The social space and the genesis of groups (Pierre Bourdieu)

Inasmuch as the properties selected to construct this space are active properties, one can also describe it as a field of forces, i.e., as a set of objective power relations that impose

The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups

Pierre Bourdieu

Theory and Society, Vol 14, No 6 (Nov., 1985), pp 723-744.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0304-2421%28198511%2914%3A6%3C723%3ATSSATG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T

Theory and Society is currently published by Springer.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.orgSun Jan 27 05:44:07 2008

THE SOCIAL SPACE A N D THE GENESIS OF GROUPS

as a real class, a n effectively mobilized group Secondly, there has to be a break with the economism that leads one to reduce the social field, a multi-dimensional space, solely to the economic field, to the relations of economic production, which are thus constituted as co-ordinates of social position Finally, there has to be a break with the objectivism that goes hand-in-hand with intellectualism, and that leads one to ignore the symbolic struggles of which the different fields are the site, where what is at stake is the very representation of the social world and, in particular, the hierarchy within each of the fields and among the different fields

It is clear that I could easily minimize the difference with Marx, by, for example, tugging in my direction the notion of "position in the relations of production" through one of those structuralist "readings" that make it possible to produce a Marx revamped for modern tastes and yet more Marxist than Marx, and so to combine the gratifications of belonging to the circle of believers with the profits of heretical distinction But we are all so imbued, willy-nilly, consciously or not, with the problems that Marx has bequeathed to us, and with the false solutions he brought to them -class-in-itself and class-for-itself, working class and proletariat, and so on -that one must not be afraid to "twist the stick in the opposite direction."

The Social Space

Initially, sociology presents itself as a socialtopology Thus, the social world can be represented as a space (with several dimensions) constructed on the

College de France, Paris

Copyright O 1985 by Pierre Bourdieu

basis of principles of differentiation or distribution constituted by the set of properties active within the social universe in question, i.e., capable of conferring strength, power within that universe, on their holder Agents and groups of agents are thus defined by their relative positions within that space Each of them is assigned to a position or a precise class of neighboring positions (i.e., a particular region in this space) and onecannot really e v e n if one can in thought -occupy two opposite regions of the space Inasmuch as the properties selected to construct this space are active properties, one can also describe it as a field of forces, i.e., as a set of objective power relations that impose themselves on all who enter the field and that are irreducible to the intentions of the individual agents or even to the direct interactions

among the agents.2

The active properties that are selected a s principles of construction of the social space are the different kinds of power or capital that arecurrent in the different fields Capital, which may exist in objectified form - in the form of material properties - or, in the case of cultural capital, in theembodied state, and which may be legally guaranteed, represents a power over- the field (at a given moment) and, more precisely, over the accumulated product of past labor (in particular over the set of instruments of production) a n d thereby over the mechanisms tending t o ensure the production of a particular category of goods and so over a set of incomes and profits The kinds of capital, like the aces in a game of cards, are powers that define the chances of profit in a given field (in fact, to each field o r sub-field there corresponds a particular kind of capital, which is current, a s a power o r stake, in that game)

F o r example, the volume of cultural capital (the same thing would be true, mutatis mutandis, of the economic game) determines the aggregate chances of profit in all the games

i n which cultural capital is effective, thereby helping t o determine position in social space (to the extent that this is determined by success in the cultural field)

The position of a given agent within the social space can thus be defined by the positions he occupies in the different fields, that is, in the distribution of the powers that are active within each of them These are, principally, economic capital (in its different kinds), cultural capital

a n d social capital, a s well as symbolic capital, commonly called prestige, reputation, renown, etc., which is the form in which the different forms of capital are perceived and recognized as legitimate One can thus construct a simplified model of the social field as a whole that makes

it possible to conceptualize, for each agent, his o r her position in all possible spaces of competition (it being understood that, while each field has its own logic and its own hierarchy, the hierarchy that prevails a m o n g the different kinds of capital a n d the statistical link between the different types of assets tends t o impose its own logic o n the other fields)

The social field can be described as a multi-dimensional space of positions such that every actual position can be defined in terms of a multi-dimension- a1 system of co-ordinates whose values correspond to the values of the different pertinent variables Thus, agents are distributed within it, in the first dimension, according to the overall volume of the capital they possess and, in the second dimension, according to the composition of their capital i.e.,-according to the relative weight of the different kinds of assets within their total assets.3

The form that is taken, at every moment, in each social field, by the set of distributions of the different kinds of capital (embodied o r materialized), as instruments for the appropriation of the objectified product of accumulated social labor, defines the state of the power relations, institutionalized in long-lasting social statuses, socially recognized or legally guaranteed, between social agents objectively defined by their position in these relations; it d e t k m i n e s the actual or potential powers within the different fields and the chances of access t o the specific profits that they offer."

Knowledge of the position occupied in this space contains information a s t o the agents' intrinsic properties (their condition) and their relational properties (their position) This is seen particularly clearly in the case of the occupants of the intermediate o r middle positions, who, in addition to the average o r median values of their properties, owe a number of their

most typical properties t o the fact that they are situated between the t w o poles of the field, in

the neutral point of the space, and that they are balanced between the two extreme positions

Classes on Paper

On the basis of knowledge of the space of positions, one can separate out classes, in the logical sense of the word, i.e., sets of agents who occupy similar positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances This "class on paper" has the theoreticalexistence that is that

of theories: insofar as it is the product of an explanatory classification, entirely similar to those of zoologists or botanists, it makes it possible to explain and predict the practices and properties of the things classified -

including their group-forming practices It is not really a class, an actual class, in the sense of a group, a group mobilized for struggle; at most, it might

be called aprobable class, inasmuch as it is a set of agents that will present fewer hindrances to efforts at mobilization than any other set of agents Thus, contrary to the nominalist relativism that cancels out social differences

by reducing them to pure theoretical artifacts, one must therefore assert the existence of an objective space determining compatibilities and incompati- bilities, proximities and distances Contrary to the realism of the intelligible (or the reification of concepts), one must assert that the classes that can be separated out in social space (for example, for the purposes of the statistical analysis which is the only means of manifesting the structure of the social space) d o not exist as real groups although they explain the probability of individuals constituting themselves as practical groups, in families (homog- amy), clubs, associations, and even trade-union or political "movements." What does exist is a space of relationships that is as real as a geographical space, in which movements are paid for in work, in efforts and above all in time (moving up means raising oneself, climbing, and acquiring the marks,

- -

the stigmata, of this effort) Distances within it are also measured in time (time taken to rise or to convert capital, for example) And the probability of mobilization into organized movements, equipped with an apparatus and spokespersons, etc (precisely what leads one to talk of a "class") will be in inverse ratio to distance in this space While the probability of assembling a set of agents, really or nominally -through the power of the delegate -rises when they are closer in social space and belong to a more restricted and therefore more homogeneous constructed class, alliance between those who are closest is never necessary, inevitable (because the effects of immediate competition may act as a screen), and alliance between those most distant from each other is never impossible Though there is more chance of mobiliz- ing the set of workers than the set composed of workers and bosses, it is possible, in an international crisis, for example, to provoke a grouping on the basis of links of national identity (partly because, by virtue of its specific history, each national social space has its specific structure -e.g as regards hierarchical distances within the economic field)

Like "being," according to Aristotle, the social world can be uttered and constructed in different ways It may be practically perceived, uttered, con- structed, according to different principles of vision and division -for exam- ple, ethnic divisions But groupings grounded in the structure of the space constructed in terms of capital distribution are more likely to be stable and durable, while other forms of grouping are always threatened by the splits and oppositions linked to distances in social space T o speak of a social space means that one cannot group just anj.one with anj.one while ignoring the fundamental differences, particularly economic and cultural ones But this never entirely excludes the possibility of organizing agents in accordance with other principles of division ethnic or national ones, for example though it has to be remembered that these are generally linked to the fundamental principles, with ethnic groups themselves being at least roughly hierarchized in the social space, in the USA for example (through seniority in immigration).5

This marks a first break with the Marxist tradition More often than not, Marxism either summarily identifies constructed class with real class (in other words, as Marx complained about Hegel, it confuses the things of logic with the logic of things); or, when it does make the distinction, with the opposition between "class-in-itself," defined in terms of a set of objective conditions, and "class-for-itself," based on subjective factors, it described the movement from one to the other (which is always celebrated as nothing less than an ontological promotion) in terms of a logic that is either totally determinist or totally voluntarist In the former case, the transition is seen as

a logical, mechanical, or organic necessity (the transformation of the prole- tariat from class-in-itself to class-for-itself is presented as an inevitable effect

of time, of the "maturing of the objective conditions"); in the latter case, it is seen as the effect of an "awakening of consciousness" @rise cie consc,ience) conceived as a "taking cognizance" @rise tie c,onnaissance) of theory, per- formed under the enlightened guidance of the Party In all cases, there is no mention of the mysterious alchemy whereby a "group in struggle," a person- alized collective, a historical agent assigning itself its own ends, arises from the objective economic conditions

A sleight of hand removes the most essential questions: First, the very question of the political, of the specific action of the agents who, in the name

of a theoretical definition of the "class," assign to its members the goals offiiciall~ best matching their "objective" -i.e., theoretical -interests; and of the work whereby they manage to produce, if not the mobilized class, then belief in the existence of the class, which is the basis of the authority of its spokesmen Secondly, the question of the relationship between the would-be scientific classifications produced by the social scientist (in the same way as a zoologist) and the classifications that the agents themselves constantly pro- duce in their ordinary existence, and through which they seek to modify their position within the objective classifications or to modify the very principles that underlie these classifications

Perception of the Social World and Political Struggle

I'he most resolutely objectivist theory has to integrate the agents' representa- tion of the social world; more precisely, it must take account of thecontribu- tion that agents make towards constructing the view of the social world, and through this towards constructing this world by means of the \cork of'

r~yrr.smrurion (in all senses of the word) that they constantly perform in order to impose their view of the world or the view of their own position in this world -their social identity Perception of the social world is the product

of a double social structuration: on the "objective" side, it is socially struc- tured because the properties attached to agents or institutions d o not offer themselves independently to perception, but in combinations that are very unequally probable (and, just as animals with feathers are more likely to have wings than are animals with fur, so the possessors of a substantial cultural capital are more likely to be museum-goers than those who lack such capital); on the "subjective" side, it is structured because the schemes of perception and apppreciation available for use at the moment in question, especially those that are deposited in language, are the product of previous symbolic struggles and express the state of the symbolic power relations, in a

more or less transformed form The objects of the social world can be perceived and uttered in different ways because, like objects in the natural world, they always include a degree of indeterminacy and fuzziness owing-

to the fact, for example, that even the most constant combinations of properties are only founded on statistical connections between interchange- able features; and also because, as historical objects, they are subject to variations in time so that their meaning, insofar as it depends on the future, is itself in suspense, in waiting, dangling, and therefore relatively indetermi- nate This element of play, of uncertainty, is what provides a basis for the plurality of world views, itself linked to the plurality of points of view, and to all the symbolic struggles for the power to produce and impose the legitimate world-view and, more precisely, to all the cognitive "filling-in" strategies that produce the meaning of the objects of the social world by going beyond the directly visible attributes by reference to the future or the past This reference may be implicit and tacit, through what Husserl calls protention and reten- tion, practical forms of prospection or retrospection without a positing of the future and the past as such; or it may be explicit, as in political struggles, in which the past -with retrospective reconstruction of a past tailored to the needs of the present ("La Fayette, here we arem6) and especially the future, -with creative forecasting, are endlessly invoked, to determine, delimit, and define the always open meaning of the present

To point out that perception of the social world implies a n act of construc- tion in no way entails acceptance of an intellectualist theory of knowledge: the essential part of the experience of the social world and of the act of construction that it implies takes place in practice, below the level of explicit representation and verbal expression More like a class unconscious than a

"class consciousness" in the Marxist sense, the sense of the position occupied

in social space (what Erving Goffman calls the "sense of one's place") is the practical mastery of the social structure as a whole that reveals itself through the sense of the position occupied within that structure The categories of perception of the social world are, as regards their most essential features, the product of the internalization, the incorporation, of the objective structures

of social space Consequently, they incline agents to accept the social world

as it is, to take it for granted, rather than to rebel against it, to counterpose to

it different, even antagonistic, possibles The sense of one's place, as a sense

of what one can o r cannot "permit oneself," implies a tacit acceptance of one's place, a sense of limits ("that's not for the likes of us," etc.), or, which amounts to the same thing, a sense of distances, to be marked and kept, respected or expected And it does so all the more strongly where the conditions of existence are most rigorous and where the reality principle most rigorously asserts itself (Hence the profound realism that generally

characterizes the world view of the dominated; functioning as a sort of socially constituted instinct of conservation, it can be seen as conservative only in terms of a n external, and therefore normative, representation of the

"objective interest" of those whom it helps to live, or survive.)'

If objective power relations tend to reproduce themselves in views of the social world that contribute to the permanence of these relations, this is therefore because the structuring principles of a world view are rooted in the objective structures of the social world: power relations are also present in people's minds, in the form of the categories of perception of these relations However, the degree of indeterminacy and fuzziness in the objects of the social world, together with the practical, pre-reflexive and implicit nature of the schemes of perception and appreciation that are applied to them, is the Archimedean leverage point that is objectively offered for political action proper Knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, the categories that make it possible, are the stakes, par excellence, of political struggle, the inextricably theoretical and practical struggle for the power to conserve or transform the social word by conserving or transforming the categories through which it is perceived

The capacity to make entities exist in the explicit state, to publish, make public (i.e., render objectified, visible, and even official) what had not previously attained objective and collective existence and had therefore remained in the state of individual o r serial existence -people's malaise, anxiety, disquiet, expectations -represents a formidable social power, the power to make groups by making the common sense, the explicit consensus,

of the whole group In fact, this work of categorization, i.e., of making-ex- plicit and of classification, is performed incessantly, at every moment of ordinary existence, in the struggles in which agents clash over the meaning of the social world and of their position within it, the meaning of their social identity, through all the forms of benediction or malediction, eulogy, praise, congratulations, compliments, or insults, reproaches, criticisms, accusa-tions, slanders, etc It is no accident that the verb kategoresthai, which gives

US our "categories" and "categoremes," means to accuse publicly

It becomes clear why one of the elementary forms of political power, in many archaic societies, consisted in the quasi-magical power to name and to make-exist by virtue of naming Thus in traditional Kabylia, the function of making-explicit and the work of symbolic production that the poets per- formed, particularly in crisis situations, when the meaning of the world slips away, conferred on them major political functions, those of the warlord or

a m b a s s a d ~ r ~But with the growing differentiation of the social world and

the constitution of relatively autonomous fields, the work of producing and imposing meaning is carried on in and through the struggles within the field

of cultural production (particularly the political sub-field); it becomes the particular concern, the specific interest, of the professional producers of objectified representations of the social world or, more precisely, of methods

Gestalten,exist objectively, and that the proximity of conditions, and there- fore of dispositions, tends to be translated into durable linkages and group- ings, immediately perceptible social units, such as socially distinct regions or neighborhoods (with spatial segregation), or sets of agents endowed with entirely similar visible properties, such as Weber's Stande But the fact remains that socially known and recognized differences only exist for a subject capable not only of perceiving differences but of recognizing them as significant, interesting, i.e., only for a subject endowed with the capacity and inclination to make the distinctions that are regarded as significant in the social universe in question

Thus, particularly through properties and their distributions, the social world achieves, objectively, the status of a symbolic sj.stem, which, like the system of phonemes, is organized according to the logic of difference, differential deviation, thereby constituted as significant distinction The social space, and the differences that "spontaneously" emerge within it, tends

to function symbolically as a space of life-st-yles or as a set of Stande, of groups characterized by different life-styles

Distinction does not necessarily imply the pursuit of distinction, as is often supposed, following Veblen and his theory of conspicuous consumption All consumption and, more generally, all practice, is "conspicuous," visible whether or not it is performed in order to he

seen; it is distinctive, whether or not it springs from the intention of being "conspicuous," standing out, of distinguishing oneself or behaving with distinction As such, it inevitably functions as a distinctive sign and, when the difference is recognized, legitimate and approved, as a sign qf'distinction (in all senses of the phrase) However, because social agents are capable of perceiving as significant distinctions the "spontaneous" distinctions that their categories of perception lead them to regard as pertinent, it follows that they are also capable

of intentionally underscoring these spontaneous differences in life-style by what Weber calls

"the stylization of life" (die Stilisierung des Lebens) The pursuit of distinction which may

be expressed in ways of speaking or the refusal of misalliances produces separations intended to be perceived or, more precisely, known and recognized, as legitimate differences,

Distinction -in the ordinary sense of the word -is the difference inscribed in the very structure of the social space when perceived through categories adapted to that structure; and the Weberian Stand, which is often contrasted with the Marxist class, is the class constructed by a n adequate division of social space, when perceived through categories derived from the structure of that space Symbolic capital -another name for distinction -is nothing other than capital, in whatever form, when perceived by an agent endowed with categories of perception arising from the internalization (embodiment) of the structure of its distribution, i.e., when it is known and recognized as self-evi- dent Distinctions, as symbolic transfigurations of de facto differences, and, more generally, ranks, orders, grades, and all other symbolic hierarchies, are the product of the application of schemes of construction that, like (for example) the pairs of adjectives used to utter most social judgements, are the product of the internalization of the structures to which they are applied; and the most absolute recognition of legitimacy is nothing other than the appre- hension of the everyday world as self-evident that results from the quasi-per- fect coincidence of objective structures and embodied structures

It follows, among other things, that symbolic capital goes to symbolic capital, and that the -real -autonomy of the field of symbolic production does not prevent it being dominated, in its functioning, by the constraints that dominate the social field, so that objective power relations tend to reproduce themselves in symbolic power relations, in views of the social world that help to ensure the permanence of these power relations In the struggle to impose the legitimate view of the social world, in which science itself is inevitably involved, agents yield a power proportionate to their symbolic capital, i.e., to the recognition they receive from a group The authority that underlies the performative efficacy of discourse about the social world, the symbolic strength of the views and forecasts aimed at imposing principles of vision and division of the social world, is apercipi, a being-known and being-recognized (this is the etymology of nobilis), which makes it possible to impose a percipere Those most visible in terms of the prevailing categories of perception are those best placed to change the vision

by changing the categories of perception But also, on the whole, those least inclined to d o so

The Symbolic Order and the Power to Nominate

In the symbolic struggle over the production of common sense, or, more precisely, for the monopoly of legitimate naming, that is to say, official i.e.,-explicit and public -imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world, agents engage the symbolic capital they have acquired in previous struggles,

in particular, all the power they possess over the instituted taxonomies, inscribed in minds or in objectivity, such as qualifications Thus, all the symbolic strategies through which agents seek t o impose their vision of the divisions of the social world and their position within it, can be located between two extremes: the insult, an idios logos with which a n individual tries t o impose his point of view while taking the risk of reciprocity, and

official nomination, an act of symbolic imposition that has behind it all the strength of the collective, the consensus, the common sense, because it is performed by a delegated agent of the State, the holder of the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence On the one hand, there is the world of particu- lar perspectives, singular agents who, from their individual viewpoint, their personal position, produce particular, self-interested namings, of themselves and others (nicknames, by-names, insults, even accusations, slanders), that lack the capacity to force recognition, and therefore to exert a symbolic effect, to the extent that their authors are less authorized and have a more direct interest in forcing recognition of the viewpoint they seek to impose.9

On the other hand, there is the authorized viewpoint of an agent authorized,

in his personal capacity, such as a "major critic," a prestigious prefacer or a consecrated author (cf Zola's "J'accuse"), and, above all, the legitimate viewpoint of the authorized spokesman of the mandated representative of the State, the "plane of all perspectives," in Leibniz's phrase - official nomination, the "entitlement" (tirre) that, like the academic qualification (titre scolaire), is valid on all markets and that, as an official definition of official identity, rescues its holders from the symbolic struggle of all against all, by uttering the authorized, universally recognized perspective on all social agents The State, which produces the official classifications, is in a sense the supreme tribunal t o which Kafka refers in The Trial when he has Block say of the advocate and his claim t o be one of the "great advocates":

"Any man can call himself 'great,' of course, if he pleases, but in this matter the Court tradition must decide." The fact is that scientific analysis does not have to choose between perspectivism and what has to be called absolutism; the truth of the social world is the stake in struggle between agents very unequally equipped to achieve absolute, i.e., self-fulfilling, vision and fore- casting

One could analyze in this light the functioning of an institution like the French national statistics office, INSEE, a state institute that produces official taxonomies, invested with quasi-legal authority, particularly, in relations between employers and employees, that of the title, capable of conferring rights independent of actual productive activity In so doing,

it tends to fix the hierarchies and thus to sanction and consecrate a power relationship between the agents with respect t o the names of trades and occupations, an essential component of social identity.10 The management of names is one of the ways of managing material scarcity, and the names of groups, especially occupational groups, record a state of the struggles and bargaining over official designations and the material and symbolic

advantages associated with them The occupational name that is conferred o n agents, the title they are given, is one of the positive o r negative retributions (on the same footing a s their salary), inasmuch a s it is a distinctive mark (an emblem o r stigma) that receives its \,sluefrom its position in a hierarchically organized system of titles and that thereby helps t o determine the relative positions of agents and groups Consequently, agents have recourse t o practical

o r symbolic strategies aimed a t maximizing the symbolic profit of naming: for example, they may decline the economic gratifications provided by one j o b in order t o occupy a less well-paid but more prestigiously named position; o r they may try to move towards positions whose designation is less precise a n d so escape the effects of symbolic devaluation Similarly,

in stating their personal identity, they may give themselves a name that includes them in a class sufficiently broad t o contain agents occupying positions superior to their own: for example, in France, a primary school teacher, a n instituteur, may refer t o himself as a n

enseignant, thereby implying that he might be a lycee teacher o r a university teacher More

generally, they always have a choice between several names a n d they can play o n the uncertainties and the effects of vagueness linked t o the plurality of perspectives so a s to try to escape the verdict of the official taxonomy

But the logic of official naming is most clearly seen in the case of all the symbolic property rights that in French are called titres titles of nobility, -educational qualifications, professional titles Titles are symbolic capital, socially and even legally recognized The noble is not just someone who is known (nobilis), noteworthy, well-regarded, recognized; the noble also is someone recognized by an official, "universal" tribunal, in other words known and recognized by all The professional or academic title is a kind of legal rule of social perception, a "being-perceived" guaranteed as a right It is symbolic capital in an institutionalized, legal (and no longer merely legiti- mate) form Increasingly inseparable from the academic qualification, since the educational system increasingly tends to represent the ultimate and only guarantee of professional titles, it has a value in itself and, although it is a

"common noun," it functions like a "great name" (the name of a great family

o r a proper name), securing all sorts of symbolic profits (and assets that cannot be obtained directly with money).11 It is the symbolic scarcity of the title in the space of the names of professions that tends to govern the rewards

of the occupation (and not the relationship between the supply of and demand for a particular form of labor) It follows from this that the rewards

of the title tend to acquire autonomy with respect to the rewards of labor Thus, the same work may receive different renumeration depending on the titles of the person who does it (e.g., tenured, official post-holder (titulaire) as opposed to a part-timer (intkrimaire) or someone "acting" Cfaisant fonction)

in that capacity, etc.) Since the title is in itself an institution (like language) that is more durable than the intrinsic characteristics of the work, the rewards of the title may be maintained despite changes in the work and its relative value It is not the relative value of the work that determines the value

of the name, but the institutionalized value of the title that can be used as a means of defending or maintaining the value of the work.12