Radioactivity in the environment chapter 10 lessons learned from the chernobyl accident in norway

Radioactivity in the environment chapter 10 lessons learned from the chernobyl accident in norway Radioactivity in the environment chapter 10 lessons learned from the chernobyl accident in norway Radioactivity in the environment chapter 10 lessons learned from the chernobyl accident in norway Radioactivity in the environment chapter 10 lessons learned from the chernobyl accident in norway Radioactivity in the environment chapter 10 lessons learned from the chernobyl accident in norway Radioactivity in the environment chapter 10 lessons learned from the chernobyl accident in norway Radioactivity in the environment chapter 10 lessons learned from the chernobyl accident in norway Radioactivity in the environment chapter 10 lessons learned from the chernobyl accident in norway Radioactivity in the environment chapter 10 lessons learned from the chernobyl accident in norway

Radioactivity in the Environment, Volume 19

ISSN 1569-4860, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-045015-5.00010-1

Lessons Learned from the

Chernobyl Accident in Norway

Astrid Liland * and Lavrans Skuterud

Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, Østerås, Norway

*Corresponding author: E-mail: astrid.liland@nrpa.no

Chapter Outline

10.1 Introduction 159

10.2 Radioactive

Contamination—A

Societal Challenge 161

10.3 Early Lessons from the

Chernobyl Accident 162

10.3.1 Information

10.3.2 The Importance of

Local Monitoring

10.3.3 Setting Permissible

Levels for

Radioactive

Substances in

Foodstuffs 163

10.3.4 Consequences and

Countermeasures

in Food

Production 164

10.3.5 Monitoring of Affected People 165 10.3.6 Psychosocial

10.4 Long-Term Challenges and Lessons Learned 167

10.4.1 Information

10.4.2 Zoning and Compensation 167 10.4.3 Technical and Social Countermeasures 168 10.4.4 Involvement of Affected Groups 171 10.4.5 Psychosocial

10.5 Health Concerns 172

10.1 INTRODUCTION

Norway was the country outside the former Soviet Union that experienced the largest consequences of the fallout from the Chernobyl accident (Liland, Lochard,

& Skuterud, 2009; Tveten, Brynildsen, Amundsen, & Bergan, 1998) As a non-nuclear country Norway had limited emergency plans for non-nuclear accidents and

the authorities faced an immense challenge in handling the situation In the fall-out affected regions natural pastures are important in milk and meat production for sheep, cows, goats, and reindeer (see Figure 10.1) and the contamination of foodstuffs was significant, see Table 10.1 The contamination greatly exceeded the permissible levels in foodstuffs for radiocesium, which in June 1986 were set

at 600 Bq/kg for basic foodstuffs and 370 Bq/kg for milk and infant food In July

1986, the authorities declared that all producers should be financially compensated

FIGURE 10.1 Map of Chernobyl Cs-137 deposition in Norway Interpolated map based on

aver-age municipality values from Backe, Bjerke, Rudjord, and Ugletveit (1986) (For color version of this figure, the reader is referred to the online version of this book.)

TABLE 10.1 Some Maximum Values Measured

in Foodstuffs in Norway in 1986

Produce Activity Concentration

for their economic losses due to the consequences of the accident The affected regions were sparsely populated by humans but the problems they faced in dealing with the situation were significant Authorities, experts, producers and lay people worked together to develop management strategies that proved successful for han-dling the situation Norway is still performing mitigating actions and extensive monitoring due to radioactive contamination 27 years after the Chernobyl accident

10.2 RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION—A SOCIETAL

CHALLENGE

When a large territory is contaminated by radioactive substances, every part of society is affected in the contaminated regions—environment, economy, pro-duction, living conditions, and health It is thus a societal problem, not a radia-tion protecradia-tion or health issue alone

In addition, people generally have little knowledge about radioactivity and radiation and are not prepared to tackle a contamination event The fear of some-thing that is invisible and at the same time ubiquitous and invasive in people’s life can be very difficult for people to handle This has also been seen for other contaminants like pesticides (Baudé, Levinson, Ollagnon, & Hériard Dubreuil, 2012) From our Chernobyl experience in Norway and Belarus and Fukushima experience in Japan, we know that people have general worries such as:

generations?

In such situations, experience shows that it may be important for authorities to provide information and knowledge to the affected population so that they will

be able to understand the challenge they are facing It has proven useful for authorities to engage in dialogues with the people in contaminated regions to find possible solutions to their problems Local residents have the best expertise

on relevant local conditions and local resources that could be used in a rehabili-tation strategy with the aim of normalizing the living conditions, but in most cases they need assistance from various experts to find the sound solutions to the challenges

Situations where large areas within a country would be contaminated for

a decade or more would represent a huge challenge to any country There is a range of possible countermeasures that could be implemented after a nuclear

or radiological accident, directed both at the population and at the production

of food, feed, and goods However, actions in the recovery phase need to be chosen with care, taking account of the wider societal aspects and preferably

in elaboration with people from local, regional, and national levels The goal

of the remediation strategies would be a return to a normal situation which

is not a preaccident situation, but a situation where people can live and pro-duce in a contaminated area with acceptable risk and living conditions due

to the implementation of mitigating actions Most probably, the management strategy would also need to be revised with time to accommodate changes in contamination levels, environmental factors, technical solutions, and societal development

10.3 EARLY LESSONS FROM THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT 10.3.1 Information Needs

In the early period after the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the information needs

in Norway were immense Many of the questions were related to food safety and health concerns People wanted to know what was dangerous and what was safe Could they become seriously ill because they had stayed outdoors for a long time during the days of fallout? Could they eat fish or drink the milk? Some lost the joy of gardening or outdoor activities because of the uncertain risk from touching the grass and ground It seemed difficult for the public to compare the health risks from this new danger to other health risks (Daugstad, 1996)

Different authorities gave conflicting messages in the early period (April/ May) after the accident adding to the general confusion Sometimes, the state-ments were categorical even if the facts were insecure or missing and they were later perceived as too reassuring and unreasonably trying to minimize the risks The publics’ information needs were immense and the situation turned into

an information crisis as health authorities did not manage to cover the needs (Norges offentlige utredninger, 1986) Further, the credibility of the health authorities were weakened when it was known that they had deliberately held back some information that the public and media felt they were entitled to know (Reistad & Larsen, 1996)

People also want to know the real facts even if the truth is frightening: “We can handle the truth” (Bay-Larsen, Oughton, Liland, Eikelmann, & Hansen, 2009) Experience has shown that the public responds better to possible worst case scenarios than to attempts from authorities to minimize the dangers Sandman (2001) expresses this as “Tell people how scary the situation is (…) and watch them get calmer” in his guidelines for risk communication

A public opinion poll performed shortly after the accident showed that 32% of the public understood most of the information provided, 50% under-stood some while 8% did not understand anything of the information pro-vided When asked if they trusted the information given, only 2% stated they had high confidence and 32% reasonable confidence, while 38 and 22% had little or very little confidence, respectively, in the information given (Weisæth, 1989)

10.3.2 The Importance of Local Monitoring Stations

During the summer of 1986, the Norwegian authorities initiated the creation of

a network of local monitoring stations for radiocesium in selected local food control laboratories across the country (Strand, Strand, & Baarli, 1987) Local monitoring stations were important for providing information to people on the contamination in local foodstuffs and environmental samples But the distribu-tion of such instruments was scarce and people in many districts had to wait several weeks to get the results In one district, the community started a fund-raising so that the local food control office could buy an instrument of their own For an efficient transmission of the measurement results, the results for local samples were broadcasted daily on the local radio rather than spending time writing reports for every sample since the number of samples was over-whelming “Everyone” in the community listened to this broadcasting After some time, the national authorities suddenly decided that this local food-control office was not allowed to publish the measurement results before they had been approved by regional or national authorities This created strong reactions at the local level Why were they not allowed to know their situation straight away? After strong pressure, this practice was abolished (Røine, 1996) and local food control offices around the country played an important role in building public trust in a very difficult situation (Daugstad, 1996)

10.3.3 Setting Permissible Levels for Radioactive Substances

in Foodstuffs

Permissible levels is a challenging topic as the public in general interpret these levels as directly related to toxicity, while in practice other concerns like the ALARA principle (As Low As Reasonably Achieveable), consumer’s confidence and trade are also important in the decision-making process Therefore, coun-tries may adopt different strategies to permissible levels, with Norway’s strategy (described below) being an example differing significantly from Japan’s recent decision on reducing the permissible level for radiocesium in foods to 100 Bq/kg

At the time of the Chernobyl accident, Norway had no permissible lev-els for radionuclides in foods In May, values of 1000 Bq/kg and 300 Bq/

kg were chosen as temporary values for I-131 and Cs-137, respectively During May and June, the information on the extent of the fallout and the results of the food sampling provided a better basis for assessing the contri-bution by various foodstuffs to the public’s radionuclide intake This was used to assess more permanent permissible levels based on radiation pro-tection principles However, the levels adopted in Norway in June 1986 were the results of consultations among Nordic countries and were also in accordance with European Economic Community (EEC) levels: 370 Bq/kg

other foodstuffs Mitigating actions, mainly food bans, were imposed in the

food production systems to comply with the new limits in 1986, while better countermeasures were developed the following years

The consequences for reindeer husbandry became evident during late sum-mer and early autumn, with average radiocesium concentrations in reindeer meat in some areas approaching 100 times the permissible level Furthermore, the experience from the nuclear bomb fallout in northern Norway showed

indicating that reindeer husbandry would be affected for more than a generation Reindeer herders therefore felt their whole existence was endangered (Stephens, 1987) These semidomesticated animals are free-ranging in herds of hundreds and thousands giving limited possibilities for mitigating actions like fencing and clean feeding Therefore, in November 1986 the government decided to increase the permissible level for radiocesium in reindeer meat to 6000 Bq/kg

in an attempt to maintain a meaningful business base for reindeer herders—and also protecting the associated Sámi culture and life-style The decision followed

a radiation protection assessment justifying the elevated level by the low

per year) The elevated level applied to traded reindeer meat, while high con-sumers like reindeer herders were recommended special actions to reduce the contamination in reindeer meat consumed in the Sámi household (e.g clean feeding, dietary advice, specific preparation of meat etc.) From 1987 the level

of 6000 Bq/kg also applied for wild freshwater fish and game meat

Although it was not explicitly stated at the time the permissible level was raised to 6000 Bq/kg, it was the intention to reduce the level as the contamina-tion in reindeer declined and it was justified on a radiacontamina-tion proteccontamina-tion basis (i.e ALARA) In 1994, the level was reduced to 3000 Bq/kg, while later assess-ments (in 2001 and 2009) concluded that reductions to 1500 Bq/kg will not be cost-efficient Justification on a radiation protection basis has been the most important criteria in these assessments, but other aspects also need to be taken into account These include e.g consumer needs and practical consequences for producers For the producers, a lowering of levels will impose more applica-tion of remedial acapplica-tions, and may be perceived as reintroducing the accident and its consequences in areas that have been declared “clean” for many years The pragmatic approach with higher permissible levels for traded reindeer meat could also be viewed as an expression of sympathy with the affected population

10.3.4 Consequences and Countermeasures in Food Production

Meat and milk were produced as normal in the contaminated regions in 1986, but much of the food could not be used for human consumption The milk was collected at the farms and the animals slaughtered as usual, but the milk and meat was either used as feed for fur farming or discarded and disposed of as waste It was a heavy burden for the farmers to produce food that would only be condemned, even if the authorities would give them a financial compensation

for their loss They could not use the products from the farm in their own house-hold either and were obliged to buy food from the stores instead (Ekerbakke, 1996)

Clean feeding and live monitoring of animals were introduced as counter-measures in meat production from 1987 Although this reduced the need for condemnation, it brought about several practical problems for farmers The sheep farming in Norway is based on a limited stock housed during wintertime The lambs are born in spring and spend the whole summer season outdoor on the pastures In autumn, the lambs are slaughtered before the cold weather necessitates housing again Due to the very high contamination in animals (several 1000 Bq/kg of radiocesium), the clean feeding times could extend for several months The barns were too small to appropriately accommodate so many sheep and the animal welfare was questionable (Røine, 1996)

From 1989 Prussian blue (a cesium binder) was added to feed concentrates, salt licks, and rumen boli to reduce the uptake of radiocesium in animals graz-ing contaminated pasture This reduced the length of the clean feedgraz-ing periods, but entailed other extra work for the farmers Although the Norwegian authori-ties had declared on 31 July 1986 that the producers should be compensated for any financial loss, the farmers and reindeer herders in affected regions clearly express that the compensation received is not sufficient to cover all their real costs of implementing countermeasures A lot of their extra labor time is not covered, even if the direct costs are covered (Bay-Larsen, Oughton, Liland, Eikelmann, Hansen, 2009; Daugstad, 1996)

Nonetheless, the implementation of countermeasures ensured that it was possible to continue farming in the contaminated regions and produce milk and meat that complied with the permissible levels in foodstuffs Very few farm-ers gave up their farms due to the accident, even if the work became more laborsome

For the reindeer herders, the situation was even more difficult In some areas, all meat produced the first three years were discarded from human con-sumption This was a depressing time for the herders The first positive sign came in 1989 when the use of boli with Prussian blue reduced the radiocesium levels in meat considerably so that it could again be used for humans But they realized that the contamination would persist for a long time and had to adapt the husbandry practice for good The use of Prussian blue, altered slaughtering season, live monitoring, and clean feeding were all new practices that had to be implemented The traditional successful breeding based on weight and health was no longer of value since the animals were now selected for slaughtering based on their individual Bq level (Håkenstad, 1996)

10.3.5 Monitoring of Affected People

Monitoring of persons was used in northern Norway from 1965 as a method to survey internal doses for people exposed to fallout from the nuclear weapons

testing After 1986, the program was enlarged to include people affected by the Chernobyl accident It gave the authorities information on the contamina-tion levels caused by the accident and the successfulness of the remediacontamina-tion strategies The first years after Chernobyl, the focus was on reindeer herders, hunters/gatherers and general rural population groups in the most affected areas

in Norway (Strand, Selnæs, Bøe, Harbitz, & Andersson-Sørlie, 1992) The stud-ies showed that reindeer herders were by far the most exposed group and later monitoring was limited to this group The elevated dietary intake of radioce-sium by reindeer herders were expected based on over 20 years’ experience on radiocesium in the lichen—reindeer—humans food-chain in northern Norway (Westerlund et al., 1987) Therefore, special arrangements were put in place to reduce the dietary intake These included:

contaminated areas;

contaminated meat; and

contamination levels

Dietary surveys were also performed to provide more detailed information on intake of foods and radiocaesium Combining diet information and knowledge

of contamination levels in major foodstuffs with the results of the repeated mon-itoring of people proved very useful in the dialogue with the affected persons in Norway: In most cases reasonable explanations for observed internal contami-nation could be elaborated, and for the affected people it has been reassuring to study the success of their personal efforts to reduce contamination intake The monitoring thus turned out to be an important tool in helping the population in coping with the situation (Tønnessen et al., 1996) Similar experiences were made in Belarus, and this initiated the development of a prototype software tool for this purpose (Levy, Bataille, Croüail, & Skuterud, 2008)

10.3.6 Psychosocial Effects

Shortly after the accident, a survey was performed among almost 1000 Norwe-gians on their reactions to the accident 25% said they kept their children more indoors, 20% perceived the situation as unpleasantly stressing, and women were more worried than men It was clear that people had little prior knowledge on radiation risks that most probably increased the perceived risk compared to the real risk (Weisæth, 1989)

As described above, the producers in the affected regions encountered many challenges that influenced their life The uncertainty linked to the dura-tion of the problem and the associated risks added psychosocial burdens to the affected people For instance, the early practice of producing food that was dis-carded for human consumption was ethically unacceptable for many producers

For people in animal husbandry, the consumer trust in their products is of utmost importance and an invisible enemy that reduced the quality of their produce was difficult to handle The initiation of mitigating actions directly involving the producers helped relieve the psychosocial effects since it enabled producers to

do something to improve their situation Some farmers have also pointed to the handling of the Chernobyl accident as a community voluntary work that had a positive spin-off for the engagement and social behavior in the affected territory (Bay-Larsen et al., 2009) Nonetheless, a nuclear accident with serious contami-nation of large areas will entail a number of psychosocial effects that should be properly addressed by the health authorities

10.4 LONG-TERM CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

10.4.1 Information Needs

It is clear that information needs are large both in early and late phases after

an accident In the affected territories in Norway local measurement stations were essential, both for food safety, health, industry, and trade It was a means

to increase public trust, and gave them a feeling of self-control that reduced the psychosocial stress reactions Authorities at both national and regional/local level should continue a good information and communication strategy over the years To improve understanding and acceptance, the information should be tailored to meet the needs of the public, include the new generations as they grow up and include newcomers to an affected production system

Today, the speed of information flow, the wealth of information channels, and the use of social media pose both a challenge and a possibility for inform-ing and communicatinform-ing with the public For instance, it can be difficult for the public and the media to know which experts to trust when they give conflicting messages After a nuclear emergency, journalists may also want to seek alterna-tive voices because they do not know which information sources they can rely

on in this radically new situation Internet provides a wealth of sites that claim they have the right knowledge and solution to consumer’s challenges and it can

be difficult for people to know what is trustworthy or not On the other hand, authorities have a large set of information and communication tools available that could be an asset to them if used wisely

10.4.2 Zoning and Compensation

The use of geographical zoning for managing the situation may be necessary

in the emergency phase In areas like Belarus, geographical zones defined by the ground contamination levels have been used to regulate economic compen-sation schemes for the population In Norway, no compencompen-sation was paid to others than the producers having direct economic losses or expenses because

of the contamination Although the Norwegian system may not have been perfect (see above), it is our impression that compensation schemes based on

expenses/losses are better than those based only on contamination levels In Belarus the latter have been shown to result in stigma and resignation The affected inhabitants in Belarus were relying on the aid from the government

or from foreign countries instead of enabling them to improve their own situa-tion In Norway, zoning was based on the levels of radiocesium in live animals, and just used to indicate if and for how long countermeasures were needed Compensation was paid to farmers and reindeer herders for their extra labor and economic losses incurred due to countermeasures application Reindeer herders were also paid “compensation for alternative diets”, enabling them to replace their own highly contaminated reindeer meat with less contaminated products The affected people in Norway have not been victims of stigma or passivity to our knowledge It is thus reasonable to ask whether zoning and compensation

of people are appropriate tools taking into account the risk of inducing a passive attitude among the population and consequently favoring a possible recession

of the living conditions in the contaminated territories Compensations to sup-port mitigating actions performed by the affected individuals seem to be more positive than compensations based solely on living in a contaminated territory (Liland et al., 2009)

10.4.3 Technical and Social Countermeasures

Section 3.4 discussed some of the consequences of the Chernobyl fallout for food production in Norway In the long-term management, the following mea-sures have been or are still being applied to reduce contamination levels and consequences:

avoid condemnation of meat above the permissible levels);

rumen bolus to prevent absorption of ingested radiocesium in the animals;

Although most of the measures were initiated by national/central authorities

or institutes, the practical implementation was elaborated in close cooperation with representatives of farmers and herders in the affected areas The extensive use of monitoring of animals before slaughter is one of the success stories of Norwegian Chernobyl management: In addition to reducing public expenses

on compensation for condemned meat, clean feeding of contaminated animals bypasses the psychological burden that production for condemnation can be for farmers and herders Another success was the implementation of Prussian blue in various forms Bentonite and zeolite were initially tried as cesium binders However, the high doses needed of these clay minerals involved also