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Why isn’t Thailand’s middle class fond of democracy?

25 July 2017

Author: Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Kyoto University

The growth of the middle class and civil society plays a pivotal role in the promotion of democracy They

closely monitor a government’s performance and its commitment to good governance The middle class also

demands access to political resources, while underscoring the importance of participatory democracy But in

Thailand the orthodox concept of the middle class as an agent of democratic change seems to be under

challenge

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Since the Thai political crisis of 2005, which culminated a year later in the military coup that overthrew the

elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra, it has become apparent that the Thai middle class and the

country’s many civil society organisations are no longer agents of change, but instead have become guardians

of the ancien régime.

In 2005, the Bangkok-based middle class, under a new movement called the People’s Alliance for

Democracy (PAD), took to the streets to topple Thaksin, largely considered a champion of the poor, on the

grounds that he abused power for his own benefit

On the surface, the middle class and civil society claimed to be guarding democracy, which had supposedly

been tainted by Thaksin At a deeper level, however, it was the fear that Thaksin and his assertive populist

policies would empower marginalised rural citizens that explained why the middle class and civil society

rejected his kind of democracy

The protesters also accused Thaksin of disrespecting the much-revered monarchy — an inviolable institution

in Thailand and long regarded as a symbol of prosperity for the Thai middle class The monarchy provided

itself as an instrument for its supporters to disparage democracy, à la Thaksin, through a binary choice: moral

verses immoral politics, with the monarch representing the former and selfish politicians the latter

Chakrit Tiebtianrat argues that Thaksin was the first prime minister who sought to deal with civil society

systematically He set out to co-opt those who could be co-opted, and to discredit those who could not, either

by dividing them from their supporters, or through more devious means such as using legal manoeuvers to

diminish the effectiveness of civil society

But by selectively choosing to support certain civil society organisations, Thaksin also helped promote a

culture of corruption and nepotism Critics interpreted this as Thaksin’s devious way of buying allegiances

and loyalty from his constituencies Those civil society organisations that continued to cooperate with the

Thaksin government were perceived by critics as politically superfluous

Meanwhile, those who challenged the integrity of Thaksin’s government were viewed with skepticism and

possibly harassed A divide-and-rule tactic characterised the relationship between his government and civil

society in general But civil society groups finally gained an upper hand over the government by joining

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Committee (PDRC) — returned to street politics, reviving the old trick of assigning themselves the role of

moral guardian against the supposed evil of Yingluck Her premiership, like that of her brother, ended in a

military coup in May 2014

The rise and fall of democracy in modern Thailand, as demonstrated in two successive coups, can be

described, on the one hand, as a situation in which the middle class and civil society could no longer tolerate

corrupt regimes and therefore gave their support to the coups On the other hand, a deeper analysis is needed

to comprehend the complexity of Thai politics beyond a struggle between the ‘moral’ middle class and civil

society and ‘immoral’ politicians

It is true that the ‘network monarchy’, which includes key institutions such as the monarchy, bureaucracy and

military, had long governed Thai politics, and the middle class and civil society became enthusiastic

supporters of the network monarchy, exploiting the revered status of the royal institution to reap benefits

from the system Gradually, the alliance between the network monarchy and members of the middle class and

civil society began to isolate the rural population

While the network monarchy was able to redefine the political landscape by placing the monarchy at the top

of the political structure, the rural population was allowed to participate in electoral politics on certain

conditions — their chosen governments must be subservient to the dominant network monarchy, otherwise

they would be overthrown in coups This kind of structure permitted members of the network monarchy and

supporters among the middle class to defend their political territory, while at the same time appearing to

adhere to democratic processes

Thaksin constructed his political network by highlighting the fact that the electoral process could be used to

overturn the power equilibrium and dismantle the status quo He concentrated on winning votes from the two

regions of the country long marginalised by the network monarchy — the north and northeast Thaksin could

count on those votes owing to his generous populist programs His political party, Thai Rak Thai, won

landslide elections twice, causing grave concerns among the network monarchy and the middle class, which

retaliated through extra-parliamentary means

The network monarchy, drawing on the powerful moral authority of King Bhumibol, might have dominated

the political realm in this way for several decades, but Bhumibol recently passed away, paving the way for his

unpopular son, Vajiralongkorn, to be enthroned The new king is undoubtedly generating concerns among the

middle class and civil society groups because without Bhumibol their political interests are no longer

guaranteed in the transition period This anxiety has driven Thailand’s middle class to further divorce itself

from trust in the democratic apparatus and its supposed role as an agent of democratic change

At this critical royal transition, both the middle class and civil society do not even hide their taste for

authoritarianism It manifests itself chiefly in politicisation and self-interest on their part

Pavin Chachavalpongpun is Associate Professor at Kyoto University’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies.

This article was first published here on Global Asia.

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