HINDU NATIONALISM AND THE RISE OF CASTE-BASED PARTIES IN NORTH INDIA Yamini Vasudevan A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES SOUTH AS
Trang 1HINDU NATIONALISM AND THE RISE OF
CASTE-BASED PARTIES IN NORTH INDIA
Yamini Vasudevan
A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES PROGRAMME
2007
Trang 2Chapter 2: The Sangh Parivar and the
- Revival of religious nationalism in the 1980s 26
- Caste – The regional barometer of the north 33
Chapter 3: The BJP and caste-based parties (I):
- Politics of the post-Ramajanambhoomi phase 47
Chapter 4: The BJP and caste-based parties (II):
- Early 1990s: Expansion and consolidation of the BJP in UP 70
Trang 3- Mid to late 1990s: Impact of post-Mandal developments 73
- Caste (mis-) management – The Kalyan affair 78
- The 1999 elections – Battling the odds 82
- Early 2000 to 2004 elections – Coalitions and challenges 85
- The 2004 elections – Picking up the pieces 92
- The 2004 elections and the BJP –
- In retrospect – Re-visiting the BJP’s journey 105
- Looking to the future: Whither the BJP, whither Hindutva? 108
Trang 4
Abstract
The rise of Hindu nationalism and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as a major force in
Indian politics in the early 1990s is an oft-examined topic of contemporary Indian
political history However, the progress of the BJP in the 1990s met several challenges,
the strongest of which centred on the rise of caste-based parties as key state-level political
mediators in north India Whilst the Mandal Commission’s recommendations made caste
a central element of target voter bases and electoral appeal, deep-seated processes from
the 1970s spurred the rise of caste-based parties The rise of caste-based parties
challenged the pan-Indian overtones of Hindutva and the BJP’s attempts to consolidate
the ‘Hindu vote’ – for acknowledging caste-based parties as political partners meant a
dilution of commitment towards the Sangh Parivar’s call for a united Hindu society The
BJP’s handling of this ideological and political problematic, the effect this had on the
party’s character and functioning, and the transformation effected on Hindu nationalism
as a result of these challenges, forms the central queries of this thesis
Trang 5Acknowledgements
This thesis was undertaken whilst in receipt of the Graduate Research Scholarship by the National University of Singapore The grant was very helpful, and is gratefully acknowledged
Several people were instrumental in the writing of this thesis Foremost amongst them was my supervisor, Dr Rajesh Rai – a friend, philosopher and guide in the true sense of every word His insightful comments and analysis were important to making this thesis complete, whilst his constant motivation kept me going till the end I also thank Prof Peter Reeves for his guidance through the years Whatever little I may have gained by way of knowledge in the realm of academic research, I owe it to him
Needless to say, my family played one of the most important roles during this time Despite being away from me, they never made the distance felt They were my constant source of encouragement and support Even though we were separated by time zones, it was very comforting to know they were just a phone call away, no matter what the time
A special thank you to Saras, my best friend She always made time to listen to my tales
of woe, helped to strengthen my resolve and enlivened my day – she was my Duracell battery Thanks also to Kumeresh, a special friend, for keeping my spirits high through one of the toughest stages of my writing, and for putting a smile on my face no matter how dark the day
A hearty thank you to all my graduate roommates for all the good times we spent together, especially Sathia I take back with me some very memorable moments
There are many others who have stood by me through these years, and touched me with their concern and words of encouragement Thank you to all
Yamini Vasudevan
Trang 6Abbreviations
BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party
BJS: Bharatiya Jan Sangh
BSP: Bahujan Samaj Party
JP: Janata Party
MP: Member of Parliament
NDA: National Democratic Alliance
OBC: Other Backward Classes
RSS: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SC: Scheduled Castes
SP: Samajwadi Party
UP: Uttar Pradesh
VHP: Vishwa Hindu Parishad
Trang 7Introduction
Hindu nationalism and Indian politics
In the late 1980s, India witnessed a surge in support for militant Hindu nationalism
espoused by the umbrella group of organizations known as the Sangh Parivar The
change was a significant one in that it had occurred after nearly five decades of secular
post independence history, and prompted academics worldwide to ponder if the country
was on the verge of an identity crisis Their concerns were heightened when the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its sibling Hindu nationalist organizations launched the
Ramjanambhoomi campaign, which sought to ‘liberate’ the birthplace of the Hindu god
Ram in Ayodhya in the state of Uttar Pradesh in 1990-91 Despite the fact that it left
behind a trail of communal riots and at least 2000 people dead, the movement became
extremely popular in the Hindi belt and acted as a launch pad for the BJP into Indian
politics In the 1991 General Elections, held in the aftermath of the Ramjanambhoomi
movement, the BJP emerged as the second largest party in the Lok Sabha with 120 seats
and 20 per cent of the vote share For a party that had scraped up a humiliating tally of 2
seats in 1984, this was a tremendous achievement In effect, the BJP seemed poised to
emerge as a plausible successor to the Congress’s mantle at the Center, and alongside it,
Hindutva as a possible alternative ideology in Indian politics.1
1
Jaffrelot, Christophe The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics: 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies
of identity-building, implantation and mobilization London: Hurst & Company 1996
Trang 8Contrary to expectations, the post-Ramjanambhoomi movement period made it amply
clear that the BJP’s standing was far less secure than it appeared In December 1992,
members of the Hindu nationalist combine demolished the Babri Masjid in line with the
promised aim of building a Ram temple in its place However, in an ironical turn of
events, Ayodhya failed to capture the public imagination as it had the previous year The
violent backlash that followed in many parts of north India had an unsettling effect on the
population, and robbed the movement of its earlier credibility More importantly, the
impetus of regional politics had by this time shifted away from inter-religious differences
to caste cleavages and caste-based parties – with the result that religious majoritarianism
had lost much of its new found potency, and was instead challenged by the advent of a
new form of politics that centered on caste-based affiliations
The intersection of the differentiated trajectories of Hindu nationalism and caste politics
in the mid 1990s was not a coincidence, but rather the convergence of two parallel
movements that had been engendered, and later aided, by the institutional and electoral
decline of the Congress from the 1970s onwards In the post-independence period, the
Congress had instituted an extensive network of patronage politics that relied on local
notables to help bring together diverse social groups (including Upper castes, Scheduled
Castes (SC), and Muslims) under a common political umbrella, thereby allowing little
room for alternative parties to carve out their individual spheres of influence In the
1970s and 80s, the growing tendency towards centralization of decision-making and
operation processes by the Congress leadership led to the degeneration of the clientelistic
structure, and eroded the party’s control over its ‘coalition of extremes’ As the system
Trang 9began to crumble, differentiated political voices and demands began to emerge from the
cracks, which became manifest in the form of political parties over time Along with the
Congress’s decline, the party’s populist, inclusive rhetoric began to lose its importance,
and in its place, political appeal based on communal and community identities began to
dominate the electoral and political circles In other words, the Indian polity came to be
fragmented on religious and caste lines, freeing up the space and opportunity for
differentiated political parties to carve out niche vote banks from those population
segments hitherto appropriated by the Congress The BJP was one of the beneficiaries of
this change; caste-based parties were another
The developments mentioned above were subtle and had no perceptible impact on the
BJP’s career, especially in the early years following its formation in 1980 In the initial
period, the BJP decided to follow a moderate strategy that relied on Integral Humanism2
as its guiding principle and refrained from making direct overtures to religion However,
the strategy failed, and the party faced a humiliating defeat in the 1984 Parliament
elections when it managed to secure only 2 seats Faced with increasing pressure from the
Sangh Parivar to assert its core identity, the party reverted to a hard line Hindutva stance
and began to revive its efforts towards reinforcing ‘Hindu’ identity, with particular
reference to the opposing ‘Other’, which was centered on the Muslims in the
sub-continent It was an ironic coincidence that by the mid 1980s, the Congress too had begun
2
A treatise written in 1965 by RSS ideologue Deendayal Upadhyaya, ‘Integral Humanism’ set forth a moderate socio-economic agenda that rejected westernization, and advocated a Gandhian socio-economic model that focused on indigenous production, small-scale industries, and national culture based on traditionalist ideals as the best means of progress Integral Humanism was key to the foundation of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the predecessor of the BJP, and played a crucial role in creating an alternative
ideological avenue for Hindu nationalists Upadhyaya, Deendayal Integral Humanism 1965 (Taken from
a series of four lectures delivered in Bombay in April 1965 Source: www.bjp.org/history/human.htm)
Trang 10to rely on religious rhetoric and symbolism to revive its waning popularity, thereby
relaxing the strict adherence to secularism and legitimizing the incorporation of religion
into politics This proved a major advantage for the BJP, for the Congress had indirectly
sanctioned religious propaganda as a legitimate form of political appeal In addition, the
Congress’s lack of ideological coherence in its decisions over major politico-religious
issues like the Shah Bano case3 eroded popular faith in both the party’s capability for governance and the viability of secularism, and thrust Hindu nationalism forward in new
light as a viable political ideology
A significant feature of the Sangh Parivar’s efforts at religious revival in the 1980s
involved the organizations’ concerted attempts to conspicuously ‘incorporate’ lower
castes within the Hindu fold – a move that was a consequence of the Hindu nationalists’
vulnerability vis-à-vis the other religious groups that drew on the social stigma suffered
by lower caste groups to propagate proselytisation It is important to note that the stress
on inter-caste harmonization was not a new feature in Hindu nationalist ideology In the
early stages of the Hindu nationalist movement, there had been several initiatives by
reformers to ease the barriers of caste and commence the process of integration of lower
castes, such as through Shuddhi or purification rituals advocated by the Arya Samaj for
the reintegration of Untouchables into Hindu society The difference lay in the fact that
whilst these early initiatives were intended primarily to restructure the caste system so as
to diminish the stigma associated with ‘lower’ caste status, the Sangh Parivar, especially
3
The Shah Bano case concerned the Congress’s controversial decision to override the Supreme Court’s judgment over the alimony to be paid to a divorced Muslim lady called Shah Bano For more details, see Chapter 2, pp 31-32
Trang 11the RSS, took the idea a step further and aimed to institute a pan-Hindu identity that
would subsume all internal sub-divisions completely over time
Whilst the RSS acted as the social medium of change from the grassroots, the BJP played
the role of the negotiator of Hindu nationalist interests in the political sphere
Conventionally, the BJP derived much of its electoral support from the upper-caste, urban
middle class segments, on account of their receptivity to the RSS’s traditionalist ethos
and culture In the early 1990s, the party had made better progress due to the popularity
of the Ramjanambhoomi movement, but its appeal was still restricted to the upper-caste
segments of the population Given the limited demographic presence of the upper castes
(about 15 per cent of the Hindu population), the party was hard pressed to expand its
support base amongst the lower caste segments in order to strengthen its standing This
was an ideological necessity as well, to complement the Sangh Parivar’s efforts to
institutionalize ethno-religious criteria as the primary determinant of identity In doing so,
however, the BJP was challenged by the rise of caste-based parties, which advocated a
contradictory form of politics that placed caste identity at the heart of their socio-political
agenda – one that demanded the redistribution of power to lower castes as the means of
retribution for the material and psychological deprivation suffered by them in the past
Rise of caste-based parties
The rise of caste-based parties in the Hindi belt was relatively delayed when compared to
the south, where they had begun to dominate the political scene since the 1950s and 60s
The lack of a collective political consciousness on part of the lower castes in the north
Trang 12was a result of contextual limitations including the strong demographic presence of the
upper castes (10 to 15 per cent in the north as compared to 3 to 5 per cent in the south);
and the prevalence of the Zamindari system of land ownership, which concentrated
power in the hands of a select section of the population In addition, the perceived
superiority of upper-caste ethics led to the promulgation of a culture that relied primarily
on Sanskritisation or the emulation of upper-caste practices as the means of social
mobility, thereby strengthening the ‘moral’ authority of the upper castes on the one hand,
and diminishing the chances of socio-political organization of lower castes on the other.4
Lower caste empowerment received a strong thrust from two movements in the 1960s
and ‘70s – the peasant-based mobilisation led by Charan Singh and the socialism-oriented
movement initiated by Ram Manohar Lohia – which helped lay the foundations for the
rise of caste-based parties in the 1980s and 90s.5 More importantly, the two movements acted as a catalyst for the mobilization of lower castes into horizontal interest groups and
the propagation of the idea that the fulfillment of collective socio-political interests was
the key to the realization of personal benefits as well Caste-based parties carried this idea
further and prioritized the capture of political power as the primary means for the
emancipation of the lower castes from the suppression they had suffered to date The
argument rested on the premise that “the capture of political power will automatically
transform the composition of the bureaucratic elite”6 – a sign, as Varshney notes, that the
4
Jaffrelot, Christophe India’s silent revolution: The rise of lower castes in north India London: Hurst & Company 2003 See also Varshney, Ashutosh “Is India becoming more democratic?” in The Journal of Asian Studies Vol 59, No 1 Feb 2000 p 19
Trang 13caste-based parties had realised that “it [wa]s time now to play the game of democratic
politics more equally.”7
Mandal and Mandir – Dual ideologies
The inherent ideological contradiction between caste-based parties and Hindu nationalists
came to light in 1989 when the incumbent Prime Minister V.P Singh announced the
implementation of the Mandal Commission reforms, which entailed the reservation of up
to 27 per cent of seats in government jobs and education for the Other Backward Classes
(OBC), apart from the existent reservation of jobs for the Scheduled Castes.8 The government’s announcement elicited a harsh response from the upper castes, which
included public immolation by several students, who viewed the measure as an
encroachment of their traditional dominance in the sectors of bureaucracy and higher
education Although a member of the ruling coalition government, the BJP condemned
Singh’s move and opposed the ‘positive’ discrimination measures as divisive and
eventually harmful to society at large The BJP’s reaction helped to strengthen the party’s
image as well as its standing amongst the upper castes, but it also added weight to the
caste-based parties’ allegation that Hindutva was a pseudonym for Brahmanism, and the
BJP was the political guardian of the upper castes
In the early 1990s, the polarization of opinion had little impact on the BJP due to the
party’s ability to deflect public attention to the realm of Hindu-Muslim relations through
the Ramjanambhoomi movement However, once the communal dust had settled,
Trang 14based parties began to dominate politics at the state level The ability of caste-based
parties to stake their claim to regional power lay in their ability to fuse together ascriptive
categorization and socio-political connotation,9 which helped to overcome the presence
of multiple sub-divisions within the community as well as their lack of geographic
concentration The extent of the caste-based parties’ strength in representative politics
was made clear by the mid-1990s For example, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which
identified itself as the spokes-party of the Dalits, bolstered its standing from merely 2.5
per cent of the vote share in the 1985 elections to 16 per cent in 1989, and later 21 per
cent of the vote share in the 1998 elections Given that SCs and OBCs together
constituted nearly 60 per cent of the total Hindu population, caste-based parties had a
huge support base to tap into
It is important to note that the rise of caste-based parties was aided by shifts in the
political system at the center as well By the mid-1990s, the single-dominant-party
system prominent until the late 1980s had given way to a “bi-modal, multi-party
system”10 wherein “two major or national political parties [were] manoeuvring within a large vortex of small regional parties.”11 Major national parties, namely the Congress, the BJP and the Janata Dal, no longer functioned as individual political agents, but rather
acted as poles around which regional parties formed coalitions In other words,
9
Chandra, Kanchan The Transformation of ethnic politics in India: The decline of Congress and the rise of
the Bahujan Samaj Party in Hoshiarpur” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 59, No 1 (Feb 2000) pp
26-61
10
Wallace, Paul “Introduction: India's 1998 election – Hindutva, the tail wags the elephant, and Pokhran”
in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace 1999 Indian politics and the 1998 election: regionalism, Hindutva
and state politics New Delhi: Sage Publications p 17
11
Ibid
Trang 15[By the 1990s], the overall logic of electoral politics in India had over the
last decade been transformed in such a way that the locus classicus of
political power in India – the one-party dominance at the centre which
remain[ed] the tantalizing object of BJP’s strategies – seem[ed] to have
become a thing of the past.12
Thus, to form alliances with regional parties as a means to obtain power was no longer an
option, but a compulsion However, the process of forming and maintaining steady
alliances with caste-based parties was fraught with ideological and practical concerns for
the BJP Unlike the RSS, which firmly believed in the long term transformation of
society as the primary aim of Hindutva, the BJP’s immediate concern was the need to
establish its presence beyond its niche support bases in order to maintain its place in the
running for power Yet, to acknowledge the caste-based parties’ presence and/or their aim
of empowerment posed an ideological dichotomy, for Hindutva advocated a pan-Hindu
identity that derided sectarian divisions Furthermore, the BJP’s emergence as a
prominent political agent was in large part derived from the shift of a large section of the
upper-caste vote in its favor in the post-math of the Mandal affair Hence, by forming an
alliance with caste-based parties, the BJP faced the threat of alienating its core support
base, in turn weakening its stability in the political sphere The need of the hour was thus
for a strategy that helped to balance the party’s traditionalist stance with the
accommodation of caste issues Whether the BJP was able to do so, and overcome the
challenge or not, forms the central query of this thesis
12
Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds 1998 The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India 2nd Ed New Delhi: Oxford University Press p 2
Trang 16Literature review
A thesis that places Hindu nationalism as its central focus might seem redundant given
the glut of literature available on the subject With some exceptions,13 Hindu nationalism took the academic spotlight from the mid to late 1980s, when the Sangh Parivar began to
emerge as a prominent force in Indian society and politics With the rise of the
Ramjanambhoomi movement as a pan-north Indian concern, it was evident that the surge
in support for religious nationalism was the result of deep-rooted developments that had
altered the political landscape of the Hindi belt significantly It might be argued at this
point that such a development was imminent given the strong presence of traditional
Hindu elements in the social psyche of this region, even as part of the Congress’s
functional agenda, since the pre-independence period However, until the late 1980s,
there was little by way of formal support for religious majoritarianism as a political
ideology – as was seen from the failure of the BJS, and even the BJP in its early stages, to
attain a reasonable level of popular acceptance and success The change was thus one that
spanned many dimensions and hence, created a need to interpret the nature of Hindutva
as a socio-political ideology, and gain a better understanding of its influence in
contemporary Indian society and politics
Studies on Hindu nationalism have been so numerous and comprehensive that it is near
impossible to account for all of them Hence, this brief review takes up some of the broad
strands of study that encompass much of the relevant literature on this subject The first
Trang 17amongst these is the focus on the ideological and socio-political origins of Hindu
nationalism Most studies place the genesis of Hindu nationalism at the late 19th century, wherein the conjunction of two strands of nationalist thought – Indian nationalism and
Hindu revivalism – produced a synthesized ideology that was secular as well as religious
The unique, or ironic, blend of elements was derived to a large extent from the influence
of European scholarship on the Indian elite, as a result of which the Indian elite attempted
to emulate the West subconsciously,14 yet outwardly sought to reinstate a national identity that was shaped by elements of Indian tradition and culture Significantly,
Hinduism was seen as the only religion capable of engendering and sustaining such a
transformation The centrality of Hinduism to the nationalist movement was further
strengthened by the formation of religious and socio-political organizations (Arya Samaj,
Hindu Mahasabha) and mass-based movements (the Cow Protection movement), which
helped to disseminate and strengthen a growing sense of religious consciousness.15 It is noteworthy that the influence was not limited to Hindu revivalists alone – the Congress’s
‘secular’ framework was itself constituted of traditionalist Hindu elements, especially at
the state level.16
There is common consensus that Hindu nationalist ideology was ‘formalized’ in the early
1920s when V.D Savarkar sought to provide a comprehensive definition of the ‘Hindu’
14
Chatterjee, Partha Bengal politics and the Muslim masses, 1920-47 in Hasan, Mushirul, ed 1993
India's partition : process, strategy, and mobilization Delhi: Oxford University Press; Prakash, Gyan
Body politic in colonial India in Mitchell, Timothy 2000 Questions of modernity Minneapolis; London:
University of Minnesota Press
Gould, William 2004 Hindu nationalism and the language of politics in late colonial India New
York: Cambridge University Press
Trang 18based on multiple markers of geography, race, religion and ethnicity in his thesis
Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (First published in 1923).17 Savarkar’s work was instrumental to the development of Hindu nationalism for two important reasons: firstly,
the centrality of religion to the definition of the nation and its citizenry marked the point
of divergence between Hindu and Indian nationalism; and secondly, it provided a basis
for the creation of an inclusive socio-political identity that could effectively override the
presence of sectarian divisions within Hindu society Despite his not being a member of
the RSS, Savarkar’s work was to prove a central reference point for Hindu nationalists,
especially the RSS The borrowing of ideological precepts can be seen from RSS
ideologue Golwalkar’s work, We or our nationhood defined (first published in 1939),
which provides a similar set of defining features for the Hindu, albeit in an extreme,
fascist framework.18
The importance of Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s works to contemporary Hindu nationalist
ideology derives from their ability to provide a firm theoretical basis that legitimizes the
exclusion of followers of other religions, especially Muslims, from the right to ‘belong’
in the country of their birth.19 Studies of the Ramjanambhoomi movement20 point to the centrality of this element to the campaign, especially with regard to the stress on the
moderated version of his ideological percepts in his next work, Bunch of thoughts Details: Golwalkar,
M.S 1966 Bunch of Thoughts Bangalore: Vikrama Prakashan
19
Pandey, Gyanendra, ed 1993 Hindus and others: The question of identity in India today New Delhi;
New York: Viking
Trang 19‘Muslim’ origins of the mosque and the call for the demonstration of ‘Hindu’ pride
through participation in the effort to replace it with a temple Apart from this central
focus, the literature on the Ramjanambhoomi movement has dealt with several aspects
that relate to the larger socio-economic forces shaping the country’s psyche such as the
importance of media in shaping the public imagination, with particular reference to the
televised series, Ramayana;21 the means by which socio-economic grievances had been contextualized within religion;22 and the contributory factors to, and impact of, communal rioting and its impact on political and social structures.23
Another dimension of the study of Hindu nationalism concentrates on the core
organizations that constitute the Sangh Parivar Of these, the RSS has received
considerable attention, given its primacy as the foundation upon which the Sangh Parivar
was built On a general note, the RSS is often perceived as the progenitor and inheritor of
the fascist tradition of Hindu nationalism, largely because of the extremist leanings of the
organization in the 1930s and 40s Although the RSS moderated much of its rhetoric and
maintained its distance from politics in the post-independence period, certain elements
that continued to be retained, such as the para-military style of its training and
organization in the shakas24, sustained the stereotype of the organization This perception
21
Rajagopal, Arvind 2001 Politics after television: Religious nationalism and the reshaping of the
Indian public New York: Cambridge University Press
22
Nandy, Ashis et al 1995 Creating a nationality: The Ramjanmabhumi movement and fear of the self
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
23
McGuire, John, Peter Reeves and Howard Brasted, eds 1996 Politics of violence: From Ayodhya to
Behrampada New Delhi; Thousand Oaks: Sage; Hansen, Thomas Blom 1999 The saffron wave: Democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press
24
Shakas is the term used to refer to local branches or centers of the RSS
Trang 20has been tempered to some extent by studies in recent times,25 which have highlighted the different aspects of the ideology, structure and functioning of the RSS In particular, these
studies have dealt with important issues including the spread and development of Hindu
nationalism in the post-independence period, the manner in which Hindu nationalism has
come to be ingrained within the social and political culture of north India, and the limits
to the RSS’s ‘non-involvement’ with politics
The steady growth in membership over the years from mere hundreds to over a million in
recent times is a result of the RSS’s modus operandi that institutes cadre based networks
throughout the country, which in turn implant memberships at the local level Underlying
this strategy is the RSS’s disregard for short-term social or numerical gain, with the sole
aim of transforming society over time from the grassroots The RSS’s strategy is
complemented by its social welfare wings such as the ‘Sewa Bharti’ and schools like
‘Sanskrit Kendra’ and ‘Saraswathi Shishu Mandir’, which work with lower-caste or tribal
groups In recent times, these initiatives have come under criticism on account of the
25
Andersen, Walter K and Shridhar D Damle 1987 The brotherhood in saffron: The Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu revivalism New Delhi: Vistaar Publications; Basu, Tapan et al 1993 Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right New Delhi: Orient Longman Viking
25
Basu, Tapan et al 1993 Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right New Delhi: Orient Longman; Katju, Manjari 2003 The Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Indian politics Hyderabad: Orient Longman; McKean, Lise 1996 Divine enterprise: Gurus and the Hindu nationalist movement
Chicago: University of Chicago Press
University Press.; Jaffrelot, Christophe 1996 The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics, 1925
to the 1990s: Strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilization London: Hurst & Company;
Kanungo, Pralay 2003 RSS’s tryst with politics: From Hedgewar to Sudarshan Delhi: Manohar
Publisher and Distributors
Trang 21organizations’ efforts to propagate a synthesized set of Hindu practices that could
promulgate attachment to the religion and the society simultaneously – a practice that is
seen as representative of the RSS’s underlying pro-Brahminical ethos, and contradictory
to its claims of a casteless agenda.26 Nevertheless, despite the questions raised over the nature of its ideological commitment, there is common consensus that the RSS is the
primary representative of Hindutva in Indian society over the years
Whilst other organizations within the Sangh Parivar such as the VHP27 have also received considerable attention, the BJP commands a special place in academic discourse on
account of its role as the sole envoy of the Sangh Parivar’s interests in the political forte
Although focus on the BJP intensified only in the late 1980s, the studies that have
emerged since have been extensive and numerous, especially when compared to the
works on the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS).28 The general themes of analysis include the BJP’s ideology, strategy and functioning.29 Amongst these, an oft-examined topic of analysis centers on the timing of the rise of the BJP in Indian politics Given the close-
26
Jaffrelot, Christophe 1996 The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics, 1925 to the 1990s:
Strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilization London: Hurst & Company; Pandey,
Gyanendra, ed 1993 Hindus and others: The question of identity in India today New Delhi; New York: Viking; Basu, Tapan et al 1993 Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right New
Delhi: Orient Longman
27
Basu, Tapan et al 1993 Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right New Delhi: Orient Longman; Katju, Manjari 2003 The Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Indian politics Hyderabad: Orient Longman; McKean, Lise 1996 Divine enterprise: Gurus and the Hindu nationalist movement
Chicago: University of Chicago Press
University Press
Trang 22knit framework of the Sangh Parivar, the BJP had a strong member network built up by
the RSS since the 1920s to tap into for support However, the BJP failed to make its mark
as a prominent political force until the late 1980s The reason for this delay lay in the lack
of an opportune political moment, which was created by the convergence of specific
socio-political conditions that provided the Sangh Parivar with an opportunity to
implement its strategy of ethno-religious mobilization and validate the notion of the
threatening ‘Other’.30 In particular, the ineptitude of the Congress in the 1970s and 80s31and the inability of the state to adapt its secular ideology to suit a changing social polity32resulted in the weakening of the secular principle and ‘legitimized’ the growth in support
for religious nationalism in the early 1990s
Much has been said on the BJP’s ability to capitalize on the shifting trends through the
Ramjanambhoomi movement It is important to note that apart from its larger
implications for Indian society and politics as a whole, the significance of the movement
lay in its ability to provide the BJP with an opportunity to reconcile its roles as both a
movement and a political party.33 However, the post-Ramjanambhoomi movement period brought to fore challenges that restricted the BJP’s rise and expansion, and more
importantly, put to test the resilience of the BJP’s commitment to the social agenda of the
Sangh Parivar As a result, the academic spotlight moved away from the dominant
discourse on the communal leanings of the party to an assessment of the manner in which
30
Jaffrelot, Christophe 1996 The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics, 1925 to the 1990s:
Strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilization London: Hurst & Company
31
Hasan, Zoya 1998 Quest for power: Oppositional movements and post-Congress politics in Uttar
Pradesh Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press
32
Nandy, Ashis 2002 Time warps: Silent and evasive pasts in Indian politics and religion London:
Hurst & Company
33
Basu, Amrita The dialectics of Hindu nationalism in Atul Kohli, ed 2001 The success of India’s
democracy New York: Cambridge University Press
Trang 23the BJP had accommodated itself within Indian politics and the factors that tested its
expansion
Given the instability of governance in the 1990s, reflected in the holding of four general
elections in quick succession in 1991, 1996, 1998 and 1999, much of the work on the BJP
from the mid 1990s onwards centered on a comparative analysis of the party’s strategies
and performance in the different sectors and states.34 When the BJP-led coalition emerged as the ruling alliance at the center in 1999, after a shaky term in power for one
year, the party seemed to have finally found its footing in the political scene However,
the unexpected defeat of the BJP-led NDA coalition in the 2004 general elections and the
re-emergence of the Congress gave rise to a new set of questions that aimed to better
understand whether the BJP’s failure was more the verdict of an electorate afflicted by an
anti-incumbency mood, or the end result of party’s inability to adapt to challenges and
changes at the national and regional levels.35
In the discussion above, a commonly referred to but relatively unexplored factor has been
the impact of the rise of caste politics and caste-based parties on the BJP’s strategy and
functioning Needless to say, extensive ground has been covered on the social and
34
Gould, Harold and Sumit Ganguly, eds 1993 India votes: Alliance politics and minority governments
in the ninth and tenth general elections Boulder: Westview Press; Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe
Jaffrelot, eds 1998 The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India New Delhi: Oxford University Press; Varshney, Ashutosh 1998 India’s 12th national elections New York: Asia Society; Roy, Ramashray and Paul Wallace, eds 1999 Indian politics and the 1998 election: Regionalism, Hindutva
and state politics New Delhi: Sage Publications; Roy, Ramashray and Paul Wallace, eds 2003 India’s
1999 elections and 20 th century politics Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications; Jenkins, Rob, ed 2004 Regional reflections: Comparing politics across India’s states New Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University
Press
35
Adeney, Katharine and Lawrence Saez eds 2005 Coalition politics and Hindu nationalism New York:
Routledge
Trang 24political significance of caste,36 the rise of caste-based parties, and their role in contemporary Indian politics.37 Furthermore, Froystad’s38 account of the shifts in the relationships between the different families in her study town of Kanpur in the state of
Uttar Pradesh provides an excellent account of the manner in which this change
manifested itself at the ground level However, these studies have focused largely on the
social and political processes that led to the rise of caste-based parties as a significant
force in the 1980s and the manner in which they have transformed contemporary Indian
politics They point to the fact that the significance of the rise of caste-based parties lay in
their ability to rephrase the demand for equality of opportunity and outcomes as one that
called for the redistribution of power and resources to the underprivileged sections of
society Needles to say, the change was a relatively subtle one, and the extent to which
caste had become ingrained in the socio-political psyche of the population became more
evident in the fallout over the implementations of the Mandal Commission’s
recommendations
As mentioned earlier, the BJP’s challenges came to fore only in the post-Mandal period
The Babri Masjid issue had lost its significance by the mid-1990s; the Hindutva
bandwagon could no longer rely on religion as the sole basis of its propaganda, and the
36
Rudolph, Lloyd I and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph 1967 The modernity of tradition: Political
development in India Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Bayly, Susan 1999 Caste, society and politics in India from the eighteenth century to the modern age New York: Cambridge University Press;
Gupta, Dipankar 2000 Interrogating caste: Understanding hierarchy and difference in Indian society New Delhi; New York: Penguin Books; Shah, Ghanshyam ed 2004 Caste and Democratic Politics in
India London: Anthem
37
Hasan, Zoya 1998 Quest for power: Oppositional movements and post-Congress politics in Uttar
Pradesh Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press; Pai, Sudha 2002 Dalit assertion and the unfinished democratic revolution: The Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications;
Chandra, Kanchan 2004 Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic head counts in India
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press
38
Froystad, Kathinka 2005 Blended boundaries: caste, class, and shifting faces of 'Hinduness' in a
north Indian city Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press
Trang 25party leadership was faced with the need to find new means of integrating their ideology
within the larger political discourse Given the BJP’s lack of support in terms of alliance
partners at the centre and the restricted appeal of its ideology at the ground level, the
choice of maintaining its ideological stringency and rejecting co-option with caste-based
parties was a difficult choice to make The need to form alliances with caste-based parties
was further pressed by the fact that caste-based parties had been aided by the growing
regionalization of politics and the resultant decentralization of power, and emerged as the
power brokers at the state level However, the process of forming and maintaining such
alliances, and the larger challenge of integrating the issue of caste within the Hindu
nationalist framework proved to be a far bigger challenge for the BJP than expected
Despite the vast literature on Hindu nationalism and caste, there is a lacuna in the
analysis on the manner in which the trajectories of caste and Hindu nationalism have
interacted, and the extent to which caste has come to affect the progress of the BJP, and
the character of Hindu nationalism Primarily, the discourse has centered on the
discrepancy between the upper-caste nature of the BJP’s character and composition, and
the leadership’s efforts to present it as a ‘catch-all’ party, in much the same mould as the
Congress, to gain popular acceptance Nevertheless, much of the discussion has been
situated within the larger discourse of the Sangh Parivar’s efforts to ‘integrate’ the lower
castes within the Hindu fold, and hence, place greater emphasis on the ideological and
social initiatives of the Sangh Parivar as a whole In other words, there is relatively little
detail on the effects of the intricacies of political negotiation on the BJP’s rank and file on
the one hand, and the manner in which its character and functioning have been affected
Trang 26these changes Focus on these issues is crucial to understanding the ideological and
identity-based challenges faced by the party, which in turn point to the larger question of
whether or not Hindutva has indeed managed to gain acceptance as an ideology of
pan-Indian significance Yet, given the concentration of RSS members and alumni within the
BJP’s hierarchy and the strong ties between the two organizations, the challenges and
issues specific to the BJP as a political party are oftentimes underplayed in light of the
larger social and ideological perspectives
Chapter descriptions
This thesis aims to address this concern by taking up the relationship between the BJP
and caste-based parties, with emphasis on three specific dimensions of analysis: firstly,
the manner in which relations with caste-based parties affected the party’s functioning at
the state level; secondly, the effects of caste politics on the internal ranks of the BJP; and
finally, the impact of these factors on the resilience of Hindutva and the extent to which
the party has been effective in handling this challenge Hence, the analysis is centered on
key issues that affected the party’s functioning and the leadership’s response to these
developments, with the discussion based on a chronological order of events from the
party’s inception in 1980 to the latest general elections in 2004 Whilst it is very difficult
to view the BJP in isolation from the workings of the RSS and other components of the
Sangh Parivar, effort has been made to shed light on the ‘political’ pressures and issues
that affect the party’s structure and functioning
Trang 27Chapter 2 takes up the progress of the BJP through the 1980s up to the early 1990s when
the BJP could finally lay claim to the political spotlight A closer look at some of the
developments through the passage of the 1980s helps to highlight key socio-political
vulnerabilities that resulted from the decline of the Congress, which were instrumental to
the resurgence of Hindu nationalism; selfsame processes that also functioned as a catalyst
for the deepening of caste boundaries and the rise of caste-based parties It also examines
the inherent tensions between caste and Hindu nationalism that came to light with the
fallout over the Mandal issues, but were undermined by the progress of the
Ramjanambhoomi movement
Chapter 3 picks up the thread of the discourse at the point immediately preceding the
1991 elections and traces the development of the BJP through the 1990s, with the
impetus resting on an analysis of the main challenges faced by the BJP in its attempt to
adapt to the constraints of caste and coalition politics Consciousness of caste coupled
with the limitations imposed by the RSS’s organicist philosophy was instrumental in
reshaping the character of the BJP The impact of these factors on the party’s strategy and
functioning, and the depth of these changes helps to better understand the multi-faceted
nature of the caste challenge, and the BJP’s calibre in handling it
To better illustrate the nature of these challenges, chapter 4 takes up a case study of the
BJP’s career in the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) Regarded as the barometer of politics in
the Hindi belt, UP was central to the Ramjanambhoomi movement and the rise of
caste-based parties The case study helps to elaborate the difficulties faced by the BJP in its
Trang 28attempt to formulae a coherent strategy to suit the demands of multiple caste bases, and
the difficulty in internalising caste divisions completely within a party structure
traditionally indoctrinated with the organicist philosophy of the RSS
The concluding chapter traces the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance’s dismal
performance in the 2004 elections and its implications for the BJP’s progress in the
coming years In particular, it takes up the retrospective view and highlights the BJP’s
struggle with the need to maintain a balance of support bases whilst retaining its
distinctiveness – a tough challenge that was accentuated by the constant need to sustain a
harmony of interests with the RSS This chapter thus provides a brief account of the key
facets of the party’s strategy through the 1990s, the manner in which the BJP has
‘matured’ over the years and the extent to which it has managed to ascertain its identity in
the political sphere, ending with a comment on its future prospects
Trang 29Chapter 2: The Sangh Parivar and the Revival of Hindu Nationalism
The Bharatiya Janata Party and the ‘new’ face of Hindutva
The Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS), formed in 1951, was the first step of Hindu nationalists’
involvement in post-independence Indian politics The BJS was formed primarily as an
anti-Congress alternative that sought to reinforce a pro-Hindu, pro-Hindi perspective on
Indian politics Throughout its career, the party remained a largely marginal player,
despite its one shot at power with the Janata coalition after the 1977 elections However,
the inability to balance the different voices within the coalition led to the collapse of the
Janata experiment within 30 months, following which the BJS was disbanded, and
reorganised as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980
The BJP’s entry into the political foray was marked by two significant factors Firstly, its
predecessor had left behind little by way of a coherent political legacy for the party to
follow To a great extent, the BJS had oscillated between a strident Hindu nationalist
stance, and a moderate position that was geared towards socio-economic issues Over
time, the party’s reliance on the RSS for physical and moral support made the choice of
adopting a liberal tone a difficult one, and the leadership started “showing an increasing
tendency to choose isolation and doctrinal purity”39 typified by the combination of puritan leanings with a call to Hindu unity, as was made explicit in the BJS’s manifesto:
39
Graham, Bruce Desmond Hindu nationalism and Indian politics: The origins and development of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press 1990 p 42
Trang 30Unity in diversity has been the characteristic feature of Bharatiya culture
which is a synthesis of different regional, local and tribal growths, natural
in such a country It has never been tied to the strings of any particular
dogma or creed All the creeds that form the commonwealth of the
Bharatiya Rashtra have their share in the stream of Bharatiya culture
which has flown down from the Vedas in an unbroken continuity
absorbing and assimilating contributions made by different peoples, creeds
and cultures that came in touch with it in the course of history, in such a
way as to make them an indistinguishable part and parcel of the main
current.40
It must be noted though that the BJS consistently refrained from alluding to a particular
sect, caste or even book, in line with its aim to “offer a notion of Hinduism as a means of
transcending the limitations of sect and of achieving the ultimate ideal of Hindu
Sangathan”.41 However, adherence to the organicist nature of the Hindu community coloured the party’s ideology with a ‘Brahminical’ hue that implicitly seemed to
encourage the acceptance of the traditional social hierarchy As a result, the BJS’s
support base was restricted to the upper caste and urban middle class sections, making it
difficult for the party to stretch its political appeal to encompass a wider spectrum of
population even within the Hindi belt This limitation was to prove the dead albatross
Trang 31around the BJP’s neck in later years, especially in lieu of the compulsions of caste
politics, when the party finally found its momentum in Indian politics
Yet, the BJS’s failure to emerge as a viable competitor was not a result of the party’s
structural or ideological shortcomings alone Rather, it was compounded by the
Congress’s status as the political guardian for the umbrella amalgam of upper castes,
lower castes and Muslims in the post-independence period The Congress’s ability to
forge the loyalties of the disparate groups derived largely from the party’s ability to
position itself within the electorate such that it maintained a balance between elite
representation and popular appeal
The classical Congress structure of the Nehruvian period was an intricate
institutional mechanism negotiating power, resources, and mandates
among districts and between the states and the center, distributing fiscal
resources and arbiting social and political conflicts Its resilience was
premised on the inclusion of most important elite groups within a structure
of negotiation, bargaining, and aggregation of the discrete powers and
constituencies of local elites upward to the center.42
It is important to note that the Congress’s maintenance of a rainbow coalition of castes
and communities did not translate to equal political representation for the different groups
within the party structure or government The party’s higher ranks were dominated by
42
Hansen, Thomas Blom The saffron wave: Democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1999 p 135 (Emphasis added)
Trang 32members of the upper castes with little opportunity provided to members of the lower
castes, in tandem with the Congress’s reliance on a network of upper-caste notables and
landlords for electoral support
The Congress’s ability to maintain a monopoly over much of the electorate, despite the
lack of a corresponding programme that benefited all sections equally led to the
establishment of a system that relied on the support of loosely demarcated socio-political
segments, all of which relied on a single political party as their representative As
Graham has noted, “The central paradox of Indian politics in the 1950s and 1960s [was]
that the party system, although highly differentiated in terms of programmes and
doctrines, was unable to organize the mass electorate into clearly defined and separated
sectors of social and regional support”.43 The deficiency of opposing forces that could capitalise on the disparity between rhetoric and reality in the Congress’s policies was a
central reason behind the ability of the latter to maintain electoral harmony between the
different social segments in popular politics in the 1950s and 60s The breakdown of this
idyllic balance was the second important factor that was to affect the BJP’s rise and
growth in the 1980s and 90s
Revival of religion and nationalism in the 1980s
The early years of the BJP’s career, from the early to mid-1980s, were influenced by
different undercurrents of change, the conjunction of which created a volatile
43
Graham Hindu nationalism and Indian politics p 53
Trang 33atmosphere At the national level, the proliferation of communal sentiments by ethnic
factions in Jammu and Kashmir, Assam and Punjab raised doubts over the legitimacy of
secularism as the governing policy, and led to the re-emergence of communal politics in
the Indian nation state The growing presence of conditions conducive to the propagation
of religious majoritarianism apart, the Congress’s conscious departure from its
commitment to Nehruvian secularism to regain its waning popularity was a key factor in
instigating a turnaround in the priorities of political competition and governance The
Congress essentially relied on a “…combination of contradictory elements for it appealed
alternatively to Hindu, Muslim or anti-Sikh feelings However its general effect was the
establishment of communal idioms in political discourse at the expense of secular
themes”.44 After decades of being confined to the margins of the Indian polity, Hindu nationalists found that the stage was set for them to legitimately embark on their long-
standing ethno-religious program of creating a Hindu rashtra (Hindu nation)
The Sangh Parivar was quick to take advantage of the Congress’s inability to uphold its
secular agenda to set in place a concerted strategy, at the heart of which was the attempt
to posit the genesis of the Hindus’ real and perceived insecurities vis-à-vis the Muslim
community This was to act as a corollary to the primary aim of disseminating the
message of Hindu sangathan, or organised Hindu unity, as embodied in the Ekmata Yatra
campaigns organised by the VHP in 1982-83.45 The Ekmata Yatra campaigns incorporated the image of the Bharat Mata (Mother India) as their main icon alongside
44
Jaffrelot, Christophe The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies
of identity-building, implantation and mobilization London: Hurst & Company 1996 p 332
45
Hansen The saffron wave p 154
Trang 34other Hindu deities, and were organised to run from north to south and east to west to
symbolically depict the internal harmony within the territorial boundaries of India
Essentially, the VHP and RSS were making a strong “bid to dominate the public space
with symbolic manifestations of religious community in order to give material body,
concrete crystallisation, and emotional affiliation to the imaginary national space”,46 and
in doing so, attempted to present Hindu nationalism “as a spontaneous surge of Hindus
irrespective of caste, class, gender and sect”.47 The Sangh Parivar’s campaign was well timed as the 1980s had witnessed a growing sense of vulnerability amongst the Hindu
community on account of events such as the Meenakshipuram conversions in south India
in 1981, and the Shah Bano case in 1985
The Meenakshipuram conversions were a case in point wherein analogous socio-political
grievances were situated within the dominant communal discourse to bolster its popular
appeal On 19 February 1981, about 1,000 members of Scheduled Castes converted to
Islam in the village of Meenakshipuram, in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu.48Interestingly, the conversions were timed to precede the laying of the foundation stone
for a mosque in the village in early March The Meenakshipuram incident acted as a
catalyst for further such conversions in the following months, thus sparking off
widespread debate over the issues of caste and proselytisation It is noteworthy that the
main justification given for the conversion by those who had embraced Islam was the
social stigma of being born into a lower caste Amongst those who had converted, some
Trang 35were educated and economically mobile, but chose to convert to another religion to
escape the brunt of caste discrimination
The Meenakshipuram conversions became notoriously popular because they were
reinterpreted by sections of the media as part of an “International Islamic conspiracy”49 to increase the demographic presence of Muslims in India through proselytisation.50 This gave rise to a host of doubts including the nature and extent of involvement of
organisations like the Jamaat-i-Islami and Arab countries in this ‘plan’, and the resultant
possibility of the Hindu community diminishing over time – all of which contributed to a
heightened sense of susceptibility on the part of the Hindu community to external
‘threats’ In an attempt to reinforce the message, an article in the Indian Express
published statistics that predicted the decline of the Hindu population to a minority
position in India by the year 2281 or 2231 if the conversions were allowed to continue.51
The anxiety over religious encroachment provided an ideal context for the Sangh Parivar
to resound its call for a united Hindu society By making it apparent that lower castes
were most susceptible to proselytisation, the Meenakshipuram incident had brought up
the need to address the issue of caste discrimination as well As Mahant Avaidyanath, a
prominent BJP candidate from eastern U.P pointed out, there had been an underlying
Trang 36concern that the trend of lower caste conversion might mushroom in north India as well.52
In response, the executive wing of the RSS called for a meeting on 12 July 1981 to vote
for a law against involuntary conversions In the course of the meeting, the RSS pressed
the need for internal transformation by asking “…the entire Hindu society to bury deep
the internal caste dissensions and the pernicious practice of untouchability and stand up
as one single homogenous family, so that the neglected and down-trodden sections will
be assured of a place of equality, security and honour in the Hindu fold”.53
Two days later, a Hindu Solidarity Conference was organised by the VHP at
Meenakshipuram A proclamation, similar to that of the RSS, but grounded in strong
theological terms, was made:
We, the religious heads assembled today at Meenakshipuram solemnly
declare that our Vedas and Shastras have not mentioned untouchability in
any form, anywhere but have propounded only complete brotherhood […]
We therefore ardently appeal to all our Hindu brethren to individually and
collectively throw out these evils lock, stock and barrel and strive to
ensure equality and fraternity among all sections of our Hindu people.54
A series of such Solidarity conferences were organised in the south, and then later in
other parts of India, in order to increase awareness of the dangers of proselytisation and
52
Avaidyanath’s comments on the Meenakshipuram incident were recorded in an interview regarding the
hardline Hindu stance at a later date See Joshi, Ishan “Beating Vajpayee to pulp” Outlook Feb 18 1998
Trang 37the need for Hindu cohesion to guard against the same.55 Symbolic socio-religious practices were integrated within the conferences to reinforce the message of inter-caste
solidarity For example, in one of the conferences, religious leaders organised a sacrifice
ceremony and held a banquet after, during which they shared a meal with 2,000 people
from the Scheduled Castes.56 The aim was to present a complete socio-political
‘package’, which illustrated the socio-theological basis of a traditionalist Hindu society
that could overcome the presence of internal differences for the greater goal of defending
against ‘external’ elements
The Sangh Parivar’s attempt to encourage an inclusive Hindu brotherhood also received a
strong boost from the perceived unanimity of Muslim conservatism over the Shah Bano
case Shah Bano was a Muslim woman who was divorced by her husband in 1978 after
46 years of marriage Following her divorce, she sued her husband and established her
right to alimony In 1980, she demanded a review of her allowance, which was contested
by her former husband on grounds that he was not obliged to continue payment after 3
months following divorce according to the Shariat law The Supreme Court dismissed his
claim and established Shah Bano’s right to alimony The Supreme Court’s decision to
dismiss the claim based on Shariat and the judges’ regret over the lack of a common civil
code was regarded by Muslim organisations and leaders as interference with religious
edicts, leading to widespread rallies and protests across India
Trang 38Public remonstrations over the Shah Bano affair were viewed by the Hindus as an unfair
assertion of minority rights – a sentiment further stoked by Rajiv Gandhi’s decision to
override the Supreme Court’s verdict to appease the Muslim population Popular
resentment against the Congress’s ineffective handling of the case, coupled with
mounting apprehension over the ‘unity’ of the Muslim community, deepened social
cleavages and made the Hindu populace more receptive to the communal undertone of
Hindutva The Shah Bano case had exposed a key deficiency of the ‘secular’ Indian
constitution, a side effect of which was the raking up of dormant fears generated by the
Meenakshipuram conversions In brief, “Muslim mobilisation over the ‘Shah Bano’ affair
was seen…as part of the same pattern as an earlier renewal of Islamic militancy”.57
The early to mid-1980s were thus marked by a growing tendency towards communal
mobilisation – an important factor that enabled the Sangh Parivar to garner support for its
majoritarian Hindu agenda In contrast to its surrogate organisations’ active efforts,
however, the BJP chose to maintain a low profile in the early 1980s and voted to continue
with the moderate policy of the Jan Sangh, based on Integral Humanism and peppered
with socio-economic concerns The BJP’s decision to tone down its majoritarian rhetoric
was probably based on the experience of the 1977 elections, when the BJS had managed
to accumulate 92 seats by pedalling a ‘soft’ form of Hindutva Nevertheless, the decision
proved costly for the BJP, especially in lieu of the growing communal sensitivity, and the
party suffered a humiliating defeat in the 1984 general elections when it scraped a tally of
57
Jaffrelot The Hindu nationalist movement pp 338-339
Trang 39just 2 seats Following the 1984 elections, the BJP bowed to pressure from the RSS and
steered its agenda towards an aggressive Hindu nationalist stand
Despite the lack of electoral returns, the Sangh Parivar’s efforts were instrumental in
effecting a perceptible shift towards religious majoritarianism, especially in the Hindi
belt However, although the Hindu nationalists were able to propagate their political
ideology in the public arena, they failed to foster a mutual identity that could bond the
disparate Hindu sections under the umbrella of religious solidarity This was on account
of the continued dependence on the rhetoric of the “Other” and Hindu-Muslim
antagonism, the constricted focus of which was challenged by the rise of an alternative
form of representative politics based on caste in the mid to late 1980s
Caste – The regional barometer of north India
Caste politics in the north experienced a delayed thrust when compared to the south,
which had seen the entry of the lower castes in the state power structure as early as the
1950s The increased demographic presence of upper castes and the Zamindari system of
land ownership in north India were some of the main reasons behind the political
suppression of lower castes Furthermore, the ‘clientelistic’ policies of the Congress
resulted in an overrepresentation of upper-caste members in the parliament till the early
1970s, thereby prolonging the political suppression of the lower castes.58 The roots of lower-caste empowerment in the north lay in two broad movements In the 1960s, Ram
58
Jaffrelot, Christophe “The rise of the Other Backward Classes in the Hindi belt” in The Journal of Asian Studies Vol 59, No 1 Feb 2000 p 86
Trang 40Manohar Lohia’s socialist principles, housed in an anti-Congress manifesto began to gain
importance in the Hindi belt, especially amongst the backward sections of the population
The socialist principles were reinforced by capitalist developments in this region in the
1970s, following the advent of the Green Revolution, which led to the strengthening of
the farmers’ lobby in Uttar Pradesh (UP)
The beneficiaries of the Green Revolution were constituted mainly of members of middle
and backward castes, who increasingly began to press for greater political participation
alongside their newfound economic mobility The need to fulfil the void created by a lack
of access to power and party positions formed the central premise of Charan Singh’s
demand for greater benefits and power to be channelled to the farmers.59 Whilst both Lohia and Singh represented different strands of anti-Congress politics, it was evident
that regional politics was witnessing a deeper change In effect,
Social change arising from the breakdown of traditional pre-capitalist
relation exerted a major influence on political development The
expansion of democracy and electoral politics attracted non-elite sections
who desired greater participation…Both processes played a key role in
political transformation The pattern of vertical relationships and political
aggregation gave way to more horizontal relationships and conflicts…”60
59
Hasan, Zoya Quest for power: Oppositional movements and post-Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press 1998 See also, Jaffrelot, Christophe India’s silent revolution: Yhe rise of the lower castes in north India London: Hurst & Company 2003
60
Hasan Quest for power p 70