DSpace at VNU: Managing Vietnam''s maritime boundary disputes

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To cite this article: Nguyen Hong Thao & Ramses Amer (2007): Managing Vietnam's Maritime Boundary

Disputes, Ocean Development & International Law, 38:3, 305-324

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DOI: 10.1080/00908320701530482

Managing Vietnam’s Maritime Boundary Disputes

NGUYEN HONG THAOProfessor

Faculty of LawVietnam National UniversityHanoi, Vietnam

RAMSES AMERSenior LecturerDepartment of Political ScienceUmea University

Umea, Sweden

This article examines the progress made in managing Vietnam’s maritime boundary disputes and analyzes the challenges that lie ahead relating to unsettled disputes The continuity and change in Vietnam’s approach to dispute a settlement and the difficulties in managing the unresolved maritime disputes are assessed Vietnam has made considerable progress in managing its maritime disputes; however, continued efforts are needed to address the unresolved disputes.

Keywords boundary, Gulf of Thailand, Gulf of Tonkin, maritime disputes, Spratly

archipelago, Vietnam

Purpose and Structure

The main purpose of this article is to analyze and assess the progress made in managingthe maritime disputes between Vietnam and its neighboring countries This is done through

a process that has three sections The first encompasses the identification of the scopeand basis of the claims of Vietnam and of its neighboring countries The second sectioninvolves the identification of the maritime disputes with Vietnam through an overview of theagreements reached thus far between Vietnam and its neighbors and through an overview

Received 4 July 2006; accepted 24 August 2006

This study draws on earlier and ongoing research carried out by the two authors on an individualbasis on Vietnam’s maritime disputes as well as the as on other aspects of the developments in the SouthChina Sea A travel grant from the Swedish School of Advanced Asia-Pacific Studies (SSAAPS) made

a working visit by Professor Amer to Vietnam possible in March 2006, during which an earlier version

of this manuscript was discussed The views expressed are the personal views of the two authors.For an earlier study encompassing Vietnam’s land border disputes, see Ramses Amer and NguyenHong Thao, “The Management of Vietnam’s Border Disputes: What Impact on Its Sovereignty and

Regional Integration?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27(3), (December 2005), pp 429–452.

Address correspondence to Associate Professor Ramses Amer, Department of Political Science,Umea University, SE-901Umea, Sweden E-mail: ramses.amer@pol.umu.se or thaonh@vista.gov.vn

305

of the unsettled disputes The third section provides an analysis of the agreements reachedand the remaining dispute situations from both a legal and political perspective, with a look

at identifying strategies for management and models for settlement of disputes

Vietnam’s Maritime Claims through a Comparative Perspective

In this section, the basis and extent of Vietnam’s ocean claims and the claims of itsneighboring countries in the South China Sea proper as well as in the Gulf of Thailand andthe Gulf of Tonkin are outlined.1It should be noted that although the claims and argumentspresented have been formulated and used by the various countries, in some cases, theirspecific extent has not been outlined on maps Further, in some cases, earlier governmentsformulated the claims displayed on maps

Vietnam 2

Vietnam claims sovereignty over the Paracel archipelago (Hoang Sa in Vietnamese) and Spratly archipelago (Truong Sa in Vietnamese) It has claimed an exclusive economic zone

(EEZ) of 200 nautical miles and the adjacent continental shelf in the South China Sea (East

Sea—Bien Dong in Vietnamese) on the basis of natural prolongation The Government

Statement on the Territorial Sea, the Zone Contiguous, the Economic Exclusive Zone, andthe Continental Shelf of Vietnam of 12 May 1977 and the Government Statement on theBaselines of Vietnam of 12 November 1982 outline the extent of Vietnamese claims tomaritime areas in the South China Sea Vietnam also has claimed an EEZ and continentalshelf areas in the Gulf of Thailand and the Gulf of Tonkin

Vietnam currently controls more then 20 islands, cays, and reefs in the Spratlyarchipelago The control over features in the Spratly archipelago has gradually beenincreasing since the mid-1970s when Vietnam had permanent troops on seven of thefeatures Vietnam has no physical control of any island, cay, or reef in the Paracelarchipelago, which has been fully under China’s control since 1974, when the ChineseNavy took control over the islands from the then Republic of Vietnam (ROV) (South).Vietnam’s sovereignty claims to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos in the SouthChina Sea are based on historical records and maps from precolonial time and from theFrench colonial period Vietnam maintains the position that the “Feudal Vietnamese State”had effectively controlled the two archipelagos since the 17th Century The “unified”Vietnam relies on documentation from the former ROV to substantiate its claims.3 TheVietnamese sovereignty claim to island features in the Gulf of Thailand also seems to

be historical Regarding ocean areas, Vietnam has increasingly been arguing in terms ofmodern international law—that is, the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea(UNCLOS)4—to substantiate its claims to EEZ and continental shelf areas in the SouthChina Sea proper, the Gulf of Thailand, and the Gulf of Tonkin

Brunei Darussalam5

Brunei Darussalam claims an EEZ and the natural prolongation of its adjacent continentalshelf in the southern part of the South China Sea Brunei claims sovereignty over LouisaReef in the Spratly archipelago, which is, however, currently under Malaysian control.Brunei relies on the UNCLOS to sustain its claims to EEZ and continental shelf areas inthe South China Sea The claim to the Louisa Reef appears to be based on the fact that it islocated within the continental shelf area claimed by Brunei

Cambodia has sovereignty claims to islands, cays, and reefs in the Gulf of Thailand andcontrols some of these features The extent of Cambodia’s claims has gradually been definedsince the late 1960s Through a Government Statement on 31 July 1982, Cambodia hasdefined its claim to 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, 24 nautical miles of contiguous zone,and a 200 nautical miles of EEZ Cambodia is not a party to the UNCLOS.7Nevertheless,Cambodia argues that UNCLOS supports its claims to EEZ and continental shelf areas inthe Gulf of Thailand The basis of the sovereignty claims to land features in the Gulf seems

to be historical

China8

China,9 alongside Taiwan, has the most extensive claims in the South China Sea China

claims sovereignty over the Paracel archipelago (Xisha in Chinese) and the Spratly archipelago (Nansha in Chinese), as well as the Pratas Islands As shown on official Chinese

maps, China claims the major parts of the South China Sea as “historical waters” in aU-shaped area marked by the so-called dotted lines southward to the east of the Vietnamesecoastline, turning eastward to the northeast of the Indonesian controlled Natuna Islands,and to the north of the Malaysian state of Sarawak, and then turning northeastward alongthe coast of Brunei Darussalam and the Malaysian state of Sabah, and finally northward tothe west of the Philippines China also claims an EEZ and the natural prolongation of thecontinental shelf in the Gulf of Tonkin

China controls the whole Paracel archipelago In 1956, China took control of theeastern part of the Paracels and took control of the western part by force in 1974 Chinagained its first foothold in the Spratly archipelago in 1988 Since then, China has expandedits control over islands and reefs in the Spratly area It is estimated that China currentlycontrols ten islands, cays, and reefs in the Spratlys The Pratas Islands are under Taiwanesecontrol

China’s claims in the South China Sea seem to be based on historical records and maps,which are used to sustain two kinds of claims First, it is argued that they show that Chinadiscovered the island groups in the South China Sea; and second, it is argued that theyshow how Chinese people occupied the islands and developed them More recently, Chinahas also been arguing in terms of modern international law—UNCLOS—to substantiateits claims to water and continental shelf areas in the South China Sea

Indonesia10

Indonesia controls the Anambas, Badas, Natuna, and Tambelan Islands Indonesia alsoclaims an EEZ and the continental shelf extending into the South China Sea proper to thenorth of the Anambas Islands and to the north and east of the Natuna Islands

Indonesia regards itself as an archipelagic state and therefore considers the water areaswithin the straight baselines joining “appropriate” points of the outermost islands of theIndonesian archipelago as archipelagic waters Indonesia’s claims to a territorial sea, EEZ,and continental shelf are measured from the archipelagic baselines that link the outermostislands of the Indonesian archipelago Indonesian’s use of the archipelagic principle andclaims to territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf areas in the South China Sea are based

on UNCLOS

Malaysia claims sovereignty over the southern part of the Spratly archipelago Malaysiaalso claims an EEZ and the natural prolongation of the continental shelf in the South ChinaSea off the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia and off the coasts of the states of Sabah andSarawak on the island of Kalimantan (Borneo) Malaysia similarly claims an EEZ and thenatural prolongation of the continental shelf in the Gulf of Thailand off the northeast coast

of Peninsular Malaysia The extent of Malaysia’s claims has gradually been defined sincethe 1960s Malaysia publicized the extent of its territorial sea (12 nautical miles) and of itscontinental shelf claims through two maps in December 1979 Malaysia proclaimed its 200nautical miles EEZ in April 2003 The 1979 maps display the extent of Malaysia’s claims

on the southern part of the Spratly archipelago

Currently, Malaysia controls at least five islands and reefs in the Spratly archipelago,with Swallow Reef being the first, claimed in June 1983

Malaysia argues in terms of the 1982 UNCLOS to sustain its claims to EEZ andcontinental shelf areas in the South China Sea The claim to the islands controlled by it

in the Spratlys appears to be based on the fact that these features are located within thecontinental shelf area claimed by Malaysia

The Philippines12

The Philippines claim sovereignty over almost the entire Spratly archipelago (KalayaanIsland Group [KIG] is the terminology used in the Philippines), with the exception of theSpratly Island itself, Royal Charlotte Reef, Swallow Reef, and Louisa Reef The formalannexation of the western Spratlys as part of the Philippines was announced in June 1978through Presidential Order Number 1596 The Philippines also claims an EEZ and thenatural prolongation of the continental shelf in the South China Sea to the west of thecountry

The Philippines control nine islands, cays, and reefs in the Spratly archipelago ThePhilippines first took control of five islands, cays, and reefs in the early 1970s and has sinceexpanded its control

The Philippines regards itself as an archipelagic state and, as a result, claims that itsEEZ and continental shelf areas are measured from the outermost islands of the Filipinoarchipelago Thus far, however, it is not clear how the maritime zones will be drawn aroundthe KIG that is claimed by the Philippines

The claims to sovereignty over the major part of the Spratly archipelago are based ondiscovery, adjacency, and effective occupation To support its views on the applicability ofthe archipelagic principle and claims to EEZ and continental shelf areas in the South ChinaSea, the Philippines relies on the 1982 UNCLOS

Taiwan13

Taiwan pursues the same claims as China in the South China Sea.14It can be argued thatboth China and Taiwan are pursuing a “Chinese” claim Taiwan claims sovereignty overthe Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, as well as the Pratas Islands Taiwan also claims themajor parts of the sea areas of the South China Sea as “historical waters,” relying on theU-shaped area outlined on the Chinese maps described previously

Taiwan controls Itu Aban Island in the Spratly archipelago and the Pratas Islands.Taiwan does not control any island, cay, or reef in the Paracel archipelago

Like Mainland China, Taiwan’s claims in the South China Sea are based on historicaltitle of discovery by Chinese fishermen In more recent times, Taiwan has increasinglyrelied on the 1982 UNCLOS to substantiate its claims to water and continental shelf areas

in the South China Sea

on the Continental Shelf16to sustain its claims Thailand is not party to the 1982 UNCLOS,however, this has not prevented Thailand from using the 1982 UNCLOS to sustain its claim

in necessary cases

Vietnam’s Maritime Disputes

While Vietnam’s maritime disputes can be studied from various perspectives, here thefocus is on the current status of the disputes (i.e., are the disputes settled or not) Theagreements reached between Vietnam and neighboring countries solving or relating toareas of overlapping claims will be listed, followed by a section that overviews Vietnam’sremaining maritime disputes

Agreements

The following are the agreements that have been reached between Vietnam and neighboringcountries relating to areas of overlapping claims

Ĺ Vietnam and the then People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) signed an agreement

on “historic waters” on 7 July 1982.17A Treaty on the Principles for the Settlement

of Border Problems between Cambodia and Vietnam and an agreement on borderregulations was signed on 20 July 1983 in Phnom Penh.18On 27 December 1985,the Treaty on the Delimitation of the Vietnam-Kampuchea Frontier was signed bythe two countries and ratified by the Council of the State of Vietnam on 30 January

1986 and by the National Assembly of the PRK on 7 February 1986.19Finally, on 10October 2005, the two countries signed a Supplementary Treaty to the 1985 Treaty.20

Ĺ Between Malaysia and Vietnam, an agreement was reached on 5 June 1992 to engage

in joint development in areas of overlapping claims to continental shelf areas in theGulf of Thailand to the southwest of Vietnam and to the east-northeast off the eastcoast of Peninsular Malaysia.21

Ĺ Thailand and Vietnam reached an agreement delimiting their continental shelf andEEZ boundaries in a disputed area in the Gulf of Thailand to the southwest ofVietnam and to the northeast of Thailand on 9 August 1997.22

Ĺ China and Vietnam signed the Agreement on the Delimitation of the TerritorialWaters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin on

25 December 2000,23which resolved their maritime boundary disputes in the Gulf

On the same day, the two countries signed an agreement on fishery cooperation in the

Gulf of Tonkin.24On 29 April 2004, the Supplementary Protocol to the Agreement

on Fishery cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf and the regulations on preservation andmanagement of the living resources in the Common Fishery Zone in the Gulf ofTonkin were signed.25

Ĺ Indonesia and Vietnam signed an agreement on the delimitation of their continentalshelf boundary in and area to the North of the Natuna Islands on 11 June 2003.26

Conflict Situations

Some political factions and parties within Cambodia have opposed the agreements betweenVietnam and Cambodia that were signed in the 1980s New bilateral talks on the status ofthe borders between the two states have been initiated to reach a solution to the remainingdisputed issues.27The October 2005 Supplementary Treaty to the 1985 Treaty only relates

to the land border and not to the maritime issues between the two countries.28This raisesthe issue of to what extent the 1980s border agreements related to maritime issues The

1982 agreement on “historic waters” stands out as the most pertinent respecting maritimedisputes The 1982 agreement defined “historic waters” as being located between the coast

of Kien Giang Province, Phu Quoc Island, and the Tho Chu islands on the Vietnamese sideand the coast of Kampot Province and the Poulo Wai islands on the Cambodian side Theagreement stipulated that the two countries would hold, “at a suitable time,” negotiations

to determine the maritime frontier in the “historic waters.”29 Pending such a settlement,the two countries would continue to regard the Br´evi´e Line that was drawn in 1939 asthe diving line for the islands within the “historic waters” and the exploitation of the zonewould be decided by “common agreement.”30The 1985 Treaty on the Delimitation of theVietnam-Kampuchea Frontier related primarily to the land border issues, but the “historicalwaters” are also mentioned in the 1985 Treaty.31 Overlapping maritime claims betweenVietnam and Cambodia in the Gulf of Thailand remain unresolved

China’s claims to “historical waters” in the South China Sea proper overlaps with theclaims to EEZ and continental shelf areas of Vietnam China’s sovereignty claim to theParacel archipelago is also disputed by Vietnam China’s sovereignty claim to the wholeSpratly archipelago is another dispute with Vietnam that is bilateral for those areas notclaimed by other Southeast Asian countries and a major multilateral dispute for those areasalso claimed by Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines

Taiwan’s claims in the South China Sea area overlap with the claims of Vietnam.Taiwan is pursuing similar claims with China in the South China Sea However, Vietnamdoes not recognise Taiwan, except as a province of China (the one-China policy) and thus,

no formal diplomatic relations exist between Vietnam and Taiwan In the context of thisarticle, the Taiwanese presence in any of the areas in which it has a claim is viewed ascreating a maritime dispute between Taiwan and Vietnam, although it could be argued thatVietnam is facing a single “Chinese” claim

There is no Taiwanese presence in the Paracel archipelago; therefore, the overlappingsovereignty claims by Taiwan and Vietnam to the archipelago are not regarded as a dispute

in the context of this article Taiwan and Vietnam’s overlapping claims in the Gulf of Tonkinare also not classified as a conflict situation since Taiwan does not have a presence in thearea The situation in the Spratly archipelago is different since both Vietnam and Taiwancontrol several islands, cays, and reefs, there is a conflict situation between Taiwan andVietnam Taiwan’s extensive claim to “historical waters” in the South China Sea properoverlaps with claims made by Vietnam, causing a bilateral dispute between the two parties

Because of overlapping sovereignty claims to the whole or parts of the Spratlyarchipelago, there is a multilateral conflict situation involving Brunei Darussalam, China,Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

In the Gulf of Thailand, the maritime boundary dispute between Thailand andVietnam has been resolved32and the bilateral disputes between Malaysia and Thailand andbetween Malaysia and Vietnam, respectively, have been handled through joint developmentagreements.33However, these three countries have yet to resolve a trilateral overlappingclaim in one area of the Gulf of Thailand Furthermore, Cambodia and Vietnam haveoverlapping claims in other parts of the Gulf of Thailand

To summarize, Vietnam is involved in two multilateral dispute situations First, theSpratly conflict that involves overlapping sovereignty claims to the whole or parts of theSpratly archipelago from five other claimants, and second, the trilateral dispute in the Gulf

of Thailand that involves Malaysia and Thailand Vietnam is involved in bilateral disputeswith the following countries: Brunei (Spratly), Cambodia (Gulf of Thailand), China (SouthChina Sea), Malaysia (Spratly), the Philippines (Spratly), and Taiwan (Spratly)

Analyzing the Management of Vietnam’s Maritime Disputes

Vietnam’s first agreements on maritime disputes were those with the then PRK in 1982,

1983, and 1985 The Cambodian conflict (1979–1991) prevented discussions from takingplace on maritime issues between Vietnam and its other neighbors, except for Indonesia.There were significant changes in the 1990s A joint development agreement (JDA)was reached with Malaysia in 1992 in an area of bilateral dispute in the Gulf of Thailand

In 1995, Vietnam and the Philippines agreed on a “code of conduct” to be observed by thetwo countries in the South China Sea.34The negotiations between Vietnam and Thailandeventually resulted in the agreement on maritime boundaries of 1997, which concernedareas in the Gulf of Thailand

The JDA reached with Malaysia in 1992 has proven to be a more flexible model

of joint development than the Thailand-Malaysia 1979 model Malaysia and Vietnamagreed to nominate Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS) and Vietnam Oil andGas Corporation (PETROVIETNAM), respectively, to undertake the exploration andexploitation of petroleum in the “Defined Area” and to enter into appropriate commercialarrangements Four years after the conclusion of the commercial arrangement (29 July1997), the first petroleum was extracted from the field Bunga Kekwa.35

The 1997 Thailand-Vietnam agreement was the first in the region to use a single linefor delimiting both the continental shelf and EEZ It was Vietnam’s first agreement onmaritime delimitation.36It was also the first settlement of a maritime dispute in the regionafter the entry into force in 1994 of the 1982 UNCLOS

Notable progress during the 1990s was the initiation of trilateral talks between Vietnam,Malaysia, and Thailand regarding an area of the Gulf of Thailand where the claims ofthe three countries overlap These talks were made possibly by the maritime boundaryagreement between Vietnam and Thailand in 1997.37

Regarding Taiwan, in recent years Vietnam has made official statements criticizingTaiwanese activities in the Spratlys near the “Banthan” reef38as well as on Itu Aban, whichTaiwan controls.39Since Vietnam adheres to the “one-China policy,” Vietnam cannot enterinto official talks with Taiwan on the overlapping maritime claims of the two parties

In the following years, the full normalization of relations between Vietnam and China

in November 1991 had fluctuating levels of tension concerning territorial disputes.40Sharp

differences were expressed regarding all the territorial disputes; i.e., the overlapping claims

to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, to water and continental shelf areas in the SouthChina Sea, and in the Gulf of Tonkin Differences on oil exploration in the South China Seaand the signing of contracts with foreign companies for exploration were prevalent duringApril–June 1994, April–May 1996, and March–April 1997 In 1998 there was no extendedperiod of tension on the maritime disputes, although there were shorter periods noted in theSouth China Sea in April, May, July, and September.41

To cope with the fluctuating level of tension on maritime disputes, the two countriesdeveloped a system of talks at the expert, government, and high levels Talks at the expertlevel were initiated in October 1992 The talks at the government level began in August

1993, with the twelfth round of talks held in December 2005.42The first achievement ofthese talks was the signing of an agreement on 19 October 1993 on the principles forhandling the Gulf of Tonkin dispute.43They also agreed to set up a joint working group

at the expert level specific to the Gulf of Tonkin The joint working group on the Gulf

of Tonkin met 17 times—from March 1994 until the signing of the Agreement on theDemarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in the Gulf ofTonkin in December 2000.44Talks at the expert level on the disputes in the South ChinaSea proper, the so-called sea issues, were initiated in November 1995, and the tenth round

of talks was held in June 2005.45

The 2000 Gulf of Tonkin Agreement46entered into force on 30 June 2004, when thetwo countries exchanged documents ratifying the agreement in Hanoi.47 The ratificationand entry into force of the agreement was made possible by the completion of the talks onthe Supplementary Protocol to the Agreement of Fishery Cooperation, which was signed

on the same day as the boundary agreement in December 2000.48Agreeing on the Protocolwas a prerequisite to the ratification of the maritime boundary agreement At the tenth round

of government-level talks held in Hanoi in January 2004, it was reported that the two sideshad “appreciated” the progress made in the settlement of technical issues on the fisheryissues Further, the two sides “showed their determination to complete the subsequent work

in order to put the Agreement on Delineation and the Agreement on Fishery Co-operation

in the Tonkin Gulf into reality in the first half of 2004.”49The progress in the talks on theSupplementary Protocol on Fishing was publicly displayed in reports from the ninth round

of talks at the vice-ministerial level on the issue held in Hanoi on 21–24 February 2004.50The Agreement on the Additional Protocol was signed in Beijing on 29 April 200451andentered into force at the same time as the boundary agreement on 30 June 2004.52

The negotiations on the Gulf of Tonkin centred on how to reach an agreement on amutually acceptable framework or model for dividing the Gulf A core issue was whichprinciple should be used to divide the Gulf In this context, the islands’ impact was ofcrucial importance, in particular, Vietnam’s Bach Long Vi Island The first question waswhether Bach Long Vi Island qualified as an island according to the relevant provisions

of the 1982 UNCLOS If it did, as argued by Vietnam, then it was entitled to an EEZ thatwould impact on a line of equidistance China had an interest in minimizing the impactthat Bach Long Vi Island would have on any delimitation This could be accomplished byeither arguing that Bach Long Vi was not an island in accordance with the provisions of

1982 UNCLOS (and as a result only entitled to a 12 mile territorial sea) or by arguingthat its impact on an equidistance line should be minimized and possibly disregarded.53Itwould have been difficult for China to argue that Bach Long Vi was not an island sinceChina had controlled the Island earlier and had claimed that the Island was inhabited before

it was handed over to Vietnam in the late 1950s.54An assessment of the coordinates thatwere agreed on as the maritime boundary in the 2000 agreement indicates that the impact

of Bach Long Vi was not “valued” fully in the delimitation, it was partly “valued” as it wasgiven a quarter of impact; i.e., 15 nautical miles from the Island.55

Another complicating factor of the Gulf of Tonkin negotiations was the status of theSino-French Agreement of 1887 Vietnam would probably have favored using the line inthe 1887 agreement to delimit the Gulf of Tonkin, since the line would be to its advantage.China would have opposed and argued that the 1887 agreement was only intended todetermine the administrative control over the islands in the Gulf and did not apply to thewater and seabed in the Gulf.56In the 2000 agreement, both sides eventually agreed that

if the 1887 Sino-French Agreement was brought up during the negotiations, it would nothave an impact on the delimitation of maritime zones in the Gulf of Tonkin

The maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin established in the 2000 agreement is a line

of equidistance, albeit significantly modified, as a result of sorting out differences related

to how islands should impact on the delimitation, in particular Bach Long Vi Island.57The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin reaffirms the Vietnameseposition of using a single line for both the continental shelf and an EEZ in an area of lessthan 400 nautical miles between opposite coasts The agreement is also relevant from theperspectives of the effects of coastal and outlying islands (e.g., Bach Long Vi), in its role

in low-tide elevations in delimitation, regarding the issue of the outlet of a boundary river,and in the question of the use of a closing line in the Gulf of Tonkin.58

The 2000 Agreement on Fishery Co-operation is an example of a double-step solutionfor settling fishing disputes and delimiting EEZs The EEZ was divided but the application

of the fisheries regime was delayed to minimize the economic dislocation of states In thecase of the Gulf of Tonkin, the regime of EEZ in regards to fisheries will be applied afterfour years for the Transitory Fishery Zone and after 15 years for the Common FisheryZone.59

A shooting incident that led to the death of at least eight Vietnamese persons in theGulf of Tonkin in January 2005 highlighted the need to enhance the collaboration betweenthe countries in managing the situation in the Common Fishery Zone.60 This process isunderway, as was indicated in the Joint Communiqu´e issued in connection with PresidentTran Duc Luong’s visit to China in July 2005, in which it is stated that the two countrieswould “exert joint efforts to ensure marine security and order in fishery development” in theGulf.61Furthermore, they agreed to “conduct joint patrol between the two countries’ navalforces.” On 28 April 2006, the first joint patrol exercise by the Chinese and Vietnamesenavies demonstrated this commitment.62

Following the entry into force of Gulf of Tonkin maritime boundary agreement andthe fisheries cooperation agreement, the two countries initiated expert-level talks on thedelimitation of the area outside the entrance of the Gulf of Tonkin The first meeting of theexpert-level working group was held in January 2006 in Hanoi.63

The expert-level meetings on the “maritime issues” (South China Sea) have not mademuch progress, partly due to disagreement on what issues should be on the agenda, withVietnam pushing for the inclusion of the issue of the Paracels, and China insisting that thisissue should not be on the agenda Nevertheless, the level of tension on the disputes in theSouth China Sea have been reducing considerably since 1999—a trend that has continuedinto the 2000s.64Despite the lack of progress in the expert-level talks, high-level talks haveresulted in agreements on increasingly sophisticated principles for the behavior of the twocountries in the South China Sea that is designed to avoid actions that could provoke tensionand to minimize tension if a dispute does arise.65

In the context of the multilateral dispute on the Spratly archipelago and the broaderissue of the situation in the South China Sea, Vietnam is actively involved in the ASEAN