Advances and innovations in nuclear decommissioning3 the cultural aspects of decommissioning

Advances and innovations in nuclear decommissioning3 the cultural aspects of decommissioning Advances and innovations in nuclear decommissioning3 the cultural aspects of decommissioning Advances and innovations in nuclear decommissioning3 the cultural aspects of decommissioning Advances and innovations in nuclear decommissioning3 the cultural aspects of decommissioning Advances and innovations in nuclear decommissioning3 the cultural aspects of decommissioning

Advances and Innovations in Nuclear Decommissioning http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-101122-5.00003-X

3

The cultural aspects of

decommissioning

M Laraia

Independent consultant, Rome, Italy

3.1 Introduction

A few years ago it became evident that not everything in decommissioning can be reduced to technologies or procedures, although all of these remain of overwhelming importance There is a somehow “hidden” “soft” side, which has to do with motiva-tion, behaviors, and mindsets, in other words, “culture.” It goes without saying that

“cultural” aspects are more difficult to single out, measure, evaluate, and amend, if needed, than other aspects of decommissioning Various approaches to cultural met-rics have been adopted, but a feeling remains that the essence of the problem may still

be missing And the multidisciplinary nature of decommissioning requires a holistic approach, which can be further elusive [1]

Edgar H Schein, commonly deemed the founder of organizational culture as a standalone science, defines organizational culture as follows: “A pattern of basic as-sumptions invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore is to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” [2]

Several factors that determine the cultural aspects of decommissioning are already evident from this definition:

● Culture shapes the identity(ies) (e.g., of the team performing decommissioning);

● Culture creates a sense of “belonging”;

● There are many possible sets of conditions, humans can adapt to different conditions, and different cultures are created accordingly;

● No culture is intrinsically superior to another;

● Cultures are organized, and the parts fit together;

● Culture produces the distinction of and the (inevitable) interactions between “us” and “the others.”

In other words, every person wants to belong to a group of people, to be accepted

by the other members of the group as “one of them,” and to be recognized by outsiders

as a member of that group The members of the group share backgrounds, circum-stances, tastes, and values (with some individual variations) And the group speaks a common “language.”

The following provides a brief outline, which exemplifies the expected cultural issues in nuclear decommissioning:

Teamwork

Teamwork is essential in decommissioning in that (a) the working environment changes at all times, (b) different organizations work together—typically operations staff and contrac-tors, and (c) different types of expertise are required at the same time (e.g., waste manage-ment and dismantling techniques).

Trust

The new teams, often short lived or even ad hoc, cannot always rely on past experience and familiarity with each other’s competences, work modes, and views Establishing these teams

in a fruitful way, training them, and building trust between team members are all essential for safe, timely, and cost-effective performance.

Shared situation awareness

Shared situation awareness is important for making the right decisions and for ensuring implementation of these decisions after they are made Another important part of situation awareness is the identification of risks pertaining to a decision or work task.

Goal conflicts

The new targets, often with strong requirements on economy, efficiency, quality, documentation, and flexibility, require people to balance goals; for example, safety goals versus efficiency goals, workers’ goals against other stakeholders’ goals, etc It has been reported both in the nuclear and other industries that errors, incidents, and other mishaps are more likely to occur when people or organizations experience goal conflicts.

Confidence to speak up

A “guts to speak” or “no-blame” culture can be essential, especially in flexible organiza-tions, for combining efficiency with safety A lack of such confidence has in several projects imposed undue risks, as well as significantly reduced motivation.

Change management

Some elements of change management will need to be taken into account Special focus should be placed on individual motivation and acceptance when change is inevitable Decommissioning is basically demolition and waste generation This simplification may lead to a perception of low priority and lack of interest, more likely in a highly qualified team (researchers, etc.) who have necessarily to adapt to changing work conditions.

Decommissioning is often a “one-end” process Appreciating one’s position as “working oneself out of a job” is hardly conducive to good motivation and performance Adjusting oneself to changes of this kind can be hard.

Stakeholders

There are many stakeholders in nuclear decommissioning, ranging from those internal to the decommissioning organization (from top management to regular staff), to contractors, and

to the general public These different groups—and their subgroups share different identities and cultures Success of the decommissioning project imposes at least some harmonization (see Chapter 6 ).

3.2 Cultural review as the latest development in the history of nuclear decommissioning

The dawn of the third millennium brought about a growing awareness that technology alone was insufficient to lead a large decommissioning project to safe, timely, and cost-effective completion Until then, the focus had been largely placed on technolo-gies and a large amount of R&D efforts (from the US Department of Energy, European Commission, IAEA, and Japan) was invested to improve them: it is well recognized today that decommissioning is a mature industry, not unlike the car industry And yet, like the car industry, decommissioning techniques are being constantly improved and optimized This implies an ever-changing assessment of safety: what was safe

20 years ago is not safe enough today Standards have been raised

In the first decade of the 2000s, more attention was given to the experience avail-able globally regarding the management and organizational aspects of decommission-ing This knowledge began to be collected in IAEA technical reports [3] The current feeling is that, while decommissioning technology is generally well understood and capable to tackle almost all decommissioning projects, organizational aspects are more difficult to “appreciate.” First and foremost, organizational aspects are difficult

to see, measure, assess, and correct than the technological sides of decommissioning Gathering and sharing lessons learned, and promulgating guidance, on technologi-cal and organizational facets of decommissioning remain essential, and the decommis-sioning programs of major national and international organizations remain focused on those aspects But more recently, a new paradigm came to light Decommissioning is especially sensitive to the impacts of “cultural” inadequacies In this regard it is differ-ent from other fully “procedurized” and well-regulated phases of a facility’s service life such as operations This difference is due to the dynamic nature and the necessary flexibility of the decommissioning process, which inevitably leaves a large amount

of room for unknowns, unexpected occurrences, and the need for action in circum-stances that cannot be predefined in detail Decommissioning is intrinsically multi-disciplinary (including radiological and industrial safety; radioactive and hazardous waste management; civil, mechanical, chemical, and electronic engineering; costing and funding; stakeholder involvement; etc.), and this dictates that the abovementioned disciplines be managed within an integrated vision, which is indeed another cultural point of distinction

3.3 The cultural changes between operations and

decommissioning

Regardless of the opportunities offered by organizational changes, it should be recog-nized that the transition from operations to decommissioning reflects in a number of potentially hard-to-digest cultural changes

An operations organization is generally permanent and stable Changes are rarely radical, and the “skeleton” of the organization will in essence be permanent or long

lasting (including job security) This is no longer the case when the organization starts transitioning to decommissioning, and the original organization or its remain-ing parts undergo significant, continual changes in a relatively short time Many of these changes involve change from stability and routine into temporary and task-based roles and activities Regulators will assume different objectives; inspections will be more frequent; many new stakeholders (the media, local communities, the corporate headquarters, etc.) will appear more frequently on the scene and start asking unex-pected questions (Section  3.4 of this chapter) Working teams will change with an increasing attendance of newcomers (the contractors) and the gradual disappearance

of old teammates The contractors will introduce new cultures (including differences

in backgrounds, working habits, quality assurance programs, and even languages—or

at least jargons and slangs) The old staff will have to learn and be trained for new jobs that would be more in line with the specific competence of the contractors: this can be viewed by someone as a loss of hard-earned prestige Older staff can be reluctant to accept a drastic change to their lifestyles

It should be noted that cross-cultural interactions are exacerbated by the presence

of multiple contractors working on the plant at the same time In such a case harmo-nization will be needed not only between the responsible orgaharmo-nization and the con-tractors, but also between different groups of contractors In certain decommissioning projects the responsible organizations have opted to rely on one prime contractor, rather than many smaller-size contractors Typically it is up to the prime contractor

to choose between doing all work alone or to trust single subcontractors to complete some parts of it

Once the operations-to-decommissioning transition is over, a new cultural balance

is established between all parties It is possible and desirable that initially different cultures have reconciled, perhaps having reached a “middle ground” of mutual un-derstanding The most critical part is the transition period when the old balances are disappearing and the new balances are not fully in place Change in progress at Phenix Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), France is assessed in more detail in Ref [4] General guidance to change management is given in Ref [5], one out of many publications on the topic

3.3.1 The motivational aspects of decommissioning

After final shutdown, drastic changes will inevitably occur in jobs and the use of in-dividual expertise, which may have an impact on inin-dividual or collective motivation With new job requirements emerging, a number of respected competences may turn out to be irrelevant: a neutron specialist may be offered a job in demolition, with no regard being given to his former profession Besides, some staff may view the plant shutdown as premature, politically driven, and a sheer waste of money and resources This view may easily cause a rift between, on one side, the plant staff and, on the other side, the corporate management and the government These perceptions and more of this type can make the staff reluctant to fully engage during decommissioning Uncertainty about the timing, schedule, and end state of the decommission-ing project can exacerbate motivational issues For example, in one scenario, the

decommissioning program is firmly established but limited in time, in other words, the plans exist for a finite time but are subject to review of priorities, and budgets may significantly change This strategy is sometimes called “incremental decommission-ing” or (more brutally) “stop and go.” It entails some measure of certainty, but changes can be significant and ultimately impact motivation An even worse scenario appears when the program is uncertain and plans change with every emerging issue or political decision This strategy is discouraged by international guidance because it will impact, among other aspects, the workforce occupations, training, and working hours The timescale of the program may also change, in other words, it may accelerate

or become delayed Provided the plans are clear, the negative impact on motivation can be reduced Difficulties can arise where management have based reward or career/ retirement promises on the previous program, for example, a retirement timetable based

on a set timing or career moves based on completion of a project and availability of redeployment opportunities

In this domain the reader may usefully consult Energy Institute [6]

For the individuals who have been working at an operating facility and expect to be engaged in the facility’s decommissioning, a number of uncertainties will exist:

● How long will I have a job? Will early retirement be an option (depending on age and na-tional legislation)? If I am made redundant will I be offered compensation? Conversely will

I be offered a bonus for staying with the decommissioning organization?

● Will I be forced to work for a contractor?

● What will be my new job? What will the salary be? What will be the short- or long-term prospects for my professional development?

● Will I have to relocate to take a new job? What will my family do? Will I be able to commute from home to the workplace?

● Will I be offered training to start a new job “properly”? What will the workload be? Will I have to familiarize with new coworkers? Will I like them?

The negative view of these uncertainties could lead to loss of motivation and often to the “working-yourself-out-of-a-job” syndrome Thus, the decommissioning project may become the sad end of a professional career

An unmotivated workforce could have a negative impact on the business through [7]:

● Lower productivity (or worse, boycott, sabotage, or vandalism);

● Frequent incidents;

● Higher rates of absenteeism and strikes;

● Personal conflicts;

● Less readiness to train or change to new jobs; and

● Greater need of supervision.

It is a fact (although rarely publicized) that certain decommissioning projects have been delayed by the lack of cooperation by workers who did not feel motivated to do the work quickly and well In other words, a form of “passive resistance” may appear, which can be hard to promptly identify and correct

A more frequent reaction to a negative understanding of this situation would be workers leaving the organization on their own will People might leave even if the proposed change is a good change because they find it difficult to cope with

These issues can be solved through individual management schemes and the iden-tification of resources offered by national welfare and market opportunities Typical mechanisms to enhance motivation may include the following [7]:

● Retaining staff by helping them develop new skills (e.g., by training)

● Pension schemes

● Financial benefits (e.g., linked to performance)

● Nonfinancial benefits (e.g., holidays, health insurance, school fees, good working atmo-sphere, etc.)

● Providing work-life balance (e.g., relocation assistance, family leave, counseling, etc.)

Timely planning for postdecommissioning redevelopment of the nuclear site can

be a strategic move to solve social issues, maintain personnel motivation, and assist

in the smooth progress of decommissioning Decommissioning workers can feel more motivated if they know that there is a future for them when decommissioning is over: their qualifications and skills will be reused locally with no need for moving hundreds

of km away (job mobility is not at all socially acceptable in many countries)

General guidance to teamwork is given in Ref [8] Motivation in workplaces is dealt with extensively in Ref [9] These are only two publications amongst dozens in this general field Fig. 3.1 shows a team dismantling a research reactor

Fig. 3.1 Dismantling of a research reactor.

M Laraia’s photo, 1987.

3.3.2 Implicit versus explicit coordination

The distinction between implicit and explicit coordination (a form of, respectively, im-plicit and exim-plicit knowledge) can be useful in understanding the nature of the needed coordination This aspect is especially critical in decommissioning due to the work teams changing from former operations Explicit coordination implies that team mem-bers communicate to express their plans, actions, and responsibilities or purposely co-ordinate by the use of schedules, plans, and procedures Implicit coordination is about the team’s ability to act in concert without the need for overt communication Implicit coordination is founded on the knowledge that the team members share about the task and about each other; in other words, they share a culture This form of coordination

is typical of long-standing teams who have become used to humoring individual per-sonalities; in fact most of them are personal friends Most teams will apply a mixture

of implicit and explicit coordination, and the pros and cons of implicit and explicit coordination depend on the nature of the task, the task environment, as well as the

“chemistry” of the team The advantage of implicit coordination during high work-load situations has been ascertained But implicit coordination does not necessarily produce adequate performance In novel tasks—there are many during decommis-sioning—it might be necessary for efficient performance to be explicit in defining the problem, defining strategies, and having contingency plans The “costs” and penalties

of implicit and explicit coordination have different features For example, training time and efforts are needed to form the mutual basis of understanding for implicit coordination, while explicit coordination has a higher communication “cost” during execution than implicit coordination [10] (Fig. 3.2)

Fig. 3.2 Implicit or explicit coordination? The former was generally the rule in earlier times.

Photo by M Laraia, 1983.

3.3.3 Building trust

Trust is a key factor in teamwork and a frequently raised issue in decommissioning

Do we trust the new management? Do they have our best interest in mind? Do I trust this new colleague who never worked with us before? Do we trust that the people who wrote this procedure for a task we have never done had the right competence to do so? Trust is often easier to build in an environment of stability and routine, where an indi-vidual’s exposure to other individuals actions and decisions is modest and well known

In a changing situation where jobs and tasks are no longer fixed—where, for example, the nature of safety risks changes and today’s key qualifications may be obsolete to-morrow—vulnerability increases Trust is also essential for motivation

Trust needs to be just adequate While too little trust in teammates, subordinates, or leaders may lead to, say, excessive verification of information or questioning of argu-ments, too much trust may lead to complacency and even relaxation of performance standards

Trust is also one of the coordination mechanisms for teamwork as described in

decommission-ing project, the teams, often short lived or even ad hoc, cannot always rely on past experience and familiarity with each other’s competences, work modes, and views Establishing the new teams in a fruitful way, training them, and building (the right measure of) trust between team members is essential for safe, timely, and cost- effective performance in a decommissioning team

For communication across boundaries to work, people need to trust each other In times of change, trust must be constantly worked upon, or it may easily break Several decommissioning projects have been struggling with trust

3.3.4 Conflicting goals

Several types of goal conflicts can been identified in the literature [11] A typical case

in question for decommissioning is the organizational goal of maximizing productiv-ity (e.g., tons of waste generated per month) while the goal of those responsible for safety is to take all the time needed to assess, and make accurate plans for, the minimi-zation of hazards In practice productivity can cause safety concerns for reasons such

as the following:

● New hires not mentored (reportedly, mentoring takes >10% time).

● No monitoring of workload, fatigue, and stress.

● Old equipment kept in poor condition (“It is to be demolished; why bother maintaining it? It’s unfortunate that the equipment still must serve its purposes for a while”).

● Lack of human factor risk assessment under new circumstances (e.g., skills shortage).

One type of conflict arises when an externally imposed goal conflicts with the individual’s personal goals For instance, it appears that when subjects were assigned (e.g., in decommissioning) a goal that was significantly higher than their previously chosen personal goal level (e.g., in former plant operation), the commitment to the assigned goal and task performance was lower than when personal goals were set after the goal was assigned

When an optimal solution cannot be found whereby all goals are met, an accept-able strategy is generally employed resulting in a solution that’s “good enough” from the standpoint of the person performing the activity Such satisfactory strategies are essential for the overall performance because they allow individuals and organizations

to operate under time and resource constraints

A case reported to the writer is quoted here as an example During operations, keeping the environment clean from contamination is essential During activities of cutting and grinding, which continue for days or weeks, this goal is no longer a viable approach, and within certain work areas staff should rather focus on keeping contam-ination within acceptable levels and not spreading it to other, cleaner areas Still, their inbred safety focus will often lead them to clean up meticulously every day, unneces-sarily losing valuable time

In order to model goal conflicts [11], several relevant factors should be identified:

● Goal commitment: The more conflict individuals experience among different goals, the less committed they are to one goal;

● Goal attainment: Beliefs about whether the task can be carried out successfully;

● Self-efficacy: Beliefs about one’s personal ability to achieve a task;

● Need for achievement: A personality trait describing a person’s ambition to accomplish dif-ficult tasks; and

● Outcome emotions: Performance has emotional consequences that will affect future performance.

3.3.5 New procedures

There is a continual need during decommissioning to draft procedures for tasks that have never been performed before Due to lack of familiarity with decommissioning

by the drafters, the procedures may be imprecise or lack the necessary degree of detail Conversely, procedures may be written with too high a level of detail and be overpro-tective because the drafters want to be on the safe side, or they may be obsessed with procedural compliance Too stringent procedures may lack the flexibility needed to cope with unexpected events or with an incomplete knowledge of the working envi-ronment It is reported across organizations that workers have a hard time choosing between “straight forward and efficient methods” and following the procedure exactly The right balance between procedure and competence (taking due account of training imparted) should be ensured This is often a problem of coordination: enforcing pro-cedures is easier when the objectives of the procedure are known and communications with the procedure drafters are open Overall, those expected to implement procedures taking part in drafting them is advantageous Sometime a hotline for technical support can help Also, there can be an issue of trust (Section 3.3.3): those drafting the proce-dures may belong to a different organization than those implementing the proceproce-dures

An additional point is related to the deep aspects of culture, namely ingrained tradi-tions and customs (Section 3.3.7): in some nations, rules, directives, and procedures are taken as suggestions (but “I know better”), while in other nations they are little less than God’s commandments Decommissioning procedures should be regularly reviewed un-der a continuous improvement program based on feedback by the implementers

3.3.6 Safety culture

Safety culture is commonly intended as a subset of organizational culture Safety cul-ture focuses on the intents and attitudes that affect safety performance

Broadly speaking, safety culture can be defined as a pervasive (i.e., through all management and operating tiers of a given organization) expectation that workers will adopt safety as the prime concern of their activities, that supervisors will embed safety considerations in their decision making, that management will include significant safety margins and contingencies in their vision and goals, and that the whole respon-sible organization will promote safe behaviors and punish omissions and inattention that compromise safety A good safety culture should be alert in locating existing or potential hazards, proactive in establishing mitigation measures, and attentive to les-sons learned—whether good or bad (including near misses)

Similar to organizational culture, there is an intangible element to safety culture While some of its elements can be measured and regulated (e.g., qualifications of the workers, number of training courses attended, number of inspections, etc.), safety cul-ture as a whole is hardly quantifiable

Regulators grant (decommissioning) licenses based on compliance with regulatory requirements However, they have no power or means to enforce “cultural” require-ments Investigations often identify poor safety culture as a root cause (bad attitudes led to bad consequences) Therefore, the justification for a safety culture program is the avoidance of extra training or repair costs later (prevention is better than cure) This is not a regulatory requirement It is more of a warning But safety culture mains broader a domain than regulations (likewise, driving safely goes beyond re-specting traffic rules)

Management of safety is important throughout both operations and decommission-ing Typically during operations similar hazards are dealt with on a daily basis The main hazards of operations are radiological The decommissioning phase is critical because it leads operators to dismantle the existing equipment, which calls for the workers to be close to radioactive sources and take industrial (i.e., nonradiological) risks This in turn requires the adoption of work practices different from operations and use of new tools, like remotely-operated equipment or robots

A challenge in decommissioning could be a wrong understanding—especially among former operations staff—that decommissioning is a trivial activity, which can

be tackled if and when needed This “cultural” attitude can induce a sense of sloppi-ness and complacency, which is inimical to safety

In decommissioning, the industrial risk is greatly increased This also means that the safety focus may vary: one task may pose high chemical risk, while another may pose

a high risk of radiological exposure This is another cultural issue: the former opera-tions staff have a radiological background, which needs to be adapted to new hazards Training is mandatory in this regard Vice versa, many contractors are familiar with nonradiological hazards but may feel out of place in a radiological environment In many countries, nuclear regulators belong to a different organization than industrial regulators The plant staff will have to work closely with the contractors, often in joint teams The former staff and the contractors will typically have different professional