Chinas maritime silk road initiative and south asia a political economic analysis of its purposes, perils, and promise

Blanchard China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative and South Asia A Political Economic Analysis of its Purposes, Perils, and Promise PALGRAVE STUDIES IN ASIA-PACIFIC POLITICAL ECONOMY...

Edited by

Jean-Marc F Blanchard

China’s Maritime Silk Road

Initiative and South Asia

A Political Economic Analysis of its

Purposes, Perils, and Promise

PALGRAVE STUDIES

IN ASIA-PACIFIC POLITICAL ECONOMY

Palgrave Studies in Asia-Pacific Political Economy

Series Editor Jean-Marc F. Blanchard School of Advanced International and Area Studies,

East China Normal University,

Shanghai, China

Mr & Mrs S.H Wong Center for the Study

of Multinational Corporations, Los Gatos, 

California, USA

Aim of the series

The series aims to publish works, which will be meaningful to academics, businesspeople, and policymakers and broaden or deepen their knowledge about contemporary events or significant trends, or enable them to think

in new ways about the interaction of politics and economics in the APR. Possible candidates for the series include topics relating to foreign direct investment, bilateral investment treaties, multinational corpora-tions, regional economic institutions, technology policy, economic global-ization, corporate social responsibility, economic development strategies, and labor movements

More information about this series at

http://www.springer.com/series/15638

Jean-Marc F Blanchard

Editor China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative and

South Asia

A Political Economic Analysis of its Purposes,

Perils, and Promise

Palgrave Studies in Asia-Pacific Political Economy

ISBN 978-981-10-5238-5 ISBN 978-981-10-5239-2 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5239-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017952342

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

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Editor

Jean-Marc F Blanchard

School of Advanced International and Area Studies

East China Normal University, Shanghai, China

Mr & Mrs S.H Wong Center for the Study

of Multinational Corporations, Los Gatos

California, USA

This book is dedicated to my mother for her unending support for my

education and learning through all the years.

In November 2015, the Mr & Mrs S.H. Wong Center for the Study of Multinational Corporations (Wong MNC Center), a US-based think tank focusing on the political economy of multinational corporations in/from East Asia, and East China Normal University (ECNU)’s School of Advanced International and Area Studies (SAIAS) orchestrated a very suc-cessful international academic conference in Shanghai entitled “The Political Economy of China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative and South Asia” which gathered academics, consultants, and researchers from Australia, China, India, and the United States of America to present their latest research findings about and discuss topics such as the goals, imple-mentation, and implications of the MSRI.  Seeking to go beyond past treatments of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), which have often been subsumed within overly general discussions of China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, workshop participants focused only on the MSRI, examined specific country pairs like China’s MSRI and Pakistan, China’s MSRI and India, and China’s MSRI and Sri Lanka, and under-took deeper political economic analysis than most other analysts do The results of that conference are embodied in this book, which represents one

of the most in-depth contemporary treatments of the MSRI

There are many who merit acknowledgement for their contribution to the aforementioned conference as well as this book At the institutional level, I would like to thank ECNU and, above all, ECNU SAIAS where I currently serve as Distinguished Professor, for their financial and adminis-trative support for the November 2015 event and this multi-year project

on China’s MSRI. Beyond this, I would like to thank the Wong MNC

viii PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Center for its vital managerial, financial, and administrative support for this project, a topic which the Wong MNC Center Board of Directors imme-diately recognized has great importance to multinational corporations in and from East Asia and is pervaded by political economic dynamics

In terms of individuals, Professor Liu Jun, ECNU SAIAS Dean, was a vital backer of the aforementioned conference and from the get-go expressed ECNU SAIAS’s willingness to host it and contribute resources

I also would like to thank my colleagues Professor Zang Shumei and Ms Chen Jing who ably dealt with a slew of conference matters All the par-ticipants in the November 2015 event, many of whom are contributors to this book, deserve appreciation for their intellectual contribution and enthusiastic participation I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Yang Jiemian, former President of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, Ambassador Liu Youfa, former Consul General of the People’s Republic of China in Mumbai, Professor Feng Shaolei, former Dean of the ECNU SAIAS, Professor Zhang Cuiping, Deputy Director, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Professor Shi Yinhong, and Professor Zheng Yu for taking time out of their busy schedules to partici-pate in the November conference Special thanks are due to Professor Yang and Ambassador Liu for giving very informative keynote speeches Professors Colin Flint and Gregory Moore also deserve special acknowl-edgement for their yeoman’s discussant work providing content on numerous papers delivered in Shanghai Professor Flint also warrants spe-cial mention for his guidance on and involvement, as advisor, editor, and

contributor, in a special section of Geopolitics (entitled “The Geopolitics of

China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative”) in which a few of the conference papers appeared I look forward to opportunities to work with Colin in the future Finally, Dr Bas Hooijmaaijers, my new colleague at ECNU SAIAS and the new Assistant Director of the Wong MNC Center, merits kudos for his excellent work in assisting with the production process for this book I look forward to many years of collaboration in the future Ms Chen Yifan’s efforts in support of the production of the book are also much appreciated

1 China’s Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road

Initiative and South Asia: Political and Economic

4 China’s Strategy Towards South Asia in the Context

Xinmin Sui

5 The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

Jabin T Jacob

x CONTENTS

6 Sri Lanka, the Maritime Silk Road,

list of figures

Fig 1.1 Map of China’s Twenty-First-Century Maritime

list of tables

Table 5.1 Pakistan–China Bilateral Trade, 2005–2014 110 Table 7.1 Maldives trade with China, 1999–2003 186 Table 7.2 China–Maldives trade, 2003–2014 187 Table 8.1 Busiest container ports on MSRI route, 2013 215

© The Author(s) 2018

J.-M.F Blanchard (ed.), China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative

and South Asia, Palgrave Studies in Asia-Pacific Political Economy,

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5239-2_1

CHAPTER 1

China’s Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative and South Asia: Political and Economic Contours, Challenges,

of the Chinese mega-project known as One Belt, One Road (OBOR) It

is far from a foregone conclusion that China’s two ambitious plans will yield what Beijing wants them to deliver economically or politically or that both projects will be fully realized Regardless, it is hard not to be capti-vated by the two schemes given their immense scale and potentially trans-formative effects on power hierarchies, global, regional, and subregional institutions, individual countries, and multinational corporations (MNCs)

J.-M.F Blanchard ( * )

School of Advanced International and Area Studies, East China Normal

University, Shanghai, China

Mr & Mrs S.H Wong Center for the Study of Multinational Corporations, Los Gatos, California, USA

2

As well, top PRC decision-makers have made abundantly clear that OBOR

is a top Chinese-government policy priority.1

To date, scholars have provided background on OBOR, assessed its fit with China’s grand strategy, and probed its links to China’s energy security

In addition, they have considered OBOR’s implications for the PRC’s eral relations and global security, examined the economic issues associated with China’s schemes, and judged OBOR’s narratives Beyond this, they have opined on OBOR’s attractions, challenges, and significance.2 While the existing literature is useful in providing information about OBOR, it has diverse shortcomings First, there are few monograph-length treatments and most works speak to OBOR as a whole even though the MSRI and SREB have their own unique features, players, and obstacles, which necessitate separate, in-depth discussions To illustrate, China–India relations are a huge issue requiring detailed attention in studies of the MSRI, whereas China–Russia relations and Xinjiang are significant questions meriting extensive analysis in the case of SREB analyses Second, many studies neglect the interaction of politics and economics, even though they will be, and are, closely intertwined and OBOR will have political and economic effects Third, most studies overlook the role of subnational (e.g., Chinese prov-inces) and nonstate actors (e.g., MNCs) even though they are both objects

bilat-of the MSRI and SREB and shapers bilat-of them.3 In light of these limitations, the Mr & Mrs S.H.  Wong Center for the Study of Multinational Corporations organized a conference on “The Political Economy of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative and South Asia,” which was co-hosted with the School of Advanced International and Area Studies, East China Normal University, in November 2015 At the behest of the organizers, presenters offered papers related only to the MSRI and, moreover, narrow topics such

as China, the MSRI, and Sri Lanka, or the MSRI-Indian business dynamic.There are numerous theoretical rationales for studying the MSRI. One is that it can inform work on the political economy of national security which contemplates how economic forces influence state policies.4 Second, it can enhance our knowledge of the factors shaping China’s foreign policy and its implementation Third, it can provide a mechanism for appreciating how geography molds and is molded by foreign policy.5 From a policy stand-point, the MSRI merits analysis because it entails the creation of interna-tional organizations, the reconfiguration of the Asia-Pacific Region (APR)’s infrastructure, and closer political ties between China and MSRI partici-pants as well as a, potentially, greater leadership role for China.6 To para-phrase John Garver (see Chap 2), the MSRI and associated schemes, which

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consist of interlinked, intermodal sea-land corridors, mean China will no longer be trapped in East Asia because with its “application of modern transportation technology … age-old geographic barriers … are collapsing” and China will be able to interact at greater distance, more intensively, and

in a more sustained way than ever before.7 Turning to economics, we should study the MSRI because it will affect: aid; trade and investment flows; the growth rate of China and MSRI participants; and renminbi (RMB) interna-tionalization For businesses, it will raise new competitive challenges in the form of Chinese companies and “Chinese” goods going overseas

Acknowledging that the MSRI is a work in process and that many things can change as it unfolds, this volume offers several key findings, some already recognized and others less well appreciated One is that the MSRI has numerous economic and political purposes and that, on a related note, even if it does not have explicit political objectives there still are likely to be political consequences flowing from it Regarding the lat-ter, however, it is important to point out, as this volume shows, that the link between economic and politics is a contingent one and affected by numerous intervening factors Another is that China faces a number of serious political and economic challenges in bringing its ambitious venture

to fruition in South Asia These challenges include India’s ambivalence (and even opposition), the need to coordinate government ministries and subnational actors (e.g., provinces), the troubled economic and political situation in some of its partner countries (e.g., Pakistan), the immense amount of money needed, and the risk that a successful MSRI may breed

a backlash among partner and host countries Yet another is that nonstate actors in China, MSRI participants, and MSRI non-participants are an important part of the story of the MSRI in South Asia

The next section provides basic background information on the MSRI, delving into, among other things, its geographic features, its participants, and a number of actions China has already taken to advance it The third part of this chapter delves into the initiative’s putative economic objectives and the obstacles China will face in realizing them The fourth section considers the plan’s potential political goals and the challenges China will face in bringing them to fruition The fifth part provides an overview of the chapters in the volume and assesses what they have to say about the future of the MSRI and its potential political and economic implications

The last section inter alia supplies some summary remarks, highlights

various findings of interest to academics, business people, and policymakers, and identifies some potential avenues for future research

CHINA’S TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD INITIATIVE

4

In October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the idea of a MSRI during a visit to Indonesia.8 China’s contemporary MSRI (see Fig. 1.1 below) relates to the ancient maritime Silk Road that began in Fujian (a province in China) and connected to Southeast Asia through the South China Sea and then, via the Malacca Strait, Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean, to Europe, still the end destination of the contemporary MSRI. Unlike the ancient maritime Silk Road, news reports officials sug-gest that it is possible the contemporary MSRI may branch to various African countries like Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Tanzania and that the MSRI may have a branch linking it to the South Pacific Islands.9

The MSRI involves dozens of hard infrastructure initiatives on the land and sea as is well detailed in the chapters by Garver, David Brewster, Jabin Jacob, and Amitendu Palit, among others Specifically, it will entail the construction of hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of projects with dual civilian and military potential such as airports, bridges, pipelines and  power plants, railways, and roads Furthermore, it will include the

Fig 1.1 Map of China’s Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative

J.-M.F BLANCHARD

development of large industrial parks and special economic zones (SEZs) and the construction of factories and trade zones within these parks and SEZs Many expect the development of the MSRI will also witness large investments in shipping, communications, energy, commerce, tourism, information technology, biotechnology, and alternative energy as inves-tors try to take advantage of the opportunities flowing from it, and as it boosts economic activity in China as well as MSRI participant nations Finally, the MSRI will bring with it trade fairs, exhibition halls, and other structures that facilitate and support MSRI-related economic activity.10

It needs to be appreciated that the MSRI is not just about hard

infra-structure and that Chinese leaders seek the development of soft

infrastruc-ture, too President Xi has stated, “linking Asian countries is ‘not merely about building roads and bridges or making linear connection of different places … it should be a three-way combination of infrastructure, institu-tions, and people-to-people exchanges and five-way progress in policy communication, infrastructure connectivity, trade link[s], capital flow[s], and understanding among peoples.’”11 This soft infrastructure will or should entail various hard and soft institutions: accords on air travel and logistics, agreements to facilitate people-to-people exchange, bilateral investment treaties, policy coordination among MSRI participant nations, and structures allowing for the movement of capital, goods, and labor.12

Beijing has taken numerous steps to advance the MSRI which have involved leveraging its own financial muscle One was the establishment of financial institutions such as the $40-billion Silk Road Fund (SRF) and the

$50-billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which will fund infrastructure projects relating to the MSRI, SREB, and OBOR as a whole Another is to direct existing financial institutions to support the MSRI. In this vein, the China Development Bank (CDB) reportedly plans

to invest more than $890 billion in the MSRI and other OBOR tives.13 On top of this, in August 2015, China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) injected $90 billion into the CDB and into the Export-Import Bank of China (the China Exim Bank) to support the MSRI and other initiatives.14 Per the official Chinese media, Chinese financial institutions already have entered into a number of concrete finan-cial undertakings, with the China Exim Bank having funded more than

initia-1000 MSRI- and SREB-related projects in 2015 alone.15

Looking specifically at the MSRI and South Asia, China has pursued warmer relations with diverse countries such as Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka through various political and economic mechanisms To illustrate,

CHINA’S TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD INITIATIVE

6

in the case of Maldives, Srikanth Kondapalli (Chap 7) exhaustively details high-level civilian and military exchanges between the two countries, vari-ous formal bilateral agreements, and Chinese backing for part of Maldives’s key diplomatic agenda like measures to fight climate change.16 With respect

to Pakistan, China’s “all-weather friend,” Jacob reports (Chap 5) China has supplied it with billions of dollars of loans, sold it billions of dollars of weapons, and offered Islamabad precious diplomatic support, though not all of this is directly related to the MSRI or the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which connects the MSRI and the SREB. Turning to Sri Lanka, David J. Karl (Chap 6) writes China is funding hundreds of millions of airport and port projects, dispatching submarines to the island nation, and building infrastructure there Beyond this, China’s diplomatic and political interactions with countries such as Egypt, India, and Iran now regularly incorporate discussions about the MSRI and ways China and these countries can enhance their MSRI-related interactions.17

In terms of hard infrastructure, it is extremely difficult to isolate ects in South Asia that tie exclusively to the MSRI. Nevertheless, the chap-ters by Garver, Brewster, Jacob, Karl, and Kondapalli make manifest that the MSRI is linked directly and indirectly to various energy, transporta-tion, and other projects, ongoing or completed, in MSRI participant countries such as Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka As far as Maldives is concerned, significant activities include a prospective bridge, which would link the capital and the country’s international airport and for which a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has been signed, as well as China’s potential construction of roads in Male, the capital, coupled with

proj-an upgrade of its airport Noteworthy examples with respect to the latter two countries include China’s allocation of $46 billion for diverse airport, hydropower, pipeline, port, power-plant, railway, and road projects in Pakistan, and involvement in the multi-billion dollar Colombo Port City and Hambantota port and international airport projects in Sri Lanka

A key goal of the MSRI is to promote China’s economic growth by increasing its exports Beijing expects this export boost to result from the opening of existing or new markets (Chap 4, Xinmin Sui); the reduction

of tariff and non-tariff barriers; the slashing of transportation costs through improved connectivity (Palit); the vertical integration of trading activities (Chap 3, Brewster); increased Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI);

J.-M.F BLANCHARD

the construction of industrial parks, SEZs, and trade zones; and the MSRI’s spurring of participant growth.18 Furthermore, the MSRI will promote growth by helping China dispose of its excess capacity while con-currently easing industrial restructuring.19 Beyond this, Beijing feels the infrastructure associated with the MSRI will support growth.20 First, it will provide a foundation for China to sell more overseas.21 Second, the MSRI will energize networks of capital, services, and people that are key to economic exchange.22 Third, as several writers in this volume note, the building of hard infrastructure itself will generate prospects for Chinese companies and sale and service openings for Chinese firms

The MSRI also performs the function of giving China more profitable ways to use its massive foreign currency reserves, of which the vast major-ity are invested in low-yielding US Treasury securities.23 One way this will occur is that these moneys will go to Chinese financial institutions like the SRF, AIIB, and CDB, mentioned above, which, in turn, will lend money for MSRI projects These institutions (China) will not only make money from these loans, but the loans will also increase the likelihood that MSRI projects will be completed.24 On a related note, the MSRI will contribute

to Beijing’s effort to internationalize the RMB because MSRI countries and companies (including Chinese ones) are expected to increase their usage of it for debt issuances, swaps, settlement, credit insurance, currency speculation, trade pricing, investment, and trade financing as a way to hedge and reduce transaction costs.25

At the non-governmental level, Chinese businesses see new ties of all kinds flowing from the MSRI. They feel the MSRI will enlarge the market for their products and services.26 In addition, they believe the MSRI will ease access to production inputs, provide new financing sources, bolster the ability of Chinese companies to diversify their client base, and provide them with new opportunities to participate in consortia or joint ventures.27 The MSRI further fits with the desire of many Chinese firms to obtain increased opportunities for outward FDI (OFDI) to boost their profit margins, build regional production bases and headquarters, and gain brands, technology, and production knowledge.28

opportuni-Turning to specific companies, we see Alibaba looking to build, in nership with other public and private entities, a cross-border e-commerce platform involving logistics, financial services, and customs clearance ser-vices to promote goods from countries and regions along the MSRI.29

part-Similarly, IZP Technologies plans to set up cross-border clearing and ment systems, dual-currency credit cards, and finance small and medium

CHINA’S TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD INITIATIVE

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enterprises and trade logistics and marketing networks.30 COFCO, the Chinese commodity/food giant, believes the MSRI will give it greater opportunities to build grain and agricultural product supply chains.31

CRRC Corporation Limited, a railway company and state-owned prise (SOE), sees exciting possibilities in terms of selling trains, building trunk and light-rail systems, setting up overseas manufacturing, marketing exposure and providing services.32

enter-As Sui observes in Chap 4, the MSRI may help China by bolstering the economies of MSRI participants Many of them have significant economic problems, including poor integration with their neighbors, a lack of mar-kets, and serious capital shortages.33 Regarding markets, China, obviously, offers a huge one, especially for raw materials Looking at capital, China can make two contributions One is that it directly will help MSRI coun-tries develop their hard infrastructure.34 This may have multiple positive externalities For instance, as Jacob makes clear in his treatment of the CPEC in Chap 5, China’s contribution to Pakistan’s power infrastructure

is not just about boosting the latter’s energy capacity; it also is about enhancing Pakistan’s industrial capacity which, in turn, boosts its growth and export potential Second, it will lend moneys for infrastructure Third, Chinese companies will engage in OFDI, partly through greenfield invest-ments, and thus inject capital into host country economies This infra-

structure, ceteris paribus, will help MSRI participants boost economic

activity, spark investment by others, and fuel new kinds of economic ity Of course, if the growth prospects of MSRI countries improve, then China, in turn, gains new opportunities

activ-It will be immensely challenging to realize China’s MSRI. activ-It could not

be otherwise given the MSRI’s size, the number of massive infrastructure projects involved, and variation in regional financial, logistics, and transpor-tation systems Furthermore, Sui highlights that the MSRI will have to develop in an environment that lacks solid, extant infrastructure and legal institutions On top of this, the future of the MSRI will be closely linked to the economic situation in China and other countries We have many  reasons

to be positive about China even if it does not grow at the same rates as in the past It is far from certain, however, that other key MSRI participants in South Asia like Pakistan will succeed in surmounting their economic prob-lems If not, this undoubtedly will limit the progress of the MSRI. Regarding economics, it remains uncertain if all of the MSRI’s infrastructure projects make economic sense, with some, for example, expressing doubt if train-based systems really are more cost effective than ships.35 Brewster, Karl, and

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Palit point out in their respective pieces in this book that it is open to question if the volumes at MSRI “nodes” (e.g., ports or logistics facilities) will be sufficient or whether MSRI facilities and pipelines will be more cost effective or attractive than the alternatives, given domestic issues in host countries and the existing low level of trade integration, intensity, and net-working in South Asia (see Palit, Chap 8)

A major economic issue is that the MSRI has little chance of reaching its full potential unless India enthusiastically participates.36 Yet almost all the contributors to this volume seem skeptical this will happen Power, mili-tary, economic, prestige, and identity considerations and China’s close relations with Pakistan (see Jacob, Chap 5), coupled with the way China has gone about promoting the MSRI, have made India quite cautious about the project Indeed, Delhi has been adopting various measures that directly or indirectly counter or slow the MSRI. Examples include building better relations with MSRI countries such as the Maldives and Sri Lanka and active involvement in their domestic politics (see Karl, Chap 6 and Kondapalli, Chap 7), launching an Indian MSRI “equivalent” (Project Mausam), seeking better ties with extra-regional powers like Japan, build-ing up its own naval capabilities, and so on.37 Even if the Indian govern-ment per se was on board, Indian political parties have expressed strong, uniform concern about the project.38 Moreover, the Indian strategic com-munity has been voicing alarmist sentiments about the end goals of China’s MSRI, deeming it a scheme to balance against India, establish a “string of pearls” (bases) that would allow it to dominate the Indian Ocean and trade across it, and “cement Chinese influence in its near and extended neigh-borhood at the exclusion of other significant actors such as the US, Japan, Russia, and India.”39

One of the largest challenges facing China with respect to the successful implementation of the MSRI will be the actions of Chinese businesses, which often lack adequate knowledge of the cultural, social, and environ-mental contexts in which they will operate abroad, do not understand the political and credit risks they face, and are ignorant about foreign bureau-cracies, legal mechanisms, and regulatory procedures, as well as local part-ners.40 These defects plus each firm’s own selfish interests can cause businesses to take actions that diminish the appeal of the MSRI, disrupt efforts to complete projects, and waste financial resources Ensuring Chinese companies behave in accordance with Beijing’s wishes will not be easy given their number, the fact they will be operating far away from Beijing, and the fact that some are SOEs and/or otherwise have political clout

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Many argue that China is pursuing the MSRI to improve the security of its sea lines of communication (SLOCS) and, relatedly, its resource (energy and raw materials) security.41 With respect to SLOCS, the MSRI gives China alternatives to them by establishing routes through Pakistan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh through which commodities, energy supplies, and other goods can flow to China.42 Of course, resource security requires not just access, but also steps to ensure there is sufficient production of the needed resources In this regard, MSRI-fueled infrastructure develop-ment, MSRI-spurred investment (by Chinese firms and others) in oil, gas, and mines, and cooperation with MSRI host countries, should be quite helpful

as they will expedite certain resource projects and lubricate the completion

of projects that otherwise might not have been initiated/completed.Some believe the MSRI will facilitate China’s efforts to strengthen its relationships with MSRI participants and bolster its ties with other coun-tries.43 One reason for this is that the MSRI will promote a multitude of flows that could potentially bind countries together.44 A second is that MSRI loans, infrastructure, and the like have the potential to boost China’s soft power by showing it to be an economic and political leader and benefactor.45 This is especially salient in the case of countries like Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, which lack other avenues for aid, capi-tal, equipment, technology, or weapons One Sri Lankan official put it thus: “Who else is going to bring us money, given the tight conditions in the West?”46 A third is that the MSRI offers a counterpoint to what some countries see as China’s recent military assertiveness and helps Beijing

“‘convince countries … it is in their interests to accept China as the alpha power in the continent.’”47 Chinese leaders and elites have underscored repeatedly the potential of the MSRI to enhance China’s image and foster more cooperative relations with other countries.48

Many writers, including Garver (Chap 2) and Kondapalli (Chap 7), feel China backs the MSRI in order to achieve a role commensurate with its status and rising global power.49 After all, an important aspect of Chinese President Xi’s “Chinese dream” of the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” is China assuming a leadership role.50 There are those who assert the MSRI has more nefarious connotations, including helping China break American hegemony and seize the Eurasian heartland.51

Furthermore, the MSRI putatively will bind surrounding countries and regions more closely to China.52 Finally, the MSRI will allegedly help

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China diminish existing financial institutions like the Asian Development Bank (ABD) and the World Bank and undermine the standards that these and other Western-created and/or -dominated institutions advocate.53

China refutes those who see the MSRI as having malevolent aims It stresses that the MSRI, MSRI-associated financing institutions, and MSRI principles are not closed/exclusionary.54 Painting it differently, Chinese representatives underline the MSRI is “not a solo but a symphony” and that China’s initiatives are “open to all countries wherever they are” “‘as long as they accept the spirit of the initiatives.’”55 Palit (Chap 8) takes a neutral stance, but observes that China’s creation of China-centric insti-tutions and concurrent neglect of non-Chinese regional organizations raises suspicions

There are those who argue that the MSRI is a way for China to leverage its economic capabilities to realize strategic objectives.56 Beijing, though, has said repeatedly it is not going to leverage its economic might for politi-cal ends and that MSRI-related financial institutions do not represent any-thing akin to the Marshall Plan.57 Similarly, Sui (Chap 4) argues the MSRI

is a recognition of the fact that contemporary world politics is about nomics (which Sui terms a world of “geo-polionomics”) and that it does not constitute a nefarious scheme to empower China or ensnare its neigh-bors, but is rather a way to elevate the situation of those neighbors, which will help China economically as well as politically Yet, even if the MSRI is not a Marshall Plan involving any overt strategic goals, it can help China achieve such aims indirectly After all, China will be the key player in MSRI integration, hard and soft infrastructure- and institution-building, and exchange initiatives.58 Beyond these political benefits, the MSRI should give China some measure of agenda-setting power and deference since it

eco-is and will be its leader Finally, the MSRI will afford Chinese public and private actors diverse opportunities to penetrate the political and eco-nomic borders of MSRI participants

According to some, the MSRI has some country-specific political objectives For example, Garver (Chap 2), Brewster (Chap 3), and Jacob (Chap 5) see the CPEC and the MSRI, of which CPEC is a part, affect-ing the ability of Pakistan (and its neighbor Afghanistan) to deal with a myriad of economic issues which, in turn, can stabilize China’s long-time ally Furthermore, these schemes can transform the Sino-Pakistan rela-tionship from one that has been almost entirely military to one that does

a better job of serving China’s economic interests In the case of Maldives, China is attempting to solidify its friendship with a country that is strate-gically placed (Kondapalli, Chap 7)

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The MSRI’s realization will require China to address numerous political challenges The large number of MSRI actors and the plan’s scope and scale alone will present daunting hurdles Paradoxically, a successful MSRI will have the potential to create political challenges for China First, some companies and workers in MSRI participant countries will suffer costs from greater inflows of Chinese goods or firms, or increased competition

in third markets These costs, in turn, could generate political friction Second, some MSRI participants will be concerned about their trade defi-cits with China, and Chinese pressure on their industries Jacob (Chap 7) writes, illuminatingly, “in the case of the Sino-Indian economic relation-ship … bonhomie evaporated as soon as India’s trade surpluses turned into persistent trade deficits with China.” Third, resource-rich MSRI countries will worry about becoming excessively dependent on resource exports Fourth, MSRI participants will fear domination as they become economically bound to China.59 Fifth, a successful MSRI will open new routes for crime (e.g., drug smuggling and human trafficking), the spread

of fundamentalism and separatism, and environmental degradation.Another political hurdle to the MSRI’s successful realization is the fact China will have to obtain the approval of countries with vastly different or poorly developed political, regulatory, and legal systems.60 In some cases,

it will be quite daunting to get countries not only to buy into, but also to become meaningful contributors to the MSRI because of security worries, identity and prestige considerations, territorial and maritime quarrels, domestic political issues, or other factors.61 Indeed, some countries along the MSRI may take actions that affect its progress To illustrate, as detailed above, China’s progress in expanding into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and advancing the MSRI have pushed India to bolster its relations with MSRI participants like Sri Lanka, to build up its navy, to expand resource exploitation activities, to endeavor to enhance regional institu-tions, and to increase its maritime surveillance activities

Implementing the MSRI will be formidable even if all embrace the project After all, as various contributors comment, the MSRI will involve countries that have boundary conflicts with each other and China; have unstable leaderships, governments, and policies; and possess limited technocratic capacities For example, Pakistan is confronting a severe separatist insurgency in Baluchistan that is creating and will engender future problems for the implementation of the MSRI, as noted by many contributors to this book In Sri Lanka, leadership change has brought

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about project delays and cancellations, and, to some extent, changed the economic atmosphere between Sri Lanka and China.62 While Myanmar is not directly part of the MSRI in South Asia, the MSRI in its entirety includes Myanmar and infrastructure in Myanmar will link to China’s MSRI

in South Asia Thus, what happens in Myanmar has potential ramifications for the MSRI in South Asia. In this vein, it is worth highlighting that leadership turnover there, infrastructure construction problems, and border and ethnic minority issues have disrupted investment ties between Myanmar and China and are impeding the completion of certain projects.63

One obstacle confronting the MSRI is the coordination of Chinese companies Many take it for granted that Beijing “can completely override enterprises in making decisions” and force them to participate consistently, enthusiastically, and substantively in the implementation of the MSRI. Yet this is not necessarily the case Chinese firms, like businesses throughout the world, will be cautious because of potential low investment returns, a lack of host-country legal safeguards, and unfavorable commercial envi-ronments as well as sundry political and other risks.64 If Chinese firms are too cautious, though, then it will be difficult for the MSRI to reach its full potential It will be a political challenge for Beijing to gain full control over the investment and operating decisions of Chinese companies, espe-cially in the case of SOEs, which have a variety of tools that allow them to influence policy

A related problem will be the misbehavior of Chinese companies These firms will often be inattentive to the political dynamics in the countries where they invest or operate and/or may not be sufficiently conscientious with regard to the negative externalities that flow from their mining projects, infrastructure building, energy-extraction activi-ties, port and utility construction, and so on All of this has the potential

to, among other outcomes, prevent projects from receiving approval, stop projects midstream, and to turn MSRI participants or their publics against the MSRI or select initiatives Such dynamics have been seen in the case of non-MSRI- participant states like Cameroon and Peru and MSRI participants such as Myanmar.65 Beijing is well aware of these potential problems Illustrating this, in February 2015 Vice Premier Zhang said at a conference that it was important for Chinese companies

to protect the environment and be aware of Corporate Social Responsibility.66 Sui mentions in Chap 4 that the Chinese government is working to encourage its companies to behave in order to minimize the risk of a domestic political backlash in partner countries

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In Chap 2, John Garver focuses two historical lenses on China’s MSRI: one that examines it relative to past Chinese efforts to access the South Asia and the Indian Ocean (SA-IO) littoral, and another which compares

it to what other countries like Germany have done He details China’s construction of multiple railway and highway corridors linking China with countries in the SA-IO littoral He argues these corridors create powerful two-directional conduits carrying SA-IO region (SA-IOR) resources to China and Chinese goods to SA-IOR markets In fact, previously daunt-ing barriers such as the Tibetan plateau are becoming platforms for power projection Chinese initiatives build on efforts that can be traced back to the 1930s and 1960s, but its contemporary programs are quali-tatively different because they are powered by the previously unparal-leled capabilities of an ambitious Chinese state facing declining external constraints In Garver’s view, China’s programs are partially inspired

by a desire to grow its influence across the SA-IOR and overcome the tyranny of distance and difficult terrain that historically separated it from that region Garver points out that China’s use of transportation technology to enhance its national influence is not new historically, relative to what other countries have attempted, but contends that Beijing’s efforts mean the territorial sphere of influence of a truly

“risen” China will exceed that carved by China’s historic dynasties, with profound implications, as detailed elsewhere in this volume.David Brewster (Chap 3) enhances our ability to ponder the military- strategic dimensions of the MSRI in South Asia He notes that control over access to the Indian Ocean, whether by land or by sea, has tradition-ally been viewed through an intensely strategic lens He adds that the unusual geography of the Indian Ocean has long made it a relatively closed strategic space that could be dominated by a succession of extra-regional naval powers—most recently the USA—while land powers such

as China have largely been excluded from the region But China’s MSRI, involving the construction of new maritime pathways to and across the Indian Ocean, will likely alter the naval balance in the Indian Ocean and, perhaps, the entire strategic nature of the region such that the Indian

Ocean is no longer a mare clausum Moreover, whereas China’s previous

“remoteness from its Indian Ocean neighbors often helped give it the luxury of being able to avoid getting its hands dirty,” Brewster posits that China’s new interests in Indian Ocean ports and the development of new overland pathways have the potential to fundamentally change the nature

of China’s security role in the region More specifically, China may

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increasingly become a resident power in the Indian Ocean rather than just

an extra- regional power Still Brewster is doubtful that China can nate the Indian Ocean given its lack of bases, its long supply lines, and its limited naval capabilities, among other things

domi-In Chap 4, Xinmin Sui provides a history of China’s links with South Asia, which, over time, shifted to become more focused on and favorable

to Pakistan He also paints a portrait of China’s contemporary ties with various South Asian countries, which he labels a “patchwork of bilateral relations” and as non-reflective of any grand strategy towards the region; and of China’s stance towards various regional institutions such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Turning to China’s policies towards South Asia in the context of the MSRI, Sui contends China’s goals are economic, with Beijing seeking to enhance its resource security, find new markets, and facilitate the development of its West and South Asian neighbors He argues that China’s increasing naval presence

in the Indian Ocean is not about containing India or securing a dominant position, but rather about defending its resources and economic interests While Sui believes the MSRI will be beneficial to all, he recognizes there are a multitude of obstacles in the region and with respect to China, which may slow or obstruct its realization

Chapter 5 (Jabin Jacob) is the first chapter in this volume stressing a specific bilateral relationship, China–Pakistan ties, in the context of China’s MSRI and South Asia It focuses on the CPEC, which has its own history and existence separate from the MSRI, but also is incontrovertibly related

to it and has implications for Sino-Indian relations which, in turn, have ramifications for the development of the MSRI Jacob informs us about the historical and present-day Sino-Pakistan relationship, which has been and is

a long-term one of strategic political and military interdependence, as has been reaffirmed repeatedly by Beijing For Jacob, the launch of the CPEC under the framework of the MSRI and China’s OBOR scheme more gener-ally is a sign the relationship is graduating to become a more complex and multilayered one with economic facets, too Still, CPEC was designed to serve a number of political purposes for China such as bolstering its influ-ence in the IOR and stabilizing Pakistan (and neighboring Afghanistan) Aside from India’s major sensitivities about anything strengthening Sino-Pakistan relations, Jacob notes that impediments to the implementation of CPEC and the MSRI will flow from terrorism, corruption, and other political problems inside Pakistan and observes that the economics of vari-ous projects in the latter country may not pan out because of the attitude

of Chinese companies or the situation on the ground in Pakistan

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In Chap 6, David J. Karl examines China’s rapidly advancing ties with Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka’s relations with China in the context of the MSRI, Indo-Sri Lanka dynamics, and the challenges Sri Lanka’s internal situation may present to the realization of China’s scheme Sri Lanka would seem unworthy of Beijing’s attention, but, as Karl points out, the country sits

“astride shipping lanes that carry two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments and half of all container traffic.” Moreover, its “centrality in the Indian Ocean” makes it “a vital node” in the MSRI. India is attuned to these issues, too, and they coupled with other links between India and Sri Lanka suggest, to quote Karl, “the stage is thus set for Sri Lanka to become an arena of maritime competition and geopolitical rivalry.” India is in a disad-vantageous position, however, because of China’s superior capabilities Political changes in Sri Lanka have complicated China’s MSRI and other economic plans, but the reality is that Sri Lanka needs China because there

is nowhere else to turn Consequently, Karl believes it likely will be a erative partner in China’s MSRI scheme

coop-Chapter 7, penned by Srikanth Kondapalli, addresses themes similar to those of Karl’s chapter, albeit with a focus on Maldives As with Sri Lanka, China cares about Maldives partly because of the latter’s strategic position

in the Indian Ocean through which it imports hundreds of millions of tons of oil and exports hundreds of billions of dollars of manufactured goods Furthermore, an intensification of interactions with Maldives would benefit China and could help to advance the MSRI, which Kondapalli believes Beijing is pushing to bolster its sagging growth rates, expand its dealings with countries far and wide (which has both economic and political rationales), and address the US “rebalance to the Asia- Pacific.” In line with its growing relationship with Maldives, China has opened up an embassy in Male and initiated high-level political, economic, and military consultations with the Maldivian leadership Moreover, China

is deeply involved in infrastructure, maritime cooperation, and tourism in Maldives Kondapalli reports China has been making inroads into the Maldivian political landscape, too For its part, Maldives has embraced China’s MSRI and AIIB and also given China support on some of its regional initiatives relating to, for example, South Asian Associaition for Regional Cooperation

Chapter 8 (Amitendu Palit) is the most economically oriented chapter

in this volume, but makes quite clear that economic issues have political consequences and politics have economic ones In his chapter, Palit exam-ines some of the economic implications of the MSRI with a particular focus on its maritime dimensions and China–India economic relations

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Since China proposed the MSRI in 2013, businesspeople, government officials inside and outside China, and scholars have been spending an increasing amount of time contemplating the details and implications

of  China’s grand scheme and the details of the SREB and the larger OBOR.  While the number of studies has been expanding steadily, the extant literature is afflicted by various shortcomings including, most noticeably, a lack of focused analysis, no or insufficient attention to politico- economy, and a failure to consider the importance of subnational and nonstate actors This book surmounts these limitations in various ways One is that it focuses only on the MSRI. A second is that it looks at the MSRI in the South Asian context A third, related to the second, is that it has a number of chapters offering special insights on subjects such as China, the MSRI, and Pakistan, or China, the MSRI, and the Maldives A fourth is that it is highly attuned to the interaction of polit-ical and economic factors Finally, as the context warrants, the volume pays attention to nonstate and subnational actors

While this volume is not meant to be theoretical, it does have a number

of conceptual implications First, it shows that economic stimuli (the aid, trade, and investment associated with the MSRI) do not necessarily have positive political consequences for reasons such as, inter alia, the fact they can be negative, be offset by international or domestic political factors, or

be diminished by countervailing signals Second, it demonstrates that dents of Chinese foreign policy should not confine themselves to national

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security actors, issues, or tools, but pay attention to economic ones, too Turning to policy ramifications, the various chapters herein demonstrate that while the MSRI has potentially transformative effects, there are numer-ous, daunting political, military, economic, social, and other obstacles that China has to surmount before these effects will occur Thus, for many years yet, it seems one should be calm about the MSRI’s implications Furthermore, the chapters make clear that it is vital for China to bring India

on board to realize the MSRI’s full potential Finally, the chapters suggest there are many business and economic opportunities and challenges that will flow directly and indirectly from China’s MSRI, though the specific magnitude of these opportunities and challenges is not known at present.The MSRI, in tandem with other Chinese initiatives, has been seen by many as leading to a sea change in the world political and economic order;

as a “game changer” to quote one Voice of America news story.67 The ies herein indicate that many changes are afoot throughout South Asia and

stud-in regard to specific dyadic or triadic relationships and that Chstud-ina stud-indeed hopes the MSRI can help it achieve multiple political and economic ends Yet, they also reveal that there has been no transformation as of yet and that a significant change can occur only after China and MSRI participant countries have resolved many serious political, economic, and social issues, some external and others internal This, however, can hardly be taken for granted despite China’s political and economic weight and past successes

in realizing large-scale projects Moreover, other countries, schemes, and technologies will not stand still while China’s MSRI unfolds, making it even fuzzier what new world we will see in 10, 20, or 50 years It should not be forgotten, too, that China’s original Maritime Silk Road came to an end because of dynamics internal to China This, too, is a matter to which

we must be attentive and which will add to the uncertainty and excitement

of watching the MSRI unfold

noteS

1 Jeremy Page, “China Sees Itself at Center of New Asian Order,” The

Wall Street Journal, November 9, 2014 , http://www.wsj.com/articles/ chinasnewtraderoutescenteritongeopoliticalmap1415559290 ; and Charles Clover and Lucy Hornby, “China’s Great Game: Road to a New Empire,”

Financial Times, October 12, 2015 ; “Chinese Vice Premier Urges Closer Cooperation along Belt and Road,” China.Org.cn, January 16, 2016 , http:// www.china.org.cn/business/2016-01/16/content_37590431.htm

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2 For discussion and references, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Colin Flint,

“The Geopolitics of China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative,” Geopolitics 22,

no 2 ( 2017 ): 223–245.

3 The issue of subnational actors and the MSRI receives extensive attention

in Jean-Marc F Blanchard, “Probing China’s Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI): An Examination of MSRI

Narratives,” Geopolitics 22, no 2 (2017 ): 246–268.

4 An illustrative work is Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman,

Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy: Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations (London: Routledge, 2013 ).

5 For an attempt to do this, see the special section entitled “The Geopolitics

of China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative” in Geopolitics 22, no 2 (2017 ).

6 Shannon Tiezzi offers some similar observations in “The New Silk Road:

China’s Marshall Plan?” The Diplomat, November 6, 2014 , diplomat.com/2014/11/the-new-silk-road-chinas-marshall-plan

http://the-7 David Brewster remarks the MSRI and associated schemes mean that the

long-isolated Indian Ocean will no longer be a mare clausum, or closed sea.

8 Two years later, China promulgated an associated government White Paper

It is formally called the “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road” [hereinafter the “SREB/MSRI Vision”] and was jointly issued by the PRC National Development Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Ministry of Commerce on March 28, 2015 It is available at http://news xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-03/28/c_134105858.htm , among other sites.

9 Wu Jiao and Zhang Yunbi, “A New ‘Maritime Silk Road’ Called

For,” China Daily, October 4,  2013 , http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/ epaper/2013-10/04/content_17009583.htm ; Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s

Maritime Silk Road’: Don’t Forget Africa,” The Diplomat, January 29, 2015,

get-africa; Chen Jia, “‘Belt and Road’ Takes New Route,” China Daily,

http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-maritime-silk-road-dont-for-April 15, 2015, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-04/15/ content_20435638.htm ; and Ambassador Xu Bu, “Maritime Silk Road Can

Bridge China-ASEAN Cooperation,” The Jakarta Post, August 5, 2015 , http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/05/maritime-silk-road- can-bridge-china-asean-cooperation.html

10 T.K. Premadasa, “Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road,” Financial

Times, October 25, 2014 ; “China to Speed up Construction of New Silk

Road: Xi,” Xinhuanet, November 6, 2014 , http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/china/2014-11/06/c_133770684.htm ; Page, “China Sees Itself

at Center of New Asian Order”; “China Sketches Out Priorities of

‘Belt and Road’ Initiatives,” China Daily, February 2, 2015 , http://www chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-02/02/content_19464329.htm ; CHINA’S TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD INITIATIVE

20

Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “NPC Meeting Touts New Silk Road as

New Driver for Economic Growth,” China Brief 15, no 6 (2015 ): 1–3; and Chen, “‘Belt and Road’ Takes New Route.”

11 “China Pledges $40 Billion for New ‘Silk Road,’” The Japan Times,

November 9, 2014 , http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/09/ business/economy-business/china-pledges-40-billion-for-new-silk- road/#.VF_2KvSUdzM

12 Page, “China Sees Itself at Center of New Asian Order”; Charles Hutzler,

“China Lays Out Path to Silk Road,” The Wall Street Journal, March 28,

2015 , out-path-to-one-belt-one-road ; He Yini, “China to Invest $900b in Belt

http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/03/28/china-lays-and Road Initiative,” China Daily, May 28, 2015 , http://www.chinadaily com.cn/business/2015-05/28/content_20845654.htm ; “Air Transport Ties to Deepen Along Belt and Road,” China.Org.cn, July 19, 2015 , http://www.china.org.cn/business/2015-07/19/content_36093293 htm ; and “C.  Asia, Africa to Benefit Most from B&R Initiative: ITC

Executive Director,” CRIEnglish, May 31, 2016 , http://english.cri cn/12394/2016/05/31/4203s929463.htm

13 John Liu, “China’s Xi Pledges $40 Billion for Silk Road Infrastructure

Fund,” Bloomberg, November 8, 2014 , http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/print/2014-11-08/china-s-xi-pledges-40-billion-for-silk-road- infrastructure-fund.html ; He, “China to Invest $900b in Belt and Road Initiative”; and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “Prospects and Challenges on China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’: A Risk Assessment Report,”

2015 , 3–4, http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid= OneBeltOneRoad

14 Chen Jia, “Policy Banks Get $90b Cash Infusion,” China Daily,

August  19,  2015 , http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-08/19/ content_21643373.htm

15 “China Exim Bank Boosts Lending to Belt and Road Projects,” China.org.

cn, January 14, 2016 , http://www.china.org.cn/business/2016-01/14/ content_37578812.htm

16 PRC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China and Maldives,” http://www fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/ gjlb_663354/2737_663478

17 EIU, “Prospects and Challenges on China’s ‘One Belt, One Road,’” 2;

Daniel Balazas, “Monsoons on the New Silk Road,” Foreign Policy, June

23, 2015 , new-silk-road ; Zhang Yunbi and Wu Jiao, “Iraq Looks to Chinese

https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/23/monsoons-on-the-Companies for Rail Expansion,” China Daily, December, 24, 2015,

h t t p : / / e u r o p e c h i n a d a i l y c o m c n / b u s i n e s s / 2 0 1 5 - 1 2 / 2 4 / content_22790922.htm ; and “Spotlight: Belt and Road Initiative Boosts

Mideast Development,” Xinhuanet, January 19, 2016 , http://news xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/19/c_135024655.htm

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18 Page, “China Sees Itself at Center of New Asian Order”; Ji-Yong Lee,

“Political and Economic Implications of China’s New Silk Road Strategy,”

IFANS BRIEF, Winter 2014 ; and Xu, “Maritime Silk Road Can Bridge China-ASEAN Cooperation.”

19 Tiezzi, “The New Silk Road”; He Huifeng, “China Needs New Trade

Route to Future, Premier Li Keqiang Says,” South China Morning Post,

April 6, 2015 , http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1757174/ china-needs-new-trade-route-future-premier-li-keqiang-says ; and Lucio Blanco Pitlo, “Chinese Infrastructure Investment Goes Abroad,”

The  Diplomat, August 6, 2015 , http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/ chinese-infrastructure-investment-goes-abroad

20 “China Sketches Out Priorities of ‘Belt and Road’ Initiatives”; “Two

Sessions to Focus on Growth,” Global Times, March 2, 2015 , http:// www.globaltimes.cn/content/909845.shtml ; and Beauchamp-Mustafaga,

“NPC Meeting Touts New Silk Road as New Driver for Economic Growth.”

21 Liu, “China’s Xi Pledges $40 Billion for Silk Road Infrastructure Fund”;

“China Pledges $40 Billion for New ‘Silk Road’”; and Gordon G. Chang,

“This Is How You Blow $1 Trillion if You’re China,” Forbes, June 7, 2015 , http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2015/06/07/ china-blowing-a-trillion-dollars-on-its-silk-roads

22 Michael Spence, “China’s International Growth Agenda,” Project

Syndicate, June 17, 2015 , http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/ china-international-growth-agenda-by-michael-spence-2015-06

23 Liu, “China’s Xi Pledges $40 Billion for Silk Road Infrastructure Fund”; John

Kemp, “China Flexes its Silk Road Muscle,” The Japan Times, November 11,

2014 , http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/11/11/commentary/ world-commentary/china-flexes-silk-road-muscle ; and Lee, “Political and Economic Implications of China’s New Silk Road Strategy,” 15 This also is one of the purposes of the China Investment Corporation (CIC) On the CIC, see Jean-Marc F.  Blanchard, “The China Investment Corporation:

Power, Wealth, or Something Else,” China: An International Journal 12,

26 “Chinese Cosmetics Firms Shine in Mideast with New Silk Road

Drive,” China Daily, May 27, 2014 , http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ business/2015-05/27/content_20834245.htm

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27 Zhang Yuhe, “With New Funds, China Hits a Silk Road Stride,”

Caixin,  December 9, 2014 , 03/101012865.html ; Shannon Tiezzi, “What’s It Like to Have China

http://www.caixinglobal.com/2014-12-Build You a Port? Ask Cameroon,” The Diplomat, February 27, 2015 , http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/whats-it-like-to-have-china-build- you-a-port-ask-cameroon ; Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “NPC Meeting Touts New Silk Road as New Driver for Economic Growth”; “Beijing’s Belt and

Road Means Overseas Military Bases,” WantChinaTimes, May 31, 2015 , http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=201505310 00044&cid=1101 ; Huo et al., “Investors Embrace China’s Big Belt, Risky Road”; and “Belt and Road Initiative Opens Opportunities for Chinese

Gold Miners,” China Daily, October 23, 2015 , http://www.chinadaily com.cn/business/2015-10/23/content_22268061.htm

28 For a general treatment of the drivers of Chinese OFDI, see Jean-Marc

F. Blanchard, “Chinese MNCs as China’s New Long March: A Review and

Critique of the Western Literature,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 16,

no 1 ( 2011 ): 91–108.

29 Qiu Quanlin, “E-Commerce to Help Build Maritime Silk Road,” China

Daily, November 13, 2014 , http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/ tech/2014-11/13/content_18906835.htm

30 Dai Tian, “Big Data Conglomerate Dreams Big on Silk Road,” China Daily,

July 29, 2015 , http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-07/29/ content_21432401.htm

31 Zhong Nan, “COFCO Commits to Belt and Road Initiative,”

China Daily,  June 3, 2015 , http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ business/2015-06/03/content_20895016.htm

32 PRC, MOFCOM, “Chinese Company Invests in Malaysian Rail  to Boost  Maritime Silk Road,” September 23, 2015 , http:// english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/counselorsoffice/ westernasiaandafricareport/201509/20150901120981.shtml

33 Wang, “Closer Look”; “Experts Say ‘Maritime Silk Road’ Will Stimulate

Economic Potential of Developing Countries,” Xinhuanet, February 9,

2015 , http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-02/09/c_133981299 htm; Nicholas Choa, “Building a High-Speed Silk Road,” US News and

World Report, April 14, 2015 , http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/ world-report/2015/04/14/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-and- china-rail-network-worth-watching ; and Spence, “China’s International Growth Agenda”; and Sui’s chapter in this book, Chap 4

34 “Experts Say ‘Maritime Silk Road’ Will Stimulate Economic Potential of Developing Countries.”

35 Andrew Browne, “On Track or at Sea? Beijing Reopens Old Land Routes,”

The Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2015 , http://www.wsj.com/articles/ chinas-world-on-track-or-at-sea-beijing-r eopens-old-land- routes-1425371903

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36 Yang Jiemian, “Making the Maritime Silk Road a New Promoter of Cooperative Interaction between China and South Asia” (keynote speech given at the “Political Economy of China’s Maritime Silk Road and South Asia” conference, Shanghai, China, November 21, 2015 ).

37 Akhilesh Pillalamarri, “Project Mausam: India’s Answer to China’s

‘Maritime Silk Road,’” The Diplomat, September 18, 2014 , http:// thediplomat.com/2014/09/project-mausam-indias-answer-to-chinas- maritime-silk-road; David Brewster, “China’s Rocky Silk Road,” East Asia Forum,

December 9, 2015 , http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/09/ chinas-rocky-silk-road ; Liu Zongyi, “India’s Political Goals Hinder

Cooperation with China on ‘Belt, Road,’” Global Times, July 3, 2016 , http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/992047.shtml ; “Narenda Modi Changed India’s ‘Attitude’ towards Maritime Silk Road: Chinese Daily,”

The Economic Times, July 4, 2016 , http://economictimes.indiatimes com/news/politics-and-nation/narendra-modi-changed-indias-attitude- towards-maritime-silk-road-chinese-daily/articleshow/53042664.cms

38 “India Important Cooperative Partner in Silk Road Project: China,” The

Economic Times, October 20, 2015 , http://economictimes.indiatimes com/news/politics-and-nation/india-important-cooperative-partner-in- silk-road-project-china/articleshow/49472560.cms

39 See the chapters by Brewster (Chap 3 ), Karl (Chap 6 ), and Kondapalli (Chap 7 ) herein The quotation comes from Jacob’s chapter (Chap 5 ).

40 Wang, “Closer Look”; Chen, “‘Belt and Road’ Takes New Route”; Huo

et  al., “Investors Embrace China’s Big Belt, Risky Road”; and Blanco,

“Chinese Infrastructure Investment Goes Abroad.”

41 This is emphasized in Sui’s chapter (Chap 4 ) and also mentioned in the ters by Garver, Karl, and Kondapalli (Chaps 2 6 , and 7 ) See also Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Dispatch from Beijing: PLA Writings on the New

chap-Silk Road,” China Brief 15, no 4 (2015): 1–2; Shuaihua Wallace Cheng,

“China’s New Silk Road: Implications for the US,” YaleGlobal Online, May

28, 2015 , road-implications-us ; and Blanchard, “Probing China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative,” 255–256.

http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china%E2%80%99s-new-silk-42 Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Dispatch from Beijing,” 3; Philip Stephens, “Now

China Starts to Make the Rules,” Financial Times, May 28, 2015; and Spence,

“China’s International Growth Agenda”; “New Silk Road Ruins US Military

Plans to Impose Blockade of China,” Sputnik International, June 29, 2015 , http://sputniknews.com/business/20150629/1023998554.html

43 See Premadasa, “Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road”; Yang Jiemian, “Making the Maritime Silk Road a New Promoter of Cooperative Interaction between China and South Asia”; and Garver’s chapter below (Chap 2 ).

44 Xu, “Maritime Silk Road Can Bridge China-ASEAN Cooperation.” CHINA’S TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD INITIATIVE

24

45 D.S.  Rajan, “Indian Ocean in Focus: China-India-US Jostling for

Power-Analysis,” Eurasia Review, February 23, 2015 , http://www.southasiaanalysis org/node/1718 For a general discussion of issues surrounding the analysis of China and soft power, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Fujia Lu, “Thinking Hard about Soft Power: A Review and Critique of the Literature on China and

Soft Power,” Asian Perspective 36, no 4 (2012 ): 565–589.

46 See Karl’s chapter (Chap 6 ).

47 Page, “China Sees Itself at Center of New Asian Order.”

48 Xu, “Maritime Silk Road Can Bridge China-ASEAN Cooperation”;

“Chinese President calls for Asian Political Parties’ Support on Belt and

Road,” Xinhuanet, October 15, 2015 , http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2015-10/15/c_134717621.htm ; and Yang Jiemian, “Making the Maritime Silk Road a New Promoter of Cooperative Interaction between China and South Asia.”

49 Zhang, “With New Funds, China Hits a Silk Road Stride”; Mustafaga, “Dispatch from Beijing,” 2; Stephens, “Now China Starts to Make the Rules”; Cary Huang, “New World Order: Xi Bent on Securing

Beauchamp-Bigger Role for China in Global Affairs, Analysts Say,” South China

Morning Post, October 14, 2015 , http://www.scmp.com/print/news/ china/diplomacy-defence/article/1867576/xi-set-securing-new-role- china-world-affairs-analysts ; and Garver (Chap 2 ).

50 Ting Shi, “Xi Risks Road Backlash to Remake China Center of the World,”

Bloomberg, November 26, 2014 , http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ print/2014-11-25/xi-risks-silk-road-backlash-to-reclaim-china-as-center- of-world.html ; “‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative Will Define China’s Role

as a World Leader,” South China Morning Post, April 2, 2015 , http:// www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1753773/one-belt- one-road-initiative-will-define-chinas-role-world ; and Theresa Fallon,

“The New Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy for Eurasia,” American

Foreign Policy Interests 37, no 3 (2015 ): 141.

51 Ting, “Xi Risks Road Backlash to Remake China Center of the World”; Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Dispatch from Beijing,” 2; Choa, “Building a High-Speed Silk Road”; Michael Clarke, “Understanding China’s Eurasian

Pivot,” The Diplomat, September 10, 2015, http://thediplomat com/2015/09/understanding-chinas-eurasian-pivot ; and Fallon, “The New Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy for Eurasia,” 142.

52 Page, “China Sees Itself at Center of New Asian Order”; Mustafaga, “Dispatch from Beijing,” 2; and Fallon, “The New Silk Road:

Beauchamp-Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy for Eurasia,” 142.

53 Liu, “China’s Xi Pledges $40 Billion for Silk Road Infrastructure Fund”; Page, “China Sees Itself at Center of New Asian Order”; and Kemp,

“China Flexes its Silk Road Muscle.”

J.-M.F BLANCHARD

54 “China to Speed up Construction of New Silk Road”; Zhu Wenqian, “Tax

Plan to Support the Belt and Road Initiative,” China Daily, April 1, 2015 , http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-04/01/content_19973451 htm ; and “Chinese President calls for Asian Political Parties’ Support on Belt and Road.”

55 The first quote comes from Wang Sheng, “Commentary: Chinese Marshall

Plan Analogy Reveals Ignorance, Ulterior Intentions,” Xinhuanet, March 11,

2015 , http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/11/c_134057346 htm The second quote comes from Chen Boyuan, “‘Belt and Road’ Opens

to All,” China.Org.cn, October 19, 2015 , http://www.china.org.cn/ china/2015-10/19/content_36836016.htm

56 Tiezzi, “The New Silk Road”; Kemp, “China Flexes its Silk Road Muscle”; and Li Yonghui, “Constructing a Strategic Peripheral Belt to Support the

Wings of China’s Rise,” Contemporary International Relations 23, no 6

( 2013 ).

57 Wang, “Closer Look”; “Silk Road Not Marshall Plan: Scholars,” China Org.cn, February 12, 2015 , http://www.china.org.cn/world/2015- 02/12/content_34805640.htm ; and “Belt and Road Not Geopolitical

Tool, Says Spokesperson,” Xinhuanet, December 29, 2015 , http://news xinhuanet.com/english/2015-12/29/c_134962167.htm

58 Xu, “Maritime Silk Road Can Bridge China-ASEAN Cooperation.”

59 Zhao Minghao, “Silk Road Aspirations Face Complications from National

Squabbles,” Global Times, December 18, 2014 , http://www.globaltimes cn/content/897363.shtml

60 Zhang, “With New Funds, China Hits a Silk Road Stride”; Yang Jiemian,

“Making the Maritime Silk Road a New Promoter of Cooperative Interaction between China and South Asia”; and Shi Yinhong, “Belt and Road: A Searching for Strategic Rationale and Appealing for Political Prudence” (presentation to the “Political Economy of China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative and South Asia” conference, Shanghai, China, November 22, 2015 ) On these issues, see also Jacob’s chapter (Chap 5 ).

61 Christopher Len, “China’s Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road

Initiative, Energy Security, and SLOC Access,” Maritime Affairs 11, no 1

( 2015 ): 9–10; “Indonesia Says Could Also Take China to Court over

South China Sea,” Reuters, November 11, 2015 , http://www.reuters com/article/2015/11/11/us-southchinasea-china-indonesia- idUSKCN0T00VC20151111

62 Premadasa, “Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road”; Len, “China’s Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative, Energy Security, and SLOC Access,” 10; and Karl’s chapter (Chap 6 ).

63 Len, “China’s Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative, Energy Security, and SLOC Access,” 11–12.

64 Zhao, “Silk Road Aspirations Face Complications from National Squabbles.” CHINA’S TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD INITIATIVE

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65 Tiezzi, “What’s It Like to Have China Build You a Port?”

66 “China Sketches Out Priorities of ‘Belt and Road’ Initiatives.”

67 For the former, see Steve LeVine, “China is Building the Most Extensive

Global Commercial-Military Empire in History,” Quartz, June 9, 2015 , http://qz.com/415649/china-is-building-the-most-extensive-global- commercial-military-empire-in-history and Robert Berke, “New ‘Silk

Road’ Could Alter Global Economics,” USA Today, May 25, 2015 , http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2015/05/25/oil- price-dotcom-silk-road/27746785 For the game-change remark, see Ron

Corben, “China Silk Road Initiative Seen As Game Changer,” VOA,

May  19, 2016 , changer/3336984.html

New Silk Road.” China Brief 15, no 4 (2015a): 1–3.

Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Nathan “NPC Meeting Touts New Silk Road as New

Driver for Economic Growth.” China Brief 15, no 6 (2015b): 1–3.

“Beijing’s Belt and Road Means Overseas Military Bases.” WantChinaTimes, May

31, 2015 http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=2015 0531000044&cid=1101

“Belt and Road Initiative Opens Opportunities for Chinese Gold Miners.” China

Daily, October 23, 2015 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015–10/23/ content_22268061.htm

“Belt and Road Not Geopolitical Tool, Says Spokesperson.” Xinhuanet, December

29, 2015 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015–12/29/c_134962167 htm

Berke, Robert “New ‘Silk Road’ Could Alter Global Economics.” USA Today, May

25, 2015 http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2015/05/25/ oilprice-dotcom-silk-road/27746785

Blanchard, Jean-Marc F “Chinese MNCs as China’s New Long March: A Review

and Critique of the Western Literature.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 16,

no 1 (2011): 91–108.

Blanchard, Jean-Marc F “Probing China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road

Initiative (MSRI): An Examination of MSRI Narratives.” Geopolitics 22, no 2

(2016): 246–268.

Blanchard, Jean-Marc F “The China Investment Corporation: Power, Wealth, or

Something Else.” China: An International Journal 12, no 3 (2014): 155–175.

J.-M.F BLANCHARD

Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., and Colin Flint “The Geopolitics of China’s Maritime

Silk Road Initiative.” Geopolitics 22, no 2 (2017): 223–245.

Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., and Fujia Lu “Thinking Hard about Soft Power: A

Review and Critique of the Literature on China and Soft Power.” Asian

Perspective 36, no 4 (2012): 565–589.

Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., and Norrin M. Ripsman Economic Statecraft and Foreign

Policy: Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations London: Routledge,

2013.

Blanco Pitlo, Lucio “Chinese Infrastructure Investment Goes Abroad.”

The  Diplomat, August 6, 2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/ chinese-infrastructure-investment-goes-abroad

Boyuan, Chen “‘Belt and Road’ Opens to All.” China.Org.cn, October 19, 2015 http://www.china.org.cn/china/2015-10/19/content_36836016.htm

Brewster, David “China’s Rocky Silk Road.” East Asia Forum, December 9,

2015 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/09/chinas-rocky-silk-road Browne, Andrew “On Track or at Sea? Beijing Reopens Old Land Routes.”

The  Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2015 http://www.wsj.com/articles/ chinas-world-on-track-or-at-sea-beijing-reopens-old-land-routes-1425371903

“C Asia, Africa to Benefit Most from B&R Initiative: ITC

Execu-tive Director.” CRIEnglish, May 31, 2016 http://english.cri cn/12394/2016/05/31/4203s929463.htm

Chang, Gordon G “This is How You Blow $1 Trillion if You’re China.” Forbes,

June 7, 2015 http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2015/06/07/ china-blowing-a-trillion-dollars-on-its-silk-roads

Cheng, Shuaihua Wallace “China’s New Silk Road: Implications for the US.”

YaleGlobal Online, May 28, 2015 http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/ china%E2%80%99s–new-silk-road-implications-us

“China Exim Bank Boosts Lending to Belt and Road Projects.” China.org.cn, January 14, 2016 http://www.china.org.cn/business/2016–01/14/ content_37578812.htm

“China Pledges $40 Billion for New ‘Silk Road.’” The Japan Times, November 9,

2014 business/china-pledges-40-billion-for-new-silk-road/#.VF_2KvSUdzM

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/09/business/economy-“China Sketches Out Priorities of ‘Belt and Road’ Initiatives.” China Daily,

February 2, 2015 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015–02/02/ content_19464329.htm

“China to Speed up Construction of New Silk Road: Xi.” Xinhuanet, November 6,

2014 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014–11/06/c_133770684 htm

“Chinese Cosmetics Firms Shine in Mideast with New Silk Road Drive.” China

Daily, May 27, 2014 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015–05/27/ content_20834245.htm

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“Chinese Vice Premier Urges Closer Cooperation along Belt and Road.” China Org.cn, January 16, 2016 http://www.china.org.cn/business/2016–01/16/ content_37590431.htm

Choa, Nicholas “Building a High-Speed Silk Road.” U.S. News & World Report, April 14,

2015 http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/04/14/ asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-and-china-rail-network-worth-watching

Clarke, Michael “Understanding China’s Eurasian Pivot.” The Diplomat, September 10,

2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/understanding-chinas-eurasian-pivot Clover, Charles, and Lucy Hornby “China’s Great Game: Road to a New Empire.”

Financial Times, October 12, 2015.

Corben, Ron “China Silk Road Initiative Seen As Game Changer.” VOA, May 19,

2016 http://www.voanews.com/a/china-silk-road-game-changer/3336984 html

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) “Prospects and Challenges on China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’: A Risk Assessment Report.” 2015, 3–4 http://www.eiu com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=OneBeltOneRoad

“Experts Say ‘Maritime Silk Road’ Will Economic Potential of Developing

Countries.” XinhuaNet, February 9, 2015 http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2015–02/09/c_133981299.htm

Fallon, Theresa “The New Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy for Eurasia.”

American Foreign Policy Interests 37, no 3 (2015): 141–142.

He, Huifeng “China Needs New Trade Route to Future, Premier Li Keqiang Says.”

South China Morning Post, April 6, 2015a http://www.scmp.com/news/china/ article/1757174/china-needs-new-trade-route-future-premier-li-keqiang-says

He, Yini “China to Invest $900b in Belt and Road Initiative.” China Daily,

May  28, 2015b http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-05/28/ content_20845654.htm

Huang, Cary “New World Order: Xi Bent on Securing Bigger Role for China in

Global Affairs, Analysts Say.” South China Morning Post, October 14, 2015

cle/1867576/xi-set-securing-new-role-china-world-affairs-analysts

http://www.scmp.com/print/news/china/diplomacy-defence/arti-Huo, Kan, Wang Ling, and Wu Hongyuran “Investors Embrace China’s Big Belt,

Risky Road.” Caixin, June 17, 2015 17/100820036.html

http://english.caixin.com/2015-06-Hutzler, Charles “China Lays Out Path to Silk Road.” The Wall Street Journal,

March 28, 2015 http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/03/28/ china-lays-out-path-to-one-belt-one-road

“India Important Cooperative Partner in Silk Road Project: China.” The Economic

Times, October 20, 2015 tics-and-nation/india-important-cooperative-partner-in-silk-road-project- china/articleshow/49472560.cms

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/poli-J.-M.F BLANCHARD