The work of the maritime and coastguard agency

As part of our ongoing inquiry into Department for Transport-related Executive Agencies and Non-Departmental Bodies, we took oral evidence from Captain Stephen Bligh, Chief Executive, an

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Contents

Summary 3

Implementation of Integrated Coastguard Communication System and Incident

Summary

The Maritime and Coastal Agency has a vital role in preserving life It does this through its work on ship safety, and through its Coastguard work Forerunners to this Committee have examined the Agency in the past, and expressed grave concerns about its management of Coastguard operations We are concerned the problems still continue Since 1998, the number of incidents, accidents and deaths in the United Kingdom search and rescue region has risen The Agency has no clear analysis of the reasons for this The number of rescue coordination centres has been cut; the Agency has no clear analysis of the effect that this has had on response times We are so concerned at the apparent absence of any strategic analysis that we believe an independent review is necessary to establish whether the Agency’s actions have contributed to the increase in fatalities around our coast

Individual coastguard officers may perform heroically, but individual effort will not compensate for insufficient staff on duty, or for staff expected to undertake tasks for which they are not qualified Our inquiry revealed a routine acceptance that coastguard stations will frequently be staffed at, or even below, the minimum complement The Agency has defined staff competences, but has no system for ensuring that underqualified staff are not called on to provide cover for long periods

Moreover, the Agency is failing in its duty to give a clear lead when Government policy may have implications for safety at sea Far too often, it is left responding to developments, rather than taking the initiative We believe there are still serious problems within the Agency, which its new Chief Executive will have to address

1 Introduction

1 As part of our ongoing inquiry into Department for Transport-related Executive Agencies and Non-Departmental Bodies, we took oral evidence from Captain Stephen Bligh, Chief Executive, and Mr Neil Goodall, Finance Director, of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) on 31 March 2004

2 Our predecessor Committee reported on the MCA in 1999 and again, as part of a broader inquiry into a number of Executive Agencies, in 2001.1 Those Reports identified a number of concerns we wished to revisit; we also wished to hear Captain Bligh’s views—as the relatively recently appointed Chief Executive of the Agency 2—on the priorities for, and challenges facing, the MCA On the basis of a single evidence session, this Report does not cover every aspect of the MCA’s activities, but focuses on the areas about which we are concerned and where we seek improvements

3 We are grateful to the MCA for their oral evidence and follow-up written memoranda

We are also grateful to the following organisations for their written evidence: the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds; the Royal Yachting Association; the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS); the Inland Waterways Association; and the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) We have also been greatly assisted in this inquiry by our Specialist Adviser, Professor James McConville

1 Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee, Sixth Report of Session 1998-99, The Maritime and Coastguard Agency, HC 31; and Seventh Report of Session 2000-01, The Transport-Related Executive Agencies of the

Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, HC 1224

2 Appointed 1 September 2003

2 The Maritime and Coastguard Agency

Role of the MCA

4 The Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) and the Coastguard Agency merged on 1 April 1998

to form the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) The Agency “is responsible throughout the UK for implementing the Government’s maritime safety policy That includes co-ordinating search and rescue at sea through Her Majesty’s Coastguard, and checking that ships meet UK and international safety rules… [The Agency] works to prevent the loss of lives at the coast and at sea, to ensure that ships are safe, and to prevent coastal pollution… [It is] putting increasing effort into prevention work and a measure of [its] success is when accidents do not happen, or where [it] intervenes to minimise their impact.”3 The Agency’s slogan is Safer Lives, Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas

5 The Agency, which in 2002-03 employed 1,100 staff and had a net operating cost of

£105, 095, 000,4 seeks to achieve four outcomes:

x A reduced rate of accidents, and accident related deaths, involving UK Registered merchant ships and fishing vessels

x A reduced number of accidents, and deaths resulting from accidents, within the

UK Search and Rescue Region and Coastline

x A reduced number of incidents of pollution from shipping activities in the UK pollution control zone

x An enhanced safety record for the Red Ensign Fleet.5

Scrutiny of the MCA in the previous Parliament

6 Our predecessor Committee’s Report into the MCA in February 1999 expressed concern that the Agency was planning to close four (out of 21) maritime rescue co-ordination centres (Oban, Pentland, Tyne Tees and Liverpool) and that Portland and Solent centres were to be co-located The Committee recommended that all 21 stations remain open Subsequently, the decision to close the Liverpool station and co-locate Portland and Solent was rescinded When it looked at the Agency again in 2001 as part of its inquiry into the Department’s Executive Agencies, the Committee: urged the Agency to modernise management structures; noted the need for adequate numbers of suitably qualified staff to

be on duty at Coastguard stations; re-iterated the Committee’s opposition to the closure programme; and expressed concern about the introduction and operation of the new digital Integrated Coastguard Communications System (ICCS) We revisit these issues in this Report

3 www.mcga.gov.uk

4 Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Annual Report and Accounts 2002-03, HC 863, pp 50 and 63

5 Ibid., p 8

Safety

Incidents, accidents and deaths

7 As noted above, one of the principal outcomes the MCA strives to achieve is “a reduced number of accidents, and deaths resulting from accidents in the UK search and rescue region” However, the number of incidents, accidents and deaths increased significantly between 1998 and 2002:

Table1: Incidents, Accidents and Deaths, 1998-2002

Data Source: MCA Annual Report 2002-03, p 91; percentages inserted by Transport Committee

8 It is particularly alarming that the numbers of deaths has risen more sharply than those

of incidents and accidents The MCA’s Annual Report states that “this is a worrying trend and supports our strategic objective to redirect our coastguard expertise into a more coherent and sustained accident prevention strategy based on education, information and advice It is accidents to people swimming, and walking on beaches and cliffs that has increased, whilst accidents involving vessels has decreased We are planning to undertake a series of quarterly sample surveys of potential customers, to gain a better understanding of their safety awareness and how best to promote our safety messages.”6

9 We pressed Captain Bligh to explain why the number of incidents, accidents and deaths has been increasing He said that greater analysis was needed but noted that: there might be some double-reporting of incidents and accidents;7 not all the deaths were related to maritime incidents;8 and that statistics on the exposure of the public to coastal areas were not available.9 These responses were not wholly convincing: double-counting of incidents and accidents would not account for the increase in deaths, as Captain Bligh conceded; and the fact that not all the deaths were related to marine incidents was presumably also the case in 1998, and so does not explain the increase Finally, the MCA does not know if more people are engaging in activities on or near the coast: such an increase – if it has occurred – might be a factor in the increased numbers of incidents and accidents, but would not explain why deaths had increased at an even greater rate There was a clear increase in the number of incidents in 1999; by 2000, the increase in the number of accidents was marked; although the significant increase in deaths in 2001 might have been considered a statistical

quirk, by 2002 it should have given cause for concern We are shocked that when we took

evidence in 2004 the Agency was unable to demonstrate that it had already analysed the reasons for the increases in incidents, accidents and deaths since 1998 This displays a

6 Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Annual Report and Accounts 2002-03, HC 863, p 8

7 Q 29

8 Q 32

9 Q 43

worrying inability to note trends, and to take the necessary action to make sure the Agency understands them.

10 Given that the MCA were unable to provide a convincing explanation, we asked whether three important aspects of the Agency’s performance – the reduced number of rescue co-ordination centres, the time taken to respond to incidents, and staffing levels – were factors in the increasing numbers of incidents, accidents and deaths We now turn to each of those factors

Closure of rescue co-ordination centres

11 Asked about the consequences of the closure of Oban, Pentland and Tyne Tees Centres, Captain Bligh said “I am not aware of any consequences of the closure of those three stations.”10 However, this is perhaps not surprising - or confidence-inspiring - given that he was also unaware of any assessment of the impact of the closures having been carried out by the MCA.11

12 In its subsequent written evidence to the Committee, the MCA stated that

Since the closure of Oban, Pentland and Tyne Tees, regular exercises have been carried out to ensure the operation integrity of the areas taken over by other co- ordination centres Moreover, the search and rescue (SAR) resources and response are discussed at the local SAR committees and marine safety groups for the areas in question In addition, the SAR levels of activity are frequently and regularly risk appraised In short, the operational integrity of all Agency areas of responsibility is kept under review There has been no reduction of Coastguard Rescue Teams on the ground locally, and there has been absolutely no evidence of safety being jeopardised.12

We note the MCA’s assertion that the closure of three rescue co-ordination centres has not resulted in safety being jeopardised We would have greater confidence in such an assertion if it were based on a full assessment of the impact of the closures The risk appraisals already undertaken do not constitute such an assessment; otherwise the Agency’s Chief Executive would have referred to them in his oral evidence

13 The MCA should carry out a full assessment of the impact of the closures of Oban,

Pentland and Tyne Tees rescue co-ordination centres This assessment should cover, as a minimum, any impact of the closures on:

x Time taken to decide on appropriate search and rescue responses and to initiate action;

x Time taken for Coastguard Response Units to arrive at the scene of an incident; and

x The prevalence of incidents, accidents and deaths

10 Q 60

11 Qq 70-71

12 Ev 27

Until such an assessment has been undertaken the MCA’s claims that safety has not been jeopardised will be impossible to verify.

Time taken to respond to incidents

14 One of the MCA’s Ministerial Key Targets for 2003-04 was:

In at least 96% of incidents, take a decision on the appropriate search and rescue (SAR) response to accidents and life threatening situations and initiate action if necessary within five minutes of being alerted.13

This applies to action in the rescue coordination centres The MCA met the Target comfortably in 2002-03, with decisions taken within 5 minutes in 99% of cases

15 In addition, there are targets for the coastguard response units themselves The relevant Agency “Service Standard” is

For the Coastguard to arrive on the scene of an incident within 30 minutes of a response unit being activated.14

The Agency met the Service Standard on 97.6% of occasions, but even so there were 206 incidents which Coastguard Rescue Teams failed to reach within 30 minutes of being activated

16 Impressive performance against both the Target and the Service Standard reflects the hard work and dedication exhibited by staff on the ground Nevertheless, our investigation suggested that even here the Agency did not take a sufficiently strategic view We asked Captain Bligh why Coastguard Response Teams failed to meet the Service Standard on 206 occasions and what the impact of this had been Captain Bligh “did not have the information with him”15 and said he had not undertaken a study of the 206 incidents.16 However, in written evidence provided subsequently, the MCA said that

the Agency does not hold records of how much outside our exacting Standard time

of 30 minutes these occurrences were, however in every case the Teams arrived at the scene and carried out their duties, and safety was not affected in any of the 206 incidents Also, there were no instances of complaints or investigations resulting from any of them Delays in arrival were primarily due to traffic congestion.17

17 We are extremely surprised to hear that these figures are not kept, particularly since the PCS told us that “every Coastguard Operations room has … a logging system that indicates when the first call came into the operations room, when a rescue asset was alerted,

despatched, on scene …”18 (our emphasis) Be that as it may, we do not understand how the

13 HC Deb, 10 April 2003, col 32WS

Agency can state that safety was not affected in any of the 206 cases in which teams arrived late, if it does not know how much outside the 30 minute Standard they arrived Given the time-sensitive nature of the rescues undertaken (for example, involving mud rescue teams

or cliff rescue teams), it stretches credulity to believe that there was not a single incident in which safety was not compromised

18 The MCA should monitor the time taken for Coastguard response teams to arrive at

Watch Staffing Levels

19 The PCS made a number of claims about staffing levels, including the following:

…it has become commonplace… to operate on minimum staffing levels rather than the recommended level… The minimum staffing level can be defined as the level that is capable of supporting the normal level of incident activity without the margin

of safety.19

20 Giving oral evidence, Captain Bligh said that 90% of watches were run at recommended levels.20 When we probed further, he also said that up to 10% of watches each month are staffed below minimum levels.21 Table 2, based on data provided by the MCA, shows the number of watches operated at minimum, and below minimum, levels for March 2003 to February 2004

19 Ev 22

20 Q 47

21 Qq 48-56

Table 2: Watch operation levels

Total watches

Total at

or above recom’d Level

Total at minimum level

% of total

Total below minimum level

Data Source: Ev., p 29; percentages and average inserted by Transport Committee

21 Far from having 90 per cent of watches being staffed at recommended levels, nearly a third are run at or below minimum levels When we asked about the implications of operating regularly at minimum levels, Captain Bligh said “I do not believe there are any safety implications in running at the minimum level.”22 He also claimed that at times when watches operated below minimum level other staff were undertaking training in new technology on the premises.23

22 In contrast, the PCS drew our attention to the MAIB report on the fatality at Loch Ryan As the PCS pointed out, the report found

the watch manning level at Belfast MRSC did not meet the minimum requirement of four, as defined by Coastguard guidelines In addition, the three members of staff on duty were all probationary and acting above their substantive ranks in the positions they held during that watch… although Clyde did meet the minimum on the evening watch… it failed to meet the recommended requirement of five staff…24 During the incident the MAIB found

22 Q 55

23 Q 53

24 Ev 22

The Clyde Coastguard watch assistant dealing with VHF channel 16 monitored the yacht’s “Pan Pan” call to Belfast Coastguard and made a typing error in omitting the decimal point in the minutes of latitude His attempt to correct the error resulted in

an anomalous entry (009 9) Typographical errors are to be expected in the normal course of events, particularly when complex messages are being précised in real time The watch assistant’s failure to make an unambiguous correction might have been,

in part, because of inexperience….25

23 As a result of this error, the search and rescue helicopter was initially directed to the wrong place We do not wish to castigate those involved in this incident; we are concerned with the underlying problems As the MAIB says

the procedures used in managing an incident do not seem to provide a robust defence against transmission of simple typing errors In part this is probably because

of the workload involved in the early stages of an incident…26

The MAIB concluded:

The Belfast Coastguard team was undermanned (below minimum level) and Clyde Coastguard team was manned at below the recommended level The three people on duty in Belfast were all acting above their substantive ranks Under-resourcing possibly contributed to high workload which, in turn, contributed to the errors made.27

We would add that in a larger team someone might have spotted the mistake in time to send the helicopter to the correct location

24 We note the MAIB report made no reference to the presence of other qualified people

on site able to assist the Belfast team This evidence seems to undermine Captain Bligh’s assertion that running watches at minimum levels has no safety implications

25 Captain Bligh suggested that the staffing levels set out in Operational Advice Note/122, which were set in 2001, had been superseded by new technology.28 In written evidence we were told that that an interim operational advice note allowed the relaxation of existing arrangements.29 We note that a review of staffing levels is underway, and in the interim, the levels set out in the existing Operational Advice Note would be used as guidance, and watch levels would be set on the basis of risk assessment by district operations managers and watch managers trained for the task.30

26 For the year March 2003-February 2004, monthly figures showed that between 5.7%

and 12.4% of all watches were staffed below the minimum level Over the year as a

25 Marine Accident Investigation Branch, Report on the investigation of the swamping and foundering of a 4.6m grp open sports boat with the loss of three lives on Loch Ryan south-west Scotland 12 July 2003, Report No 5/2004 April

whole 8.6% of watches were staffed below minimum levels It is unacceptable that, month after month, nearly a third of all watches are operating at or below minimum levels We expect to receive a full briefing on the results of the staffing review when it has reported Given the seemingly inexorable rise in the number of incidents, accidents and deaths, we would need to hear very convincing arguments before condoning any diminution of recommended or minimum staffing levels.

27 The interim relaxation of arrangements would be acceptable only if we could be certain that managers were given the staff they considered necessary The PCS claimed that “watch managers who complete risk assessments and request extra staff are being told that the vacancy will not be filled and they are to run with the staff they have got”.31 In contrast, MCA told us that “there have been no requests from Watch Managers to HR or Regional Management for additional staff in the last 12 months”.32 The PCS maintained that the appropriate route for such requests was through District Management.33 We asked the MCA for clarification of this point They told us:

There have been no recorded requests through District Operations Managers for additions to the complement of Rescue Centres during the last 12 months Records

of such requests would have been kept – in the case of written requests copies of these would have been retained, and in the case of verbal requests these would have been recorded at management meetings.34

We cannot decide between these competing claims, but it is clear from the PCS’s comment that Coastguards themselves have little faith that watches have the staff they need with the

skills they need We understand the interim arrangements until the staffing review is

completed will be that existing recommended and minimum watch levels are to be treated as guidance and watch levels will be set on the basis of risk assessment This will only be acceptable if it is guaranteed that managers will receive the staff that the risk assessments show they need.

Accident prevention

28 Captain Bligh has stressed his commitment to accident prevention which, he told us,

“has to go right across the Agency as a whole”.35 A new accident prevention branch has been set up and a research programme is underway As part of the increased emphasis being placed on prevention, which we welcome, the Agency has developed a new Target In 2003-04, the Target was:

Ensure that at least 5% of available Coastguard time is spent on prevention activity36

This has been superseded by the following Target for 2004-05:

Develop a robust statistical base and design a system which will allow the Agency to measure accurately the impact of its incident prevention activity.37

29 In written evidence, Captain Bligh said

The Agency has always been involved in actively preventing shipping accidents… Until recently, we have been less proactive in coastal incident prevention, having considered that to be an operational search and rescue function However, I see this

as requiring a similar approach to that already taken in relation to shipping: identifying the root causes of an accident, determining what can be done to address the cause, balancing the risks and the costs, and taking appropriate action on the basis of that analysis We have therefore brought our risk analysis and prevention co- ordination functions together This will allow us to make the best use of the available skills, by enabling us to take a more strategic approach to incident prevention, rather than requiring shipping standards and operational activities to be considered separately as in the past.38

30 We welcome the Agency’s commitment to accident prevention, and appreciate the

need for a Target which allows the Agency to assess more accurately which methods of accident prevention are effective We assume that the new Target is a transitional one and that, once a system is in place by which types of preventative work can be assessed,

it will be superseded by a Target which challenges the Agency to implement a range of effective prevention programmes.

Incidents, Accidents and Deaths: Conclusions

31 The rising numbers of incidents, accidents and deaths are very worrying We are concerned that the Agency has a tendency to explain these by referring to factors outside its control while maintaining that actions for which it has responsibility—the closure of rescue co-ordination centres, the time taken to respond to incidents, and staffing levels— have no safety implications The Agency’s Chief Executive cannot confidently maintain that these factors have no safety implications while conceding that he did “not have a straightforward answer” as to why deaths have increased39 and that he did not have

“detailed enough knowledge of each of those individual deaths to be able to identify what was the primary cause”.40

32 The Maritime and Coastguard Agency has failed to review sufficiently swiftly its actions in the light of the increasing numbers of incidents, accidents and deaths The Department for Transport should therefore commission an external independent review As well as considering factors such as suicides and use of coastal areas by the public, that review should include the MCA’s responsibilities, and in particular should examine the effect of closing rescue co-ordination centres; the time taken to respond to incidents; and staffing levels

37 HC Deb, 1 April 2004, col 99WS

38 Ev 31

39 Q 35

40 Q 42

Implementation of Integrated Coastguard Communication System and Incident Management System

33 MCA’s 2002-03 Annual Report states that “the installation and implementation of the Integrated Coastguard Communication System (ICCS) at all of our Coastguard Co- ordination Centres and our Training Centre was completed in February 2003 This has been a most successful project and was delivered on time and within budget We have also similarly implemented the first two phases of the Incident Management System (IMS) Development of the third phase is ongoing, and represents a major leap forward in incident, message and report handling and most significantly, management information collection and reporting We hope to have this completed in August 2004.”41

34 PCS’s written evidence stated that “the radio communications part of this new technology is working well and has been well received by our members However…the command and control side called ‘Vision’ is cause for concern and its installation has been suspended.”42

35 In oral evidence, Captain Bligh said “the ICCS system is working well”,43 although he noted that there had been “isolated incidents”, “a couple of problems with the infrastructure” and one “major failure” caused by a lightning strike at a centre in Falmouth.44 In supplementary written evidence, the MCA gave more details of this major incident; and also of nine further incidents as a result of which, it stated, there was no loss

of distress and safety service However, the “initial comments” relating to these incidents makes it clear that these problems were, at the least, disruptive:

x “ICCS – unable to change radio channels – error message on monitor (a serious error has occurred while writing to drive C) system locked & unable to change over servers” (of an incident in London);

x “Both 999 & one ex directory telephone line lost” (Humber);

x “Thames Barrier Navigational Centre – loss of sound all VHF and phones” (London – Woolwich);

x “ICCS screens continually faulting – hampering use” (Aberdeen).45

36 Given the evidence that the radio communications part of the new technology seemed

to be working well, but that there were reported problems with Vision – the command and

control part of the system – the Committee asked whether the latter had been suspended Captain Bligh said that it had not been suspended,46 but that there was a “temporary stop”

41 Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Annual Report and Accounts 2002-03, HC 863, p 21

before “rolling the system out.”47 However, Captain Bligh was confident that the entire system would be in place by November 2004.48

37 New technology frequently takes longer to refine than originally envisaged, and the

implementation date for IMS has already slipped from August to November 2004 The

MCA must ensure that the Incident Management System is not implemented until all the problems so far encountered have been fully resolved, even if that requires a further delay

Staff issues

Qualifications and competencies

38 Captain Bligh told us that it was his belief that “over a period of time, we will find ourselves in a position where those traditional pools of recruitment from which we are able

to draw will become less and less So we need to find a way of possibly developing our own people for the future, through training.”49 The “traditional pools” to which Captain Bligh referred included entrants with formal qualifications The potential diminution of candidates with suitable qualifications, often coupled with some form of maritime experience and expertise, has been one of the factors in the drawing up of a “competence- based recruitment system”, whereby the competencies required for each post are identified and candidates assessed against them (on a system of levels from 0 – “no knowledge required” – to 4 – “Specialist”– for technical and non-technical competencies; and at

“standard”, “higher” and “advanced” levels for behavioural competencies) Some, but not all, of the competencies are equivalent to formal qualifications.50

39 The MCA’s subsequent written evidence stated that

posts for certain categories of professionally qualified marine surveyor are already difficult to fill with suitably qualified personnel Within the last month we have needed to re-trawl three posts because, despite many applications, no suitable candidates were found The decade or so leading up to the mid-nineties had seen a decline in the UK shipping industry and fewer graduates choosing seafaring as a career Consequently, the pool of potential marine surveyors shrunk In the future

we will need to replace existing marine surveyors with home-grown professionals

We are already recruiting marine technicians who can acquire specialist skills in a surveyor development programme and over several years become fully competent as marine surveyors.51

40 The written evidence also stated that

for surveyor posts and all Coastguard posts excluding Coastguard Watch Assistants (Operations) (CWA(O)) there is a requirement to have some externally assessed

qualification(s), that demonstrates and confirms technical competence….The CWA (O) post requires a specific level of numeracy and literacy at the recruitment stage, all Coastguard technical competencies are developed by attending formal in-house training courses… All Coastguard Watch Assistants and Watch Officers must pass internally assessed examinations It is the intention to have these internal examinations externally accredited.”52

41 We wanted to know the degree to which postholders without externally or examination-based competencies were able to fill posts normally requiring them on a temporary basis The MCA’s written response acknowledged the value of externally assessed qualifications but also said that “if, for operational reasons, it is necessary for a person without formal qualifications to carry out some aspects of a post for a short time, it would be on the basis that they would have very strong and effective support and guidance from a formally qualified colleague” Asked what systems were in place to ensure that those without relevant validated competencies filling posts on a temporary basis could gain such validation, the MCA said that “there is no specific system or process in place” although it did outline more generally the means by which training requirements were identified and met.53

42 Given the likelihood of a future shortage of suitably qualified candidates for some

posts, it is only sensible that the MCA should seek ways to ensure its staff are up to the job However, in order to ensure that standards are not diluted, the Agency needs to ensure that its internally identified competencies are at least as stretching as comparable externally awarded qualifications The Agency needs to move quickly to ensure that its competency framework is externally assessed to ensure it is sufficiently rigorous.

43 The Agency’s responses about the circumstances in which unqualified staff might temporarily take on posts requiring qualifications suggested that its approach was entirely

ad hoc The MCA needs to draw up proper formal guidance – and stick to it –

stipulating: the circumstances in which unqualified staff may temporarily fill posts requiring specific qualifications or competencies; the regime in place to ensure such staff are sufficiently supported and monitored; and the steps to be taken to ensure that they receive the extra validations and/or qualifications required to fill the posts in question substantively.

Administration

44 In our study of the Department for Transport’s Annual Report we noted “the Spring Supplementary Estimate reclassified over £40 million of staff costs from administration costs to “other current” costs in February 2003” and that “frontline delivery staff in Departments and Departmental agencies are now charged to programme rather than to administration costs.”54 In the course of our hearing on the MCA it became clear that the reclassification had caused difficulties to the Agency, since its budget for 2002-2003 was

52 Ev 32

53 Ev 33

54 Transport Committee, Second Report of Session 2003-2004, The Departmental Annual Report, para 25

only finalised in February 2003, and the Agency “ended up losing £700,000”55 “10 or 11 months into the financial year”.56 It is entirely unsatisfactory that because of Treasury

adjustments the Maritime and Coastguard Agency did not have its 2003-03 budget settled until the financial year was almost over In these circumstances, no blame can attach to the Agency for the overspend While we support attempts to improve the accuracy of Government accounts, those making the improvements should be aware of the potential operational impact of their actions.

exploit new technology to detect pollution offences and to identify and trace offenders.” 58

46 We were disappointed to discover that the Agency’s Chief Executive did not seem to be aware of the PAC’s Report when giving evidence to us Asked what had been done to exploit new technology, Captain Bligh said “I do not have an answer.”59 Captain Bligh then recalled that “we are apparently working with the EU on a satellite monitoring project on detection of oil spills.”60

47 More generally, Captain Bligh did not seem to be championing innovative approaches

to tackling pollution When invited to do so, he could not offer any technological, regulatory or legislative changes he would like to see implemented in order to combat pollution.61 He was confident that the Agency had sufficient resources in this area.62

48 The MCA summarises its objectives as Safer Lives, Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas

However, the Agency’s Chief Executive appeared not to be briefed on a key Report about pollution from ships, was apparently unaware of the one example the Agency could muster as evidence of its exploitation of new technology, and could not suggest a single desirable legislative, regulatory or technological change The Department should review with the MCA the strategic approach provided by the Agency on pollution matters.

60 Q 98 The Agency subsequently provided the Committee with updates on the Public Accounts Committee conclusions

on Survey and Inspection and Dealing with Pollution from Ships (not printed)

61 Qq 91-92

62 Q 94

services In developing a new structure for the Department, an important priority has been

to strengthen the role and position of the agencies, ensuring they are fully engaged in shaping as well as delivering policy”; and that “In its policy development function, the MCA works closely in partnership with the Department’s Shipping Policy division.”63

50 In oral evidence, Captain Bligh said that the MCA had influenced policy on maritime security and had been involved in discussions on “a number of Directives and statutory instruments.”64 However, he also said “I am not aware of any major shipping policy issues that I have been directly involved with since I took office”65 and could not point to any specific outcomes achieved as a result of the MCA’s involvement in a policy debate.66

51 In subsequent written evidence, the Agency outlined the “regular formal and informal contact with DfT at all levels”, but, responding to a question about the policies it had influenced or changed, said that “our relationship with the Department works on a different basis… The Agency works collaboratively and collectively with its parent Department and respects the principle of a two-way ‘no surprises’ rule.”67

52 The RMT’s written evidence noted that

The MCA needs to be more aware of the wider DfT Government objectives for shipping and information needs to be effectively shared between the two organisations so that policy objectives can be pursued effectively.68

We are not convinced that the MCA is intervening effectively in the policy debate For example, it was clear from our evidence that the MCA did not consider itself to be an active participant in the policy debate on the siting of offshore windfarms When we first asked about this, we were told that the MCA’s role was to circulate guidance, after initial decisions had been taken Further questioning produced a response that the policy was the responsibility of “another department” (that is, the Department of Trade and Industry, rather than the Department for Transport) Finally we elicited the following exchange:

Captain Bligh: There have been a number of meetings between the Department of

Transport and the DTI

Chairman: At which we can take it you suggested it was not a good idea to build wind turbines in a navigable shipping lane, or am I misinterpreting what you say?

Captain Bligh: I am sure that advice was given.69

Captain Bligh made it clear that he had some “personal concerns” about development of policy on offshore wind farms It is astounding that he could not tell us clearly what he had

done to convey those concerns to others within government It is alarming that the

63 Department for Transport, Annual Report 2003, CM 5907, paras 2.12, 2.13 and 7.33

Agency’s Chief Executive could not give us specific examples of the MCA's influence on policy debates It is clear from the evidence we took on offshore wind farms that the MCA is not engaging properly with the policy development process The Department needs to ensure that the Agency’s views are fully taken into account at an early stage in the formulation of relevant policy But the principal onus is on the Agency itself to identify areas of emerging or deficient policy and to make coherent and pragmatic proposals to the Department The head of the government’s maritime safety agency has not only the right but the duty to make his views about matters which could affect the safety of navigation known to those formulating policy

Justification for policy

53 We also asked Captain Bligh to answer complaints from the Inland Waterways Association and the Royal Yachting Association that the Agency may be overregulating some activities He told us that he did not believe that the measures were disproportionate, but maintained that “I am not aware of a measurement technique to decide whether it was proportionate.”70 We asked for copies of the Agency’s regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) We note that they are brief in the extreme, and one, on the Introduction of Commercial Inland Waterways Boatmasters’ Licences, lacked any figures for costs The written evidence explained

The RIA on International Standards for Commercial Inland Waterway Vessels is only partial because there was a fundamental lack of national vessel information on which to base a complete one It was hoped that feed back from the consultation would provide some further information on vessels and likely costs.71

54 Cabinet Office guidance makes clear “the initial RIA provides a rough and ready assessment based on what is known This helps to identify gaps in knowledge and aids the collection of fuller, more accurate information, for example through external consultation This is then developed into a partial RIA which contains more detailed policy options and refined estimates of the costs and benefits.”72

55 As far as benefits are concerned, the RIA notes “This is an area for which accident statistics have never, up to now, been compiled Therefore it is difficult to quantify the positive effects on safety resulting from the proposal”.73 The RIA’s analysis of costs boils down to a guess at the cost of licences, a recognition that any increased costs will be difficult for the many small businesses in the sector to bear, and two blanks for the total costs in the first and subsequent years This is hardly a “refined estimate of the costs and benefits”

56 Not only does the MCA’s RIA contain no real figures for costs and benefits, it misstates the case for its policy The RIA claims that a national Boatmasters’ license, which is to apply to all commercial and passenger vessels, is made necessary by European Council

70 Q 181

71 Ev 29

72 Cabinet Office, A Quick Guide to Regulatory Impact Assessment

73 National Inland Waterways Boatmasters’ Licence, Regulatory Impact Assessment, section 3

Directive 96/50/EC.74 The Consultation Document claims that “as a member of the EC, the

UK is obliged to implement this directive.”75 In fact, Article 3 of the directive itself makes it clear that the directive does not apply to

x boatmasters of vessels intended for goods transport which are under 20 metres in length,

x boatmasters of vessels intended for passenger transport, which carry no more than 12 people in addition to the crew

57 In addition, it provides that:

A Member State may, after consulting the Commission, exempt from the application

of this Directive boatmasters operating exclusively on national waterways not linked

to the navigable network of another Member State and issue them with national boatmasters’ certificates, the conditions for obtaining which may differ from those defined in this Directive The validity of those national certificates shall in that case

be limited to those waterways

58 The MCA recognises that since the mainland United Kingdom has no national waterways linked to the navigable network of another Member State it would be possible to exempt national waterways, but claims an obligation to introduce “national measures that attain equivalent standards to those required by the Directive”.76 It is not clear to what extent the MCA has consulted the Commission as the Directive envisages, and whether this is a condition of exempting the UK from the Directive imposed by the Commission This is something the consultation or the RIA should make explicit The MCA also prays

in aid a commitment to revise the present Directive given in the EC Transport White Paper, even though “the EC has made little progress with this to date, so we do not yet know the details of the revisions”.77

59 Given that the Directive says that certificates for national waterways shall only be valid

on such waterways it is puzzling that the RIA claims that the UK National Boatmasters’ Licence should make it easier for any boatmaster who wished to work on inland waterways within the EU.78

60 The MCA claims that its proposals for boatmasters’ licences will not impose any

requirements that are more onerous than those of the Directive on Harmonisation of the conditions for obtaining national boatmasters’ certificates for the carriage of goods and passengers by inland waterways in the community In fact, they will apply standards to vessels not covered by the Directive This is gold plating at its worst. The MCA’s statement is true only in the sense that it does not apply the detailed technical

74 Ibid, section 1

75 National Inland Waterways Boatmasters’ Licence, Base Consultation Document, para 12

76 National Inland Waterways Boatmasters’ Licence, Base Consultation Document, para 12

77 National Inland Waterways Boatmasters’ Licence, Base Consultation Document, para 13

78 National Inland Waterways Boatmasters’ Licence, Regulatory Impact Assessment, section 3

requirements needed for navigation on major continental waterways to the entirely distinct United Kingdom system

61 The justification and cost and benefit analysis given for the proposals for an Inland

Waterways Boatmasters’ Licence is entirely inadequate If the MCA does not have the information it needs to make sensible policy, it should do the necessary research before

it makes proposals.

3 Future of the Agency

Rescue co-ordination centres

62 We have already noted that no full assessment of the closure of Oban, Pentland and Tyne Tees centres has been carried out In their written evidence, PCS claim that

The MCA had… made a commitment that there would be no station closures during the ten year life of the integrated communications and control rescue centres (ICCS) Despite the fact that the ICCS is still being installed… the Chief Executive has given Ministers a list of rescue centres that could be closed if there is the political will to do

so.79

63 Captain Bligh denied this claim when giving oral evidence and said “I have not given a list of rescue centres I have discussed the situation informally internally that, if I was required to do something, what would be some of the options that we would have to take if

we were asked to cut our costs I made a statement that we should be looking at these things I believe that it is my duty as Chief Executive at least to put these debates in the round…”80

64 We have criticised the Agency for not taking the initiative in forming policy It is

ironic that the only case of initiative we have found—a discussion of which rescue centres might be closed should the Agency be asked to make cuts—is entirely undesirable and destabilising It is unacceptable to contemplate further closures when there has been no full assessment of the closures already made, and the numbers of incidents, accidents and deaths are increasing.

Agency’s Remit

65 PCS’s written evidence stated that Captain Bligh told a management seminar “he would like to see one organisation covering all marine issues.”81 In oral evidence, Captain Bligh said he had been talking “in general terms” and that he needed “to understand more about the organisation themselves” Pressed by our Chairman, he conceded that he was not resiling from the statement, but saying “not yet”.82

66 The Agency’s existing remit is extensive With a very high degree of dedication and professionalism, its staff do the important work of responding to incidents on the coast and at sea, dealing with pollution incidents, managing the shipping register, inspecting foreign registered ships visiting UK ports, and ensuring seafarers are qualified and competent The comments made in this Report reflect on the need for those at the top

of the Agency give its staff the leadership they deserve On the evidence we have taken, the MCA has failed to intervene effectively in the policy debate Its own policy proposals are made without proper analysis Most damningly, when accidents and

79 Ev 22

80 Q 75

81 Ev 22

82 Qq 18-20

deaths are rising, it has both failed to conduct timely research into the reasons for this increase and appears entirely complacent about the consistent understaffing of its maritime rescue co-ordination centres The new Chief Executive has serious problems

to tackle; we are far from confident he recognises them Until he addresses the areas we have identified, we see absolutely no case for considering an extension of the MCA’s remit to other areas

Conclusions and recommendations

We note the MCA’s assertion that the closure of three rescue co-ordination centres has not resulted in safety being jeopardised We would have greater confidence in such an assertion if it were based on a full assessment of the impact of the closures (Paragraph 12)

The MCA should carry out a full assessment of the impact of the closures of Oban, Pentland and Tyne Tees rescue co-ordination centres Until such an assessment has been undertaken the MCA’s claims that safety has not been jeopardised will be impossible to verify (Paragraph 13)

The MCA should monitor the time taken for Coastguard response teams to arrive at incidents so that:

x the exact time of response is recorded in each case where the 30 minute Standard is not met and an assessment made of the impact of the failure to reach the Standard;

x the national situation can be assessed to see whether the Standard is breached in certain areas more frequently than others and what the implications are of any such variation.(Paragraph 18)

For the year March 2003-February 2004, monthly figures showed that between 5.7% and 12.4% of all watches were staffed below the minimum level Over the year as a whole 8.6% of watches were staffed below minimum levels It is unacceptable that, month after month, nearly a third of all watches are operating at or below minimum levels We expect to receive a full briefing on the results of the staffing review when it has reported Given the seemingly inexorable rise in the number of incidents, accidents and deaths, we would need to hear very convincing arguments before condoning any diminution of recommended or minimum staffing levels (Paragraph 26)

We understand the interim arrangements until the staffing review is completed will

be that existing recommended and minimum watch levels are to be treated as guidance and watch levels will be set on the basis of risk assessment This will only be acceptable if it is guaranteed that managers will receive the staff that the risk assessments show they need (Paragraph 27)

We welcome the Agency’s commitment to accident prevention, and appreciate the need for a Target which allows the Agency to assess more accurately which methods

of accident prevention are effective We assume that the new Target is a transitional

one and that, once a system is in place by which types of preventative work can be assessed, it will be superseded by a Target which challenges the Agency to implement

a range of effective prevention programmes (Paragraph 30)

The MCA must ensure that the Incident Management System is not implemented until all the problems so far encountered have been fully resolved, even if that requires a further delay (Paragraph 37)

Staff Issues

Given the likelihood of a future shortage of suitably qualified candidates for some posts, it is only sensible that the MCA should seek ways to ensure its staff are up to the job However, in order to ensure that standards are not diluted, the Agency needs

to ensure that its internally identified competencies are at least as stretching as comparable externally awarded qualifications The Agency needs to move quickly to ensure that its competency framework is externally assessed to ensure it is sufficiently rigorous (Paragraph 42)

The MCA needs to draw up proper formal guidance – and stick to it – stipulating: the circumstances in which unqualified staff may temporarily fill posts requiring specific qualifications or competencies; the regime in place to ensure such staff are sufficiently supported and monitored; and the steps to be taken to ensure that they receive the extra validations and/or qualifications required to fill the posts in question substantively (Paragraph 43)

It is entirely unsatisfactory that because of Treasury adjustments the Maritime and

Coastguard Agency did not have its 2003-03 budget settled until the financial year was almost over In these circumstances, no blame can attach to the Agency for the overspend While we support attempts to improve the accuracy of Government accounts, those making the improvements should be aware of the potential

operational impact of their actions (Paragraph 44)

Tackling Pollution

The MCA summarises its objectives as Safer Lives, Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas However, the Agency’s Chief Executive appeared not to be briefed on a key Report about pollution from ships, was apparently unaware of the one example the Agency could muster as evidence of its exploitation of new technology, and could not suggest

a single desirable legislative, regulatory or technological change The Department

should review with the MCA the strategic approach provided by the Agency on pollution matters (Paragraph 48)

It is alarming that the Agency’s Chief Executive could not give us specific examples

of the MCA's influence on policy debates It is clear from the evidence we took on offshore wind farms that the MCA is not engaging properly with the policy development process The Department needs to ensure that the Agency’s views are fully taken into account at an early stage in the formulation of relevant policy But

the principal onus is on the Agency itself to identify areas of emerging or deficient

policy and to make coherent and pragmatic proposals to the Department The head

of the government’s maritime safety agency has not only the right but the duty to make his views about matters which could affect the safety of navigation known to those formulating policy (Paragraph 52)

The MCA claims that its proposals for boatmasters’ licences will not impose any requirements that are more onerous than those of the Directive on Harmonisation of the conditions for obtaining national boatmasters’ certificates for the carriage of goods and passengers by inland waterways in the community In fact, they will apply standards to vessels not covered by the Directive This is gold plating at its worst (Paragraph 60)

The justification and cost and benefit analysis given for the proposals for an Inland Waterways Boatmasters’ Licence is entirely inadequate If the MCA does not have the information it needs to make sensible policy, it should do the necessary research before it makes proposals (Paragraph 61)

Future of the Agency

We have criticised the Agency for not taking the initiative in forming policy It is ironic that the only case of initiative we have found—a discussion of which rescue centres might be closed should the Agency be asked to make cuts—is entirely undesirable and destabilising It is unacceptable to contemplate further closures when there has been no full assessment of the closures already made, and the numbers of incidents, accidents and deaths are increasing (Paragraph 64)

The Agency’s existing remit is extensive With a very high degree of dedication and professionalism, its staff do the important work of responding to incidents on the coast and at sea, dealing with pollution incidents, managing the shipping register, inspecting foreign registered ships visiting UK ports, and ensuring seafarers are qualified and competent The comments made in this Report reflect on the need for those at the top of the Agency give its staff the leadership they deserve On the evidence we have taken, the MCA has failed to intervene effectively in the policy debate Its own policy proposals are made without proper analysis Most damningly, when accidents and deaths are rising, it has both failed to conduct timely research into the reasons for this increase and appears entirely complacent about the consistent understaffing of its maritime rescue co-ordination centres The new Chief Executive has serious problems to tackle; we are far from confident he recognises them Until he addresses the areas we have identified, we see absolutely no case for considering an extension of the MCA’s remit to other areas (Paragraph 66)

Formal minutes

The following Declarations of Interest were made:

Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody: Member of the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen

Mr Brian H Donohoe, Mrs Louise Ellman and Mr George Stevenson: Members of Transport and General Workers’ Union

Miss Anne McIntosh: Holder of shares in First Group and Eurotunnel

The Committee deliberated

Draft Report (The Maritime and Coastguard Agency), proposed by the Chairman,

brought up and read

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph

Paragraphs 1 to 66 read and agreed to

Resolved, That the Report be the Fourteenth Report of the Committee to the House Ordered, That the Chairman do make the Report to the House

Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No 134 (Select committees (reports))

be applied to the Report

Ordered, That the Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee

be reported to the House.—(The Chairman.)

[Adjourned till Monday 5 July at 3.00pm

List of witnesses

Captain Stephen Bligh, and Mr Neil Goodall, Finance Director,

List of written evidence

Reports from the Transport Committee since 2002

Session 2003–04

Third Report The Regulation of Licensed Taxis and Private

Hire Vehicle Services in the UK

HC 215-I Fourth Report Transport Committee Annual Report 2002-03 HC 317 Fifth Report The Office of Fair Trading’s Response to the

Third Report of the Committee: The Regulation

of Licensed Taxis and Private Hire Vehicle Services in the UK

HC 418

British Transport Police The Rail Regulator’s Last Consultations The Work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency

Financial Protection for Air Travellers

Investment Plans

HC 38-I

First Special Report Government and Office of Fair Trading

Responses to the Seventeenth Report of the Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee, The Bus Industry

First Special Report The Attendance of a Minister from HM Treasury

before the Transport, Local Government and The Regions Committee

HC 771

Second Special

Report

Government Response to the to the Fifth Report

of the Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee, Session 2001-02, European Transport White Paper

HC 1285

Third Special Report Government Response to the Eighteenth Report

of the Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee, Session 2001-02, National Air Traffic Services Finances

HC 1305

Oral evidence

Taken before the Transport Committee

on Wednesday 31 March 2004

Members present:

Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody, in the Chair

Mr Gregory Campbell Mrs Louise Ellman

Mr Brian H Donohoe Miss Anne McIntoshClive EVord Mr Graham Stringer

Witnesses: Captain Stephen Bligh, Chief Executive, and Mr Neil Goodall, Finance Director, Maritime and

Coastguard Agency, examined

Chairman: Good afternoon We have a little organisation rather than the view from the outside

Since I have done that, I have found, fundamentally,housekeeping to take care of first, if we may Perhaps

we can explain the ground rules to you afterwards a well-founded, well-structured and well-organised

organisation

Members having an interest to declare?

Clive EVord: Member of the Transport and General

Workers Union

Miss McIntosh:I have interests in Eurotunnel

Q4 Chairman:It has changed since I last looked at

Chairman:ASLEF

it I am sorry—do carry on

Mr Donohoe:Member of the Transport and General

Captain Bligh: I found a structured,

well-Workers Union

organised organisation that was in need of some

Mr Stringer:A member of Amicus and a director of

further evolutionary changes in its structure, to trythe Centre for Local Economic Strategies

to focus on some of the areas where we had had

Mrs Ellman: A member of the Transport and

weaknesses in the past and some of the areas whereGeneral Workers Union

I saw that there were weaknesses However, they aremainly of internal reorganisation, trying to prevent

Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon to you, Mr Bligh

what I refer to as silo operations We had areas of thePlease tell us who you are first, and who your business that seemed to be working to a remit thatcolleague is was very commendable and laudable for the

Captain Bligh: Good afternoon, Madam Chairman. particular area in which they were working, but it

My name is Stephen Bligh I am the Chief Executive

was sometimes diYcult to get a pan-agency

of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency My

perspective We worked in a fairly hierarchicalcolleague with me this afternoon is Neil Goodall,

management structure, and that hierarchicalwho is my Finance Director

management structure tended to lead to thingsoperating, as I said, in silos What I wanted to try to

Q2 Chairman:Did you have something you wanted do was to put more cross-cutting across the agency,

to say to the Committee before we begin? trying to get people to recognise other people’s

Captain Bligh: I do not have a general opening responsibility and what they were doing on our

address for the Committee overall message—which is obviously safer lives,

cleaner seas, safer ships—and for people to

Q3 Chairman:Perhaps I may ask you this You were understand what part they were playing within theappointed to the agency only last September What agency in fulfilling that There were some peopleare you priorities as Chief Executive? who were working very diligently on some projects

Captain Bligh: Since joining the agency, I thought that were part of the overall picture, but who did not

that my first priority was fully to understand the necessarily understand where they fitted in.

business I had been a customer of the Maritime and

Coastguard Agency all my working life I came to

the agency with some preconceived ideas, and I

Q5 Chairman:What part do the two silos, as you callthought that was a somewhat dangerous place to

them, play? What contribution, for example, do thestart I therefore needed to go out and to make sure

coastguard and the marine surveyors contribute tothat I properly understood the full working of the

your overall level of outcomes? Do they complementbusiness In the first six months of my appointment,

each other?

I have made sure that I have been out to all of our

Captain Bligh: I think that, first of all, it is

operation I have tried to engage with as many

worthwhile pointing out that when I talk about silos,people as possible, and generally tried to find out

the silos were not necessarily the coastguard andwhat is going on within the agency—people’s

surveying side of the organisation There were silosfeelings, people’s reactions, some of their problems

I have tried to find out from the inside of the within silos

31 March 2004 Captain Stephen Bligh and Mr Neil Goodall

Q6 Chairman:It does sound complicated! Captain Bligh: That is exactly the case, and most

people do have the relevant qualifications

Captain Bligh: It was interesting, Madam Chairman.

There were areas of our business, even within the

surveying and the headquarters side of the Q10 Chairman: Do you now insist on watchorganisation, that were not as cross-cutting as they assistants having exactly the same qualifications asshould be There was the coastal side of our some of the other senior oYcers?

organisation on the coast, who did not necessarily Captain Bligh: No, we do not insist, but we operateunderstand what some of the jobs that people were a competence-based recruitment system.

performing—

Q11 Chairman:A “competence-based”—

Q7 Chairman:Mr Bligh, I hesitate to interrupt you, Captain Bligh: So that, provided people have the

but the reality is that they were completely diVerent necessary competencies, they can transfer—services This is the third time this Committee has

looked at it They were doing diVerent things; they Q12 Chairman: How do you define competencyhad totally diVerent functions Just how do they now versus a qualification? I am terribly competent—“I

fit together? How do they work together? am sure I am”, says she modestly, and they are all

Captain Bligh: At the moment, the organisation is much too cowardly to say otherwise!—but

delivered into an operational side and a quality and qualifications I am rather light on.

standards side The operational side has within it the Captain Bligh: There is a competency-basedformer coastguard remit of search and rescue There framework, where each job’s competencies are

is also surveyors’ work within the operational side detailed.

Oil pollution fits within the operational side On

quality and standards, that is the knowledge base for

Q13 Chairman:Are they the equivalent of the old,reference for surveyors, with regard to incidents or

specific qualifications that were taken?

things on which they might require back-up and

Captain Bligh: Some of them, yes.

greater knowledge In the operational side, as I have

said, there are 14 divisions which have a variety of

Q14 Chairman:Some of them?

functions, and one of those is the search and rescue

Captain Bligh: For instance, somebody who was

That is the area in which the marine rescue

co-previously a surveyor would have come to theordination centres operate Then we have our

agency with either a maritime qualification, aauxiliary coastguards, who are also managed in

master’s certificate, a chief engineer’s certificate, or athat area

naval architect’s certificate

Q8 Chairman: You said you want continuous

Q15 Chairman:Yes, related to the subject that theyimprovement What particular improvements, and

hoped to do

how urgent are they?

Captain Bligh: Yes Those are still within the system Captain Bligh: One of the things that I noted was

However, it is my belief that, over a period of time,that we were a fairly bureaucratic organisation and

we will find ourselves in a position where thosehad a certain love of paperwork One of the areas

traditional pools of recruitment from which we werethat I wanted to start to improve, therefore, was to

able to draw will become less and less So we need tolook first at some of the work processes; to

find a way of possibly developing our own people forunderstand why we were doing them; had we always

the future, through training

done them that way; what were the benefits of them;

whether we could change them; and whether we

Q16 Chairman:Does that mean you are producing acould in fact stop some of them Most large

series of qualifications which are the equivalent to ororganisations are very good at bringing in new

an improvement on the previous standards, whichstructures and new working practices, but they are

can be easily assessed by somebody outside thenot very good at getting rid of things that are no

agency? Obviously, you would not want to give thelonger relevant So it was continuous improvement

impression that your competencies were not up to

in that particular fashion I also wanted to see

the standard of the previous qualifications

continuing improvement, in that the staV who work

Captain Bligh: At the moment it is work in progress,

with the agency need to be able to understand that

in the sense that we will move forward This is athere is scope for advancement for them; that we are

future—

not a siloed operation and that people who have

started part of their career in one part of the

organisation should not be in a position where jobs Q17 Chairman: You see, the diYculty is that youare not readily available to them, or that they do not have said you want “One organisation covering allfeel are within their competence to be available marine issues”.

Captain Bligh: Yes.

Q9 Chairman: Surely, as long as they have the

relevant qualifications, that could not be the case? Q18 Chairman:That is a very broad spectrum You

are presumably thinking of taking in other silos,The diYculty of moving people from one silo to

another must surely arise when they do not have the therefore Have you, for example, thought of taking

control over lights?

relevant qualifications?

31 March 2004 Captain Stephen Bligh and Mr Neil Goodall

Captain Bligh: The time when I made that statement Captain Bligh: There are existing lighthouse

authorities, but AIS as such is a ship identificationwas part of the time when I was talking with people

in general terms system

Q26 Chairman: I understand that, but the

Q19 Chairman:It is not all that general, is it? “One

implications might be rather wider than simplyorganisation covering all marine issues” seems to me

working out what you can take from the gatheringfairly positive and clear Perhaps unusual for the

of electronic information, might it not?

head of agencies, but it is quite clear

Captain Bligh: It might well be and, until such time Captain Bligh: The statement is clear, and I think

we have completed the evaluation trial, we will bethat I need to do and to understand more about the

sitting down with the lighthouse authorities and, iforganisations themselves

there is information from that trial that they canutilise or it can be passed to them, it will be

Q20 Chairman:So we are not exactly resiling from

it, but we are saying “not yet”? Q27 Chairman: Do you think it would be

Captain Bligh: That is correct. appropriate to regulate safety in ports?

Captain Bligh: The regulation of safety in ports—

Q21 Chairman:I see I do ask you again: who will and I would say safety in general terms—is veryevaluate these qualifications that you are developing important The Maritime and Coastguard Agencyfrom the competencies? One of the hazards, as you has been given the responsibility for the dailywill know, is that in marrying together two very management of the Port Marine Safety Code.diVerent skills it is absolutely vital that, if the public

are to retain confidence in your agency, they should Q28 Chairman:Yes, but there is a clear division, isnot be seen to be watering down their existing there not? You are responsible for safety on ships;expertise the HSE is responsible for port safety.

Captain Bligh: I would never wish to water down— Captain Bligh: I think that the HSE is responsible for

the safety of port workers

Chairman:No Perhaps if you read our report, Mr

Q22 Chairman: I am sure you would not, and

Bligh, you would find that we spell it out in sometherefore when you talk about the work in progress,

detail I am sorry, I must not hog you to myself.are you working with the educational authorities or

the naval authorities? Who are you working with to

Q29 Mr Donohoe:Perhaps I can turn your attention,produce these sets of qualifications which will enable

Captain Bligh, to the accident prevention statisticsyou to move people round the agency?

as far as the UK shipping area is concerned Why is

Captain Bligh: At the moment we are not working

there an increasing number of accidents, and inwith anybody This is something that I have

particular accidents within the UK search andidentified for the future At the moment we can still

rescue region?

recruit from the pool of professionally qualified

Captain Bligh: Regarding the accident prevention

Captain Bligh: Yes, but I believe that at some point double-reporting—what is actually an accident and

in the future we will come to a position where they

an incident Again, some of the items that arewill not be readily available presently recorded we have no control over.

Q24 Chairman:Could you tell me why you want to Q30 Mr Donohoe:If you take the specific of deaths,provide automatic identification systems for ships’ that figure is also increasing You can have doubledequipment, rather than leaving it to the General anything else, but you do not count a death twice, ILighthouse Authorities? Or was that one of the other would presume?

sorts of opening gambits that you made, that you are Captain Bligh: No.

thinking about now?

Captain Bligh: Basically, we have presently set up a Q31 Mr Donohoe:Therefore there is an increasing

trial network to be able to record information from level of fatal accidents, going from just under 250 inAIS At the moment we have a national network, of 1998 to over 319 on the last 2002 figure you have.which we are still trialing the technical side and the Captain Bligh: That is correct.

feasibility of the electronic gathering When we have

done that, later this year we need to sit down and Q32 Mr Donohoe:What do you put that down to?work out exactly what information we will take from Captain Bligh: Those records of deaths at the

it, what will be the value of it, and where such moment unfortunately are not all necessarilyinformation should be deposited marine-related deaths They are deaths that we have

been involved with Some of them, unfortunately,are suicides Our coastguard organisation operates a

Q25 Chairman: There are existing lighthouse

authorities who would think they had responsibility rescue service at Beachy Head, and have been called

upon to recover a number of bodies at the foot offor that, are there not?

31 March 2004 Captain Stephen Bligh and Mr Neil Goodall

Beachy Head We have also been responsible for a Captain Bligh: No, we have not spread ourselves We

still have the same number of auxiliary coastguardnumber of bodies out of the Thames They are all

within those overall figures However, I would teams that we have had for a number of years These

are the people who are the frontline deliverers ofemphasise that we want the agency to become very

much more proactive with regard to accident rescue services There is the same number

prevention When I joined the agency, we had a

target that said 5% of our available coastguard time Q39 Chairman:You have the same number of fullywas required to be spent on accident prevention I qualified coastguards as you have always had?

am presently setting up within the agency a more Captain Bligh: No, the number of coastguarddetailed accident prevention branch, to try to drill stations before I joined the—

down through some of the statistics we have, to find

out what in some instances are the fundamental Q40 Chairman: No, I am not talking about thecauses coastguard stations, because we were assured that

when some of the coastguard stations were closeddown the maintenance of the level of service would

Q33 Mr Donohoe:Can you tell me why Britain is the

not suVer in any way The question being asked is,only European country that does not have anybody

are you spreading the number of coastguards toothat is out in a boat over 25 feet having to be

thinly and the services too thinly?

qualified? That is an indication, is it not, that there

Captain Bligh: In my opinion, at the moment we

is something fundamentally wrong in there and that

are not

this would be part of that, or could be part of that?

Captain Bligh: We are carrying out some work at the

Q41 Mr Donohoe: So you do not think that is amoment with a view to looking at qualification for

factor at all in any of this?

other boat-users At the moment we are looking at

Captain Bligh: No.

how other countries—

Q42 Mr Donohoe:What is the factor? You do not

Q34 Mr Donohoe:Why should we just be “looking seem to know what the factor is How do you notat”? Why should we not be implementing that? It is know what the factor is, but you say the oppositevery clear that there is a problem as far as that when asked the question a diVerent way?

situation itself is concerned Only this week I heard Captain Bligh: Because we have responded to thethat you do not cover that type of person in terms of accidents or the incidents within the givenwhat is now being implemented for captains of the timeframes which we have always done We have notcommercial fleet—by virtue of breathalysing them changed our delivery So the actual death or theWhy not all of this in the UK when we are, after all, circumstances of the death—at the moment I do not

an island? Why is that not the case and what are you have detailed enough knowledge of each of thosedoing to assist that? individual deaths to be able to identify what was the

Captain Bligh: As I said, at the moment we are trying primary cause That is what we are trying to do with

to understand the value of what other people have our accident prevention branch: trying to drill intofound, rather than just implementing something as the statistics to find out what we can deal with and

a grab-oV-the-shelf and saying, “As of today, we’re deliver.

going to do this”

Q43 Mr Donohoe: In terms of the figures that arethere for us to see, there is a marked diVerence in that

Q35 Chairman:Why do you think the deaths have

sense I am just referring to what I have as a brief ingone up?

front of me There is no doubt that there is a change

Captain Bligh: I do not have a straightforward

in the ratio and it could be argued that it is aanswer to that, in the sense that—

contributory factor as to why we have this problem

Captain Bligh: I do not believe it is Although there

Q36 Chairman:It is incidents, it is accidents, but it is is an increase in the number of deaths, I do not thinkvery specifically deaths that anybody at the moment has detailed figures, for

Captain Bligh: Yes, I am aware that deaths have instance, on exposure: how many more people are

gone up enjoying leisure pursuits on the coast; how many

more people are at risk

Q37 Mr Donohoe: Is it possible that it is the fact

Q44 Chairman:Mr Bligh, the diYculty is not that.that—on the basis of information we have had in the

The diYculty is your own figures in relation to thepast and previous reports—you are now spreading

time to mobilise when asked for help, and theyourself too thinly around the coast?

number of incidents where they were not mobilised

Captain Bligh: I am not aware that any of those

within five minutes of being alerted The target is nodeaths could be attributed to the fact that we did not

better now You have told us 95% You are doingrespond in the fashion that we should have

very well on your targets but, frankly, your targets

in 2002 were not as good as they were in 1999 Wehave to be realistic about this This is statistical

Q38 Mr Donohoe:But it is a possibility, is it not, that

you have spread yourself more thinly than you information provided in your reports Would it not

seem to you that that is worrying?

should have?

31 March 2004 Captain Stephen Bligh and Mr Neil Goodall

Captain Bligh: I am concerned about the rise in Captain Bligh: I believe that might well be the case.

deaths

Q53 Mr Stringer:Why?

Captain Bligh: Basically, the minimum and the

Q45 Chairman:So there is a problem with the rise in

maximum levels were set in 2001, through adeaths There is fairly clear evidence that you are not

discussion both with the relevant union and thedoing any better in the time taken to mobilise and

various operational areas of the business They haverespond You are doing mildly worse, although it is

not been reviewed since that date Since then, we

so marginal as not to be clear; but you do not think

have implemented new technology, new recordingthat has anything to do with the fact that you have

systems, and the operational advice note, which isstretched the coastguard system too thinly?

OAN/122, needs to be revised in the light of risk

Captain Bligh: They are the resource centres who

assessment In some cases, some of the watches havereceive the initial identification The people who

operated below minimum level and, at such time,respond to the incident, who actually carry out the

there have been other people within the station whorescue—there have been no changes to the location,

have been on a training course and who, while not in

no changes to the numbers We utilise the lifeboat

the watch room, were actually on the premisesservices, and our helicopters are still at the same level

receiving training in some of the new technology

of readiness as they have always been

Chairman:Do you think that the rise in deaths may

be something to do with the amount of hours they Q54 Mr Stringer:You mean they were unqualified?spend in the water or what? Captain Bligh: No, they were receiving training in

some of the new technology we are rolling out Some

of it is computer-based training and people need

Q46 Mr Donohoe: It is worrying that you do not

time to understand and to be led through some of thehave that and you have not been able to present that

procedures

What worries me is that you are not in a position

today to be able to answer that in an adequate way

Captain Bligh: I might have more statistics within Q55 Mr Stringer: What are the implications of

the organisation to which I can refer and I can send operating at minimum levels regularly? What are thethem to the Committee at a later date in writing, but safety implications of that?

I do not have those oV the top of my head at the Captain Bligh: I do not believe there are any safetymoment implications in running at the minimum level We

ask all watch managers to carry out a riskassessment It depends on the situation Certain

Q47 Mr Stringer: What proportion of coastguard

stations have historically high peaks and troughs,watches are operated at recommended levels?

where we know that the leisure community will or

Captain Bligh: Ninety per cent.

will not be out at particular times, and we ask for arisk assessment to be carried out

Q48 Mr Stringer: What proportion at minimum

levels?

Q56 Mr Stringer: Are you going to change the

Captain Bligh: I do not have that figure directly.

recommended levels?

There were 10% of incidents when they were below

Captain Bligh: We are reviewing them.

the minimum manning level

Q57 Mr Stringer: What is the attitude of the staV

Q49 Mr Stringer: I do not want there to be a

to this?

misunderstanding on this I was going to ask that

Captain Bligh: As I understand it, there is a

next There are three levels: the recommended level;

consultation-based approach to reviewing them Ithe minimum level; and below the minimum level

have not directly been involved in the review process

Captain Bligh: Yes.

and I am not aware at the moment of what theoutcome of such a review is; but it is being looked at

Q50 Mr Stringer: What are the figures for those at the moment.

three diVerent levels?

Captain Bligh: I only have figures in front of me with

Q58 Mr Stringer: Can you explain what are theregard to the minimum level As I said, out of the

qualifications when you are operating at minimum1,100 coastguard watches per month that we

levels? Is it coastguard assistants or is it fullyoperate, less than 10% have run below the minimum

qualified coastguards?

manning level

Captain Bligh: There is a watch manager, a watch

oYcer, and watch assistants, depending on the

Q51 Mr Stringer:So there are 10% below your own particular station There are diVering figures forminimum levels each individual station

Captain Bligh: Yes.

Q59 Mr Stringer:I left this Committee in 1999 forthree years When I left, the Committee was in

Q52 Mr Stringer: Would it be true to say that

minimum levels are the norm, as opposed to disputes with Ms Jackson, who was then the

Transport Minister, about the number of rescuerecommended levels?

31 March 2004 Captain Stephen Bligh and Mr Neil Goodall

centres Ms Jackson wanted some closed; the Captain Bligh: No, I have not.

Committee thought that it was a bad idea Can you

tell me how many were closed? Q69 Mr Stringer: One of the arguments that the

Captain Bligh: My understanding is that three closed Committee had was that local knowledge was

at that time important, and that is why the stations should not be

closed Do you believe that to be true?

Q60 Mr Stringer:Have there been any consequences Captain Bligh: In certain circumstances yes, and in

of the closure of those three? other circumstances no The problem is defining

Captain Bligh: I am not aware of any consequences what we mean by “local knowledge” We should be

of the closure of those three stations under no illusion now that coastguard stations are

not on cliV tops, overlooking a set piece of the coast

Q61 Mr Stringer:Have you any proposals to close They are using electronic relays from a number ofany more? areas over a wider patch The individuals who

Captain Bligh: No. respond do have that local knowledge Our auxiliary

teams are drawn from the local community They

Q62 Mr Stringer:Why have you failed to get to 206 are the people who are out there on the ground, whoincidents within the recommended time or, to use the are searching the coastline or searching the cliV toptechnical word, the service response time? for individuals, and they do have that local

Captain Bligh: I do not have that information with knowledge They are still there, in abundance, at

me at the moment 390-odd locations round the country

Q63 Mr Stringer:It is pretty important, is it not? Q70 Mr Stringer: Before I leave this line of

Captain Bligh: Yes, I appreciate that However, I am argument, you have made no assessment of the

talking about figures which, unfortunately, were impact of the closure of those rescue centres onprior to my joining the agency I tried to do as much safety? You have not done that study?

research on that as I could before appearing before Captain Bligh: I have not done it directly.

the Committee, but I do not have that one to hand

at the moment

Q71 Mr Stringer: Within the service, has it beendone?

Q64 Mr Stringer: So 206 incidents happened and

Captain Bligh: As I said, it is an area where I have

coastguards did not get there on time Three stations

failed to do my research

have been closed, and yet you assure us that this has

had no consequences—but you do not know why

they did not get there on time Q72 Chairman: Someone would surely have told

Captain Bligh: I think that it was 206 incidents where you, Mr Bligh, if such an assessment had been made

we failed to respond within the five minutes That After all, if you are taking the reports of thisdoes not mean that they did not arrive on scene Committee seriously, as I explained to you, this is

the third time that we have felt it necessary to call themarine agency forward Did you not discuss this

Q65 Mr Stringer:No, I did not say that I said that

with any of your senior oYcers?

they did not arrive within the service response time

Captain Bligh: I discussed a number of things and I Captain Bligh: Yes As I say, I do not have those

was given a number of briefings I have quite aanswers for you at the moment, but I can come back

detailed pack in front of me

with those in more detail

Chairman:Do not worry We will get to lots of it; wewill not waste it

Q66 Mr Stringer:You say it is five minutes Does it

not vary from place to place?

Captain Bligh: Inevitably the amount of time for our Q73 Mr Stringer:I am amazed at two things First,

auxiliaries to man-up depends on the location It is it has been a main line of argument of this

a very challenging target We have to remain within Committee both when I have been on the Committeethe requirements of the law, of the Road TraYc Act and not, but you are not briefed on it Secondly, youMany of the individuals are on an auxiliary base and are also prepared to say that the closure of thosehave to travel from their place of work to the base, stations has not jeopardised people’s safety, but you

to man-up the vehicle or man-up the requirement In do not have an analysis before us I will ask one final,certain circumstances, at certain times of the year, diVerent question, if I may On a number ofthere are problems with them getting to the scene occasions over the last six or seven years I have asked

the Secretary of State about the levels of piracy in the

Q67 Mr Stringer: Do you know what the seas around the United Kingdom You have someconsequences of those 206 incidents where the responsibility for the safety and security of vessels,service response time was gone over? do you?

Captain Bligh: No As I said, unfortunately that is Captain Bligh: Under the requirements of the

one area where I failed to do proper research International Ship and Port Security Code, the

Transec Directorate of the Department forTransport has responsibility for the ISPS code They

Q68 Mr Stringer: You have not made any

assessment of the impact of those changes and no have delegated to my agency the requirement for

ship security plans for cargo ships So I have thatstudy of those 206 incidents?