DSpace at VNU: In the crossfire: Vietnam’s relations with China and Soviet Union during the Vietnam War (1965-1972)

Although both the Soviet Union and China claimcd to be "cioing their intemational proletarian duty" by supporting Vietnam in thc war against the United States, at the same time both coun

VNU Joum al of Science, Social Sciences a n d H u m an ities 25, No.5E (2009) 24-36

In the crossíìre: V ietnam ’s relations with China

and Soviet Union during the Vietnam W ar (1965-1972)

Pham Quang Minh*

College o f Social Sciences and Humanities, VNU

336 Nguyen Trai, Thanh Xuan, Hatioi, Viettĩatĩì

Receivcd 13 November 2009

A bstract Although most điplomatic history is written as an a c c o u n t o f relations between tvvo nations, in reality niany interactions in international rclations involve morc than simplc bilateral exchanges This paper is intcnded to rcmedy this weakness in the litcrature by analyzing thc strategic triangle created by Vietnam, Soviet Union, and the Pcoples' Repubhc of China during the Vietnam War (1965-1972)

A tria n g u la r fra m e w o rk is a p p ro p ria te fo r ih is p u rp o s e b e c a u s e e a c h o f th e b ila tc ra l lin k s - Vietnam - Soviet Union; Vietnam - China; China - Soviet Union was affcctcd by thc third membcr

o f ihe triangle Although both the Soviet Union and China claimcd to be "cioing their intemational proletarian duty" by supporting Vietnam in thc war against the United States, at the same time both countries folỉowed theirovvn policy and interests

Based on V ictnam ese sources, the paper

tries to exam ine the com plexity o f this triangle

relationship and argues that, although Victnam

achieved its aim, it vvas a paw n in 2 global

ideological and pow cr struggle am ong big

powers

1 R atio n alc

Although m ost diplom atic history is w ritten

as an account o f relations betw een tw o nations,

in reality m any interactions in intem ational

relations involve m ore than sim ple bilateral

exchanges This proposal is intended to rem edy

this vveakness in the liierature by analyzing the

strategic tnangle created by V ietnam , Soviet

Union, and the Peoplcs’ R epublic o f China

during the years o f heavy U.S involvem ent in

the Vietnam W ar (1965-1872)

A triangular íramevvork is appropriate for this purpose becausc each o f the bilateral links -

V ietnam - Soviet U nion; V ietnam - China;

C hina - Soviet U nion - was affected by thc third

m em bcr o f th e triangle

China^s po licy in V ietnam m ust be understood in th e context o f its goals vis-à-vis the Soviet U nion and the U nited States China hoped the w ar w ould w eaken the U nited States, vvhile sim ultaneously prcvcnting expansion o f Soviet-A m crican rapprochem ent China tricd, at the sam e tim e, to avoid both an enlargcd war and negotiations to end the war In fact, China ultim ately prom otcd a prolonged vvar o f attrition for all involvcd parlicipants For Vietnam , C hina w as an ally, a supplicr o f troops and supplies, and a deterrent against a U.S invasion o f thc N orlh, but also a much stronger ncighbor w ho m ight ultim ately begin

P.Q M inh / V N U Ịouninl p f Science, Soàal Sciences and Hitmanities Hunumitíes 25, No.5E /2009/ 24-36 25

to take advantage o f its great size to push

Vietnam into a clcarly subordinatc status

In com parison to C hina and thc United

States, the Soviet U nion’s position on Vietnam

was more uncom fortablc bccause it was

inlluenccd by tw o coníìicting intcrcsts: a desire

to reach a detente with the U nited States, and an

interest to gain VictnartTs support in its struggle

w ith C hina In general, Sovict policy tovvards

V ietnam dun n g the vvar had several

dim ensions Firsí, M oscow ilid not w ant to

sacnfice its stratecy o f dctentc in its rclations

w ith the u s Second, M oscow w as ready to

provide all the necessary m ilitary and economic

aid n e e d e d for Hanoi to pursuc its war Third,

M oscow prcferrcd negotiating a sctticm cnt to

the vvar rather than being d raw n further into

It[ 1J In other w ords, the S o v iet U nion tried to

have greai iníluencc in V ietnam in order to

realize its foreign policy goals: to rcach an

appropriate settlem cnt to thc vvar and to make

the DRV a reliablc Sovict ally in thc world

com m unist m ovem ent

In short, during thc w ar, V ictnam was a

paw n in a global ìdeological and po w er struggle

am ong the U nited States, C hina, and thc Soviet

Union W hile C hinese interests \vould only later

becom e clear, both the Sovict U nion and the

U nited States clearly show ed their interests in

the V ietnam co n ílict for thc first tim c in 1950

The U nited States íeared a rapprochem ent

betw een the tw o com m unist p o w ers C hina, in

turn, w a s afraid o f a Soviet-A m erican dctcnte

w hile th e Soviet U nion w as co n cem ed about

any im provem ent o f Sino-A m crican rclations

2 T h e E m e rg e n c e o f th e tria n g le

T he G eneva A ccords recogm zed the

baỉance o f these pow crs B oth the Sovict Union

and C hina agreed to cnd the First Indochina

w ar, bul for diffcrcnt reasons W hilc the Soviet

U nion prefcrrcd dctcnte with the U nited States

in order to kecp a status quo in Europe, China tblloNvcd its Hve principles o f peaceíul co- existence in Indochina, with tw o V ietnam s and

a protracted strugglc in the co untry’s South

H ow cver, both the Soviet Union and China continued to support N orth V ietnam in reconstructing its econom y, in order to build up

V ietnam as an “advance p o st” o f socialism

C hina was a m ain supporter as w ell as a beneficiary o f the G encva A ccords o f 1954[2]

On M arch 3, 1954, the C hinese N ew s Agency announced that C hincse govem m ent accepted the invitation o f Sovict U nion to participate in the G eneva confcrcnce on K orea and Indochina[3] Jcan C hauvel called the Geneva

C onferencc as thc íirst m ceting betw een the East and the W est with participation o f

B eijing[4Ị R ealizing thc im portance o f the confcrencc China had preparcd very carefully, and sent to G cneva a largc delegation o f 200 persons[5] D uring thc G eneva conference, Chou Enlai show ed his skills as a diplom at and negotiator B ased on the fact o f détente am ong pow ers, C hina tried to pcrsuade V ietnam to sign the G eneva A ccord by accepting a division

o f the country into tw o parts the N orth and the South along the 16th parallcl How ever, China suggested that if France will not accept this proposal, V ietnam w ould m akc Hai Phong a free port allow ing Francc to settle a certain forces In w orst case, V ictnam could propose that the H ighw ay N o 5 and Hanoi and Hai Phong cities to becom e an arca o f common conlrol and non-m ilitary purposes[3]

As a main ílgure in shaping the Geneva agreem cnt, the Sino-V ictnam rclationship was very close in thc sccond h a lf o f the 1950s and at the beginning o f thc 1960s A bout one year aíter the G eneva conĩcrcnce H o C hi M inh led a high ranking govcm m ental delegation from

2 6 P.Q Minh / V N U Ịoum al o f Science, Soàal Sciences and Humanities 25, No.5E (2009) 24-36

V ietnam to pay an official visit to C hina from

June 24 to July 7, 1955 D uring this visit two

sides signed some agrcem ents on econom ic,

cultural and education exchanges C hina also

agrecd to provide V ietnam w ith a grant o f 800

m illions Y uan (200 m illion USD)[3]

In this pcriod, both C hina and Soviet Union

were o f the same opinion on V ietnam ese

revolution that DRV had to concentrate on

construction o f socialism in thc N orth o f

Vietnam T he consensus o f C hina and Soviet

U nion was cxplaincd by several factors First,

alter years o f conírontation thc intem ational

relations entered in the period o f détente

betvveen big powers Second, both Soviet Union

and China w anted to take this opportunity to

c o n s o lid a te th e ir i n te m a l a ff a ir s Third, the

conflict bctw ccn Sovict Union and C hina still

did not appcar serious

The harm onized relations betw een Soviet

Union and China were clear during the Geneva

confcrence In a speech delivered on M ay 12,

1954, C hou Enlai relerrcđ to Soviet Union as a

guarantee for solving the conílict in Indochina:

“It is also necessary to m ention the peaceful

policy o f Soviet Union - Soviet U nion is alvvays

patient to sole the co n ílict in Indochina in

peaceful way, and to support the national self-

detcrm ination o f Indochinese p eo p le.”[3] In a

tclcgram datcd o f M ay 30, and in a spcech o f

June 8, 1954, Choư Enlai m entioned again and

again about Soviet U nion that shared the idca o f

China in the issue o f intem ational control in

Indochina a íìe r G eneva coníerence W ithout the

agreement betw cen Soviet U nion and China,

the Geneva confcrence vvould have taken m orc

time It was Soviet U nion and C hina who

played an important role in settlem ent o f the

conílict in Indochina N ot only in V ietnam ese

issucs, but also in solving thc questions o íL a o s

and Cam bodia, both C hina and Soviet Union

shared the same idcas The đifference w as in

the vvay that China dealt w ith Laos and

Cam bodia A ccording to C hina all parties, including V ietnam , had to vvithdravv th e ir íorces from Laos and C am bodia W hile, in Laos, the revolutionary forces could m ove to th e north oi the country in the border arca vvith C hina and Vietnam ,[3] in C am bodia, there was no di Vision

o f conlrolled area for revolution and national forces[3]

U ntil N ovem ber 1956, the split betvveen

C hina and Soviet U nion had not em erged The relationship betw een tvvo countries becam e worse as N ikita K hrushchev denounced Stalin

at the T enth Party congrcss o f the C om m unist Party o f the Soviet U nion in early 1956 During the visit o f C hinese g ovem m ent and

C om m unist Party o f C hina delegation led by

C hou Enlai to V ietnam on N ovcm ber 18-22,

1956, C hou Enlai had a long discussion vvith

V ictnam ese leaders on several im portant

questions First, according to C hou Enlai, the

recent intcm ational situation, especially after events in A lgeria and Hungary, became seriously com plicatcd T he situatiơn in Hungary and in other countries in Eastem Europe shovved that, dcspite th e fact that Soviet Union invested m any resources in E astem Europe, but the people there vvere still against Soviet Union

T he reason for their protest was, according to

C hina, Soviet hegem ony Chou Enlai said: “The principles o f M arxism -Leninism are universal truth, but one cannot forcc a country to accept these principles - One has to com bine w ith the practice o f those countries.” [3] According to

C hou Enlai, C hina w as especially displeased

\vith hegem ony in the relationship between countries Although hegcm ony was not a m ajor trend C hou continued, it existed in some relations, and could iníluence badly on the

masses Secotĩd, on the question o f Vietnam

unification, Chou advised V ietnam to follow a protractcđ struggle A ccording to Chou, Victnam should regard the principle o f reunification through free election as a slogan

P Q M inh / VNU lounm l o f Science, Social Sciences and Hunmiúties Humanities 25, No.5K (2(X)9) 24-36 27

for political struggle rathcr than as a guidcline

for daily actìon D iscussing thc issue o f

economic policy, cspccialiy thc land reíbrm ,

C hou was o f thc opinion that thc program was

esscntially succcsslul, w hilc m istakes and

shortcom ings Nvere isolated and local Using

this opportunity C hou Enlai dcfcndcd Stalin

IVom the attack o f Sovict leadcrship: “C om rade

Stalin m ade scrious m istakes, but it is to

contìrm that in thc m ain his policics vvere the

co ư ect and victorious."[3]

In 1957, thc split bctw een Sovict Union and

C hina becam e m ore open NVhilc dcfcnding

Stalin, China becam e criticize Soviet policy

tow ard building Socialism through focusing on

heavy ìndustry In A pril 1957, Prcm icr M inistcr

Pham Van D ong lcd a delegation to visit China

to discuss on situation and plan o f dcvcloping

the North o f Vietnam D uring a m ceting with

V ictnam ese collcagues on April 22, 1957, Mao

Zcdong advised: “C om rades, it wi!l be

dangerous if you go by the recent vvTong way o f

brothcr co u n tn es in E astem Europc Hungary

madc m istake bccausc it docs not dcvelop

agnculture, because o f loo fast dcvelopm cnt o f

industry, developing w ithout a markct Poland

has paid m uch attention to industry, w hile the

country did not have enough food, and even had

to ìm port to feed itself.” [3] (It should be noted

thai, like the othcr co u n tn es in E astem liurope,

C hina had also follow ed the dircction from

Soviet U nion that m eans to focus on heavy

industry w ithout paying attention to rcsources

and m arkets T he results w cre a w asle o f 4

billions U SD [3].)

T he othcr issue conccm ing both C hina and

Soviet U nion was how V ictnam csc revolution

in the South o f V ietnam should bc continucd In

D ccem ber 1955 there w as a visit o f a delegation

frotn the M ilitary C om m ission o f thc Party

C entral C om m ittec (Q uan uy T rung uong) to

China D u n n g the m eeting betw een tw o sides

on D eccm ber 8, 1955 D cng X iaopm g \vas the opinion that V ietnam had to prepare for a prolonged w ar o f 10 or 20 years[3]

In general, in thc period from 1954-1963,

C hina w ieldcd cnorm ous intluence on

V ietnam csc dom estic issues Follow ing this stralegy, B eijing tricđ to convince the Norlh

V ietnam to acccpt a dcfinitive division o f

V ietnani by advising it to consolidate thc revolutionary achicvcm cnts in the North[6]

U nlike C hm a thc Soviet Union recognized the role o f V ictnam csc rcvolution rather late in its global stratcgy Even aftcr 1954 Soviet aid

to V ietnam was far behind that o f China[7] In order to help V ictnam to carry out the íìrst five vear plan (1961-1965) Soviet U nion provided

V ietnam a rcnt o f 430 m illion rubles with íavorable conditions and anothcr 350 million rubles to cultivate Iropical trees in agricultural, state-run farm s In addition, a grant o f 20

m illion rublc was providcd for com bating

m alaria[8] Until 1964, w ith assistance o f Soviet U nion about 90 im portant projects were renovatcd or ncw built up A m ong these there

w ere projccts in thc íiclds o f hydroelectricity,

m ining, m cchanics, chcm istry, light industry, and education A ccording to Prem ier M inister Pham V an D ong, thesc prọjects played very

im portant rolc in building up initial m atenal and technical foundation o f socialism in Vietnam [8]

A lthough Sovict U nion continued helping

V ietnam in building up ihe country and íìghting against A m erica, its assistance during this period charactcrizcd as at “an indifferent level” There w ere no Sovict high ranking delegations

to visit V ictnam The highest official who visited V ietnam w as M oukhidinov, Politburo

m em ber and Sccrctary o f the Central com m ittee

o f CPSV w ho attcnd the Third Party congress

o f V ietnam ’s W orkers Party in 1960 Nikita

K hrushchev did not pay any visit to Vietnam ,

2 8 P.Q M inh / VNL1 Ịoum aì o f Science, Social Sciences and Hunuììĩities 25, No.5E (2009) 24-36

but had do n e so in Indonesia, Indìa, M yanm ar

and A lg h an istan during February and M arch

1960, dcspite th e fact that Presidcnt Ho Chi

M inh ex tcnded an invitation to him severa!

tim es[8]

T h e attitude o f Soviet U nion tovvard

V ietnam b ecam e w orse in the m id-1963 after

V ietnam p u b licly statcd its opinion on

intem ational affairs and after thc visit o f Liu

Shaoqi in M ay 1963 Although thc V ietnam

W orkers Parly recognized the c o n ílic t betvveen

the Soviet U nion and C hina early on, It w as too

late in expressing its attitudes about the

problem On Fcbruary 12, 1963, thrce years

afte r the c o n ílict had opened, the polilburo o f

the V ietn am ’s W ork er Party callcd the íratem al

parties to stop attacks against each other in the

m ass m cdia, and called for a m ecú n g to solve

the disunity w ith in the w o rld ’s com m unist and

w orkers m ovem ent T h e silcnce o f thc

V ietnam ’s W o rk ers Party can be explained by

its w ish to w in thc support from both sides for

its o\vn struggle against thc us H ow ever,

silence was not alw ays the bcst policy T he late

reaction o f th e V ictn am ’s W orker Party made

b o th sides unhappy, especially C hina, and vvas

criticized by Icadcrs o f other socialist

c o u n tn e s|9 ] M oreovcr “th e politics o f

neutrality exacted a high pricc on H anoi’s war

e íĩo rt [10]

In M ay 1963, President Liu Shaoqi decidcd

to pay an o íĩic ia l visit to Victnam T he niain

objective o f this v isit w as to discuss w ith the

V ietnam ’s W orker Party on the unity and

solidarity am ong socialist countries as well as

relationship b etw een V ictnam -Soviet U nion-

C hina B eío re going to V ictnam , Liu raised

som e question to V ietnam cse leaders: why

there is disagrcem ent am ong socialist

countries? W hat is the charactcr o f this

co n ílict? C an this co n ílict bc overcom e? Is this

dangerous if the co n tlict w ill be continued?[8]

A lthough he stated that “ this visit is friendly visit bccause tw o countrics are b ro th ers and socialist co m rad es," but in fact C hina critĩcízed

V ietnam ese attitudc to the split betvveen Soviet Union and C hina, and askcd V ietnam to support China in this co n ílict Liu Shaoqi stated:

“ Let m e talk about prin cip lc issue 'I*he problem s arise \vhcn therc is discussion o n the principles, there is n o m id-\vay and com prom ise choice T h is is not attitude o f M arxism - Lenim sm - Ít is nccessary to have a clear stable opim on on problem s, such as questions o f

p rin cip les W e have never hcard Ihat you are consistent in principle T h e unity vvithout

p r in c ip le 1S c o m p r o m i s e l l n i t y m u s t b e b a s c d

on p n n cip le o f M arxism -L eninism , o f th e tvvo

M oscow statem cnts C ontm uing unity w hile refusing th ese principlcs wou!d be not acceptable.” [8]

A ccording to V ictnam cse sources, during the period bctw ecn 1960 and 1964, the C entral

C om m ittce o f V ictn am ’s \V orker Party rcceived more than ten letters and announcem ents o f

C entral C om m ittce and 1’olitburo o f CPSV

m entionm g Sovict-C hina split, and callm g for a Soviet-V ietnam ese m eeling regarding bad

V ietnam csc attitu d es tow ard Sovict cxpcrts in

V ietnam M ore over, C entral C om m ittee o f CPSV insisted that V ietnam “change vievvpoints'' (thay doi lap truong) In a m eeting

w ith Le D uan, First Sccrctary o f V ietnam ’s

W orker Party in Fcbruary 1964, Khrushchcv even thrcatened to cut o ff m ilitary assistance for

V ietnam [8]

In D ccem bcr 1963, V ietnam ’s Central

C om im ttee decidcd to call its N inth Plenum to discuss dom cstic and intcrnational p o lic y [ll]

In the context o f dccpcned conflict betwecn China and Soviet Union, Ho Chi Minh rem inded thc participants to pay special attention to the problcm o f unity betvveen

V ietnam and C hina, on the one sidc, and

P.Q M inh / V N U Ịoum al of Science, Sociaỉ Sciences and Hunmnities Humanitics 25, No.5E (2009) 24-36 2 9

betvvccn Victnam and Soviet U nion, on the

o ther side, considering Ít to bc th c íìrst priority

o f thc V ictnam ’s W orker P arty 's torcign policy

Hc em phasized: “O ur goal is unity For umty

wc ha ve to struggle T o strugglc is to serve

umty, not to spcak badly about anyone (VVc

m ust som c) hovv d o so so that vvithin o u r party

and pcoplc thcre is lovc and gratitudc to thc

íratem al brothcr countries.”[ 12)

Hoxvcver, duc to diffcrcnces in stratcgics

bctw ccn thc VietnarrTs VVorkcr Party and the

Soviet U nion, the relationship bctw cen V ietnam

and ihc Soviet U nion aftcr thc N inth Plcnum

bccam e vvorsc V ietnam callcd its students

s tu d y i n g s o c ia l s c i e n c c s in thc Sovict Union

back to VietnanV A ftcr thc N inth Plenum ,

sounng rclationshíps not only c x isted betw een

the tw o parties but also betvvccn thc tw o states

T he Soviet U nion had thrcatcncd and íorccd

V ictnam to follovv its policy direction,

interfering in the intcm al p olitics and

sovcrcignty o f Vietnam Ị 13] In a letter d atcd o f

July 6, 1964 thc C entral C om m ittee o f C PSV

\vrote:

“ In recent tim e som e activities o f m cm bers

o f C entral C om m ittee o f V ietn am ’s W orker

Party m ade us w orry and unhappy, bccausc

thcsc actions have clearly gonc in a contrary

direction to the statcm ent o f V ictnam ese

T hẽrẽ wcrc about one thousand stu d cn ts w crc callcd

back to V ictnam during 1963-1964 A ccording thc

intcrvicw conductcd by thc author in A ugusl 2004, all

studcnts (m ost o f th cm w cre second or third ycars studcnts

in ihc Sovict U nion) had to lcavc th c S ovict U nion for

V ictnam as soon as possiblc w iihout knovving w hcther

thcy could com e back to Sovict Union T h crcíorc, thcy

had to go back w ithout taking an>ihing w ith Ihcm A íìcr

a m vai in V ictnam , thcy faccd m any difficultics T h c y did

no! know \vhat to do, and w h at to study In c o m p a n so n to

thc studcnts w ho cam c back from C h in a, Ihcy w crc

ncglcctcd and did not rcccivc any support o r attcntion

Until today these studcnts still havc an inícrio rity com plcx

and dissatisfaction A m ong thcm thcrc vvcrc o n ly thrcc

pcrsons w h o could rctum !0 thc Sovict U nion, an d íìnished

thcir study thcrc A m ong thcsc lucky p crsons, thcrc w as

Dang X uan Ky, thc so n o f T ruong Chinh

delegatcs on Soviet-V ietnam fricndship A recent u n ín cn d ly cam paign ag ainst Soviet

U nion \vas carricd out morc and m ore w idely and actively w ithin D cm ocratic R epubhc o f

V ietnam In secrct m cctings o f the Party and

am ong population thcrc w as a vvidc dissem ination o f falsification to sprcad suspicions about the country o f Lenin, to stir bad sentim ent tow ard thc country o f Lenin.”

T he letter concludcd: “ Rightly wc believe that íriendship m ust bc rcciprocated with fhendship.” [8]

In short, thc trianglc V ictnam -Soviet-U nion relations w erc vcry com plicated and covered by intem ational, rcgional and intem al íactors This relation also reĩlcctcd the split in relationship betvvecn Soviet U nion and C hina B oth o f them tricd to have morc inllucnces on V ietnam , and used this for their purposes

3 T h e trỉa n g lc in th e p c rio d o f 1964-1968

The ycar o f 1964 w as a tu m in g point in the triangle rclations bctw ecn V ielnam -Soviet

U nion-China T here w crc som e reasons to

explain this change F irsty in O ctob er 1964,

K hrushchev w as rcm ovcd from the position o f the First Secrctary o f thc C PSV by Leonid

Brezhncv Second, thc escalation o f the

V ietnam W ar forccd Sovict U nion and othcr socialist countries lo provide m ore assistance

for V ictnam Third, thc com plexity and incrcase

o f conflict betw ccn Sovict U nion and C hina iníluenced grcatly on V ietnam —the third parly The Victnam policy o f Soviet U nion was

m odified in thc Brczhnev cra

C hinese aid to N orth V ietnam increased dram atically evcn after 1963 T here vvere a

num ber o f rcasons for this increase F irst, the

escalation o f m ilitary co n ílicts in South

V ietnam lcd to an cxpansion o f the w ar to

N orth V ictnam and dccpcned C h in a ’s fear that

30 P.Q M inh / V N il Ịournnì o ị Science, Sociaỉ Sciences and H urm nities 25, No.5E (2(X)9) 24-36

the war could threaten its security T hereíbre,

China dccidcd to o íĩc r additional forces,

consisting o f 230 battalions, to North

Victnam[2Ị Second, M ao uscđ the intem ational

situation and support to V ietnam to w in the

upper hand in an intem al strugglc for povver

am ong C hincse C om m unist Party leaders

Third, C h in a’s m otivation for increasing

support to Victnam was rclatcd to the split

betw ecn China and the Soviet U nion that took

placc in 1956 after the 20lh C ongress o f the

Sovict C om m unisl Parly Through its support to

Victnam, thc C hincsc leadcrship tricd to shovv

that China was the country that could provide

Vietnam w ith su íĩìcien t support for its national

libcration m ovcm cnt, and that C hina w as a Irue

com m um st country in com parison to Soviet

Union F ourth, C hina’s support to V ictnam can

also bc cxplained through its desire to play a

lcading rolc in hclping rcvolutionary

m ovem ents in thc third vvorld In sum , through

support to V ietnam , C h in a ’s leadcrship tried to

achicvc both intcrnational and dom cstic goals

As part o f this proccss, during A ugust 1964,

China c am c d out changcs to its m ilitary

presencc in thc South o f C hina, such as the

redcploym cnt o f its air forcc and anti-craft

artillcry, as well as thc construction o f new

airportsỊ 14] In political and social life, there

was a trcm cndous m ovem cnt know n as “ Resist

A m erica and Assist V ietnam " w hich was

organizcd throughout thc country w ith the

parlicipation o f m orc than 20 m ilhon people(2)

In latc 1964 and carly 1965, C hina even madc

clear that it was rcady to scnd its arm y to fight

together w ith thc V ictnam cse pcople, and that it

would offer all rnanner o f support to V ictnam (3)

In the pcriod 1964-1968, China*s supporl to

Victnam was cxpresscd in thrcc m ain forms: the

construction and m aintenance o f deíense

^ Rcnmin ribao (1965), 7 and 12 August.

(ỉ) Rcnmin nbao (1965), 25 March.

inírastructurc, air íĩclds, roads and railvvays; the use o f C h inesc anli-aircraft artillery troops in the d cícn se o f im porlant strategic areas of North V ietnam ; and the su p p ly o f m ilitary equipm ent and civil m aterials A ccording to onc statistic, o v c r 320,000 C hinese cnginccring and anti-aircralì artillcry forccs w ere in V ietnam at the tim e[ 15]

In co m p ariso n to ihe previous period, during 1964-1968, Sovict U nion had m odified their po licy tow arđ V ictnam T he nevv lcadership o f Sovict Union has reconfìrm ed their role o f co-chair íbr G eneva conlercnce

1954 for V ictnam T he lcttcr o f M inister o f Foreign A ftầirs G rom yko to M inister Xuan Thuy datcd o f D ccem ber 12, 1964 stated: The states participating in G eneva conícrcnce could not be o ulside, vvhcn security o f nations and peace in Indochina vvas thrcatcnccl.,,

The tu m in g point in thc relationship bctvvecn the Sovict Union and N orth Victnam

w as in 1965 w hen Soviet Prem ier Kosygin visitcd H anoi in early February The mcaning

o f the visit w as m ultidim cnsional Firsty the

Soviet U nion w anted to makc clcar its eíĩo rts to đcfend lỉa n o i from A m erican air attacks by eqưipping ihe DRV with anti-aircraíì vveapons

Second, thc Soviet U nion vvanted to c m p h a s i z e

its position in Southeast A sia Third, the Soviet

Union intcnded to w am Victnam not to undcrestim atc the u s plans regarding

com m unism in Asia L a st bui not ỉeast, the

Soviet U nion planned to com c to an agrcement

w ith C hincse lcadcrship on thc Vietnam W ar, taking into account K osygin’s tw o visits to Beijing[16]

D uring this pcriod, Sovict Union vvas intcndcd for V ictnam a strong politica! support

O n May 8, 1965, thc First Sccretary Leonid Brezhncv stated: “T o support Victnam in the strugglc against aggrcssion o f American

im pcrialism is an honorahlc cause, and vital

P.Q M inh / VN U Ịournal o f Science, Soàal Sciences and Humanities Humanities 25, No.5E (2009) 24-36 31

intcrest o f all people deíending íreedom and

indcpcndcnce.” [8]

Soviet Union also established official

rclations vvith N ational Liberation F ront (NLF)

On January 13, 1965, thc representative offìce

o f N LF was founded in M oscow In M ay o f

1965 this offĩce gained diplom atic status On

lune 13, 1969 Soviet U nion offĩcially

recognized Provisional R evolutionary

Government o f Rcpublic o f S o u th V ietnam

(PRG)

In term o f econom y, like during the

previous period, Soviet support continued

playing an im portant role In F eb ru ary 1965,

Soviet Union decided to defer V ietnam ese

debts

A fter the visit o f K osygin, S o v iet aid to

Vietnam increased every year Hovvever,

Moscovv (lid not want to risk its relations with

the u s and the W est As a result, M oscow ’s

foreign policy was in a dilem m a O n th e one

hand, the Soviet U nion had to show its

intemational prolctarianism to its V ietnam ese

fricnds On the other hand, it did not like to

block its com m unication w ith th e W est In

addition, the m eeting vvith C hina did n o t bring

positive results China rcíu sed to coordinate

support to V ietnam All these factors gave an

i m p r e s s i o n th a t the Soviet U nion, despite its

statem ent to support V ietnam , still tried to

avoid involvem ent in the V ietnam c o n ílic t and

to cooperate w ith the u s in m ak ing a political

settlement

From M arch 1965 on, due to th e escalation

o f the w ar and the failure o f a diplom atic

settlemcnt to the conílict, M oscow decided to

strengthen cooperation w ith V ietnam in

economic and m ilitary areas Soviet aid was

m ostly in form o f food and equipm ent, and was

transported initially by sea, but afte r M arch 30,

1965 through C hinese territory S oviet leaders

made several sừong public statem ents on

intem ationalism during M arch 1965[4]

The high point o f the cooperation between the Soviet U nion and V ietnam was the official visit o f the V ietn am 's W orker Party delegation, headed by Le Duan, to M oscow from April 10

to 17, 1965 In the jo in t com m uniqué draíìed by the end o f the visit, both sides stated: “ If the us intensifies its aggression against the DRV, in a necessary case and i f the DRV requires it, the Soviet U nion govem m ent would perm it the departure to V ictnam o f those Soviet citizens

w ho expressed their w ish in accordance with the feelings o f intem ational proletarian spirit to struggle for the ju s t cause o f Vietnamese people, for defense o f socialist achievcm ents o f the D R V ” [17]

As a result, the Soviet Union agreed to provide V ietnam with surface-to-air m issile batteries for the area around H anoi, Hai Phong and other im portant cities, in addition to fighter aircraft, pilots, and technicians T he April 1965 visit also solved problem s o f the transportation

o f Soviet aid through C hinese teưitory The íìrst fifteen M IG 15/17s and one hundred arm ored personnel carriers w ere sent to

V ietnam Later som e light IL-28 bombers arrived in V ietnam as well[[7]

D uring 1965 bo th W ashington and Hanoi

w ere in no hurry to negotiate, preferring to gain

m ilitary victories, and then to negotiate from a position o f strength T hereíore, during 1965 the

w ar in V ietnam approached a nevv and dangerous phase, though there vvere several attem pts to prevent it The Soviet U nion was the only m ediator that could negotiate a settlem ent, b u t it íailed to do so because such a settlem ent could isolate the Soviet U nion from coĩnm unist and national liberation m ovements Soviet aid to V ielnam grew steadily from

1965 to 1968 By 1967 total socialist-country aid to the DRV accounted for about 1.5 billion

32 p Q M inh / V N U Ịournnì o f Science, Sociaỉ Sciences and Hum anities 25, No.5E (2(X)9) 24-36

rubles (m ore than 1.5 billion USD ), am ong

vvhich M oscow ’s share was 36.8 percent (608

million USD) By th e cnd o f 1967, Soviet

supporl grcw to 50 pcrccnt o f total socialist-

country aid Among this, m ilitary aid com prised

tw o-thirds o f all Soviet assistance, and

accounted for 396.7 m illion U SD in 1968 In

addition in Septem bcr 1965 thcrc vvcrc betw ecn

1,500 to 2,500 Sovict m ilitary pcrsonnel

serving in V ietnam T hey w ere m ostly

tcchm cians, pilots and SAM opcrators In

addition thcrc vvas a spccial group rcsponsible

for obtainm g sam plcs o f A m erican vveapons to

lcam about up-to-datc u s arm s[7] In 1968, the

Soviet Union took ovcr thc top position in

supporting V ietnam from C hina HoNvever, it

was a bitter m om ent for the Soviet Union,

according to one rcport from thc Soviet

em bassy in H anoi, as the Sovict U nioi^s

ìníluence in V ietnam did not grow accordingly

\vith their support

By 1965, faceđ with escalation o f the w ar in

V ietnam and sim ilarly cscalating com m itm ents,

the Sovict Union proposed a plan to unify

activities among socialist countries to support

Vietnam This plan w as t\vofold: to strengthen

support for V ietnam , and at the same tim e to

put China in on the defensivc D uring his visit

to Vietnam in Fcbruary 1965, Prcsident

K osygin suggestcd that thrcc countries

Victnam, Soviet U nion and C hina issue a

com m on statem cnt on a uniiìed plan

Suggestions on a com m on statcm cnt o f socialist

countrics regarding V ictnam m ade by Soviet

Union on January 12, 1966 and in M arch 1967

vvere again rẹịected by China

T he split betvvecn Sovict U nion and China

has badly influcnccd on transportation o f aid

goods from Sovict Union and other socialist

countries through C hinese tcrritory U sing its

position as a transit tcrm inal, China tried to

manipulatc this aid to lim it big m ilitary attacks

by thc V ictnam csc B cginnm g in 1965, Soviet

U nion sug g cstcđ a scrics o f p lan s, su ch as the cslablishm cnt o f a n air basc for S o v ict airplanes

in H ainan province, or cstab lish n ìcn t o f air- bridgc through C hina, using H oa N an porl to scnd Sovict goods to V ietnam , o r org an izing a specialisl gro u p in Binh T u o n g Iỉo \v ev cr, all these in itiativ es o f Soviet U nion w ere rcjcctcd

by C hina[8]

In the context o f the dccp split bctvvecn Soviet U nion and C hina, the atm o sp h cre o f the triangle relationship was ch aractcrized by distrust B oth C hina and Sovict U nion vvere

w orried about thc position o f V ietnam

A lthough Soviet U nion providcd V ietnam with

h ea\ 7 support during this period, it w as still

w o m c d that V ictnam vvould m o ve from thc Sovict side to C hincse onc T h e S o v ict Union was o f thc opinion that V ietnam w as biascd tow ards C hina D uring high ranking ncgotiations in A ugust 1966, the Sovict Union did not hesitate to raise q uestions regarding vvhat C hina had advised V ictnam to do, and

w hat V ietnam had agreed w ith C hina Sovict Union also suspected that V ietnam w as too depcndcnt on C hincse International policy, and that V ietnam had scparatc talks w ith C h im to oppose ihc Sovict U nion M orc over, according

to the Soviet U nion, V ictnam h ad treatcd Soviet specialists coolly, prevented V ietnam esc pcoplc from contacting thc specialists, and lim ited thcir travel V ictnam did not allow Sovict spccialists, but rath cr C h in ese ones to visit a m issilc basc that had bcen built by thc Soviet U nion Also,

V ietnam , accord ing to Sovict U nion, w as silcnt when C hina slandercd thc Sovict U nion[8] All thcsc inHucnccd badly on relations betw ecn th e Sovict U nion and V ietnam The Soviet U nion required V ietnam to m ake clear choice: total depcndence on Sovict Union, or continucd dcpcndcncc on C hina It vvas not surprise that Soviet Union did not confirm

P.Q Minh / VNL1 ịo u rm l o f Science, Sociaỉ Sciences and Humanities Hunuinities 25, No.5L <2009) 24-36 3 3

additional aid for 1968 as w cll as m ilitary and

economic aid for 1969, with the cxplanation

that the rcqucst Irom V ietnam was so high that

they needed lime to co n sid e r|8 |

In short, in the pcriod o f 1964-1968, both

big brothers wcrc com peting to assist V ietnam

in the vvar against the u s Sovict sources

claim ed that V ictnam csc sym pathies tow ard

China vvere stronger than thosc tow ard the

Soviet Union T h e reason for this w as that

China remamed an im portant su p p lier o f

econom ic and hum an rcsourccs for V ietnam

China was also closer to V ictnam ihan any

oihcr socialist country in geographical and

ideological tcrms T he Soviet Union tricd to use

every channel to cxploit disagrccm ent betw een

China and V ietnam for its ovvn interests

Although both C hina and the S oviet Union

w ere ihc supporters o l'V ietn am , ncither o f them

vvas satisiìed w ith thcir V ietnam esc íriends In

order to placate thc C hinese as wcll as to lieter

thc Sovicts, V ietnam dccided to arrest a group

o f high ranking officials supposed to be pro-

Soviet in 1967 T hcy w crc accused for treason,

espionage and transm itting State secrets [10]

This cam paign w as kno\vn as the “ R evisionist

Anti-Party AíTair.” T he arrcsts o f these persons

ihow ed on the o ne hand that the V ietn am ’s

VVorkers Party w ould not fall into the sphere o f

iníluence o f M oscow , w hile on the o th er hand

affirming V ictnam ’s continued po licy o f

neutrality in thc Sino-Soviet split

4 The Triangle in thc last pcriod of the war

(1968 1973)

T he year o f 1968 w as tum ing p o in t in the

Vietnam W ar Inilucnccd by thc T e t offensive

n January 1968, on O ctobcr 3 1 ,1 9 6 8 P resident

íohnson ordcrcd thc ccssation o f bom bing in

sỉorth V ietnam [18]

D uring this pcriod, Soviet Union continued assisting V ictnam to íìght A m erica on the one hand, and tried to play a rolc o f m cdiator in

V ietnam -U SA negotiation In doing so, Soviet

U nion from the bcginning tried to persuade

V ietnam to acccpt thc "low conditions” raised

by Am erica O n January 28, 1967, M inister o f Foreign A íĩairs N guycn D uy Trinh made a statem ent saying: “Only a íte r Am erica stops bom bing unconditionally and ccases any other vvarlike actions against the Democratic Republic o f V ictnam , can the DRV start talking

w ith A m erica about rclatcd problem s.” [19) The Soviet U nion respondcd that Am erica would hardly accept to stop bom bing unconditionally, thus preventing ncgotiations A ccording to Soviet U nion, it w as an unrealistic conđition raised by V ietnam T he Soviet U nion asked

V ietnam to m eet somc requircm cnts o f USA

N egotiations m ust bc bascd on thc reciprocity principle, thereforc N orlh V ictnam should stop íĩghting in South V ictnam , and North

V ietnam ese forccs should w ithdraw from South

V ietnam O n April 25, 1968 K osygin said to Prem ier M inister Pham Van Dong: “O f course,

A m erica cannot stop bom bing N orth Vietnam 100% if they have achicvcd nothing Surcly they w ill require you to stop your support o f ừoops and w eapons for South V ietnam , if only

on the su rfa c e If you firm ly required that the

us stop bom bing N orth V ietnam totally and unconditionally, and you will not com prom ise

on anything, this is an ultim atum But a real vvillingness to negotiate requires all parties to stop issuing ultim ate.” [8]

R egarding thc placc o f ncgotiations, Soviet Union also tricd lo persuadc V ietnam to accept Soviet proposal At thc beginning o f 1968, Soviet U nion proposcd to m eet in Moscovv or in

W arsaw In April 1968, Sovict U nion advised Prem ier M inister Pham V an D ong during his

v isit to Moscovv that N o rth V ictnam and

A m erica could m eet on a Soviet m ilitary ship