Annual report on urban development of china 2013 (current chinese economic report series)

Wei eds., Annual Report on Urban Development of China 2013, Current Chinese Economic Report Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-46324-6_1 Overall Strategy for Promoting the Citizenization of

Jiahua Pan • Houkai Wei

Editors

Annual Report on Urban Development of China 2013

Sponsored by Innovation Project of CASS

ISSN 2194-7937 ISSN 2194-7945 (electronic)

Current Chinese Economic Report Series

ISBN 978-3-662-46323-9 ISBN 978-3-662-46324-6 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-46324-6

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The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Beijing , China

The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Beijing , China

citizenization in China Derived from China’s hukou system, or household

registra-tion system, that unfairly favors urban residents over rural ones, the inequitable distribution of benefi ts between institutionally favored groups and others, and between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies, for example, has resulted in advantaged groups and vested interests obviously wanting to maintain and cement this pattern while the disadvantaged groups and those whose interests are damaged are unable to change it

In China, cities can compulsorily purchase land from farmers at low or even no costs, but most profi ts from added land value are usually unavailable to farmers who rely on land for a living, generation after generation Assuming annual profi ts of one trillion yuan 1 from land trades and transfers across China, then China’s cities can absorb a total of 10 million rural migrants at the cost of 100,000 yuan per migrant

or 20 million at the cost of 50,000 per migrant Unfortunately, children of migrant workers in China are deprived of the right to compulsory education despite the fact that these workers pay taxes in their host cities and their employers pay the so-called

“city construction fees” and “educational surcharge” Payments to migrant workers should be able to cover basic expenses of the family In particular, they should cover not only the costs of necessities and the living support for dependents such as the elderly and the disabled, but also the cost of raising children In some cities, how-ever, the rights and interests of migrant workers are overlooked Local governments may go so far as to conspire with relevant companies to underpay and/or postpone payment to these workers Even some state-owned organizations offer unequal

1 Wu Jinglian noted at the China Development Forum held on March 23–25, 2013 that the Chinese government had earned 30 trillion yuan from expropriating farmland for urbanization, http://

fi nance.qq.com/a/20130323/001590.htm

opportunities and payments to employees depending on whether they subscribe to the aforementioned unfair institutional arrangements or not Decision makers in certain Chinese cities seem to believe in the theory of cost while ignoring that of rights or benefi ts in an apparent attempt to favor vested interests There are also think tank members who, despite their supposedly interest-neutral nature, employ biased methods and draw prejudiced conclusions Nonetheless, such incomplete urbanization, which can be compared to catching fi sh by means of draining the pond entirely, is doomed to be unsustainable and is certainly unlikely to make the Chinese Dream come true

The provision of equal opportunities and basic support in the process of ization in developed countries deserves closer study Take Chinese people who have gone to study in the United States for example After graduation, except for a minor-ity who stay in the academic or research sectors, they tend to work in private com-panies or start their own business It seems clear that there are few diffi culties caused

urban-by the institutional bias evoked above 2 In Japan, the urbanization rate was only 27.8 % in 1945 but increased rapidly to 72.1 % 25 years later, a rate nearly twice that of China To provide workers with housing, Japan spent public funds building public hostels It was in the early 1960s that Japan launched a program to decentral-ize human, fi nancial and physical resources from big cities to smaller towns, thereby facilitating the employment and citizenization of Japanese people in their respective places of residence 3 In the period between independence and the early 1980s, Singapore, as one of the four Asian Dragons, became industrialized and urbanized rapidly The Housing Development Board (HDB) provided 80 % of Singaporeans with apartments within only some 20 years In the 1990s, there were nearly 90 % of Singaporeans living in buildings provided by the HDB In the twenty-fi rst century, the HDB has launched the Studio Apartments (SAs) program for the aging popula-tion One-bedroom SAs are 35 or 45 m 2 in size and sold on 30-year leases at SGD 47,800–71,700 4 With a small territory and high population density, and by adopting

a combination of state monopoly and privatization policies, Singapore has managed

to achieve near-universal coverage of housing assistance while at the same time securing a fuel for national development in the long term 5

Breaking down the existing distributive pattern of rights and privileges requires legislation and law enforcement We are unable to maximize national and social interests if our cities are at the same time aiming to maximize their own interests while ignoring those of rural migrant workers It is similarly impossible to assure

2 The Heilongjiang Morning Post reported on January 5, 2013 that the city of Harbin publicly

recruited cleaners from around China and that 7 of the 29 candidates who had master’s or doctoral degrees had got the job

3 Lan Jianzhong: “How did Japan turn farmers into registered city residents”, Reference News ,

the fi nancial and social interests of 260 million rural migrant workers only through the efforts of the 31 migrant workers who are delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC) 6 Before reform and opening up began, the distributive pattern of benefi ts in the Chinese society was relatively simple, which was one of urban–rural dichotomy After that, the distributive pattern, while remaining in essence dualistic, i.e., pitting urban against rural areas, features a larger number of and fi ner-grained

categories, including those with either urban or rural hukou , and those with either urban or rural hukou that live in metropolitan areas, as well as those who lack of hukou registered in cities (or towns)

To break through the existing distributive pattern of rights and privileges, we must fi rst legally clarify and confi rm the social costs and benefi ts of citizenization

so as to let everyone who contributes to China’s industrialization and urbanization, whether he/she is an old or new citizen, or a rural migrant not yet registered on the

local hukou system, benefi t from its reform and development We should know what

the costs and benefi ts are Second, we should make laws to decentralize social and economic resources and make them market-oriented The reasons why Tier 1 cities and provincial capitals are suffering serious urban problems, such as being overbur-dened with a great number of rural migrants, primarily include the monopoly of economic and social resources caused by the centralization of administrative pow-ers In China, almost all the best education, medical, cultural, sports and other resources are centralized in Tier 1 cities and provincial capitals In contrast there is

a shortage of job opportunities in Tier 3 and 4 cities, where people often fi nd it

dif-fi cult to make a living Third, and most important, is law enforcement instead of selective law enforcement We should say that China already has a rather complete legal system consisting of the labor law, the compulsory education law, the social security law and so on Nonetheless, some cities and decision makers opt for selec-tive law enforcement or the circumvention of particular laws, making it impossible

to effectively enforce laws The average salary income at a monopolistic SOE should never be much higher than the average national income if it is all-people- owned; proceeds from the sale of reserved land for urban development, if it is state- owned, can add much to the fund for building houses that ensure the citizenization

of rural migrants The constitution grants people the right to vote and be voted for, which should not be denied where rural migrants work and live

With institutional arrangements that lead to an urban–rural dual structure, Chinese cities have been receiving direct and indirect benefi ts from rural migrants since the country began the process of reform and opening up But at the same time they have overlooked, or even refused, to give citizenization-relevant benefi ts to such migrants This has greatly hindered the process of citizenization while continu-ously increasing the already high social, economic and environmental costs Workers recruited from rural areas before China began the process of reform and opening up,

6 In China, the number of migrant-worker delegates to the NPC increased to 31 for the 12th NPC from three 5 years ago; they represent 260 million migrant workers Yao Xueqing: “Thirty-one

migrant-worker delegates to the NPC: they speak for 260 million migrant workers”, People’s

Daily , March 12, 2013

as well as university graduates in the 1980s and the 1990s, typically lived in less comfortable dormitories and received low wages/salaries Nonetheless, they had access to basic security and rights With regard to the citizenization of rural migrants, they do not need benefi ts available to the white-collar elite, nor do they expect to live in luxurious houses While contributing their labor and wisdom to the host cities, they need basic housing, education, medical care, political rights, labor ben-efi ts and equal opportunities Since the citizenization of rural migrants clearly makes sense from the social, economic and legal perspectives, it should and can be implemented To this end, we need only to break through the existing pattern of interests and respect the citizenization-relevant rights of rural migrant workers

1 Overall Strategy for Promoting the Citizenization

of Rural Migrant Workers 1 Jiahua Pan

2 Evaluating China’s Cities for Scientifically- Sound

Development 47 Jingjing Shan , Zhanyun Wu , and Ya’nan Geng

3 The Evolution of China’s Migrant Worker Policies

for Since 1978 81 Shunjiang Huang

4 The Status of Migrants in Cities and Innovations

in Social Management 101

Min Du

5 Cost Estimation and Cost Sharing Mechanism

for Citizenization of Rural Migrant Workers 129

Jingjing Shan

6 Methods for the Citizenization of Migrant Workers

in Megacities 149

Yanting Ni and Yingchang Song

7 Approach to and Suggestions for Further Reform

of the Hukou System 163

10 Promoting Universal Coverage of Basic Public

Services Among Urban Residents 237

Ning Wang and Yeqiang Wang

11 Improving the Social Security System for Migrant Workers 255

Hongyu Li and Shangpeng Liang

12 Strengthening Housing Security for Migrant Workers 275

Xin Dong

Xueyuan Chen is in a post-doctoral program at the IUE and focuses his research on

integrated urban and rural development, reforming of the rural property rights tem, and rural collective economy

Xin Dong is a Ph.D in Economics and associate researcher at the IUE who focuses

on real estate economics

Min Du holds a Ph.D in management and is an associate researcher at China

Population and Development Research Center (CPDRC) who focuses on graphic economics

Ya’nan Geng is a candidate for a master’s degree at the Department of Urban

Development and Environment, the Graduate School of the CASS, who focuses on urban and regional management

Shunjiang Huang is an associate researcher at the IUE who focuses on researching

urbanization

Hongyu Li is Director, the Urban Planning Research Offi ce, the IUE, and Chairperson, the Urban Policy and Culture Research Center, who focuses on urban planning and sustainability

Meng Li is an associate researcher at the IUE whose research focuses on urban/

environmental economics and sustainable development

Shangpeng Liang is a postgraduate student at the IUE who focuses on urban

eco-nomics and researches urban and regional development

Yanting Ni is a doctoral candidate at the IUE who focuses on urban and regional

management

Jiahua Pan is Director of Institute for Urban and Environmental Studies (IUES),

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and Professor of Economics at CASS

Graduate School, Editor-in-Chief of the Chinese Journal of Urban and Environmental Studies Received his Ph.D from Cambridge University in 1992 Areas of study

include: economics of sustainable development, energy and climate policy, world economy and environmental and natural resource economics Worked for the UNDP Beijing Offi ce as an advisor on environment and development; Lead author of the IPCC Working Group III 3rd, 4th and 5th Assessment Report on Mitigation; Member of China National Expert Panel on Climate Change; Member of National Foreign Policy Advisory Group; Advisor to the Ministry of Environment Protection Vice president of Chinese Association for Urban Economy, vice president of the Chinese Society of Ecological Economists, vice president of Chinese Energy Association Co-editor of Climate Change 2001: Mitigation , published by Cambridge University Press, and author or co-author of over 300 papers, articles

and books in both English (including Science , Nature , Oxford Review of Economic Policy ) and Chinese (including Journal of Economic Research and China Social Sciences ) Winner of First and Second prize for best research work, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (2002, 2004 and 2013) Winner of Sun Yefang Prize in

Economic Science, 2011 Named China Green Person of the Year 2010/2011

Qimin Peng is an associate researcher at the National Key Laboratory of Integrated

Information System Technology, the Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, who focuses on social computing, integrated information processing and smart city

Jingjing Shan is researcher of IUES, CASS Main areas of research include: urban

and regional planning and development strategies Led or participated in the ing of both general and topical economic and social development plans for more than 20 cities or areas Head of research team for 28 research projects, including 19 commissioned by provincial governments Some of these projects have been funded

draft-by the National Social Sciences Fund of China, CASS, and the Foundation for Young Scholars; Authored, co-authored or edited 17 books; Published over 50 papers in both English and Chinese, and wrote over 50 research reports; Author or co-author of more than 10 policy proposals submitted to the State Council

Yingchang Song is deputy director-general and researcher of IUES, CASS; Director-general of the Offi ce of Urban and Regional Management; Professor and doctoral advisor in Urban and Environmental Studies Department, CASS Graduate School; Executive director of China Society of Urban Economy; Member of the Academic Committee of Regional Planning and Urban Economy of UPSC; Member

of the expert committee of the Association for Promoting Administrative Districting and Regional Development in China; Member of Academic Advisory Board, Beijing Municipal Natural Science Foundation; Head of research team for six key

or major research projects supported by the National Social Sciences Fund of China and CASS, and 20 local government-commissioned projects; Author of 4 mono-

graphs, and over 50 articles and chapters in core academic journals such as Journal

of Geographical Sciences , Geography Research , Urban Planning , Urban Development Studies , Economic Geography , Urban Planning Forum , and Journal

of Population Studies

Liejun Wang is an associate researcher and Director of the Research Offi ce, the

Social Development Research Department, the DRC

Ning Wang is a candidate for a doctoral degree at the Department of Urban Development and Environment, the Graduate School of the CASS, who focuses on public services

Yeqiang Wang is associate research fellow at IUES, CASS, and deputy secretary-

general of the Research Center for Western China, CASS Received M.Sc from Nanjing University and Ph.D in Economics from CASS Graduate School; Post- doctoral researcher at Institute of Fiscal Science, Ministry of Finance; Author or co-author of over 10 papers published in core national academic journals, including

Management World , China Industrial Economics , Statistical Research , Economic Geography , Finance and Trade Economics , and 2 of them were reprinted by Renmin

University of China’s Information Center for Social Sciences The paper fi rst

pub-lished in China Economic Journal was indexed in the Taylor & Francis database, and reprinted in Revista de Economie Industriala , a Romanian journal Authored,

co-authored or edited 6 books; Participated in many research projects supported by National Social Sciences Fund of China and National Natural Science Foundation

of China, and the drafting of many local economic and social development plans

Houkai Wei is deputy director of IUES, CASS and director-general, professor and

doctoral advisor in Urban and Environmental Studies Department, CASS Graduate School; Recipient of the State Council Special Governance Allowance; Elected director-general of the Research Center for Western China, CASS; Deputy secretary- general of the Regional Science Association of China and China Society of Regional Economic Development; Elected deputy director-general of the Academic Committee

on Regional Planning and Urban Economy of the Urban Planning Society of China (UPSC), and the Natural Resources Economy and Planning Committee of the Chinese Society of Economics of Geology and Mineral Resources; Assistant profes-sor at Peking University, Shandong University, Sichuan University, Minzu University

of China, Hunan University, Hunan Normal University, Henan University, Northwest University; Head of research team for over 60 key CASS and government-commis-sioned projects; Author or chief editor of over 20 books, over 300 papers in both English and Chinese language journals such as Social Sciences in China and Economic Research Journal More than 50 of these were reprinted in Xinhua Digest

and the Renmin University of China’s Information Center for Social Sciences; Winner of over 20 national or provincial-level awards for outstanding research; Author or co-author of over 20 policy proposals submitted to the State Council

Zhanyun Wu is a postdoctoral researcher at the IUE, who focuses on urbanization

and urban/regional planning

© Social Sciences Academic Press and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

J Pan, H Wei (eds.), Annual Report on Urban Development of China 2013,

Current Chinese Economic Report Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-46324-6_1

Overall Strategy for Promoting

the Citizenization of Rural Migrant Workers

Jiahua Pan

As China has rapidly industrialized since it began the process of reform and opening

up, a great many farmers have shifted out of agriculture and are now working or studying and living in towns or cities, leading to a fast increase in China’s

Urbanization rate However, given that reform of the hukou system has stagnated, as

well as the fact that social security and public service systems prioritize urban areas over rural ones, rural migrant workers are not treated in the same way as native urban residents in terms of employment and welfare, despite being counted as part

of the urban population This has led to a low citizenization rate As a result, a new dual structure consisting of rural migrant workers and native urban residents has come into being in Chinese cities at a time when the long-standing urban-rural dual structure has yet to be eliminated This has severely hindered the building of a har-monious society and the urbanization of China To remove such a dual structure as soon as possible, the Communist Party of China (CPC) made it clear in the report to

the 18th CPC Congress that it would accelerate reform of the hukou system,

system-atically promote the citizenization of rural migrant workers, and endeavor to cover the entire permanent urban population with basic public services Later on, the CPC announced at the Central Economic Work Conference that it would prioritize the systematic promotion of the citizenization of rural migrant workers In this new situation, a key challenge in promoting and improving urbanization in China will be how to systematically promote the citizenization of rural migrant workers by adopt-ing effective policies and measures

J Pan ( * )

Institute for Urban and Environmental Studies (IUES), Chinese Academy

of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing, China

Citizenization of Rural Migrant Workers: Definition

and Meaning

The term “the citizenization of rural migrant workers” first appeared in the report to the 18th CPC Congress held in late 2012 It is consistent with “steadily promot[ing] the turning of rural migrant workers into urban residents” mentioned in the 12th Five-Year Plan

In order to gain a clear understanding of the citizenization of rural migrant ers, we should first make clear the meaning of rural migrant workers In a broad sense, rural migrant workers include people who have moved to towns or cities from the countryside and people who have shifted to non-agricultural sectors from agri-culture These two groups are closely tied to each other, on the one hand, and differ from each other, on the other But both of them mainly comprise people who have moved to urban areas to work or do business there In addition to these people, the first group includes their family members, suburban farmers who have lost their land1 and rural people who have moved to towns or cities for education, marriage or other reasons; the second group includes people who have otherwise moved to towns or cities to work there and who work in non-agricultural sectors in the coun-tryside In a narrow sense, rural migrant workers mainly refer to people with rural

work-hukou who work at local township and village enterprises (TVEs) or who have

moved to towns or cities to work in non-agricultural sectors It is intended to replace the concept of “migrant workers” Although the CPC Central Committee has pro-posed the citizenization of rural migrant workers, the focus of many scholars, such

as Jin Sanlin (2013), Jin Zhongxia and Xiong Lu (2013), and Zhang Guiwen (2013),

is still non-local migrant workers in the cities The citizenization of these workers is more difficult than that of farmers who have lost their land and local migrant work-ers Since non-local migrant workers constitute the vast majority of rural migrant workers, we have focused our study on this group

While the definition of the citizenization of rural migrant workers varies from scholar to scholar, the differences aren’t significant It is believed by some that the citizenization of rural migrant workers refers to a situation whereby, after making occupational changes, rural migrant workers secure social status and rights equiva-

lent to those of residents with urban hukou and gain equal access to public resources

and social welfare in the host towns or cities It would also mean that they get fully involved in political, economic, social and cultural activities, thereby achieving financial security, social acceptance, identity and cultural integration (Jin Sanlin

2013) It is believed by others that the citizenization of rural migrant workers refers

to the process where rural migrant workers find jobs in the host towns or cities and ultimately become urban residents who have received permits for permanent residence in these places and gained equal access to public services for urban residents (Jin Zhongxia and Xiong Lu 2013) It is also believed by some that the

1 They refer to rural people who have lost all the contracted land due to expropriation for urban construction.

citizenization of rural migrant workers refers to the process where, and the result that, rural people become truly integrated into urban life and are accepted by native urban residents after going through changes in location, occupation, lifestyle,

behavior and hukou, making improvements in overall competence, and subscribing

to civic values (Qiu Pengxu 2013)

To sum up, we believe that the citizenization of rural migrant workers is the cess where rural migrant workers, or former-farmers, turn into city resident regis-tered city residents Specifically, it refers to the process that, while going through migration and occupational changes, rural migrant workers become urban residents who have received permits for permanent residence in the host towns or cities and gained access to social welfare and political rights equal to those available to native urban residents The citizenization of rural migrant workers means much more than

pro-people having their rural hukous changed to urban ones It is in fact a process whereby after receiving urban hukou, rural migrant workers are treated in the same

way as native urban residents in terms of political rights, jobs, social security, public services and others, while getting gradually integrated into the host cities in terms

of values, social identity and lifestyle As a result, the citizenization of rural migrant workers will be a very long process It chief marks are:

Change in Social Status Today, a large number of rural migrant workers are

counted as part of the permanent urban population, but still have rural hukou In

short, their residency status as farmers remains unchanged They still carry the stigma as “migrant workers” even though they are already settled in the host towns

or cities As a result, the citizenization of rural migrant workers requires the reform

of the hukou system to be expedited so that rural migrant workers may soon rather

than later obtain permanent residence in the host towns or cities, thereby becoming part of the urban residents in these places

Equality in Terms of Political Rights In China, the political rights of urban and

rural residents have long been closely linked with their hukou Today, few rural

migrant workers in Chinese towns or cities are denied the rights to vote or run in elections, and to participate in community management But they are faced with severe inequality in political rights when compared with native urban residents The citizenization of rural migrant workers requires that rural migrant workers be granted the same rights to political participation as those of native urban residents, including the rights to vote or be voted for, to participate in the administration and discussion of state affairs, to form trade unions, and to participate in community management

Full Coverage by Public Services Today in China, public services and social

security policies are essentially linked with hukou and prioritize urban areas over

rural ones Accordingly, rural migrant workers typically do not have equal access to public services and social security benefits The citizenization of rural migrant workers aims to ensure that these migrants and native urban residents have equal access to public services and social security benefits relevant to employment, child education, medical care, social insurance, housing assistance and social assistance,

thereby promoting the full public-service coverage of the permanent urban population while protecting rural migrant workers from being discriminated against

in terms of public services

Improvements in Financial and Living Conditions Given limitations in sional competence, education level and money, rural migrant workers tend to have low incomes and quality of life and are apparently behind native urban residents in terms of financial and living conditions The citizenization of rural migrant workers requires a continuous increase in the incomes of rural migrant workers and assis-tance in improving their housing and living conditions This will gradually reduce gaps between them and native urban residents and help them make the transforma-tion from farmers into registered city residents in terms of lifestyle and patterns of consumption Only by changing the lifestyle can rural migrant workers really get integrated into urban life

profes-Improvements in Overall Cultural Competence Rural migrant workers are far from meeting requirements for modern registered city residents as they are under- educated and short of occupational training with lower overall capability Such cul-tural capability affects occupational choices made by rural migrant workers, increases income inequalities, and weakens their sense of belonging to the host city For this reason, some native urban residents will have prejudices against rural migrant workers As a result, the citizenization of rural migrant workers requires helping rural migrant workers improve their overall competence including profes-sional skills, education levels and so on

Extensive Acceptance Across the Host Society In order for rural migrant workers

to turn into registered city residents and become really integrated into urban society, extensive acceptance is also required On the one hand, rural migrant workers are supposed to have a sense of belonging to the city, achieve self-identity and view themselves as part of the urban residential population On the other hand, social discrimination and prejudice against rural migrant workers should gradually disappear before these migrants are extensively accepted across the host society Only after they achieve such self-identity and are accepted by others at the same time, can rural migrant workers integrate with native urban residents

Current Rural Migrant Workers in China: Citizenization

Status

The urbanization of China is primarily characterized by a large number of rural migrant workers with a low citizenization rate A thorough understanding of the number and characteristics of rural migrant workers as well as their citizenization status constitutes the basis and precondition for proposing a scientifically reason-able citizenization strategy and developing practicable citizenization policies/measures

Rapid and Steady Growth in Number

Nowadays, the number of rural migrant workers is increasing rapidly and steadily

in China A review of rural-urban migration since China began the process of reform and opening up shows that the growth of the number of non-local migrant workers

as part of the population of rural migrant workers is obviously characterized by five stages due to the effects of China’s macro-economy and macro-level policies (see Fig 1.1):

Stage 1 was a period of migration to the nearest location in the 1980s Since the household responsibility system was implemented in rural areas shortly after China began the process of reform and opening up, a large part of the rural labor force shifted to TVEs, leading to a migration model in which farmers left farm-land but still worked in their hometowns It was during this stage that the number

of non-local migrant workers increased to 30 million people in 1989 from about two million people in 1983, or an annual average growth of about five million people

Stage 2 was a period of interprovincial migration in the early 1990s As a great many jobs were created in China’s coastal regions thanks to fast economic growth and rapid transition to a market economy after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992, the number of rural migrant workers grew sharply to 70 million people in 1995, or an annual average growth of nearly seven million people.Stage 3 was a period of slow growth in the late 1990s Some cities imposed restric-tive measures on the recruitment of migrant workers under the pressure to create jobs for incoming farmers, new members of the urban labor force and the

Fig 1.1 Five stages in the growth of the number of Chinese non-local rural migrant workers

(Source: data of 1983, 1989 and 1993 is from the Research Team, the Research Office of the State Council ( 2006 ); data of 1996 and 2006 is from the first and second National Agricultural Census; data of the 2008–2011 period is from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) (2012); data of the remaining years is from surveys by the NBS)

unemployed As a result, the number of rural migrant workers increased at a lower rate in China Among them, the number of non-local migrant workers increased to 78.49 million people in 2000 at an annual average rate of only about 1.7 million people.

Stage 4 was a period of compensatory rebound in 2001 and 2002 Under the policy

of “Remove unreasonable restrictions on the rural labor force’s entry into towns

or cities for jobs, and guide its migration between urban and rural areas and between regions” specified in the 10th Five-Year Plan,2 a compensatory rebound occurred in the growth of the number of rural migrant workers in China In 2001, the number of non-local migrant workers reached 83.99 million people; in 2002,

it was 104.7 million people, an increase of more than 24 % or 20.71 million people year on year

Stage 5 is a period of fast and steady growth since 2003 With continuous policy incentives, the number of rural migrant workers has entered a period of steady growth In 2012, the number of non-local migrant workers reached 163.36 mil-lion people, or an annual average growth of about six million people Non-local migrant workers in Chinese towns and cities (their total number is estimated on

a 95.6 % basis3) represent a nearly constant share, or about 21.5 % on average, of the urban population since 2003 In 2012, for example, that share was 21.9 % The contribution of such migrant workers to the Urbanization rate increased to 11.5 percentage points in 2012 from 7.8 percentage points in 2002, or an annual average growth of 0.37 percentage points

Numbers and Characteristics

There Were About 240 Million Rural Migrant Workers in Towns

and Cities, or Around One Third of China’s Urban Population in 2012

There were about 240 million rural migrant workers in Chinese towns and cities, or around one third of China’s urban population (712 million people) in 2012 Specifically, there were about 156 million non-local migrant workers, or 21.9 % of

2 Before the outline of the 10th Five-Year Plan was released, the then General Office of the Ministry

of Labor (MOL) issued the Opinions on Creating Jobs for the Surplus Labor Force in early 2000

In June, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council co-issued the Opinions on Promoting

the Healthy Growth of Small Towns and Cities In July, Chinese ministries/commissions such as the MOL, together with the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), co-issued

the Notice on Furthering the Pilot Program of Creating Jobs for the Rural Labor Force All these

documents proposed that rural-urban migration be promoted and that unreasonable restrictions on farmers’ entry into cities for jobs be removed In late 2001, the then State Planning Commission (SPC) required that seven charges relevant to migrant workers be cancelled by the end of February

2002 These policies and plans jointly led to the compensatory growth of the number of rural migrant workers in 2001 and 2002.

3 In 2009, 95.6 % of Chinese non-local migrant workers worked in towns or cities (the Department

of Rural Surveys, the NBS 2010 ).

China’s urban population They contributed 11.5 percentage points to China’s Urbanization rate If we estimate the number of local migrant workers who work or live in towns or cities on a 40 % basis, then that number is about 40 million people There are about 50 million farmers who have lost their land (Wei Houkai et al

2011) The other people represent a small portion of the population

Since raw statistics about rural migrant workers are unavailable, we made an

estimate using data relevant to people with rural hukou, the floating population and

the number of non-local migrant workers in China’s urban population The results are shown in Table 1.1 and Fig 1.2

1 People with rural hukou as part of the urban population refers to the entirety of permanent urban residents with rural hukou, including non-local migrant work-

ers who permanently live in towns or cities and permanent urban residents with

rural hukou such as farmers in formerly rural areas reclassified as cities but still

basically under rural governances, a kind of quasi-city and sometimes called

“villages inside cities”, farmers who have lost their land, some local migrant workers and farmers in city districts In 2010, there were 310 million people with

rural hukou, or 46.3 %, of China’s urban population They contributed 21.5

per-centage points to China’s urbanization rate This number included 145 million

people with rural hukou in cities and 165 million such people in towns.

2 The floating population in the urban population refers to urban residents who have

left the places where their hukous are registered for at least half a year (excluding people who live in city districts and have left the places where their hukous are

registered for at least half a year), including farmers living in quasi- cities, i.e., landless farmers, and local migrant workers In 2010, the floating population in Chinese towns and cities reached 187 million people, or 27.9 % of China’s urban

Table 1.1 The number of rural migrant workers in China’s urban population (in million)

People with rural Hukou among urban population 310 (46.3 %)

Floating population in urban population 187 (27.9 %)

Non-local migrant workers in towns and cities 146 (21.8 %) 156 (21.9 %)

Source: the calculations are based on the Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People’s

Republic of China , the China Population & Employment Statistics Yearbook 2011, the Migrant

Workers Monitoring Survey Report 2011 , and the Statistical Bulletin of the People’s Republic of

China on the 2008 National Economic and Social Development

Note: the parenthesized percentages are the shares in the urban population The number of non- local migrant workers in towns and cities was estimated on a 95.6 % basis

population, who contributed 13.9 percentage points to China’s Urbanization rate

It included 133 million people in cities and 54 million ones in towns

3 Non-local migrant workers in the urban population In 2012, there were 263 lion migrant workers in China, including 163 million non-local ones If 95.6 %

mil-of them worked in towns and cities, then there were about 156 million non-local migrant workers in these places, or 21.9 % of the urban population, who contrib-uted 11.5 percentage points to the Urbanization rate

Those Whose Families Migrate with Them Always Represent

About 20 % of All Non-local Migrant Workers

With regard to staying with their families or not, rural migrant workers mainly include those whose families migrate with them and those who migrate alone NBS survey data shows that from 2008 to 2011, the ratio of migrant workers who migrated with their families to those who migrated alone was always around 1:4 In other words, migrant workers who migrated with their families represented about

20 % of all non-local migrant workers (see Fig 1.3) We may therefore estimate that, of 163.36 million non-local workers in 2012, there were about 33 million of them who migrated with their families, and the remaining 130 million were those who migrated alone

Fig 1.2 Make-up of China’s urban population, 2010 (Source: this figure is based on data in

Table 1.1 )

Under-Educated Young Men Represent the Majority of Non-local

Migrant Workers

The sex ratio of Chinese migrant workers is nearly unchanged since 2008, as men represent about two thirds of all such workers In 2011, for example, men repre-sented 65.9 % of all Chinese migrant workers (the NBS 2012) With regard to age, most non-local migrant workers are younger than 40 years of age In 2011, for example, there were about 130 million non-local migrant workers younger than 40 years of age, or 81.8 % of all such workers Among them, those born after 1980, or the new-generation migrant workers, represented over 60 % of all non-local migrant workers With regard to educational background, those at the level of junior high school or lower represent about three quarters of all non-local migrant workers In

2011, for example, those at the level of junior high school or lower represented 74.5 % of all non-local migrant workers, including 62.9 % at the level junior high school, 10.7 % at the level of elementary school, and 0.9 % at the level of illiteracy

or near-illiteracy (the NBS 2012)

Eastern Region Are the Leading Destination of Non-local

Migrant Workers, but with a Decreasing Percentage

In China, the eastern region has long been the leading destination of non-local migrant workers, while central and west regions are the leading source of them In

2009, 68.1 % of all 145 million non-local migrant workers across China were from

Fig 1.3 Family migration characteristics of non-local rural migrant workers, 2008–2012 Note:

the number of non-local migrant workers who migrated with their families in 2012 was estimated

on a pro rata basis (Source: data of the 2008–2011 period is from the Migrant Workers Monitoring

Survey Report 2011 , and data of 2012 is from the Statistical Bulletin of the People’s Republic of

China on the 2012 National Economic and Social Development)

central and west regions; 62.5 % of them went to the eastern region (the Department

of Rural Surveys, the NBS 2010) In other words, the majority of non-local migrant workers left central and western regions for eastern ones, especially the Pearl and Yangtze River deltas Nonetheless, with their rapid economic growth in most recent years, central and western regions combine to have an increasing percentage in received non-local migrant workers, whereas eastern regions see a rapidly decreas-ing percentage The number of migrant workers who move between provinces in particular has been decreasing, leading to a change in the situation where they rep-resent the majority of all non-local migrant workers In 2011, for example, there were 74.73 million migrant workers who moved between provinces, or 47.1 % of all non-local migrant workers in China (the NBS 2012), which was 6.2 percentage points lower than in 2008

The floating population in towns and cities can reflect the status of non-local migrant workers from another perspective In 2010, the floating population in towns and cities in eastern regions was 107.91 million people, or 57.6 % of China’s float-ing population; it was 38.30 million people in central regions and 41.11 million people in western regions, or 20.4 % and 22.0 % of China’s total population respec-tively Specifically, the provinces of Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Shandong took the lead and combined to represent 36.5 % of China’s floating population in towns and cities (see Fig 1.4) Of the interprovincial floating population in 2011, 72.45 % was from the provinces of Anhui, Sichuan, Henan, Hunan, Jiangxi and Guizhou; 86.81 % went to Guangdong, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Beijing, Jiangsu and Fujian (the Department of Floating Population Service and Management (DFPSM),

Fig 1.4 Distribution of floating population in towns and cities by province, 2010 (Source: this

figure is based on population sampling survey data from the Tabulation on the 2010 Population

Census of the People’s Republic of China)

the National Population and Family Planning Commission of People’s Republic of China (NPFPC) 2012).

Most Migrant Workers Are in Industries Such as Manufacturing,

Construction and Traditional Services

Since they are under-educated and short of professional skills, non-local migrant workers tend to be in industries with low skill requirements, such as manufacturing, construction and traditional services 2010 population census data shows that most,

or 71.9 %, of the sampled 14.37 million non-local migrant workers, were in fields such as production, transport equipment operation, commerce and services Specifically, those in the fields of production and transport equipment operation represented 40.6 %; those in the fields of commerce and services, 31.3 %; techni-cians, 11.0 %; those in the other four categories, 17.1 % (see Fig 1.5) And accord-ing to an NBS survey (2012), most migrant workers have long worked in manufacturing, construction and traditional services, which received 36.0 %, 17.7 % and 34.2 % of all such workers respectively, or a combined 87.9 %, in 2011 As for traditional services, resident and other services represented 12.2 %; wholesale and retail, 10.1 %; hotel and restaurant, 5.3 %; transport, warehousing and postal ser-vice, 6.6 %

Fig 1.5 Distribution of non-local rural migrant workers by occupation (Source: this figure is

based on population sampling survey data from the Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of

the People’s Republic of China)

Citizenization Status

Calculated with the Number of People with Urban hukou in Towns

and Cities, the Citizenization Rate in China was only 27 % in 2010;

the Northeast Region Had the Highest Combined Citizenization Rate;

Eastern Regions Had the Biggest Difference Between the Citizenization Rate and the Urbanization Rate

From the perspective of possessing a hukou, registered city residents usually refer to residents in towns or cities with local urban hukou China’s hukou system catego- rizes residents into those with rural hukou and those with urban hukou People with urban hukou are eligible for numerous rights and benefits in towns or cities, whereas

rural migrant workers are not treated in exactly the same way as are residents with urban hukou registered city residents despite being also counted as permanent urban residents As long as relevant data are available, therefore, we may roughly measure

the citizenization rate using the percentage of people with local urban hukous in the

total population By the end of 2010, there were about 356 million people with

urban hukous in Chinese towns and cities, according to the 2010 Population Census

data In other words, the citizenization rate was only 27.0 %, which was 23 age points lower than the Urbanization rate of the permanent population in the year.4

percent-From the regional perspective, the northeast region had the highest citizenization rate at 45.5 % Specifically, the provinces of Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin had citizenization rates at 47.6 %, 45.4 % and 42.2 % respectively, making them 4th through 6th across China and only behind the eastern cities of Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin Eastern regions had a combined citizenization rate of 28.3 % Specifically, Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin ranked 1st through 3rd, at 59.3 %, 59.0 % and 49.0 % respectively, as opposed to lower citizenization rates elsewhere

in these regions (see Fig 1.6 and Table 1.2) Central and western regions had the lowest combined citizenization rates at 23.3 % and 23.2 % respectively Specifically, Tibet, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi and Henan had the lowest citizenization rates across China; all the four lowest-ranking provinces were in western regions.Generally, urbanization without citizenization is incomplete urbanization We may thus refer to the difference between the Urbanization rate and the Citizenization rate of the permanent population as the rate of incomplete urbanization, namely, the percentage of urban residents without access to urban public services because of lack of hukou In 2010, for example, this difference was about 23 % on average in China and was the highest in the eastern regions, at 31.4 % All the ten eastern municipalities and provinces happened to be the Top 10 in China, suggesting that they were faced with tough challenges for the citizenization of rural migrant work-ers The differences for the central and the western regions were 20.2 % and 18.2 % respectively The number is the lowest for the northeast region, at only 12.2 % The

4 In 2012, people with urban hukous represented 35.29 % of China’s total population; the Urbanization rate of people with hukous registered in their respective places of permanent resi-

dence was as many as 17.3 percentage points lower than that of the permanent population.

rate differences were lower still for western provinces such as Xinjiang, Tibet and Gansu as well as all the three northeastern provinces (see Table 1.2).

The Citizenization Rate of Rural Migrant Workers Was Only 40 %

in 2011 and Was Much Lower than That of Urban Residents

We developed a comprehensive index for the citizenization rate of rural migrant workers in four dimensions including political rights, public services, financial con-ditions, and overall cultural competence, in addition to change in social status and social identity This index is intended to assess gaps between rural migrant workers and urban residents (or registered city residents ) in all aspects of citizenization First of all, we selected corresponding indicators and employed the Delphi method

to weight them, thereby building a comprehensive indicator system for assessing the citizenization rate of rural migrant workers In the meantime, we selected corre-sponding standard values and calculated the gap for each indicator, before working out the weighted calculation of the citizenization rate of rural migrant workers The

gap for each indicator was calculated using the equation p i = /x X i i , where p i is

the gap for each indicator, x i is the real value, and X i is the standard value The tion for calculating the comprehensive index of the citizenization rate of rural migrant workers is P=∑ ×

equa-1

n

p w , where P is the comprehensive index of the

citi-zenization rate of rural migrant workers and ω i is the weight of each indicator The

equation for calculating each citizenization rate term is P j

jk

jk i

=∑p ×w /∑w ,

Fig 1.6 Citizenization and urbanization rates by province, 2010 (Source: this figure is based on

data from the Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China)

where P j is the jth citizenization rate term, p ji is the state of the ith indicator of the

jth term, ω i is the weight of the ith indicator, and

j

jk i

First, Rural Migrant Workers Had a Very Low Level of Political Participation

Given that rural migrant workers have almost no access to the rights to vote or be

voted for, social management and others under restrictions posed by the hukou

sys-tem, we selected “the percentage of CPC and China Communist Youth League (CCYL) members who participate in CPC/CCYL activities”, with data availability

in mind, as the indicator of the level of political participation by rural migrant ers This percentage was about 37.20 %, according to survey data from the DRC Research Team (2011)

work-Second, the Percentage of Rural Migrant Workers Who Had Access to Basic Public Services Was Low In 2011, rural migrant workers were only 45.20 % as high in the level of access to public services as urban residents in terms of children’s education, employment, medical care, social insurance and affordable housing This suggests that China is faced with tough challenges for covering the entire permanent urban population with basic public services On the side of children’s education, the

State Council issued the Opinions on Furthering Compulsory Education for the Children of Migrant Workers back in 2003, but public schools find it difficult, as a

result of insufficient education resources, to satisfy rural migrant workers’ need for the schooling of the children who migrate with them Only 39.2 % of the children

of migrant workers go to public schools in the places where they work, 9 % others

go to private schools in these places, and the remaining 51.8 % go to school in the hometowns and are commonly known as “left-behind children”, according to a sur-vey by the DRC Research Team (2011)

On the side of employment, 43.80 % of non-local migrant workers signed employment contracts with their employers, according to NBS survey data (2012)

On the side of social insurance, the Regulations on Workplace Injury Insurance

issued in 2003 have led to an increase in the percentage of migrant workers who have workplace injury insurance, which reached 23.6 % in 2011 and was very close

to that of employed urban residents who have such insurance (25.6 %) On the side

of pension and medical insurance, however, the overall percentage of rural migrant workers covered by urban social insurance is low due to the existence of the new rural endowment insurance (NREI) and the new rural cooperative medical care sys-tem (NRCMCS) in addition to institutional issues such as the continuation, shifting and inter-city settlement of pension and medical insurance In 2011, the percentages

of non-local migrant workers who had pension, medical, unemployment and

Table 1.3 Comprehensive assessment on the citizenization rate of rural migrant workers, 2011

1 Right to vote or run in elections a

2 Participate in community management a

3 Percentage of CPC/CCYL members

who participate in CPC/CCYL

5 Percentage of migrant workers who

sign employment contracts

6 Percentage of migrant workers who

have urban social insurance

9 Percentage of migrant workers who

bought an apartment or rent one alone

competence

(35.63 %)

11 Percentage of migrant workers at

the level of senior high school/2-year

technical school or higher

12 Percentage of migrant workers at

the level of 3-year college or higher

13 Professional skills a

Comprehensive index of the citizenization rate

of rural migrant workers (

Source: This table is based on data from the China Statistics Yearbook 2012 and the China

Population & Employment Statistics Yearbook 2012

Notes: (1) a denotes a lack of data; (2) b denotes 2010 data; (3) the standard values are the means of relevant indicators of urban residents in 2011: the standard value for the percentage of migrant workers who have urban social insurance is the percentage of the number of people covered by social insurances in the urban population; the standard values for monthly average wage and monthly average consumer spending per capita are the average wage/salary of employed urban residents and the average consumer spending per capita in cash respectively; the standard values for the percentage

of migrant workers at the level of senior high school/2-year technical school or higher and that of migrant workers at the level of 3-year college or higher are the percentage of employed urban residents at the level of senior high school/2-year technical school or higher and that of employed urban residents at the level of 3-year college or higher respectively The monthly average consumer spending per capita among rural migrant workers were estimated with the monthly average consumer spending per migrant-worker household in 2010, the growth rate of urban consumer spending and the assumption that each migrant-worker household has two members

maternity insurances were 13.9 %, 16.7 %, 8.0 % and 5.6 % respectively, as opposed

to 41.1 %, 68.5 %, 20.7 % and 20.1 % for the urban population in the same period

Third, Rural Migrant Workers Were Only 50 % as Well Off in Financial Conditions as Urban Residents on Average In 2011, the index for measuring the financial conditions of rural migrant workers was 50.77 %, that is, only half of the average level of urban residents, according to indicators for rural migrant workers such as monthly average wage/salary, housing conditions and consumer spending per capita NBS survey data (2012) shows that the monthly average wage/salary of non-local migrant workers was 2,049 yuan in 2011, or only 58.83 % of that of employed urban residents (3,483 yuan); the percentage of non-local migrant work-ers who rented an apartment alone or bought one was only about 15 % (14.3 % in the first case and 0.4 % in the other); most people lived in dormitories provided by their employers (32.4 %), temporary accommodation at sites (10.2 %), workplaces (5.9 %) or apartments that they rented with others (19.3 %) We estimated with data from the DRC Research Team (2011) that the monthly average spending per migrant worker was about 700 yuan, which was only 55.42 % that of urban residents (1,263 yuan)

Fourth, Rural Migrant Workers Had Lower Overall Cultural Competence and Professional Skills Given the lack of professional skill data, we measured the cul-tural competence of rural migrant workers using the percentages of people at differ-ent education levels The result shows that the overall cultural competence of rural migrant workers, if measured by education level, was only 35.63 % as high as that

of urban residents In 2011, the percentage of non-local migrant workers at the level

of senior high school/2-year technical school or higher was 25.5 %, as opposed to 50.0 % for employed urban residents in the same period; the percentage of non- local migrant workers at the level of 3-year college or higher was 7.0 %, as opposed

to 25.0 % for employed urban residents in the same period On the side of sional skill training, only 10.5 % of migrant workers received training in agricul-tural technology; 26.2 % of them received professional training in non-agricultural skills All these reflect the lower professional skills of migrant workers

Obstacles and Challenges

Today, the citizenization of rural migrant workers is faced with six obstacles: costs, institutions, capability, culture, social exclusion and urban capacity

Costs

The costs of the citizenization of rural migrant workers mainly refer to financial inputs needed for such migrants to settle down in towns or cities and receive corre-sponding benefits and equal public services Sources of such inputs are generally

categorized into public costs (government costs), individual costs and corporate costs Among them, public costs are primarily added fiscal expenditures needed for the government to provide rural migrant workers with public services, social secu-rity and new or expanded infrastructures Individual costs mainly refer to living and development costs that rural migrant workers and their families need to pay so as to settle down in towns or cities Businesses must obey China’s Labor Contract Law and provide employees with necessary working conditions, workplace protection, fringe benefits/pay and social insurance Public and individual costs are the main forms of cost obstacles to the citizenization of rural migrant workers Estimates from a special report show that the average public costs of citizenization per migrant worker in China’s east, central and west regions are 176,000, 104,000 and 106,000 yuan respectively, with a national average of about 130,000 yuan (including about 26,000 yuan as the initial cost and an input of about 2,400 yuan per year); the aver-age individual costs per capita are 20,000, 15,000 and 16,000 yuan per year respec-tively, with a national average of about 18,000 yuan per year In addition, most migrant workers need to pay an initial housing cost, which is on average 126,000, 84,000 and 91,000 yuan per capita in eastern, central and western towns and cities respectively, with a national average of about 100,000 yuan per capita, or about 300,000 yuan per household.

High citizenization costs not only put the governments under certain financial pressure, but also put most rural migrant workers under unbearable financial pres-sure, posing a severe obstacle to the process of citizenization On the side of the governments, the initial cost per capita is not high, but local governments, espe-cially those of large cities, will definitely become less active in pushing citizeniza-tion given the number of rural migrant workers and follow-up costs For the 240 million or so rural migrant workers that are candidates for citizenization, the gov-ernment at different levels need to spend about 6.2 trillion yuan as the total initial cost (factors such as willingness to become registered city residents are not consid-ered), which is slightly higher than half of China’s 2012 public revenue In addition, they need to pay a total follow-up cost of about 0.6 trillion yuan per year Given the huge amount of public costs, the governments can only handle the issue of citizeni-zation on a long-term planned basis On the side of individuals, most rural migrant workers do not have enough income to pay the post-citizenization living and devel-opment costs An analysis of 2011 data shows that non-local migrant workers had

an annual income of about 25,000 yuan, which would be barely enough to support the consumer spending per capita at 18,000 yuan/year after the dependency ratio (34.4 %) is factored in As a result, most rural migrant workers will find it difficult

to bear the housing cost outside the annual average consumer spending

Institutions

The Chinese government has launched a series of policies that encourage rural migrant workers to work and live in towns and cities since it proposed “Eliminat[ing] the system that unfairly prioritizes urban areas over rural ones” in the 10th

Five- Year Plan Nonetheless, it has yet to establish a policy system that supports the employment of migrant workers in towns or cities and their access to registered city residents’ status as institutional changes involve major cost and interest issues Institutional obstacles to the citizenization of rural migrant workers remain deep-

rooted, especially in the hukou system and its affiliated public service, social

secu-rity and land institutions

The Existing hukou System and Its Affiliated Social Welfare Policies

The hukou system and its affiliated social welfare institutions that prioritize urban

areas over rural ones constitute the primary institutional obstacle to rural migrant workers’ access to registered city residents’ status China has yet to make substan-

tial progress in the reform of the hukou system despite the fact that it has launched

a series of relevant policies and conducted pilot projects in making an overall plan

for urban and rural areas Reform of the hukou system is always difficult mainly

because it includes various public services and social welfare, which suggests that the equal provision of social welfare to all would put local governments under heavy financial pressure Even though some provinces (e.g., Hubei) have tried to unify

urban and rural hukous, there remain inequalities between urban and rural residents

in terms of minimum living allowances, affordable housing, social insurance, eran treatment, and damages in case of traffic accidents (the DRC Research Team

vet-2011)

In Beijing, for example, there are wide gaps between urban and rural residents in terms of minimum living allowances, social insurance and damages in case of traffic accidents, in addition to inequalities in the education of children caused by unequal access to education resources (see Table 1.4) On the side of minimum living allow-

ances for urban and rural residents, Beijing residents with urban (or rural) hukou

who are eligible for such allowances will receive 580 (or 460) yuan per month from

2013 onward, and permanent residents without Beijing hukou are not eligible On

the side of social insurance for residents, Beijing has established an NREI-based pension insurance system for urban and rural residents, achieving equalities between urban and rural residents in terms of payments and benefits With regard to medical insurance, however, there are differences between medical insurance for urban resi-dents and the NRCMCS, as the latter comes with lower payments made by individu-als, more allowances and better benefits On the side of social insurance for employed urban residents, there are almost no differences between Beijing-based

employees with local hukou and those without them in terms of the lowest monthly

corporate and individual payments for pension, medical and workplace injury

insur-ances Nonetheless, only employees with local urban hukou are legally required to

pay the individual part of the Housing Provident Fund (HPF), although this is

optional for those with either local rural hukou or non-local hukou In addition, employees with non-local hukous can opt to pay the premium for maternity insur-

ance or not On the side of affordable housing, it is available only to residents with

local urban hukous; price-controlled housing and public rental housing are available

to farmers resettled because of land expropriation who are eligible for such housing;

Table 1.4 Benefits available to urban & rural residents with local Hukou vs those with non-local

Social insurance for

residents (yuan/month) Pension insurance for urban/rural

residents (unified)

Incl pension

Basic medical insurance

Medical

Social insurance for

employed urban residents

Price-controlled housing Income criteria Farmers resettled

for land expropriation

Compliant with certain criteria

Compulsory education Go to the nearest school according

to hukou or place of residence with

no need for entrance exams

Go to the nearest school after producing relevant documents

Damages for death, injury

or disability caused by

traffic accidents (yuan)

residents with local hukou

are available after producing the proof for one’s residence in Beijing Compensation for families

from the Guide to Beijing Policy for Indemnificatory Housing released at www.beijing.gov.cn ;

public rental housing is only available to permanent residents with non-local hukou

who are eligible for such housing.5 On the side of compulsory education, children

of Beijing residents with local hukou go to the nearest schools with no need to take entrance exams, whereas those of residents with non-local hukou need to provide

corresponding certificates6 and, typically, to go through cumbersome procedures

On the side of damages in case of traffic accidents, they are calculated for local urban or rural residents according to their respective applicable incomes per capita,

whereas residents with non-local hukou need to provide corresponding certificates

issued in their places of permanent residence before having corresponding levels of damages established On the side of compensation for families of conscripted servi-cepeople, Beijing has been following a single compensation standard for urban and rural areas since 2008 Nonetheless, such a single standard has yet to be developed

in many other areas

5 Such residents refer to non-locals who have had steady jobs in Beijing for a certain number of years, have full capacity for civil conduct, have household incomes compliant with relevant requirements, are able to provide evidence for residence in the specified period and for paying the individual part of the HPF or social insurance, and have no apartment or house in Beijing whether themselves or their family members Public rental housing in local industry parks is mainly avail- able to talented people recruited from elsewhere and workers in these parks.

6 The Opinions of the Beijing Municipal Commission of Education on School Admission for

Compulsory Education in 2012 provides that, where children of school age with non-local hukous

need to receive compulsory education in the city of Beijing because their parents or other legal guardians work or live in this city, then their parents or other legal guardians shall contact schools designated by the education committees of the counties or districts where they live with documents that have been verified by the sub-district offices or the local governments of the places where they live, such as the permits for their temporary residence in Beijing, proof that they really live in the aforementioned places, proof that they are employed in Beijing, proof provided by the govern-

ments of the places where their hukous are registered that they are unable to take care of their children in these places, and the household registers (i.e., the registers of the hukous of their house-

holds); and the contacted schools may submit applications to the competent education committees for assistance where it is difficult for them to receive these children.

compulsory education information is based on the Opinions of the Beijing Municipal Commission

of Education on School Admission for Compulsory Education in 2012; information on the

compen-sation for families of conscripted service people is based on the Notice on Adjusting the Pension/

Allowance Standards for Certain Individuals and the Compensation Standard for Families of Conscripted Service people (JMYF [2011] No 473) (effective since October 1, 2011)

Note: damages for death, injury or disability caused by traffic accidents are paid to concerned urban (or rural) residents at an amount equal to the average disposable per capita income of urban residents (or the average net income per capita of rural residents) in Beijing in the previous year

Table 1.4 (continued)

The Existing Land System

The land system is also a major institutional obstacle to the citizenization of rural migrant workers First, the current compensation for land expropriation is too low

to cover the costs of citizenization Moreover, a high selling price of the ated land result in an increase in the housing price, which in turn adds to the housing cost of rural migrant workers Second, restrictions over the transfer of collectively- owned rural land make it impossible for rural migrant workers to receive any added value from land and relevant real estates, that is, to provide financial support for their settling down in towns or cities Moreover, they result in a severe wastage of rural land resources Third, it is now difficult for the ongoing reform of “Land for social security, curtilage for property” in many Chinese areas to receive strong sup-port from farmers As the value-adding potential of land grows, rural migrant work-ers see increasing opportunity costs resulting from changing land for registered city residents hip A survey by the DRC Research Team shows that 73 % of the surveyed migrant workers hope to retain their contracted land after they settle down in towns

expropri-or cities; 67 % of them hope to retain their curtilage Fourth, the current policy of using rural land for urban development does not take into account the reception of a corresponding number of rural migrant workers, resulting in a severe imbalance between the sources and destinations of migrants in terms of the distribution of population and land resources (Zhang Guiwen 2013)

is impossible in the Factory of the World (a special reporter team from the Southern Metropolis Daily 2012) Since these job roles come with low technical requirements and insufficient job training, relevant migrant workers find themselves in a vicious cycle in terms of job choices and improvements in professional skills—a narrow

range of job choices result in a lack of opportunities for improving professional skills, and poor professional skills cause a narrow range of job choices.

Such a capability deficit hinders citizenization mainly in two ways On the one hand, staying too long in traditional industries in jobs requiring little professional skills keeps rural migrant workers’ income low, leaving them unable to afford the high costs of settling down, living and developing in towns or cities In 2011, the monthly average wage/salary of non-local migrant workers across China was less than 60 % that of employed urban residents; the average per capita wage/salary income for migrant-worker families was 10,508 yuan, or only 69 % of the average per capita spending for urban residents Given their low wages/salaries, migrant workers find it difficult to afford the cost of settling the whole family in towns or cities As a result, in many cases, the male migrant workers decide to have their parents, wives and children stay back in the countryside These are commonly known in China as the “left-behind elderly”, “left-behind wives” and “left-behind children” On the other hand, low levels of education attainment and poor profes-sional skills make rural migrant workers unable to meet the points requirements for

urban hukou eligibility Guangdong, for example, was the first province in China that implemented the point system for allocating urban hukou Guangdong cities

such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Dongguan and Zhongshan had all mented such a system by the end of 2011 In Guangzhou, for example, migrants who have a bachelor’s, master’s or doctoral degree receive 80, 90 or 100 points for education attainment and skills, whereas those who have completed junior or senior high school receive only 5 or 20 points in the same category; in Shenzhen, no one with less thant senior high school education is eligible for entering the points-based

imple-hukou allotment system , whose point distribution is similar to that for the system in

Guangzhou Due to these restrictions on education levels and professional skills, only a small number of rural migrant workers can make the cut-offline In 2010,

Shenzhen-based migrant workers with rural hukou who reached the cut-off, which

is set at 100 points, represented only 14 % of all those who met the requirements for

urban hukou (a special reporter team from the Southern Metropolis Daily 2012)

Culture

Since urban and rural areas in China have long been isolated from each other, they already have the growing characteristics of two civilizations in a divided society Such differences between urban and rural residents are highlighted by their educa-tion levels and even values and degrees of civilization (Amartya Sen 2005; Li Guicheng 2013) Such a culture in which urban and rural areas are isolated from each other has impede citizenization of rural migrant workers in two ways:

First, rural migrant workers are unable to adapt to urban life and feel alienated from their host cities Rural migrant workers were born and grew up in the countryside and have formed lifestyles and values unique to farmers As a result of such a

long-standing, profound cultural influence, farmers are typically unable to adapt

to urban life after they move into cities On the side of the sense of belonging to the host city, most rural migrant workers have no sense of belonging to the group

of urban residents Cultural and behavioral differences, financial gaps and some urban residents’ prejudice against them are among the major reasons for the lack

of the sense of belonging to the host city And they cause misunderstanding, estrangement and even conflicts between rural migrant workers and native urban residents, creating a new dual structure within the city According to a survey about the self-identity of migrant workers, only 19.31 % of the surveyed migrant workers selected “urban citizen”; 57.93 %, “farmer”; 22.51 %, “marginalized person” (Mei Jianming 2006) According to a survey about new-generation migrant workers in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan and other cities, 63 % of the surveyed non-local migrant workers felt, to varying extents, that “I do not belong to this place” (Zhang Liyan and Chen Yuting 2012)

Second, some urban residents discriminate against rural migrant workers Such prejudice derives mainly from a long-standing system that unfairly prioritizes urban areas over rural ones in China Such an unfair system has resulted in a city- centric feeling of superiority among some urban residents Manifestations include: some urban residents think of migrant workers as “strangers” and

“bumpkins” , as people who are inferior, and as conservative small farmers who have no place in modern cities—in short, both mentally and in action, many urban residents reject migrant workers (Li Guicheng 2013); some urban resi-dents develop a negative opinion of the entire migrant worker population based

on the misconduct of a few members

Social Exclusion

Social exclusion of new comers by native urban residents is another major obstacle

to the citizenization of rural migrant workers The concept of ‘social exclusion’ derives from studies done in France in the 1960s and 1970s about poverty and social inequalities The term “social exclusion” originally referred to ethnic discrimination and prejudice characterized by complete or partial exclusion of ethnic minority groups by the ethnic majority group Such discrimination and prejudice are built upon a policy basis laid intentionally by society, in which the dominant group already holds social powers and is unwilling to share them with others (Tang Jun

2009) Today, social exclusion of rural migrant workers by towns and cities is marily manifested by overt institutional exclusion and covert ideological exclusion Manifestations of the former mainly include discrimination against rural migrant

pri-workers with regard to hukou, employment, education, medical care and social

security; those of the latter include, prejudice and unfairness against such migrants

on ideological and identity level During urbanization in China, various entry ers for cities have indeed been a typical form of social exclusion While receiving the labor force from the countryside, in particular, Chinese cities have excluded

barri-non-locals as equal members entitled to the same benefits A talent-centric hukou

system reform is now in progress in a lot of places, where only a small number of top-level talent and non-local migrant workers who have made significant contribu-

tions are granted local hukou; some cities even set a great many unfair, demanding

requirements to restrict the inflow of people This is actually a type of narrow regionalism

Urban Capacity

The citizenization of rural migrant workers is also faced with the obstacle of limited urban capacity During urbanization in China, the vast majority of rural migrant workers moved to medium- and large-sized cities as a result of unnecessary admin-istrative interference in resource distribution as well as huge inequalities in public services, job opportunities and wage/salary levels Of all non-local migrant workers across China in 2011, 30.8 % moved to the municipalities directly under the central government (i.e., Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) and provincial capi-tals; 33.9 % to prefecture-level cities, according to an NBS survey (2012) In other words, medium- and large-sized cities at the prefecture or higher levels combined to receive 64.7 % of non-local migrant workers in the year, or 1.7 percentage points higher than in the previous year The Top 50 Chinese cities by the size of received floating population combine to accommodate more than 60 % of China’s total float-ing population; about 70 % of rural migrant workers who wish to get an urban

hukou prefer large cities, according to data from the DFPSM (2012) The high centration of rural migrant workers in medium- and large-sized cities has caused a severe imbalance in terms of city size On the one hand, large cities, especially ultra-large ones, are sharply expanding and suffering urban problems such as traffic congestion, high housing price, environmental pollution, and resource shortages

con-On the other, small towns and cities are on the wane for a lack of supporting tries, low-quality public services and low popularity

indus-In ultra-large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, in particular, there is a growing conflict between the expanding population and a limited urban carrying capacity In Beijing, for example, the population has always been growing sharply The permanent population of Beijing tended to rapidly surpass the planned target, according to the results of its previous overall plans.7 The third revision to the

Beijing Overall Urban Plan (2004–2020) proposed that the actual resident

popula-tion be controlled at around 18 million people by 2020 Nonetheless, the local manent population reached 19.62 and 20.69 million people in 2010 and 2012 respectively, both of which already surpassed the planned size for 2020 Although

per-7 The 1983 plan set a target of 10 million people by 2000, but the population reached this number

in 1986; the 1990 plan set a target of about 12.50 million people by 2010, but the population already reached 13.82 million people in 2000; the 2005 plan set a target of 18 million people by

2020, but the population already surpassed this number in 2010.

Beijing has long been trying to control population growth by various measures, its total permanent population keeps increasing by about 500,000 people per year, resulting in increasingly severe problems such as traffic congestion, air pollution and a shortage of water resources A study of the capacity of Beijing shows that it is within 18 million people but that the current local population is excessive and unsustainable (Feng Haiyan et al 2006; Tong Yufeng 2010; Shi Minjun et al 2013).Accordingly, the Beijing municipal government has been working to control the

local population in recent years by administrative means such as hukou policy and

restrictions on house and vehicle purchase These restrictive policies have tuted severe obstacles to the citizenization of nearly eight million people with non-

consti-local hukou The other ultra-large cities have also begun to develop population

policies in accordance with a “reasonable capacity” They have set or raised barriers

of entry into the city so as to selectively receive rural migrant workers In fact, urban capacity is not changeless but instead keeps changing with economic transforma-tion, industry upgrades, technology advancements and improvements in traffic con-ditions and spatial structure It is true that the urban population should not expand without any limitation and, instead, should be restricted according to available resources as well as the capacities of environment and infrastructure From the per-spective of registered city residents’ equal access to social benefits, however, we should not take an insufficient urban capacity as an excuse for hindering the process

of citizenization

Estimating the Number of Rural Migrant Workers

Who Need Citizenization in China

Urban population refers to the permanent population that lives in towns or cities, including areas administered by them, for at least 6 months, according to statistical criteria of the NBS In 2012, China had an urban population of 711.82 million people, or a Urbanization rate at 52.6 % Since the current urban population con-tains a great many rural migrant workers who have yet to be fully citizenized, urban-ization in China is a typical example of partial urbanization, or semi-urbanization

To make such partial urbanization into full urbanization and to improve the quality

of urbanization, the key is to systematically promote the citizenization of rural migrant workers We must accurately estimate the number of rural migrant workers who need citizenization in China before proposing a general solution for promoting citizenization Rural migrant workers who need citizenization include those who now permanently live in towns or cities but have yet to be fully citizenized and new comers who will appear as urbanization develops