, amendments were made to the Gas Act to allow construction of pipelines by private corporations – previously only the state body Bord Gáis was permitted to construct gas pipelines The introduction of a number of Statutory Instruments (SIs) also aided the progress of the Corrib gas project:  SI 100 of

2000 saw Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Bertie Ahern transfer regulatory power and duties related to ‘upstream pipeline networks’ from the Minister for Public Enterprise (who had responsibility for Bord Gáis) to the Minister for the Marine and Natural Resources, Frank Fahey This separation in responsibility for gas pipelines meant the DMNR would manage upstream (exploration and produc-tion) pipelines), while Bord Gáis maintained oversight for downstream pipelines

SI 100 enabled Fahey’s Department to approve construction of the Corrib line by the gas consortium and, in 2001, Fahey introduced SI 517 to allow him

pipe-to grant Compulsory Acquisition Orders (CAOs) pipe-to permit private companies

to occupy land and construct a pipeline even if the landowners objected With these actions, the state sought to fix holes in its deficient legislative framework to facilitate the advancement of Corrib, thereby enabling pipeline construction on private land owned by people opposed to the project

2001 was a busy year for the consortium who bought 400 acres of Coillte (state forestry service) owned land in Ballinaboy as a site for the gas processing terminal, without having planning permission for the construction or opera-tion of the gas terminal on that site Furthermore, Enterprise, acting as oper-ator of behalf of the consortium, did not yet hold a petroleum lease to produce Corrib gas

Undeterred by significant opposition to the project and gaps in the permissions and planning processes, in April 2002 the Marine Licence Vetting Committee (MLVC) submitted a report to the Minister for Marine and Natural Resources en-dorsing the method of development (onshore pipeline and processing terminal) and Enterprise’s proposal for the terminal site (Moore, 2003, p. 197) Moore de-scribed the MLVC conclusions as appearing ‘to be beyond the realms of a rational approach to the planning of this major infrastructural development and exhibits

nothing short of prematurity … when the decision of the Board on the critical issue of where to locate a terminal has not been made’ (2003, p. 212).

Although the development concept for Corrib gas and the location of the terminal were being contested in the formal planning process (with ABP later refusing planning permission for the terminal) other arms of the state were sanc-tioning components of the project

Project-splitting and fragmented permissions processes

By 2004 approval for various elements of the Corrib gas project had been granted, despite the absence of planning permission for the gas terminal Consents in-cluded: the petroleum lease to produce Corrib gas (Petroleum and Other Minerals Development Act 1960; granted November 2001); construction of subsea struc-tures (Continental Shelf Act, 1968; 2001); export pipeline consent (Section 8 of the Gas Act, 1976, as amended; 28 February 2002); and consent for the construction of

a pipeline (section 40 of the Gas Act, 1976, as amended; 15 April 2002) (Johnston,

2004, p. 60) Although the consortium did not have planning permission for the terminal, Frank Fahey granted approval for the construction of the pipeline to transport gas to the contested site, exempt from planning permission (Siggins,

2010d), which illustrates the project-splitting inherent to the development.Approval for the plan of development for the overall Corrib gas project (Petroleum and Other Minerals Development Act 1960) was granted on 15 April

2002 and, a month later, a Foreshore Licence for the pipeline, umbilical and fall pipe (for thirty years) was granted under Section 3 of the Foreshore Act, 1933; 17 May 2002 (Johnson, 2004, p. 60) ‘It’s pretty clear that there was a need for an awful lot more joined up thinking about the permits and consents … this was setting a precedent because there was no legislation in place to deal with the distribution of gas … there was an exploration regime obviously, but even that … there was an awful lot of woolly thinking’ (Seamus, a Shell employee) Robert, a representative from the Irish Offshore Operators Association (IOOA), also shared concerns about the permissions processes, describing it as ‘extremely complex’, with ‘a lot of different agencies involved, some of which impose condi-tions which are contrary to those imposed by other agencies … you find yourself going around in a circle from one agency to another then … back, not where you started, but somewhere quite different’

out-The granting of the petroleum lease (November 2001) prior to approval for the POD (April 2002) is problematic as the award of a petroleum lease transfers control and ownership of produced resources to the lease holders (the Corrib gas consortium) and this agreement was made before the state had granted approval for how these resources would be produced and processed Against a backdrop of challenges to the proposed location for gas processing, which theoretically could prohibit the Corrib gas development, the state signed over rights to its gas to

Politics and pipelines 23private companies Furthermore, before the blueprint for all production activi-ties (the plan of development) was approved, consent had already been given for the construction of subsea structures and an export pipeline (consent was later granted for the various pipeline sections and infrastructure).

The PAD, as the specific branch responsible for state hydrocarbon ment, prematurely committed the state to agreements with oil companies without thorough consideration of how the resources would be developed or the impacts

manage-on communities and society Project-splitting remained a cmanage-ontentious subject for all parties and is a topic which would repeatedly arise Crucially, as PAD staff considered the POD to be adequate, it is questionable whether other permissions allocated by different departments could have resulted in fundamental changes to Corrib or its constituent parts In retrospect, it’s difficult not to view the project

as a fait accompli, particularly when one considers suggestions of political vention in the dispute

inter-Political intervention

While refusal for planning permission for the gas terminal might have halted some developers, Shell continued with its plans for Corrib, supported by some important politicians and staff within the PAD A sense of unease therefore sur-rounded connections between the consortium and the state, with accusations of political intervention in the Corrib gas project rife In his report for human rights organisation Frontline, barrister Brian Barrington highlighted Shell’s Committee

of Managing Directors’ concern about delays with the Corrib gas project in 2002, drawing attention to their recorded queries around whether they had ‘sufficiently well placed contacts with the Irish government and regulators’ (2010, pp. 15–16)

‘It is disconcerting that the recorded reaction of the Committee of Directors was to query whether they had appropriate contacts with the Irish regulatory authorities,

rather than appropriate compliance with Irish regulatory requirements’ (ibid.).

In 2003, representatives from Shell met with politicians including then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern (Centre for Public Inquiry (CPI), 2005) According to Siggins (2010a), four days after Shell met with the Taoiseach, an IOOA dele-gation, including senior executives from Shell, Statoil and Marathon, met with members of ABP Paul (a film-maker) maintained Shell saw the refusal of plan-ning permission as a ‘failure of project management … they didn’t see this as a flaw in their project, it was a flaw in how it was perceived’ Part of the process of rectifying this problem was having better contact with the regulators and the po-litical establishment, the ‘meetings with Bertie Ahern and securing … the U-turn

in planning for the refinery’ (Paul)

Although ABP chairman John O’Conner stated it was ‘wrong’ to infer that the meeting resulted in special treatment for the Corrib consortium (Siggins, 2010a,

p. 175), the subject has attracted much concern and is one that arose unprompted

in several interviews Stephen (a journalist) described the meetings as ter’, suggesting that when planning permission was refused, Shell demanded a meeting with the Taoiseach and the later meeting with ABP with the purpose of discussing ‘how to get around the obstacle of this inspector’s refusal’ (Stephen) From Stephen’s perspective, the intervention of the Taoiseach was an effort to achieve a particular outcome (planning permission) and is problematic: ‘it’s not proper or appropriate that any interest in a planning application would be meet-ing with the Board while an appeal is under way It’s completely improper … if that’s not an attempt to influence a decision, nothing is.’

‘sinis-Ken, a Fianna Fáil Government Minister at the time of these events, described the meetings between ABP and Shell as ‘a very serious issue’, yet surmised that his colleagues ‘Bertie Ahern and Martin Cullen were told that under no cir-cumstances could they go and interfere with ABP.’ Ken thought that when the companies asked if they could meet with ABP, they were told ‘ok … but what-ever happens between you and Bord Pleanála is your business’ Ken suggested those politicians took a facilitative approach by organising the meeting, without directly interfering in ABP’s decision Ken, however, did not rule out improper behaviour and in his view, if there is:

any allegation made in all of this … you follow it up, unless it runs into the sand

or is substantiated … if it is substantiated, fine then a serious thing will follow ther … or if it runs into the sand … [it’s] dropped … [although] there’s reasonable explanations that people don’t see it I always believe those cases, trying to follow it until you prove to the person that there’s no substance Or if there is substance you follow it up and then take action

fur-O’Donnell (2011, p. 73) recognised any suggestion of ‘governmental corruption and state collusion with Shell’ amounts to a serious allegation, yet cannot be easily dismissed To date, issues of political intervention in the Corrib gas project have not been the subject of a detailed, independent investigation

Second application for planning permission

In 2004, Shell reapplied for planning permission for the gas terminal in the same site in Ballinaboy, proposing the storage of 450,000 sq metres of excavated peat

on a separate site at Srahmore, 11 km from the terminal MCC granted planning permission on 30 April 2004, subject to seventy conditions In response, local people appealed the decision to ABP Although an oral hearing was requested, ABP decided to not hold one, explaining its decision was premised on ‘plan-ning history in relation to this proposed gas terminal and to the amount of background information available arising from the two previous extensive oral

Politics and pipelines 25hearings already held and the information provided in the planning application and the EIS’ (Johnson, 2004, p. 4).

Senior Planning Inspector Moore would not adjudicate the new appeal; rather

a Deputy Planning Officer, Inspector Johnson, was tasked with the duty and he recommended the granting of planning permission Whilst recognising the ‘sig-nificant disamenity, disruption and inconvenience’ to residents, Johnson con-cluded these impacts would be short-term and outweighed by the ‘importance

of the development and the real and potential benefits which it could generate’ (2004, p. 75) Shell’s new application for planning permission for the gas terminal was therefore upheld

Worthy of note is how Johnson’s conclusions bore little resemblance to those reached by Moore in 2003 Moore, it should be repeated, had serious concerns about the location being completely unsuitable on several grounds, including the lack of attention to alternatives; peat; visual impacts; and health and safety It is difficult to connect Moore and Johnson’s reports to the same project particularly

in terms of differing perspectives on the strategic importance, or otherwise, of the project, and the benefits and ‘disamenity’ to the community

In addition, Moore’s fears about project-splitting were being realised Moore had argued ABP should not be constrained by any decisions which may have been made by other agencies as to do otherwise would be to present the terminal development as a fait accompli (Moore, 2002, p. 167) If the development was al-ready considered a fait accompli, it would mean the interests of proper planning and sustainable development had been completely stymied and would ignore

the ‘wholly inappropriate choice of site for this large industrial complex’ (ibid.)

Moore also stated ‘the deliberations by other parties on elements of the Corrib gas field development, inclusive of the Corrib plan of development, should not undermine decision-making in the planning process relating to this gas pro-cessing terminal’ (Moore, 2003, p. 350)

However, it seems deliberations by other parties did influence ABP’s later decision-making Emphasising the support of different Ministers for the Corrib gas project, Johnson claimed it was clear from Ministers’ statements that government policy was to support the Corrib gas field and ‘the Board is obliged to have regard

to government policy, although it is not rigidly constrained by it’ (2004, pp. 28–34) Considering Moore’s articulated concerns on the issues of project-splitting, amidst the lobbying of politicians and ABP by oil companies, the impartiality of the new appeal and consequent decision-making is questionable Also concerning is ABP’s marked change of position as reflected in the change of inspectors, the new inspec-tor’s report and the decision to grant planning permission

With permission for the terminal now granted, Shell and its partners ued with their plans until 2005 when events began to take a turn for the worse