DSpace at VNU: Economic reforms and mangrove forests in central Vietnam

DSpace at VNU: Economic reforms and mangrove forests in central Vietnam tài liệu, giáo án, bài giảng , luận văn, luận án...

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/usnr20

Economic Reforms and Mangrove Forests

in Central Vietnam

Hue Le a a

Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies , Vietnam National University , Hanoi, Vietnam

Published online: 22 Feb 2008

To cite this article: Hue Le (2008) Economic Reforms and Mangrove Forests in Central

Vietnam, Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal, 21:2, 106-119, DOI:

10.1080/08941920701617775

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08941920701617775

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the

“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform However, Taylor & Francis,

our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,

and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources

of information Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,

proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes Any

substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,

systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Economic Reforms and Mangrove Forests

in Central Vietnam

HUE LE

Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, Vietnam

Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is increasingly viewed

as especially suitable for promoting the sustainable development of common-pool resources It is considered an alternative to state control or privatization because

it ostensibly brings about decentralization, meaningful participation, and conser-vation Although attracting international attention, CBNRM has not been widely implemented in Vietnam, where the main strategies are centralized management

by state agencies and assignment of management responsibility to individual house-holds Findings are presented of a study of mangrove forest use and management in a commune in central Vietnam since the introduction of economic reforms in 1986 This article argues that the promotion of nationalization or privatization, rather than solving problems of resource degradation and overexploitation, has deprived many rural households of their livelihoods Further research is needed to define what mix of economic incentives and state and community regulation will best achieve and maintain sustainable and equitable management of local resources

Keywords economic reforms, heterogeneity, land, mangroves, nationalization, privatization, property institutions, Vietnam

Economic reforms (doi moi) introduced in 1986 in Vietnam included the elimination

of the commune cooperative’s monopoly on agriculture and forestry, the introduc-tion of short-term land use rights (up to 20 years for agriculture), and the encourage-ment of privatization and market liberalization, changing the entire makeup of the rural areas in Vietnam (Reed 1996, 267; Ngo 1993) Rural living conditions have improved greatly since then; many peasant households have brick houses, electricity, television, radio broadcasts, and other amenities Yet it has been argued that these conditions are not yet guaranteed because private land ownership, thought to be the key to further development, may lead in the longer term to land fragmentation and increased social differentiation in rural areas (Ngo 1993) Further, others argue that rising inequality is associated with nonagricultural activities, such as commercial aquaculture, in lowland coastal North Vietnam, particularly when the distribution of land is relatively equitable (Adger 1999; Lutrell 2002)

Received 1 August 2006; accepted 27 June 2007

An earlier version of this article was presented at the International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASCP) in Oxaca City, Oxaca, Mexico, 9–13 August 2004 The author would like to thank two reviewers for their useful comments on previous versions of this paper Address correspondence to Hue Le, Centre for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies, Vietnam National University, 19 Le Thanh Tong Street, Hanoi, Vietnam E-mail: huetle2002@yahoo.com

DOI: 10.1080/08941920701617775

106

This article presents research on the impact of privatization on mangrove resource use and management practices of local people in Vietnam since the introduction of the economic reforms in 1986 (doi moi) This study compared one commune (Giao Lac) in the Red River Delta in northern Vietnam, in which mangrove degradation has been reversed and sustainable mangrove management practices have emerged, with another in central Vietnam (Phuoc Son), where mangrove forest degradation has led to increased damage by floods and typhoons Giao Lac was chosen as a case of successful mangrove management, and Phuoc Son was selected as the unsuccessful case where degradation of mangrove forests has increased This study aims to provide new insights into the differentiating effects

of national economic reforms by comparing the findings of my work in Phuoc Son with the previous work in Giao Lac

The study was conducted in Phuoc Son, Tuy Phuoc District, Binh Dinh Province in central Vietnam between January 2004 and March 2006 This study examines rapid changes in local land use and resource tenure systems, patterns of mangrove utilization, and management practices in response to national policy reforms in the community Like Agrawal and Gibson (1999), I contend that deci-sions regarding resource use must be examined in terms of multiple interests and actors within communities (see also Leach et al 1999) Proponents of privatization contend that privatization internalizes costs and benefits, reduces uncertainty, and increases individual responsibility for environmental resources (e.g., McCay and Acheson 1987) I argue that when some individuals become the owners of a resource, they may develop its potential to maximize their own short-term net return and, in fact, may ignore sustainable practices that could provide long-term benefits The study involved both library research and ethnographic fieldwork in Phuoc Son commune Library research, conducted in order to understand the physical and social structure of Phuoc Son, focused on government records and maps and on project reports

of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment The primary field research was carried out in Con Chim island village, which is one of 36 villages in Phuoc Son commune Con Chim was selected because it seemed representative, being of average size, average income status, and one that has been most dependent on shrimp farming as a main source of income It is an offshore island and is also close to the newly planted mangroves and the Thi Nai Lagoon

At the time of the research, Con Chim had 180 households with a total population of 1,176 people Based on the results of a wealth ranking exercise, which considered annual income, household assets, and the house itself, the 180 households were stratified into 4 groups consisting of 35 rich, 20 upper-income, 105 middle-income, and 20 poor households A sample of 36 households, accounting for 20% of all households in Con Chim, was randomly selected and included 7 rich, 3 upper-middle-income, 22 middle-upper-middle-income, and 4 poor households

Semistructured interviews were conducted with the head or the wife of the head

of each of 36 households sampled Discussion and unstructured interviews were also conducted with the heads of the households when appropriate The questions covered information about the house and household possessions, demography, health and nutrition, transportation and communication, household economy, social organization, cultural identity, gender relations, individual aspirations (including personal life), and environmental conditions In addition, interviews with local government and cooperative officials in Phuoc Son commune, the director and the deputy director of the Provincial Fisheries Services, and the manager of the Ecological

Thi Nai Lagoon Project provided insights into the local implementation of national policy on land allocation, and specifically mangroves, the institutional setting, and local power relations

The analysis pays explicit attention to (a) changes in access to and control over mangrove resources, (b) the resultant conflicts between those who have been able to capture nearly exclusive access and those who have lost access as a result of the priva-tization of coastal aquaculture resources, and (c) the different management practices of men and women It explores how differing levels of access to and control over mangrove resources have caused inequality in household incomes, despite the fact that agricultural land and shrimp ponds remain equitably distributed among households

Managing the Commons

The role of the state in managing common-pool resources has long been the subject of great debate According to Garrett Hardin’s model, such resources ‘‘for which there are multiple owners and where one or a set of users can have adverse effects upon the inter-ests of other users’’ (Baden 1977, 137) should be either privatized or controlled by central government authority to ensure sustainable use (Hardin and Baden 1977; McCay and Acheson 1987; Ostrom 1990; see also Berkes 1989) According to Baden (1977), in such situations, where no agency has the power to coordinate, action that is individually rational can be collectively disastrous—and the result is the ‘‘tragedy of the commons.’’

It is now clear that such tragedies can occur in situations of both open access and government regulation A policy where central governments control most natu-ral resource systems is a strategy of the commons that has been followed extensively, particularly in developing countries (Ostrom 1990) The centralizing state establishes

a whole new, simplified institutional nexus and imposes a novel and (from the center) legitimate property regime that has been designed by scientists who are outsiders As

a result, the regime does not reflect the complexity and variability of the local system This is far more static and schematic than the actual social phenomena the scientists presume to typify (Scott 1998)

Furthermore, although governments may wish to implement state property regimes and officially regulate resource use, they often lack the necessary organiza-tional capacity and political will to do so (Scott 1998; Ostrom 1990) In addition, the state neither has the administrative tools or accurate information, nor is it able to change incentives and impose sanctions correctly Moreover, it is politically too risky for the state to allow local communities to specify the commons, to work out ways to deal with overexploitation of and conflict over access to resources (McCay and Acheson 1987) In the process, the state threatens to destroy a great deal of local power and autonomy (Scott 1998), and local people proceed to use the resources

in an unregulated way Consequently, where limited-access common-property resources had previously existed and operated in a functional manner, the centra-lized control and regulation of natural resources unintentionally create an unsustain-able open access resource (see Ostrom 1990) Scott (1998) suggests that we must never assume that local practice conforms to state theory

At the other end of the spectrum are those who believe that the privatization of common-pool resources is the only way to avoid the tragedy of the commons They argue that privatization of the commons internalizes costs and benefits, reduces uncertainty, and thereby increases individual responsibility for the environment and rational use of resources (Hardin 1968; Johnson 1972; Grafton 1995)

Ostrom (1990) argues that the imposition of private property regimes does not stipulate how that bundle of rights is going to be defined, who will pay for the costs

of excluding nonowners from access, and how conflicts over rights will be adjudicated

In addition, how the residual interests of the rights holders in the resource system itself will be organized is not stated Furthermore, as this case of mangrove resources in Vietnam demonstrates, privatization often deprives a large portion of the population

of their livelihood (see also Pomeroy 1992)

In contrast to both privatization regimes and state control of common-pool resources, research from scholars of common-property regimes has shown common-property institutions to be sustainable alternatives to state and private management of resources, both of which aimed to exclude locals in the name of resource conservation (Agrawal and Gibson 1999) Research on common-property institutions has highlighted the flaws in Hardin’s argument In particular, it has pointed out that his analysis of the commons ignores the geographical and historical prevalence of local institutions for communally managing common property, especially those designed to prevent ‘‘free-riding,’’ and thus, in fact, is an analysis

of open-access resources, rather than common property (Ruttan 1998) As com-mon-property institutions have become better understood, community-based natural resource management (CBNRM)—which has its foundations in common-property principles—is ‘‘increasingly viewed as the most appropriate arrangement for promoting sustainable development of natural resources’’ (Gibson and Koontz 1998, 621) Like common-property regimes, CBNRM is based on the premise that local populations have a greater interest in the sustainable use of resources than do the state or distant corporate managers; that local communities are more cognizant of the intricacies of local ecological processes and practices; and that they are able to manage those resources more effectively through local or ‘‘traditional’’ forms of access (Tsing et al 1999) CBNRM involves self-management where the community takes responsibility for surveillance and enforcement A property rights regime and rules of behavior for resource use are thus established CBNRM allows each com-munity to develop a management strategy that meets its own particular needs and conditions Therefore, it allows for a sufficient degree of flexibility and can be modified easily It provides for greater participation in resource management by the community compared to centralized management and privatization Since the community is involved in the formulation and implementation of management measures, a higher degree of acceptability and compliance can be expected CBNRM strives to make maximum use of local knowledge and expertise in developing management strategies (Pomeroy 1992)

Many now argue that social equity, economic efficiency, and ecological sustain-ability can be compatible under community-based management and that livelihood improvement and forest protection can go hand in hand (National Community Forestry Center 2000) The Ford Foundation (1998) argues that CBNRM enables villagers, including marginalized groups within local communities that might other-wise be excluded from the decision-making process, to negotiate with government officials, and it provides a forum for airing the conflicting needs of those who depend

on the area’s natural resources

Issues of institutional arrangements, resource regimes, and property rights are at the core of CBNRM (Pomeroy 1992; Agrawal and Gibson 1999) Accepting approaches that are participatory and more decentralized, such as community-based management, will involve a major shift in the role of national bureaucracies

unaccustomed to sharing power Governments should recognize that smaller organi-zational units, such as villages, which are ‘‘better equipped to manage their own resources than are large authorities,’’ may be ‘‘a more effective basis for rural devel-opment and sustainable resource management than institutions imposed from out-side’’ (Pomeroy 1992, 3) This shift may be necessary if natural resources are to be managed in a sustainable manner

Still, CBNRM is not without its problems One emerging criticism is on the definition of community According to Agrawal and Gibson (1999), defining a community as a spatial unit, as a social structure, or as a set of shared norms seems

no longer to be relevant and in fact indicates weaknesses in the concept (see also Leach et al 1997; 1999) Furthermore, the concept of ‘‘community’’ fails to explain the cause of these characteristics or spell out their effect on natural resource use (Agrawal and Gibson 1999) Leach et al (1997) provided a critical analysis of community and environment and the relationship between them, and found that com-munities are not ‘‘bounded, homogeneous entities, but socially differentiated and diverse’’ and divided and crosscut by ‘‘gender, caste, wealth, age, origins, and other aspects of social identity’’ (pp 5–7) McCay and Acheson (1987) point out that com-munity itself involves conflicts between users over rights of access to the resources and over the definition of property rights and law and competition between different social groups within the community (see also Leach et al 1997; 1999)

Furthermore, the concept of ‘‘community’’ can also exclude and marginalize in two ways: (1) by the way community and community membership are defined, which may exclude those defined as outsiders; and (2) by the way rights of access to resource use are unequally allocated within communities by gender, class, age, wealth, and origins Most of the time, women or poorer people are marginalized This article addresses these questions regarding the dynamic way in which power, structure, and historical social relations shape community, common-pool resource use, and collective action

History of Mangrove Management in Phuoc Son Commune

Phuoc Son Commune is a largely Buddhist community located in central Vietnam, and it covers an area of about 2,582 ha Agricultural land accounts for 1,210 ha (47%) and commercial shrimp farming 304 ha (12%) of the total commune area (Figure 1) This agricultural community supports a population of about 24,853 in 5,500 rice-farming households that also engage in animal husbandry Of which

322 households are allocated shrimp ponds and engaged in commercial shrimp farming On average, rice production is 6.1 tons per hectare per year Each person receives 50 kg rice per month from the commune’s allocated land, which the people till themselves Thi Nai Lagoon marks the eastern boundary, Phuoc Hiep Commune the western, and Phuoc Thuan Commune the southern Phuoc Son is accessible by roads and waterways and has 24 kindergartens, 3 primary schools, 1 middle school, 1 secondary school, a health clinic, and 1 main market, which is open every 2 days Phuoc Son Commune is a community with a long and rich history Elderly people in the commune have experienced life under three regimes: the French colonial government, the Republic of Vietnam, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam They have experienced the struggle to unify the country, the post-1975 period of collectivization, and, more recently, the period of economic reform

The commune was established more than 100 years ago when many mangrove islands were within several kilometers of the commune According to elders, Phuoc Son is thought to have had about 300 ha of mangrove at that time The trees were 4

to 6 m tall and the dominant forest species were Avicennia marina (Forssk.) Vierh.,Rhizophora apiculata Blume,and Rhizophora mucronata Lam (Phan and Hoang 1993) At the beginning, the mangroves were open to all villagers People went there to collect firewood and marine products such as crab, fish, shrimp, and bivalves for domestic use Later, these islands were owned by and named after those who first claimed them, and these names are still used today

In previous times, according to the elders, people went to the forests to catch birds and collect bird eggs, crabs, fish, shrimp, and bee honey either to eat or to sell

at the local market They also collected firewood and cut mangrove trees for timber and dike construction during the rainy season They used mangrove trees to make rafts, which provided shade and food for fish, thus making them easier to catch The fishing season started in September (according to the Lunar Calendar) and ended in July the following year When the season was over, the mangrove rafts were used for firewood Those who did not own an island were not allowed to cut mangrove trees, but could collect crab, fish, and shrimp, and dry branches for firewood In addition, there were open waterfronts and an open intertidal area where villagers collected marine products In this way, the poor were not excluded from the mangrove and marine resources Elderly people questioned during the field research stated that the island owners also replanted mangroves after they had been harvested According to these accounts, local practices thus amounted to effective

Figure 1 Location and land use map of Phuoc Son Note: This map is a publication of the Phuoc Son People’s Committee and not subject to copyright

resource management, although there were no laws regarding forest exploitation and management

During the French and American occupations, the mangroves of Phuoc Son were little used by the villagers In fact, these resources were essentially protected during these two conflicts On March 31, 1975, the commune was liberated from American occupation After liberation, the province constructed a 3.7-km-long dike and divided the area into two tracts: one for rice production and the other for shrimp farming Mangrove trees were used once more to build the dike The north’s collectivization model was then applied to the south In 1977, Phuoc Son’s first coop-erative (an organization that is owned or managed jointly by villagers who use its facilities or services), an agricultural cooperative, was established Farmers were supposed to pool their land and tools and farm in common The amount each member worked for one day was measured in points After each harvest, and after a portion was set aside to pay for the use of members’ land and for production funds, members received a share of the crop according to the work points they had accumulated

In 1978, the state-owned Thi Nai Lagoon Shrimp Farming Enterprise was established under the provincial Aquatic Products Department An area of 140 ha, consisting of Trang, Chim, and Gia Islands, was set aside for the enterprise The owners had been asked to donate their land, and it is said that those unwilling to give

up their land were forced to do so For the first time, villagers witnessed outsiders coming in to cut mangrove trees (formerly belonging to the villagers) in order to practice commercial farming using extensive shrimp aquaculture The enterprise also set rules under which villagers were not allowed to log mangrove trees or to catch any marine produce within its territory All of the land and resources that used to belong to the villagers then became the property of the state In return, the shrimp farming enterprise did not make any contributions to the development of the com-munity at all Instead, it contributed greatly to the budget of the province simply because it was under the management of the province

According to those interviewed during the field survey, villagers were not allowed to pass through the enterprise’s shrimp farming area or they would be arrested and brought before the Commune People’s Committee Many were fined for having stolen what they perceived of as their own resources This resulted in resentment between the enterprise workers and the villagers, who were not passive but found ways to resist the enterprise’s policies Since the enterprise did not have enough personnel to guard the mangroves and no one had real responsibility for guarding the forest, villagers tried their best to poach in the forests, hiding long knives and even cutting down big mangrove trees for firewood The result was a

‘‘tragedy of the commons,’’ as the mangrove forests were severely depleted

Impacts of Economic Reform (Doi Moi ): New Institutions for Shrimp

Management

During the 1980s, a household-based economy increasingly displaced the cooperat-ive-based economy (Le and Rambo 1999) The government of Vietnam shifted responsibility for the management of natural resources (both land and water) away from commune cooperatives and into the hands of individual farm households (Nguyen 1995) Generally speaking, rural living conditions improved greatly (Ngo 1993) Although it has been argued that the positive results of reforms are not yet

guaranteed, market liberalization has led to greater diversification of income sources and consequently in social differentiation (Adger 1999; Le 2004)

In 1985, the Commune Aquaculture Cooperative was established to pool the villagers’ mangrove forests The commune’s remaining island owners or those who inherited land from their parents or grandparents were asked to pool their lands and join the cooperative Farmers then constructed ponds for shrimp farming The cooperative was leasing shrimp ponds to groups of five or six shrimp farmer households Household contractors were responsible for fry, labor, pond manage-ment, and even marketing At that time, a production quota for each pond was fixed for a period of 1 year, and farmers had to pay for the rent of shrimp ponds (in shrimp, not in cash) Cooperative members who exceeded their production quotas kept 100% of the surplus for home consumption or to sell to private traders Con-versely, in cases of natural calamities or other extenuating circumstances, they were required to make up for all production deficits This practice did not help improve the cooperative’s management

During the economic reform period, countries in Asia and Europe and the United States had become the biggest importers of Vietnam’s marine products Therefore, shrimp and other marine products fetched much better prices Motivated

by large export profits both the central and local governments have encouraged shrimp farming In 1991, households were able to lease shrimp ponds for a period of 20 years This policy was also applied to the Thi Nai Lagoon Shrimp Farming enterprise Its workers, who were outsiders, were allocated land to do shrimp farming

Conflict increased between villagers who did not have enough land for aquacul-ture and the enterprise’s workers In 1991 villagers’ complaints were addressed to the enterprise’s Board of Management The Provincial Party Committee Secretary was then assigned to come to the commune to solve the villagers’ problem In 1992, the enterprise had to return 54 ha to the commune; this land was then allocated to some households In 1993, the commune’s aquaculture reserve fund of 51 ha was auctioned to individuals for shrimp farming The proceeds were spent on the commune’s infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and health clinics Although the bidding process was nominally open to everyone, only the rich who had sufficient capital, management skills, and more importantly connections were able to partici-pate in the process

On December 21, 1994, the Prime Minister issued National Decree 773-TTg, which stipulated that open coastal areas and waterfronts can be used for shrimp and crab farming Households that cleared the mangroves for shrimp ponds were not supposed to pay any tax to the cooperative for the first 5 years During this time, those who cleared the forests for shrimp pond construction were called heroes of the

‘‘uncultivated land encroachment’’ movement This policy encouraged shrimp farmers to clear all of the commune’s remaining mangrove forests for shrimp farming It also resulted in greater demand for aquaculture land in the commune Between 1996 and 1997, the modified extensive aquaculture (stocking densities

of 1 to 5 shrimp=m2, with additional artificial stocking with crab, fish, and shrimp) was applied to Phuoc Son A one hectare pond could bring in VND 60 million (roughly US$5,000), a higher amount than could be earned from rice farming For the first time, hatcheries were established in the area, partly because natural shrimp fry were no longer available According to villagers and a commune leader, shrimp farmers tried to extend the area of their ponds by illegally encroaching on the open waterfronts where the villagers, mostly women and girls, used to collect marine

products Consequently, the area of the open waterfronts has shrunk It is important

to note that this process of land reclamation excluded the poor and female-headed households that did not have capital to invest in lucrative shrimp farming According

to shrimp pond owners, because shrimp farming is a risky business and requires large amounts of capital, women are not allowed to participate However, in four exceptional cases (out of 322 households headed by men engaged in shrimp farming) women were engaged in shrimp farming Some women participated in clam collec-tion in their ponds Most women are confined to the private sphere and household duties Thus, men have better opportunities to earn much more than women, who, because of the persistence of certain patriarchal norms at the village level, have been virtually excluded from the newly privatized aquaculture resources

In 1999, households that received land were issued ‘‘red books,’’ documents that the head of the household signed and that provided households with the right to use their allocated lands Each household head received an allocation of shrimp ponds based on the number of members per household (0.14 ha per household member)

In other words, men and women, young and old alike, did not receive an individual right to land, but were tied to household heads, most of whom were men It should

be noted that a household member is not supposed to receive both agricultural land and a shrimp pond, although within households it was common for one or two members to receive agricultural land, while others received shrimp ponds

Between 2000 and 2001, semi-intensive aquaculture (use of small 1- to 5-ha ponds, from which supplementary stocking and feeding are routine) was implemented in the commune The household surveys showed that 50% of households (161 households) that were not able to invest in commercial shrimp farming sold their ponds (117 ha

in total) to those who had capital sources, management skills, and political power Some sold rights to their land for 5 years and others sold rights for 10 or even 15 years, and were then willing to work for those rich shrimp farmers These men (not women) were paid no more than US$28 per month to guard the shrimp ponds of the rich Usually, two or more people share a pond In this way, they share the costs and the risks of shrimp production It is important to note that most local authorities had shrimp ponds, but this was not well known They either shared the pond with some-one else or hired a poor villager to work for them For the first 2 years, many earned large profits from shrimp farming An area of 0.8 ha could render VND 200 million (roughly US$13,000)

Between 2002 and 2003, a white-spotdisease outbreak caused almost all shrimp farms to fail At the request of the provincial government, scientists investigated and found that loss of the mangroves was the main reason for the degraded environment for shrimps Mangroves in the pond provide food and shade for shrimps when the sun is out or space for them to escape into the cooler shaded water or to absorb the food residue in the pond The loss of mangrove cover resulted in water pollution, which in turn led to the disease outbreak (Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies 2004) The large quantity of semi-intensive shrimp ponds

in the commune enabled the disease to spread

As a result, many people lost huge amounts of money and therefore could not repay loans to the bank For an area of 0.8 ha one could now earn only US$3,000, or about one fourth of the revenue during 2000 and 2001 While a shrimp farmer’s pond would not be confiscated for defaulting on loan repayments,1 as shrimp farming became less lucrative, many local leaders sold their ponds to outside shrimp farmers