A handbook of primary commodities in the global economy

Producers suffered heavily as prices fell in response to new supply facilities going into production, juxtaposed with disappointing demand evolution from China in particular, marking the

A Handbook of Primary Commodities

in the Global Economy

The 2010s have been a dramatic period for most primary commodity kets Producers suffered heavily as prices fell in response to new supply facilities going into production, juxtaposed with disappointing demand evolution from China in particular, marking the end of the most powerful and enduring commodity boom since the Second World War This book

mar-is a guide to the primary commodity universe, a crucial part of the world economy In the present updated edition, Marian Radetzki and Linda Wårell introduce and explain pertinent issues surrounding international commodity markets, including the importance of fossil fuel markets among commodities, price formation, price trends, the shift in primary commodity consumption toward Asia, the increasing reliance on com-modity exchanges, the new relaxed attitude toward depletion, cartel action, and the revival of nationalism and state ownership This is a com-prehensive and easily accessible read of use to a variety of specialists, aca-demics, as well as practitioners who need to broaden their outlook, but also to those with a general interest in the primary commodities universe

Marian Radetzki is Professor of Economics at Luleå University of Technology, Sweden He has authored more than two dozen books, the

most recent being The Price of Oil, with Cambridge University Press,

and has undertaken consulting assignments for industry, governments and international organizations such as the World Bank and the UNDP

Linda Wårell is Associate Professor of Economics at Luleå University of

Technology, Sweden She is the Editor-in-Chief of Mineral Economics, a

multidisciplinary journal focusing on economic and policy issues in the mineral industries, and has published numerous studies on competition and public policy questions, predominantly in the minerals industry

A Handbook of Primary Commodities in the

Global Economy

Second Edition

Marian Radetzki and Linda Wårell

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Names: Radetzki, Marian, author | Wårell, Linda, author.

Title: A handbook of primary commodities in the global economy / Marian Radetzki and Linda Wårell.

Description: Second edition | Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press, 2017 | Includes bibliographical references and index Identifiers: LCCN 2016032815 | ISBN 9781107129801 (hardback)

Subjects: LCSH: Primary commodities | Commercial policy | Primary commodities—Prices.

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2 The Geography of Commodity Production and Trade 28

3 Comparative Advantage and Trade Policy Distortions 56

8 Threats of Resource Depletion and Sustainability

9 Fears Regarding and Measures to Assure Supply Security 179

10 Producer Cartels in International Commodity Markets 198

11 Public Ownership of Commodity Production 219

12 The Monoeconomies: Issues Raised by Heavy

Dependence on Commodity Production and Exports 245

Figures

1.1 Share of primary sector in GDP in 2013 10 1.2 Intensity of steel use in South Korea 1970–2013 12 1.3 Regional natural gas prices 2003–14, $/mBTU 17

4.1 Indexes of commodity prices in constant money,

4.2 US natural gas and oil production (MBOE/D) 82

5.3 World copper variable costs in 2004 and 2007,

commodities, annual averages (billion dollars) 35 2.3 World production and exports of selected primary

2.4 Commodity and total goods trade by region,

annual average 2011–13 (billion dollars) 39 2.5 Share of world exports for selected countries

2.6 Country share of world exports of oil

2.7 Consumption developments for four important

industrial commodities in four regions 48 2.8 Commercial energy at the primary stage: ratio

3.1 An illustration of tariff escalation: Nominal

3.2 Tariff escalation in high-income OECD

world copper industry, and LME copper prices

viii Tables

6.1 Growth patterns during three booms (%) 115 6.2 Peaks in constant dollar commodity price indices

6.3 Growth patterns during the third boom (%) 122 7.1 Futures and options volume, 2001–14

7.2 The major exchanges 2014 ranked by number

of futures and options contracts combined 131

8.1 Proven reserves and R/P ratios for four minerals 160 8.2 Operating cash costs for three metals 165 9.1 Oil prices and the macroeconomy 185 10.1 The price elasticities of demand for output

from a cartel (EDC) which controls 60%

10.2 Five leading corporations’ share of global production 207 10.3 Bauxite output among leading producers

10.4 OPEC and world oil output (MBD) 216 11.1 State-controlled share in mining

12.2 The oil monoeconomies: oil and oil products

accounting for more than 80% of total exports

Work on this edition of the Handbook has been undertaken while we

were both associated with the Economics Division at Luleå University

of Technology We are grateful to our colleagues for the intellectual stimulation that enthused us and continuously fertilized our effort Our research assistant, Andreas Gustafsson, did an invaluable job in updat-ing the wealth of statistics that constitute the foundation upon which the book rests Special thanks are due to Jan-Olof Edberg, chairman

of Insamlingsstiftelsen Naturresursernas Ekonomi, a Swedish research foundation, for financially supporting the work Finally, we wish to convey our deep appreciation for the support and encouragement for the project received from Chris Harrison, Phil Good, and Matt Lloyd

at Cambridge University Press, and to their staff for efficiently dling all the practicalities through the production process

Background

The antecedent to the present work is Marian Radetzki’s book,

A Guide to Primary Commodities in the World Economy, published

by Blackwell in 1990 In that book Radetzki presented the gist of what

he had learnt during twenty five years of active study and research on international primary commodity markets The timing of that pub-lication was clearly inopportune Although the book received posi-tive reviews, it aroused only limited attention Through the 1980s and 1990s, primary commodity markets were in the doldrums Supply con-ditions for most commodities were quite relaxed most of the time, and prices remained suppressed The advanced economies were in a pro-cess of dematerialization, where declining volumes of raw materials were needed per unit of value added This suppressed demand growth and reduced the significance of commodities in their macroeconomies

In these circumstances, security of supply assumed a low priority for users Producers struggled with excess capacity and weak profitabil-ity Speculators’ interest was muted by the relative market calmness and declining prices Noncommercial investors like pension funds and mutual funds had little incentive to engage in longer term commodity placements These actors, instead, directed their capital flows to fields like information technology and sophisticated services, where markets appeared to provide a better profit potential

Against this background, interest in commodities dwindled among public policymakers and media, but also in the academic commu-nity Researchers found more fertile ground for their efforts in other sectors of the economy, while students’ attention went elsewhere Commodities were simply not a rewarding career area

This situation changed dramatically a few years into the present century, when the most powerful and unusually enduring commodity

2 Introduction

boom began Prices of most commodities in all categories, fuels as well

as minerals, food products, and agricultural raw materials, exploded Existing production capacity, dilapidated by years of negligence due

to low prices, could simply not satisfy the speedy demand expansion resulting from spectacular economic advances in the emerging world, with China in the vanguard, passing through an especially commodity- intensive phase of their economic development Earlier attitudes

of complacency among consumers were replaced by worries about security of supply, with the realization that ample availability of com-modities is indispensable, and that even prosperous dematerializing economies cannot survive without safe raw material inputs Producers

of commodities, in contrast, experienced an unexpected and dinary profit surge Investments in capacity growth were stimulated by the high prices, to the extent of exhausting the immediate availability

extraor-of investment inputs

The rising commodity prices galvanized the managers of hedge funds, pension funds, and other capital portfolios to invest in commodities, both as a means of diversification and for the prospect of significant profit opportunities Speculators also reentered the commodity markets

on a large scale

From 2005 onwards, primary commodities became truly hot stuff, with current events in the commodity markets regularly displayed on the first pages of newspapers and magazines, and figuring prominently

on TV screens 2008, in the midst of the commodity boom, was then

a highly opportune time to see a second edition of Radetzki’s book,

this time titled A Handbook of Primary Commodities in the Global Economy, and published by Cambridge University Press (the first edition

for this new publisher)

The exceptional prices of most commodities persisted for a few more years after the book’s publication, the constant price indexes for each major category reaching a peak in 2011 Substantial price falls have since been recorded, as massive new capacity, whose establish-ment was triggered by the boom, went into production, while at the same time the explosive global demand expansion was suppressed by

a sizable downward adjustment in the economic growth pace of China and several other emerging economies In consequence, by January

2015 the price index of all primary commodities was 40% below the peak of four years earlier

An Opportune Time to Publish 3

January 2015 was also the time when Cambridge University Press

approached Radetzki about a new edition of the Handbook 2017,

the planned publication date for this edition, may have been slightly less exhilarating than 2008, but there is little doubt that a number of exciting stories worthy of sharing with a wider audience have emerged since the previous edition, and many of them are included in the present expanded opus To mention just a few: The dominant role of China

as commodity consumer has only recently been fully acknowledged; price transparency has been greatly improved by the relentless progress

of commodity exchanges; resource nationalism has been on the rise, stimulated by the high prices of past years; and the emergence of shale oil and shale gas has given a new perspective to fuels markets and on sustainability and depletion

There is dual authorship this time Radetzki, having reached an impressive age, invited Linda Wårell, a knowledgeable and versatile colleague professor at Luleå, to share the workload, and her acceptance has undoubtedly contributed to a broadened and refreshed treatment

of the problems

An Opportune Time to Publish

The recently ended drama of the commodity boom and the ensuing spectacular price falls have maintained a strong interest in the primary commodities universe among public policymakers, captains of indus-try, and scholars, amongst many others The contribution of the pri-mary resource industries to GDP may be small, but there is now a clear perception that primary commodity supplies are indispensable to pro-gress, despite decades of dematerialization and increasing dominance

of the service sector in the rich world Despite a growth deceleration, the emerging world continues to expand speedily through develop-ment phases of high commodity intensity, and this assures continued steady commodity demand growth The publication of a broad-based book on primary commodity markets in the international economy, therefore, appears appropriate and important This is especially so since, to our knowledge, no such book has been published since 1990, when Radetzki’s old opus first appeared

The text which follows provides a comprehensive overview of tinent issues relating to primary commodities in the global economy

per-4 Introduction

The basic structure of earlier editions has been retained because we believe that it continues to be valid and appropriate Major components

in that structure cover:

• The geography of commodity production and trade;

• The distortions of production location and comparative advantage caused by protectionist trade policies;

• The institutions of price formation; the causes of short-run price bility and long-run price trends; the role of commodity exchanges;

insta-• Fears of and measures to ensure the importers’ supply security;

• Prospects for successful monopolistic producer collusion;

• Trends in and implications of public ownership;

• Issues raised by a very high national dependence on commodity production and exports

So much has changed over the past decade that a mere updating

of the old text was completely inadequate All the above themes have therefore been thoroughly rewritten

New portions have been added providing further detail to cover what was formerly overlooked or to explore newly emerging phenomena The additions comprise:

• A completely new chapter on fossil fuels, to reflect the great tance of fossil markets among commodities;

impor-• The geographical shift of the center of gravity in the world economy and in primary commodity consumption from the prosperous OECD nations toward the populous developing Asia;

• The changing directions of the global trade flows, with developing countries greatly expanding their exports of manufactures and losing their dominance as net exporters of raw materials;

• The recent role played by China and India as consumers of imported primary commodities;

• The increasing reliance on commodity exchanges, providing valuable opportunities for stabilizing hedging, but at the same time widening the scope for speculative activity and financial investment in commodity markets;

• The new and more relaxed attitude toward depletion, where peak oil or peak gold and peak copper have lost their urgency;

• The revival during the 2000s decade of the popularity of alization and state ownership in some resource-rich countries and industries

nation-The Readership 5

The subject of primary commodities in the global economy is vast, and not all its aspects can be treated within the confines of a single tome Our focus is on the economics of commodity production and trade in

a somewhat narrow sense, while issues related to, e.g., employment, skill creation in the sector, or regional development do not receive any detailed attention in the following chapters

The Readership

The subject treatment is firmly based on standard economic theory and economic logic But we have consciously avoided technical jargon and algebra Readers with only basic training in economics should therefore find the text fully accessible

Despite the omissions mentioned above, the book offers a hensive survey of the commodity world in the international econ-omy, and we are aiming at a broad readership While experts in a particular aspect of that world will probably not gain any substantive new insights in their specialization, we are convinced that reading this book will provide them with a valuable context from which to pursue further work in their chosen field

compre-The categories of readers that should find the book of interest comprise:

• Students in economics, finance, business administration and related disciplines, with an interest in primary commodity markets Researchers who have chosen a specific commodity or a specific commodity-related issue as their area of specialization, who desire a snapshot overview of the entire commodity economics field;

• Executives responsible for marketing or investment decisions in firms that produce and export primary commodities;

• Executives responsible for purchase management strategies and their execution in firms whose production relies heavily on raw materials inputs;

• Members of the financial community with an interest in primary commodities for the purpose of speculation or as an object for finan-cial investment Such individuals would be found on the commodity exchanges and in organizations that manage capital portfolios, like hedge funds, pension funds and mutual funds, but also in financial institutions, e.g., investment banks, that develop and market instru-ments for commodity placements;

6 Introduction

• Government officials in nations heavily dependent on primary modity production and exports – Chile, Peru, Botswana, Ghana, Mongolia, and Papua New Guinea provide examples, but there are many more Government officials in countries that rely heavily on commodity imports ought to have an equally strong interest in the analyses presented below The latter country group would comprise China, the EU, Japan, and the USA;

com-• Finally, the book should find many additional readers among the broad general public concerned about rising prices and the future availability of commodities

The Historical Framework

This introductory chapter provides a historical framework for world commodity markets It considers four major themes The first theme reviews the significance of primary commodities in the overall econ-omy at different stages of economic development The second tracks the long-run decline in bulk transport costs, and explores the impli-cations of this decline for the establishment of markets with a global reach for an increasing group of raw materials The third theme focuses

on the twentieth century It demonstrates the greatly expanded role

of public intervention and control in primary commodity production and trade from the early 1930s until the late 1970s, and the subse-quent retreat of government involvement in favor of market forces The fourth treats the recent strong growth in emerging economies, which has had – and continues to have – a profound impact on the world commodity markets This theme is only briefly introduced in the present chapter, as many of the remaining chapters will further elaborate on the subject

1.1 Primary Commodities in the Economic

by other sectors of the economy An alternative and somewhat wider definition, derived from foreign trade statistics, appears to be more appropriate for most of the subject treatment in the rest of the book This is further discussed in Chapter 2

1

8 The Historical Framework

The significance of primary commodities in a national economy is reduced in the process of economic development Long historical series

to vindicate this statement are hard to come by, given that national accounts were not prepared prior to the twentieth century and recon-structions of the more distant past lack common standards Simon Kuznets (1966) presents the following assessments of the shares of agriculture and mining (but not utilities) in GDP in selected countries over extended periods of time The contraction in the primary share emerges starkly from his figures:

Australia c:a 1860 36% c:a 1940 26%

Italy c:a 1860 55% c:a 1950 26%

UK c:a 1905 41% c:a 1950 13%

USA c:a 1870 22% c:a 1960 5%

Data on a more systematic basis did not become available until the late 1930s, and in Table 1.1 time series (including utilities from 1975 and onwards) for selected countries for which these series are reason-ably complete are presented As in the numbers provided by Kuznets, the primary share exhibits a dramatic decline as the economies develop over time The table additionally reveals far lower primary shares for rich, advanced countries, such as Italy, Japan, South Korea, and the USA, compared to poorer ones, such as India, Thailand, and Turkey, for the ultimate year Norway stands out as an exception, explained further below

A closer look behind the figures of Table 1.1 shows that in most cases agriculture predominated the primary sector during most of the twentieth century In Kuznets’ assessments, for instance, the agricul-tural sector exceeded four-fifths of the primary total for the initial year, except for Australia, where the share was more than three-fifths Because of its dominance, agriculture also dominates the recorded reduction of the primary share over time The decline in the smaller initial share accounted for by mining, is much less accentuated In some cases (Italy, USA) that share appears to have remained relatively stable through the economic development process (Kuznets, 1966) In recent years we note that mining and utilities have come to dominate the primary sector This can mainly be explained by the exceptionally high demand for many mining and utilities products since the turn of the century Chapter 2 discusses this in more detail

of economic development, measured by GDP per capita, and the share

of the primary sector in the economy Figure 1.1 provides a stration The data show unambiguously that the dominant pattern is

demon-a decline in the primdemon-ary shdemon-are of the economy demon-as ndemon-ations develop

In rich market economies the primary sector seldom exceeds 10% of GDP Exceptions to this finding require mention, and Norway is an illustrative example Its primary share has shown no decline over time

in Table 1.1, and the country represents the extreme outlier position

in Figure 1.1, combining a very high income level with an equally high primary sector share The traditional importance of fishing in the country’s economy explains the high weight of the primary sector until the 1960s The subsequent development of offshore oil and gas has made Norway exceedingly rich, while expanding the primary share even more Other exceptions to mention are Australia, Canada, and New Zealand: prosperous countries with an abundant export-oriented agriculture and a rich mineral endowment, where the primary sector accounts for more than 10% of overall national value added When studying the share of the primary sector over time for these economies,

10 The Historical Framework

a moderate increase in the primary share is noted since about 2005 This corresponds to the rapid increase in primary commodity prices witnessed during this time period

The general finding that the primary sector exhibits declining tance as economies develop is not particularly surprising Simply expressed (and abstracting from the possibilities offered by foreign trade), a key element in the economic development process is rising productivity, which permits the domestic satisfaction of raw materials needs with ever lesser factor inputs Labor and capital can then be switched to the secondary sector, i.e., production of manufactures whose sophistication typically increases over time As manufactures demand, too, is eventually saturated, the factors of production can migrate again, now to the service sector The overall economy expands, but the secondary and tertiary sectors more so than the primary one, leaving the latter with a declining share of the total

impor-With this perspective, the path of economic development can be seen

as a process of dematerialization Since all material inputs originate

in the primary sector, and since this sector accounts for a shrinking share of the total, it follows that each dollar’s addition to GDP will carry a material weight that declines over time Table 1.2 illustrates what is involved It presents the value in US$ (2014) per kilogram

Figure 1.1 Share of primary sector in GDP in 2013

Note: 40 countries selected to assure a wide spread in per capita GDP Primary

sector defined as agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining, and utilities.

Source: United Nations Statistics Division on the Internet: http://unstats

Table 1.2 Value in US$ per kg, at prices in 2014

Cloud service Almost ∞

Source: Own computations.

of a set of goods and services, listed in ascending order The higher the value, the less primary material inputs will be needed per dollar value represented by the items The essence of economic development

is to move the center of the economy’s gravity down the list, toward goods with ever higher value per kilogram In consequence, the raw materials input needs will grow more slowly than the overall economy

as countries grow richer Material savings will be further boosted

by technological progress, which is typically weight-reducing It is ceivable that the need for primary materials inputs could stagnate, and plausibly even shrink, as growing rich economies become increasingly dematerialized This finding can easily be depicted using data on primary commodity consumption and economic growth

con-Figure 1.2 presents steel demand as a fraction of total GDP at different stages of economic development in South Korea between

12 The Historical Framework

1970 and 2013 The figure clearly illustrates that when the economy initially expands, the share of primary commodities in GDP increases

as a result of investments in infrastructure, roads, houses, factories, cars, and household appliances When the economy becomes richer and the industry sector more advanced, this increase in primary con-sumption levels out and eventually starts to decline Previous studies confirm that most of the developed countries have reached the income level where commodity consumption starts to decline, but this is not the case for the current emerging economies (see, e.g., Wårell, 2014a)

It is easy to become complacent about the role and importance of the primary sector when its share of the economic activity settles at no more than a few percentage points, as is the case in many advanced nations Complacency may be in place so long as commodity markets function smoothly and existing needs can be satisfied without serious hurdles Since the dawn of the present century this complacency has been put in serious doubt, as rapid demand from emerging econo-mies, such as China and India, has led to a strong boom in primary commodities markets Income levels in China have been increasing at

an unprecedented pace, and the infrastructure needed to support the expanding urban population has required large amounts of resources The rapid demand has fueled sharp increases in prices for primary commodities, as supply has struggled to keep up with the exceptional demand evolution

GDP/capita, USD at constant prices (2005)

Figure 1.2 Intensity of steel use in South Korea 1970–2013

Source: United Nations Statistics Division on the Internet: http://unstats

1.2 Declining Transport Costs 13

More specifically, during the past 20 years the demand for products that contain so-called rare earth metals, such as mobile phones, com-puter memories, rechargeable batteries, and fluorescent lighting (to name a few), have exploded Since economically exploitable resources

of rare earth metals are limited and geographically concentrated, it is not surprising that widespread fears of supply shortages have been voiced by users

At the same time, it needs pointing out that sophisticated modern economies have become masters of substitutability, permitting them

to function without a particular material But the ability to tute will be of no help against a general constraint on supply for raw materials in aggregate, for it is overwhelmingly clear that not even the most modern economy can function without assured raw materials availability The population will die if food supplies fail The manu-facturing sector is critically dependent on raw materials inputs, even if the volumes needed have shrunk impressively compared to the value

substi-of manufactured output The service sector may require quite nificant inputs of raw materials, but it clearly cannot function if these supplies fail Primary commodities are indispensable, just like an ordi-narily inconspicuous glass of water that acquires an immense value

insig-in the desert This is easily forgotten, given the economic insig-insignificance

of raw materials in “normal” times when their availability is taken for granted

1.2 Declining Transport Costs and the Emergence

of Global Commodity Markets

Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, freight rates on long hauls were prohibitively high, except for goods with very high unit prices In consequence, global commodity trade at the time was small in vol-ume and consisted in the main of highly valued luxuries like coffee, cocoa, spices, and precious or semi-precious metals, imported predom-inantly to industrializing Europe (Landes, 1980) The main subsequent changes in transport technology and transport costs for bulk materi-als, it seems, occurred in two spurts The first took place in the latter half of the nineteenth century; the second began in the 1950s, but its effects came to fruition only in the 1970s Each involved the globali-zation of numerous additional markets for commodities, which until then had had no more than a local or regional reach Globalization

14 The Historical Framework

involves not only trade flows across oceans and between continents, but also, importantly, a convergence of prices across regional markets

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the application of steam power to transport revolutionized the economics of moving goods on land as well as across oceans A large group of raw materials produced

at increasing distances from the coast in overseas territories became economically accessible to the world’s industrial centers as overland transport by oxen, horses, and camels was switched to railways, and

as metal steamships replaced wooden sailing vessels This becomes dramatically evident in Paul Bairoch’s (1965) numbers for the cost of shipping cotton and wheat from New York to Liverpool in constant (1910–14) dollars per ton:

1825: 55.1 1857: 15.7 1880: 8.6 1910: 3.5

Shipping costs are akin to tariff barriers Little trade will typically take place when the transport charges account for a dominant share of the delivered price Trade will be encouraged as this share declines.The evolution of cereals imports into (western) Europe provides a vivid illustration of the evolving impact of transport cost decline on the widening of production sources Odessa’s short-run glory as a lead-ing European port in the mid-1800s was based on booming shipping

of Russian and Ukrainian rye and wheat to Western Europe Much

of this trade was lost in the 1870s, first because of a flood of shipped American wheat after the end of the US Civil War, and then the extension of Russian railways which took over the transport of

steam-remaining Russian cereals exports (The Economist, 2004, Dec 16) At the same time, new rail connections from the prairies around Chicago

to New York made the US cereals even more competitive in Europe The bulk transport revolution continued during the following decades Between 1880 and 1910, the transatlantic shipping cost declined from 18% to 8% of the price of wheat in the USA (Bairoch, 1965)

The 1880s also saw the introduction of refrigerated ships, ting long-distance transport of meat and fruit The globalization of the markets for many food products speeded up European industrialization

permit-by assuring cheaper food supplies to the growing numbers of urban industrial workers But it involved painful adjustments for European farmers, who lost out in many food products, and agricultural raw materials like cotton and wool to overseas supplies The impact was profound: In the 1850s, two-thirds of British bread consumption was

based on domestic cereals; by the 1880s that proportion had shrunk

to 20% (Dillard, 1967)

The second spurt in transport technology was far more specific, and

it was importantly triggered by the Suez crisis in the mid-1950s The shipping industry’s response to the canal closure was to opt for spe-cialized huge bulk carriers, along with the concomitant loading and unloading facilities in the harbors, to permit economic transport of low-value products like iron ore, steam coal, bauxite, and oil across vastly extended distances The impact of the effort began to be felt only in the 1970s The result was a further dramatic decline in the cost

of shipping, particularly accentuated for the truly extended anic transport routes

transoce-Between 1960 and 1988, the average size of the bulk carrier fleet had more than doubled In 1960, virtually all internationally traded iron ore and coal was shipped in vessels of less than 40,000 dwt, but this proportion had declined to 10% or less by 1988 Carriers in excess of 100,000 dwt did not exist in 1960, but by the latter year they accounted for 70% of iron ore and 40% of coal shipments (Lundgren,

1996) Recent developments in the world bulk carrier fleet market point toward a continued increase in average ship sizes, as carriers in excess of 160,000 dwt account for the major share of dry bulk ship-ments In 11 years, between 2004 and 2014, the average size per ship

of the bulk carrier fleet almost doubled (UNCTAD, 2014)

The economic impact of the new bulk transport technology was very substantial, and especially so for the mining industries Many European miners faced problems akin to those experienced by farmers 120 years earlier Freight rates for Brazilian iron ore to Europe declined from $24 per ton in 1960 to $7 in the early 1990s At the same time, the much smaller shipping costs for iron ore from Narvik in Norway to Germany were reduced from $8 to $4 The geographic protection afforded to the Swedish supplies shipped through Narvik thus shrank from $16

to only $3 (Lundgren, 1996) The freight rate as a proportion of total price for US coal in Western Europe was reduced from more than 30%

to less than 15% in the 30-year period The consequence was a rapid evolution of global markets for these low-cost products Long-distance maritime iron ore trade rose from 23% of world production in 1960

to 36% in 1990, and for coal from 2% to 9% (Lundgren, 1996) These shares continue to grow In 2013, transoceanic trade in coal accounted for 17% of global output (IEA, 2014a)

16 The Historical Framework

The market for natural gas is the most recent to be subjected to the forces of globalization Gas is an extremely bulky product (prices

in the range of $0.1–0.2/m3) with transport costs constituting a very high proportion of delivered price Until at least the 1980s, transport

by pipe was the completely dominant delivery mode The lowest-cost gas sources had a limited geographical reach because the transport cost was proportional to distance, and higher for piping under the sea Three regional markets developed around the main consumption centers, viz., North America and Europe (including Russia), both pre-dominantly supplied by pipe from internal sources, and Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (and more recently also China), supplied exclusively by liquid natural gas (LNG)1 from Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia Each of the three markets was, by and large, isolated from the others, with prices evolving along separate levels and patterns Until the mid-1990s, the East Asian market recorded prices that were twice the level

in the USA and 50% higher than in Europe (BP, annual, 2006) primarily because of the high cost of liquefaction and shipping

Since then, however, prices in the three markets have been affected

by two major, but highly opposing, developments First, the prices became equalized for a few years, as a consequence of a combination

of rising prices of piped supply and substantial cost reductions in LNG production and transport technology These developments stimulated

a rapid growth of additional LNG sources, providing an extended web of long-distance supply routes and causing prices to converge Second, the development of US shale gas production has had a pro-found impact on natural gas prices, especially in the USA (Aguilera and Radetzki, 2014) Figure 1.3 illustrates the development of natural gas prices in the three markets from 2003 to 2014, and it pictures both the period of converging prices and the clear pattern of divergence from about 2008 The main cause of the divergence is the production

of shale gas in the USA, which has mainly put pressure on national natural gas prices This development will be further elaborated upon

in Chapter 4 However, the recent developments clearly illustrate that the natural gas market still can be characterized as regional rather

1 Approximately 1.4 m 3 of natural gas equals 1 kg of LNG, with prices in the range of 0.2–0.4$/kg The substantial compression makes LNG economically transportable by ship.

than international In 2013, 31% of global natural gas production was traded internationally, about a third of which was as LNG (BP, annual, 2014).2

Successive technological revolutions have gradually reduced the transport costs of bulk commodities by a total of almost 90% between the 1870s and 1990s (Lundgren, 1996) In Figure 1.4 recent devel-opments of transport costs for bulk commodities are depicted, and

it is evident from the figure that, despite a sharp increase during the height of the commodity boom, there is no rise between the end of the 1990s and 2014 This, in turn, has increased the number of glob-ally traded primary commodities, from selected high-priced luxuries before 1850 to encompass virtually all products with perceptible value in the most recent decades Even waste, e.g., metal scrap or rejects from forestry and agriculture, or packaging material after use, valued as sources of energy extraction or of recycling, are increasingly

2 The dramatic oil price fall of 2014 is bound to reduce the regional price differences in gas if the lower oil prices prevail This is because most gas in Europe and the Far East, but not in North America, is sold at prices linked to the oil price, with a 6–9 month lag.

Figure 1.3 Regional natural gas prices 2003–14, $/mBTU

Source: BP (annual); IMF (biannual, 2015).

18 The Historical Framework

subject to international trade Chinese stone for garden decoration is being successfully marketed in Europe An important repercussion

of the globalization of primary commodity markets has been a growing dependence of the world’s manufacturing centers, initially Europe, then Japan and the USA, and most recently China, on imported supply

We will return to this subject in Chapter 2

Some recent developments in maritime transportation require tioning Before the financial crisis in 2008, as the world economy was still at the height of the boom, the available shipping capacity was not enough to meet the increasing import demand, especially from China The situation in the maritime transportation market was thus one

men-of significant shortage, leading to a sharp increase in shipping costs, especially to important ports in China, as is depicted in Figure 1.4 This development resembled the situation at the time in many commod-ity markets, where producers ultimately failed to satisfy accelerating demand, resulting in exploding commodity prices (discussed further

in Chapter 5) The implications of the shipping boom were sometimes far-reaching For instance, Wårell (2014b) stresses that the increase

in transportation costs in 2007–08 was a major cause of the down of the iron ore pricing system

Figure 1.4 Baltic Dry Index, 1999–2015

Note: The index base year is 1985 (1,000 points) and is compiled from 20

key dry bulk routes measured on a time charter basis The index covers dry bulk carriers carrying commodities such as iron ore, coal, and grain.

Source: London Baltic Exchange data.

1.3 The 50-year Wave of Public Intervention and Control 19

Transportation costs peaked in 2008, but after the financial crisis there was an abrupt turnaround This is evident in the Baltic Dry Index, which dropped dramatically from about 10,000 points in Q2 2008 to about 1,000 points in Q4 2008 – indeed a remarkable collapse In

2015, almost seven years after the financial crisis, world trade has not yet recovered to precrisis levels (aside from a temporary rebound in 2010) Maritime freight rates continue to be low and volatile, largely due to the current over-capacity in the global merchant fleet, built up excessively during the preceding boom In fact, the Baltic Dry Index is currently at an all-time low (Q1 2015), mainly explained by over-capacity

rather than a major slowdown in demand (The Economist, 2015a, Mar 10)

1.3 The 50-year Wave of Public Intervention and

Control in the Primary Commodity Markets

There has been a clear and strong 50-year wave of far-reaching public and political intervention in primary commodity markets, beginning

in the early 1930s Since the late 1970s, the wave has been waning, with market forces assuming increasing roles in shaping commodity market developments Before studying the content and consequences

of the wave, it may initially be instructive to ask what brought about the government involvement in the first place For if we look further back in time, say to the beginning of the twentieth century, it is clear that governments were hardly involved at all

We see four major and two subordinate factors explaining and/or motivating the deep public intervention in global primary commodity

production and trade The 1930s depression led to a price collapse for

many primary materials, so deep that it warranted public intervention

to rescue the farmers and miners, mainly in the rich world The Second World War created havoc in many supply lines, which was so worri-

some that governments thought it opportune to take action aimed at

restoring order The breakup of colonial empires established

numer-ous independent nations, many of which had economies dominated

by raw materials production Their governments thought it tive to gain control over the commodity sector, especially in minerals and energy, where ownership had traditionally rested in colonial or other foreign hands The fourth factor had ideological connotations The second and third quarters of the twentieth century were a period

impera-20 The Historical Framework

characterized by strong beliefs in collective action as a means to come

to grips with the numerous purported fallacies of the market system (Skidelsky, 1996)

The subordinate factors comprise (a) the ascendancy of the Soviet Union to prominence in the international economy, and its interven-

tions in international commodity trade and (b) the worries and

con-cerns raised by the emergent import dependence of the USA on an

increasing number of raw materials Sometimes, one factor worked

in isolation in prompting public action Quite often, several of these factors worked in combination and reinforced each other in complex ways in encouraging state intervention in the commodities field

In the 1930s depression, falling prices triggered several public involvements The governments of Canada and the USA interfered jointly in the wheat markets to cut supply from abroad to save their farmers from further price falls Cuba collaborated with Java

in launching export quotas in sugar The colonial administrations of Malaya and Ceylon instituted export restrictions on rubber, but this scheme met resistance from consuming interests in the USA, and soon collapsed (Rowe, 1965)

In the 1945–65 period, with the scarcities and price spikes of the Second World War and the Korean conflict fresh in the memory, com-modity agreements were launched by the governments of exporting and importing countries to keep prices within bands that both groups would find acceptable Export controls, sometimes combined with buffer stock operations, were the instruments used The markets for sugar, wheat, coffee, and tin were interfered with in this manner, but after some time the efforts disintegrated, usually due to internal ten-sions, and sometimes also because they failed to deliver the desired results (Radetzki, 1970)

The decade after the Second World War involved a painful rience for the USA, as the country became dependent on imports of

expe-a widening group of commodities of criticexpe-al importexpe-ance in wexpe-ar expe-and peace (Paley, 1952) This prompted the government to build strategic stocks, in many cases of very significant size On occasion, the acqui-sition of these stocks and their subsequent disposal created serious instability in the commodity markets In 1962, when the International Tin Agreement held a buffer stock of 51,000 tons, the US govern-ment declared that its strategic stock, 350,000 tons, equal to two years’ world production, was 150,000 tons in excess of what was

considered US strategic needs US disposals in 1963–66 amounted to 69,000 tons, adding 10% to global mine supply in these years, obvi-ously complicating the operations of the International Tin Agreement (International Tin Council, annual and monthly) In December 1973, the US Government again declared substantial excess strategic stocks

of metals and rubber, and the very sizable sales in the following year contributed to the price collapse in the international market (Cooper and Lawrence, 1975)

The early 1970s also experienced commodity price and export trols in several countries, to assure supplies at low prices to domestic users In the USA, price ceilings on many commodities were instituted, and export restrictions for metal scrap and soybeans, among others, were introduced to assure domestic availability (Cooper and Lawrence,

con-1975) The gasoline queues in the USA in 1974 were a direct quence of the gasoline price caps The Canadian government, for its part, implemented severe constraints on uranium exports in the mid-1970s, purportedly to assure national needs (Radetzki, 1981).Foreign aid became common after numerous nations in Africa and Asia gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s, and since many were heavily dependent on commodity exports, schemes were launched to extend existing commodity agreements by adding elements of foreign assistance One such extension was the “multilateral contract,” with guarantees by the importing member countries to buy predetermined quantities of the commodity from exporting members at above market prices Another was “food aid,” under which huge amounts of surplus cereals, edible fats, and other agricultural products were dispatched

conse-to developing countries, undoubtedly improving nutritional ards, but at the same time making life harder for Third World farmers (Radetzki, 1970)

stand-Altruism was certainly not the only motivation for the arrangements Security of supply was also important And in the case of the Coffee Agreement, the virtually explicit reason to pay the Latin American producing countries more than the market price was to prevent the spread of noncapitalist political systems on the continent, an impor-tant issue at the time (Commodity Yearbook, 1964; Rowe, 1965).The Soviet Union was also actively intervening in the international commodity markets It signed a number of “bilateral agreements,”

in a few cases involving the entire commodity export of individual developing countries for a number of years to come, in exchange for

22 The Historical Framework

manufactures, often on a barter basis These agreements were regularly biased in favor of the commodity exporting nation, and their implicit aim was to gain political influence Sometimes it did not work so well for the “beneficiaries,” as when the Soviet Union resold large quantities of Cuban sugar and Indian cloth in Western Europe, suppressing prices for the exporters’ sales outside the “agreement” (Radetzki, 1970)

Despite this courtship of developing countries by capitalist and communist commodity importers, there was a massive wave of nationalizations of foreign-owned resource industries, primarily in the minerals and energy fields, in the 1960s and 1970s Compensation was meager and sometimes completely absent in these takeovers The USA and the UK lost most in the process, being the largest foreign direct investors in these sectors The Soviet Union and Japan did not suffer much from the nationalizations, since their ownership posi-tions were insignificant The resultant state enterprises in minerals and energy brought in yet another tool for public intervention in primary commodities

The tide of public intervention and control started to subside in the 1980s A shift in beliefs played a crucial but by no means exclusive role in this turnaround Confidence in the ability of markets to solve problems experienced a strong surge as a consequence of the ideolog-ical revolution launched by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan

“Political failure” replaced “market failure” as the main problem to handle, according to the emerging credo

Far-reaching consequences have followed from this ideological shift The crumbling of the communist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is perhaps the most important result The commodities sector has seen a wholesale privatization of state-owned positions in minerals in all parts of the world, but a contributing explanation to this development was the disappointing performance of state entre-preneurship In contrast, state ownership continues unabated in the oil industries of developing countries, perhaps because of laxer perfor-mance requirements given the persistent high oil prices and oil profits (Chapter 10)

The institution of international commodity agreements in which governments meddle for whatever objective has completely lost its appeal Price stabilization is instead attempted with the help of hedg-ing on commodity exchanges, whose futures market services have

been greatly extended in time and across commodities since the 1970s Publicly controlled strategic stocks in advanced countries in the pres-ent century are by and large limited to petroleum, and at less than 5% of global annual consumption (IEA, monthly), they represent a trifle of the strategic stock ambitions of earlier decades Government price controls have not been considered despite more than fourfold price increases for materials such as copper and oil between 2002 and

2008 The market is seen as an adequate instrument for establishing the value of most commodities and for assuring the satisfaction of the most urgent requirements No queues have been seen at petrol stations

or strategic metal warehouses in the rich world of late

Governments’ abdication from involvement in primary commodity markets has been quite impressive, though it is far from complete The most important exception relates to the rich world’s agricultural policies, which continue to seriously distort the markets for a number

of food products (Chapter 3) In 2010–12, farm subsidies represented over 40% of agricultural factor income in the EU In 2013 the EU negotiated a major reform of its agricultural policy, and many coun-tries (especially the UK) were hoping for large cuts in farm subsidies Even though farm spending did not increase, the new deal made clear that agricultural subsidies claim the lion’s share of the total EU budget, and are expected to do so also in the future (European Commission,

2013) Japan is another rich country with highly distorted agricultural policies, not least considering that it has one of the world’s highest

tariffs on rice (The Economist, 2013a, Nov 30) However, since 2013 Japan has joined negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, putting pressure on trade liberalization (Dyck and Arita, 2014)

OPEC represents the other important remnant of public involvement

in international commodity markets The governments of the cartel’s member countries have remained the completely dominant owners of the oil industry (the UAE is an exception) The governments, not their companies, in most cases shape policy in terms of investments, output, and prices, as well as with regard to exploration and the volume and direction of investments The governments appoint the management, often on political merit, and they also control the financial resources available to their oil industry (for details see Chapter 4) Events in Bolivia, Russia, and Venezuela in the mid-2000 decade suggest that the temptation to nationalize oil and gas remains, especially when prices and profits are high

24 The Historical Framework

Later chapters will have more to say on the market distortions caused by remaining public policy in the commodities field, and on the implications of persistent state ownership in some of the primary resource industries

Despite these important exceptions, it is reasonable to claim that the era of state interventionism in commodities is well past its peak, and that market forces have been allowed to play a greatly increased role in the international commodity markets since the late 1980s But one should not be too sure The recently increasing popularity of state control in some places may be a harbinger of a new wave of nation-alistic public intervention in the resource industries after a 30-year withdrawal However that may be, it is instructive to be aware of the perspective of the 50-year flood of state involvement between 1930 and 1980, followed by an ebb in the most recent decades, as the subject matters of the following chapters evolve

1.4 Transformation of the Resource Landscape – The Role

of Emerging Asia

Since the dawn of the twenty-first century the demand for natural resources has been surging The main driver for this is the develop-ment of large emerging economies in Asia, especially China and India.3Incomes in these countries are rising at a pace that have never been seen before China and India, whose population together is about 2.5 billion, have been doubling their real per capita income levels every

12 and 16 years, respectively This can be compared to the UK, which doubled its real per capita income level during the entire Industrial Revolution, which lasted for 150 years (Madison, 2007) Considering this exceptional rise in income levels for such large populations, the effect on the world economy from the emerging economies in Asia can therefore be seen as transforming the entire resource landscape.Demand for primary commodities (energy, minerals, and agricultural products) by emerging economies increases especially quickly during

3 Emerging Asia, as defined by the IMF, includes China, India, and the ASEAN-5 (i.e., Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) Other emerging economies are Brazil, Turkey, Russia, and South Africa The IMF classification for

“Emerging and Developing Economies” contains 152 countries, with 29 countries for “Emerging and Developing Asia” (IMF, biannual, 2015 April).

1.4 Transformation of the Resource Landscape 25

the period when they are in the resource-intensive phase of their economic development, as discussed in relation to Figure 1.2 The impact on demand for primary commodities from China and India is particularly strong, given their exceptional population size and pace of growth It is expected that in the coming years large proportions of the population in these economies will enter the middle class The demand for cars, refrigerators, heating and cooling systems, and other residen-tial appliances is expected to intensify Large amounts of resources are also required for infrastructure as their urban populations expand More energy will be needed to accomplish growth in the household, commercial, and industrial sectors Demand for agricultural products (both food and nonfood) is also expected to increase to satisfy the higher nutritional standards of the growing middle class

Kharas (2010) has estimated that the size of the global middle class, defined as people in households with daily per capita incomes (PPP adjusted) between US$10 and US$100, is expected to increase from 1.8 billion people in 2009 to 3.2 billion in 2020 Almost all of this growth stems from China and India It is fair to assume that emerging Asia will be the leading consumer of primary commodities for many years to come The geographical shift in primary consumption patterns

in the world is further elaborated in Chapter 2

The commodities boom early in the present century provides ther evidence of the transformation of primary commodity markets

fur-as a consequence of the rapid economic growth in the emerging Asian giants World economic growth during the twentieth century mostly took place in parallel with decreasing real resource prices Even though demand for primary commodities increased substantially, it was eas-ily met by expanded supply The rise in supply was made possible by productivity increases due to technological developments that also led

to lower production costs In the twenty-first century, much like what occurred in shipping, the unprecedented rate of increase in demand for primary commodities has not been matched by a parallel increase

in supply, so prices have been pushed up The failure of supply to rise

in line with demand was caused by the suddenness and strength of the growth in demand, exacerbated by more challenging access to new supply sources augmenting the cost of extraction (Dobbs et al., 2013) Only in the most recent years (2013 onwards) have signs emerged of commodity markets regaining a better balance Large investments in new production capacity have matured, while China’s economic growth

26 The Historical Framework

and commodity demand have decelerated A substantial downward price adjustment has followed Historically, the role of emerging economies for primary commodity markets has always been impor-tant What was exceptional early in the twenty-first century has been the fact that the emerging economies represented more than a third

of the world population, while their growth rates were unprecedented The result was an explosion in commodity demand and commodity prices Chapter 5 provides a detailed account of the relationships sketched in the present paragraph

1.5 Conclusion

The main findings of this historical overview of some aspects of commodity markets are stated below:

1 Economic development almost invariably reduces the role played

by commodities in the macroeconomy Poor, undeveloped mies produce raw materials and consume them after only limited processing As economies advance, the scope for further and more sophisticated processing increases, as does the scope for the expan-sion of activities with limited raw material input needs, notably the service sector But while (with few exceptions) the primary share of GDP shrinks as economies develop, it is essential to keep in mind that commodities are indispensable, and that no society, however economically advanced, can survive without their assured supply

2 Historically the production and consumption of commodities was basically a national affair Excepting expensive luxury goods, like coffee and precious metals, commodities were simply too expensive

to transport across borders and oceans The secular fall in port costs has greatly increased international trade in commodities, making it possible to move production to locations which offer the lowest cost opportunities In the twenty-first century, imports of commodities throughout the world account for a very sizable share

trans-of consumption This holds even for cheap bulk products like iron ore and natural gas

3 The 50-year period between 1930 and 1980 was characterized

by deep nationalist state intervention in the resource sector This period was preceded and followed by periods of highly liberal government attitudes, with substantial scope for market forces in

1.5 Conclusion 27

commodity production and trade Recent efforts in some countries

to increase the government’s grip over natural resources may be a harbinger of a new wave of state involvement, but currently one cannot be sure The efforts could alternatively be a response to the 2000s commodity boom, and could dissipate as commodity prices fall when the boom comes to an end

4 Since the dawn of the twenty-first century, income levels in emerging Asia, especially China and India, have increased at an unprecedented pace Demand for primary commodities generated by emerging Asia

is currently dominating world demand, and is expected to continue

to grow as increasing proportions of these countries’ population enters the middle class Despite the recent sharp declines in primary commodity prices, which indicate the end of an unusually strong and extended commodity boom, the demand for primary commodities will remain elevated for many years to come in order to satisfy the needs of the growing middle class in emerging Asia

The Geography of Commodity

Production and Trade

The agenda for this chapter comprises four items presented in secutive sections The first section defines primary commodities and classifies them into a variety of distinct groups These distinctions are important for some of the analyses performed in later chapters The second section attempts to determine the significance of commodities

con-in the con-international economy, at both the aggregate and con-individual product levels The third section paints a broad picture of the cur-rent geography of traded commodity production and consumption The import dependence of the major industrial regions on overseas commodity supply is explored and quantified, and the most important commodity-exporting countries are identified in the process Finally, section four assumes an historical perspective and considers briefly the forces that have led to the increasing dependence of Western Europe, the USA, Japan, and, more recently, China and India, on commodity imports over the past 100 years

2.1 Commodity Groups and Their Characteristics

The subject matter of this book is the world of raw materials, tively referred to as primary commodities or, for short, commodities

alterna-A first important task is therefore to distinguish commodities from other goods This distinction may sound straightforward and clear, but however one proceeds, substantial ambiguities remain Some of these were briefly touched upon in the preceding chapter

The national accounts statistics of individual countries divide GDP

in accordance with the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) of All Economic Activities, as designed by the United Nations Statistical Office The GDP is obtained by aggregating the value added from the primary sector, comprising agriculture (including hunting, forestry, and fishing), mining (including extraction of fossil fuels), and utilities; the secondary sector (basically manufacturing); and

2