Employer Discrimination• Assume for simplicity that the supply of both players is the same • Panel b in Figure 10.1 indicates that the wages of both kinds of players will be the same • P
Trang 1Chapter 10
Discrimination:
Theory, Measurement, and Consequences
FIFTH EDITIONThe Economics of Sports
MICHAEL A LEEDS | PETER VON ALLMEN
Trang 2• Jackie Robinson became the first black player in
MLB’s modern era (NL; hired by manager Branch Rickie)
Trang 3Learning Objectives
• Understand the Becker model of discrimination
• Describe how various forms of discrimination can occur in professional sports
• Evaluate gender discrimination in college sports
Trang 4Empirical Studies and Definitions
• A major study finds that all players face the same
opportunities in MLB, NFL and NBA
• Some economic studies find that there are differences in pay in the NBA as well as European soccer
• They also find evidence of discrimination in the NFL draft
• We need to distinguish between
– Prejudice a feeling or emotion
– Discrimination an action
• Economists separate two issues
– Equal access to work (draft order)
– Equal pay for equal work (equal salaries to equally
talented players in same positions)
Trang 510.1 Becker’s Theory of
Discrimination
• Gary Becker (1957) uses neoclassical theory to
analyze and evaluate discrimination like any other
“good”
– Neoclassical theory assumes that people
maximize utility subject to constraint
– Economists focus much more on the outcome of discrimination than on its origin
• Becker considers prejudice a taste
– Discrimination is indulging that taste
– This indulgence comes at a cost
• We can reduce discrimination by raising its cost
Trang 6• As people with a taste for discrimination maximize their utility, their willingness to pay to indulge their tastes has a variety of effects
Trang 7– English-speaking (E) and French-speaking (F)
• We assume for now that, although the players’ styles may differ, they are equally productive
– They have the same MP L
Trang 8Employer Discrimination
• If a hockey team owner dislikes Francophones,
employing them brings a psychic cost
– He feels that he pays them more than others
– The perceived wage is
• wF = (1+dF)wE
– dF = discrimination coefficient (%)
• If the employer pays both F and E the same, he
feels as if he is paying F more
• As a result, the demand for F falls
Trang 9Employer Discrimination
• Assume for simplicity that the supply of both
players is the same
• Panel b in Figure 10.1 indicates that the wages of both kinds of players will be the same
• Panel a in Figure 10.1 indicates that with
discrimination, the demand for Francophones falls– At any given wage, the employers’ distaste for them reduces their willingness to hire them
• As a result, F’s wage falls relative to E’s
– WE > WF
Trang 10Figure 10.1
Trang 11Who Wins and Who Loses:
Summary
• Francophone players lose
– Pay is lower and fewer are employed (Figure10.1)
• Anglophone players win
– Pay is higher and more are employed
– Less qualified workers are hired
• Unequal pay for equal work results
• Prejudiced employers lose
– Francophones’ lower pay offsets psychic cost
– Employers pay more for worse players
Trang 12Statistical Discrimination
• What if productivity differs across the two groups?
• Group statistics may indicate nothing about
individual performance
• The use of group averages to judge individual
productivity is called statistical discrimination
– Employers may use it if obtaining individual
information is costly
• Small differences in group statistics can have a
strong impact on a team’s hiring practices and may result in decisions that look like taste discrimination – Statistical discrimination may generate a self-
fulfilling prophesy
Trang 13Does Anyone Win with Employer Discrimination?
• Consider the case of racial discrimination in MLB
• Blacks were effectively barred from organized
baseball from 1888 to 1947 by a “gentlemen’s
agreement”
• One group that benefited from discrimination was
white players of that era
• More white players played in the major leagues than would have been possible otherwise
• Figure 10.2 reflects the result of assuming that there
is a large supply of white players (deep pool of
talent) willing to play at market wages—no blacks are hired
Trang 14Figure 10.2
Trang 15• Figures 10.3 shows the market for Negro League
• Figure 10.4 shows the MLB market
• Tastes of consumers changed, both blacks and whites
Trang 16Figure 10.3
Trang 17Figure 10.4
Trang 18Competition Can Eliminate
Discrimination
• Unprejudiced employers have an advantage over
prejudiced employers
– They hire more productive players (and get higher
revenue if consumers and employees are not prejudiced) – They do not have to pay as much as teams with
Anglophones
– They have higher profits
• As more unprejudiced employers enter, or as more people worry about profit than taste
– Pay of Francophones is driven up
– Pay eventually equals those of Anglophones
• Perfect competition eliminates discrimination
Trang 19Competition and Discrimination
• In the 1950s, integrated teams were better
– Dodgers, Giants, Indians, Braves, and White Sox were dominant teams
• Dodgers and Giants won pennants
– Only the Yankees were good and remained white
• Owners had recognized black talent but could not act on it
• MLB kept Bill Veeck from buying the Phillies in 1943
– Veeck had wanted to hire Negro League players– He was the first to integrate AL with 1947
Cleveland Indians
Trang 20When Markets Are Not
• The standard model is presented in Figure 10.5
• Without discrimination, the employer pays the same low wage (found on the supply curve) to all players– In this figure, the wage is $800 while the value of the player is $1000
Trang 21Figure 10.5
Trang 22Figure 10.6
Trang 23Monopsony Model with
Discrimination
• Figure 10.6 shows the wages paid to F players
• It assumes that
– F players are more productive than E players, so
F players are worth $1500 rather than $1000 that
E players receive (for example)
– Employers discriminate against F players, which shifts the demand curve from D to D’
• F players are paid more than E players
($960>$800)
• F players are paid less than they are worth because
of monopsony power and because of discrimination
Trang 24– They feel like they are being paid less
• In 1880s, a few blacks played in the American Association – The first was Moses Fleetwood Walker for Toledo in 1884 – Cap Anson, a dominant player for Chicago White
Stockings, played in an exhibition game against Toledo team with Moses Fleetwood Walker
– Next year he had a contract not to include black players – White players drove blacks out of MLB by 1888
Trang 25Employee Discrimination History
• Attempts to reintegrate MLB started after WWII
even as employee discrimination was rampant
• The Dodgers traded 5 players for Al Gionfriddo &
$100,000, a marginal player, who was willing to
take the locker next to Robinson (& “carry the
money”)
• In 1947, Dodger players circulated a petition
refusing to play with Robinson
• Dodgers manager, Leo Durocher, called a late-night meeting and (in an exquisite speech of which there are different versions) said
– See the next slide
Trang 26– …I hear that some of you don’t want to play with
Robinson Some of you have drawn a petition Well, you know what you can do with that petition
– I hear Dixie Walker is going to write Mr Rickey a letter asking to be traded Just hand him the letter, Dixie, and you’re gone! I don’t care if a fellow is yellow or black or if he has stripes like a fuckin’ zebra
– I am the manager, and I say he plays …I’ll play an elephant if he can do the job, and to make room for him I’ll send my own brother home
– He’s going to win pennants for us He’s going to put money in your pockets and money in mine
Trang 27Discrimination in Perfect
Competition
• Assume the labor market is perfectly competitive
– The supply curve is horizontal
• Prejudiced players require a compensation above the market wage: w/(1-dj)
– Such a wage does not exist
• Prejudiced players are replaced by those willing to take the market wage
• Alternatively, the employer could ban black players
– Players no longer require a premium wage
• Segregation thus results in this case from employee discrimination
Trang 28– Dixie Walker refused to play alongside Robinson
– Walker was not refusing to play
– He just did not want to play with Robinson
• Dodgers traded Walker to the Pirates in 1948
– Teams separate into integrated and non-integrated teams
– Pay and treatment on those teams is not affected by race
Trang 29A Digression into Boxing
• Jack Johnson and “unforgivable blackness”
– In some ways, he resembled Muhammad Ali
– Times did not tolerate a brash black man who taunted his
opponents
– Race riots accompanied his title win and defenses (1915)
– He spurred the search for a great white hope
• No black man fought for the title between 1915 and 1936
• Joe Louis was a supremely talented fighter
– He was groomed with Jack Johnson in mind
– His achievement went beyond boxing 2 bouts v Max Schmeling – He became symbol of American ideals v Nazism
• Schmeling beat Louis in 193
• The rematch in 1938 brought interracial celebration rather than riots
Trang 30Consumer Discrimination
• Consumers have a taste for discrimination if they prefer not to purchase goods or services from
members of a specific group
– Customers feel a psychic cost
• Some fans feel they pay a higher price p(1+dk)
when watching black players
– p is the price of watching white players
• Consumer discrimination can be difficult to isolate
• A team feels pressure to discriminate
– It fears that fans will go elsewhere
– Unprejudiced employers are led to discriminate
Trang 31Consumer Discrimination
• Consumer discrimination can affect attendance
• Consumers could show their taste for discrimination
by supporting teams that have fewer players from the group that they dislike
• Consumers could follow teams that are integrated but do so with less intensity—going to fewer games, buying fewer jerseys, watching the team less on
television
Trang 32Detecting Consumer
Discrimination
• Studying consumer behavior can be difficult
– It is not obvious how to separate taste for the
team from the taste for individual players
• Several studies focus on memorabilia rather than game attendance
– Do fans prefer the cards of white players, all else equal?
– Evidence suggests they do
Trang 33Measuring Discrimination
• In 1988 Kahn & Scherer asked:
– Is there racial discrimination in the NBA?
– How can there be when the NBA is 80% Black?
• Black players earn more than white ones on average
• The theory of discrimination says that
– Average pay is suggestive but not conclusive
– Discrimination means paying equals unequally
– Compare black players with otherwise identical
whites
• Kahn and Scherer found that black players received about 20% less than white players
Trang 34– Collectively, UEFA feared loss of national identity
on club teams if clubs use too many foreigners
– Individual teams tried to hire many foreign
Trang 35• Because the EU (Treaty of Rome…) allows free
movement of labor, teams had to adjust
• 3 + 2 Rule limited each team to three starting
players from other countries in 1991
– It, too, was struck down—by the “Bosman Ruling”
• Jean-Marc Bosman tried to move from Liege (a team
in the Belgian League) to Dunkerque (France); he
was blocked and appealed to the European Court of Justice
• UEFA’s current regulation requires “eight players
from every 25-man squad to have been developed
in the fielding club’s national association”
Trang 36Positional Discrimination
• Positional (or role) discrimination occurs if players have unequal access to specific positions in team sports
• Players are stacked in specific positions
• Consider positions in the NFL in 2010
– 83 percent of quarterbacks are white
– 84 percent of wide receivers are black
– In general, white players are more likely to be on offense than on defense
• Table 10.1 reports similar inequalities in MLB
Trang 37Table 10.1
Trang 38Hockey and Football
• Hockey has changed since the fall of the Wall
• Role discrimination is a possible form of statistical
self-• This could be happening in the NFL
– Because there are few black quarterback and their low incidence could be discouraging others from trying
Trang 39• Women are represented in all major sports, though they
generally have little say in personnel decisions
• Division I college coaching resembles professional ranks
– Minorities are underrepresented at Division II and III schools – Fewer women are coaching – even in women’s sports
• Do minority coaches have to be better?
– Manning finds that minority NFL coaches have better records – Kahn finds that minority NBA coaches are no more likely to
be fired
Trang 40Gender Equity—A Special Case?
• Gender equity is harder to measure
• Men & women are seldom in the same venue
– Babe Didrikson Zaharias, Annika Sorenstam, and Michelle Wie entered the PGA—they are exceptions – Even the same sport may vary: tennis & figure
skating
• Mixed competition is rare
– Mixed tennis doubles is a contrived event
– Horse & auto racing are the only real examples
– We do not know if there are few women because demand or supply is low
Trang 41Fan Demand for Women’s Sports
• Demand for women’s professional team sports,
such as soccer or basketball, is much lower than for men’s sports
• Women fare much better in individual sports
– Tennis is a primary example
• Wimbledon TV ratings of women’s tennis is high
– Women are paid more in gymnastics and figure skating
• Women have recently encountered problems in golf
– Number of women’s tournaments has fallen
Trang 4210.3 Title IX & Discrimination in College Sports
• Title IX has been credited with the success of US
women in soccer and the Olympics
• Titles deals with more than sports
– It is part of 1972 Education Amendments to the
1964 Civil Rights Act
– It mandates equal access & opportunities for
women in federally funded education programs
• Secondary schools and college
Trang 43Title IX Compliance
• Compliance has a long history
– It is overseen by the Office of Civil Rights in the
Department of Education
• There are three ways to comply
– Funding and participation must be proportional to
enrollment
• 5% gap is allowed – School must show history of expansion of programs – School must accommodate interests of students
• Very few programs are truly in compliance
• No school has been penalized/sanctioned
Trang 44Title IX Impact
• Some results are desirable Title IX
– Spurred rapid growth in women’s sports
• Most of the growth was in the 1970s and 1980s
– Gave women grounds to seek remediation
• Some results are undesirable
– Many colleges have cut men’s programs rather than expand women’s programs
– As rewards to coaching have risen, women
coaches have disappeared
• Fell from ~80% of coaches in women’s sports to ~44%