The nautical institute on the managent of safety in shipping

Robson, MNI Supervisor, Safety and Training, Chevron Shipping Company, USA SAFETYIS IMPORTANTin every aspect of running a and technology fields-inert gas, automatic radarship, and althou

THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE

First published 1991 by The Nautical Institute,

202 Lambeth Road, London SE1 7LQ, UK.

©The Nautical Institute 1991.

All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publishers, except for the quotation of brief passages in reviews.

ISBN 1 870077 08 3 Although great care has been taken with the writing and production of this volume, neither The Nautical Institute nor the authors can accept any responsibility for errors, omissions or their consequences.

This book has been prepared by The Nautical Institute to address the subject of the management of safety in shipping This should not, however, be taken to mean that this document deals comprehensively with all of the concerns which will need to be addressed or even, where a particular matter is addressed, that this document sets out the only definitive view for all situations.

The opinions expressed are those of the authors only and are not necessarily to be taken as the policies or views of any organisation with which they have any connection.

Readers and students should make themselves aware of any local, national or international changes to bylaws, legislation, statutory and administrative requirements that have been introduced which might affect some authors' conclusions.

This volume was edited by DavidJ Sanders, Ex.C, FNI, and compiled by C J Parker, BSc, FNI, under the general direction

of The Ship Safety Working Group of The Nautical Institute.

Text set in Baskerville and printed in England by the Silverdale Press, Hayes, Middlesex UB3 3BH.

2 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE

Preface Captain Warren G Leback, FNI, US Maritime Administrator

'Pollcy

C/w.pter

1 A TANKER OPERATOR'S SAFETY POLICY Captain G T Robson, MNI, Supervisor Safety and Training,

Chevron Shipping Company, USA.

Page

5

9

2 SHIP OPERATIONS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN A SHIP MANAGEMENT COMPANY 19

Captain S.J Pressly, BA, MNI, Safety and Marine Superintendent, V Ships UK Ltd.

3 FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN PREPARING A FLEET SAFETY POLICY G B Standring, 25 Managing Director, Marine Safety Services Ltd, UK.

4 THE CODE OF SHIP MANAGEMENT STANDARDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SHIP MANAGERS' 28 ASSOCIATION Introduced by J Spruyt, formerly Managing Director, Wescol, author of Ship Management.

5 SHIPMASTERS' RESPONSIBILITIES FOR IMPLEMENTING SAFETY POLICIES ON BOARD 40

Captain C.M Mahidhara, MNI, Master, Dip Command.

6 GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT SHIPS MEET INTERNATIONAL 45 CONVENTION STANDARDS E Jansen, Deputy Director General of Shipping and Navigation, Norwegian

Maritime Directorate.

7 A NEW ORDER OF BUSINESS IN MARINE SAFETY Rear-AdmiraIJD Sipes, USCG, Office of Marine 51 Safety, Security and Environmental Protection.

8 CLASSIFICATION AND STATUTORY SURVEYS Documents, certificates and harmonisation 54

9 FIRE PROTECTION IN MERCHANT SHIPS - AN OVERVIEW Lieutenant S.J Ohnstad, USCG, PE, 60 Marine Technical and Hazardous Materials Division.

10 LIABILITIES AND PENALTIES FOR UNSAFE SHIPS DrS.L Hodges, LL.B, Lecturer, Cardiff Law School, 64 University of Wales

11.THE WORK OF THE BALTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MARITIME COUNCIL IN PROMOTING 70

HIGH STANDARDS E Odorico, Information Officer, BIMCO.

12 HOW TO PROMOTE ERROR TOLERANCE IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF SHIPS 74 AND AIRCRAFT. ProfessorJ T Reason, Department of Psychology, University of Manchester.

13 OPERATING AND SAFETY MANUALS AND PLANS C R Cushing, C.R Cushing & Co Inc, New York 83

14 IMPROVED SAFETY THROUGH THE USE OF COMPUTER BASED PLANNED MAINTENANCE 92

SYSTEMS Captain M Macleod, FNI, Amos Systems, UK.

15 SHIP OPERATIONS AND INSURANCE. Captain C F Luddeke, FNI, ACIArb, Director, Mediterranean 96 Shipping Co SA; Director, Liverpool and London Steamship P&I Association Ltd; Member, Technical Advisory Board, Germanischer Lloyd.

16 MEASURES TO IMPROVE SAFETY -A DISCUSSION Rear-Admiral D J Mackenzie, CB, FNI, Vice- 105 President, The Nautical Institute, Chairman, The Ship Operational Working Group

17 OPERATIONAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS CaptainA.G Marsh, MNR, MNI, Marsh Morison 108 and Associates Ltd, UK.

18 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF A SIX-MAN REFRIGERATED 111

VESSEL T Munk, Senior Vice-President, J.Lauritzen A/S, Denmark.

19 RECENT FERRY TRAGEDIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SHIPOWNERS/FERRY OPERATORS 117

Captain PA Heathcote, B.Comm, LLB, MBA, MNI, MRIN, Formerly Vice-President, Marine Services, Marine

Atlantic, Canada.

20 CHEMICAL CARRIERS. Captain A Allievi, KOMIR, FNI, MRIN, Centre for Advanced Maritime Studies, 123 Edinburgh, Scotland.

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 3

21 ASSURING THE SAFE TRANSPORTATION OF CHEMICALS BY SEA Captain C Allport, FNI, Safety 139

Superintendent, Exxon Chemical International Inc, Europe.

22 SAFETY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE IN AN OFFSHORE FLEET Captain P R Maudsley, MNI, Deputy 143

Managing Director, Farstad UK Ltd, and Captain VR Gibson, MNI, Managing Director, Notac Ltd.

23 FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN IMPLEMENTING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN OFFSHORE 149

STANDBY VESSELS O H Andersen, Managing Director, Esvagt, Denmark.

24 FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN IMPLEMENTING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN A MIXED 157 MANAGED FLEET. Captain V Patwardhan, Vice-President, Ship Management, Western Marine Agencies, USA.

25 OIL POLLUTION RESPONSE AND CLEAN-UP. Captain R.B Middleton, FNI, Managing Director, Briggs 161 Marine Environmental Services, UK.

26 PREVENTION OF OIL SPILLS DUE TO GOOD TANKER PRACTICE. CaptainM.B Smith, FICS, MNI. 166

27 SAFE OPERATION OF BULK CARRIERS. Captain P.J Swift, FNI, Director and Marine Superintendent. 168

28 PREPARING FOR EMERGENCIES AT SEA Captain PN Le Marquand, FNI, Shipmaster (Rtd), BHP Ltd, 171 Australia.

People

29 ROLE OF THE MARINE SUPERINTENDENT IN PROMOTING SAFE OPERATING PRACTICES 178

Captain WA Codrington, FNI, Senior Port Captain, World-Wide Shipping Agencies Ltd, Hong Kong.

30 ROLE OF THE ENGINEER SUPERINTENDENT IN PROMOTING SAFE OPERATING PRACTICES 182

j R Duffy, C Eng, MIMarE, Senior Fleet Superintendent, P&O Containers, UK.

31 SAFE WORKING PRACTICES AT SEA, SAFETY COMMITTEES, PERMITS TO WORK, TRAINING, 188 DRUGS, ALCOHOL, SECURITY - A SHIPMASTER'S CONCERN. Captain j.H Drahos, BSc, FNI,

Shipmaster, USA.

32 THE SELECTION, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING OF SHIPS' OFFICERS AND CREWS IN A 194

MANAGED FLEET Captain U Zellmer, Hanseatic Shipping Company Ltd, Cyprus.

33 COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS INHERENT IN A CROSS-CULTURAL MANNING 198 ENVIRONMENT. Professor D H Moreby, FNI, formerly Polytechnic South West, UK and Chairman, The Nautical Institute, Education and Training Committee.

34 EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE SAFETY AND 202 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. Captain A Allievi, KOMIR, FNI, MRIN, Centre for Advanced Maritime Studies, Edinburgh, Scotland.

35 TRAINING FOR MARITIME CREWS Captain R O Elsensohn, FNI, Principal MITAGS, Maryland, USA 209

36 SUBSTANDARD SHIPS AND THE SHIPMASTER Report of The Nautical Institute Council 211

37 PERSONAL ACCIDENTS SEEN FROM A P&I CLUB AND MEASURES WHICH NEED TO BE TAKEN 218

TO REDUCE CLAIMS.j.R.H Bull, BA (Law), Director for Thomas Miller P&I, UK.

38 SAFETY, MANAGEMENT AND THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE. C.J Parker, BSc, FNI, Secretary, The 227 Nautical Institute.

4 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE

tr MAY SEEM strange to maritime observers that a book such as this should be published in 1991 After all,.hipping has existed for millenia and there are reasonable grounds to suppose that all the lessons relating to safe.hip operations have been learnt There is another argument put forward by industrialists, that sea transport has

• price which is indeed reasonable when compared to other modes of transport However, it is recognised thataccidents and damage do occur, there is an acceptance of risk, and this leads to financial protection throughIDSUrance

This view often assumes that all shipping companies are well run and operate to the high standards of earliercenerations Their managements produced company standing orders Nearly all ships had a company bridgehook and the marine superintendent made his presence felt when new staff were employed, requisitions made,GIlt-turns assessed, surveys conducted and dry docks planned

Today the situation is different The same high standards can be found in many companies as the chapters inthis book demonstrate well, but the operating practices have changed significantly The factors affecting thischange can be summarised as follows:

• A growing separation between financial ownership and management

• A widening division between the country of origin of the company and the country of ship registration

• Increased time between dry docks due to improved coatings

• The increasing average age of the world fleet

• The majority of seamen and officers from Far Eastern countries, sailing on ships of many different flags

• The use of manning agents to employ seamen and officers who no longer visit the company's head office

• The increase<;lactivity in the sale and purchase market

• The varying d~ands placed upon ship management companies to take in new fleets of various character and

to remain viable when other fleets are withdrawn

• The higher level of ~pectations of the travelling public towards high standards of safety in all modes oftransport, including shipping

• The growing awareness of environmental issues and the realisation that inland seas and now oceans needprotection

Many of the changes which have occurred enabled cost savings to be made and the economicefficiency of shipping as part of the overall transport system to improve However, it must beappreciated that there is also more competition, less return on investment, much more complicatedcontractual arrangements, increased pressure on time and bourgeoning legislation With all thesepressures, the demands of ship operational safety, which often appears on balance sheets only as a costitem can be overlooked

Like all disciplines, safe practices have to be learnt and impressed Once a company loses itscommitment to safety standards, it loses its ability to contain risk This important lesson is re-learntevery time there is a marine disaster, but by that time, of course, it is too late Penalties followingavoidable accidents are becoming more severe and claims for compensation can be crippling It has to

be observed that the consequences of oil pollution in sensitive areas caused by one ship can now threatenthe viability of whole companies

This book is designed to answer the question: 'How can ship safety be managed effectively in thecurrent competitive operational climate?' Th~re is no attempt to single out one system as better thananother because there are many different ways to achieve good results

What the book does demonstrate is that ship safety management is a demanding job which requirestalented people with a high level of professional commitment It is noteworthy that in my formeremployment as Executive Vice-President ofEI Paso Marine, I made it my duty to ensure the marinedepartments had equal access to the top Their contribution to the running of the company wasinvaluable In my present position as the Maritime Administrator of the United States Government,

I see the tragic consequences where companies have lost this vital link

If leadership is defined as 'showing the way' then the authors who have all contributed suchthoughtful and inspiring chapters are to be heartily congratulated To my knowledge, this is the firstbook of its type and the standards it extols are those which can be fully supported by The NauticalInstitute's Council

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 5

Whilst the emphasis of this book is on safety, my working group identified the complementaryfunction of management as also needing support and attention This is because companies have becomemore diverse, so making practical communication more difficult There are also constraints upon timeand resources to enable sea staff and shore employees, in different locations, to attend managementtraining courses.

Good management practices underpin good safety practices and to promote this element ofendeavour, The Nautical Institute is providing a new management course on Personal Effectiveness

through a well-constructed open learning scheme Candidates can select six of the eight modules,covering planning, controlling, problem solving, leadership, delegating, managing time,communicating, running meetings, and coaching others On successfully meeting the assessmentstandards, a Diploma will be awarded

In conclusion, this major project by The Nautical Institute brings together 38 chapters on the

Management oJSaJety in Shipping into an authoritative, practical book, which demonstrates what a prudentowner should do to ensure safe ship operation Also available are eight well-constmcted learning texts

to improve the quality of management effectiveness Within these two initiatives, The NauticalInstitute Council can claim to have made a most positive professional contribution to maritimesafety.0

6 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE

PART I

POLICY

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 7

A TANKER OPERATOR'S SAFETY POLICY

Captain G T Robson, MNI

Supervisor, Safety and Training, Chevron Shipping Company, USA

SAFETYIS IMPORTANTin every aspect of running a and technology fields-inert gas, automatic radarship, and although there are many approaches to plotting aids and covered lifeboats being just a fewcreate a safe working environment at sea, Chevron examples Such improvements make the seafarer'sbelieves that personal safety awareness is the root job safer from the start But there is another side tofrom which all other safety considerations stem safety which isjust as intriguing and far more difficultAlthough dangers exist in any industrial setting, they to control: the human portion of the equation Theare even more likely at sea, where the motion of the idea that ships should be made entirely 'sailor proofvessel and unique work environment compound the contradicts the inclination to mould a safer employee,risk of an accident occurring, and the problems in and it is this aptitude for creating safety awareness inrec~i,:,ing medical treatment compound the severity of people that transforms safety from a science to an art

an Injury The capability of man to advance his survival byWith the help of numerous flag administrations altering his environment represents an interrelation-and classification societies, international conventions ship between conditions (the environment) andsuch as Solas have come a long way in promulgating actions exerted on them Actions and conditionsshipboard requirements that make the maritime affect each other in such a way that new circumstancesindustry safer overall However, the responsibility of arise which are themselves safe or unsafe dependingensuring the safety of ships and those who sail on them on the safety of the previous actions and conditionsmust initiate from the owners themselves Chevron's which moulded them Thus, in its simplest form,safety policy extends far beyond providing good accident prevention IS an evolutionary processequipment and professional training Chevron's between people and their surroundings The art ofpersonnel safety programme attempts to transform safety lies in the capacity to keep people from doingthe company's official safety conventions into the dangerous things, and the science of safety lies in theemployee's personal safety convictions capacity to keep things from becoming dangerous.The immense task of running a safe ship, let alone Although the interrelationship between unsafe acts

a safe fleet, can not be accomplished by rules and and conditions creates a new set of circumstances thatregulations alone Safety performance is, after all, invariably results in accidents, what explains thedetermined by the decisions and actions of those on existence of unsafe acts and conditions? Hints as toboard Safety of life at sea, collisions, groundings, why these preconditions develop can be foundexplosions, fires, equipment failures and personal scattered along the evolutionary path of accidentinjuries are only some of the risks which a seafarer prevention as techniques to eliminate accidentsmust face No safety policy will adequately address become more and more specialised These techniquesthese contingencies unless it is aimed at the people have evolved by overcoming the most elementalwho do the work problems first and then moving on to the next one ByUltimately, Chevron's safety policy is founded on determining the characteristic phases of accidentthe principle that safety is everyone's responsibility- prevention, the problems dealt with in each phase willeven if it is for different reasons It does not matter also be revealed, and we will see the origins of unsafewhether Chevron Shipping Company holds that acts and unsafe conditions.

safety is the cornerstone of an efficient operation, if

Origin ofaccidents

our employees do not practise sound safety habits

What does matter is that every single person on board Chevron Shipping Company's safety group hasrealises the importance of his own personal safety so been able to distinguish six phases in the evolution ofthat the safety of the crew, the vessel, the fleet and the accident prevention Each phase represents a sourcecompany naturally follow This can be done for cor- from which accidents originate In the absence of allporate, moral, legal, personal or any other reasons, so safety controls, the most elemental accidents are alsolong as at the end of the day, everyone knows that no the most common Thus, Phase 1 accidents accountjob is done correctly unless it is done safely for the largest area in the accident triangle, Phase 2

the second largest and so on

Evolution ofaccident prevention The most elemental accidents involve equipmentFor years, accidents have been addressed in terms failure due to poor design, construction or faulty

of unsafe acts and unsafe conditions, and it is from this equipment. These casualties, referred to here asbroad spectrum of possibilities that an open-minded Phase 1 accidents, are prevented with improvedaccident investigator reviews the factors that enter technology, construction procedures and qualityinto an accident Unsafe conditions are usually solved control Such accidents rarely occur in the shipping

by building a better mousetrap, and in fact, the best industry today because of the stringent requirementssafety achievements continue to be in the engineering set forth by international conventions such as Solas.

In addition, the harsh environment encountered by

* This chapter was originally presented to Sasmex 90 and is ships has forced the use of high-quality 'marine'

reproduced by courtesy of Safety at Sea. standard equipment

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 9

It is in the interest of the industry overall to prevent of accidents, but mistakes due to inadequate Phase 1 accidents from occurring because good fessional knowledge are usually far more severe.designs accomplish safety In conjunction with

pro-efficiency, and solid construction accomplishes safety Unsafe procedures

in conjunction with reduced maintenance costs In Phase 4 involves casualties that occur as a result oftoday's shipping environment, the only area of unsafe procedures This is much like conducting aconcern is poor construction due to cutting corners symphony without music scores-even the finestHowever, even in this area, improved construction instruments and the best talent will produce astandards and the importance of credibility among cacophony of sound similar to that when an accidentshipyard contractors have gone a long way to cultivate occurs on board ship Watchstanding procedures,safe construction overhauls, mooring operations, cargo transfer andEven a well-designed and -constructed vessel with any other type of shipboard procedure must bethe best equipment affords little chance of safety if the carefully orchestrated in order to maintain control.equipment is abused because of hasty operations, or This means first promulgating clear, conCIseintentionally 'run ragged' to save on maintenance operating guidelines, and providing the on-boardexpenses Phase 2 accidents occur because of equip- training to ensure they are understood

ment failure caused by misplaced company and/or Accidents that occur in this area usually result fromvessel priorities These priorities are driven by the major shipboard operations such as tying up ormotive to maximise profits by saving costs on time during engine overhauls, and are typified by explana-(including labour and demurrage) and maintenance tions such as 'there was a breakdown in communica-Although owners must always be cost-conscious in tion,' 'he should have asked for help' or 'it was done

a highly competitive industry such as shipping, care out of order.' Through prior planning, discussionmust be taken not to sacrifice long-term profits for about the potential hazards of the procedure,short-term gains by deviating from established safe deliberate work, good communication and activepractices and equipment design requirements Safety supervIsIOn, these accidents will virtually beand reliability reflect significant expenses in equip- eliminated.

ment and manpower, and reducing this expense is a The fifth type of accident distinguished in thetempting way to increase profits However, many evolution of accident prevention results from inat-companies have discovered that the losses suffered as tention to hazards associated with the job, such as

a result of future casualties far outweigh any missing a navigational aid, standing in the dangertemporary improvements in the balance sheets zone of a mooring line or not noticing a load hanging

overhead Although there are any number of reasons

Good preventive maintenance for not recognising potential hazards, they can benarrowed down to either mental or physical

distrac-From an engineering standpoint, a good pre- tions Mental distractions are usually caused byventive maintenance programme will keep equip- mindless complacency or reckless haste, whilement running smoothly and reliably, so long as the physical distractions occur when an outside stimulusequipment is used within rated design specifications breaks one's concentration. In either event,such as maximum load limits, speeds, temperatures distractions can easily be eliminated by developing aand pressures However, if equipment is intentionally sense of priorities in the seafarer This is best doneused beyond its capacity, or maintained below with hypothetical training and drills, combined withstandard, Phase 2 accidents are bound to occur The good coaching and supervision to create a sense ofconcept of 'risk management' has gone a long way what is really important in the job.

toward promoting the financial benefits of safety by

comparing the probability and severity of a casualty Unrecognlsed hazards

(i.e., risk) to the cost of preventing it

Some hazards are historically not even recognisedPhase 3 accidents in the evolutionary process of after the accident has occurred, as evidenced byaccident prevention involve equipment failure due to injury reports that indicate an accident resulted frommisuse It is important to distinguish misuse, the 'uncontrollable circumstances' which were impos-unintentional mishandling of equipment, from Phase sible to see or prevent Although events are clearly out

2 abuse, condoned to satisfy short-term returns by of control at the moment of an accident, the getting the job done quicker lying causes almost always exist long enough to beProfessionalism, the combination of attitude and recognised and resolved by a trained eye

under-expertise necessary to get the job done, is the beSt The capability to predict an accident is a naturalproponent of Phase 3 accident prevention, and is instinct that comes with experience However, goodusually gained through on-board training Most of training reinforces the importance not only of readingthis training is not formal, but is passed along by the danger signs, but of using goodjudgement to preventsupervisor, who also takes the opportunity to convey hazards from turning into an accident It is in-actionthe expectations of the company in order to develop that is the danger in Phase 5 accidents Once a sea-the right attitude Comprehensive training in ships farer genuinely believes that all circumstances aresystems and equipment must be an integral part of controllable, he will effortlessly look for, find andthe new employee indoctrination programme, and correct potential hazards At this point, safetyshould be repeated over and over until this know- awareness shifts from passive to proactive

ledge becom~ second nature Simple human error, The sixth and final type of accident distinguished indescribed in Phase 6, accounts for the vast majority the evolution of accident prevention results from

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 11

simple, careless mistakes They are typified by self- ment in shipboard safety On one extreme, inflicted injuries such as slips/trips/falls, striking panies that attempt to maximise short-term profitsone's own finger, poor lifting techniques and others without regard to long-term growth would reside inthat show an almost eerie absence of personal safety Phase 2, while companies with high attrition andawareness separate and distinct from professional insufficient professional training would be in Phase 3,competence Lack of competency found in Phase 3 and those with inadequate or poorly understoodmistakes is not a factor in Phase 6 accidents, dispelling operating guidelines and procedures in Phase 4,the view that professional training will virtually and so on.

com-eliminate accidents Ironically, although Phase 6

accidents appear to be the most easily preventable on Chevron's position

the surface, they may have very deep seated psycho- Chevron management believes that Chevron islogIcal roots that effect motivatIOn and morale operating somewhere at the end of Phase 5 This

•• assessment is supported by the fact that 90 per cent of

Varied motIvation all injuries sustained by the company in 1989 were ofMotivation varies not only from person to person, the Phase 6 type Obviously it is better to sustainbut from nationality to nationality, and in the 90 per cent of all accidents in a small segment of theshipping industry this fact can be crucial Although accident triangle, like Phase 6, rather than in a largegeneralisations are dangerous, and the master must segment like Phase 1 In addition to the type ofknow how to motivate each individual, there is useful accidents Chevron normally sustains, our injury rateinformation to be gained, for instance, from the fact has been sufficiently low for the past several years tothat different nationalities are motivated for different suggest that we are at least toward the latter end of thereasons depending on their own unique culture spectrum

Sometimes just knowing something about a seafarer's A good safety programme is strategically designedbackground not only boosts his morale, but makes it to combat accidents in each phase, but it is importanteasier to determine which motivation techniques to maintain a balance in all phases of accidentwork Of course, there may be other considerations prevention For instance, a company can lose sight ofwhich only the company can resolve, such as pay and accidents that occur due to Phase 3 equipment misusecontract duration, but usually an employee's level of while management concentrates on updating Phase 4motivation is proportional to the feeling that his job, procedures It is for this reason that accident reviewsfor one reason or another, matters conducted on board must be meaningful, and injuryMost careless mistakes can be safeguarded against statistics accurately entered and properly main-

by applying basic safe working habits, such as tained Using correct and timely information aboutisolating power and pressure, shielding heat sources, what is happening in the fleet, management canbeing aware of surroundings, being conscious of respond to impending dangers

balance, working deliberately and wearing protective

equipment The importance of these principles and Investigation, reporting and records

habits must be readily apparent in all operating Chevron maintains its personal injury records on aprocedures, and they should be well ingrained in the computer for easy reference and trend analysis.consciousness of the individual seafarer to prevent Although hard copies are kept of all vessel casualtypersonal mistakes reports, it must be remembered that Chevron

Shipping Company operates under the philosophythat personal safety awareness is the root from whichall other safety considerations stem A properaccident review is therefore critical to developingaccident prevention techniques for the right phase

In the event of an injury, four things must happen

on board: the accident must be investigated,reported, discussed at a safety meeting, and classified.Although there are a number of reasons for such anextensive accident follow-up, by far the mostimportant reason is to prevent recurrence

Investigation

An accident investigation is the first and mostimportant step in the accident follow-up A goodinvestigation requires not only careful examination ofthe immediate sequence of events that caused theaccident, but also unsafe practices, faulty equipment,inadequate maintenance, poor communication orother operating conditions that may have played arole

Chevron encourages a thorough accident gation even of near misses In many cases an accidentinvolving no injury may reveal as many constructiveconclusions as the investigation of an accident

investi-MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 13

involving a serious injury Bodily harm is more often reporting standard is becoming readily apparent Itdetermined by the individual's location and response may be appropriate for the International Maritime

at the moment of danger than the accident itself For Organization to establish its own procedures forthis reason Chevron expects its officers to consider reporting personnel injuries to review the effec-what caused the threat rather than the severity of the tiveness of its safety regulations

injury when conducting an accident investigation U sing a computerised database, Chevron classifies

A good accident investigation extends beyond injuries by their key parameters, such as the accidentdetermining what happened by asking what should Phase (1-6), the vessel on which the injury occurred,have happened The result is not just a description of the name of the supervisor and department head, thethe event, but a senes of proposed solutions principal cause, vessel activity, location of injury,Obviously, when an accident occurs there is room for type of injury and a multitude of other considerations.improvement Whether this means a major policy Although tedious at times, these raw data compriseshift is necessary or a simple equipment change will the basis for trend analysis necessary to effect proper

do, chances are some action will be required as a result action by the Home Office and ultimately, the vessel

of a well done investigation

Reporting tohome office On-board safety programmeVessel management is hardly a new concept In the

Because of the ease and relatively low cost of ship- days of sail, it was not uncommon for the master to actto-shore communication, Chevron has over the years as the owner/operator of the vessel and its cargo As aplaced more emphasis on rapid reporting of ship- result, the master employed his own crew, chose hisboard injuries by telex This rapid report can be own trade, undertook his own repairs and conducteduseful for three reasons: first, it allowsthe home office his affairs in every other way like a normal business-

to assist with injury classification when there is man Although in retrospect, such ventures wereconfusion; second, it allows the home office to assist sometimes conducted with abandon, the sense ofwith directing key questions in an accident investi- ownership or a 'stake' in the venture created a firmgation; and, third, it allows the home office to inform and effective vessel management Over the years,the rest of the fleet if any immediate danger exists management has shifted into the home office, along

A telex report is required in the event of all lost time with the perception of ownership

injuries, which Chevron classifies as resulting in 24 At Chevron, we are trying to emphasise manyhours or more off work If there is doubt whether lost aspects of vessel management on board, and, in sotime may be involved, masters are advised to err on doing, inspire ownership among our officers andthe side of caution and send the message It is crew This is being done slowlyas a balanced businessgenerally recognised that some detail is lost in a rapid decision in an attempt to boost profitability where itreport, particularly if the accident is complicated and can be improved on board Interestingly, the effort

an extensive investigation is needed However, so toward vessel-determined profitability echoes a safetylong as the necessary information is received, details policy that has been in effect for over 50 years insurrounding the accident and investigation can wait Chevron A successful balance between a vessel-until Chevron's written personnel injury report and managed safety programme (administered on board)accident analysis report are received Once these and fleet-managed safety programme (administeredreports are reviewed, the information is transferred ashore) consolidates the personal desire to avoidinto the company's computerised database for injury with the company's desire to reduce risk Thestatistical analysis and performance evaluation result is improved safety performance

Chevron's safety programme is designed to

de-Safety meeting velop Phase 6 safety awareness in order to eliminate

As part of the accident analysis or when the all unsafe actions and conditions The vessel safetyinvestigation is complete, the master must hold a programme does this in two ways: it allowssafety to besafety meeting with all parties concerned The managed where it needs to be-on board; and focusedpurpose of this meeting is to ensure everyone where it needs to be-on seafarers. Althoughunderstands what caused the accident, discuss the Chevron must provide the tools and impetus toimportance of working safely and establish guidelines develop personal safety awareness, the onus for

to prevent recurrence performance rests squarely on the shoulders of thoseChevron believes that improved experience is the who serve on the ships, and it is up to the vessel safetyonly benefit of an accident, which costs far too much committee to cultivate the participation of all hands

to ignore! Although it is the master's responsibility to on board.

conduct a meaningful safety meeting, it is up to the

crew to adapt the incident to their own experience so Vessel safety committee

that it won't happen again Chaired by the master, the vessel safety committee

Classification is made up of all officers on board, and is responsiblefor managing the safety of the ship and crew EvenChevron Shipping Company reports accidents to within Chevron's fleet, safety is handled differendyChevron Corporation according to an established set on each ship; but the principles about what makes

of guidelines that classify injuries as either first safety work are uniform, as is the company's goal toaid, non-lost time or lost time While Chevron achieve personal safety awareness

Shipping will continue to follow corporate reporting Safety awareness is largely determined by therequirements, the need for an industry-wide safety master's management style Not surprisingly, some

14 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE

management styles appear'to be more effective than officers spend one assignment (normally about fiveothers, and although it is not the aim of this chapter to months) in the home office rather than at sea Aboutdiscuss management techniques, it is clear that safety five officers are in the office at any given time underawareness is encouraged most by an 'open' manage- this programme, and one of the positions is alwaysment approach One must see the value of safety in with the safety and training group By actuallyorder to possess personal safety awareness Unfortu- working in the office, seafarers gain a much betternately, while sometimes this insight is obtained by understanding of how business decisions are made,witnessing a gruesome accident, an injury is not a while at the same time the home office taps a pool ofdesirable means of developing safety awareness experts on specific problems that occur within thePreferably, the master can convice everyone on board fleet The overall result is a safer and more efficientthat safety is valuable by using open management operation.

techniques such as good communication, training Decisions regarding the phases of accident and leadership vention that need work, and the strategy for

pre-I can think of no other industrial setting where overcoming them must be made ashore, wherethe influence of one individual can make as much fleetwide tendencies are reviewed, and the budget anddifference as the master of a ship To those who have course of the safety programme is determined Theserved at sea, it is self-evident that every ship reflects management safety committee provides this impetusnot only the capability, but the personality, of the for Chevron's fleet safety programme

master Even though safety is a democratic issue, this

power to persuade can be used to advantage in the Management safety committee

industry-the important question is how? Members of the management safety committeeFor Chevron, the vessel safety committee provides represent all divisions of Chevron Shipping Company

an excellent vehicle for communicating the master's directly involved in the safety of fleet operations Thegoals The committee meets formally at least once a four-member committee is chaired by the fleetmonth to discuss various accidents and near misses, manager, with three other members representing theunsafe conditions, possible hazards of upcomingjobs, divisions shown in graph 9 The supervisor of safety

safety suggestions and other related safety issues In and training, as a member of the vice-president'saddition, a crew safety meeting is held, usually on the staff, acts as secretary to the committee, and providessame day, to convey these issues as they apply to the an important interface between operations andcrew These meetings lay the ground work for safe safety Normally the chairman calls for a meeting ofworking practices which are later adopted on deck, in the management safety committee about once athe engineroom and in the gallery month to discuss business such as the annual marineShipboard safety meetings also provide a means of training plan, safety statistics and incentive targets,communicating with the home office about existing technical and regulatory issues, Chevron proceduressafety concerns through minutes compiled by a and regulations, casualties affecting the fleet, fleetdesignated secretary and signed by the master At requirements for new safety equipment and any otherChevron, questions and suggestions raised in vessel business pertaining to safety and training

safety meetings are given a high priority and always Once an agenda item is approved by the answered by the safety group ment safety committee, the safety and training groupCharged with the task of developing personal safety carries out the necessary action to ensure it isawareness, the master must convince the crew that it implemented This may include involving other

manage-is important to work safely, rather than attempt to departments in Chevron or the manning officescontroltheir every move With this direction, the day- (especially where training is concerned.) Althoughto-day administration of safety in all phases is the safety and training group reports principally to theoverseen by the vessel safety committee officers and vice-president in charge of operations, it also has verythe petty officers who work closely with the crew close ties with the fleet division This relationship is

absolutely essential for the safety and training group

Fleet safety programme to have an active role in the day-to-day operation ofThere is a symbiotic relationship between the fleet

Chevron's fleet safety programme run by the home

office, and the vessel safety programme run on board Safety and training

each ship (i.e., one can not exist without the other.) Chevron administers both its safety and trainingTherefore, it is important that all vessels are in programmes through one group for a reason-safetysynchronisation with the overall safety goals set forth must be learned by a combination of experience,

by the home office Despite the indisputable fact that training and persuasion Unfortunately, experiencecompany management is responsible for setting only comes with time, but the quality of experiencesafety policy, the home office makes every effort to can be improved with good training and exposure toavoid creating 'sides' by asking for and recognising solid evidence about the importance of safety.input from the fleet This is done whenever possible, Of course, most training is intended to developsuch as when developing incentive awards or passing professional skills, which primarily reduce Phase 3along suggestions from one vessel to the rest of the (equipment misuse) accidents Countless hours arefleet put in by officers and crew on board to sharpen their

In addition, Chevron continually rotates officers professional knowledge In addition, the company

from the fleet into the home office using the officer sends many personnel each year to outside

development programme. In this programme, selected professional training courses

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 15

While the total cost of the safety and training eflort Incentives are one way of recognising a job well

is significant, it is easily justified, considering the done, and Chevron uses awards to recognise fleetaverage cost of each injury to Chevron is $14,000 Of achievements like meeting the targeted annual injurycourse, training would not be complete if a special rate, vessel achievements such as operating one yearprogramme did not exist for those who need it most- without injury, and personal achievements such asnew employees Graph 10 shows that significant producing a usable safety suggestion Althoughsavings can be obtained by imparting safe working sceptics criticise the use of incentive awards withhabits during the first years of company employment arguments such as 'safety is a basic criteria of theGiven enough time, employment with the com- job, and should not be recognised as an outstandingpany tends to improve the safety awareness of all its accomplishment': or 'awards only provide recogni-employees However, new employees continue to be tion, not incentive': or 'safety should be its ownresponsible for a high number of Phase 5-6 accidents reward,' Chevron believes that incentive awards do(improper attention/actions.) In view of this, have their place in a safety programme They do theirChevron recently developed a safety i,ndocrination job simply by making seafarers think about safety,package to reduce injuries to new employees begin- and that is justification enough

ning with their first company contract Initially

implemented by the company's manning offices and Safety Bulletin

participating off-duty senior officers whenever One of the oldest and most important toolspossible, the introductory safety indoctrination Chevron Shipping Company uses is the companyprogramme is based on a 20-minute videotape Safety Bulletin. Dedicated to the welfare of those whodeveloped by Chevron Shipping Company that gives serve on the ships the Bulletin first appeared in 1938,solid advice on safety and explains company and has since then developed a wide industryexpectations to new employees The intent of the distribution

programme is to emphasise the importance of saf~ty The primary objective of the Bulletin is to offerbefore the new employee even se~s a Ch~vron ShIp practical advice on how to prevent accidents andThe fast~r th~ new employee IS convmce~ ~hat promote safety in the marine environment In lineChevron ISsenous about safety, the faster the mJury with Chevron's belief that personal safety awarenesscurve for new employees wIll drop is the root from which all other safety considerationsThe introductory safety indoctrination programme stem, theSafety Bulletin is directed towards preventinggives tips exclusively on accidents in Phases 4-6 personal injuries, and provokes frequent feedback(improper procedures/attention/actions), leaving from its shipboard audience The Safety Bulletin is aprofessional training up to the vessel officers to window into the company's safety programme, andeliminate Phase 3 (improper use) accidents Although promotes safety by making seafarers more aware ofintended for use ashore, the introductory safety the problems that exist in their fleet

indoctrination programme is also kept on board all

company vessels to assist the vessel safety committee Superintendents' programme

with accident repeaters, or new em~l~yees who did Communication is essential to the success of anynot have an opportumty to partIcIpate ashore safety programme With better communicationIntended solely as an introduction ~o saf~ty in between the home office and the fleet, goals can beChevr~m, the pro.grar.nmecreates a startmg pomt for focused, priorities directed, operating requirementsextensIve mdoctrmatIOn later conducted on board understood, and company efforts unified Shipping is

one of the most difficult industries in which to

Tools ofthe trade: visual aids establish genuine communication because of a

In an attempt to promote safety, Chevron admi- vessel's capability to operate self-sufficiently innisters numerous training aids specifically designed remote areas of the world The superintendents'

to improve personal safety awareness Each company group fills this communication gap by representingship has an extensive video library on subjects such as the home office on board for about one week at a time.eye safety, hand and power tool safety, back safety As senior members of operating m.anagement,and other precautions necessary to prevent personal marine, engineering and safety superintendentsinjury The group also provides tape/slide pro- conduct a number of on-board programmes togrammes such as 'Safe Rigging and Lifting,' which maintain the safety and efficiency of Chevron fleetshows proper lifting techniques, the 'Convince,' vessels at the highest possible level This is not an easywhich graphically shows injuries that happen on job, and requires the co-operation of everyone oncertain jobs, and the 'Loss Prevention Slide board both during and after the visit

Programme,' which shows staged unsafe actions and Safety superintendents playa unique part in theconditions in order to elicit comments and thoughts superintendents' programme While all superin-

on good safety habits tendents stress the importance of safety, only safety

superintendents are responsible for particular safety

Incentive awards and training programmes dedicated to improvingChevron is extremely sensitive to the fact that safety at sea This job takes on many forms, includingpersonal safety awareness must be developed by providing information and training to officers andpersuasion, not coercion This is reflected by the crew, conducting inspections and evaluating officersgroup's constant effort to promote safety with tools in terms of safety performance

that convince seafarers the job is done correctly only The safety superintendents' on-board safetywhen it is done safely programme is designed so that a safety superin-

16 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 17

SHIP OPERA TIONS AND SAFETY

COMPANY (PART A)

Captain S J Pressly, SA, MNI

Safety and Marine Superintendent, V Ships (UK) Ltd

MODERNPROFESSIONALshipmanagers and owners links Each office is managed under one or two of theoperate in an increasingly safety and environmentally organisation's directors, thus ensuring that closelinksconscious world A relatively small number of large- with the board's policies are maintained, togetherscale accidents covered by the media has increased the with rapid feedback at board level of any localpublic perception that the industry is not as safe as it difficulties

should be This, combined with a plethora of national The vessels managed by each office are divided intoand international legislation and recommendations, a number of fleets of up to ten vessels, which arehas raised the standards required of all shipping controlled by a semi-autonomous group of two orUnfortunately, the average age of the world's fleet three superintendents, a fleet co-ordinator,

is increasing Many older vesselshave suffered at least purchasing manager, fleet accountant and fleetone period of 'minimum maintenance' during their secretary These sit in close proximity to one anotherlives, and crew levels are falling-some say to in- in order to maximise efficient communication andappropriately low levels on vessels not specifically minimise the need for formal inter-departmentaldesigned for small crews Arguably, it is said that communications The emphasis is on the team ratheroverall standards of officers and crews have fallen with than the department

the rise of Third World maritime nations The personnel function is independent of the fleet

On the face of it, the shipmanager's task is an system in order to co-ordinate crew movements, asunenviable one He may be offered the management ship personnel often change between fleets and

of vessels ranging from new buildings to old, sub- offices The marine and safety functions operatestandard, vessels with a multitude of defects, and any independently, to allow consistent standards of vesselcombination in between One constant factor will be auditing The headquarters in Monte Carlo retainshigh expectations from owners and charterers who, of the training function and specialist functions such ascourse, expect any vessel to operate with the naval architects and steel surveyors, which areminimum of delay and at a cost comparable to any available to all offices when required Group safetyother vessel of a similar age and type, regardless of the audits are also co-ordinated centrally

standard of safety A vital part of the organisation are the worldwideModern multi-national shipmanagers, such as V crewing agencies such as Bombay, Manila, ColomboShips, have therefore evolved into organisations and Odessa These allow a large degree of flexibilitycapable of handling these factors successfully with in choosing possible crews and crew combinations,favourable results The way in which an organisation as no shipmanagement organisation can expect tohandles these problems may be split into two: maintain standards unless both officers and crews areorganisation structure; and method of operation selected on the basis of suitability Through internalFurthermore, in the context of safety management, auditing, a comprehensive picture has been built upthe problems may be simplified into two broad areas: over the varying standards which, in turn, enablesassessment of safety; and management of safety training to be focused on the groups that will most

As no two shipmanagement organisations are benefit

identical, Iwill be using V Ships as an example of

Method ofoperation-safe management

how these four areas may be successfully tackled in a

multi-national shipmanagement organisation, Given the structure outlined above, muchmanaging over 120 vessels, ranging from new gas emphasis is placed on the unique standard systemscarriers, chemical and oil tankers to multi-purpose used throughout the organisation Each vessel reportscargo vessels and bulk carriers in the same way and each fleet has identical

V Ships organisation structure procedures and filing systems, many of which arefully computerised This allows both ship and shore

V Ships is the shipmanagement branch of the personnel to move among the fleets with theVlasov Group, and operates completely inde- minimum of accustomisation needed

pendently from its parent The organisation is based More importantly for safety aspects, when taking

in Monaco, but at present also manages vessels from over a vessel the standard procedures are immediatelyfour additional offices situated in Limassol, Oslo, commenced, allowing the officers to spend timeSouthampton, and New York V Ships has a stated familiarising themselves with the operational andstrategy to locate regional offices wherever the safety aspects of the vessel rather than with paper-shipowners and clients are located Owners and work To keep officers and crews within the V Shipsclients may choose whichever office they desire for Group is a stated objective of the organisation, andmanagement, and this optimises communication low turnover ensures that the majority will be familiar

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 19

FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN

COMMUNICA TING A FLEET SAFETY

POLICY (PART B)

COMMUNICA nON IS the art of transferring a The message will not be received unless the receiver thought or idea between the originator and one or is 'open' or ready to receive, and thereafter, accurate more recipients The word 'communication' is often decoding will depend upon use of the same code and confused with the method of transmitting a message rules as used in coding For practical purposes, a two- such a speech, telex or a newspaper It means much way flow of messages termed 'feedback' is required by more than this, encompassing the whole process of the originator to ensure that the message has been thought transfer For example, managers that believe both received and understood It is worth noting that

a circular has 'communicated' a particular policy copying the original message back to the originator could be mistaken The circular has simply carried the does signify receipt, but not necessarily under- message, and as this message may not have been read standing.

or understood, the managers may be operating under

the possible dangerous illusion that their fleet is Comparison with reality

following a certain policy. Given an understanding of this model of the

com-In this chapter, I will clarify our understanding of munication process, applying it to the specific task ofthe meaning of communication and the processes communicating a fleet safety policy is straightforwardinvolved in communicating I will build a genel'alised and such application will assist managers in high-model of the communication process and use this to lighting the relevant factors to consider whenillustrate the practical task of communicating a fleet formulating a communication strategy.

safety policy. Safety policy is equivalent to the 'thought' in the

model It is essential to understand that in any

The theory policy First the 'official' written policy and secondly,organisation there are at least two manifestations of

Very simply, the process of communicating can be the traditional, unwritten or 'real' policy, whichillustrated by a flow diagram. manifests itself in the form of actions by policy

makers The messages sent from each policy are often conflicting.

I will not comment here on the content of the policy

a company creates, but I will assume that the official policy will accurately mirror the real policy at the policy creation level, and that no conflict exists between them This is certainly not always the case and in some organisations, middle-level managers can spend much time and effort in trying to com- municate an official policy which was never intended

A thought can be any idea or belief, but before

to be taken literally It is a truism to say that the actions of individuals in an organisation tend to be transferring to a receiver it must be coded into guided more by real policy than the official writtensuitable form called the message An example of a policy and, therefore, it is the task of those making thecode is language with the rules of use being grammar. policy to ensure that the real policy closely follows adThis coding is the single most important part of the complements the intent of the written version.communication process and must take into account Many organisations recognise this and, in thethe channels available, the codes available common to context of safety policy, have developed a safetyboth the originator and receiver, and the ability of the tradition or safety 'culture.' This is developed andreceiver to decode accurately The message may be reinforced in a number of ways, including assessmentwords (speech or writing), actions, diagrams, films, of individual safety performance when consideringetc., and of course, a thought may require more than bonuses and promotions. A vital part of a safetyone message and use more than one code to be com- culture strategy will be good communication betweenmunicated accurately. all levels of the organisation. To a greater or lesserThe message is the coded thought and is trans- extent, every organisation should consider promotionmitted along a channel such as a memo (for words), of a safety culture if it requires a safety policy to beair (for speech), light, television, radio, etc Channels effective and self-perpetuating.

are subject to interference or 'noise' which may

Encoding the message

distort the message, but this can be overcome by

repeating the message through different channels, How the safety policy is coded into a message will using error detecting and correcting codes, increasing depend, to a large extent, on the channels available the strength of the messages, using feedback or any and the receivers to whom the policy is aimed In a combination of these multinational ship management company such as

22 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE

V Ships, the nationalities, culture, education and Telex Very effective III reinforcing a motivation of the receivers may vary widely and particular instruction.

therefore the correct message and channel must be Usually read by the intended receiver.used to communicate effectively Newsletters Often seen as a marketing device

rather than real news if heavily The following is a list of communication channels censored.

available to the policy originator Economical method of spreading the

official written policy.

If used with skill, can reduce the

CHANNEL COMMENTS 'us and them' thinking between Actions Very effective-for example, personnel afloat and those ashore.

• Creation of safety/training Circulars May not be read.

• Backing safe actions even when ship's staff are not educated to followresulting in cost or delay. company policy.

• Acting on suggestions and

recom-Posters Many available 'off the shelf ' mendations.

Useful for reinforcing policy daily Culture Self-perpetuating.

Requires commitment and time. Receivers

Opens receivers to 'weaker' channels. Safety policy must be communicated to all levels inSuperintendents Very effective in passing on policy the organisation if it is to be truly effective. In any

sizable multi-national organisation such as V Ships, both written and unwritten during

the different levels have receivers of different visits.

back-Receive instant feedback when grounds, language and experience, who will thereforevisiting vessels. require different messages to allow proper under-Superintendents may be more standing of the safety policy In this case, a single effective communicators if they hail channel will certainly not be effective in communica- from the same background as the ting policy to all levels To use a practical example, avessel's complement. detailed written safety policy may be adequate toMasters In many cases, the only link between communicate policy to motivated literate managers,

the crew and shore management. but totally inadequate to communicate to a Third

It is possible to select masters on World crew who, in the terminology of the the basis of good communication munication model, may not be able to decode it.with managers-e.g., of the same Many cultures place very little weight on thenationality. written word, believing perhaps correctly in someEssential to have complete under- cases, that the written instructions are simply there asstanding of safety policy. cover for the managers in case of an accident. ToTraining Effective if well briefed. understand better the potential problems, it is usefulOfficers/Cadet Do not normally have the respon- to list the groups of receivers in a typical organisationInstructional sibilities and hence the authority of managing ships There will be most of the following Officers superin tenden ts functions concerned with safety: seniOr policy- Safety Function The very existence of a safety function makingship operations;management;masters;local managers;officers; and crew.safety group;

com-is a policy statement and motivating

Thus, all levels below the policy makers can be factor.

Does not usually have resources for regarded as receivers, with each level having differentday to day monitoring of the fleet channels available, requiring different messages In Audits the organisation and vessels, addition, the following receivers will have a strong therefore, a valuable source of interest in safety policy and its effectiveness This is feedback. extremely relevant as many safety policies are eitherPolicy Statement Essential. partly or wholly compiled with these receivers in

Will be ignored if not backed up by mind: the shipowner; classification societies; P&Iaction. Clubs; charterers (especially in the case of oil,

chemical or hazardous cargoes); potential clients; Policy Manual Expands and clarifies policy state- port State control; Coastguard; and the public.

ment. The appropriate channels here may be the May not be read, therefore content nation of top-level written policy, perhaps in the formmay be ignored if not reinforced by

dissemi-of press releases and possibly posters on the vessels, other channels.

which all visitors will observe when boarding In the Operating Will reinforce policy case of many surveyors, the relevant policy will be the Manuals Care must be taken to ensure that they 'real' shipboard policy detected by observing the

accurately reflect policy actions of master, officers and crew.

Videos/Films Can bring a message across effectively

Practical communication

to a large varied audience.

May be expensive and time con- Initially an increase in effective communication suming to produce can be achieved by reducing the number of levels

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 23

24 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE

FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN

PREPARING A FLEET SAFETY POLICY

G B Standring

Managing Director, Marine Safety Services Ltd, UK

AT THE SIXTEENTHSESSIONof the Assembly of the and profit margins will fall below the renewal International Maritime Organization held III old as bank credit-worthiness is diminished

thresh-October 1989, Resolution A647 (16) 'Guidelines on Where passenger vessels are concerned, theManagement for the Safe Operation of Ships and for situation is more critical The Herald oj Free Enterprise

Pollution Prevention' was adopted This calls for and the Scandinavian Star disasters have so heightenedshipping companies to: public awareness of ferry safety standards that the

establish a sajety and environmental protect£onpolicy consequences of another such accident will carry very

with the objectives oj saje operation and theprevention heavy penalties indeed Passengers can make their

oj pollution The Policy should state these objectives own decisions and the operators of cruise lines and

and set out the means oj achieving them, in broad ferries know that their future lies in attracting back

terms, taking into account the relevant international passengers, rather than losing them to the opposition

conventions and nat£onal regulat£ons. The consequences of a serious accident would be verySome shipping companies required no encourage- damaging.

ment to draw up and implement a safety policy and Vessels carrying oil and chemicals have the rest can now be in no doubt as to the need to tingly run into serious liability problems following theestablish their own In the forefront of the minds of stranding of the Exxon Valdez This ship, like the Amoco

unwit-managers will be the need to keep their ships eligible Cadiz, was in no way substandard, but the effect of the

to trade or capable of doing so Factors which may accident has been to awaken public awareness, andlead to a reduction in that capacity-e.g., whether or hence political intervention concerning safety of thenot to use an OBO in wet or dry trades-are carefully environment and, secondly, left the industry with anweighed against cost and potential revenue extraordinarily expensive bill for cleaning up the oil.Should commercial priorities receive over-riding The cornerstones of good management in anyimportance in a company, it is possible that the business are commitment from the top and effectiveintegrity of the ship may be compromised Evidence line management A safety policy issued on the

of this was given in a recent seminar (Sub-Standard authority of the chief executive helps to avoid the

Ships, the Master's Dilemma-Proceedings oj a Seminar, falling standards mentioned above and indicates

1989 The Nautical Institute) where P&I Clubs management's commitment to safety, not only totheinvestigating claims found that ships involved in workforce, but also to people outside the company,accidents and large claims invariably had all their such as customers, competitors and the generalstatutory and classification certificates in order when public It sets out responsibilities and procedures to bethe condition of the ship or the competence of the crew followed from the chief executive down the line towere in dispute High safety standards promote good masters and ship personnel These are perhaps thebusiness and this chapter looks at some of the factors most obvious reasons for having a safety policy, but

to be considered when drawing up a balanced fleet there are other benefits, namely:

safety policy • It establishessafetyand environmental objectivesto be

achievedby a company

Reasons for having a safety policy • By auditing the policy, management can obtain early

It is important at this point to discuss why a com- warning of accidental losses.

pany should make a conscious effort and expenditure • It can be used to monitor the success of a company's

to implement a safety policy In commercial terms, safety and environmental programme.

• It indicates to ships' personnel that they have a duty to

it can be argued that provided compensation is act responsibly to protect themselves and theiravailable through insurance, at rates which are colleagues.

acceptable, then services can be maintained Even • It commits a company to comply with relevant

if a company ship has to go into dry dock, there i~ legislation.

usually another vessel which can be chartered to take

its place and the loss or inconvenience to the shipper Quality assurance

can be minimised The growth of quality assurance programmes inThe danger with this operational philosophy is that the shipping industry demonstrates that 'market

it is one of degradation The fleet will gradually leaders' have realised the potential benefits of goodbecome less reliable and the point will be reached safety systems integrated into their commercial andwhen a shipper will notice that a more efficient service operational management Improvements will lead to:can be obtained elsewhere In all probability the better occupancy and less downtime; lower insuranceincidence of injuries to personnel and damage to premiUms; better and more profitable charters;property wil.lincrease Gradually hull and machinery improved quality of crew; access to more competitiveand P&I Insurance premiUms will rIse, good finance; and less exposure to liability In the long termpersonnel will no longer be attracted to the company these factors lead to competitive advantage as each

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 25

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 27

CODE OF SHIPMANAGEMENT

J Spruyt

Author of Ship Management

THE GROUPOF FIVE'Squality code incorporated in industries, so they had the capability to help us andthis chapter is the result of a year of hard drafting by they were interested to continue private and cautious

a team of varied specialists It is worth reading very discussions As the atmosphere became moreclosely It is a sensible and practical document and it positive, Det Norske Veritas was asked to join in, andwill be another milestone in the slow progress of the a little later Germanischer Lloyd

shipping industry towards acceptance of modern By the spring of 1990 the eight parties-fivemanagement techniques Otto Fritzner of Columbia managers and three classification societies, all of themand his team from Barber, Denholm, Hanseatic and highly competitive in their markets-met in Oslo.Wallem have done a good job They have made

Almost to everyone's surprise there was a unanimoushistory by doing it in co-operation with Lloyd's decision to set up a working group to develop a qualityRegister, Det Norske Veritas and Germanischer

code for shipmanagers, be they dedicated managersLloyd or owner managers The results were published earlyHowever, quality approval as a concept is new to in the New Year of 1991 By any standards ofmost shipowners and managers There is a long way regulatory development, nine months of gestation

to go before it becomes an accepted part of normal must be a record

operations, even in the more hazardous trades The

The Group of Five code and quality approvalidea that shipmanagers should look at quality systems in general will no doubt receive a lot ofapproval started in 1989 The classification societies

criticism The idle will say it's yet another unwantedannounced their plans for extended life tankers Eric chore, a generator of defensive paperwork ThereKruse of Barber, ever a missionary, exploded with

may be some truth in that-especially if you have arage at the thought of yet another delay in the

casual operation, or you lack the ability to design andreplacement of the world's tanker fleet 'If we are

implement good internal control systems Others willgoing to have extended life ships,' he said, 'we say cynically that the Group of Five are off on adefinitely need high quality crews to operate them marketing frolic, and trying to appear holier thanClassifying steelwork is not in itself going to make

their competitors who may be smaller but are just asships operate safely.' good at the real game of managing ships There is

Standards for all some truth in this, too Size is no necessary prere-quisite of quality It is certainly true that the Group of

I suggested may be in that case we should have Five's activities have been motivated by marketspecial extended life ship operating standards 'Why positioning

then,' replied Eric, 'don't we have operating The cynics are right only if the quality approvalstandards for all ships Then owners and charterers systems are fraudulent, if they are not going to helpwill have some way of sorting the management sheep consumers to identify managers who set themselvesfrom the goats Bankers and underwriters will be able high standards Anyway, long-term market reposi-gradually to support those owners and managers who tioning rarely comes off if it is a con Mercedes andcan demonstrate that they are doing the job Volvo, for example, have not achieved theirproperly? ' reputations by pretending to make good cars TheyThe idea developed It soon became clear that do, and they are able to charge profitable prices forwhatever the standards or code and whatever the them It is hoped that the opposition will be weak andcompany administrative systems that followed them, that the shipping business as a whole will be

we would get no recognition without a well regarded sympathetic to the new development By the end ofand reliable auditor to validate our conformity We the decade we may be proud of the self-regulatoryconsidered talking to the multi-national financial spirit which has emerged in the last two years.auditors But it was clear that, lacking marine

expertise, they would have to delegate much of their General framework

inspection, particularly shipboard, back into the

The code IS a general framework on whichshipping industry

managers and owners may hang their own

appro-Classification societies join in priate control systems This is where the problemsstart Any well-run company can tick off the code's

So the United Kingdom shipmanagers discreetly obligations as easily as all of us believe in motherhood.approached Lloyd's Register to see if they were To pass the regimes imposed by BS 5750 and ISOinterested To begin with they were cautious They 9002 is not, however, a matter of ticking boxes Ithave constitutionally avoided operational supervision demands an exquisitely thorough examination of allthroughout their history But they do supply quality of a company's working practices It had better not beapproval and inspection services to non-marine done casually

28 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE

To go for a quality approval system must be a process will be self-defeating; systems need to bepositive decision of the board of directors who must finalised with care so that the business does not end upunderstand the strategic implications The chief submerged in a sea of paper.

executive must be personally committed and must As the principles of quality approval systemsensure that the project is pursued by a very senior become accepted by the shipping industry'smanager or director who has the clout to make it customers, insistence on supplier conformity willhappen Even then, according to one of the leading grow The systems are a healthy formal response to amanagers, 12 months of hard work must precede request for good management practice The beauty offormal· approval So that managers who have not them is they are self-regulatory, not prescribed byalready made a start (and only a few have in national or supra-national authorities It is worthanticipation of the publication of the code) will not be taking a lot of trouble to achieve overall operationalable to claim they are quality approved until, at the improvement without enduring more detailedearliest, the spring of 1992 To try to speed up that legislation.0

*Readers should be aware that the Group oj Five no longer exists as an entity On 30 APril 1991in London the International Ship Managers' Association (ISMA) was formally constituted which embraces all previous work Altogether 35shipmanagement companies Joined at the inaugural meeting The main condition of membership is compliance with the management code.

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 29

CODE OF SHIP:MANAGE:MEN~ S~ANDARDS

Barber International AIS, Oslo; Columbia Shipmanagement Ltd., Limassol;

Denholm Ship Management, Glasgow; Hanseatic Shipping Company Ltd., Limassol; Wescol International Marine, London

Det Norske Veritas; Germanischer Lloyd; Lloyd's Register

Cyprus 19th December 1990

Preamble the efficiency, reliability and standards of theThe Group of Five wish to promote quality 'shipmanagement companies' by introducing QAstandards in the shipping industry and has systems and having them certified by anprepared and adopted this Code as their basic independent auditing body

instrument through which quality and safety can

be further enhanced The Code enumerates the CHAPTEB1

principles, which are to govern the work within

the different sectors concerned with 'Ship General

Ageing fleets, reduction in shipyard capacities and This Code for quality ship management specifiesthe shortage of qualified seafarers will continue to requirements for quality assured ship manage-have an impact on the overall situation in ship ment and operation Compliance with this Codebymanagement At the same time, the international a ship management Company will ensure that itshipping community and the users of ship- operates with quality assured systems

management services recognize the ever growing This Code specifies those areas where systems andneed for a safe, environmentally conscious and controls are essential to meet this objective Theefficient ship operation Shipping authorities, requirements of this Code apply to both shoreclassification societies and others are engaged in based and shipboard management.

reviewing rules and regulations, governing The verification of compliance with this Code willquality and safety be carried out by an independent body.

This Code is based on the experience of people A company requiring certification under this Codedirectly involved in the shipping industry and must operate in and comply with all chapters ofintensive discussion and team work within the this Code Where any individual ship managementGroup of Five, assisted by representatives of agreement does not require the company toleading class societies provide all of the services detailed in this Code, theAlthough this Code originally was intended for company, having received certification, shallindependent ship management companies, it has apply the relevant requirements of the Code to thebeen formulated in a way to enable straight- services it provides.

forward adoption by shipowners managing their By this Codethe Group of Five intend to establish aown ships In the latter case, chapter 17 regarding quality assurance system within its scope andthe Ship Management Contract is likely to be field of application The Code is not intended to besuperfluous, but a similar type of document must read or construed as a product guarantee/exist between the investment side of the company warranty.

and its Ship Management division

In this Code items with suffix '0' are a descriptionThree Classification Societies- namely, Det of its underlying aims and general expressions ofNorske Veritas, Germanischer Lloyd and Lloyd's intent which fall outside the scope of audit.

Register of Shipping-will form an independent

body, which will be responsible for assessing the 1.1 Objectives

quality assured management of the Group of Five The objective is to provide quality assuredCompanies (and any other companies wishing to ship management services This entails, but is notcomply with this Code) This body will audit the limited to:

company's operations, and at the discretion of the

• Operating the ship and transporting cargoauditors, spot check shipboard operations safely and efficiently;

The Code will be updated and revised according to

• Avoiding injuries to personnel and loss of life;the following procedures:

1 The Group of Five together with the three • Conserving and protecting the environment;classification societies shall convene a meeting • Protecting the owners' assets that are entrusted

at least once a year to discuss updating and to the shipmanager;

revision of the Code • Complying with statutory and classification

2 The Group of Five shall appoint one of its rules and requirements;

members to co-ordinate and circulate infor- • Applying recognised industry standards whenmation regarding the Code generated by its appropriate;

members internally and from the three classifi- • Providing the owner with sufficient, accuratecation societies and outsiders and timely information about the operation and

3 Any revisions/amendments in the Code will be status of the ship;

by unanimous agreement by the Group of Five • Continuous development of skills, systems and

It is hoped that this Code will be welcomed by the understanding of the business;

industry and further strengthen the confidence in • Preparing for emergencies

30 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE

CBAP~ER S 5.3.2 Integrity of the ship

The company shall establish and maintain

Safety on board procedures to verify:

5.0 The company places the highest emphasis on • The watertight and weathertight integrity ofthe safe operation of the ship and the safety the ship;

5.1 Company safety policy overstressed;

The company shall have a clear written • That the ship has adequate stability

sta~ment of policy concerning safety This 5.4 Safety of cargo

P?licy shall be approved by the board of The company shall establish and maintaindIrectors and shall: on-board procedures to safeguard the

• Specify the importance the company places condition and security of cargoes likely to be

on safety; carried regularly by the ship during loading

• Acknowledge the company's responsibilities and discharge and throughout the voyage

• Designate company personnel in shore- 5.5.1 Shipboard monitoring "

based management and shipboard manage- • The company s~all esta~llsh an~ mamtam:ment, who shall be given the authority to Proce~ure~ WhIChshall mClude.,

implement the company's safety policy' • InvestIgatIon of personal aCCIdents and

, reporting of the circumstances and findings

• Det~il the organisation to give effect to the to the company;

• Be ~xplained to all company I?erson~el and • Immediate reports to the company ofcopIes of the polIcy made readIly avaIlable; significant safety deficiencies or defects

• Specify that the master has the responsibi- which cannot be rectified by ship's staff;lity to review the onboard safety procedures • Conducting safety inspections at scheduled5.2 Safety of personnel interval~ and to ~ecord and report the resultsThe company shall establish and maintain of these mspectIOns;

shipboard procedures to protect and secure • Verification of compliance with the specifiedthe safety of personnel which shall include: safety procedures

• Standards of safe working practices for 5.5.2 Shore-based monitoring ,

general shipboard application and for The company shall establish and mamtamapplication to the specific type of ship, type procedures to:

of cargo or any other aspect which may be a • Review the safety policy and make potential hazard; mendations for revision of the policy as

machinery, equipment and fittings in safe • RevIew all safety reports from the ~hlP andworking condition' make recommendatIons as approprIate;

• E d' 'd tif' t' f • Review, collate and analyse accidents andmergency proce ures, I en Ica Ion 0 near misses'

potential emergencies, contingency plans • ' ' _ ,

and training for emergencies' Momtor by on boar.d mspect~on the

, standards of safety bemg mamtamed and

• Maintenance procedures to ensure that fire make recommendations based on findings;

~nd lif~saving appliances are available for • Implement action based on

• Security procedures as appropriate to action;

combat acts of terrorism or sabotage; • Detail reasons why recommendations are

• Procedures to protect and preserve the not implemented

health of seafarers

5.3 Safe shIp operatIon

5.3.1 Navigational safety Environmental Protection

The company shall establish and maintain 6 The company accords a very high priority tonavigational and ship keeping procedures to conserving and protecting the environment.secure the safety of the ship and third-party 6.1 Environmental protection policy

property which shall include: The company shall have a clear written

state-• Allocation of bridge and engineroom watch- ment o.f pOlic! co~cerning environmentalkeeping duties and responsibilities for navi- protectIOn ThIS polIcy shall:

gational and machinery procedures; • Specify the importance the company places

• P d f g I 'g don conserving and protecting the roce ur:es or voya e p anmn an ment;

c now e ge e company s responsl I lIes

• Chart and nautical publications correction to undertake all possible actions forprocedures to maintain these documents up preventing all kinds of pollution;

• Procedures to ensure that all essential preventing pollution is to ensure safe shipnavigational equipment and main and operation as detailed in the company'sauxiliary machinery is available procedures;

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 33

20.5 The company shall identify and plan (all) 21.4 Changes to documents are to be reviewed andactivities and operations which directly approved by the designated personnel beforeaffect quality and ensure that these are issue Changes are to be readily identifiablecarried out under controlled conditions in the documents.

Controlled cond~tions shall include 21.5 A suitable document control procedure is toprocedures, work mstructIOns, etc., where be established in order to ensure that thethe absence of such would adversely affect revision status of the documents can bequality readily identfied and to preclude the use of20.6 Special operations superseded or obsolete documents TheThese are activities, operations, tasks, etc., documentation control procedure shall alsowhere substandard performance/ errors define the method of distribution andonly become apparent after an accident has prescribed location or holder

occurred or the quality of the service is

significantly impaired CHAP~EB 88

Special operations are to be identified and

continuous monitoring and/or compliance Internal quality audits

required to ensure that intended service 22.1 The company shall carry outmternal qualityrequirements are met audits to verify whether quality activities

comply with planned arrangements and to

and approved by designated personnel 22.4 Theresults of the audits shall be documentedbefore issue and brought to the attention of the personnel21.2 All such documents are to be controlled in having responsibility in the area audited.order to ensure that the pertinent issue of The management personnel responsible forappropriate documents are available at the area shall take timely corrective actiondefined locations or to specified personnel on the deficiencies found by the audit.21.3 Obsolete documents are to be promptly 22.5 The audits shall be carried out by personnelremoved from these defined locations or independent of those having direct respon-specified personnel sibility for the work being performed.D

MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 39

FOR IMPLEMENTING

SAFETY POLICIES ON BOARD

Captain C M Mahidhara, MNI, DipCommand*

Shipmaster

THE SHIPMASTERhas a responsibility firstly to the minor and major hazards that concern them duringcrew for the safety of their lives and health; to the their work The best way of discussing safety aspectscargo owners and interests for safe delivery of their of the ship's work, and of implementing and takingcargo without loss or damage or untoward incidents corrective action on hazardous situations, would bewhich may cause them concern in unwanted publi- the formation of a safety committee on board :Thecity, damage to their business interests and reputa- safety committee itself cannot consist of everyone ontion; to his owners for safe, efficient and economic board, as it would then be too unwieldy, but it shouldoperation of the ship; to the marine environment for have representatives from different departments onkeeping it safe and clean; and to third parties for board, with the senior officers and the masteravoiding damage to their property, livelihood or lives, participating and giving guidance

due to unsafe operation of his ship The safety committee should meet regularly toThe shipmaster, when considering the imple- discuss accidents and near accidents and any othermentation of safety policies on board, should hazardous conditions that may have come to anyone'sapproach the problem so that all the safety policies for notice The safety concerns discussed should not onlythe various routil1es on board are not compart- involve personal safety and safe working practices,mentalised, but are interlinked to each other That is but should also include discussions about operationalsafAtyof crew, cargo, vessel, environment, etc., are safety, as safety of life is in as much danger whereall considered in the various routines of the ship, such there are operational accidents such as explosions,

as working practices, cargo operations, navigation, groundings, pollutions, etc., during cargo maintenance, etc tions, navigation or maintenance The shipmaster

opera-In implementing safety policies on board, the ship- should during these meetings gIve guidancemaster will be guided by company policies, inter- regarding any corrective action to be taken regardingnational, national and local laws and regulations, but hazardous conditions brought up, and should also

it is he who bears the full responsibility for imple- give guidance regarding any wrong practices onmenting and operating safety policies on board The board.

master should discharge his responsibilities by

motivating all personnel on board and creating an Safety drills

atmosphere of trust and confidence, so all on board Safety drills on board should be well thought outare able to contribute to the elevation of safety and imaginative and should not be allowed to degene-standards on board rate into ritualistic affairs Plans for drills should

be discussed well in advance, and they should be

Master must set example conducted with all seriousness, and any shortcomings

The master must be foremost on the ship in setting should be pointed out and ironed out As the crew getexamples, and must observe all the safety policies and more practised, more involved drills should berules he has implemented for the ship The safety practised and the crew should also be involved in thestandards on board should not appear to be cosmetic, planning of drills also.

and should not appear to be applied to high risk areas Drills should not just involve boat and fire drills asonly In fact, the safety standards and atmosphere on required by regulations, but should also involve drillsboard should be such that an experienced person regarding oil spill response plans, evacuation ofcoming on board for the first time should be able to injured persons from enclosed spaces, contingencysense it The master can achieve the highest standards plans for various other situations on the ship like man

of safety on his ship by creating a sense of belonging overboard, explosions, groundings, collisions, etc.among those on board, so that they feel proud of their Discussion, planning and implementation of safetyship, and so feel voluntarily compelled to contribute drills, contingency plans, etc., helps bring abouteffectively and positively towards the safe and knowledge of the reliability of equipment, and alsoefficient running of the ship the requirement of additional equipment Such drillsThe best way of implementing safety policies on also bring about a realisation for all on board thedifficulties of fighting fire, rescues, etc., and bringsboard ship would be to involve all on board directly home the point that prevention is better than cure.They should feel confident in bringing up various

There is often a tendency among crews to relegate

*Captain Mahidhara was one of the first candidates to safety as something which is cumbersome and makes

complete successfully The Nautical Institute Command their work harder, and for some safe working

Diploma Scheme and was selected to write this chapter on practices to be seen as impinging on their idea of

account of the distinction he obtained in his results. bravado It is the shipmaster's responsibility in this

40 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE