Local governance, social networks and REDD Lessons from Swidden communities in Vietnam

Local Governance, Social Networks and REDD+: Lessonsfrom Swidden Communities in Vietnam Moira Moeliono1&Thu Thuy Pham2&Ngoc Dung Le2&Maria Brockhaus1& Grace Wong1,3&Maarit Kallio1,4&Dinh

Local Governance, Social Networks and REDD+: Lessons

from Swidden Communities in Vietnam

Moira Moeliono1&Thu Thuy Pham2&Ngoc Dung Le2&Maria Brockhaus1&

Grace Wong1,3&Maarit Kallio1,4&Dinh Tien Nguyen5

# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Abstract Swidden is often blamed for deforestation but

re-search has shown that these traditional systems can have a role

in maintaining and enhancing carbon stocks and therefore

could be compatible with efforts such as payments for

envi-ronmental services (PES) and Reducing Emissions from

Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) schemes in

Vietnam This would require that PES and REDD+ project

developers build on existing local governance structures In

this paper we attempt to understand such structures though

analysis of information and resource exchange in two

com-munities in Vietnam, focusing on traditional local governance

guiding swidden practices, and mass organisations

Results show a high diversity of formal

(government-formed networks) and informal (traditional) swidden

gover-nance structures that can be embedded in REDD+ and PES

schemes, where geographical accessibility, socio-cultural

practices, and capacities of government will also determine which structure will work best for swidden communities to participate in REDD+/PES

Keywords Swidden Reducing emissions from deforestation and Forest degradation (REDD+) Payments for

environmental services (PES) Local governance structure Vietnam

Introduction

In efforts to turn the tide of deforestation and forest degrada-tion and establish ‘good’ forest governance, governments have experimented with, among others, social (community) forestry (SF) and payments for environmental services (PES) More recently, concern over climate change has led

to the development of REDD+, a scheme to reduce emissions through reducing deforestation and forest degradation in order

to maintain the associated carbon stocks and thus contribute to the mitigation of global climate change (e.g., Angelsen et al.,

2009) The areas targeted by many of these schemes are also areas where swidden practices remain a traditional way of life (Dove1983; Padoch et al.2007; Fox et al.2009; Mertz et al

2009) (Figs.1,2and3)

Key elements of swidden systems– such as the rotation of fields rather than crops (Mertz et al.2009), the use of fire to clear fields, and the typically long fallows of traditional sys-tems can be productive and sustainable adaptations to chal-lenging environmental conditions (Cairns2007), with the CO2 emitted during the burning more than offset by the sequestra-tion in vegetasequestra-tion regrowth during the fallow phase (Mertz

et al.2009; FCPF2010; Fox et al.2014) and the remaining forest in the landscape In addition, alternatives to swidden agriculture often have more adverse impacts (Ziegler et al

* Moira Moeliono

moira.moeliono@gmail.com

1

Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Jalan CIFOR,

Situ Gede, Sindang Barang, Bogor (Barat) 16115, Indonesia

2 CIFOR, No.17A, Nguyen Khang Street, Cau Giay District,

Hanoi, Vietnam

3

Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 46

Shimoadachi-cho, Yoshida, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan

4

Viikki Tropical Resources Institute (VITRI), Department of Forestry

Sciences, University of Helsinki, Latokartanonkaari 7,

FI-00014 Helsinki, Finland

5 Center for Agricultural Research and Ecological Studies (CARES),

Vietnam National University of Agriculture, Trau Quy, Gia Lam

District, Hanoi, Vietnam

DOI 10.1007/s10745-016-9839-4

2009; Hett et al.,2011; Ziegler et al.2012), for example the

decline of soil organic carbon after conversion from swidden

cultivation to oil palm plantations (Bruun et al.2013) Yet,

perceptions about swidden are almost universally negative

(Dove1983; McElwee1999; Fox et al.2009) leading to the

adoption of SF, PES and REDD+ programs as strategies to

change these‘destructive practices,’ even though in cases

where restricted swidden expansion coupled with increased

population has led to unsustainable cultivation because of

shortened fallows, REDD+ programs could provide an

incen-tive for swidden farmers to lengthen their fallows again

Whatever the motivation, the introduction of any new

mechanism that aims at changing swidden and/or

decision-making about natural resources– SF, PES or REDD+ − a

thorough understanding of the local context, the

socio-ecological system, and governance arrangements will be key

to the effectiveness of the interventions (Baland and Platteau

1996; Wollenberg and Springate-Baginski2009; Thompson

et al.2011; Parrotta et al.2012; KFCP 2014)

In this study, we attempt to provide a deeper understanding

of local governance in two swidden systems with different

political, economic and social contexts in Vietnam We

ana-lyse the governance and networks of information and resource

exchange to provide guidance for the introduction of PES and

REDD+ schemes

Earlier research has shown that change is an integral part of

swidden communities (Baland and Platteau1996; Padoch

et al 2007; Cramb et al 2009; Fox et al 2009)

Furthermore, swidden communities are diverse and linked

through multiple social networks to the larger community,

bringing change and new opportunities Thus they continually

adapt, ignore, bypass, manipulate, and thereby change and reproduce, various constraining institutions and rules (Powell et al.2011)

We first present the theoretical background on informal and formal structures in swidden systems and how they can be embedded in PES and or REDD+ designs, followed by our research methods and findings A final section highlights our conclusions

Theoretical Background

Governance, PES, REDD+ and Swidden

When REDD+ was introduced in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations in

2005, it was seen as a PES-like instrument, with results-based payments provided to local land-use decision-makers for forest carbon as the delivered ecosystem service (for more information on the history of REDD+ and the key elements of PES schemes, see Wunder 2005; Angelsen and McNeill

2012) Early research indicates that to be effective, implemen-tation needs to use bottom up approaches (Kanowski et al.,

2011) and build on existing governance structures and link-ages (Baland and Platteau1996; Wollenberg and Springate-Baginski2009; Thompson et al.2011; Parrotta et al 2012; KFCP2014)

PES and REDD+ can be conceived as environmental gov-ernance systems (Corbera and Schroeder, 2010; Thompson

et al.2011) and similar to swidden systems involve both for-mal and inforfor-mal institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, citizens and organizations, through which collective interests are

articulat-ed, rights and obligations are establisharticulat-ed, and differences are mediated (Thakur and Van Langenhove2006) At the local level, REDD+ planners need to consider the interactions of formal structures such as State organizations and institutions, usually involving some form of hierarchy (Marshall1998), as well as informal social networks (Agrawal et al.2013) The formal structures concern rules and their enforcement to en-sure that deforestation and forest degradation are handled sys-tematically and the informal structures pertain to social rela-tions, to how people work together in practice and build social networks, and use locally rooted compliance incentives based

on tradition (Ranganathan et al.2011)

Governance and incentives are inextricably linked by how people connect with, contribute to and benefit from schemes

to manage their environment Incentives are defined as re-wards for changing behaviour, of the individual as well as the organization, for better natural resource management (Theisohn and Land2006) While REDD+ ultimately aims

to provide incentives for individual households to change their behaviour to better protect forests, we also need to consider Fig 1 Site locations

incentives for good governance, i.e., incentives for the

differ-ent actors involved in governance, such as governmdiffer-ent

agen-cies, actors behind drivers of deforestation and degradation

and local communities involved in forest protection

In this study, we look at the governance structures related

to exchanges of information and resources to generate an

understanding of how to enable information-sharing and

par-ticipation of local actors in interventions such as REDD+ or

PES We define governance structures as composed of actors

and rules (Vatn and Vedeld2013) Actors are characterized

by their capacities and competencies, and their rights and

responsibilities The social structures are the conventions,

norms and rules facilitating the interaction/coordination

among the actors We examine both the formal structure of

government policies and the informal networks formed by

non-State actors, focusing on two important systems in

Vietnam rural life: agriculture, specifically swidden, and

mass organizations

Actors

REDD+ (as well as PES and SF) requiresBthe formation of dominant coalitions able to challenge the structural patterns that form the root cause of deforestation and forest degradation^ (Brockhaus et al.2014) REDD+ should there-fore involve actors across both vertical and horizontal linkages (Galaz et al.2012; Brockhaus and Angelsen2012; Korhonen-Kurki et al.2013; Gallemore et al.2014; Korhonen-Kurki

et al.2015) and aim to create synergies among different com-petencies and sources of knowledge to deal with complex and interlinked problems in a Bnetwork of governance^ (Dedeurwaerdere 2005; Crona and Hubacek 2010; Newig

et al.2010) Involvement of local communities is thus essen-tial (Wollenberg and Springate-Baginski 2009; Thompson

et al.2011; Parrotta et al.2012; KFCP2014)

Studying the links and resulting networks acknowledges the complexity of the issues and the diversity of actors

Fig 2 Land Use Map of Tan

Xuan Commune, Son La

Province were village A is

located Source: CIFOR-ASFCC

(Carlsson and Sandstrom2008) In making decisions on

loca-tions, timing and which crops to plant, for example,

swiddeners in Vietnam are influenced by government actors

and institutions, by the political party through the commune

leaders, by traders and the market, and by labour and credit

made available through mass organizations The interactions

among these actors, especially in terms of exchange of

infor-mation and resources, contribute to the structuring of the

gov-ernance system in a village through social networks (Kickert

1997; Pierre and Peters2000; Carlsson and Sandstrom2008)

Research Methods

In order to provide an understanding of governance in two

swidden systems in Vietnam through a focus on the role of

both formal and informal structures and derive a set of lessons learned for future PES and REDD+ programmes, we address the following research questions:

& What are the formal and informal structures in swidden communities that could enable and/or constrain REDD+/ PES schemes?

& What are the social networks in these communities through which information and resources are exchanged?

We adopted methodology to reflect the diversity (in terms

of ethnicity, social capital and capacity) of swidden commu-nities in Vietnam We selected two sites, village A in Son La in the north, and village B in Nghe An in the central south, to conduct our fieldwork We first analysed who is involved in

Fig 3 Land Use map of Binh

Chuan commune, Nghe An

province where village B is

located Source: CIFOR-ASFCC

decision-making and the networks on information and

re-source exchange Secondly, we analysed the factors driving

people to participate in formal (government and mass

organi-zations) and informal structures such as the trade network and

self-organized farmers groups

We used social network analysis (SNA) to understand the

systems of interaction as expressed through the relationships

and the exchange of information and resources among actors

in the context of their roles and status within the swidden

communities (Wellman1983; Bodin et al 2006; Carlsson

and Sandstrom2008) Social networks can generally be

de-fined as a set of relationships or linkages among individuals or

organizations, usually denoted as‘actors,’ which have varying

degrees of significance to wider networks The data for social

network analysis were collected through four methods:

Focus Group Discussions At each site, three focus group

discussions (FGD) involving 51 informants in village A and

31 in village B, differentiated by gender and age, were

orga-nized to provide a basic understanding of environmental and

social characteristics The FGDs identified the most important

the agricultural and social organizations and networks in these

swidden communities through which resources are exchanged

within the community and beyond These data formed the

basis for the follow-up ego-network survey

Ego-Network Surveys Interviews with a random sample of

household heads provided socioeconomic data as well as

in-formation used to construct resource exchange networks

Questions most relevant for our analysis here were:

– Who are the three most influential persons involved in the

swidden systems?

– Why and who are the most important people with whom

you most frequently exchange information and benefits

related to swidden systems?

– What types of information and benefits did you

exchange?

We also asked whether these households participated in

two dominant governance structures (agriculture and mass

organizations) and what drove their participations or

non-par-ticipation In total, 88 informants (48 in village A and 40 in

village B) were interviewed

Organizational Survey Interviews were conducted with nine

(four in Son La and five in Nghe An) officials of key

organi-zations that have decision-making responsibilities over forests

and forested land focussing on policies related to forest and

land use This survey provided background information on the

governance structure and the sites

Consultation Workshops Four feedback workshops were or-ganized in March 2014 (two in each site: one with local au-thorities and one with local communities) to present prelimi-nary research results and to seek feedback from local commu-nities on those results

Site Selection

The two villages were selected based on the following criteria:

& Swidden as a dominant land use in the community

& Significant forest cover in the village area (including ma-ture forest)

& Other characteristics of specific interest for the project included proximity to a protected area, border areas, and migration history

& Synergies with other projects

& Ethnic diversity

Village A is located in Van Ho1district, Son La province and B in Con Cuong district, Nghe An province Son La is the site of the pilot PES programme of the Government of Vietnam while in village B, some REDD +−related initiatives had been conducted Both villages are poor and have been recipients of numerous poverty reduction programmes, includ-ing one that compensated local people for involvement in for-est protection Description of the two sites is shown in Table1 The structure of power and policymaking in Vietnam is often seen as centred on three main groups of actors: the Party, the State and the people, as articulated in the motto for the management of society in Vietnam:Bthe Party to lead, the State to manage and the people to own.^ Despite more recent changes, these three components of the social structure remain the cornerstone of contemporary Vietnamese society (Wischermann2010; Tran2011)

The state is structured according to the government hierar-chy of province, district, and commune At each level, a par-allel structure consists of the Peoples Committees (PCs) that among many other things regulate property rights and formal lending institutions (Pham et al.2012) Below this formal structure is the village, with the village head often the only link between village people and the formal government In addition, at commune and village level, most people belong

to mass organizations

With the economic reforms of 1986, the State has become less authoritarian (Wischermann2013) and although the VCP retains control it has become less visible Mass organizations have greater leeway to express their views and are no longer Btransmission belts^ that exclusively help to implement gov-ernment decisions, enlighten, convince and mobilize the

1

Van Ho is a new district split from Moc Chau district during the period

of our survey (2013)

m as s e s a n d m ai n t a i n s u pp o r t f or t h e VC P’s rule

(Wischermann2013) While they sometimes play the role of

civil society organizations, to a large degree they still act as the

government’s right arm and are not neutral in terms of their

political vision and interests (Pham et al.2010) Local people

are free to decide whether they want to join such social

orga-nizations although in practice most feel obliged to do so to be

seen as socially accepted (McCarty2014) Households can

decide on their own faith relatively freely but every other

aspect of daily life is organized within the orbit of government

control

Findings and Discussion

Swidden, Deforestation and Forest Degradation:

Mismatch between Political Policies and Realities

Swidden is generally considered a main driver of deforestation

and degradation, especially by provincial government

agen-cies (organizational survey), and therefore regarded as

politi-cally and socially undesirable (Dove1983; McElwee1999:

Fox et al.2009) The Vietnamese Government has initiated

various programs to halt swidden, among them the

Re-greening Uplands Program (Program 327), the 5 Million

Hectare Reforestation Program (Program 661), and the

Community Forestry Programs that promote local

participation and increasing local over forest resources (Wode and Bao2009)

Yet, as reported by local people and supported by earlier research (e.g., Ziegler et al.2012), illegal logging, road build-ing and dam development are in fact more important drivers of deforestation and degradation Research has also shown that if swidden is understood at the landscape scale as part of the overall landscape mosaic (Padoch and Sunderland2013), it can contribute a wide range of ecosystem services including carbon sequestration (McElwee1999; Cairns2007; Fox et al

2014) Furthermore converting swidden to more permanent uses, such as rubber plantations (Fox et al.2014), more inten-sive cultivation (Ziegler et al.2012), or removing swidden from the landscape (Castella et al.2013) could have negative effects on the landscape and carbon balance

Unfortunately, there still remains a lot of uncertainty about the role of swidden in carbon sequestration (Bruun et al.2009; Ziegler et al.2012; Bruun et al.2013) and while research is ongoing, governments continue with standard programmes to Bbring economic development^ and aimed at eradicating swidden cultivation (McElwee1999)

Government authorities in Vietnam are therefore reluctant

to admit that swidden cultivation continues to be practiced and unwilling to even discuss it A forest protection officer in Son

La and district committee member in Nghe An admitted that reporting on current swidden farming meant that local author-ities had failed to implement government policies As a result, figures on swidden are unreported, unavailable or ignored

Table 1 Characteristics of the two study sites

Location (remote/relatively easy access) Remote Remote but with the new road more accessible

Proximity to Laos Border (very close)

National park Core zone of the Xuan Nha National Park Bordering, buffer zone of the Pu Huong National Park

Poverty rate Commune 38.9 % with Lay the poorest of

9 villages Government interventions:

Forest Land Allocation (Program 163) None FLA with 130 Ha allocated for swidden

Forest protection contracts Before 2010 10,000 VND/yr (0.4USD/yr).; 2010:

50,000 VND/year (2.2 USD/yr); 2011 discontinued

40,000 VND/HH/yr (2002)

134 and 135 are poverty reduction programs providing support to poor districts throughout Vietnam

With no economic alternatives and fearing social unrest,

officials have allowed swidden in designated areas but attempt

to restrict its expansion In border areas such as in our study

sites this policy is part of the national strategy to secure the

border

The Forest Land Allocation (FLA) program also aims to

eradicate swidden as a key driver of deforestation and

degra-dation but does not always meet its original objectives and

political goals In village B, FLA was implemented in 1998,

but the legal allocation of rights allocated only 130 ha to

swidden (with a pre-determined fallow rotation of 10 years),

which is not enough for the 86 households of the village.2In

2011, in response to stricter enforcement of the prohibition to

expand swidden, people switched to paddy rice but lack of

sufficient water for irrigation and shortage of land limited the

potential of this option Swidden was retained but with very

short or no fallow rotations, leading to degraded swidden

fields, which were subsequently abandoned Officially, FLA

is intended to motivate local people to protect forests In

prac-tice, all interviewees claimed that FLA is the cause of food

shortages People needed to clear additional fields for

surviv-al As a result, forests are not well protected and many young

people have been driven to seek employment elsewhere,

mostly in industrial zones in the lowlands as well as in Laos

and Thailand

Although in village A, FLA was not implemented and

of-ficially all land is within the national park boundaries, to

main-tain food security and income, all local people admitted that

they ignore prohibitions and continue their traditional

prac-tices including (illegal) logging and land clearing to expand

their cultivation area

Governance Structure of Swidden Communities: Lessons for REDD+

The Role of Swidden and Mass Organizations

Although the two sites have different social and economic characteristics, all interviewees indicated swidden and mass organizations as the most important governance structures in their daily lives (Fig.4) Swidden, however, is already chang-ing More and more people plant maize for sale in their swid-den fields and consequently need to buy rice Fallows are short: 2–3 years People also focus more on other sources of income such as bamboo shoots, which provide some VND 600,000 (USD 30) per household per year, galangal, bananas and other fruit trees, cattle, and fish

While acknowledging the role of mass organizations in village governance, we focus our analysis more on the swid-den system for two main reasons First, swidswid-den comprises the main livelihood and structure of local and social development

in both sites All (100 %) people in village A depend on swidden In village B, more sources of income are available, but more than 70 % of respondents said they depend on swid-den Second, all villagers interviewed claimed that mass orga-nizations are more important for their role in organizing social events than in supporting economic development

Yet, in village A, where the people are very isolated both geographically and culturally, mass organizations play an im-portant role as sources of information as well as support in developing and improving agricultural practices In contrast, where local people have better access to roads and resources,

as in village B, mass organizations are more important as a social meeting venue

Often, in order to cope with constraints on swidden and poverty, villagers tend to migrate to urban centres, which has

a significant impact on land use, particularly in the case of Nghe

An This phenomenon needs further research and analysis

2

A common assumption is that one household of 4 –5 people require 1 ha

of swidden annually.

Fig 4 Level of participation in agriculture and mass organizations Nodes denote respondents Lines show the participation in swidden and or mass organization

Actors’ Reputational Power in Swidden Governance

In all FGDs, a range of actors was identified as influential in

swidden governance (Table2), with government, through the

District Agricultural Board, the Commune Agriculture

Extension Agency, the Policy and Social Development Bank

(PSD bank), and the National Park Agency, recognized as

playing the most visible and important role

Yet, local people are sceptical of the programmes

adminis-tered through these agencies, which are often initiated and

stopped without their being informed In addition, a number

of programmes, such as agricultural extension schemes, which

are conducted more or less regularly to provide information on

how to improve agriculture production, are often weak on

follow up and provision of inputs Other programs are seen

as merely restrictive without providing alternatives For

exam-ple, the national park is perceived mainly as a constraint to the

expansion of swidden Most programs are typically delivered

through the formal structure of commune and village heads

and often lose information and inputs in transmission

People have therefore put their trust in informal actors The

household survey reveals a different set of actors considered

important compared with the focussed group discussions The

network analysis based on household surveys shows that in

village B the most influential person is a former village leader

(node # 43) who is a the secretary of the Communist Party at

village level (Fig.5), while in village A, informal actors such

as itinerant traders (node # 50) and shop owners (node # 51

and 52) are the most prominent (Fig.3) People perceive these

actors as influential because of their wealth and power status,

experience in agriculture production (e.g., members of the

Farmer’s Association and Women’s Union) that local people

can learn from, or the ability to access and provide important

information and resources on agriculture techniques, market

price and social development (e.g., traders and shop owners,

members of the Farmers’ Association and Women’s Union)

Network of Swidden Related Information Exchange

Influential formal and informal actors (Fig.6) in both villages

are also people with whom communities exchange

informa-tion and resources (Figs7and8) Government actors, such as

extension staff, national park staff, border police, commune

staff and village heads not only inform local people about the

government support programs on agriculture development but

also advocate government policies on national security and

forest protection programs, often perceived by local people

as not relevant to their livelihood, mostly through village

meetings

In village B, the secretary of the CP at village level is seen

as most influential He is in charge of disseminating

informa-tion and arranging elecinforma-tions He attends meetings at commune

and district level, and thus is well informed on development in

general and a source of information on policy and regulations

on forest management He provides both information and, as

he is rich, loans in an emergency Interestingly, he is also the person with whom local people share information (Fig 8) regarding their swidden practices People come to him to dis-cuss their problems and in the process give him information The head of mass organizations (Youth Union, Farmer Association, and Women’s Union) are also considered power-ful as they represent people wishing to borrow money from the Policy and Social Development Bank Mass organizations also provide social support (swidden labor for female-headed households for example) and contribute to social cohesion Information exchange related to swidden is mostly through a network of informal actors such as traders and friends from outside the village Newly upgraded roads have allowed more frequent visits of traders who have become important sources of information on market prices

of agriculture products, types of fertilizers, new seed va-rieties, as well as the sources of goods (e.g., clothes, ra-dios, TVs and books) In many cases, traders also act as loan providers for local people and are also important as buyers of NTFPs (mainly herbs/medicinal plants, honey, and bamboo shoots) collected by women

Both formal and informal actors provide information and resources important for swidden, but people choose those most useful, relevant and expedient for their requirements Their choice is influenced by the capacity of formal govern-ment actors, the accessibility of the site, and social customs of the swidden community itself For example, information on techniques for cultivation of maize and paddy rice and for livestock production is provided by government extension officers in both study villages However, since extension staff visit village A only once or twice a year people depend more

on traders Interestingly, though brokered by village heads, the commercial growing of maize was first introduced and devel-oped by traders As a result, people in village A prefer to seek advice and help from informal actors such as traders rather than government extension agents

Informal social networks are perhaps more accessible to individuals to share information and resources They help connect people within their network to employers, gain access

to government and community programs and services, and navigate through organizational spaces to obtain the required information and resources At the same time, formal structures provide the space for social networks to develop This mutu-ally reinforcing dynamic has important implications for public policy and necessitates the recognition of informal networks and the design of programs to engage them

In contrast, in village B, a formal actor such as the head of Farmers’ Association (node # 41 Fig.7), is seen as an impor-tant source of information on available government support, new agricultural techniques and market prices More impor-tantly, he determines who can borrow money from the

Farmers’ Association and provides access to the support from

government agencies Mass organizations also play a different

role according to location, ethnicity, and accessibility

Clearly PES and REDD+ projects can build on both formal

and informal governance systems As Prell et al (2010) also

found, both formal and informal networks appear to guide and

constrain individual behavior, where the informal system often

fills gaps that the formal system is unable or unwilling to fill

For example, in our study informal networks appear to be

the favoured source for information related to agriculture,

mainly through itinerant traders This importance of traders might be the result of a governance vacuum (Lemos and Agrawal2006); that is, government agencies fail to enforce forest protection measures and fail to deliver meaningful ag-riculture extension services Our survey shows that traders might also be the main drivers of Deforestation and Forest Degradation, but villagers rely heavily on their access to in-formation At the same time, government efforts towards re-forestation and reducing carbon emissions do not take account

of or make use of these people

Table 2 Actors related to swidden governance as identified by focus group discussions

District Agricultural Board

(represented by extension

staff)

Agriculture extension service (seen as training courses)

District and commune extension service

Commune agricultural board

Agricultural extension officers

Forest Protection Board of

national park represented by forest

rangers

Mass organizations Forest rangers Department of Natural

Resources and Environment (DONRE)

DONRE

Border Security Staff Security police Commune government

and village leaders

Government authorities Commune Youth Union Youth and Women

Union;

Farmer ’s Association

Youth Union

Gold miner

Itinerant traders Itinerant traders Shops in village Outside traders

Retailer agents in Moc Chau

town

Laos and Thai people NGO from

Luxembourg

NGO from Luxembourg

NGO from Luxembourg

Fig 5 Sources of Information on

agriculture issues

This was confirmed by interviews revealing that the formal

network of the national park forest protection groups, border

police, village heads and agricultural extension units, is weak

and not perceived to have much influence on local livelihoods

As a result, villagers do not expect much from the state and

continue their traditional way of life Nevertheless, modern

influences are slowly being incorporated linking the villages

to the larger cash economy Traders who supply cash and

information on how to obtain cash are therefore more

impor-tant than government development interventions, which are

often inaccessible to local people

Dependence on outsiders as their sole source of information

poses certain risks to local communities, although traders are

equally dependent on local people for the exchange of goods

As they are not part of the community (and the strong ties within), these outsiders disseminate new information and trig-ger innovation (Granovetter1973) Nevertheless, a change in the market might cause traders to go elsewhere for better deals Large commercial companies are often seen as private-sector drivers of deforestation, but as our results from in vil-lage A show, the many small-scale traders influence decisions

on how land is used and hence on deforestation and forest degradation These traders appear to compete with govern-ment agencies in supporting and influencing local people’s activities in livelihood improvement and forest protection Ideally they should be included in the decision- and policy-making processes to address drivers of deforestation and degradation

Fig 6 Most influential actors in swidden governance Node size show number of nominations by others in the village

Fig 7 Exchange of information related to swidden in village A Note:

Indegree sending (left) and receiving (right) information Nodes denote

actors and the size shows the frequency of being mentioned as the

destination (send information) or the source (receive information) Arrows point towards actors mentioned as targets or sources of information