The linguistic dimension of kants thought historical and critical essays

This volume assembles several essays around a common, albeit easily overlooked topic in Immanuel Kant’s thought: the issue of language and its importance in shaping the landscape of his

D I M E N S I O N O F

K A N T ’ S T H O U G H T Historical and Critical Essays

Edited by Frank Schalow and Richard Velkley

Northwestern University Press

Evanston, Illinois

Printed in the United States of America

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data

The linguistic dimension of Kant’s thought : historical and critical essays / edited by Frank Schalow and Richard Velkley.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978- 0- 8101- 2996- 2 (cloth : alk paper)

1 Kant, Immanuel, 1724–1804 2 Language and languages—Philosophy

I Schalow, Frank, 1956– editor of compilation II Velkley, Richard L., editor

Acknowledgments vii

Frank Schalow and Richard Velkley

Part 1 The Question of Language

Part 3 Historical Perspectives on Language

9 Reason, Idealism, and the Category: Kantian Language in Hegel’s

11 Language, Nature, and the Self: Language, Psychology, and the

Eric S Nelson

12 The Inexhaustibility of Art and the Conditions of Language: Kant and Heidegger 288 Richard Velkley

Mi-in securMi-ing funds for the completion of this project, we wish to express gratitude to Provost Michael Bernstein of Tulane University and the Carl Muckley Bequest of the Philosophy department at the University of New Orleans.

Special thanks also go to the senior editor and director of western University Press, Henry Carrigan and Jane Bunker, respectively, for lending their time and expertise in bringing this volume to fruition.Finally, we wish to thank the editors of the following journals for granting permission to reprint a version of Michael N Forster, “Kant’s

North-Philosophy of Language?,”Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 74/ 3 (2012); Kirk

Pil-low, “Jupiter’s Eagle and the Despot’s Hand Mill: Two Views of Metaphor

in Kant,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 59 (2001): 193–212; Susan Shell, “Nachschrift eines Freundes: Kant on Language, Friendshp, and the Concept of a People,” Kantian Review 11/ 1 (2011): 117–24.

The following abbreviations and translations of Kant’s works are cited throughout the text and notes Abbreviations used only within a single chapter are noted on first appearance

Abbreviations

AA Akademie Ausgabe, i.e., Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter,

1902–)

Gr Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten (AA 4)

KpV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (AA 5)

KrV Kritik der reinen Vernunft (AA 3–4)

KU Kritik der Urteilskraft (AA 5)

MAM Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte (AA 8)

MdS Metaphysik der Sitten (AA 6)

MpVT Über das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee (AA 8)

Pr Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik (AA 4)

RGV Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (AA 6)

Translations of Kant’s Works

Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, general editors Paul Guyer and

Al-len Wood (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1995–)

Critique of Judgment, trans Werner S Pluhar (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1987) Critique of Pure Reason, trans Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St Martin’s,

1965)

Critique of Pure Reason, trans Werner S Pluhar (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1996) Dreams of a Spirit Seer Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics, trans E F Goerwitz (New

York: Macmillan, 1900)

Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans J Ellington (Indianapolis, Ind.:

Hackett, 1981)

Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759–99, ed and trans A Zweig (Chicago:

Uni-versity of Chicago Press, 1967)

Logic, trans R Hartman and W Schwarz (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs- Merrill,

1974)

This volume assembles several essays around a common, albeit easily overlooked topic in Immanuel Kant’s thought: the issue of language and its importance in shaping the landscape of his critical philosophy To

be sure, language can be viewed as a formal structure of thought and expression, as is evident throughout the philosophical tradition This collection of essays, however, approaches “Kant’s linguistic dimension”

more broadly as a practice including communication, exchange, and dialogue

Although there are undoubtedly different avenues to pursue this topic,

a concerted effort has been made to develop a plurality of outlooks that will allow the reader to achieve a new perspective on the unity of Kant’s thought as whole, along with its historical influence

In this regard, Kant’s philosophy is not viewed as a finalized system, but instead as engendering new possibilities to pursue philosophy and develop insight into its intimate connection with language As a result of the carefully chosen essays in this volume, it is hoped that a new and ex-citing light will be cast on a thinker whose philosophical work continues

to challenge the scholar and student alike

Kant’s Thought

Frank Schalow and Richard Velkley

Formulation of the Topic

Among modern philosophers, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) probably influenced the development of contemporary philosophy as much as anyone Yet, ironically, where the issue of language has become a key fulcrum of Continental philosophy in the twentieth century, Kant is rarely viewed as a “pioneer” in this area Not surprisingly, while there have been various attempts to address the historical origin and develop-ment of the problem of language in Continental philosophy, Immanuel Kant has been overlooked as a thinker whose breadth of insights have helped to spearhead this advance Indeed, an anomaly emerges such that while Kant’s critical philosophy has been identified as the crossroads from which subsequent paths of Continental philosophy arise, and while

it is often believed that the concern for language unifies these paths, he is usually discounted as having either interest in, or insight into, the nature

of language itself

And yet, for all his apparent indifference to this topic, Kant vides seductive hints concerning the use and nature of language, if only

pro-on the rarest occasipro-ons Most noteworthy, in his work devoted primarily

to art and aesthetics, the Critique of Judgment, he claims that aesthetic

ex-perience is possible only because a level of meaning is reserved for the

“communication of sensations,” prior to the use of preset concepts

(Cri-tique of Judgment, section 51) This is a representative example of how the

concern for language peers through a shadow of obscurity and ence To employ an apt description of a philosopher whom Kant later in-fluenced, Martin Heidegger, language may only “announce itself” rather than explicitly “show itself” as a “phenomenon.”1 Nevertheless, because Kant leaves only a trace of the importance of language throughout his

indiffer-writings, a study devoted to uncovering it and unfolding its implications can prove to be provocative as well as instructive.

Because the “place” of language in Kant’s thinking is not evident

at the outset, we might consider four different angles from which to proach this problematic First, the most obvious tactic is simply to con-sider explicitly what Kant says about language, the actual statements

ap-he makes in tap-he course of his writings, from tap-he “pre- critical” period

through the publication of the three Critiques.2 For example, in section

53 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant describes music as a “language of the

affections,” although, by the same token, he does not extrapolate from this one statement to consider the nature of language as such The ques-tion that might then be posed is whether Kant had an explicit account or

“theory” of the nature of language (Sprachtheorie) Secondly, regardless

of how explicitly Kant reflected upon language, one might address the implicit understanding of its importance which arises from the study of his critical philosophy In other words, Kant’s multifaceted account of thinking, judgment, and the limitations of knowledge may harbor cer-tain (implicit) insights about language which can be explicated through further examination and interpretation of his vast writings Thirdly, an-other strategy would be to consider the influences that Kant had on sub-

sequent thinkers who did consider the nature of language Among these

we must identify two twentieth- century philosophers whose paths sected in an epic debate in Davos, Switzerland, in 1929:3 (1) Ernst Cas-sirer (1874–1945), who spearheaded the “back to Kant” movement in the 1920s and expanded the frontiers of transcendental philosophy to include a concern for symbol, myth, and culture;4 and (2) Martin Hei-degger, who not only provided the most influential alternative to the “neo- Kantian” interpretation of transcendental philosophy, but also encour-aged several of his most accomplished students, including Hans- Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) and Hannah Arendt (1906–75), to rediscover in Kant’s thought the inspiration for new philosophical paths As we will establish throughout our study, the development of this third approach requires a more explicit interpretation of Kant’s writings and an appreci-ation of its continual relevance, as well as its legacy, for the development

inter-of philosophy today Because twentieth- century methodologies inter-of nomenology, hermeneutics, and deconstruction all hinge on a common concern for language, we will underscore the innovativeness of Kant’s method as implicated in other disciplines that reflect upon the dimen-sion of meaning in human experience, including, history, religion, and literature, as well as philosophy

phe-Fourthly, one might propose an “internal critique” of Kant’s own thought, addressing shortcomings that suggest the need to consider lan-

guage as a prerequisite, premise, or presupposition that “grounds” or even helps to complete his system of critical philosophy As a case in point, there has been a perennial question in Kant studies from the time

of his contemporaries—Johann Georg Hamann (1730–88) and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) providing the foremost examples5—as to whether the transcendental exposition of the principles of knowledge and morality is self- grounding, or instead hinges on another level of dis-course which governs the critical investigation itself apart from the prin-ciples it yields By showing how Kant’s critical enterprise unfolds within

a wider universe of discourse, it might be possible to establish the chitectonic linchpin” which joins the theoretical and practical sides of Kant’s critical enterprise—a linchpin that has often been conjectured, albeit not necessarily established, to reside within the purview of the

“ar-third Critique Each of these approaches has merit in its own right In

the course of study, we will draw upon the interplay of all four, although, given the need to explicate the “problem of language,” and outline its larger significance for Kant’s thought, different degrees of emphasis will

be placed on any single approach

In exploring the place of language in Kant’s philosophy, the first question to surface is whether the determination of thought as “predi-cation” monopolizes all other forms of expression Or, conversely, even where he focuses on the linguistic acts of predication, for example, in establishing the basis for synthetic a priori judgments about physical ob-jects (i.e., nature), does he presuppose an even more fundamental, “pre- predicative” level of “meaning”? Indeed, even within the context of the

Critique of Pure Reason, we can point to certain turning points in the

de-velopment of Kant’s transcendental methodology that tests the limits of predication and expression as such For example, in his famous discus-

sion of “schematism” in the “Analytic” portion of the first Critique, Kant

points to the importance that the “temporal,” “image- producing” power

of imagination (Einbildungskraft) has on reconstructing the “meaning”

of categories on a more original plane By the same token, in the lectic” Kant extends his transcendental methodology to show how the

“Dia-“ideas” of reason possess the power to “self- reflexively” convey its own boundaries, and thereby implement a “tribunal” in which its participants

can “express” disputes and seek their “critical” resolution (Critique of Pure

Reason, A739/ B767) As a further illustration, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant leaves open the possibility of the individual’s expression of

his or her own moral self- awareness And yet, the establishment of the individual as an instance of a moral lawgiver, and hence as a member of a community, implies an intermediation between universal and particular, that is, acts of “judging.” Indeed, the difference between acting out of

moral discretion, rather than arbitrarily from impulse, lies in being able

to express “why” we act, that is, to articulate the binding character of an obligation

Given Kant’s tendency to “presuppose” the importance of language

in his critical philosophy, the second question governing our study is

whether he entered the uncharted waters of the Critique of Judgment in

order to unravel this presupposition Put another way, does the third

Critique showcase Kant’s attempt to uncover the linguistic roots of his

enterprise—in terms of the evocation of “meaning” and social practice—and thereby answer the enigma as to the ultimate grounding and system-

atic unity of his critical philosophy? By interpreting the third Critique in

terms of its wider systematic and methodological role (as well as doctrine

of aesthetics),6 we gain a new perspective from which to reexamine the premise of Kant’s critical enterprise and identify the form of linguistic practice that sustains the self- examination of reason in its theoretical and practical dimensions In this way, we can discover how the concluding

phase of Kant’s critical philosophy, or the Critique of Judgment, broaches

the topic of language which is otherwise presupposed from the outset of

the Critique of Pure Reason.

The more we unfold the problematic of language, and expand the scope of these questions, we can consider whether Kant leaves room for alternative forms of expression Given the backdrop of a “pre- predicative” level of “meaning” on the one hand, and the example of aesthetic forms of expression on the other, we can discover the extent

to which Kant allows for figurative, metaphoric, and symbolic forms of language Conversely, the characterization of language in this multidi-mensional sense may in turn have direct impact upon diverse fields of the study of culture, history, and religion, as well as art, literature, and

poetry Indeed, as Kant suggests in the third Critique, all communication

between human beings includes a “pre- discursive” dimension, in terms

of the “tonality” and inflection of the speech, of which the art of music provides the foremost example

The Uniqueness of the Study and How It

Differs from Other Approaches

Even though he is often considered to be the greatest philosopher of the modern era, it is not always easy to assess the extent of Kant’s enor-mous influences on other thinkers and on the development of other disciplines beyond philosophy There are also illustrious thinkers after

Kant who built upon his thinking, but were also critical thereof to the point of seeming almost to denounce many of his key insights A case

in point would be G W F Hegel (1780–1831), the leading figure in the development of German idealism in the nineteenth century Hegel not only claimed that Kant’s philosophy was ungrounded in its premises, but also suggested that Kant was naive concerning the nature of language and its constitution as medium in shaping the development of human consciousness as well as thought Hegel’s landmark development of the

“dialectical method” as a way of counterposing and reconciling sites suggested the pattern by which consciousness, and, ultimately, Spirit

oppo-(Geist) could unfold, and, simultaneously appear as a medium for the

articulation of the dialectical process itself Accordingly, he identified a

form of language to exemplify the self- articulation of consciousness in the stages of its dialectical progression to its culmination as “Absolute

Spirit.” In the “Preface” to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel called this

prototypical form of language the “speculative proposition.”7 Because of Hegel’s enormous influence on subsequent philosophy, and the volume

of scholarship that has been devoted to the explication of his speculative philosophy, there has been a tendency to overlook Kant’s insight into language, however provisional Indeed, in the course of two centuries,

a presumption has evolved which singles out the key figures of German idealism, whether J G Fichte (1762–1814), F W J Schelling (1775–1854),

or the illustrious Hegel himself, as the originators of the philosophical problem of language—thereby suggesting, either by commission or omission, that Kant was completely oblivious to the nature of language.Given this historical context, we would be remiss not to emphasize the influence and contribution of Kant’s contemporary, Johann Gott-fried Herder As an important figure in the history of ideas, who was both a student of Kant and later a staunch critic,8 Herder marks a new point of departure in the philosophical study of language Moreover, his novel insights into language arise from and typify his broader critique

of the basic presuppositions of Kant’s transcendental philosophy Two considerations prevail First, Herder was among the first philosophers who challenged the legitimacy of Kant’s project and its ability to be self- grounding Specifically, he voiced what became a long- standing enigma

in Kant’s philosophy: how does the articulation of his system imply a guage which is more fundamental than, and cannot be reduced to, the predicative acts of the pure concepts of understanding? Herder’s “meta-critique” of Kant’s critical philosophy not only sets the stage for the rise

lan-of German idealism, but also includes an investigation into the “origin

of language” as a distinctive human capability.9 In this regard, Herder’s metacritique brings to a sharper focus a parallel criticism developed by

his contemporary, Johann Georg Hamann In 1784 Hamann had

writ-ten an essay entitled Metacritique of the Purism of Reason, in which he also

pointed to language as the historical- cultural backdrop for reason’s self- examination, and conversely, argued that Kant’s failure to make this con-nection undermines the foundation of his project.10

Second, Herder points to the vocalization and utterance of speech

as the key to understanding its origin, including its phonetic powers and the reverberation of its sounds In this way, Herder shifts the focus away from language as an instrument to represent ideational content to a ca-pacity definitive of human beings as such Where previously thinking had taken precedence over language, and the latter was merely an addendum

to the former (in both Enlightenment and pre- Enlightenment models), now Herder reverses that priority and distinguishes the ability to speak as

a power in its own right Language emerges as a power to express human emotion as well as thought The development of language into a narra-tive form, for example, through lyrics and stories, also enables thought

to evolve as the backbone of human culture Jere Surber summarizes this development:

Although both Rousseau and Herder begin from the premise that language begins as an expression of emotion, is conspicuously manifest

in music and poetry, and involves an important imitation of natural sounds, Herder views the subsequent development of language as always correlated with the natural progress of thought in an ever-

ascending trajectory Herder sees the development of language (and

thought) as coevolutionary with the development of human culture and the particular forms of its “genius.” 11

As John Zammito states, in casting further light on the philosophical portance of Herder’s treatment of language: “Herder’s concept of lan-guage was not just formal but genetic- historical,” that is, by spearheading the ascent of human culture.12 Herder’s “Treatise on the Origin of Lan-guage” (1772), on the one hand, and his criticism of Kant’s transcen-dental philosophy on the other, mark an important crossroads in the his-torical examination of language as a philosophical topic in its own right.13

im-By the same token, the attempt throughout this volume to bring Kant’s nascent insight into language to the foreground suggests not only a reply

to Herder, but also illustrates the extent to which this crucial period of thought plants the seeds for our understanding of language today

By casting Kant’s approach to language in both a critical and torical light, the preceding discussion shows how the basic thrust of this volume will diverge from other perspectives, both philosophical and lin-

his-guistic, as well as other approaches to investigating Kant’s connection to the problem of language.

Language and the Challenge of

Transcendental Logic

Even if we assume that for the most part Kant takes language as such for granted there are, nevertheless, key turning or transitional points in his thinking that test the very limits of expression Indeed, we need to look

no farther than his efforts to pioneer a new “transcendental”

methodol-ogy, from the inaugural pages of the Critique of Pure Reason, to find such

an example In raising the basic question of “how can we know?” we must also consider, conversely, how the ground and preconditions of knowl-edge can be articulated, in order to become open to the scrutiny and self- criticism which reason embodies Kant refers to the “tribunal” of pure reason as the forum for its own self- examination and the formulation of the basic principles for its guidance But the creation of such a forum implies (1) an invitation to each of us who instantiates reason to partici-pate in the philosophical inquiry which Kant initiates and (2) a way of conveying how that inquiry proceeds, as well as its results, including en-gendering new distinctions that give both direction and shape to Kant’s transcendental investigation If even in the most innocuous and incon-spicuous ways, a sense of language as logos still faintly shines through in the basic need to etch new distinctions and thereby challenge the limits

of expression

We might thereby expect in the junctures, crossings, and tions of Kant’s critical project, as well as in its more familiar places, that flashes of his interest in language should first appear When we look at

disloca-the division of Kant’s major work, disloca-the Critique of Pure Reason, into

“Tran-scendental Aesthetic” and “Tran“Tran-scendental Logic,” the namesake of the

latter already implies, by a concern for reason as logos in at least the

minimal sense, the power of making distinctions Whenever human ings employ language, and, conversely, are co- determined by this abil-ity, the need to make distinctions emerges to the forefront This need becomes most pronounced when Kant proposes a new or even “revo-lutionary” brand of logic that can break with the mold of traditional or

be-“formal” logic whose aim was primarily to outline the rules of correct thinking A Transcendental Logic, on the other hand, depends upon an already given content of an object, under the finite conditions of space and time, which is supplied by the Transcendental Aesthetic The need

to incorporate these finite conditions, in order that thinking cannot only map its own form, but also employ its pure concepts to articulate the character of human experience, poses a special challenge to Transcen-dental Logic.

Kant in turn subdivides “Transcendental Logic” into tal Analytic” and “Transcendental Dialectic.” The former outlines the conditions under which our pure concepts can be applied to legitimately define objects and facilitate our knowledge thereof; it is called a “logic

“Transcenden-of truth” (A63/ B87) The latter assesses the risk “Transcenden-of presumptuously and illegitimately misapplying the pure concepts to know objects which can-not be given in possible experience, as well as adjudicates the disputes that subsequently arise and points to the need of bringing reason back within its proper bounds; it is properly designated as a “logic of illusion.”

By circumscribing the proper use of our pure concepts, the dental Analytic also provides keys to how these concepts can serve as predicates, that is, which “stand for” or “signify” the nature of the objects

Transcen-we can know In a way that bears further scrutiny, Kant points to the miotic” dimension of language, even while remaining for the most part shrouded in a conventional model of predication And yet, as obvious as this connection may be, it may very well be in the corollary pursuit, not

“se-of establishing the possibility “se-of cognizing an object, but the impossibility

thereof, that light may actually be shed on language as a form of tic practice (and not just as a vehicle of predication)

linguis-Indeed, we cannot discount the contribution that the dental Dialectic” makes in jump- starting a discussion about the prob-lem of language in critical philosophy Once again, the namesake may itself prove instructive, if only because “dia- lectic,” even before Hegel’s unique rendition of it, implies a dynamic of differentiation, of point- counterpoint, which forms the cornerstone of all dialogue In this spirit the “Transcendental Dialectic” can accentuate the “performative” of speech itself, because its hallmark lies in tracing a certain measure of in-telligibility and “meaning” precisely in the absence of any corresponding object for knowledge With the emphasis on the object, the focus shifts

“Transcen-to how reason can accurately demarcate its boundaries, outlining them

by appealing to its own antecedent conditions of finitude In the absence

of any object and its signification by predicates, reason can delineate its boundaries only indirectly Put simply, the boundaries emerge only through the “example” of reason’s own critical and legitimate employ-ment of its “transcendental ideas” (e.g., of God, freedom, and immortal-ity) That is, these boundaries become concrete through the illustration that reason itself provides, by reflecting upon its own conditions, that

is, by making the comparison between what cannot be known with what

can be As Kant states in the “Conclusion” to the Prolegomena to Any Future

Metaphysics:

But metaphysics leads us towards bounds [Grenzen] in the dialectical

attempts of pure reason (not undertaken arbitrarily or wantonly, but stimulated thereto by the nature of reason itself) And the transcenden- tal ideas, as they do not admit of evasion and yet are never capable of realization, serve to point out to us actually not only the bounds of pure reason, but also the way to determine them Such is the end and use of this natural predisposition, which has brought forth metaphysics as its favorite child, whose generation, like every other in the world, is not to

be ascribed to blind chance but to an original germ, wisely organized for great ends (p 353) 14

This alternating comparison- contrast, which takes the form of scendental reflection” (A261/ B317), conveys “figuratively,” as it were, or through a mode of “gesture” or “indication.” Reason thereby illuminates its boundaries in the manner of “pointing to” them Yet this style of indi-cating, however innovative and creative it may appear at first sight, never-theless still embodies a “logic” of its own To cite once again from Kant’s

“tran-“Conclusion” to the Prolegomena:

But the setting of a boundary to the field of understanding by thing which is otherwise unknown to reason, is still a cognition which belongs to it even at this point, and by which it is neither confined within the sensible nor strays beyond it, but only limits itself, as befits the knowledge of a boundary, to the relation between what lies beyond and what is contained within itself (p 361) 15

some-In a parallel way that Hegel popularized, the “dialectic” harnesses the power of “negation” and “opposition” in order that the acknowl-edgment of the lack of any object can “indicate” precisely how far the boundaries of reason extend As an example, we can point to Kant’s suc-cess in resolving the “third antinomy,” or the conflict between freedom and determinism, by establishing a boundary that allows for both a di-vergence and traversal from either side (of the debate) Thus, the law of cause and effect can be reaffirmed from within one realm of jurisdiction (of phenomena), while the legislation of freedom cannot be excluded within the other realm of jurisdiction (of noumena) In this way, the complementarity of these realms becomes possible, because of the de-marcation of a boundary that holds each in tension with the other, and, moreover, conveys their reciprocity in a manner in concert with the ulti-

mate unity of reason As part of Kant’s strategy to resolve the third mony, he emphasizes that it is equally as important to “restrict” the law of cause and effect to events that can be given under the sensible conditions

anti-of space and time, as it establishes the counterpoint anti-of the impossibility

of specifying an object for a spontaneous cause (or freedom) In other words, the demarcation and location of the boundaries allow reason to mark the overlap of two distinct realms of legislation The illumination

of reason’s boundaries opens up what is conveyed in two different tions, and these two fronts suggest a kind of dual mode of indication

direc-or “double gesture.” While Kant may not have explicitly addressed this unique manner of expression, he certainly provided an important clue

to how language breaks out of a mode of univocity, in order to engender multiple levels of “meaning.”

The Emergence of Connotation as the

Counterpart to Denotation

Inevitably, we must consider what is the direct evidence that Kant began

to pave a new trail in how we think about the nature of language today

We must be careful to avoid reconstructing Kant’s views on language in

“anachronistic” ways In this regard, two issues immediately emerge to the surface First, language first presents us with “meaning,” a notion which, with the inception of the hermeneutic tradition from Dilthey to Heidegger through Gadamer and Ricoeur, we tend to take for granted today But what “meaning” actually entails, in thought and understand-ing, in action and life—as well as its connection with language—was far from self- evident to Kant or, for that matter, most of his contempo-raries Secondly, Kant stood at the crossroads of the development of a distinction that subsequently became important for both Continental and analytic philosophy,16 and which first enters the forefront through the late nineteenth- century philosopher G Frege, namely, the difference between “sense” and “reference.” And yet, while Kant’s philosophy does not hinge on this distinction, we can see a vestige of it in Kant’s attempt to explain the legitimate use of the pure concepts, their application to ob-jects as predicates, and the corresponding development of this lexicon.Kant once proclaimed that all philosophical questions can be re-duced to one basic question: “how are synthetic a priori judgments pos-sible?” When ensnared in the complexity of Kant’s thought, we often fail

to appreciate the simple fact that the question of human knowledge is in some sense about judgments, and, correlatively, judgments imply some

mode of articulation or expression, that is, language In simplest terms, the form of articulation involves the use of predicates, that is, an act of predicating There are for Kant, of course, twelve kinds of predicates, which initially derive from the logical table of judgments, and which, when used for the specific purpose of cognition or knowledge, constitute the “pure concepts of the understanding.” When employed as the basis

of cognition, and not merely as one of the logical forms of judgment, these pure concepts assume a new linguistic role That is, the predicates

no longer indiscriminately describe the form of any judgment, but stead pertain to something, that is, an object of knowledge That is, as the determining ground of a cognitive act, the pure concepts combine, order, and unify the corresponding intuition through which an object

in-is given to our senses The resulting “act of synthesin-is” not only imparts unity on what is known, or the correlative object, but simultaneously sup-plies the precise determinations to define it In other words, the pure concepts are “predicated” of objects in the sense that they “stand for” or

“signify” the essential nature or constitution of any object whatsoever, at

least in relation to and as possible for a knower.

On the surface, Kant’s grasp of language as predication, and hence

as a way of “signifying,” may not appear totally unique After all, he knowledges having modeled his account of predication from Aristotle And yet, the employment of these predicates under the unique quali-fication of the human knower, and the distinctive conditions thereof, completely alter the vector of this seemingly simple use of language To allude to a “vector” means here that the linguistic usage is not simply one- sided or linear, as merely denoting “x” or referring to something (ac-cording to Frege’s subsequent description) The cognitive act must also include a second vector, which interposes the limitations of the knower and its conditions as prerequisite for knowledge Only given this second vector, or the pre- conformity of the object to these finite conditions (in-cluding the pure intuitions of space and time) can the predicates and what they stand for coincide In executing his celebrated Copernican revolution, Kant shows that predication does not proceed according to

ac-a lineac-ar model of ostension, in the wac-ay thac-at empiricists mac-ay hac-ave gested There is no simple model of isomorphism between sign and signi-fied, concept and what is represented On the contrary, an intermediary must emerge, in the guise of the antecedent conditions of knower and its synthetic unity, which supports this axis of predication

sug-Could it actually be the case, then, that the “transcendental turn” which Kant pioneered under the auspices of his Copernican revolution also includes a “linguistic turn”? In many respects, the attempt to an-swer this question provides the guiding thread for the various essays in

this volume To offer a provisional glimpse, we can say that just as Kant established human finitude as the new fulcrum of knowledge, he also cleared the way for understanding the novel role that language plays in articulating what we know This mode of articulation, however, cannot simply be confined to a linear model of predication or what we might simply describe as denotation On the contrary, equal consideration must

be given to how the predicates stand for the definitive features of nature,

of physical objects, and the dynamics of human experience as a whole, that is, how they acquire a determinate content The task of outlining this content, not empirically but strictly on a priori grounds, implies pre-

cisely the innovation on which his entire transcendental project hinges

Specifically, the attempt to specify that content entails a certain kind of adjustment whereby the focus of predication shifts to the source from which new distinctions arise to define (the nature of) objects In turn, the genesis of these new distinctions speaks to the “connotation” of the predicates, which accompanies their denotative capacity Thus, in accord with Kant’s pioneering insight into the Copernican revolution, we can only unlock the signifying power of the pure concepts by outlining the unique procedure of delimitation, restriction, and adjustment whereby the pure concepts acquire their determinateness and thereby can be em-ployed in synthetic a priori judgments to define physical objects

In a section entitled the “Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment”

in the “Analytic” of the first Critique, Kant characterizes this procedure as

the task of “schematizing” the pure concepts In an enigmatic passage,

he describes schematism as an “art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze” (A141/ B181) We would do well

to ponder the implication of this statement For schematism is one of

those turning points in the Critique of Pure Reason to which we must

con-tinually return and redirect our attention The schematism provides, for what we have already suggested, the “intermediary” that adjusts the pure concept to the specific measure of determinateness in order that it can signify the constitution of an object From our perspective, this adjust-ment becomes crucial because it cultivates time, as synthesized through the intermediary of the transcendental imagination, as the new “matrix”

to construct or produce the schema for each pure concept As a result, the schemata express the distinctive temporal lexicon that all the pure concepts have in common, thereby suggesting a common root of syn-onymous and therefore a single language from which all the predicates derive and acquire their “meaning.” For example, when schematized the pure concept of “substance” means “permanence in time.” Likewise, the schema of the pure concept of existence means “present in time.”

The later example becomes particularly important to illustrate how

in the doctrine of schematism connotation takes priority over tion As Kant reiterates over and over again, particularly in refuting the

denota-“ontological proof” for God’s existence, “existence” does not function denotatively to single out another characteristic of an object (A598/ B626) As the copula of a judgment or the simple word “is,” the pure concept of existence is completely devoid of any content and is not itself another thing This concept only becomes determinate, and can serve as

a “predicate” to describe how an object stands in relation to the knower,

only when assigned specific temporal connotations, that is, “presence

in time.” In this revolutionary way, the finely chiseled temporal tions of the schemata are the new connotations by which the predicates acquire their determinateness and power to signify objects To be sure, Kant may have left it up to later hermeneutic thinkers to follow through

distinc-on the implicatidistinc-ons of this insight But at least in a very provisidistinc-onal way

he at least offers a signpost to address the issue of “meaning” (Sinn), that

is, the interface between language and experience on the one hand, and understanding and interpretation on the other

The question of meaning, and its subsequent importance for hermeneutics, suggests one way we can get a handle on the historical implications of Kant’s thought as bearing specifically on the concern for language Let us consider adjacent concerns that can help to fill out fur-ther this historical horizon

Kant at the Crossroads of History

There is a peculiar reflexivity in the attempt to address Kant’s historical influence, for the very way of asking the question presupposes a con-cept of history that he himself stood on the forefront of beginning to explore Indeed, the subsequent nineteenth century would largely be characterized by an attempt to come to grips with the dynamic of history

in various areas of thought and life: from Hegel’s account of the history

of philosophy and intellectual history, to Karl Marx’s economic account

of social conflict as the engine of history, to Wilhelm Dilthey’s neutic” description of the unfolding of human life through culture, and ultimately Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of the premise of historical progress through his “eternal recurrence of the same.” In the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger would conjoin many of these disparate views into his macro vision that the most perennial of all philosophical ques-

“herme-tions, or the question of the meaning of being (die Seinsfrage), was an

inherently historical question when recast within the orbit of the entire history of philosophy Yet, in a manner that perhaps epitomized his own

hermeneutic method, Heidegger also saw the “grounding words”

(Grund-worte) by which we seek to address being do not emerge ex nihilo, but

instead bear a historical ancestry and betray roots that sink deeply into the history of philosophy Because of its link to history, language is not merely incidental to philosophy, but instead harbors the very key to for-

mulating its foremost question, as to the meaning of the word “being,”

and thinking it with a depth of originality that echoes across the entire history of being Language thereby becomes a way of depicting the fore-most mission of philosophy, that is, of seeking to restore the “power of the most elemental words” and thereby cultivating the most basic idioms

stu-gard, a revealing passage in Heidegger’s major work, Kant and the Problem

of Metaphysics (1929), proves to be prophetic in marking the juncture for

the alternative paths on which both Arendt and Gadamer will trod: “We cannot discuss here the sense in which the pure power of imagination

recurs in the Critique of Judgment and above all whether it still recurs in

express relationship to the laying of the ground for metaphysics as such which was pointed out earlier.”18 Indeed, in different ways and in dif-

ferent styles, the focus on Kant’s third Critique will shape the philosophies

of both Arendt and Gadamer

Hannah Arendt in particular appeals to Kant’s third Critique in

order to develop discourse concerning the political through the free ministration of its citizenry By delving into the hidden recesses of Kant’s texts, she extracts the key component of the polis in a way that explicitly compensates for the void left by her mentor on that topic For example, Arendt reinterprets “reflective judgment” as a discretionary power to make decisions which counterbalance the priority of different options

ad-In this way, she resurrects the Kantian power of judgment (Urteilskraft)

on a par with Aristotle’s concept of phronesis The very possibility to

ad-judicate disputes, and to exert leadership which invites the participation

of all the citizenry of the polis, presupposes this discretionary power of judging and its formal development in both crafting and implement-ing social policies The power of critical circumspection provides the cornerstone for developing a political forum of discussion and debate

in whose openness all citizens are allowed to participate Accordingly, the possibility of political action and leadership is always conjoined with

a discourse which admits a plurality of perspectives (rather than the tates of a single ruler) As Arendt states in an important passage: “With

dic-word and deed, we insert ourselves into the world, and this insertion is like

The “enlargement of the mind” plays a crucial role in the Critique of Judgment It is accomplished by a “comparing our judgment with the

possible rather than the actual judgment of others in the place of any other man.” The faculty which makes this possible is called imagina- tion Critical thinking is possible only when the standpoints of all others are open to inspection Hence critical thinking while still a solitary business has not cut itself off from “all others” By form of imagination it makes the others present and thus moves potentiality in

a space which is public, open to all sides; in other words, it adopts the position of Kant’s world- citizen To think with the enlarged mentality— that means you train your imagination to go visiting 20

Indeed, Arendt’s allusion to Kant’s concept of a “world citizen,” the cosmopolitan spirit, underscores how significant the appropriation of critical philosophy was for the development of her own political think-ing In this spirit, we cannot overlook a key passage from the conclud-

ing part of the first Critique, the “Transcendental Doctrine of Method,”

which, in retrospect, echoes throughout Arendt’s political writings, and particularly, her interest in the intersection between “word and deed”:

Reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism; should

it limit freedom of criticism by any prohibitions, it must harm itself, drawing upon itself a damaging suspicion Nothing is so important through its usefulness, nothing so sacred, that it may be exempted from

this searching examination, which knows no respect for persons son depends on this freedom for its very existence For reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom each one must be permitted to express, without let or hindrance, his objections or even his veto (A738–39/ B766–67)

Rea-As the last line of this quote intimates, in this political context Kant peals to language in a way that points to the safeguarding of its expres-sion as a forum of free speech and dissent

ap-In a decidedly unique way, Hans- Georg Gadamer appeals to the

third Critique as both a new jumping- off point for developing the

her-meneutic method, and for illustrating a key development in the history

of aesthetics or appreciation of art In an illuminating passage from an

essay in 1960, Gadamer summarizes the historical impact of the Critique

of Judgment:

In his third Critique—the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment—Kant established

the problem of aesthetics in its systematic significance In the tive universality of the aesthetic judgment of taste, he discovered the powerful and legitimate claim to independence that the aesthetic judg- ment can make over against the claims of the understanding and mo- rality The taste of the observer can no more be comprehended as the application of concepts, norms, or rules than the genius of the artist can What sets the beautiful apart cannot be exhibited as a determinate, knowable property of an object; rather it manifests itself as a subjective

subjec-factor: the intensification of the life feeling [Lebensgefühl ] through the

harmonious correspondence of imagination and understanding What

we experience in beauty—in nature as well as in art—is the total tion and free interplay of all our spiritual powers 21

anima-Gadamer develops an explicit parallel between hermeneutics and aesthetics For the singularity of the experience of beauty, and its expres-sion of art, can only be understood by unfolding different horizons of interpretation No solitary interpretive horizon can necessarily exhaust the manifestation of beauty, and thereby a disposition of openness be-comes crucial to the interpretive process Like his mentor, who also gave priority to art, Gadamer focuses his attention on the singularity of the aesthetic experience that first comes to light in Kant’s account of beauty

In an analogous way to Arendt, Gadamer circumvents the centrality of the question of being in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, in order

to broaden the scope of hermeneutics as a method in its own right In

either case, Kant’s aesthetics provides the signpost for the detour that enables both Arendt and Gadamer to blaze new philosophical trails.Among French poststructuralists, perhaps Gilles Deleuze (1925–

95) best illustrates the influence that Kant’s Critique of Judgment has had

on the development of Continental philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century Deleuze argues that Kant was the first phenom-enologist, in the sense that he prefigured Edmund Husserl’s attempt to establish the origin and “genesis” of human experience in respect to con-sciousness or the “transcendental subject.”22 Yet, according to Deleuze, the intersection between Husserl and Kant stems not from the latter’s

epistemic works, most notably, the Critique of Pure Reason For the first

Critique emphasizes only the “possibility” of experience, and reserves for

the knower an abstract, transcendental viewpoint separate from the periential flow of life, culture, and history Instead, Deleuze points to the

ex-role of the third Critique in transposing the abstract “I” of transcendental

subjectivity into flow of experience, that is, as enriched by the sensation

of feeling, including beauty, which stems from encounters with aesthetic objects.23 Thus, the third Critique hold the key to uncovering the “con-

stitution” of transcendental subjectivity, not as an abstract “I,” but in its lived, heartfelt dimension as “self- aware” through its awareness of others and nature as well

Language and the Historical Importance of

the Third Critique

Perhaps it is not surprising that two of the most important and

innova-tive thinkers of the twentieth century would turn to the third Critique as

their point of departure Indeed, if history is any indication, thinkers often frequently look to this work as a fertile ground to develop new in-sights that were not already part of mainstream philosophy In the case

of the development of aesthetics in particular, Schelling’s philosophy is

certainly a measure of how the novelty of the third Critique inspired a

great thinker to give new direction to the future course of philosophy Yet, art and aesthetics constitute only one aspect of this work For Kant also addressed the various uses of reason and how it could establish the unity of the different parts of philosophy, the organization of a system Implied in this endeavor is the attempt to develop a discourse which gives shape to the “tribunal” of pure reason and is inherent in the adjudication

of its disputes Might it not be due to fact that the third Critique houses

the problematic of language that it could become a “clearinghouse” for future efforts to make this most pivotal of all philosophical topics?The ability to bring this question into the foreground of Kant’s thought lends further credence to the conviction that his enterprise marks the crossroads where various paths of Continental philosophy con-verge in making the concern for language central to the philosophical task As Dennis Schmidt states: while Kant did not “thematize the ques-

tion of language,” in the Critique of Judgment he nevertheless pointed to

the “problematic relation between aesthetic experience and language in general.”24 In this regard, there is the ambiguity of how explicitly Kant addresses language within the context of his critical philosophy, and, conversely, how the attempt to work the systematic unity of his thought necessarily arrives at language as the final linchpin of his system Accord-ing to Kant, this system could not be constructed arbitrarily, but must instead conform to the design of reason’s inherent architectonic Just

as the act of building a house requires the design of an architect, so the construction of a philosophical system must proceed according to an architectonic which organizes its parts into a whole Yet this unity is pos-sible only if the parts, while separate, can be joined together and in some sense mediated This potential to “mediate” the part of the system is not

a power of a “dialectical” method as in Hegel’s case, but is instead an

“intermediary” that connects without “sublating” the parts into a higher

unity As the counterpart to both reason (Vernunft) and understanding (Verstand), the “power of judgment” (Urteilskraft) and its utilization as a

form of linguistic “practice” functions to “connect” the “theoretical” and

“practical” parts of Kant’s critical philosophy

Kant certainly labored to explain the intricacies of his system and the necessity of constructing philosophy according to his own precise

“architectonic” specifications His struggle to clarify this crucial point

led him to write two different “introductions” to the Critique of Judgment,

including a version which was published separately because of its length

In each “Introduction” Kant emphasizes that the theoretical and cal halves of critical philosophy require separate jurisdiction, according

practi-to the law of nature and causality on the one hand and the law of ity and freedom on the other As Kant states in the “Introduction” to the

moral-Critique of Judgment:

But in the family of the supreme cognitive faculties there is a middle

term between the understanding and the reason This is the judgment,

of which we have cause for supposing according to the analogy that it may contain in itself, if not a special legislation, yet a special principle

of its own to be sought according to laws, though merely subjective a

priori This principle, even if it have no field of objects as its realm, yet

may have somewhere a territory with a certain character for which no other principle can be valid (Section III)

In this regard, the “middle term” is the “intermediary,” which a tive discourse must provide in order to relate the two halves of critical

distinc-philosophy, coordinate them, and ultimately express their unity.

At first it might seem strange that a concern for the intricacies of a philosophical system should assume center stage in a treatise supposedly devoted to aesthetic judgment Yet a possible overlap occurs when we consider a possible parallel between a namesake describing the design

of the system, or its architectonic, and the theme of aesthetics, or art deed, a closer look at the etymology of the term “art” helps to make this connection more explicit For the word “art” originates from the Greek

In-word techné, which entails bringing into form or the craft of building

The construction of a philosophical system would appear, by analogy,

also to be a kind of “craft” or techné Accordingly, the “reflection” on this

system does not correlate with a specific (object- ) area, but instead has

as its focus the unity of reason and the realization of its “highest ends.”

Given this larger concern for the “destination of reason,” the third

Cri-tique implies a discourse in common with art and its “communicability” of

beauty For the discourse is the universality that reason itself exemplifies, and, conversely, the figurative mode of expression, that is, vis- à- vis the ap-peal to the “example,” which we witness first and foremost through the

“medium” of art As a case in point, Kant’s account of the “genius” in the

third Critique may function self- referentially to indicate his own creativity

in envisioning an architectonic of pure reason or a form of organization which cannot be reduced simply to its component parts

Thus, for Kant, the upshot is that language is not simply about its

“ideational content,” but also about how we communicate and the factors that lead to communication Language thereby has the capacity to convey

emotion, as well as cognition We discover that Kant suggests as much, for

example, in pointing to music as a mode of expression and tion Specifically, music communicates through tone, melody, and influ-

communica-ence in such a way that it speaks “as a language of the affections”

(Cri-tique of Judgment, section 53) Music can convey sentiments about whose

depth and nuance words may fall short; for example, the aspirations and

tribulations of the heart Because of its emphasis on tonality, music above

all epitomizes the importance of listening to communication If all thetic experience involves appreciation, music in particular calls for the refinement of hearing as a capacity in its own right and even its “fine- tuning” and cultivation Due to its “auditory” nature, music marks the

aes-audience as the unique “assembly” of individuals which is presupposed

in an act of communication Communication and membership in a munity thereby become two sides of the same coin

com-Insofar as the third Critique shows how no single ideational tent can monopolize the power of language, three distinct dimensions

con-of language emerge within Kant’s critical philosophy: (1) a figurative, metaphoric, and symbolic expression of language in aesthetics, poetry, and religion; (2) a “performative” dimension of language, or its consti-tution in linguistic practice via “dialogue” and through the individual’s opportunity to participate in reason’s self- critical forum, for example, in Kant’s words, as a “citizen of the world”; and (3) a dimension of “mean-

ing” (Sinn) implicating a historical setting in which the idioms and roots

of words arise from and recede into the folds of tradition In this way, language emerges as a lived dynamic pervading art and culture, history and tradition, philosophy and thought—and not merely as a rigid, logi-cal construction

Summary of the Essays

The essays in this volume will be organized into three parts: “The tion of Language,” “The Concern for Language in Religion, Politics, and Aesthetics,” and “Historical Perspectives on Language.” Robert Wood provides the cornerstone of this volume by examining the impor-tance which language plays as a linchpin in the development of Kant’s critical philosophy In “The Place of Language: From Kant to Hegel,”

Ques-Wood addresses the role which logos has in shaping the self- critical

activ-ity of reason, its capacactiv-ity for reflexivactiv-ity, and in seeking the “highest ends”

of humanity By showing how language transposes human beings into

the social context, Wood marks the historical crossroads between Kant’s

attempt to overcome the isolation of Cartesian subjectivity, on the one hand, and, on the other, the effort to prefigure the depiction of language

as a form of dialectical exchange and “dialogue” in German idealism and the subsequent Continental tradition Far from being simply periph-eral, the concern for “language” in the deeper sense of logos lies at the heart of the formulation, development, and execution of Kant’s critical enterprise

In “The Language of Time in Kant’s Transcendental Schematism,” Frank Schalow revisits Kant’s doctrine of schematism in order to show how the imaginative formation of temporal schema provide for new idi-oms to express the “meaning” of the pure concepts of the understand-

ing Insofar as the pure concepts originate from a common root of onymy (through time), their use in defining or signifying objects of possible experience comprises a single universe of discourse In showing that a “linguistic turn” follows on the heels of Kant’s celebrated “tran-scendental turn,” we discover how Kant became a springboard for the hermeneutical tradition leading from Wilhelm Dilthey to Martin Hei-degger In “Language in Kant’s Practical Philosophy,” Chris W Surpre-nant argues that language as the power of communication provides a linchpin between his ethical theory and his political philosophy The character of moral discourse which is implied in the formulation and application of ethical maxims, that is, as based on the categorical impera-tive, becomes explicit through a body politic as predicated upon the prin-ciples of free exchange, communication, and interaction of a historical community In “Kant’s Philosophy of Language?” Michael N Forster examines the actual textual evidence, from Kant’s “pre- critical” period

syn-to his “critical” writings, as syn-to the extent syn-to which he provides an tual philosophical account of the nature of language Forster concludes that while Kant provides some tantalizing statements about language,

ac-he never formulates an explicit account tac-hereof or what would formally constitute a philosophy of language Indeed, the question of language as the usages of words, and an explicit thesis about thought’s dependence

on these usages, remains only on the periphery of Kant’s critical ophy Despite Kant’s apparent lack of interest in language as a topic in its own right, the question still remains as to whether the methodology of

philos-the three Critiques, and philos-their exposition of philos-the (finite) ground of human

reason, harbor a deeper problematic than can be found in any explicit pronouncement found therein

In “Jupiter’s Eagle and the Despot’s Hand Mill: Two Views of

Meta-phor in Kant,” Kirk Pillow turns to the third Critique in order to uncover

a discourse of indirect presentation or metaphor The development of

“aesthetic ideas” points to metaphor as a way of allowing what is given

to our senses to signify what is not directly accessible and may suggest a

“supersensible” origin In “Models and ‘Symbolic Hypotyposis’: Kant on Music and Language,” Charles Nussbaum shows how music, both in its unique genre of creativity as displayed through “indirect presentation”

of aesthetic ideas and its power to evoke emotions, constitutes a unique avenue of communication He thereby illustrates how Kant stretches the parameters of language to include a figurative and symbolic medium apart from the structure of predication Nussbaum points to a language that is based on the communication of emotions and in the intelligibility

of a common affect experienced by members of an audience

In “Kant’s Apophaticism of Finitude: A Grammar of Hope for

Speaking Humanly of God,” Philip J Rossi, S.J addresses Kant’s ability

to reserve a place for religious language and distinguish the “grammar” proper to expression Religious language, however, is not simply a vehicle for abstract speculation, but instead unfolds within the concrete setting

of a community of believers The expression of faith, and the ing of the freedom to do so, point back to the formulation and articula-tion of the principles governing a moral community Rossi thereby points

safeguard-to the importance that language and communication play in anchoring

the possibility of religious faith and belief In “Nachschrift eines Freundes:

Kant on Language, Friendship, and the Concept of a People,” Susan Shell develops the wider relevance that Kant’s notion of community, in-sofar as it is grounded in a particular language, has for outlining the political landscape of his thought She thereby establishes such key no-

tions as the sensus communis developing a political discourse which

ad-dresses the formation of the basic bonds among people, including that

of friendship

In “Reason, Idealism, and the Category: Kantian Language in

Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit,” Robert Berman examines the

incorpo-ration of Kant’s terms in Hegel’s treatment of reason Berman argues that the concentrated presence of Kantian language points to a parallel critique of reason that Hegel undertakes in assessing its limitations and expressing them within the wider linguistic structure of the dialectic In

“The Language of Natural Silence: Schelling and the Poetic Word After Kant,” Jason M Wirth proceeds beyond Kant’s view of teleological judg-ment in order to show how nature and the possibility of its communica-tion takes on a more complete and radical expression in Schelling’s phi-losophy Wirth shows how nature includes its own embryonic logos, which admits its own grammar of expression that parallels silent intimations

of both art and poetry In “Language, Nature, and the Self: Language, Psychology, and the Feeling of Life in Kant and Dilthey,” Eric S Nelson

shows how Kant’s Critique of Judgment not only provides a springboard to

subsequent hermeneutics, but, how, specifically through Dilthey, a losophy of human subjectivity and feeling assumes definite shape Nel-son thereby casts another perspective on the historical import of Kant’s

phi-third Critique, specifically, in founding a realm of discourse which

the-matizes the nature of human subjectivity In “The Inexhaustibility of Art and the Conditions of Language: Kant and Heidegger,” Richard Velkley outlines the implications that Kant’s account of art and beauty have for understanding Heidegger’s portrayal of art as a “world- disclosing” event Pursuing a suggestion of Heidegger in his Nietzsche lectures that Kant’s account harbors a metaphysical depth that was missed by interpreters

after Friedrich Schiller, Velkley shows how Kant’s intimations concerning figurative and symbolic expressions of language prefigure Heidegger’s hermeneutic account thereof as an abode of unconcealment.

Notes

1 See Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe (hereafter GA) 2

(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), 40–41.

2 For further discussion, see Michael N Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

3 See “Davoser Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin

Hei-degger,” in Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, GA 3

(Frank-furt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991), 274–96 “Davos Disputation between

Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer,” in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans

Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 193–207 Also see Frank Schalow, “Thinking at Cross Purposes with Kant: Reason, Finitude and

Truth in the Cassirer–Heidegger Debate,” Kant- Studien 87 (1996): 188–217.

4 Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth, trans Susanne K Langer (New York:

Dover Publications, 1946), 8–16.

5 See Jere Paul Surber, Language and German Idealism (Atlantic Highlands,

N.J.: Humanities Press, International, 1996), 21–22, 58.

6 For further discussion, see Tamar Japaridze, The Kantian Subject: Sensus Communis, Mimesis, Work of Mourning (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), 127–28.

7 G W F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans A V Miller (Oxford: Oxford

University Press 1977), 36–40.

8 John Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment (Chicago:

Univer-sity of Chicago Press, 1992), 1.

9 Johann Gottfried Herder, Treatise on the Origin of Language, in Herder: Philosophical Writings, ed Michael N Forster (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2002), 65–165 See Michael N Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Lan- guage in the German Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

10 Surber, Language and German Idealism, 21.

11 Ibid., 58.

12 John Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago: versity of Chicago Press, 2002), 156 Johann Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, ed Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press,

Uni-2007).

13 For further discussion, see Daniel Dahlstrom, “The Aesthetic Holism

of Hamann, Herder, Schiller,” in The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism, ed

K. Ameriks (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 96–93.

14 See Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans Paul

Carus and Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs- Merrill, 1950), 102.

15 Ibid., 109.

16 For a critical portrait of Kant’s account of predication, see Robert

Hanna, “Kant’s Theory of Meaning,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 10, no 1 (

20 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol 2 (New York: Harcourt, Brace

& Jovanovich, 1978), 257 See also Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political losophy, ed Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 40–44.

Phi-21 Hans- Georg Gadamer, “The Truth of the Work of Art,” in Heidegger’s Ways, trans John Stanley (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 100 See also Hans- Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975), 29–34.

22 For further discussion, see Joe Hughes, Deleuze and the Genesis of sentation (London: Continuum, 2008), 16–19.

Repre-23 See Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, trans Hugh Tomlinson

and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) See specifically chapter 3.

24 Dennis J Schmidt, Lyrical and Ethical Subjects (Albany: SUNY Press,

2005), 8.

The Question of Language