At the same time, China was forccd to undertake a variety o f approaches to save Vietnam from further coloiization by France.. China proposed various approaches through tributary relatio
Trang 1THE TREATY OF SAIGON.IN 1874: DISRUPTING
THE SINO - VIETNAMESE TRIBUTARY RELATIONSHIP
Ku Boon Dar
1 Introduction
The signing o f the Saigon Treaty in March 15, 1874 had not appeased France This was due to the non-adherence by both the Vietnamese and Chinese governments to the terms o f the treaty One o f these was the rights o f France on Coclin China (Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh dan Dinh Tuong at South Vietnam) This resuted in the French desperate move to consolidate its power in Vietnam, which then further opened up the gates to political instability in Vietnam This conflict also made way towards the colonization o f Vietnam by France and further benefited Frame through the signing o f the subsequent treaties At the same time, China was forccd to undertake a variety o f approaches to save Vietnam from further coloiization by France In order to address the conflict in Vietnam, China’s officials sougit to find a comprehensive resolution Hence, this paper will review the propjsals recommended by the China’s officials To what extent the Chinese government had successfully carried out its efforts to prevent the French coloiization o f Vietnam? From the outset, the Chinese efforts were made difficult
by tie differences in opinions among the Chinese officials The Chinese officials propped a set o f different solutions ranging from the voice strategy, treaty negoiations, and even military approaches to solve the conflict in Vietnam
2 Sino-Vietnamese Tributary Relations
Tributary relations between China and Vietnam were still continuing although France had conquered much o f the Vietnam’s land through the Treaty of Saigon of
1874 The tributary mission led by Tran Nguyen Khanh Thuan and his assistants Ngu’en Thuc and Hoan Nguyen was the last tributary mission from Vietnam to
* Ph.P (M alaya), School o f Distance Education, University Sains M alaysia, paper presented at the 4th International V ietnam ese Studies Conference (ICVNS2012), Vietnam National Coivention Centre, Hanoi, 26-28 November 2012 This paper was made possible with support from TPLN, University Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia.
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China When the envoys arrived in Beijing in March 20, 1882, they were greeted
with acclamation and were lodged at shenwumen (W S^H G ate o f Divine Military
Genius) before their retinues were allowed to meet with Emperor Guangxu (3 t^ l8 7 1 -1 9 0 8 ).' China had been worrying meticulously about the Vietnamese envoys when silk garments were bestowed upon the envoys by Emperor Guangxu From the point o f view o f Emperor Guangxu, the Vietnamese envoys looked rather shabby after journeying so far.2
Guangxi, Qing Yu also reminded China o f the importance o f Vietnam as its protectorate state and passed the word to Vietnam to strengthen its self-esteem for the sake o f its sovereignty.3
In 1882, Le Myre de Vilers, the Governor of Cochin China attempted to capture Hanoi Emperor Tu Due (1847-1883) instantaneously wrote a letter to Emperor Guangxu to seek his Highness’s assistance He claimed that Vietnam had been a tributary state o f China for a long time Thus, every inch o f land in Vietnam was the property o f China Consequently, it was the responsibility o f China to safeguard the sovereignty o f Vietnam He appealed to China not to let Vietnam from further being destroyed by France without taking any necessary steps to defend Vietnam.4 This was because in 1879, Emperor Tu Due had sent a letter to Emperor Guangxu to confirm that Vietnam would continue to be a protectorate of China and he agreed to present an annual tribute and to pledge loyalty to the lords
o f China.5
In the opinion o f Emperor Tu Due, the prosperity o f China had brought peace
to Vietnam But during the era o f the reign o f Emperor Xianfeng 1850-1861), China was faced with some issues with European countries which led China to
‘retreat’ for a while from Vietnam Consequently, this resulted in the fall o f six
2 R S Gundry, China and Her Neighbours: France in Indo-China, Russia and China, India and Thibet, London: Chapm an and Hall, 1893, p 140.
3 “Qingyu to Em peror Guangxu,” 28 January 1882, Qing Guangxu Chao Zhongfa Jiaoshe Shiliao (Historical M aterials o f Sino-France Negotiation during the Reign o f Emperor
4 “ Emperor Tu Due to Em peror Guangxu via Zeng G uoquan” , 22 February 1882, Qing Guangxu Chao Zhongfa Jiaoshe Shiliao, Vol 3, p 37
5 Long Yonghang, “Jindai Zhongyue Zongfan Guanxi Lunyi” , Dongnanya Yanjiu, (Southeast Asia Studies), No 1-2,1987, p 82 [ U t KV t ,
m n & w w ) o ]
Trang 3THE TREATY OF SAIGON IN 1874.
provinces of Vietnam to France which also distressed the financial resources of Vietnam.1
China was indeed aware that the French had long been interested in Vietnam Left alone in a weak situation, Vietnam was unable to defend its own land from the French attacks Furthermore, the French had succeeded in securing its right to expand its territory up to the Red River (Song Hong) through the Treaty of Saigon
of 1862 This development would be a threat to China because with the opening of the Red River, France would be able to reach China more easily through Yunnan Thus, China was concerned that the security degradation would threaten the sovereignty of Vietnam and also China The position and location o f Vietnam was seen as a fence by China.2 In other words, the collapse o f Vietnam would also mean the same to China This was, pointed out by Liu Changyou 1818-1887), the Governor General in Shanxi Province as follows:
“The borders o f China are our neigbouring countries; States on the borders of China are the door while fences are the tributary gates o f China We [China] erected fences to protect the door because the door guarantees the security o f our home country If the fence is broken, then the door will shake If the door shakes, then our home [China] will face a disaster.”3
Meanwhile, Zhou Derun (l§li§i!^? -1892) an officer of the Academic of the Grand Secretariat (neige xueshi), in his proposal to Emperor Guangxu emphasized that:
“The capture o f Vietnam was a disaster for China, as the famous Chinese aphorism goes “zhenlin qiefu, chunwang chi han.” [ ] Should China continue to show apathy, it will bring the collapse o f the tributary system? Not only that Ryukyu Islands would be lost, but Chinese protectorate states like Korea and Mongolia would be difficult to defend.”4
Then, Zhou Derun firmly asked China to take appropriate steps If China were
to lose Vietnam, it would have a disastrous impact on the survival of the Qing Dynasty in China and in the other Chinese protectorates The concept of “zhenlin qiefu, chunwang chi han” as voiced by Zhou Derun received supports from Chinese officials o f the Hanlin Academy Thus, these people continued to insist that China
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 “ Liu Changyou to Junchi chu", 8 N ovem ber 1881, Liu Wushen Kungyi Shu (The Collected Tributaries o f Liu Zhangyu), Vol 7, pp 33-38 0 ]
4 “Zhou Derun to Em peror Guangxu”, 28 February 1882, Qing Guangxu Chao Zhongfa Jiaoshe Shiliao, Vol 2, p 32.
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should consider the “baoyue gubian” [ ] strategy to defend the sovereignty o f Vietnam in order to strengthen the border security level in China
Their voices were known as the rujia voice [ ((MM.)) ] (voice o f the literati) and they established the Qing Liutang [ {(fm'Mift)) ] (Party o f the Purits).1 Among the
members were Zhang Peilun (3&M££( 1848-1903), the Governor General of Liangguang, Zhang Shusheng 1824-1884), the Governor General of Liangjiang, Liu Kunyi (1830-1902), the Governor o f Shanxi and Governor Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909) The well-known proposal put forward by them highlighted the fact that defending the barbarian o f the four quarters (include Vietnam) surrounding China was better than any vigilant action against external invasion
from the north, south, east and west The proposal was known as suowei shou sifing,
buru shou siyi [ ((#nfi ^ 0 tU 3 s 0 ^ ) ) ] 2
Indeed, the barons were o f the opinion that China should maintain its tributary system in its relations with Vietnam Through the means o f maintaining tributary relationships China would have the right over Vietnam This measure would prevent the French colonial attempts The next move would keep the peace in south western China and also in the areas along the China-Vietnam border.3 Thus, in order
to protect the security and sovereignty o f Vietnam and China, China argued strongly against the French efforts China proposed various approaches through tributary relationships in order to save Vietnam from falling into the hands o f France
3 Political Approaches
In terms o f political approaches, China was determined to strengthen its ties with Vietnam in order to look for joint solutions to face this crisis Zeng Jize or also known as Marquis Tseng (H £ B # T sen g Chi-tse, 1839-1890), who was a Chinese ambassador to Britain and France (1878-1884), was one o f the outspoken imperial barons campaigning to strengthen the cooperation between China and Vietnam.4 He
1 Eastman E Lloyd, Throne and Mandarins: C hina’s Search fo r a Policy During the Sino- French Controversy, 1880-1885, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, pp 206-222.
2 “Zhang Zhidong to Em pror Guangxu”, 26 April 1882, Zhang Wenxiang Gong Quanji
(Collected W orks o f Zhang Wenxiang), Vol 4: Memorial 4, p 14.
3 Wang Rongsheng, Qingdai Quanshi (Complete History o f Qing Dynasty), Vol 9, Shenyang: Liaoning Renm in Chubanshe, 1991, p 106 ^ / l ) ) ,
ifcPB: j l t A K i i J J & t t ]
4 Guo Tingyi & W ang Yujun, (ed.) Zhongfa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang (The Chinese and French War), Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo, Vol 1, pp 167, 1962.
, t i l t : ]
Trang 5THE TR E A TY OF SAIG ON IN 1874.
argued that only through the strengthening of relationship and cooperation between the two countries, foreign invasion could be resisted and the French could be driven out from Vietnam In December 15, 1881, Zeng Jize suggested a proposal to rescue
Vietnam, which was known as chouyue shi qitiao [ ] (Seven proposals to liberate Vietnam) to Emperor Guangxu.1
From the aspect o f diplomatic relations, Zeng Jize recommended for allowing Vietnam to station its officers in Beijing This would enable the smooth flow of recommended information from China to Vietnam immediately upon notification Zeng Jize also, suggested that the Chinese embassy in France could play a role in providing space and place for Vietnamese officials so that they could act as an intermediary in resolving the problems between the two countries From the military aspect, Zeng Jize suggested that China’s Navy should take over the Red River to enable China to monitor and protect Vietnam With this move, he hoped that it would prevent Vietnam from further encroachment by the West particularly
by France.2
In addition, China would also send officials to Vietnam to investigate the latest developments taking place in Vietnam China hoped that such action, which would allow the two countries to exchange information and intelligence, would be a comprehensive solution to resist the invasion o f the French.3 In March 15, 1881, as
a result of the resolutions put forward by Chen Baozhen ( ^ ^ S i c ) and Zhang Peilun (&{iPl£fc) to Emperor Guangxi, China decided to send Tang Yanggeng to Vietnam
to meet up with Emperor Tu Due (1829-1883) for the establishment o f contacts and cooperation with the purpose to evict France from Vietnam.4
Chen Baozhen and Zhang Peilun viewed that, the status o f Tang Yangeng as a manager o f China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, in Guangzhou (Canton) would not raise any suspicion to France In addition, they also believed in the
1 Zeng Jize & Yu Y ueheng (annotated), Zeng Jize Yiji (The C ollected Tributaries o f Zeng
: S I 4 5 & ]
2 “Jcng Jizen to Em peror Guangxu” , 15 December 1881, in G uo Tingyi & W ang Yujun, (ed.)
Zhongfa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang (Archives o f The Sino-French W ar), Taipei: Zhongyang
, h it- fftflio ]
3 Ibid., Vol l, p 210.
4 Shao Xunzheng et al., Zhongfa Zhanzheng (Sino-French W ar), Vol 2, Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1961, p 105 ( < ^ £ ¿ 1 ^ - » „ ± M :
h/SARttiK&tto ]
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calibre o f Tan Yanggeng and his political tactics Thus, Tan Yanggeng was appointed as the Lieutenant-Governor of Guangdong upon the recommendation of Zhang Peilun and Zhang Shusheng from Guangxi.1
Then in February 1882, Tan Yanggeng together with Huang Guoan, Pan Tangjing and Zhou Binglin went to Vietnam The Chinese envoys arrived under the disguise of managing the importation of rice and business dealings between China and Vietnam This move was made because China was not completely ready to confront France Tang Yanggeng’s mission failed to meet Emperor Tu Due because
he feared this meeting would bring doubt to France.2 However, Tang Yanggeng had successfully met and talked to the nobles o f Vietnam who were the influential royal advisers such as Nguyen Van Tuong, Thuong-thu (president) in ho-bo (Board of Finance) and Tran Thuc Dam During the meeting, Tang Yanggeng informed Nguyen Van Tuong and Tran Thuc Dam Nguyen that France would conquer northern Vietnam and they asked Vietnam to be more vigilant As a result of this meeting, although China and Vietnam failed to produce a robust plan to totally expel the French from Vietnam, Vietnam requested China to meet its demands as follows:3
a) To establish a Vietnamese embassy in Beijing in order to report to Zongli Yemen (Yemen Tsungli, China’s Foreign Ministry) as soon as possible with any urgent matters involving the establishment o f diplomatic relations between the two countries
b) To open a Vietnamese trade centre in Guangdong so that Vietnam and Chinese traders could mutually exchange intelligence and information about the activities o f the French in Vietnam
c) To allow all Vietnamese envoys to board in any Chinese ports
The claims as reported by Tang Yanggeng were different from customary norms practiced in the context o f China-Vietnam tributary relations The proposal was rejected and it remained only as a claim because it could not be implemented
by China.4 However, it was clear for Vietnam that Vietnam needed closer ties with China because China could help Vietnam more than any other party
1 .Ibid.
2 “Tang Yanggeng to Vietnamese officials”, 11-13 February 1882, (D ocum ent 140, Appendix 3), Zhongfa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang (Archives o f The Sino-French War), Vol 1, p 248.
3 Ibid., pp 273-274 See also Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh-Bien De Tu Ky, Vol 66, p 313.
4 “Tang Yanggeng to Zhang Shusheng”, 1 Mac 1882 (Document 140, A ppendix 3), Zhongfa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang (Archives o f The Sino-French War), Vol 1, pp 273-274.
Trang 7THE TREATY OF SAIGON IN 1874.
In addition, the Chinese government also ordered Tang Jingsong 1841-1903), the official secretary at the Department o f Civil Affairs to Vietnam to investigate the situation in Tonkin Tang Jingsong’s main mission was
to be the spokesman to Emperor Tu Due to persuade him not to deport Liu Yongfu (^UyKiw 1837-1917), the leaders of Black Flag Army out of Vietnam because of the pressure from France Besides, Tang Jingsong also hoped that his visit would gain moral support for Vietnam and alert Vietnam o f the so-called empty French promises.1
In March 25, 1883, after returning from Tonkin, Tang Jingsong filed a motion
to consolidate China-Vietnam relations, which known as xiangdu bianqing tiao
chenban fazhe [ ] (A Proposal to Save China’s State Border from French colonialism) to China He argued that China should offer help and recognize the leadership of Liu Yongfu He suggested that China should dispatch troops from the provinces of Yunnan, Guilin and Guangdong to Vietnam to join the Chinese army against the invading French However, Tang Jingsong suggested that recognition and assistance to Black Flag Army with the connivance
of China in order to avoid direct conflict with France Additionally, he suggested that the issue o f the survival of Chinese people (thanh nhan) in Vietnam would not forgotten by China The Chinese government should reach out and get in touch with these people so that they were not treated disadvantageous^ by the French, but their energy and expertise could be harnessed by the Chinese authorities.2
But in terms o f recognition o f the Black Flag Army, Zeng Jize had a different view This was because he suggested that support should be given outright In the opinion o f Jize Zeng, China should recognize the legal position o f the Black Flag Army to prevent France from expelling them.3 France had labelled them as “rogue” and “troublemakers” who caused chaos on the China-Vietnam border Zeng Jize realized that the Black Flag Army was the backbone in a series of Vietnam’s resistance with the French Not to mention that the French saw this group as a thorn
in their flesh The Black Flag Army’s prowess against the French soldiers proved to
be right when Jules Ferry (1832-1893), the Prime Minister o f France made the following comment:
1 Tang Jingsong, Qingying Riji (A Volunteer’s Dairy), Vol 1, Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe,
2 Ibid.
3 Guo Tingyi dan Wang Yujun (ed.), Zhongfa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang, Vol 2, p 939.
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We [the French] have a variety o f ways to capture the state [Vietnam] All over the empty chat! As long as the Black Flag Army is there [in Vietnam], all of them will not be successfully implemented [to conquer Vietnam].” 1
Thus, on 18 September 1883, Zeng Jize pointed to Jules Ferry that “China cannot ignore the plight o f the Black Flag Army.”2 However, in December 19,
1883, Jules Ferry insisted to eliminate this group to the grassroots Zeng Jize har.ded over the reports to Zongli Yamen and made recommendations about the French tyranny and asked China to recognize and prohibit any attempt to eliminate the Black Flag Army
Therefore, when Li Hongzhang (^'£11!: 1823-1901), the Governor o f Zhili province (Hebei) (1870-1950) represented China in the Li-Foumier Negotiations of
1883 with France, Emperor Guangxu ordered Li Hongzhang not to agree with any conditions whatsoever raised by France in connection with the expulsion of the Black Flag Army from Vietnam.3 The rescue approach together with the granting of recognition to the Black Flag Army by China proved to be the right move when the group eventually became a wall o f security which was hard to break through when the Sino-French War broke out in 1883
The political approach through negotiations held between Li Hongzhang and Frederic Albert Bouree (1836-1914), the French ambassador in Beijing snce September 1882 was attempted to save Vietnam from the French colonial rule China had informed Vietnam to send capable officials to Tianjin during the Chinese deliberations to find a solution through negotiation.4 Therefore, Vietnam sent Pham
Than Dat, thuong-thu (President) and Nguyen Thuat, thi-lang (vice president), from
Hinh-bo (Board o f Justice) as Vietnam’s representatives in the negotiations Dunng
the negotiations, China and France had reached a resolution and agreed in principle
to the following conditions:5
1 Ibid., Vol 3, p 1612.
2 “ M Jules Ferry to Zeng Jize (M arquis Tseng)” , 18 September, 1883, Diplonatic Correspondence (15 Mac 1874 - 13 Nov., 1883), Foreign Office (FO) 421/1.
3 Shao X unzheng et al., Zhongfa Zhanzheng, Vol 7, p 190 See also, Zhonfa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang, Vol 3, pp 1611-1612 & p 1690.
4 Qing Guangxu Zhao Zhongfa Jiaoshe Shiliao, Vol Ill, 25ab (Document 76), pp 1932-1 c33.
5 Shao Xunzheng, Zhongfa Yuenan Guanxi Shimo (A Complete Account o f China-Frtnch Relations Concerning Vietnam), Shijiazhuang: Hebei Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2000, p 72
Trang 9THE TREATY OF SAIGON IN 1874.
a) China was asked to retreat its army from Vietnam because France had no intention to take control over Vietnam
b) China and France were allowed to establish their own tax collection centres and marketing facilities in Lao Cai (also called Lao Kay or Laokai) near the Red River
c) Delineation o f a clear border between China and France Northern Vietnam was under the protection o f China, while France patronized the provinces in southern Vietnam The two countries agreed to protect northern Vietnam from any other aggression o f a foreign power
However, the series of consultations failed because they were rejected by Jules Ferry, who replaced Charles de Freycinet as the Prime Minister o f France Charles viewed the recommendations and requirements set forth by Frederic Albert Bouree
as an act to “gave in” to China and “lower” its status against the Saigon Agreement
of 1874 which had already recognized the special rights o f the French provinces in Cochin China.1 Arthur Tricou (1837 -?), the French ambassador to Japan was appointed as a special representative (Envoy Extraordinaire) to replace Bouree to resume negotiations with China
4 Negotiation Approaches
Thus, China had to undertake another approach to save Vietnam China gave a new interpretation in the context o f tributary relations with Vietnam China sought
to strengthen its ties with Vietnam in order to regain the sovereignty rights of its provinces in Vietnam China, represented by Zeng Jize had initiated some discussions and debates about the concept o f tributary relationships with France Thus, on 20 September, 1881, Zeng Jize who was stationed at St Petersburg, Russia acted to make a formal protest to the French Foreign Ministry through Antoine Chanzy (1823-83), the Ambassador o f France in Russia about the French military entry into Tonkin He pointed out that,
“Vietnam has long enjoyed China’s protection and it is a protectorate of China In the event o f any urgent matters in the State o f Vietnam, China cannot be ignored let alone not be informed.”2
1 “Challîm e Lacour, Foreign M inister to Bouree”, 5 Mac 1883, Documents Diplomatiques
F rancas 1811-1914 (DDF), Vol V (No 5), in Pei-Chih Hsieh, “ Prelude to Tragedy in
V ietnam the French Annexation o f Tonkin, and the Conflict with China, 1881-1885”,
Journd o f the South Seas Society, Vol 33, Parts 1 & 2, 1978, p 6.
2 “ Lette* Zeng Jize [M arquis Tseng] to M Barthélémy St H ilaire” , 24 September 1881”, Diplomatic C orresponde (15 Mac 1874-13 Nov 1883), FO 421/1.
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Nevertheless, Bouree who was just appointed as the French Foreign Ministry protested against Zeng Jise’s suggestion as he considered that, “Tonkin is under the protections o f Annam [Vietnam] and Annam [Vietnam] is under the protection o f the French Therefore, the question o f whether or not Annam [Vietnam] belongs to China does not arise.”1 After resolving the conflict between China and Russia (1879-1880) with respect to the sovereign rights o f Province o f Ili (Xinjiang), Zeng Jize immediately- reported to the French that,
“The borders are linking Vietnam with China By maintaining Vietnam, China actually sustains the provinces in it [China].”2
He said that regardless o f the negotiations taking place in Shanghai or Paris; China concern now is that China still recognizes Vietnam as its protectorate.3 However, the objections expressed through diplomatic channels by Zeng Jize did not bring any success This was acknowledged by him,
“Even though we argued strongly against their invasion [the French] in Vietnam and questioned the terms o f the agreement signed i>y them [the French] They [the French] have been determined to capture Vietnam They [the French] will not let its escape so easily again.”4
Therefore, to strengthen the existing close tributary relationship the traditional coronation ceremony o f the king of Vietnam was given top priority by China Emperor Ham Nghi (1884-1885) who inherited the throne from Tu Due wished to send a mission to China to get recognition from the Chinese emperor as the new emperor of Vietnam Emperor Ham Nghi looked forward that with the recognition granted by the Chinese Emperor it would reduce the pace o f French colonization of Vietnam.5
Meantime, in China, the coronation ceremony was an event to look forward by China as its status as the protector o f Vietnam had been the subject of the polemic
1 Henri Cordier, Histoire Des Relations de la Chine Avec les Puissances Occidentals, Vol 2
in E.V.G K iem an, British Diplomacy in China, 1880 to 1885, Cam bridge: The University Press, 1939, p 88.
2 Zeng Jize & Yu Yueheng (annotated), Zeng Jize Yiji (The Collected Tributaries o f Zeng
: i É r U ^ Î t o ]
3 Hosea Ballou M orse, The International Relations o f the Chinese Empire, London: Longmans Green, 1910, p 348.
4 See “Letter Zeng Jize to M De Freycinet”, 6 May 1882 & “ Letter M de Freycinet to Zeng Jize, 31 May 1882” , FO 421/1 See also Zeng Jize, Zeng Jize Yiji, p 200.
5 Guo Tingyi dan Wang Yujun, (ed.) Zhongfa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang, Vol II, p 1282.